Institutional trust in postcommunist Romania

Claudiu D. TufişInstitutul de Cercetare a Calităţii Vieţii

August 31, 2007 – CINEFOGO Summer School, Aberdeen

Starting point Postcommunist transition = holistic reform, radical social

change dilemma of simultaneity of transitions

“democracy has endured only in countries with a predominantly market-economy; and it has never endured in a country with a predominantly non-market economy” (Dahl, 1998: 166).

Excluding post-World War II Germany and Japan, the two systems have never been established simultaneously (Schopflin 1994; Hall 1995; Offe 1997; Pickel and Wiesenthal 1997).

Main assumptions Democratic transition and consolidation are not possible

in a society that does not accept the ideals of democracy: the stability of a democratic political system is dependent on its consistency with the political values of its people (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1989; di Palma 1990; Diamond 1993; Sørensen 1993; White, Gill and Slider 1993; Hahn 1995)

The people are: “the ultimate movers of reforms” (Sztompka, 1996a: 127) “the main obstacle to reform” (Przeworski, 1993: 185)

Main question Identifying and describing the evolution of political

culture in Romania from the beginning of the transition to the present.

At the most general level, the questions I am asking are: How does political culture change? Rephrased: How do comrades become citizens?

a case study of political culture change during the postcommunist transition in Romania

Why Romania? Theoretical expectation: failed transition. Initial findings:

“the proportion of democrats is greatest where traditions of democracy have historically been weakest, Romania” (Rose and Mishler, 1994: 170);

“the highest level by far of absolute support for democratic ideals is found in Romania […] Romania once more is the outlier on the pro-democracy side” (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 489, 496);

“rejection of the old regime is strongest and most widespread in Romania” (Mishler and Rose, 1996: 560).

significant gap between a theoretical expectation, that of a failed transition, and an empirical observation – a population characterized by high levels of support for democracy.

Viewed in these terms, Romania fits the definition of a negative case (Emigh 1997) or that of a deviant case (Lijphart 1971).

Theoretical framework (I - Easton)

Theoretical framework II (Eckstein, Swidler, Mishler and Pollack)

Data and methodology (I)

BOP (1998 - 2006) WVS / EVS (1993, 1997, 1999, 2005) USIA commissioned surveys (1990 – 1994, 1999) COMALP (1995) MECELEC (1996)

Data and Methodology (II) Missing data: multiple imputation using Norm (m=5) Index construction: PCA + MLFA w/ Oblimin rotation +

Cronbach’s Alpha (or KR-20) Descriptive analyses ANOVAs Regression analyses (OLS and logistic):

SES model Region model SES and region model Attitudinal model Full model

Trust in institutions Traditional institutions:

Church Army

Central state institutions: Parliament Cabinet Presidency Political parties

Local state institutions: Police Courts Local administration

Civil society institutions: Trade unions NGOs Mass-media

Trust in traditional institutions Non-partisan institutions, removed from the political and

economic aspects of the Romanian society Powerful symbols in the Romanian psyche

The decline of trust in the army corresponds to mass-media scandals (1997-1998: cigarette smuggling, 2002-2003: the poor state of the Romanian army)

Trivia: 90% of the Romanians believe in God + an additional 8% who believe in a life force

Sztompka (1999: 116): providentialism as a functional substitute for trust

Trust in state’s central institutions (I) Key actors of the political system and, as such, they have

a privileged position that allowed them to control the direction and the speed of the postcommunist transition.

First interesting trend: Decline over time. Putting the results into perspective (2006,

Eurobarometer 65): Trust in cabinet: RO=21%, NMS=29%, EU15=36% Trust in parliament: RO=15%, NMS=22%, EU15=41% Trust in political parties: RO=9%, NMS=14%, EU15=23%

Trust in state’s central institutions (II) Second interesting trend: significant honeymoon effect.

High levels of trust in cabinet (75%) and parliament (65%) at the beginning of the transition (inverse legitimation)

Not visible in 1992. Explanation: the incumbents won the elections + adjustment from the high levels recorded at the beginning of the transition.

1996: change in government. Center-right coalition wins increase in trust in cabinet from 31% to 66% and in parliament from 26% to 60%.

The honeymoon effect decreases over time.

Trust in state’s central institutions (III) Third interesting trend: the ranking of the institutions in

terms of trust is the same at any point during the transition: Presidency Cabinet Parliament Political parties

All four institutions have similar trajectories of trust over time.

Most trust in the institutions that can be identified with an actor.

Least trust in the faceless institutions.

Trust in state’s central institutions (IV)

Possible problems: Too much trust in presidency. Romanians still attached

to the idea of “the leader”. Romanians did not have time to learn trusting the

state’s institutions.

Trust in state’s local institutions

Not a very clear image.

Some indications of a honeymoon effect in the case of local administration in 1992 and 1996.

Mysterious significant decrease of trust in the judiciary (from 60% in 1997 to 30% in 1998).

Trust in civil society institutions Decrease of trust in mass media (1990 - 1997), explained by a

perceived lack of independence, followed by increase and stabilization around 60%-65%.

Trust in trade unions decreases over time: Trade unions were too close to the political arena Decrease in the % of population employed in state owned companies

Less than a third of the population trusts NGOs: Communist legacy Most visible NGOs are those working in the political arena, characterized

by a preference for the right side of the political spectrum low levels of trust since the majority of the population is leaning to the left.

Group differences in trust in the state’s central institutions Generalized decrease in institutional trust over time,

with the only exception being the 1999 – 2002 period, when most of the groups maintained their level of support and some (poorly educated, orthodox, and supporters of the governing party) have even managed to increase their support for the institutions of the state.

The groups that have more institutional trust are older people, poorly educated, living in the rural areas, and supporting the governing parties.

At the other extreme, young people, more educated, living in the urban areas, and supporting the opposition parties are characterized by lower levels of institutional trust.

Explaining trust in the state’s central institutions SES variables:

Gender – becomes significant only in 2005. Age – People over 60 years old have more trust in the state’s

institutions. Education – consistent negative effect, increasing over time.

Education has a significant positive effect on diffuse support for democracy and market economy the highly educated acted throughout the transition as guardians of democracy, always ready to punish the state’s institution for their deviations from the ‘normal’ behavior of democratic institutions.

Urban – consistent negative effect. Minority – has no effect.

Explaining trust in the state’s central institutions Attitudinal variables:

Church attendance – positive effect during the middle of the transition.

Interest in politics – strong positive effect at the end of the transition. This findings suggests that respondents with “high political capital” are more successful in distinguishing between institutions and their incumbents. (Similar finding: Dowley and Silver 2003).

Voting intention – Supporters of the governing parties have more trust in the state’s institutions (similar to Anderson’s findings).

Generalized trust – consistent positive effect. Spillover effect? (Similar finding in W. Europe found by Kaase 1999 and in CEE found by Dowley and Silver 2003).

Explaining trust in the state’s central institutions

Evaluation variables: Evaluations of future (not current) personal situation

have a significant positive effect prospective pocketbook theory is more appropriate in the Romanian context.

The more general indicator of satisfaction with life also has a significant positive effect, suggesting that trust in the state’s institutions should be interpreted as indicator of specific rather than of diffuse support.

Returning to the big picture High levels of diffuse support for the ideals of democracy and

market economy. The structure of the new system, however, does not enjoy

similar levels of support. Also low levels of specific support for the actions of the

economic and political systems.

Diffuse support for the principles of the system is immune to other forms of support.

Generalized support for the structure of the system is strongly influenced by specific support for the action of the system.