The First Amendment to the United States Constitution begins as follows: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-ing the free exercise thereof.”1 Interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in numerous landmark decisions,2 the Establishment Clause stands as the primary dividing line between religion and the state. The precise location of this line however is the subject of fierce and impassioned debate. No-where has this debate been more focused than on our nation’s public schools. A recent battleground has been whether a public school can hold an otherwise secular graduation ceremony in a religious building, such as a church.

Not heavily litigated in the past, this issue resurfaced in 2010 resulting in two battles in federal district court. Both sets of plaintiffs argued that holding public school graduation in a church violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-ment and demanded that the school district find a secular venue. One court in Connecticut3 agreed with the plaintiffs and enjoined the school board from hold-ing the ceremony in a nearby cathedral. Another case in Wisconsin4 held that the school district’s use of a church for gradu-ation was permissible.

This article examines both cases, highlights their factual similarities and

Inquiry & Analysis

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February 2011 Can a Public School Hold a Graduation Ceremony in a Religous Venue? ..............1

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Can A Public School Hold A Graduation Ceremony In A Religious Venue?

By: Matthew Ell, NSBA School Law Fellow, Alexandria, Virginia

differences, and focuses on the different legal analyses both judges relied upon while formulating a decision. It concludes by discussing what guidance school districts can take from these two cases. See page five for a list and description of other relevant cases.

Enfield: Graduation in Church Violates First AmendmentIn Does v. Enfield Public Schools,5 two students at two separate high schools brought suit challenging the district’s use of First Cathedral for both schools’ 2010 graduation. First Cathedral, which is located about 15 miles south of Enfield, is capable of seating around 3,000 people. Both schools had been using the cathedral for graduation ceremonies for a couple years prior to the lawsuit. In 2010, the school board originally decided to hold the ceremonies at the schools but ultimately voted to hold them at the cathedral after being lobbied by the Family Institute of Connecticut (FIC). The board provided the cathedral with a list of religious symbols to cover up in order to present a more secular appearance. Not satisfied, a number of students and the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit asking for the court to preliminarily enjoin the district from hold-ing graduation in the cathedral.

In Enfield the district court applied a modified version of the Lemon6 test. Under Lemon, for government action to pass con-stitutional muster it must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) not have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) not result in excessive government entangle-ment with religion. The court followed the Supreme Court’s approach in Agostini v. Felton7 in which the third prong of Lemon (entanglement) is merely counted as an indicator of the second prong (effect). Additionally, the Enfield court applied two other indicators of effect as well: “endorse-ment” and “coercion.”

Applying Lemon’s first prong, the court briefly concluded that the school dis-trict’s purpose was secular.8 It then spent the remainder of the opinion discussing whether the district’s actions had the effect of advancing religion. It concluded that all three indicators (endorsement, entangle-ment, and coercion) were present and that use of the cathedral had the primary effect of advancing religion. Thus, holding gradu-

ation in the cathedral was barred under the First Amendment.

First, the court found that endorsement was present because a reasonable observer would understand the school district’s site choice to endorse one religion over another; having graduation in a cathedral conveyed the message that Christianity was preferred over other religions.9 In mak-ing this determination, the court discussed at length the interior of the church and the various religious symbols present including several large crosses and prints contain-ing Biblical images.10 It also stated that the FIC’s lobbying effort and the availability of other reasonable venues would lead a rea-sonable observer to believe that the district was endorsing religion.

Second, the court found that excessive entanglement was present. Here, the court focused on the list of religious objects and symbols that the school board had directed to be covered up for the graduation cer-emony. Calling this an “uneasy process,” the court concluded that government officials became excessively entangled with religion by “mak[ing] judgments as to what constitutes religious content and what does not” when deciding what to cover.11

Third, on the coercion question the court noted that in the public school context there are “heightened concerns” with protecting students from coercion.12 The critical question, according to the court, was whether “the conformity [to religion] required of the student is too high of an exaction to withstand consti-tutional scrutiny.”13 The court stated that because students “cannot be said to have a real choice to absent themselves from their own graduation,”14 they therefore must submit themselves to a graduation ceremony within the church and all its religious symbolism. Even without any religious prayer during the ceremony, the court concluded that this submission was too high of an exaction and thus coercion was present.

In summary, because the court found all three indicators (endorsement, entangle-ment, and coercion) present, it concluded that the primary effect of holding the schools’ graduations in First Cathedral was to advance religion, and thus enjoined the district from holding the ceremonies there.

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Inquiry& Analysis

February 2011

February 2011 Inquiry & Analysis | 3

Elmbrook: Graduation in Church is Constitutionally Permissible In Does 1, 7, 8, and 9, Individually v. Elm-brook Joint Common School District No. 21,15 two high schools in Wisconsin had been using the local church for graduation for many years before a variety of individu-als brought suit.

The court began by noting that the Supreme Court had “sidestepped” Lemon in several Establishment Clause cases and therefore its analysis needed to be “delicate” to “determin[e] at what point a dissenter’s rights of religious freedom [is] infringed by the State.”16 Guided by Lemon, but not strictly following it, the court ad-dressed each of the plaintiffs’ four main arguments in turn.

The plaintiffs’ first argument was that the district was engaging in coercion by forcing students to attend graduation at a church. The plaintiffs likened this case to school-sponsored prayer held uncon-stitutional in Lee v.Weisman.17 The court distinguished this case from Lee because there was no prayer present stating “a ceremony in a church is not necessarily a church ceremony.” The court thus declined to expand Lee to find coercion in this case.

The plaintiff’s second argument was that holding graduation ceremonies at the church amounted to government endorsement of a religion. However, the court concluded that a reasonable observer would find that the decision to hold gradu-ation ceremonies in the church was “based on real and practical concerns” and thus was not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.18 These practical concerns included the location, seating availability, and ample free parking that the church provided, among other things.

The plaintiffs next argued, similar to the plaintiffs in Enfield, that the district deciding which objects and artwork were religious and had to be removed amounted to excessive entanglement with religion. However, the Elmbrook court found the school district’s attempt to “cleanse” the church of religious symbolism was not excessive entanglement because this activ-ity was not as “enduring” as some of the other cases where excessive entanglement was found.19

Finally, the plaintiffs contended that the use of taxpayer money to pay the

fees charged by the church to rent out its facility for the ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause. However, the court distinguished this case from other Estab-lishment Clause cases involving state aid to sectarian institutions and found the church rental more akin to a simple fee-for-use arrangement.

Having rejected all four of plaintiffs’ arguments, the court held that the school district was entitled to choose to have its graduation ceremonies in a church.

Comparing the CasesEnfield and Elmbrook have similar facts and follow a similar legal analysis but have opposite holdings. Separating the differ-ences in facts and legal analysis in these two cases sheds some light on whether and when schools may hold their gradua-tion ceremony at a religious site.

Factual Differences

Although both cases involve a district with two high schools holding their gradu-ation ceremonies at local churches, some key factual distinctions may have played a role in why the two cases were decided differently.

In Elmbrook, the church was located within the town only a few miles from either school. It also had a combination of amenities that other local venues lacked: ample free parking, air conditioning, and plenty of seating. Additionally, the price was right. Regardless, the school district recognized the perils of holding gradua-tion in the church and had plans to move the ceremonies to district property for the 2011 ceremony. A new field house was being built that offered similar amenities to the church.

In Enfield, by contrast, the church was located in a different town several miles away. The court noted that some of the other alternative sites compared “favorably” to First Cathedral. In addition, some of these sites were cheaper than the church.20 The court seemed especially disturbed that the board turned down a substantially less expensive site that other schools used for their graduation ceremo-nies in a period of a tight budget. In addi-tion, the school board made their decision after an intense lobbying effort by FIC. This is in contrast to the school board in Elm-brook that made its choice independently

after a thorough review of the alternatives.

Legal Differences

Beyond factual differences however, the two judges took a very different view of the issue. Had the judges in the two cases been reversed, the outcomes of both cases may possibly have been reversed as well. Because both cases discussed the concepts of “endorsement,” “entanglement,” and “coercion” (although how they fit them into the overall rubric differed), it is helpful to look at each element in turn.

Endorsement

Both cases follow a similar but subtly different approach to endorsement that leads to opposite results. Both cases use the “objective, reasonable observer” test to measure endorsement. The Enfield decision goes to great lengths to describe this observer concluding that he or she is an “adult who is aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears and who understands that the display of a reli-gious symbol in a school context may raise particular endorsement concerns, because of the pressure exerted on children by the ‘law of imitation.’”21 Elmbrook, on the other hand, merely notes that the reason-able observer is aware of the history and context of the community and forum. This subtle difference in reasonable observers arguably skews the analysis in each case to one side. Enfield’s reasonable observer is set up to view any interaction with religion and school children skeptically.

In addition, although both cases discuss how a reasonable observer would view the decision to hold graduation at a church in light of the history and context of the community and forum, the court in Enfield takes an additional step and discusses at length the character of the forum itself.22 In light of the lobbying and reasonable al-ternative venues in Enfield, the court could have merely concluded that the reason-able observer would believe that there was government endorsement of religion based on history and context alone. Instead, this additional analysis, which seems to have been inspired by “the strong impressions that were created during the court’s visit to [the church],”23 pushes the balance over the top in favor of government endorsement of religion. The Elmbrook opinion mean-while only contains a minor discussion of

4 | Inquiry & Analysis February 2011

the interior of the church, none of which appears in the endorsement inquiry.

Excessive Entanglement

The two courts differ greatly in their entanglement analysis. In Enfield, the court held the school board’s attempt to secular-ize the church against the board, stating that “[t]he act of the state entering a place of worship . . . to physically cover or remove objects within that space creates constitu-tional questions.”24 The court in Elmbrook, meanwhile, dismissed a similar argument, highlighting the need for excessive entan-glement and distinguishing the case from more “enduring” types of entanglement.

Coercion

The two courts also differed regarding whether the choice of either having to enter a church or miss graduation is “coercion.” In both cases the plaintiffs tried to compare this situation with Lee v. Weisman,25 which involved school led prayer at a graduation ceremony. The Elmbrook court distin-guished Lee easily stating that participa-tion in a secular graduation ceremony in a church was not necessarily participation in a church ceremony and could not be com-pared to participating, even through silence, in school led prayer.

The Enfield court however concluded that holding the graduation at First Cathe-dral coerced graduating seniors and their guests to support religion. The court relied on a couple of obscure religious refer-ences26 stating that for some Christians the mere act of entering a church could be seen as religious and that for some Jews, enter-ing a church is forbidden. The Enfield court also opined that holding the ceremony in a church was possibly more coercive than the school sponsored prayer at issue in Lee v. Weisman because school-sponsored prayer merely required students to be exposed to others engaging in religious activity at a secular venue, while the students in Enfield would have to enter the cathedral.27

ConclusionDespite two judges taking opposite views on similar issues, the factual and legal similarities and differences between the cases provide points for school attorneys to consider when advising school districts that want to hold graduation at religious venues. First, in Elmbrook and Enfield, under the endorsement analysis, both courts looked to history and context to determine whether a reasonable observer would think that

the school district had endorsed religion. Thus, a district is more likely to prevail in cases, like Elmbrook, where the church is the best choice for practical reasons such as cost, seating, and location. Second, per Elmbrook, removing or covering up religious items within the church may help a court conclude that the forum is more secular. However, per Enfield, allowing the church or some other non-governmental organization to decide which items should be covered may help avoid excessive entanglement. Finally, it should be noted that in Enfield the decision was handed down less than a month before the graduation ceremonies were to take place.28 School districts may want to have a backup plan in place in case a last-minute injunction prohibits them from using a religious venue as the site for a graduation ceremony.

End Notes

1. U.S. Const. amend. I.2. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (set-

ting forth a three-prong test for analyzing Establish-ment Clause claims).

3. Does v. Enfield Pub. Schs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Conn. 2010).

4. Does 1, 7, 8, and 9 Individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No. 21, No. 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010).

5. 716 F. Supp. 2d 172. 6. 403 U.S. 602.7. 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).8. The Supreme Court has found a secular purpose

lacking only when “there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (quot-ing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).

9. For the endorsement prong in the Second Circuit, a court “considers whether a reasonable observer . . . aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears, would understand it to endorse religion [over non-religion] or . . . [favor] one religion over another.” Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (quoting Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d. 1, 30 (2d Cir. 2006)).

10. The court found that this religious symbolism gave the venue a sufficient Christian character so that a reasonable observer would understand the school district to be endorsing religion by its choice of forum. Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 190.

11. Id. at 197. 12. Id. at 199 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592

(1992)).13. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 598).14. Id. at 200.15. 2010 WL 2854287.16. Id. at *717. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding prayer delivered by

clergy at a public school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause). The plaintiffs also

cited Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding student led prayer at a football game unconstitutional).

18. Elmbrook, 2010 WL 2854287, at *11. The relevant Seventh Circuit test is to assess “the totality of the circumstances” surrounding the event to determine whether “an objective, reasonable observer, aware of the history and context of the community and forum” would fairly understand the event to be a government endorsement of religion. Id. (quoting Books v. Elkhart County, Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2005)).

19. Id. at *13 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (finding excessive entanglement where a government program sent public school teachers into private schools) and Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (finding excessive entanglement where a state statute allowed churches to veto applications for liquor licenses)).

20. For example one alternative venue, the Springfield Symphony Hall, could seat 2,600 guests and cost about $6,000 less than the Cathedral.

21. Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (quoting Skoros, 437 F.3d at 24).

22. It should be noted that the Enfield court’s heavy “character of the forum” analysis appears to be a novel addition to the endorsement inquiry. It is unclear how the presence of particular symbols within the church indicates any more government endorsement than holding the ceremony within a church in the first place. The Elmbrook approach, which take into account merely the history and context in this inquiry is far more typical.

23. Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 189.24. Id. at 197. The court likened this activity to a case that

held that a government body violated the constitu-tion by deciding what food was kosher for observance purposes. See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002).

25. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).26. Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 200-01 (citing The Latin

Mass Society of England and Wales, The Kingdom of the Beloved Son, available at www.latin-mass-society.org/2007/kingdom.html and Rabbi Chaim Tabasky, Prohibition to Be in a Church, May 27, 2008, www.yeshiva.org.il/ask/eng/print.asp?id=3859.

27. See id. at 201. To support its conclusion, the court mentioned a sign that was present at the 2009 cer-emonies stating that the cathedral was “God’s house where Jesus Christ is Lord.” Apparently, however, the sign was not to be present at the 2010 ceremonies, so it is unclear what relevance this had.

28. The opinion was delivered on May 31, 2010, and the graduation ceremonies were scheduled to take place on June 23 and June 24, 2010.

I&A

February 2011 Inquiry & Analysis | 5

Graduation ceremony held at a religious venueLemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87 (D. Wis. 1974)

District court issued a preliminary injunction barring the school district from holding a public high school graduation ceremony at a Roman Catholic church, even though a majority of the seniors voted for that venue. The court concluded that the vote to hold the ceremony at a religious venue was an example of the tyranny of the majority, which ran counter to “the most obvious purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment . . . to protect the rights of religious minorities to live within the dictates of their con-sciences to the greatest extent possible in an ordered democracy.” Elmbrook distinguished this case, stating in a footnote that Lemke “is not particularly helpful to the plaintiffs because, while speaking to similar issues, it lacks discussion of the applicable constitutional framework as most recently set forth by the Supreme Court.” Elm-brook, 2010 WL 2854287, at *10 n.4.

Musgrove v. School Board of Brevard County, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005)

District court denied a motion for preliminary injunction which would have prevented a school board from holding high school graduation ceremonies in a religious institution displaying a giant cross on the ground the public interest warranted the denial. It found that the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits of the Establishment Clause claim and presumably would suffer irreparable harm to their constitutional rights absent the injunction. However, plaintiffs’ delay in seeking a preliminary injunction prevented the court from fashioning appropriate relief, due to the impossibility of rearranging four graduation ceremonies on 24 hours’ notice. In light of such delay, the interests of the community’s students, families, and friends in attending the gradu-ation ceremonies outweighed factors favoring plaintiffs.

Leasing of church facilities by public school district for classes Federal casesAmericans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Paire, 359 F. Supp. 505 (D. N.H. 1973)

District court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting a public school district from entering in an agreement to lease space in pa-rochial schools, as part of the school district’s dual-enrollment pro-gram, in order for public school teachers to provide instruction to students enrolled in parochial school on secular subjects. Applying the Lemon test, the court held that such an arrangement fostered excessive entanglement with religion. Conceding the program had a secular purpose, the court did not attempt to apply the second prong of the Lemon test, i.e., the “principal or primary effect” test, because it found the prong “semantically confusing in this context; and, in any event, the third ‘entanglement’ test is dispositive.”

Thomas v. Schmidt, 397 F.Supp. 203 (D. R.I. 1975)

District court upheld the use of public funds to lease classroom space for public school students in a Catholic church building. It determined that the lease agreement did not result in excessive entanglement with religion. It distinguished the instant case from Paire on the ground that unlike Paire, where the dual enrollment program required a partnership akin to a complete merger, the

instant case involved no further involvement of the parties than the lessor-lessee relationship.

Spacco v. Bridgewater School Department, 722 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass 1989)

District court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent assign-ing elementary school students to attend public school at facilities leased from the Roman Catholic Church. It held that the evidence demonstrated that use of the church facilities by the public school would violate the Establishment Clause. In particular, the court found that the terms of the lease would lead to excessive entangle-ment with religion as defined in the Lemon test. In addition, it found that even the appearance of shared authority between church and state, as evinced by the lease’s terms, had the primary effect of advancing religion under Lemon.

Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D. N.J. 1998)

The district court held that it does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public charter school to operate within a religious building pursuant to a standard commercial lease because the lease arrangement did not result in government indoctrination of reli-gious beliefs, it did not define its recipient by reference to religion, nor did it create an excessive entanglement between church and state. Enfield distinguished Porta on two grounds. First, in Porta the classrooms were devoid of religious symbols and church signs. Enfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 191. Second, ”Porta is also distinguished by the fact that, in that case, the ‘school’s location in the church was by process of elimination, since the site was chosen as the only possible facility after an extensive search in a limited urban real estate market.’” Id. at 191 n.23.

State casesSchool District of Hartington v. Nebraska State Board of Education, 195 N.W.2d 161 (Neb. 1972)

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause for public school districts in need of classroom space to provide, through grant of federal funds, for special educational needs of educationally deprived children by leasing classrooms in parochial schools for public school purposes, where leased classrooms were under the control of public school authorities and the instruction offered was entirely secular and nonsectarian.

Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. 2003)

The Indiana Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause the dual-enroll-ment programs permitted in Indiana do not confer substantial benefits upon any religious or theological institution, nor directly fund activities of a religious nature, such dual-enrollment programs do not violate” the Indiana Constitution’s provision prohibiting the use of public funds to support religious institutions.

Taetle v. Atlanta Independent School System, 625 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 2006)

The Georgia Supreme Court held that a commercial agreement between a public school and a church to lease church space for kindergarten classes did not violate the Georgia Constitution’s Es-tablishment Clause, which provides: “No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of any sectarian institution.”

Other Cases Relevant to Holding Graduation at a Religious Venue

6 | Inquiry & Analysis February 2011

Red Flag Program Clarification Act: Are School Districts Affected?

By: Lisa Soronen, National School Boards Association, Alexandria, Virginia

The Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010,1 by narrowing the definition of creditor, has made it unlikely that school districts will act as creditors. As a result, school districts will not have to comply with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-tion Act (FACTA)2 red flag identity theft requirements which, as of December 31, 2010, are being enforced by the Federal Trade Commission.3

An April 2009 InquIry & AnalysIs article discusses at length the purposes of FACTA, when school districts likely have to comply with FACTA, and what steps school districts should take to establish an Identity Theft Prevention Program.4 Basically, FACTA requires financial institutions and creditors with covered accounts to develop and im-plement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program in order to comply with FACTA’s red flag requirements. Before the Red Flag Program Clarification Act, under FACTA, a creditor was basically any person or entity who allowed a debtor to defer payment.5

In at least two scenarios, school districts could be considered creditors under FACTA. First, if school districts billed students at the end of the month for the cost of school meals instead of requiring payment daily or prepayment at the beginning of the month, they would be acting as a creditor. Likewise, if school districts billed non-resident students for tuition at the end of the month or the end of the year instead of at the beginning of the month or year, the school district would be acting as a creditor.

Under this same rationale, doctors, lawyers, veterinarians, plumbers, and other professionals who perform services and bill clients or patients instead of collecting pay-ment at the time the service is performed also were considered creditors under FACTA.6 Associations representing some of these professions believed that FACTA was

intended to cover companies who are in the business of lending money, like banks and credit card companies, not professionals who extend credit for the convenience of their customers. Such associations lobbied Congress for an exemption for their mem-bers, and the Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010 was passed.

Under Red Flag Program Clarification Act a creditor must (1) obtain and use consumer reports in connection with a credit transaction, (2) furnish information to a consumer reporting agency in con-nection with a credit transaction, or (3) advance funds to or on behalf of a person, based on an obligation of that person to repay the funds. In billing for school meals after they are consumed or in charging for tuition after a student has attended school, school districts are not “advancing funds” to students. Therefore, they are not acting as creditors as defined by the Red Flag Pro-gram Clarification Act unless they review credit reports before billing for either meals or tuition at the end of the month or year or provide information to credit reporting agencies regarding these transactions.

Regardless of whether schools are required to adopt an Identity Theft Preven-tion Program they may do so voluntarily to combat the growing problem of identity theft. The April 2009 InquIry & AnalysIs ar-ticle describes simple steps school districts can take to be alerted to and respond to possible identity theft in the school meals program or to the payment of tuition.

End Notes

1. Pub. L. No. 111-319, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-3987.

2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 3. Press release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Extends

Enforcement Deadline for Identity Theft Red Flags Rule (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/05/redflags.shtm.

4. Lisa Soronen, Are School Districts Creditors Under FACTA?, InquIry & analysIs, (National School Boards Association Council of School Attorneys, Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 2009, at 7-8.

5. See id. (reciting the precise definition of “creditor” and “credit”).

6. Paul A. Gilman, Client Alert: Updated Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010, Aronberg goldgehn (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.agdglaw.com/?t=40&an=5174&format=xml.

I&A

February 2011 Inquiry & Analysis | 7

Webinar – Preventing Lawsuits by the Bully and the Victim

Tuesday, February 15, 20111:00 – 2:45 p.m. Eastern Time

Join NSBA Senior Staff Attorneys Lisa Soronen and Sonja Trainor in this 1 hour and 45 minute webinar that will cover the legal basis of bullying claims that can be brought by the perpetrator and the victim of bullying, the recent enforcement position of OCR, trends in state bullying laws, and what school attorneys can advise school districts to do to avoid lawsuits from either side.

Registration information is available on the Council’s website in the “Seminars” section at http://www.nsba.org/SecondaryMenu/COSA/Seminars.aspx.

Save the Date & Call for Proposals — 2011 School Law Practice Seminar

Do you have a legal topic that you or your firm would like to present to a national audience? COSA invites its members to submit proposals for the 2011 School Law Practice Seminar to be held October 13-15, 2011, at the Hilton New Orleans Riverside, New Orleans, Louisiana.

The deadline for submission of proposals is March 21, 2011. Proposal forms can be found on the COSA website at http://www.nsba.org/cosa.

2011 School Law Seminar — New Session Just Added!

COSA’s Annual School Law Seminar will be held at the Hilton San Francisco Union Square, April 7-9, 2011, immediately prior to NSBA’s Annual Conference and Exposition.

Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn H. Ali will address registrants on Friday morning on OCR Enforcement of Bullying and Harassment Claims Against School Districts.• There are just a few rooms left on Thursday night at the Hilton San Francisco Union Square, so register now

to guarantee a choice of hotels.• Complete program and registration information can be found on the Council’s website at

http://www.nsba.org/cosa2/law/2011/.

March 1, 2011 - NSBA CONNECT to Become COSA’s Exclusive E-mail Software

NSBA is phasing out the use of its external e-mail provider “Sparklist,” the system you are currently receiving COSA e-mail on and will use NSBA Connect exclusively as of March 1 for COSA e-mail. If you want to search the archives of past “conversations” on cosa@lists.nsba.org, or any other COSA e-group you participate in, please do so before February 28, 2011. After that date, the archives of conversations on the COSA e-mail groups may not be available.

To take a look at NSBA Connect’s homepage go to http://community.nsba.org If you are not logged into the NSBA website, look in the upper right hand corner of the page for the link to log in. Log in by using your e-mail address and NSBA/COSA passcode. Check “remember me” and stay logged in for 14 days.

Scroll down on the left side of the NSBA Connect homepage for links on “How to Get Started.” Also, a message has been sent to all COSA members from COSA Director, Susan R. Butler, with documents explaining how to get started using NSBA Connect. All COSA members have been subscribed to this new private social networking and e-groups software. Select “no e-mails” in the “Subscriptions” section if you do not want to receive e-mails from COSA and COSA members. Call or e-mail Ms. Butler with your questions at (703) 838-6711 or sbutler@nsba.org.