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his article aims to chart the parame-ters o cross-cultural exchanges, andthe theological and experiential oundations ocoexistence between Muslims and aith com-munities belonging to other religions. Draw-

ing upon the legacy o the Ottoman past andthe opportunities yielded by the urkish ex-perience in the republican period, this articleprovides a detailed picture o the urkish case,which is the product o both historical legacyand modern exchanges between religion andsecularism, Islam and democracy.

In the first part o this article, I will firsttouch upon how Islam is seen in the modernworld and share my views on the widespreadimages o Islam, and the accompanying igno-rance about the rich diversity in the interpre-tation o its religious legacy and experience inthe Muslim world. In this part o the articleI will draw attention to the major sources oprevalent images and misperceptions aboutIslam. In this context, I will also examine the

ABSRAC

Tis article aims to show howexchanges between religion andsecularism, Islam and democracy andcross-cultural relations over manyyears have shaped urks perceptiono Islam and their position towardsreedom o religion and co-existenceo different aith communities.Muslims are generally attributeda monolithic identity marked byintolerance despite the act thatthey have considerable diversityin their understanding o Islamand its practice. Te urkish casechallenges such essentialist viewsby demonstrating that despite someisolated events, urkey succeedsin managing religious diversitybecause the perception o Islam

has developed in connection witha variety o current and historicalevents. Te perception that emergedin the course o urkish culturaland political history provides stronggrounds or peaceul co-existencewithin the shared social order.urkeys achievement in establishinga political culture and a perceptiono Islam that acilitates religiouspluralism can be attributed to actorsas such democracy and secularismand urkeys efforts to join theEuropean Union.

Culture of Co-existence inIslam: Te urkish Case

AL BARDAKOLU*

* Professor of Islamic Law, President of urkish Religious Affairs

Insight urkey Vol. 10 / No. 3 / 2008pp. 111-126


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main textual sources o Islam itsel to see

whether they warrant the images o Islamthat are prevalent in the western world.

In the second part o the article I willocus on the Ottoman-urkish experi-ence o peaceul co-existence betweenMuslims, Christians and Jews in a state

that governed a populous o religious, ethnic and cultural diversity or many cen-turies. Given the act that we live in a conflict-ridden world, a look at the Ot-

toman-urkish experience, I believe, may acilitate positive thinking about plu-ralism. Tis historical experience also encourages us to find legal and politicalinstruments that would contribute to the management o growing diversity in aglobalizing world.

In the third part o the article, I will briefly discuss the position o the Presi-dency o Religious Affairs and its role in acilitating a culture o peaceul co-exis-tence in modern urkey.

Te Image of Islam and Muslims in the WestTe image o Islam and o Muslims is subject to constant construction by the

media, intellectual and political discourses and the popular cultural industry.Muslims are largely perceived through the influence these orces which them-selves are inormed by social, political and cultural policies and interests. On thewhole, in the eyes o the west, Islam and Muslims have a negative image that theydo not deserve. A close examination o the relevant political, intellectual andpopular discourses will demonstrate that there is a widespread misunderstand-

ing and misperception o Islam as a religion, and o Muslims as members o theglobal community. Suffice it to cite three well-known statements by public figuresreflecting bias and prejudice against Islam. Franklin Graham, son o evangelistBilly Graham, has argued that the Quran speaks o violence against Christiansand Jews. For him Islam is a very evil and wicked religion. Jerry Falwell o theChristian Coalition, or his part, has called the Prophet Muhammad a terrorist;Pat Robertson called him a robber and brigand.1It is beyond the scope o thispresentation to give lengthy examples drawn rom political and intellectual dis-

courses. However, we can look at their impact on the public opinion and popularperceptions about Islam in the west today.

A recent study by the Pew Foundation (2007) supports our view about the

Tere is a widespread

misunderstanding andmisperception o Islam asa religion, and o Muslimsas members o the globalcommunity


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image o Islam among westerners. In the US or example, as this research shows,

nearly hal (48%) o the respondents said that they had a negative opinion oMuslims. Te same research also indicates that public attitudes about Muslimsand Islam have grown morenegative in recent years. About our-in-ten Ameri-cans (43%) say they have a avorable opinion o Muslims, while 35% express anegative view. Opinion about Muslims, on balance, was somewhat more positivein 2004 (48% avorable vs. 32% unavorable).2

Tere is a similar trend in Germany; survey findings in 2006 indicate that Ger-man esteem or Islam has been alling since the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-

tacks in the United States, with 83 percent o the respondents agreeing with thestatement that Islam is driven by anaticism. Tat amount is 10 percent higherthan the survey results compiled in 2004. A majority o the 2006 respondents, (71percent), are reported to have said they believed Islam to be intolerant, up rom66 percent in 2004. Te same survey also reports that when asked what they as-sociate with the word Islam, 91 percent o respondents connected the religion todiscrimination against women, and 61 percent called Islam undemocratic. Onlyeight percent o Germans associated peaceulness with Islam.3

As the survey results rom the US and Germany indicate, only a handul opeople in the West associate Islam with peace; the great majority, on the contrary,associate this global religion o over one billion ollowers with violence, terrorismand authoritarianism. As I will explain later, there are various sources o such im-ages.

Tese survey results reveal the prevalent images o Islam among Westerners.In this context one should analyze the sources o these negative images and see ithey correspond with Islamic texts, Muslim theology and the historical legacy oMuslim societies. Tis brings us to consider the Islamic texts and their approachto pluralism, diversity and co-existence with other aith groups in the same politi-cal and social world. O course, theological or textual discourses are not sufficientto see the whole picture. Tereore one needs to look at the historical legacy to un-derstand how these textual sources shaped Muslim history in regard to reedomo religion, the management o diversity and a tolerant political order in Muslimmajority societies.

Islamic Sources on Religious Pluralism and Co-existenceAt this point it is worth turning briefly to the main sources o Islam that in-

spired early Muslim states and the Ottoman Empire in their dealings with people


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ing with social issues such as cross-cultural relations in the Quran and Sunna and

some practices dealing with other religious groups, should be interpreted in theirsocial and political contexts. Contextualization will prevent essentialism and theemergence o a monolithic orm o understanding Islam and Muslim societieswhere politics, the economy, geography and cultural exchanges have inspiredvarious interpretations o the same textual sources since the beginning o Islam.

Historically speaking, the concept o the People o the Book provided oneo the bases o multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious states in Muslimhistory. Te Umayyads, Abbasids and Muslim empires in Andalusia and in India

managed to sustain religious diversity and pluralism in their own time inspiredby the spirit o religious liberty and toleration ound in Muslim culture. 5Te Ot-toman state itsel developed a unique legal and political instrument, the milletorcommunity system, that enabled the co-existence o Jews, Christians and major-ity Muslims under the same political order and in the same social domain orcenturies.

Tese brie observations on the Muslims textual sources and historical legacydemonstrate that Islamic theology and Muslim experience challenge the widely-

held notions about Islam. A detailed analysis o Muslim theology and discourseand, more importantly, its historical experience over the centuries indicates thata mere selective reading concerning the Muslim approach to diversity, pluralismand co-existence would do an injustice to Islam today. Tereore, instead o a se-lective reading o theory and practice which would prevent us rom seeing thelarger and more representative picture, one needs to examine a greater number ovariables and actors that are constitutive parts o Islamic theology and practice.However, these arguments should not preclude us rom developing a critical per-spective on how Islam has evolved over the centuries. We should ask the ollowing

questions at this point: What are the sources o the current misperceptions andnegative views o Islam prevalent today,

i it they are not present in the text, the

theology, or the historical legacy? How

can we explain the contradictions be-

tween the peaceul messages o Islam

that lie at the very center o the meaning

o this religion, and the actions o some

Muslims, who, although their numbersare ew, are ofen more noticeable than

the majority?

As ar as social, cultural,and religious ormations areconcerned, both theory and

practice in Muslim historydemonstrate that Islam has

recognized diversity andpluralism as a natural humancondition


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Tere are no easy and short answers

to these questions. Although I have not-ed the good practices in Muslim statesabove, we should also ace the currentreality that there are some cases, like theactions o some radical and extremistgroups in the Middle East and elsewhere,that we can not deend. In recent years in

particular we have witnessed the increasing use o religion to justiy politicallymotivated actions in the Muslim world and beyond. We have seen acts o violence

and terror that damaged the image o Islam and relations between Muslims andother aith groups. Acts o terror and violence lead to the perception o Muslimsthrough a security lens. As a result o such developments, Muslims, especiallythose living in the West, have increasingly become targets o hate crimes. As manyreports demonstrate beyond any doubt, Muslims are becoming victims o grow-ing Islamophobia, since they are seen as a security threat in the midst o westerndemocracies.6

In order to understand why some Muslims are drifing rom mainstream Islamand its peaceul values, we need to look at social and political configurations inthe modern world. When we look at the current context, we note the obvious real-ity that the world today is not a single bloc. Tere are competing actors strugglingto achieve political power, consolidate their hold and establish domination eitherwithin a nation state, in a region, or globally. Religion is very ofen used to justiyand legitimize political positions. Political actors employ a religious language andreer to its symbols and theology to make advances. Sociologically speaking, oran average individual on the street, such a discourse leads to conusion first, and

then to a conviction that religion and politics are interrelated and inseparable.When such a public opinion is constructed, it becomes much easier to conductpolitical competition and struggle through religion. Reactions and opposition tosuch configurations also use religious language and rhetoric. Ten religion be-comes entangled in political struggles. Soon the masses can no longer differenti-ate between what is religious (spiritual) and what is political. Such a state o affairseasily leads to the hijacking o religion by politically motivated groups, as we seein some Muslim countries and elsewhere. In this context, some religious authori-

ties or groups either remain silent or give tacit support to the use o religiouslanguage or political purposes.

In addition to the politicization o religion, we should also look at the mean-

Historically speaking, the

concept o the People o theBook provided one o the baseso multi-cultural, multi-ethnicand multi-religious states inMuslim history


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ing attributed to this concept and how religions relations are established with the

social and political world. As ar as Muslim societies are concerned, there is awidespread perception that religion regulates all aspects o lie. Religion is con-sidered a comprehensive project that governs social, political, cultural and eco-nomic lie on both individual and societal levels. When such views become thebasis o political justification, it is inevitable that religion comes to play a majorrole in shaping policy decisions and actions ranging rom reedom o religion todemocratic participation, and rom international relations to the orming o newalliances. Viewing religion as a comprehensive project that defines all walks o lieis rooted in social and political contexts. It is the product o historical experiences,

and social and political conditions. Domestic politics and international relations,conflicts in and around the Muslim world, wars and invasions both new and oldshape Muslims perceptions. Religion in this context emerges as an important andcomprehensive source o identity, solidarity, opposition and discursive ideology.Tus, as pointed out earlier, the boundaries between religious and political onthe one hand, and between spiritual and worldly affairs on the other hand, ofenget blurred, and in the minds o the masses become more or less different sideso the same coin. So ar, I have explained how and why religion and politics be-

came entangled and how religion is hijacked and manipulated at times. I have alsotouched upon the implications o this composition on the image on Muslims andthe culture o coexistence. Tese configurations all have bearings on the culture oco-existence in the modern world.

Te Ottoman Case and Modern urkey

Now I would like to move on to the urkish case and examine how modernurkey, a secular state with a majority Muslim population, is dealing with state-religion relations, religious communities and non-Muslim citizens. Modern ur-

key inherited a culture o co-existence between different aith communities romthe Ottoman Empire. When the Empire collapsed and the Republic o urkey wasestablished as a nation-state in 1923, Muslims and non-Muslims alike becamecitizens o urkey. Beore moving onto the current state o relations between di-erent aith groups as citizens o the republic, we need to look at the Ottoman ex-perience as a noteworthy example o how to manage religious diversity. Althoughpredominately Muslim, the Ottoman empire had managed religious communitiesand non-Muslim groups under a policy o cultural diversity that thrived as a result

o adopting a policy o recognition and tolerance or other cultures.7

Te Ottoman State ruled over three continents. Its borders extended romthe Balkans to the Caucasus and rom the Middle East to North Arica be-


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tween the thirteenth and the twentieth

centuries.8

Tere were more than twentyethnic communities living in the Ot-

toman lands, speaking dozens o lan-

guages. Christianity and Judaism, with

their various sects and denominations,

were the most prevalent religions afer

Islam in the Ottoman State.

Te Ottoman state defined its subjects according to their religious affiliation.Tis system o categorization, called the millet(community) system defined each

religious community as a separate community. Te Ottoman conquest o Istanbulin 1453, during the early years o Mehmet IIs reign (14511481), marked a histor-

ical turning point in urkish history. Mehmets policy o accommodating various

religious persuasions attracted many Muslims, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Slavs,and others to settle in Istanbul. Istanbul became the centre o Muslim-Christian

co-existence which lasted or over five hundred years.9It is noteworthy to make abrie analysis o the rationale behind the milletsystem and how it operated. Such

an analysis should prove relevant to contemporary debates on ethnic and religiousminority groups in multi-racial and multi-religious societies.10

Te milletsystem had a socio-cultural and communal ramework based first-ly on religion, and secondly on ethnicity.11Te milletsystem divided the Empires

citizens into communities according to religious affiliation. Each religious com-munity ormed a millet and the collection o millets ormed the millet system.

Each milletestablished and maintained its own institutions to care or the unc-

tions not carried out by the ruling class. Individual milletsgoverned institutions otheir own such as education, religion, justice, and social welare.12Under the millet

system, each religious community maintained its own courts, judges, and legalprinciples pertaining to civil and amily laws.13Te milletsystemallowed Greek

Orthodox Christians, Jews and Armenians to orm their own ethnic-religiouscommunities and to establish independent religious institutions in Istanbul.

As historical experience shows, theoretical approaches that determine relation-ships between the Muslim majority and non-Muslim minorities became concrete

policies and practices under the administration o Ottoman rulers. During thisprocess, reedom o religion or non-Muslims and the protection o their places o

worship were guaranteed.

Acts o terror and violence lead

to the perception o Muslimsthrough a security lens. Asa result Muslims, especiallythose living in the West, haveincreasingly become targets ohate crimes


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Religious reedom was extended to legal practices. Non-Muslims were

allowed to institutionalize their own legal systems and to administer theircourts within their community according to the principles o their aith. Asa result o this policy, the sale and use o goods prohibited by Islam wasallowed within a non-Muslim community i there was no such ban in thelatters religious laws.14Muslim rulers were held responsible or the protec-tion o the lives and goods that belonged to non-Muslims. Moreover, therewas no restriction against employing non-Muslims in public oices.15 Teautonomy and reedom available to minorities in the Ottoman Empire attractedlarge numbers o displaced Jewish communities, who were among the victims o

persecution in Spain, Poland, Austria and Bohemia. While Jewish communitiesin Russia, Romania and most o the Balkan states suffered rom persecution dueto anti-Jewish laws, Jewish communities established in the urkish territory en-joyed an atmosphere o tolerance and justice.16Later, urkey continued this tra-dition by sheltering many Jews who fled Nazi oppression in the modern period.

When judged according to the standards o liberty and reedom integral to theperiod concerned, we can argue that non-Muslims enjoyed a remarkable amounto reedom an amount that would have been unthinkable or many states in the

same period. Non-Muslims enjoyed several important reedoms which would lat-er become undamental rights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.Freedoms ranging rom selecting religious leaders; building temples; practicingreligious rituals, ceremonies and estivals; and opening religious schools in ver-nacular languages were important achievements in providing liberty in a periodwhen no one talked about basic human rights; these were guaranteed by the Otto-mans. In this period, authority in matters o internal legal matters and educationalissues within the community was generally granted to religious leaders who were

reely elected by the community concerned. Moreover, these minority communi-ties enjoyed certain financial privileges. For example, lands belonging to churchesand synagogues were exempt rom taxes. Te millet system provided reedom,then, not only in the area o religion andworship, but also in areas o civil law andpolitics. All o these policies and prac-tices indicate that the dominant percep-tion o religion and culture in the Otto-man lands developed in such a way that

a ormula enabling aith communities odifferent religions to live together withthe other was established.

Te Ottoman empire hadmanaged religious communitiesand non-Muslim groups under

a policy o cultural diversity

that thrived as a result oadopting a policy o recognitionand tolerance or other cultures


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Despite the advances it had made, the Ottoman Empire collapsed ollowing

the Second World War. Te Republic o urkey was established on the ruins othis multiethnic and multi- religious empire. Tis brings us to the question o howar modern urkey inherited the culture co-existence and which new instrumentsit developed to consolidate this culture.

Te ransition from Ottoman Empire to urkish Republic

Te transition rom a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire to a nation state,a concept underlined by homogeneity, has not been an easy process. A number

o social, political and economic reorms had to be introduced to ensure publicparticipation in the making o a new nation. In the meantime, transitional condi-tions, stormy international relations, and the war o independence all lef theirimprints on social memory. Modern urkey was established as a nation state onsecular oundations; Muslims and non-Muslims alike are incorporated into theabric o society as citizens. oday, several non-Muslim religious groups exist inurkey, most o which are concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. Sincecensus results do not contain any data pertaining to the religious affiliation o

urkish citizens, the exact membership figures or Christians, Jews and other re-ligious groups are not available.

Article thirty-nine o the reaty o Lausanne guarantees equality among urk-ish citizens regardless o their religious conviction: urkish nationals belongingto non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Mus-lims. All the inhabitants o urkey, without distinction o religion, shall be equalbeore the law. Article 40 o the Lausanne reaty urther stipulates that:

urkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and

security in law and in act as other urkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equalright to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious andsocial institutions, any schools and other establishments or instruction and education, withthe right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion reely therein.

Article 42 reaffirms this proposition:

he urkish Government undertakes to grant ull protection to the churches, synagogues,cemeteries, and other religious establishments o the above-mentioned minorities. All acili-ties and authorization [sic] will be granted to the pious oundations, and to the religious and

charitable institutions o the said minorities at present existing in urkey, and the urkishGovernment will not reuse, or the ormation o new religious and charitable institutions,any o the necessary acilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions o that na-ture.


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Although the constitution guarantees the undamental rights o minorities, and

the law describes a range o reedoms, such institutions alone cannot change every-thing about public perceptions regarding the reedom o religion. Constitutionalarrangements and legal protections may produce perect theoretical solutions; how-ever, public perceptions need to be changed to accomplish structural changes andto accept legal arrangements as valuable instruments to protect reedoms. Other-wise, the implementation o laws and institutionalization o reedoms encounterssocial and political resistance. Tereore, the structural changes and legal arrange-ments o the state should be supported by institutional efforts aimed at strength-ening the social basis or deending and supporting the reedoms o the otherin a given society. In this context, as will be explained in greater detail below, thePresidency o Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) has made considerable institutionalcontributions to the promotion o religious diversity and the culture o co-exis-tence in urkey. But beore moving onto the position o the Diyanet, we need tolook at the actors that prepared a ground or egalitarian perceptions o religionand social order.

Foundations Facilitating Freedom of Religion and Religious

Diversity in urkeyAs it stands, despite some isolated events, urkey succeeds in managing

religious diversity because the perception o Islam has developed in connec-tion with a variety o current and historical events and variables. Te percep-tion that emerged in the course o urkish social, cultural and political historyprovides strong grounds or peaceul co-existence within the shared social or-der. urkeys achievement in establishing a political culture and a perceptiono Islam that acilitates religious pluralism can be attributed to numerous ac-

tors. Tese actors range rom democracy and secularism, to the perceptiono Islam and urkeys efforts to join theEuropean Union. However it should benoted that, although we have achievedconsiderable success, we still need tomake more improvements in these ar-eas.

Te development o Islamic under-

standing among urks has much to dowith their status as a rontier nation.urkshave had contacts with other re-

Te autonomy and reedomavailable to minorities in the

Ottoman Empire attracted largenumbers o displaced Jewish

communities, who were among

the victims o persecution inSpain, Poland, Austria andBohemia


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ligious groups since their arrival to Anatolia in the 11 thcentury, and urks on

the move have always had commercial, cultural and political relations with othernations and states. Te resulting web o relations contributes to an inclusive un-derstanding o religion, as urkish Muslims have never lived in their own ghettosin cultural and geographical terms. urks sustained this non-isolationist legacyand developed it urther in the process o their social, cultural, political and eco-nomic relations with the other communities they have encountered throughouttheir history.

urkeys western orientation, known affectionately as urkeys European va-

cation has, since at least the 19th

century, shaped urkeys political culture, legalinstruments and public policy. Even during the Ottoman Empire, it contrib-uted to the rise and expansion o the ideas o liberty and equality. Constitu-tional reorms and modernization efforts, as well as increasing contacts with thewestern intellectual and cultural heritage, have served to strengthen urkeysEuropean orientation. Moreover, urkeys EU membership project, begun inthe early 1950s and gathering momentum in 2005, brought urkey much closerto Europe. Te legal and political reorms undertaken during the membershipprocess have also consolidated the reedom o religion and protection o minor-

ity aith communities.

Secularism and the culture o democracy in urkey likewise provide principlesthat are crucially important or the protection o pluralism and reedoms. By em-bracing democracy, the rule o law, and secularism, urkey has chosen a path thatenables people o various backgrounds to live peaceully in the same social andpolitical order without abandoning their culture, religion or identity. Structuraland legal provisions, as well as their social acceptance by the majority o urkishcitizens, have led to the establishment o individual reedom o religious belie

and practice, as well as the reedom o expression as ar as interpreting religion isconcerned, i.e. what might be called intra-religious reedom or reedom within a

religion. Tis is one o the peculiar char-acteristics o modern urkey today.

Although there is a wide consensuson the acceptance o secularism and de-mocracy, there is an ongoing debate inurkey on state-religion relations, as is

to be expected in a dynamic society. Tisdebate is sometimes extended to includethe limits o reedom o religion in the

Te Presidency o ReligiousAffairs (the Diyanet) has madeconsiderable institutionalcontributions to the promotion

o religious diversity and theculture o co-existence inurkey


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name o protecting the public order.

Tereore, in this context, some groupsunder the effect o the social memoryo urkeys ormative period considerexpanded religious liberty, includingmissionary activities, problematic. For-eign observers o these debates amongurkish politicians and political groupsin particular may get the impression thatthere are conflicts, contradictions and

tensions between religion and democ-racy, and Islam and the secular principles o the state. However, sociological stud-ies o modern urkish society indicate that there is neither a social basis or, noran acceptance o such conflicting views on the part o everyday urks themselves.Although politicians use discourses o conflict, either to consolidate their positionor to criticize their opponents, they remains limited to political statements andrhetoric. An overwhelming portion o urkish society considers religion, democ-racy and secularism compatible with each other.17

In this context, I would like to share some observations about the position othe Presidency o Religious Affairs (Diyanet) as ar as promoting and deendingreedom o religion and the culture o co-existence in urkey is concerned. TeDiyanetis a constitutional institution which is mandated to administer Muslimreligious affairs in urkey. Te position o the Diyanetas regards reedom o re-ligion has been a contested issue. Some people claim that the Diyanetwas estab-lished to control the religious sphere by the state. Others argue that the Diyanetenables religion to emancipate itsel rom the control o the state.18

Te Diyanettakes positive positions about the protection o religious ree-dom and liberty or minority aith groups in urkey. It does not support anyacts o violence on national and international levels, including the targeting omembers and institutions o minority religious groups. Te Diyanetplants seedso respect, tolerance and acceptance o religious and cultural diversity, believ-ing that reedoms are the basis o social cohesion. It is due to the historicallegacy, constitutional provisions and efforts o the Diyanetthat urkey providesa ground where members o various aith groups can live side by side as equal

citizens o the same state. I should point out here that the Diyanethas expandedits own realm o reedom and its realm o deending reedoms o other religions.Te Diyanets consolidation o its positions on reedoms stems rom the act that

By embracing democracy, the

rule o law, and secularism,urkey has chosen a path

that enables people o variousbackgrounds to live peaceullyin the same social and political

order without abandoning theirculture, religion or identity


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we strongly deend religious liberty and

pluralism.Te Diyanet promotes a knowledge-

based practice o Islam in urkey, view-ing it as one o the oundations o authen-tic understanding o Islam. Islam values

scholarship and strongly emphasizes acts and deeds either based on knowledgeachieved by a sel-search or provided by the consensus o learned people. Such an

understanding o Islam, based on an authentic knowledge derived rom learning

and scholarship, provides sel-confidence to Muslims. Tis sel-confidence leadsto a more open society where minority aith groups are not be seen as a threat to

the public order and dominant religion. Moreover, such an understanding o Is-

lam prevents the misuse o Islam or political purposes by extremist groups.

Deending reedomsis another significant actor contributing to peaceul co-

existence in urkey. In this context the Diyanetbelieves that religion inspires peo-

ple to respect plurality and religious liberty. urkey differs rom many other Mus-

lim countries regarding the provision o reedom o religion. In urkey, we deendthe reedom o religion not only or the Muslim majority but also or minority

aith groups and even or atheists. I will give you one recent example to show the

extent to which we have expand our view o reedom o religion inspired by Islam.

In the last issue o our official journal, we stated that conversion to other religions

is an individual right even i a Muslim chooses to become a Christian. It doesnt

mean that we approve his/her choice on religious grounds. One might ask why

the Diyanetpromotes such a perception underlined by the notion o reedom. Te

answer to this question lies in the act that we read and interpret the same text di-erently rom many other Muslim societies.19

Lastly, I would like point out that in the Diyanet, we consider it our main re-

sponsibility to teach Muslims in urkey their own religion correctly on the basis

o scholarship and learning, and to represent Islam well. Our aim is not to convert

members o other religions to Islam. It is true that we consider Islam to be the

true religion. Yet we recognize that members o other religions consider their own

aith as the true one, and that this is their natural right. Still, we trust that our

differences on this issue should not prevent us rom engaging in dialogue overmatters o common interest.

An overwhelming portion

o urkish society considersreligion, democracy andsecularism compatible witheach other


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Endnotes

1. Majid Fakhry, Te Dialogue o Civilizations: Islam and the West, A Historical Perspective, inE. Ihsanoglu (ed.), Cultural Contacts in Building a Universal Civilization(Istanbul: IRCICA, 2005), p.310.

2. Public Expresses Mixed Views o Islam, Mormonism, Te Pew Forum and Religion and Pub-lic Life, (2007). Te ull report is available at http://peworum.org/assets/files/religionviews07.pd.

3. German Mistrust o Muslims and Islam Grows, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2025041,00.html

4. Ismail R. Faruqi and L. Lamya Faruqi, Te Cultural Atlas of Islam, (London: Te MacmillanCo, 1986), p. 191.

5. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu,A Culture of Peaceful Coexistence, (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2004), p. 17.

6. For more inormation on Islamophobia see Islamophobia:A Challenge for Us All, (London:Runnymede rust,1997);Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, (Vi-enna: Te European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006); Scott Poynting andVictoria Mason, Te resistible rise o Islamophobia,Journal of Sociology,Vol.43, No:1, (2007), pp.61-86; P. Gottschalk and G. Greenberg, Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy, (Lanham: Row-man & Littlefield, 2007).

7. On the treatment o non-Muslim communities under the Ottomans see Kemal H. Karpat,Millets and Nationality: Te Roots o the Incongruity o Nation and State in the Post-OttomanEra, in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire:Te Functioning ofa Plural Society,(New York: Holmes-Meier Publishers, 1982), Vol.1, p. 141-142; For the legal status

o non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire see M. Macit Kenanolu, Osmanl Devletinde Millet Sistemive Gayrimslimlerin Hukuki Statleri (1453-1856), (Te Millet System and the Legal Status o Non-Muslims in the Ottoman State), Unpublished Dissertation, (stanbul: Marmara University, 2001).

8. For more inormation see Leon Carl Brown (ed.), Imperial Legacy: the Ottoman Imprint on theBalkans and the Middle East(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

9. Alexsis Alexandres , Te Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-urkish Relations 1918-1974(Athens: Centre or Asia Minor Studies, 1983), p. 21.

10. For recent debates on religious minorities, see Jorgen Nielsen, Contemporary Discussionson Religious Minorities in Islam, Brigham Young University Law Review(2002), pp. -369.

11. Karpat, Millets and Nationality: Te Roots o the Incongruity o Nation and State in thePost-Ottoman Era, p. 141.

12. Stanord Show, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern urkey I (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1977), p. 151.

13. Donald Quataert, Te Ottoman Empire 1700-192 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2000), p. 175.

14. M. Aki Aydn, slam ve Osmanl Hukuku Aratrmalar(Istanbul: z yaynclk, 1996), p.233.

15. For the policies and practices towards non-Muslims during the Ottoman era see Karpat,Millets and Nationality: Te Roots o the Incongruity o Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era,

p. 141-142; alip Kkcan, State, Islam and Religious Liberty in Modern urkey: Reconfigurationo Religion in the Public Sphere, Brigham Young University Law Review, No. 2, (2003), p. 480-485;Bilal Erylmaz, Osmanl Devletinde Millet Sistemi(Istanbul: Aa Yaynclk, 1992).

16. Paul Dumont, Jewish Communities in urkey During the Last Decades o the Nineteenth


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Century in the Light o the Archives o the Alliance Isralite Universelle, in B. Braude and B. Lewis(ed.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: Te Functioning of a Plural Society (New York:Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), pp. 221-22.

17. Ali arkolu and Binnaz oprak, Religion, society and politics in a changing urkey(stanbul:ESEV, 2007)

18. For more inormation on the Diyanetsee Ali Bardakolu, Te Structure, Mission and So-cial Function o the Presidency o Religious Affairs (PRA), Te Muslim World, Vol: 98, No. 2-3,(2008), pp. 173-181.

19. For more inormation on the position o the Diyanetregarding various issues such as reli-gion, democracy, pluralism and human rights see Ali Bardakolu, Religion and Society: New Perspec-tives from urkey(Ankara: urkish Presidency o Religious Affairs, 2006)

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Insight Turkey 10 3 Ali Bardakoglu