INJUNCTION CASE2.docx

7/23/2019 INJUNCTION CASE2.docx

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[G.R. No. L-30070. August 29, 1980.]

FEDERICO DECANO,Petitioner-Appellee, v. ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of

Land Transportation and CIPRIANO POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land

Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency,Respondents-Appellants.

FACTS:

the then Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico Decano, herein

petitioner-appellee, a temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office 1

, Dagupan City Agency. The appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil

Service, the said appointee assumed office and he served therein for almost four years, when herein

respondent-appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission,

Dagupan City, received a telegram from respondent-appellant Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as

Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decanos)

services effective as of the close of business on that day.

the aggrieved petitioner-appellee died before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for

"Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without

power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service, and therefore praying of the

court to declare as null and void the order for his removal, to declare him entitled to the position, to

compel his reinstatement and payment of his regular salary, and to enjoin, preliminary, and then

permanently, respondents from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting him from his position as

janitor.

As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court at the commencement of

the proceedings commanding respondents "to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or

otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor in the Land Transportation

Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date

of notice of said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court."cralaw virtua1aw

library

After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioners appointment as janitor was

temporary and therefore the latter could be ousted from his position at any time with or without

cause, the lower court nevertheless declared in its judgment that petitioners removal was null and

void upon the ground that under the law, respondent Commissioner of Land Transportation was not

the appointing authority insofar as the position of petitioner and all other minor positions in his

office were concerned; and thus lacking the power of appointment, said respondent had neither the

power of removal.

ISSUE:

HELD:

In seeking reversal of the trial courts decision, respondents make capital of the fact that the petition

for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while

respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they claim, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction

of the said court. Respondents cite the long line of cases from the 1960 case of Acosta v. Alvendia 8

where this Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4,

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and/or section 2 of Rule 58, ruled that a court of first instance has no

jurisdiction to require or control the execution of an act committed beyond the limits of its territorial


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jurisdiction.These cases invariably involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to

control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

respondent courts of first instance where said petitions had been filed. TheAcosta ruling of

non-jurisdiction does not apply, however, to the facts and circumstances at bar.

Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu,

mandamus and injunction being then merely corollary remedies to the main relief sought, and what

is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the

implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal

was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate

officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as

respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the services of respondent was a fait accompli

and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The injunction is question,

consequently, must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edus order by his

co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial

courts jurisdictional district.

Thus, in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligaen, Et Al., 9 in which the acts sought

to be controlled by "Injunction with Preliminary Injunction" were relative to the establishment of a

local telephone system being done within the territorial boundaries of the judicial district of the

Court of First Instance of Roxas, the Court similarly upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of First

Instance of Roxas over the petition, although two of the respondents named therein the Director

of the Bureau of Telecommunications, and the Regional Superintendent of Region IV of the Bureau

of Telecommunications had their official stations at Manila and Iloilo City, respectively, as

follows:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

". . . In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a local telephone system bypetitioners were being done within the territorial boundaries of the province or district of

respondent Court, and so said Court had jurisdiction to restrain them by injunction. It does not

matter that some of the respondents in the trial court, against whom the injunction order was

issued, had their official residence outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. In the case of

Gonzales v. Secretary of Public Works, Et Al., (G.R. No. L-21988, September 30, 1966, 18 SCRA

296), wherein the only question raised was whether the Court of First Instance of Davao had

jurisdiction to entertain a case the main purpose of which was to prevent the enforcement of a

decision of the Secretary of Public Works who was in Manila this Court held that, inasmuch as the

acts sought to be restrained were to be performed within the territorial boundaries of the province of

Davao, the Court of First Instance of Davao had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and to

issue the necessary injunction order. This Gonzales case was an action forcertiorariand prohibitionwith preliminary injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent the demolition of

Gonzales dam in Davao in compliance with the order of the Secretary of Public Works.

"It follows, therefore, that since the acts to be restrained were being done in Roxas City, or within

the territorial jurisdiction of respondent court, the latter had jurisdiction to restrain said acts even if

the office of respondent Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications is in Manila, and that of

respondent Regional Superintendent of Region IV is in Iloilo City."cralaw virtua1aw library

As in the above cited case of Aligaen, the national official stationed at Quezon City, namely,

respondent Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as respondent in the Pangasinan court for a complete

determination of the issues involved, the legality of Edus order of dismissal being the pivotal issue


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to determine the merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In other words Mr.

Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes but mainly for testing the legality of his

dismissal order and his transmittal thereof to his co-respondent registrar at Dagupan City to

implement the same and terminate the services of the petitioner in Dagupan City.chanrobles

lawlibrary : rednad

"The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable, in that those

cases involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers

outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved. Here the sole point in issue is

whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and without going

into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be

confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are

maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs

reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced.

"It is easy to see that if the contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the same would resultnot only in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting to denial of access to the

courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are already over-

burdened. Actually, since Ortua v. Singson, 59 Phil. 440, the power of provincial courts of first

instance to review administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently recognized.

"While the petitioner herein also prayed that the land authorities be ordered to reinstate her

original application, such remedy is purely a corollary to the main relief sought; for, as the

allegations now stand, reversal of the questioned administrative decision would necessarily lead to

the same result."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondents finally raise a technical point referring to the allegedly defective verification of thepetition filed in the trial court, contending that the clause in the verification statement "that I have

read the contents of the said petition; and that [to] the best of my knowledge are true and correct" is

insufficient since under section 6 of Rule 7, 11 it is required that the person verifying must have read

the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge. We do not see any

reason for rendering the said verification void. The statement to the best of my knowledge are true

and correct" referring to the allegations in the petition does not mean mere "knowledge, information

and belief." It constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement of section 6 of Rule 7, as held

in Madrigal vs, Rodas. 12 At any rate, this petty technicality deserves scant consideration where the

question at issue is one purely of law and there is no need of delving into the veracity of the

allegations in the petition, which are not disputed at all by respondents. As we have held time and

again, imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure are to be disregarded except wheresubstantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.


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[G.R. No. L-34761. January 17, 1974.]

CHAN BROS., INCORPORATED,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA

INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS, commonly known

as FOITAF & FREE DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNION, LIWAYWAY GAUGAU,Defendants-

Appellants.

FACTS:

This appeal on questions of law from a court of first instance decision enjoining acts of illegalpicketing and holding liable for damages Defendant Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y

Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas and its co-defendant, Free Democratic Labor Union, Liwayway

Gaugau, is primarily based on the legal proposition that in an unfair labor practice case, including

other incidents interwoven with it, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is exclusive.

Considering its indisputable character, it thus appears that this is one of those suits that a lower

court, if sufficiently mindful of the authoritative and controlling precedents, could have readily

disposed of. For notwithstanding its attention being called to the existence of a labor dispute and the

reminder that it was the labor court that had jurisdiction over the matter, it refused to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction the complaint for injunction and damages for illegal picketing. As a result, there

was added to its docket another action which need not have clogged it. What is worse, there was

imposed on this Tribunal an unnecessary burden involving expenditure of time and energy to pass


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upon the appeal. It is fortunate that the absence of jurisdiction is quite apparent, thus entailing a

minimum of effort. We reverse.

In the very complaint, after referring to the formation of "picket lines in [its] compound and

premises . . .," 1 plaintiff continued: "That the aforesaid picket line formed by and under instigationof defendants, [is] mainly and solely directed against the Liwayway Gaugau & Coffee Repacking, an

entity whose offices and factory are likewise located in the same premises as the herein-plaintiff

corporation; . . .," 2 It is true it denied its connection with the Liwayway Gaugau and Coffee

Repacking firm with which it was admitted there was a labor controversy, with pending unfair labor

practice cases in the Court of Industrial Relations, but the motion to dismiss predicated on the lack

of jurisdiction of the lower court presented a more accurate version of the matter. Thus: "It is clear

on the face of the plaintiffs Complaint that there exist . . . labor dispute[s] between the herein

plaintiff (as branch and/or sister factory) of the Liwayway Gaugau and Coffee Repacking) and the

defendants which resulted in the strike referred to by plaintiff in paragraph 4 of its Complaint.

Some of these disputes are still pending resolution [in] the Court of Industrial Relations while some

have not reached [a court] of justice. The above-mentioned strike was declared and staged by thedefendant [unions] only because [their] members could no longer endure the ordeal, oppression and

unfair labor practice being committed by the plaintiff. . . . In other words such strike is the

outgrowth and extension of the long standing industrial disputes between the parties herein." 3 To

sustain its plea, defendant Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera referred to the applicable

cases of SMB Box Factory Workers Union v. Victoriano, 4 Consolidated Labor Asso. v. Caluag, 5

Erlanger and Galinger, lnc. v. Erlanger and Galinger Employees Asso., 6 and Associated Labor

Union v. Rodriguez. 7

As stated at the outset, the lower court, instead of passing on the merits of the controversy and

ruling against defendant labor-unions which in addition to being enjoined were held liable in

damages, ought to have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

1. The latest case in point, decided on September 13, 1972, with Justice Antonio as ponente,

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Quicho, 8 categorically affirms "that a complaint for

injunction does not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance where the issue

involved is interwoven with an unfair labor practice case pending before the Court of Industrial

Relations, even if such case involves acts of violence, intimidation or coercion." 9 A rather extended

discussion of the above principle is found in one of the decisions called to the attention of the lower

court, Consolidated Labor Association of the the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion. Thus:

"Pursuant to section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 875, the Court of Industrial Relations shall have

jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent any person

from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected byany other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement,

code, Philippines v. Caluag. 10 The opinion therein was penned by law or otherwise,. . . Construing

this provision, in relation to section 9 of the same Act, regulating the issuance of injunctions in labor

disputes, we have repeatedly held that courts of first instance may not enjoin the picketing staged in

connection with such disputes, and that the jurisdiction to entertain a petition to enjoin said

picketing and to issue the corresponding writ of injunction is vested exclusively in the Court of

Industrial Relations, if charges of unfair labor practice, in relation to said labor disputes, are

pending before the latter court prior to the filing of said petition. Thus, in National Garments and

Textiles Workers Union [Paflu] (Premier Shirts and Pants Factory Chapter) v. Hon. Hermogenes

Caluag, Et Al., L-9104 (September 10, 1956) we said: . . . But, as the record discloses, this labor

dispute is already involved in the two unfair labor cases that were then pending between the same


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parties before the Court of Industrial Relations which were instituted much ahead in time than the

instant case. The Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, had already acquired jurisdiction over this

labor dispute when the instant case was instituted, which jurisdiction concerning as it does an

unfair practice, is exclusive of that court (Section 5 [a], Republic Act 875). The language used in

Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul, Et. Al. v. Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, L-9290 (January 14, 1958)was: It appearing that in addition to the labor dispute involved herein there were other labor cases

pending between the same parties before the Court of Industrial Relations which had been

instituted prior to the filing of the present case, among them Case No. 548-ULP which involved an

unfair labor practice, it was declared that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to try the instant case

for the same is already involved in those cases which had been submitted to the industrial court for

adjudication. This step is necessary in order to avoid multiplicity of actions. If the purpose of the

action is to obtain some injunctive relief against certain acts of violence of the laborers, the same

can be obtained from the industrial court which is given ample power to act thereon by the Magna

Carta. Verily, the court a quo acted without jurisdiction in the case.. . . We even declared, that when

the acts against which the injunction was obtained constitute unfair labor practices, the application

for injunction would be exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations and beyond thejurisdiction of the . . . Court of First Instance, even if no complaint for unfair labor practice had been

filed, as yet, with the Court of Industrial Relations (Reyes, Et. Al. v. Tan, et al, 99 Phil. 880; 52 Off.

Gaz., [14], 6187)." 11 Nor is the reason for the doctrine difficult to discern. As was succinctly

explained by Justice J. B. L. Reyes, speaking for the Court in Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. v. Erlanger

and Galinger Employees Association, 12 likewise cited in the motion to dismiss of defendants: "The

reason for such exclusive jurisdiction is obvious. Since the picketing and strikes may be mere

incidents or consequences of the unfair labor practice, it is but proper that the issuance of injunction

be made by the court having jurisdiction over the main case, in order that the writ be issued upon

cognizance of all revelant facts." 13 Considering that even in the case of a declaratory relief

regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, it was held by this Court in a

1972 decision, Philippine-American Management & Financing Company, Inc. v. Management &Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co,. Inc., 14 that

such power may be exercised by the Court of Industrial Relations, the proposition that the lower

court was devoid of jurisdiction appears to be incontestable. For as therein pointed out:

"Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and

unequivocally, the choice should fall on the Court of Industrial Relations." 15

It is crystal-clear then that the lower court erred in not dismissing the case.

2. Then there is the matter of picketing. Time and time again, this Court has stressed that peaceful

picketing is a constitutional right 16 embraced in the guarantee of freedom of expression. It is true

that it loses its character as such where acts of violence and intimidation are employed. It isunderstandable why it should be thus. For thereby it has been transformed from an appeal for

public support through publicizing the facts of a labor dispute to the commission of anti-social acts

that have no place under a rule of law. Nonetheless, as was made clear by this Tribunal in two

recent cases, 17 it would be inimical to the labor movement fostered by the fundamental law itself 18

if, as it did happen here, efforts of defendant-unions to protect themselves through picketing would

have been rendered nugatory not because acts of violence or intimidation were proscribed, which, if

the matter were within the jurisdiction of the lower court was something fitting and proper, but

because of the seeming ease with which it would hold liable for damages such labor organizations.

For the premise appears to be lack of sympathy for picketing as such. What is more, if a halt is not

called to a propensity to impose pecuniary liability, it is easy to discern the deleterious effects on the

labor union finances, on the whole far from healthy but instead rather anemic. It would appear,


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therefore, that even on the assumption that the lower court was possessed of jurisdiction, which it

was not, there was legitimate cause for an appeal as it was less than responsive to the plain dictates

not only of the controlling statutory provisions but also of the requirements of the Constitution.

3. Lastly, it may be observed that the failure of plaintiff as appellee to file a brief must have beencaused by the realization that this appeal was indeed meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of October 31, 1967 is reversed. Costs against plaintiff.


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[G.R. No. L-17605. January 22, 1964.]

POBLETE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and DOMINGO POBLETE,Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and JUDITH ASIAIN,Defendants-Appellees.

Placido C. Ramos, forPlaintiffs-Appellants.

1. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION; QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS. The Social Security

Commission, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Public Service Commission and

the Courts of First Instance.

2. ID.; ID.; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH INJUNCTION AGAINST THE SOCIAL SECURITY

COMMISSION. As the writs of Injunction,Certiorariand Prohibition may be issued only by a

superior court against an inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions, and as the

Social Security Commission, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Courts of First

Instance, it is held that the Court of First Instance in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to entertain

the petition forcertiorarifiled against the aforesaid Commission.

FACTS:

Poblete Construction Co. and Domingo Poblete, its president and general manager, appeal from the

order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing an action forcertiorariagainst the Social

Security Commission hereinafter referred to as the Commission and Judith Asiain and

dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.

In a petition filed with the Social Security Commission Judith Asiain sought to recover from

appellants the death benefits she would have been entitled to receive from the Social Security

System had appellants the employers of her husband reported him to the System for coverage

prior to his death, as required by law.

Appellants motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction

over the case, as appellees husband was not covered by the System, was denied and the Commission

required appellants to answer the claim. Not having done so, the Commission upon motion of

appellee entered an order of default and set the date for the reception of appellees evidence. In view

thereof, appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition forcertiorariwith

injunction to enjoin the Commission from further proceedings in said case. The Court issued a writ

of preliminary injunction restraining the Commission from proceeding with the case pending final

determination of the action forcertiorari.

Instead of filing an answer to the petition forcertiorari, appellees moved to dismiss the case on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. Over appellants opposition, the lower court


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issued the order appealed from.

Appellants now claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the case and in not ruling, after trial,

that the Social Security Commission has no jurisdiction to try and decide the petition filed with it by

Judith Asiain and her minor children, the subject matter of which should have been submitted in anordinary civil action before the regular courts.

We find the present appeal to be without merit.

In taking cognizance of the petition filed by Judith Asiain (Case No. 78),the Social Security

Commission was exercising its quasi-judicial powersgranted by Section 5 (a) of Republic Act

No. 1161, as amended. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claim aforementioned was

not within the jurisdiction of the Commission, and that it would be proper to issue a writ

ofcertiorarior injunction to restrain it from hearing and deciding the same, a Court of First

Instance has no jurisdiction to issue either of said writs against the Commission. It must be

observed that in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (c) of Republic ActNo. 1161, as amended, the decisions of said Commission are reviewable both upon law and facts by

the Court of Appeals, and that if the appeal from its decision is only on questions of law, the review

shall be made by Us. It is clear from these provisions that the Commission, in exercising its quasi-

judicial powers, ranks with the Public Service Commission and the Courts of First Instance. As the

writs of Injunction,Certiorariand Prohibition may be issued only by a superior court against an

inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions, it necessarily follows that the Court of

First Instance of Rizal, where appellants filed their petition forcertiorari, had no jurisdiction to

entertain the same.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.


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G.R. No. L-15350 November 30, 1962

MARIANO G. PINEDA, ARCADIO E. YABYABIN and MAXIMINO PIZARRO,petitioners,

vs.

HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and J. AMADO ARANETA,respondents.

This case raises a question of law heretofore undecided by this Court, to wit:

MAY A COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ENJOIN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION?

FACTS

petitioner Mariano Pineda, in his official capacity as Securities and Exchange Commissioner,

ordered the investigation of the character and, for that purpose, designated the other petition

Arcadio E. Yabyabin and Maximino Pizarro, as investigators. These last two petitioners were the

Chief Counsel and Chief Examiner, respectively, of the Commission.

Pursuant to the above order, petitioners Yabyabin and Pizarro, addressed a subpoenaduces tecumto

respondent J. Amado Araneta as well as to treasurer and secretary of the Bacolod-Murcia. On

receiving the subpoenaduces tecum, however, herein respondent corporation and J. Amado Araneta,

thru court filed a "Petition to Reconsider Order and to Set Aside SubpoenaDuces Tecum." They

contended that with approval of Republic Act No. 1143 "the power given by law to the Securities and

Exchange Commission to conduct investigations has been qualified and made subject to the

condition that such investigations must be conducted in accordance with the rules adopted by the

Commission." (Sec. 1 [d], Republic Act No. 1143.) And, since the Securities and Exchange

Commission had not till then adopted such rules, it could not proceed with the investigation.


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After due consideration, petitioner Mariano G. Pineda denied the above petition filed by the

respondent.

Subsequently, on August 21, 1958, respondents Bacolod-Murcia and J. Amado Araneta filed a

Motion to Quash and Discontinue Entire Proceedings. This was docketed as SEC Case No. 951. The

basis of this motion was principally the same as that recited in the petition to reconsider and set

aside the subpoena duces tecum. In other words, the herein respondents reiterated their contention

that the Securities and Exchange Commission could not proceed with the investigation until after it

shall have promulgated the rules required by Republic Act No. 1143. Furthermore, the respondent-

movants alleged that the complaint by the aforesaid minority stockholders "was part of a plot and

conspiracy to harass and oppress the herein respondents at the inspiration or instigation of the

Secretary of Commerce and Industry, the Honorable Pedro C. Hernaez, who has direct supervision

and control over the Securities and Exchange Commission." This motion was found to be without

merit, and was, for that reason, forthwith denied by the Commissioner on October 10, 1958.

After having received a copy of the order denying their motion of August 21, 1958, the respondent

corporation and J. Amado Araneta filed a special civil action for prohibition against the herein

petitioners Yabyabin and Pizarro, and, for the first time, joined Lacson and Lopez as respondents. It

was docketed in the sala of Judge Gregorio T. Lantin of the Manila Court of First Instance as Civil

Case No. 38456.

Having been served with summons in the above civil case, petitioners Yabyabin and Pizarro, on

November 29, 1959, moved to dismiss the same. They argued that writ prayed for would amount to a

review, modify or setting aside of an order of the Securities and change Commission and therefore,

beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. According to them, only the Supreme Court

could modify or review an order or decision of the Commission in accordance with Security 1 of Rule

43, Rules of Court and Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act 635.

On December 6, 1958, Judge Gregorio T. Lantin is the following order: "Upon consideration of the

motion to dismiss dated November 28, 1958, filed by respondent Arcadio E. Yabyabin and Maximino

B. Pizarro, and objection thereto, let resolution of the said motion deferred until the trial of the case

on the merits." Soon after the issuance of this order, or, on December 26, 1958, herein petitioners

Yabyabin and Pizarro filed an answer to the petition for prohibition. Thereafter, order deferring the

resolution of the motion to dismiss was reconsidered. Instead, the motion to dismiss was denied on

January 31, 1959.

Disagreeing with the above order of denial, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on

February 19, 1959. They reaffirmed in that pleading their position that only the Supreme Court may

review orders of Securities and Exchange Commission; that when Manila Court of First Instance didso review, it went beyond its authority and jurisdiction. This was denied again by the respondent

judge, when on February 28, 1959, he issued an order dismissing the motion for consideration.

This case was elevated to this Honorable Court review on a petition for certiorari with prohibition a

preliminary injunction. To that end, it devolved on to resolve the question of law first mentioned

above. Stated in another way, the issue here is:

ISSUE:

WAS THE CIVIL CASE FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY THEREIN RESPONDENTS PROPER

AND WITHIN IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE?


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HELD:

This Tribunal holds the view that under the Rules of Court and the law applicable to the case at bar,

a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive reliefs against the Securities and

Exchange Commission. That power is lodged exclusively with this Court.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides;

SECTION 1.Petition for review. Within thirty days from notice of an order or decision issued by

the Public Service Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, any party aggrieved

thereby may file, in the Supreme Court, a written petition for the review of such order of decision.

Furthermore, Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635,

creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission,

provides the following:

SEC. 35.Court review or orders. (a) Any person aggrieved by an order issued by the commissionin any proceeding under this Act to which such person is a party or who may be affected thereby

may obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court of the Philippines by filing in such court

within thirty days after the entry of such order a written petition praying that the order of the

Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. . . .

Beyond doubt, therefore, whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees with an order or ruling of

the Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to come to this Court on a petition for

review. He is not permitted to seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction. The two provisions

quoted above clearly pronounce that only this Court possesses the jurisdiction to review or pass upon

the legality or correctness of any order or decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and,

as circumstances might warrant, to modify, reverse, or, set aside the same.

It was urged by the herein respondents that the principal purpose of their action in the lower court

was not to have an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission reviewed but to have the

investigation stopped because of an alleged lack of jurisdiction to proceed with the same. Therefore,

the argument continued, Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Section 35 of Court

Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic No. 635, could not have properly applied.

The contention carries no weight. This Court has thoroughly read through the petition for

prohibition with the lower court. But, even a cursory reading would have revealed so fully that its

main aim was have an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission reviewed the order

denying their motion to quash and discontinue the entire proceeding in the Commission More thananything else, Civil Case No. 38456 was meant to have that order of the Commission ultimately set

aside.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that principal concern of Bacolod-Murcia in filing the

action below was indeed to stop the investigation so that jurisdiction of the investigating body to

conduct the same might first be determined, still this Court holds that action should have been

commenced in this Tribunal. When the Rules of Court and the law provided that orders and

decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are reviewable only by this Court, they could

possibly have excluded within their efficacy the review of incidental orders as the one at bar.

Otherwise, entire philosophy for providing that only this Court review on appeal orders of the

Commission would rendered mute, weak and purposeless. For then, shall be sanctioning what can

not be done directly to be done indirectly.


13/27

Finally, herein respondents contended that since questioned order of the Commission was merely in

interlocutory, they could not have come to this Court under Section 1 of Rule 43 because the said

provision refers only to final orders and decisions. This Court, however, finds neither force nor merit

in this argument. We have held already in the case ofSan Beda v. Court of Industrial Relations,

G.R. No. L-7649, promulgated October 29, 1955, that while the general rule is that interlocutoryorders are not appealable, the same may be so appealed when it is grounded upon lack of

jurisdiction.

The role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in our national economy cannot be minimized.

The legislature has entrusted to it the serious responsibility of enforcing all laws affecting

corporations and other forms of associations not otherwise vested in some other government offices.

Being charged, therefore, with overseeing the operations of those various corporate enterprises from

which our government derives great revenues and income, it cannot afford to be impeded or

restrained in the performance of its functions by writs of injunction emanating from tribunals

subordinate to this Court. If every Court of First Instance can enjoin the Commission from pursuing

its objectives, and, in the premises, substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on what

should or should not be done, then, no one will suffer thereby but the economy of our body politic

and, eventually, this country's citizenry. Certainly, the legislature could never have intended that.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court denying the motion to dismiss

filed by the herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 38456 is hereby set aside and the herein respondents

are prohibited and enjoined from proceeding with the trial and determination on the merits of the

same civil case, with costs

[G.R. No. 93640. January 7, 1994.]


14/27

TAY CHUN SUY,Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND DEVELOPMENT

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; SHERIFFS

MINISTERIAL DUTY TO CONDUCT AN AUCTION SALE; SUBJECT TO

LIMITATION. A sheriffs ministerial duty to conduct an auction sale is not without

any limitation. In the performance of this duty, he is deemed to know what is inherently

right and inherently wrong. Nonetheless, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., upon the persistent

proddings of petitioner, proceeded with the auction sale. His poor judgment alone would

not have caused any suspicion of bias. However, his precipitate action taken together with

the anomalous proceedings that ensued, and the haste with which he delivered the

certificate of sale to petitioner in the afternoon of the day of the auction sale lead to the

inevitable conclusion that the whole operation was contrived to benefit petitioner. The

handwritten Minutes of the auction sale clearly indicate the haste with which they were

prepared, a telltale evidence of the anomalous conduct of the proceedings. On its face,

one cannot determine the name of the successful bidder of the vessel. The minutes

became even more vague when Sheriff Reyes, Jr., testified that there were only three

bidders. From the minutes, however, we find that all those present offered bids as there

were amounts placed opposite their names. Significantly, the testimony of Sheriff Reyes,

Jr., to the effect that Atty. Positos did not participate in the bidding was rebutted by the

latter. In view of the ambiguity of the minutes, the trial court was constrained to ask

clarificatory questions from Sheriff Reyes, Jr. The procedure followed by Sheriff Reyes,

Jr., was patently irregular. The unexplained inconsistencies in the minutes and thecertificate of sale are so material as to affect the integrity of the whole proceedings.

Noteworthy, too, is the fact that the Minutes do not mention the request of counsel for

SCHI for deferment of the auction sale. While the request was made prior to the auction

sale, the trial court was correct in its observation that the same should have been

entered in the minutes because of its importance and relevance to the sale. Under these

circumstances, the ruling of the appellate court sustaining the trial court on the nullity

of the auction sale cannot be faulted.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY BOUGHT THEREFROM; NOT

FATAL TO THE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. Petitioner vigorously maintains that thefailure of DBP to register its title to MV Sta. Clara I with the Philippine Coast Guard is

fatal to its claim of ownership. In G.R. No. 78383, we rejected these arguments in our

resolution of 28 September 1987 - The respondent appellate court correctly held that the

Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, had jurisdiction over the auction brought

in Civil Case No. 18188 concerning the vessel herein involved which was allegedly

purchased by petitioner in an execution sale, an which execution sale was the result of

the judgment rendered by Branch 12 of the same Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.

15970. Branch 17, Regional Trial Court of Davao City, did not undertake to annul the

judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12, jurisdiction to annul

belonging to the Court of Appeals. Respondent appellate court also correctly held that a


15/27

certificate of registration of ownership of a vessel is only presumptive evidence that the

registered owner has legal title to the vessel, and that DBPs failure to register with the

Philippine Coast Guard its prior acquisition of the vessel is not fatal to its ownership of

said vessel, vis-a-vis petitioner herein, who similarly failed to register the alleged

subsequent sale of the vessel to itself (sic) in an execution sale.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE BY INJUNCTION WITH

THE JUDGMENT OR DECREE OF ANOTHER COURT WITH CONCURRENT OR

COORDINATE JURISDICTION; RULE AND EXCEPTION. At any rate, our ruling in

Santos v. Bayhon (G.R. No. 88643, 23 July 1991, 199 SCRA 525, 528) should put to rest

petitioners doubt as to the jurisdiction of the trial court - The general rule that no court

has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court

with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive

relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 142). When a third-party, or a stranger to the

action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his

claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of

the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION CREDITOR GENERALLY ACQUIRE NO HIGHER OR

BETTER RIGHT THAN WHAT THE EXECUTION DEBTOR HAS IN THE PROPERTY

LEVIED UPON. Further, petitioner contends that he is bona fide purchaser for value

at the auction sale and that he came to know about the acquisition by DBP only upon its

filing of the complaint for annulment of the execution sale. The evidence on record beliessuch contention. Before the auction sale started, counsel for petitioner was already aware

of the cloud on the title of SCLC to the vessel. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the

prior claim of DBP, petitioner insisted that the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale.

Under the caveat emptor rule, he assumed the risk of losing the vessel because his right

to it cannot be considered superior to that of DBP. As we held in one case, an execution

creditor generally acquires no higher or better right that what the execution debtor has

in the property levied upon. It follows then that if the judgment debtor had no interest in

the property, the execution creditor acquires no interest therein.

5. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; ISSUES NOT BROUGHT UP DURING THE TRIAL COURTCANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME THEREON. Petitioner is estopped

from denying knowledge of the prior claim of DBP to the vessel in the light of his judicial

admission. He asserts that he never admitted that he knew of DBPs prior acquisition at

the time of the execution sale on 16 July 1986. Petitioner never challenged this particular

ruling in his appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, he cannot be allowed to ventilate it

now in this proceeding. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately

brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,

considered by a reviewing Court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

FACTS:


16/27

Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. (SCLC), obtained a loan from private respondent

Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, SCLC mortgaged

some of its properties, among which was a vessel, MV Sta. Clara I. Upon SCLCs failure

to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed. the Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff

Ex-Officio of Sultan Kudarat, Aurelio M. Rendon, conducted an auction sale and sold the

vessel to DBP. He thereafter issued a certificate of sale dated in favor of DBP. DBP did

not register with the Philippine Coast Guard the mortgage; neither the foreclosure nor

the auction sale.

DBP and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. (SCHI), entered into a Lease/Purchase

Agreement 2 which provided that DBP should lease some of the former properties of

SCLC, including MV Sta. Clara I, to the latter and transfer actual ownership over these

properties upon completion by the lessee of the stipulated lease/purchase

payment.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

petitioner caused the levy and attachment of the same vessel, MV Sta. Clara I, in order

to satisfy a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court. At the time of the levy, the

coastwise license of the vessel was in the name of Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc.

On the scheduled date of the execution sale, Atty. Necitas Kintanar, counsel for SCHI,

verbally informed Deputy Sheriff Manases M. Reyes, Jr., who was to conduct the sale,

that MV Sta. Clara I was no longer owned by SCLC but by DBP pursuant to a prior

extrajudicial sale. Despite such information, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., proceeded with the sale

and awarded the vessel to petitioner .

MV Sta. Clara I was again levied upon and attached by Deputy Sheriff Alfonso M.

Zamora by virtue of a writ of attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court. the same

court issued an order appointing Philippine Trigon Shipyard Shipping Corporation as

depositary of the attached vessel with authority to operate the vessel temporarily. MV

Sta. Clara I was then taken from the port of Davao City to Cebu City.

Upon being informed of the execution sale to petitioner, DBP filed a complaint before the

Regional Trial Court, Br. XVII, Davao City, for annulment of the execution sale, recovery

of possession, damages and attorneys fees with prayer for restraining order and

preliminary injunction. 5 Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for alleged lack ofjurisdiction, cause of action and/or legal personality to sue on the part of DBP. 6

the court denied the motion to dismiss but granted DBPs prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction. 7 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the denial but the motion was

likewise denied. 8

petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorariand mandamus with

prohibition assailing the Orders of the trial court. the Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition. 9


17/27

Petitioner appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review oncertiorari, the Third

Division of this Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

the trial court issued a decision which, among other matters, declared that DBP was the

lawful owner of MV Sta. Clara I and that the public auction sale conducted by Deputy

Sheriff Manases Reyes, Jr., and the resultant certificate of sale were null and void.

petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals. the appellate court dismissed his

appeal. the motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied. 13

Hence, this petition for review oncertiorari. Petitioner contends that the Court of

Appeals erred (1) in finding that the sheriffs auction sale of the vessel did not enjoy the

presumption of regularity; and (2) in affirming the decision of the trial court declaring

DBP as the true and exclusive owner of MV Sta. Clara I. 14

[G.R. No. L-26294. May 31, 1972.]

HON. CARLOS ABIERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros

Occidental and the SPOUSES MIGUEL DE LA CRUZ AND JOVITA DE LA

CRUZ,Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA E.

PUENTEVELLA, as Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Luis B.

Puentevella,Respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; NO POWER TO INTERFERE BY INJUNCTION WITH

ORDERS OF COORDINATE COURT. No court has power to interfere by injunction

with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having

equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. The doctrine as thus formulated is

well-settled, and has been adhered to consistently whenever justified by the facts in order

to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring

about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN APPLICABLE. For the doctrine to apply the injunction issued


18/27

by one court must interfere with judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or

coordinate jurisdiction, and the relief sought by such injunction must be one which could

be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.

3. ID.; EXECUTION; RIGHT OF THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT ON LEVIED PROPERTY

ON EXECUTION NOT EXCLUSIVE. The right of a person who claims to be the

owner of property levied upon on execution to file a third party claim with the sheriff is

not exclusive, and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the judgment

creditor files an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to answer for any damages that

may be suffered by the third party claimant.

4. ID.; ACTIONS; MEANING AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 17 RULE 39. By "action"

as stated in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, what is meant is a separate and

independent action, such as was resorted to by the third-party claimants in this case.

5. ID.; COURTS; WHERE JUDGMENT OR INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF ONE

COURT NOT INTERFERENCE WITH ORDER OF COORDINATE COURT. Under

Section 17 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court a third person who claims property levied

upon on execution may vindicate such claims by action. Obviously a judgment rendered

in his favor, that is, declaring him to be owner of the property, would not constitute

interference with the powers or processes of the court which rendered the judgment to

enforce which the execution was levied. If that be so and it is so because the property,

being that of a stranger, is not subject to levy then an interlocutory order such as

injunction, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the claimant, cannotbe considered as such interference either.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF CABIGAO NOT IN POINT. The case of Cabigao v. Del

Rosario and Lim is not in point. In this case a writ of execution was issued by Branch II,

CFI, Manila to enforce its judgment for a sum of money. After the defendants property

was levied upon he filed a petition in another Court Branch I, praying that a writ of

preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the sheriff from carrying out the execution

on the ground therein alleged. Under these facts, it is quite clear that the preliminary

injunction issued by Branch I was improper, and constituted undue interference with a

decree of Branch II.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF HACBANG NOT IN POINT. The case of Hacbang v. Hon.

Clementino Diaz, Et. Al. is not in point. There judgment was rendered by the Court of

First Instance of Leyte against the Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., in Civil Case No. 2045. A writ

of execution was issued, and a passenger bus was levied upon by the provincial sheriff.

The respondent, Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., claiming that it was the owner of the bus and

that it was not the defendant in Civil Case No. 2045, although it bore the same name,

filed a third party claim. The Leyte court denied the claim and directed that the sale of

the bus be carried out, on the ground that said respondent was the very same company

that was the defendant against whom the judgment had been rendered. Subsequently,


19/27

respondent filed another action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, reproducing

substantially the allegations in its third party claim, and prayed that a writ of

preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the sale of the passenger bus which had been

levied upon and this was granted by said court. This court annulled the writ issued by

the Court of First Instance of Cebu, applying the doctrine laid down in Cabigao v. Del

Rosario and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Jesus de Veyra.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, NOT IN POINT.

Where the question raised is whether or not property which has been levied upon a

garnishment proceeding by one court (in Manila) may be subject to the jurisdiction of

another court (in Baguio) in an independent suit impugning the legality of said

garnishment, the reason advanced by the respondent court of Baguio City that it should

grant relief when there is apparently an illegal service of the writ . . . may not be

upheld, there being a better procedure to follow, i.e. a resort to the Manila Court wherein

the remedy may be obtained, it being the court under whose authority the illegal levy

had been made. To allow coordinate courts to interfere with each others judgments or

decrees by injunction would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the

proper administration of justice.

FACTS:

Jovita De la Cruz and her husband Miguel De la Cruz filed a complaint before Branch VI

of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and alleging that they are the owners

of the buildings occupied by the Southern Negros College as well as the equipment,books, and supplies found therein, end that the same were levied upon by the Sheriff to

satisfy a judgment rendered by Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Negros

Occidental of which said plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. De la Cruz are not parties and,

therefore, not binding on them, obtained from the Presiding Judge of Branch VI of the

same court Honorable Carlos Abiera a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Angelina

E. Puentevella and her co-defendants Sheriff and deputy sheriffs of the Province of

Negros Occidental to refrain from taking possession of the buildings and other

properties mentioned in the depository receipt mark as Exhibit A and the lots wherein

they are situated and from going on with the sale of the properties; and from preventing

the students, instructors and other personnel of the school from entering the schoolpremises and to remove the barricades from the main gate of the school premises, (until

further orders) from this court."

Puentevella filed a petition forcertiorarior mandamus with the Court of Appeals, with a

prayer "that an ex-parte writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining the Hon.

Carlos Abiera from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by him in Civil

Case No. 293 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and from further issuing

any other writ or process which would in any manner affect the enforcement of the

judgment rendered by Branch II of the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

in Civil Case No. 7435; that, after hearing, judgment be declared making the writ of


20/27

preliminary injunction prayed for in this case permanent." the Court of Appeals granted

the petition and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The

spouses De la Cruz moved to reconsider but the motion was denied in a resolution dated

June 27, 1966. In the same resolution the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary

injunction restraining "respondent Judge from further enforcing the injunction issued by

him in Civil Case No. 293."cralaw virtua1aw library

Not satisfied with the said decision as well as with the order denying their motion for

reconsideration, the spouses De la Cruz filed the instant petition for review. On motion of

petitioners We issued, a restraining order to stop the Provincial Sheriff of Negros

Occidental from proceeding with the auction sale and a writ of preliminary injunction for

the same purpose, upon a bond of P2,500.00.

ISSUE:

whether or not Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acted with

authority in enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the execution sale of

properties levied upon by him pursuant to a final judgment rendered by Branch II but

claimed by the petitioners herein, the De la Cruz spouses, in the action filed by them in

the court which issued the injunction.

HELD:


21/27

G.R. No. L-25239. November 18, 1967.]

EMERITO S. CALDERON,Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ, as

Presiding Judge of the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,

ET AL.,Respondents.

1. COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; COURTS OF CONCURRENT OR COORDINATE

JURISDICTION; INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER BRANCHES. Where Branch VII

of the Court of First Instance of Cebu has already issued a preliminary injunction

against "any or all persons connected directly or indirectly with the public works projects

in the 5th and 6th Congressional districts of Cebu to refrain and desist from

commencing, undertaking or prosecuting any such project in any municipality or city

comprised in the said congressional districts of Cebu, and from making, causing or

authorizing payment of any payroll or voucher in connection with any of the project in

question, or in any manner allowing and causing the disbursement of public funds

earmarked for such projects, upon the filing by the petitioners of a bond in the amount ofTEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) to answer for whatever damage may be caused to

the respondents by reason of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction", Branch

II of the same court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to compel the provincial treasurer

and the provincial Auditor of Cebu to pay laborers wages working on the same project for

the period from September 8 to September 16, 1965, for the same subject matter, i.e.,

disbursements of public funds in connection with the questioned projects, is involved in

the first case then pending in Branch VII, otherwise that would render nugatory the

effect of preliminary injunction issued by the first court.

2. ID.; ID.; OTHER SPECIAL REMEDIES IN CLASH WITH INJUNCTIONIMPROPER. It is the settled rule that no court has power to interfere by injunction

(mandamus in the case at bar) with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or

coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction

(mandamus), as such interference with each others judgments or decrees by injunction

(mandamus) would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the

administration of justice. (Ongsiaco Et. Al. v. Tan, Et Al., 97 Phil., 330).

FACTS:


22/27

Emerito S. Calderon, then independent congressional candidate for the 5th district,

together with then Congressman Manuel A. Zosa of the 6th district and some of the 6th

districts municipal mayors, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VII) a

verified petition for injunction with preliminary injunction. It was directed against "any

or all persons connected directly or indirectly with the projects in question." Said petition

specifically sought to enjoin or stop further commencement of the questioned public

works and highway projects as well as to enjoin or stop further disbursements of public

funds earmarked for such projects.

Upon the posting and approval of the necessary bond the writ of preliminary injunction

was issued and served upon all parties concerned.

petitioner filed a petition for contempt asking the court a quo to cite respondents district

engineer of the 4th Engineering District, the disbursing officer thereof, the highway

auditor and the provincial auditor, to appear before it and show cause why they should

not be punished for contempt for having continuously recruited laborers for the projects

in question and for having authorized the payments or disbursements of public funds in

connection therewith despite the effectivity of the aforesaid writ of preliminary

injunction.

the laborers who had worked in the various road projects in the different towns of the 5th

district filed a verified petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction

before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch II) presided by respondent Hon. Judge

Amador E. Gomez. The primary object of the suit was to compel the provincial treasurerand the provincial auditor of Cebu to effect payment of their wages. Respondent Judge

gave due course to the petition and set the hearing which was subsequently re-set.

Calderon immediately instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary

injunction. we issued an order restraining respondent Judge from taking cognizance of

and taking further action and restraining also the provincial treasurer, provincial

auditor and the Philippine National Bank (Cebu branch) from allowing, causing or

authorizing in any manner payment of any payroll or voucher for public works or

highway projects in the 5th congressional district of Cebu. the restraining order was

extended by us until further notice.

Petitioner argues that the cognizance by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch II)

of the mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 9053) constitutes undue interference with the writ

of preliminary injunction issued by another court of co-equal and coordinate jurisdiction

(Court of First Instance, Branch VII). Pursuing his arguments, petitioner points out that

the subject-matter of the mandamus case before Branch II is the payment of payrolls

covering wages of laborers allegedly working in various public works and highways

projects in the 5th congressional district. In the injunction suit filed earlier before Branch

VII, the same subject-matter, i.e., disbursements of public funds in connection with the

questioned projects, is involved. Petitioner maintains that while the mandamus case


23/27

before Branch II seeks to compel the provincial treasurer and provincial auditor of Cebu

to pay or allow payment of payrolls of public works laborers, the writ of preliminary

injunction earlier issued by Branch VII enjoins the very same acts sought to be

accomplished by the application for mandamus.

We find merit in petitioners stand. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by Branch

VII seems clear enough. Among others, it specifically "commands respondents . . . to

refrain and desist . . . from making, causing or authorizing payment of any payroll or

voucher in connection with any of the projects in question, or in any manner allowing and

causing the disbursement of public funds earmarked for such projects." When petitioners

in the mandamus case before Branch II prayed that judgment be rendered to effect

payment of (their) wages, they were obviously trying to render nugatory the effect of the

preliminary injunction. Under the guise of a separate suit, petitioners in the mandamus

suit would want a declaration in their favor and thereby avoid compliance with the writ

of preliminary injunction.

If Branch II were permitted to take cognizance with the mandamus case and thereafter

should render judgment granting the relief prayed for, it would amount in effect to the

setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction. This situation should not be permitted

to arise at all.

"It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere

by injunction with the judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate

jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.. The variousbranches of the Court of First Instance (of Manila) are in a sense coordinate courts and

to allow them to interfere with each others judgments or decrees by injunctions would

obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice."

(Onsingco, Et Al., v. Tan, Et Al., 97 Phil. 330)

"The principle has been announced that a judge of a branch of one court should not annul

the order of a judge of another branch of the same court (meaning the same judicial

district) because both of them are judges of the same category who act coordinately and

independently of each other except, of course, if the second judge acts in the place of

the first judge in the same proceeding." (Mas v. Dumara-og, G.R. No. L-16252, September29, 1964."cralaw virtua1aw library

The same principle which legally prevents a court of justice from interfering, by means of

injunction, with the judgment or decree of another court of concurrent and coordinate

jurisdiction, applies with equal logic in a case where another provisional remedy, other

than injunction, is resorted to. The basic reason for disallowing interference is to avoid

confusion and to enable the administration of justice to go unhindered. This fundamental

objective is definitely disregarded when a provisional remedy proceeding from one court

is utilized to defeat a co-equal and coordinate courts lawful processes. Jurisprudence and

existing laws do not justify such a course of action.


24/27

Reference is made to the fact that the 1965 elections, the event which largely influenced

the filing of the suit below, are a thing of the past and that the instant case has become

moot and academic as a result. We do not think so. As correctly pointed out by the

petitioner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The present petition . . . was filed before this Honorable Tribunal primarily for the

purpose of preventing the illegal, immoral, and scandalous disbursement and wastage of

public funds, amounting to approximately P800,000.00.

"The fact that payrolls and vouchers covering these funds are padded and falsified,

however, has not been cured or rendered moot by the mere passing of the elections, even

by the political victory of those responsible for their preparation. This vital issue is still

very much in dispute in Civil Case No. 241-B, and the Court of First Instance of Cebu,

Branch VII, should be given all the opportunity to seek out the truth about those

documents, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the temporary restraining order issued

by us on November 2, 1966 is hereby made permanent, with costs against respondents.

[G.R. No. L-62038. September 25, 1985.]

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA) AND ORIENTAL

MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE I (ORMECO),Petitioners, v. HON.

FILEMON MENDOZA IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH I and the INTEGRATED

BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), ORIENTAL MINDORO

CHAPTER,Respondents.


25/27

FACTS:

petitioner Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative I or (ORMECO) I, sent notices

to the electric consumers in Oriental Mindoro informing them that effective March 1,

1981, it will charge increased rates of electricity authorized by the National

Electrification Administration (NEA) .

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Oriental Mindoro Chapter, thru its officers,

opposing the increase of electric rates, filed a petition for injunction, in the Court of First

Instance of Oriental Mindoro, to prevent the implementation of the said increases.

respondent Judge issued a restraining order directing ORMECO I to refrain from

enforcing the increase in its electric rates.chanrobles law library : red

petitioner ORMECO I filed its Answer praying that the petition be dismissed for

insufficient cause of action and/or want of jurisdiction and praying therein that the

restraining order earlier issued by the court below be lifted or dissolved.

respondent Judge lifted the restraining order and dismissed the petition. However, upon

Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondent IBP, respondent Judge reinstated

the restraining order previously issued.

petitioner NEA filed its Motion for Intervention which was granted. NEA filed a Motion

to Dismiss the injunction suit on the ground that respondent Court has no jurisdictionover the subject case which pertains to the electricity rates that are being charged by a

cooperative, which matter is submitted to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NEA.

an order was issued denying Petitioner NEAs Motion to Dismiss. Respondent court

declared that it can restrain the implementation of said rates inasmuch as there was no

public hearing on the proposed rates to be collected by the cooperative from its

consumers.

Upon motion of the private respondent IBP, the respondent Judge, also issued two

Orders, (1) directing the Provincial Auditor to assist the IBP in examining the records of

petitioner ORMECO I to determine whether said entity is losing or not, and to submit itsfindings to the court and (2) fixing the rate of P1.72/kwh. These ultimately led to the

filing of the present Petition before this Court.

Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to act at all on the case. On

the other hand, private respondents maintain that the respondent Court of First

Instance, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action which it filed because the

consumers were denied due process of law due to the absence of any public hearing

conducted regarding the reasonableness of the proposed increases in the electric light

rates.


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ISSUE:

whether or not the court may interefere by with an order of regulatory

commission?

HELD:

It is undisputed that NEA was the creditor of the electric cooperative which had obtained

a huge loan from the NEA on March 27, 1973. It has been stipulated between the NEA

and the ORMECO I that the rates and charges affecting the cooperative, shall be subject

to the approval by the Board of Administrators of the NEA. Consequently, the Court of

First Instance now Regional Trial Court cannot usurp for itself the power, as it did, to

review the power rates charged by the ORMECO I and approved by NEA. This

competence has been lodged by law to the NEA and to no other. In Pineda v. Lantin, 6

SCRA 757, 763,We ruled that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with an

order of regulatory Commission because it cannot substitute its judgment for

that of the Commission on what should be or should not be done as the

legislature had not intended that. In Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc.

versus Luna 112 SCRA 604 (1982), it was ruled that "nowhere does the law

empower any Court of First Instance to interfere with the orders of the

Commission, not even on grounds of due process and jurisdiction." The

petitioner Commission, in the instant case is in the very least a co-equal body

with the Court of First Instance and co-equal bodies have no power to control

the other. Furthermore, the power of judicial review of NEAs order and

decision pertains to the Supreme Court as decreed in Section 59 of P.D. No. 269

which vests specifically on the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to review any

order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such orders,

rulings or decisions.chanrobles law library

WHEREFORE, forcertiorariin this case is hereby granted, and the questioned orders of

respondent Judge dated December 17, 1981, and March 3 and March 10, 1982 are hereby

set aside for being null and void and issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Respondent

Judge is further directed to dismiss the stated Civil Case NO. R-3326 for lack of

jurisdiction over the same. No pronouncement is here made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Documents

INJUNCTION CASE2.docx