Integrated management of resources, risks and dependability of railway infrastructure facilities at lifecycle

stages. Case studies of the methodology application

Zamyshlyaev A.М. Head of R&D Complex

for Traffic Safety and Station Automation Systems, Dr. Sci.

Session II – 12th October 2015

stages. Case studies of the methodology application in Russian Railways divisions

QUOTES

A lot of yesterday's solutions are today's problems.

Sam Nunn

2

The wheel that squeaks the loudest is the one that gets the grease.

Henry W. Shaw

Sam Nunn

PATTERN OF THE MODERN COMPANY’S WORK

Increase of

income

Increase of

income

3

Compliance ManagementCompliance ManagementCompliance ManagementCompliance Management

Cost

reduction

Cost

reduction

INFRASTRUCTURE AND ROLLING STOCK FACILITIES OF JSC RZD

Infrastructure::

Length of operational tracks 85 200 km

Length of electrified lines 43 100 km

Lines equipped with signalling equipment 62 196 km

Railway stations 5 428

Traction substations 1 402

4

Rolling stock fleet:

Traction substations 1 402

Service units (track divisions) 742

Freight locomotives (electric and diesel) 11 191

Freight cars of all types and owners 1 600 000

Shunting engines (diesel) 6 016

Long-distance passenger cars 24 100

Commuter cars 15 600

Motive power and car depots 411

URGENT ISSUES

TODAY

� Technical maintenance of the network of Russian railways requires

tremendous expenditures related to maintaining the dependability

of infrastructure facilities and ensuring the safety of transportation

5

of infrastructure facilities and ensuring the safety of transportation

process.

� The share of railway infrastructure basic funds is more than 60% of

total JSC RZD fixed assets value.

� The share of OPEX for infrastructure facilities is about 35% of total

scope of JSC RZD OPEX.

TRANSFORMATION OF RAMS METHODOLOGY INTO URRAN SYSTEM

- THE SYSTEM OF DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT

RELIABILITY SAFETY

How often does failure occur?What are consequences

of some events?

6

AVAILABILITY MAINTAINABILITY

What operation facility volume is given at the disposal?

How well/badly can the system

be maintained?

RAMS

LIFE CYCLE

OBJECT

SAFETY DEPENDABILITY RESOURCES

SYSTEM FOR DECISION MAKING SUPPORT

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RAMS METHODOLOGY INTO URRAN SYSTEM

7

URRAN

RAMS

SAFETY DEPENDABILITY RESOURCES

Indicators ReliabilityLife cycle cost

management

Risk

managementMaintainability Availability Durability

Prolongation

of a set service

life

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Acq

uis

itio

n

Inst

alla

tio

n

Op

erat

ion

Uti

lizat

ion

BASIC PROCESESOF RAILWAY TRANSPORT

TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE

OBJECTS OF TECHNICAL

REGULATION

Facilities of electrification

and power supply

Track facilities

Modernization of infrastructure and rolling stock

Technical maintenance of infrastructure facilities and

rolling stock

URRAN – SET OF STANDARDS, METHODS AND GUIDELINES USED FOR MANAGEMENT OF LIFE-CYCLE PROCESSES OF RAILWAY SYSTEMS

8

Purpose of URRAN introduction: increase of the efficiency of railway transport operation based on adaptive management under the conditions of scarce resources

Facilities of signaling and remote control

Telecommunication facilities

Locomotive facilities

Procurement management

Management of environmental, fire, industrial and labor safety

and rolling stock

URRAN normative and

methodological framework

— 109 documents

RESOURCE MODEL OF TRACK LIFE CYCLE OPTIMIZATION ON THE BASIS OF PHISICAL DEPRECIATION EVALUATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE ELEMENTS

9

LIFE CYCLE OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT FACILITY

INCLUDING THE PROCESS OF MANUFACTURING

Stage 4Specification

Specification of RT facility

Expertise of RT facility specification

Analysis of the existing state of RT facilities,

market research

Report on concept development and design

application

Development of RT facility concept variants and their

feasibility studies

Stage 1Concept of RT

facility

Specification of project scope and purpose

Project management arrangement

Revisions of previously reached dependability and safety indices (including

analogs)

Stage 2Definition of RT facility

and its application conditions (initial

requirements specification)

Specification of maintenance and repair

Definition of maintenance conditions influencing RT

facility operation

Development of dependability and safety plans for design stages

Specification of safety policy

Specification of RT facility technical parameters

Stage 15De-

commissioning and Disposal

Decommissioning planning

Documentation

Stage 12Operation and maintenance

RT facility use for intended

purpose

Various types of

maintenance and repair as to

D

ИC

M

MD

DD

D

D

MC

C

C

CBC

CB

CB

C

C

ИC

Stage 3Risk analysis

Identification of risks and hazards (including

cyberthreats)

Risk level definition (rate and consequences

analyses)

Risk evaluation

Definition of risk criteria

Risk estimation

D C

Stage 9Installation

Stage 13Monitoring of operational parameters

Monitoring of costs and profits

of RT facility operation, LCC

analysis

Collection, analysis and evaluation of data on

performance indicators

Collection, analysis and

evaluation of data on

dependability and safety

Monitoring of hazards and threats, updating of hazards

and threats list

Stages 10 и 11Validation and

Acceptance

Acceptance testing

Check of conformity with

all contract specification

requirementsMC

10

specification

Patent researches

Review and revision of Dependability and Safety

Plans

Development of technical status map

Development of acceptance testing plan (validation

plan)

Stage 14Modification and

retrofit

To stage 2

Documentation preparation, deregistration

Disposal

Dismantling of components

Development of Safety Plan

for Decommissioning and

Disposal stage

Manufacture and customization of prototypes

Integration of SW and HW

Factory testing of prototypes

Supervised operation of prototypes (if required)

Approval of design documents upon results of factory testing

Conformity proof (of single products, prototype batch)

Acceptance testing of prototypes

Approval of design documents upon results of acceptance

testing

Engineering design development

Development, agreement and approval design specifications, operational and maintenance

manuals

Development of SW for functional components and program

documentation

Safety case preparation

Stages 5 и 6Apportionment of

requirements, Design and

Implementation Conceptual design development

Review and revision of Dependability and Safety Plans

Manufacture of

preproduction batch

Conformity proof (for mass

production)

Qualification testing of preproduction batch

Approval of design documents upon results of

qualification testing

Stage 7Manufacture(production)

Development of Dependability and Safety

Plans for Manufacture stage

Safety Policy revision for Manufacture stage

Material and technical

support

Preparation of maintenance

and service manuals and

instructions for operators

Development of

Dependability and Safety

Plans for Operation and

Maintenance stage

maintenance and repair as to

the rules or RT facility state

M C Installation planning

Revision of Dependability and Safety Plans for Manufacture stage

Revision of Safety Policy for further operation

Conformity proof (by

acceptance)

Commissioning

Safety case revision

Documentation preparation, registration

Development of Dependability and Safety

Plans for Manufacture stage upon acceptance

results

Supervised operation of preproduction batch (if

required)

Verification

Validation

M

D

CB

C - Customer

- Certification body

- Manufacturer

- Designer

Stage 8 Tender procurement

Bid notice

Selection of manufacturer (supplier)

Analysis and comparison of manufacturers (suppliers)

offers

Preparation of supply contract specification and

contract signing

Preparation of requirements for RT facility

or its components to be procured

Provide for:

• Procurement with consideration

of a life cycle cost.

• Repairs according to technical

condition based on risk

assessment.

• Improvement of reliability and

GOST– 2

Terminology

GOST R– 5

subject matters:

– risk management;

– classification of dependability and functional safety indicators

STO RZD corporate standards– 16

subject matters :

– risk management including professional risks management;

– requirements and indicators of dependability and functional safety;

URRAN NORMATIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

11

• Improvement of reliability and

safety of technical devices

under the conditions of scarce

resources.

• Improvement of efficiency of the

resources redistribution over life

cycle stages

– requirements and indicators of dependability and functional safety;

– life cycle cost management;

– assessment of cyber security of control systems SW

Methodology instructions– 78

subject matters :

– technical devices risk assessment;

– calculation of reliability and functional safety;

– economics and procurement;

– performance assessment of structural divisions

Classifiers– 8

subject matters :

– pre-failures;

– procurement

109 documents in total

The standard outlines the approach and

guidelines for risks management on railway

transport related to traffic safety and

railway operation.

The standard will allow to use a new

approach towards the management of

GOST R 54505-2011. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY. RISK MANAGEMENT ON RAILWAY TRANSPORT

12

approach towards the management of

dependability and functional safety of

railway transport facilities based on risks

management.

Also, Guidelines are developed for

practical application of this national

standard where one can find the standard

clauses clarified, the methods of risk

analysis examined and the examples of risk

calculations provided.

According to IEC 62278 (the international standard on RAMS):

RISK DEFINITION ACCORDING TO RAMS METHODOLOGY

13

on RAMS):

RISK is a combination of the probability of harm occurrence and the severity of that harm

TYPICAL LEVELS OF EVENT RATES

RateEvent frequency

per year, fDescription

Frequent f > 10-3 Can occur frequently. Continuous hazard

Probable 5×10-4 ≤ f < 10-3 Repeated occurrence. Frequent occurrence of hazard is anticipated.

14

Occasional 10-4 ≤ f < 5×10-4 Probability of repeated occurrence. Repeated occurrence of hazard is anticipated.

Remote 5×10-5 ≤ f < 10-4Probability of the event occurring sometimes during the life cycle of a facility. Grounded expectation of hazard occurrence.

Improbable 10-5 ≤ f < 5×10-5Probability of occurrence is unlikely but possible. Hazard can presumably occur in extraordinary cases.

Incredible f ≤ 10-5 Probability of occurrence is very unlikely. Hazard cannot presumably occur.

Note: Values of event frequency per year are provided as an example.

Severity levels of consequences

Consequences as to types of risksInternal risks External risks

Catastrophic1 or more dead, or 5 or more railway employees critically injured or

Train damaged to the point of being put out of the fleet park orDamage to infrastructure facility in the size of over 5000 MW

1 or more dead, or 5 or more railway employees critically injured

orThreat to environment caused

emergency of federal or interregional scale

Up to 5 railway employees critically injured or1 dead, or 1 or more people critically injured as a result of deliberate or

careless actions of the victim or other persons who are not railway employees or

Up to 5 railway employees critically injured. 1 dead, or 1 or more people

critically injured as a result of deliberate or careless actions of the victim or other persons who are not

TYPICAL LEVELS OF CONSEQUENCES SEVERITY (EXAMPLE)

16

Critical employees or

Damage to rolling stock requiring to do capital repair for its operation recovery or

Damage to infrastructure facility in the size of 1500 to 5000 MWorTotal loss of goods

victim or other persons who are not railway employees.

orThreat to environment caused

emergency of regional or intermunicipal scale

Insignificant

Mid-size damage to health orDamage to rolling stock requiring to do mid-size or depot repair for its

operation recovery orDamage to infrastructure facility in the size of from 500 to 1500 MW

or Partial loss of goods

Mid-size damage to health or

Threat to environment caused emergency of local or municipal scale

Negligible

Minor damage to health orDamage to rolling stock requiring to do running repair for its operation

recovery orDamage to infrastructure facility in the size of less than 500 MW

Minor damage to healthor

Insignificant threat to environment

Note: MW is a minimum wage that may be legally paid to employees in Russia.

MODELS AND METHODS APPLIED FOR RISK ASSESSMENT IN JSC RZDFailure mode, effects and criticality analysis

(FMECA)

Effect Attenuation Sensibility

Functioning of a dangerous element

Construction, object’s security

features

Physical factor

Fire-related risks on diesel locomotives

Level of blocking of an initiating event

Level of blocking of escalation of fire-related events

YИН=m1·ББАЗА + m2 · БТЕХ + m3 · БЭКСПЛ + m4 · БЧФ + m5 · ББиМ

Specifies the possibility to prevent initiating events by means of proper maintenance and repair and/or locomotive structural feature. Depends on

Yблок=m1·Бпуть2 + m2 · ББиМEXAMPLE

Specifies the possibility to block the chain of fire-related failures and stop the development level on failures of a component without firing. Depends on the operation at the route and fire danger of the applied materials

Unit/componentLevel of blocking of

initiation, %Level of blocking of

escalation, %Average level of

blocking

Diesel exhaust system 80 70 75Cooling system 75 80 78

Fuel system 80 70 75Exhaust system ,

Failure tree analysis (FTA)

System failure

Failure of components

Failure of elements

Events generating failures

Types of effects

Exhaust system , drainage system

75 80 78

Electrics 60 80 70Traction motor 80 70 75

Oil system 75 80 78Turbocharger 75 80 78

Fire-related failures on electric locomotives

БПС

Картс рисков «Нагрев»

Нарушение

крепления

Холодная скрутка

Некачественная

пайка

Отключение защиты

Применение

нетиповых деталей

Нарушение изоляции

Излом

Обледенение

Термическое воздействие

Заклинивание

Отказ

МЗ

НагревОплавлениеНагретая

поверхность

Событие возгорания

Отсутствие

Уровень 3. Возникновение источника зажигания

3.2 Воздействие источника зажигания

3.1 Источник зажигания

Уровень 2. Основное пожароопасное

событие

Уровень 1. Переходные процессы (ПС)

1.2 Развитие ПС1.1 Инициация

ПС

Причины пожара

Группа причин ПС

Событие возгоранияПроцесс, предшесвующий возгоранию

Быстротечные элект. процессы

Электические процессы

Механические процессы

Человеческий фактор/ремонт

Человеческий фактор/эксплуатация

Узлы

1) Электрические машины и их электрические цепи;2) Электрические аппараты и оборудование;3) Вспомогательные электрические машины и их электрические цепи;4) Высоковольтные цепи;5) Низковольтные цепи;6) Систему вентиляции локомотива;7) Пневматическое оборудование;8) Другое.

17

MATRIX OF FIRE-RELATED RISKS IN RAILWAY STATIONS

Railway Station Risk Level Standardizedrisk level

Number of potential fire

sourcesFire risk with no consideration of fire protection systems

Fire risk with consideration of fire protection systems

Kazansky Undesirable Negligible 5,07·10-3 2

Rizhsky Undesirable Acceptable 2,97·10-3 3

Savelovsky Undesirable Negligible 7,6·10-3 2

17

Frequent

Probable

Occasional

Remote

Improbable

Incredible

Rizhsky

Savelovsky

Kazansky

RISK LEVEL LEVEL OF CONSEQUENCES

Station Fire-related risk Public (social) risk

Samara 10--−-6 4·10--−-6

Belorussky 10--−-6 5,3·10--−-6

Saratov 10--−-6 4·10--−-6

Kaliningrad -Yuzhny 10--−-6 5,3·10--−-6

RESULTS OF TEST CALCULATIONS

OF FIRE-RELATED RISKS IN RUSSIAN RAILWAYS’ STATIONS

18

Kaliningrad -Yuzhny 10-- 5,3·10--

Rostov-glavny 4·10--−-6 1,6·10--−5

Chelyabinsk 10--−-6 4·10--−-6

Yaroslavl 10--−-4 5,4·10--−-4

Krasnoyarsk 5,5·10--−-7 2,2·10--−-6

Novosibirsk 1,1·10--−-4 5,5·10--−-4

Kievsky 1,1·10--−-4 4,4·10--−5

Moscovsky 5·10--−-6 2,5·10--−-5

Leningradsky 5·10--−-6 2,5·10--−-5

Kazansky 10--−-6 5,18·10--−-6

ETA METHOD FOR ASSESSMENT OF WORK RELATED INJURIES

Step1) Analysis of the event possible occurrence: determination of major criterion

affecting the activation of hazard impact under the work performance

Step 2) Calculation of the expected �Барьер� =�э� ∙ опер��

�=1

�э� ∙ опер�

19

number of injuries occurred by the state of each barrier

Step 3) Calculation of the expected number of injuries in general for the

performed work

�проишествие =�Барьер�3

�=1

�Барьер� =�э� ∙ опер��

�=1

Event Tree

MODEL OF RISK ESTIMATION OF PEDESTRIAN INJURY RATES

AT ONE-LEVEL PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS

20

Average time of train being on a pedestrian crossing of i-th track (i = 1, 2) for train length Li , train speed vi and

width of crossing d

Average time of a pedestrian being on a pedestrian crossing of single track with pedestrian movement speed vp

and crossing length l

i

ii v

dL +=τ

pp v

l=τ

Single-track section Double-track section

EXAMPLE OF A FAILURE TREE FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABILITY

OF THE PEDESTRIAN CONGRUENT BEHAVIOR

21

( )( )П1

П11,

1ττ

TT

Pf a

aп ⋅−+=

TOTAL

RISK MATRIX OF PEDESTRIAN INJURY RATES AT ONE-LEVEL PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS

(exemplified by POVAROVO)

CONSEQUENCE (DAMAGE) LEVEL

category 3,

category 2,

category 1

1 and more insignificant

injures<50 thousand of

rubles.

1 serious injury200 thousand of

rubles.

1 fatality(2-10 serious

traumas)4 000 thousand

rbl.

2 - 5 fatality20 000 thousand

rbl.

> 5 fatalities> 20 000

thousand rbl.

Insignificant Serious Critical Catastrophic Disastrous

22

FREQUENCY LEVEL 1 2 3 4 5

R≥ 10-1 Frequent F F1 F2 F3 F4 F5

10-2 ≤ R <10-1 Probable P P1 P2 P3 P4 P5

10-3 ≤ R <10-2 Occasional O O1 O2 O3 O4 O5

10-4 ≤ R <10-3 Remote R R1 R2 R3 R4 R5

10-5 ≤ R <10-4 Improbable IP IP1 IP2 IP3 IP4 IP5

R < 10-5 Incredible I I1 I2 I3 I4 I5

2010:2 fatalities,3 injuries

9,9·10-1

2,3·10-1

1,64·10-2

solebar - 2bolster - 1

Number of solebars manufactured by one

supplier per year: 20 000– 16 0000 units

Number of bolsters manufactured by one

supplier per year:10 000 – 70 000 units

FREIGHT WAGON BOGIE (example)

23

Frequency of wagon inspection during maintenance:one per 800 km travelled, on the average.

– 16 0000 units10 000 – 70 000 units

Allowable number of faulty bolsters per

batch: 4х10-4

Allowable number of faulty selebars per

batch: 2х10-4

Allowable rate of failure of moulded parts: 1х10-6 per year (1 failure per

1 mil items per year)

SPECIFICATION OF STANDARD (ALLOWABLE) VALUES

Allowable rate of failure of moulded parts: 1×10-6 per year

(not more than 1 failure per 1 mil items per year)

24

Allowable number of faulty solebars in R-55 per batch: 2×10-4

USER INTERFACE OF THE SYSTEM OF CONSTRUCTION OF RISK MATRICES

RELATED TO BREAKS AND DEFECTS OF FREIGHT WAFON SOLEBARS

Choice of the report type• Full matrix

Choice of the period for analysis

System version: 1.15 Revision list

Report type Report type

Risk matrix (breaks of truck frames) Forecastgraph

Risks related to breaks and defects of frames produced by

Uralvagonzavod

Production of batches As of

quartersince till year TO FORM

25

Choice of the manufacturing plant • Bezhitsk steel plant• AzovElectroStal• Altaivagon• Kremenchug steel plant• Promtraktor-Promlit• Uralvagonzavod

• Full matrix• Summary matrix• Forecast graph Choice of the production year

Defects BreaksFailures Critical breaks

REFERENCE DATA

Very frequent

Revision listSystem version:

1.15Report type Report type

Risks related to breaks and defects of frames produced by Production of batches As of

year201420132002Full risk matrix Bezhitsk stall plantRisk matrix (breaks of truck frames) to formquarter1

CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPLETE MATRIX OF RISKS

RELATED TO BREAKS AND DEFECTS OF FREIGHT WAGON SOLEBARS

26

Fre

quen

cy L

evel

Level of severity of consequences

Frequent

Probable

Occasional

Remote

Incredible

Improbable

Insignificant,Marginal

Critical,Catastrophic

CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORECAST GRAPH OF A RISK LEVEL FOR 2002-2013 YEARS

OF BATCH PRODUCTION BY URALVAGONZAVOD

Dynamics of breaks related risks - UVZ

Report type Report type

Risk matrix (breaks of truck frames) Forecastgraph Uralvagonzavod

Production of batches As of

quartersince till year TO FORM

REFERENCE DATA

Risks related to breaks and defects of frames produ ced by

the

freq

uen

cy o

f ca

tast

rop

hic

eve

nts

27

Year of manufacture

Year of observance

Ris

k le

vel r

edu

ced

to

the

freq

uen

cy o

f ca

tast

rop

hic

eve

nts

MATRIX OF RISK OF DOWNTIME DUE TO THE FAILURES OF MDRS EQUIPMENT

BY THE EXAMPLE OF SVERDLOV DIRECTORATE FOR THE YEAR 2014

No. Types of equipment Risk level, train-h per year

1 2 3Electrics of a power circuit,

failu

re o

f tec

hnic

al fa

cilit

ies

of c

ateg

orie

s 1, 2

and

3, 1

per

yea

r FREQUENT

PROBABLE

OCCASIONAL

28

1Electrics of a power circuit, ancillary circuit and control lines

2099,3 unacceptable

2 Diesel and diesel equipment 7,8 acceptable

3Locomotive underframe and mechanical equipment

421,4 undesirable

4 Traction electric engines 668,2 undesirable

5Brake and air brake control equipment

344,5 undesirable

6Automatic control systems for traction and brake modes, electrics

negligible

7 Safety equipment 65,3 negligible

8 Ancillary electric machinery 1,3 negligible

TOTAL 3607,8 UNACCEPTABLE

Eve

nt fr

eque

ncy

–fai

lure

of t

echn

ical

faci

litie

s of

cat

egor

ies

Specific damage — mean downtime for 1 failure, train-h

REMOTE

IMPROBABLE

INCREDIBLE

INSIGNIFICANT MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC

COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF MAINENANCE PLANNING BASED ON

LEGACY METHOD AND URRAN

State of the art

Fa

ilu

re r

ate

Unacceptable

Undesirable

Acceptable

Negligible

Yaroslavl Arkhangelsk

29

URRAN-based planningLegacy planning method

Yaroslavl Arkhangelsk Yaroslavl Arkhangelsk

Fa

ilu

re r

ate

Fa

ilu

re r

ate

– 19 line section of total 174,6 km identified

– sections with the given average failure rat

chosen

– 47 line sections of total 199,5 km identified

– corrected sections with average failure rate of

Activities are scheduled in the Northern Railway where the failure rate is 9 times higher than under the

legacy procedure

EFFICIENCY OF URRAN IN GENERATION OF TRACK MAINTENANCE PLANNING

BEFORE MAINTENANCE

Failure rate, per year km 24,3·10–2

Ча

сто

та о

тка

зов

Track coordinate, km

Length: 7,001 km

Freight traffic: 92,48 mil gross t

Tonnage handled: 1418,1 mil gross t

Technical characteristics

Bakhmetskoye — Tugulym line

Unacceptable

Undesirable

Acceptable

Negligible

30

Failure rate, per year km 24,3·10

Failure rate, per year km 7·10–3

AFTER MAINTENANCE

Ча

сто

та о

тка

зов

Track coordinate, km

EFFECTS

Technical EconomicReduction of failure rate

by 23,6·10–2 per year kmReduction of maintenance cost

by 9,24 mil RUB

Unacceptable

Undesirable

Acceptable

Negligible

Effect 1. Reduction of expenditure on operational maintenance

Is achieved

by

Carrying out capital repairs on lines where operational maintenance expenditures exceed the limit

of an economical criterion as well as introducing into the repair plan those lines where the highest

FINDINGS: EFFECTS CAUSED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE URRAN METHODOLOGY

INTO THE TRACK SECTOR OF THE NORTHERN RAILWAY

31

Extending the service life for lines that have processed all the predefined tons but have not reached

the limits in terms of either technical or economical criteria

Effect 2. Reduction of the average annual cost of capital repairs

of an economical criterion as well as introducing into the repair plan those lines where the highest

reduction of expenditures on operational maintenance is forecast

Is achieved by

Economic effect per 1 km of track sections selected for repairs is 94 thousand of rubles

DETERMINATION OF TIME FOR THE NEXT PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF THE OBJECT

32

where С1 is a penalty for the object’s failure,С2 is a penalty for preventive maintenance of the object,Y(ni) is a decision function, and with Y(ni) > 1 one makes a decisionon the object’s overhaul.

URRAN SYSTEM HIERARCHY

PROCESS

DEPENDABILITY

GOST R

54505- 2011

Risk of non-provision of service

Process violations

(KASAT)

Railway systems

FU

NC

TIO

NA

L

DE

PE

ND

AB

ILIT

Y

RIS

K

MA

NA

GE

ME

NT

SERVICESPassenger traffic

Freight traffic

RAILWAY LINES

TRANSPORTATION PROCESS

PROCESSES

Traffic management

Railway infrastructure and rolling stock

maintenance, etc.

RAILWAY TECHNICAL SYSTEMS

33

. . . . . .

. . .. . .

GOST

32192-2013

Railway systems

dependability

Components

dependability

Technical failures

(KAS ANT)

ST

RC

TU

RA

L D

EP

EN

DA

BIL

ITY

Ra

ilw

ay

tra

ck

Ra

ilw

ay

au

tom

ati

on

an

d

rem

ote

co

ntr

ol

Ra

ilw

ay

po

we

r

sup

ply

Ra

ilw

ay

tele

com

mu

nic

ati

on

s

EM

Us

Loco

mo

tiv

es

RAILWAY TECHNICAL SYSTEMS(complex systems)

RAILWAY SYSTEMS COMPONENTS(simple systems)

EMUs

electric locomotives

diesel locomotives

DMUs

ПССОТС

ОбТССПДи т.д.

КСТП

ЛЭП

PICTC

TSSmarsh. syst.

etc.

CLSw

bridgesetc.

railssleepers

fasteningsballast

frogsetc.

lightsrelays

switchescables

batteriesetc.

supportscables

insulatorsswitches

transformeretc.

КООАСПКО

OFCLАФУetc.

Electric equipmentэ

braking equipment

diesel equipment

electric traction machines

safety devices

etc.

RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE ROLLING STOCK

IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONALITY OF KASANT

KASANT OPERATIONAL RESULTS

Data for report systems (Information service «Effect»)

Analytical data of operation of technical

KASANT

CONTROL OVER THE USER WORKING IN THE SYSTEM

Control НЗ-1 of the failure timeliness

Appointment НЗ-1 of the responsible

persons in case of controversies

USER WORKING WITH DATA ON

SYSTEMS INTEROPERABLE

WITH KASANT

SO

UR

CE

OF

OB

JEC

TIV

E I

NFO

RM

AT

ION

AB

OU

T F

AIL

UR

ES

OF

JS

C

RZ

D T

EC

HN

ICA

L FA

CIL

ITIE

S

Automated system of the train scheduling

(GID «Ural-VNIIZhT»)

Equipment for control of Equipment for control of the rolling stock technical

state on a train run (KTSM)

34

Analytical data of operation of technical facilities and causes of their failures

Initial data for reliability calculation in URRAN system

Initial data for the planning of measures to improve reliability of technical facilities

USER WORKING WITH DATA ON

FAILURES OF TECHNICAL FACILITIES

Forward to another

department

Consideration of

failures

Input of failure investigation

materials

Automatic generation of initial

directorate

Automatic generation of initial information about a failure, and

transfer to a relevant department,directorate

Single base of failures(and their causes)

of technical facilities

SO

UR

CE

OF

OB

JEC

TIV

E I

NFO

RM

AT

ION

AB

OU

T F

AIL

UR

ES

OF

JS

C

RZ

D T

EC

HN

ICA

L FA

CIL

ITIE

S

(KTSM)

Automated system of Automated system of warnings generation and

cancellation(ASU VOP-2)

Automated system of the monthly inspections of

stations (AS KMO)

Automated systems of the facilities management

(ASU SH-2, ASU E, ASU P)

TECHNOLOGY OF LONG-TERM PLANNING OF REPAIRING ACTIVITIES BASED ON DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM ADK-I ERA

35

System of control of basic rail parameters

Analysis of deviation growthdepending on the operational results (incl. handled tonnage)

Forecast of deviation growth rate and assessment of track state

based on probabilistic estimate according to the results of diagnostic system control

Fai

lure

ra

te

λ(t)

INCREASING INFORMATION RELIABILITY AS PART OF KASANT FUNCTIONALITY DEVELOPMENT

OVER 25 000 ACTIVE USERS ARE CURRENTLY CONNECTED TO THE SYSTEM ,OVER 120 FORMS OF OUTGOING REFERENCE DOCUMENTS IMPLEMENTED AT DIVISION AND NETWORK LEVELS

RE

LIA

BIL

ITY

OF

IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

AVERAGE NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED

TECHNICAL FAILURES PER MONTH

13000

14000

15500

DEVELOPEMNT OF SYSTEM AND

DIAGNISTICS FACILITIES

36

RE

LIA

BIL

ITY

OF

IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

8000

4000

11000

Since mid-2006 Since July 1, 2008 Since July 1, 2009 Since June 2010 2011 – 2013

ARM PSO SYSTEM FIRST STAGE OF KAS ANT SECOND STAGE OF KAS ANT KAS ANT FUNCTIONALITY DEVELOPMENT

MANUAL

DATA INPUT

MANUAL DATA INPUT+

DID URAL-VNIIZHT

EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT

EXCHANGE IN TRAIN GRAPH OPERATION

KAS ANT INTEGTATION

IN FACILITIES’ ACSs

KAS ANT INTEGRATION

WITH KTSM

EXPANSION OF FUNCTIONALITY AND

DEPLOYMENT SITES OF INDUSTRY ACSs

INTEGRATED WITH KAS ANT

FAILURE DISTRIBUTION IN THE OPERATION OF TECHNICAL FACILITIES

BY RESPONSIBILITY OF EXTERNAL COMPANIES IN SEPTEMBER 2013

BY FUNCTIONAL UNITS (6 months 2015)

Wagon complex35,93%

Track9,78%

Signalling and remote control10,13% Power supply

1,97%Passenger division

1,29%

Other causes(c.5.16 of Regulations)

1,02%

Об

ласть

приняти

я

неотл

ож

ны

х м

ер

37

Other1,76%

Locomotive complex38,12%

Other external companies, service0,89%

Transportation complex0,39%

НОД-4 Petropavlovsk0,24%

Construction and installation organizations

0,19%

Other divisions, affiliated to JSC RZD 0,05%

Wag

on c

ompl

ex

Loco

mot

ive

com

plex

Sig

nalli

ngan

d re

mot

e co

ntro

l

Tra

ck

Pow

er s

uppl

y

Pas

seng

er d

ivis

ion

Oth

er c

ause

s(c

.5.1

6 R

egul

atio

ns)

Oth

er e

xter

nal

com

pani

es,

Tra

nspo

rtat

ion

com

plex

НО

Д-4

P

etro

pavl

ovsk

к

Con

stru

ctio

n an

d in

stal

latio

n or

gani

zatio

ns

Oth

er d

ivis

ions

, aff

iliat

ed to

JS

C

RZ

D»

Об

ласть

неотл

ож

ны

х

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

50000

34 808

47 494

LOSSES DUE TO TECHNICAL FACILITIES FAILURES AND TECHNOLOGICAL VIOLATIONS ON THE RAILWAYS IN SEPTEMBER 2013

38

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

17282 430 783 1319

247 337 286 2431271 887 779 365 699 571 305

16 551

4

19 51716 724

13 958 14 615 14 123

17 885 18 15919 510

9 89612 668

10 506 9 970

GENERALLY THE LOSSES DUE TO TECHNICAL FACILITIES FAILURES ESTIMATED ABOUT4% OF TRAIN-HOURS LOSSES REGISTERED IN KASAT

LOSS OF TRAIN-HOURS DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL

BREAKDOWNS

LOSS OF TRAIN-HOURS DUE TO TECHNICAL

FACILITIES FAILURES

STATE OF THE ART AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF KASAT FUNCTIONALITY

DIVISIONAL DATABASE

OF ASOUP2 SYSTEM

SUBSYSTEM FOR EVALUATION OF POROCESS

VIOLATIONS IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONS

DATA ON ACTUAL TRAIN TRAFFCI BASED ON GID URAL-VNIIZHT

RE

FE

RE

NC

E I

NF

OR

MA

TIO

N O

N

SU

BD

IVIS

ION

S,

TE

RR

ITO

RIE

S

WIT

HIB

N R

AIL

WA

Y

CALCUALTION OF TRAIN HOUR LOSSES, DETERIORATION

OF OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO PROCESS

VIOLATION INVESTIGATION MATERALS

DATA SYNCHRONISATION UPON RECEIPT OF

INFPORMATION ON CHANGES. CALCULATION OF

CONSOLIDATED INDICATORS PER SUBDIVISIONS,

TERRITORIES

GENERATION OF INFORMATION ON TRAIN TRAFFIC

THROUGH ENDS OF BLOCK SECTIONS BASED ON DATA

RECEIVED FROM ASOUP-2

EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE

WAGON FLEET SIZE ON THE STABILITY OF

THE TRANSPORTATION PROCESS

GENERATION OF NETWORK-WIDE

STATISTICS ON TRAIN DELAYS BASED ON

INVESTIGATION OF VIOLATIONS

39

MARK

CLASSIFIER

STATIONMASTER’S

WORKSTATION

URAL-VNIIZHT TRAIN

GRAPH

AUTOMATED SYSTEM

(STATION ACS)

MARK CLASSIFIER

STATIONMASTER’S WORKSTATION

STATIONMASTER’S MARKS ON TRAIN GRAPCH

DISRUPTIONS

SHUNTING DISPATCHER’S MARKS ON PROCESS VIOLATIONSIN

STATION’S TRAIN GRAPH

SUBSYSTEM FOR ACCOUNTING AND ANALYSIS OF

PROCESS VIOLATIONS

DATA ON THE CAUSES, RESPONSIBILITY

FOR PROCESS VIOLATIONS

AND DELAYED TRAINS

CLASSIFIER OF CAUSES OF PROCESS VIOLATIONS

SERVICE (DIRECTORATE) OR

UNIT DISPATCHER’S

WORKSTATION

INPUT OF INFORMATION ON CUASES OF PROCESS

VILATIONS USING EXTENDED KASAT CLASSIFIER

CONFIRMATION OF RESPONSIBILITY OF A FACILITY

FOR PROCESS VIOLATION OR REDIRECTION BASED

ON THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF CAUSES

GENERATION OF INITIAL INFORMATION ON

TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS BASED ON DISPATCHER’S

NOTE

IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES OF TRAFFIC

DISRUPTION IN PRIMARY ROUTES

ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS OF LOSSES

CAUSED BY PROCESS VIOLATIONS.

PREPARATION OF MEASURES FOR

INCREASING THE DEPENDABILITY OF

TRANSPORTATION PROCESS

FUNCTIONS IMPLEMENTED IN CURRENT VERSION OF THE SYSTEM POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL VIOLATIONS IN KASAT

MORE THAN 30 FORMS OF RESULT REFERENCES FOR THE WORK WITH SYSTEM DATA ARE AVAILABLE FOR THEUSERS ON DIVISIONAL AND NETWORK LEVELS

FORMS OF RESULT REFERENCES ARE IMPLEMENTED WITH A POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DETALIZATION TOENSURE, IF NECESSARY, THE REVIEW OF INFORMATION OF A SPECIFIC VIOALTION

FLEXIBLE SETTINGS OF THE RESULT REFERENCES PARAMETERS ALLOW TO SET VARIOUS CRITERIA FOR THESELECTION OF DATA FOR A DETAILED ANALYSIS

Analysis of technological breakdowns of cat. 1-2 Analysis of technological breakdowns of cat. 1-2

Reporting periodReporting period

Analysis of technological breakdowns of cat. 1-2

Reporting period

40

SOME FORMS OF REFERENCES ARE DEVELOPED FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF CRITICALITY OF VIOLATIONSCAUSES THROUGH THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE LOSS OF TRAIN-HOURS

Data sourceData source

Period fromPeriod fromtoto

Breakdown categoryBreakdown category

Breakdown typeBreakdown type

Breakdown pointBreakdown point

RailwayRailway

DivisionDivision

StationStation

Open lineOpen line

Data source

Period fromto

Breakdown category

Breakdown type

Breakdown point

Railway

Division

Station

Open line

FRAGMENT OF THE RESULT REFERENCE OF LOSSES DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKDOWNS AT THE YARDS AND APPROACHES

Yard name TOTALMaintenance of locomotive fleet

in operation

Handling of the trains of

superior direction , coupled

trains

Construction and repairs

Failure of a locomotive crew to be present at the train

departure

Untimely forward of a locomotive

crew

Non-acceptance by a

neighboring line

Non-acceptance by a station

Train control by a duty

dispatcher device

Other

41

THE REFERENCE REPRESENTS THE LOSSES OF TRAIN-HOURS IN FREIGHT TRAFFIC DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKDOWNS. THE REFERENCE COULD BE DETALIZED UP TO A SPECIFIC RAILWAY

URRAN SYSTEMIndicators calculation unit (primary)

Safety- Probability of fault-free operation

- Hazardous failure rate- Average time of secure state recovery

ReliabilityDependability

- Failure rate- Probability of fault-free operation

Availability

Maintainability

Database

EK ASUTR

Delivery of proposals for to

motivation of employees of

JSC RZD business units

Planning of strategic

measures

Operational costs and

investments

Decision making support unit

Business units

performance

evaluation unit

DatabaseSIS Effekt

Database

KASKOR (SDO)

Preparation of plans of

technical training of

Infrastructure Directorate

employees

Unit for risk analysis and

evaluation of business

activities of Tr, S, E

divisions

Subsystem of decision

making support for

management of

dependability of Tr, S, E

divisions’ facilities

Unit for prediction of Tr, S, E

facilities’ condition

- Availability factor- Efficiency retention factor

- Downtime ratio

- Routine breaks sufficiency factor

Operational activities

plan

Database

ASU Invest

Acquisition of data as per

strategic measures plan

AS ETD

Longevity

evaluation unit

Decisions execution control

KPI control

UCP URRAN(Unified corporate platform

URRAN)

Database

EK ASU FR

Acquisition of data as per

operational activities plan

Economy unit

STRUCTURE OF THE UCP URRAN SYSTEM

42

Databases of services

Tr, S, E

Interfaces for acquisition of data on superstructure

condition, Sg and El services facilities

IS ASU-IBasic ACSs

DatabaseASOUP-2

Interface for acquisition of

information on trainflows from ASOUP-2

Database

GID-Ural

Interface for acquisition of

information on operational

activities from GID-Ural

Industrial ACSs

Database

KASANT

Interface for acquisition of

data on technical failures from KASANT

Database

KASAT

Interface for acquisition of

data on technical disturbances from KASAT

Database of

incidents

Interface for acquisition of

data on malfunctions and pre-failure conditions

Database

of possessions

Interface for acquisition of

information on maintenance

activities

Database of

warnings

Interface for acquisition of

data on warnings

DatabaseAS TsNSI

Interface for acquisition of general classifiers,

reference books, etc.

DatabaseASU T, ES PUL

Interface for acquisition of data on locomotive facilities

condition

Database

ASK PS

Interface for acquisition of data on KTSM safety

devices condition

Database

- Diagnostic systems data;

- Mobile diagnostic and measuring

systems data;- Inspections data.

DatabaseDatabase

ADK-I ERA

KVL-P, etc.

Database

ASU V

Interface for acquisition of

data on rolling stock facilities condition

Maintainability

- Average downtime- Average recovery time

- Average time between maintenance

- Design life extension

- Mean total labor intensity of routine maintenance- Mean and total cost of operation an maintenance

- Total cost of overhaul (modernization)

Resources

* - ASU PTO, AR BH

Database(EK ASU I (ASU-P))

Interface for acquisition of data on maintenance cost,

repair, modernization of infrastructure facilities

(PU 28/29)

Unit for generation of output

calculated indicators references

Unit for generation of output reports on evaluation and planning

of JSC RZD business activities

Database

GIS RZD

Display of calculation results

on the electronic map of the

railway system

Communication of JSC RZD

infrastructure condition

indicators

Unit for generation of

railway infrastructure

components database

subject to operating

conditionsUnit for optimization of

resources distribution

(economy unit)

Database

AS KMO

Interface for acquisition of data on monthly

commission inspections

Databaseof GI

Interface for acquisition of data on the results of

general inspections of track

Subsystem of decision

making support for

extension of design lifetime

of Tr, S, E facilities

evaluation unit

Analysis unit

of the URRAN system

- Material flows management, inventory;

- Contract management, balance of payments

execution;

- Financial and economic analysis.

AS ETD

Robustness- Robustness factor

- Operational robustness factor

Database

AS RB

Interface for acquisition of

data on events affecting train traffic safety

Database

ESMA

Interface for acquisition of

data on communications facilities condition

DatabaseTsOMM

Interface for acquisition of data from driver routes

Database

AS EP MVPS

Interface for acquisition of

data on electric multiple units condition

№ Services, facilities Assessed facilities Assessed units

1.

Department of Tracks and

Structures

And Central Directorate for

Track Maintenance

�Main tracks;� Station tracks;� Switches;� Track maintenance trains.

� Track maintenance trains;� Track sections; �Maintenance sections;� Track facilities at division level.

2.Department of Electrification

and Power Supply

�Open line sections of catenary line between anchor supports;

� Station sections of catenary line between anchor supports;

� Traction substations;� Transformer substation;

�Catenary system regions;� Traction substations;�Power supply regions;�Power supply division;� Electrification and powers supply facilities at

division level.

FACILITIES AND UNITS EVALUATED IN URRAN

43

� Transformer substation;�Power lines.

Electrification and powers supply facilities at division level.

3.Department of Automation

and Remote Control

� Switch control systems;�Block sections;�Marshalling automation systems;�CTC systems;� Train separation systems.

� Interlocking and block system division;�Automation and remote control facilities at

division level.

4.Central Communications

Station

�Railway telecommunications network;�Communications centers;� Sections of communications lines.

�Regional communications centers; �Communications facilities at division level.

5.Department of Locomotive

Fleet

� Locomotives;�New-generation locomotives;� Locomotive control system software.

�Operational motive power depots;�Regional traction directorate;�Maintenance motive power depot;�Regional motive power maintenance

directorate.

6.Central Directorate for

Multiple Units

� EMUs;�DMUs;�Diesel-electric trains.

� EMU depot;�Regional EMU directorate.

Publishing of Dependability journal in English

IMPLEMENTATION OF URRAN METHODOLOGY

IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

44

Approval of common approaches to methods of resource, risk and dependability management at meetings held with representatives of foreign railways during 2011-2015

Germany Spain Austria France

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

Alexey Zamyshlyaev

Head of R&D Complex

JSC NIIAS

45

JSC NIIAS

Dr. Sci.

JSC NIIAS

5, bldg 1 Orlikov per.,107996 Moscow, Russia

Е-mail: zam0279@gmail.com