Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance in Design › archive › nasa › casi.ntrs.nasa.gov › 200800189… · National Aeronautics and Space Administration Agenda • Leveraging

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IntegratingSafety and

MissionAssurance in

Design

Chris Cianciola

Kenneth Crane

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080018966 2020-07-30T15:55:54+00:00Z

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Agenda

• Leveraging Lessons Learned

• Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance(S&MA) into design

• Lean, Kaizen, and Six Sigma Practices inDesign and Development

• Ares I-X

• Ares I

7442.2


Leveraging Lessons Learned

• Flying with Launch Abort System IIn-line Configuration

• Improving chances for escape. .In emergencies

• Reducing ascent debris damage threat

• Using heritage hardware• Apollo-derived J-2 engine

• Shuttle solid rocket boosters

• Upgrading to new hardware whereappropriate (e.g. avionics)

• Using weight-saving measures fromET development

7442.3

S&MA Process Changes - Resources

• S&MA organization elevated from "Office" to "Directorate" level

• Civil Servant staffing increased from 102 in 2002 to 156 in 2006

Project resources still negotiated with the programs and projects but S&MA given real appeal authority to address shortfalls

• Resources provided for S&MA Technical Authority, Chief S&MAand others

• S&MA grade structure brought closer to parity with engineering

• New S&MA Vision created and communicated• S&MA unique discipline expertise

• S&MAs role of being part of the effort to find solutions

• Early S&MA involvement leads to improved quality, safety, andreliability of the design

• Center Director actively championed the rotation of some of theCenter's best engineers into S&MA


7442.4

S&MA Process Changes - Independence

• Agency further transitioning to HQ direct funding for S&MAmanagers designated as part of the technical authority

S&MA Technical Authority (TA) currently being definedand institutionalized

• Will create a healthy balance between S&MA TA, Engineer TA, andProgram/Project Management authority

• S&MA TA will have a seat at every level of management - Level 4through Level 1

• Will provide S&MA with the authority to assure S&MA requirementsare properly implemented in all programs and projects


7442.5

S&MA Process Changes - Discipline Expertise

• All S&MA personnel required toselect an S&MA discipline as theprimary area of expertise

• Professional DevelopmentRoadmaps (PDRMs) created toidentify and list courses, knowledgeand the experience necessary to bequalified at the various levels ofS&MA discipline development

• Discipline Champions established totrain and mentor S&MA personnel intheir efforts to develop

• Mandatory Discipline working groupsestablished to provide a forum fordiscipline development andknowledge sharing - run byDiscipline Champions

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Gates


7442.6

• Performed Failure Mode EffectAnalysis (FMEA) on design ofPressurization Control Panel

• Situation: A proposal was made to reducethe total number of solenoid control valvesthat control both the J-2X upper stageengine's LH2 and L02 prevalves andrecirculation valves to reduce overall costand weight while increasing the overallsystem reliability

• A formal reliability trade study wasrequested to quantify the impact onreliability compared to the baseline design

• The study team examined 4 alternativevalve designs that were more fault tolerant

• Conclusion: Design alternative 4 wasselected because it provided the highestoverall system reliability

S&MA Value Added - FMEAs

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(2,3-Way alves)


7442.7

S&MA Value Added Integrated System Failure Analysis

Critical Overpressure

Failure envi ro nmentdevelopment

Explosion Blast waveoccurs forms

Functionalfault

Faultdevelopm ent

Initiatoroccurs

Treq depends onLAS thrust capability

Time required for safe overpressure

R onse timeline

Precursordetected

Escape system CEV generatesactivate d escape thrust

Safe distance

achieved


7442.8

Integrated System Failure AnalysisFailure Event to Initial Failure Environment

Excessive propellant flow to engine

Combustion chamber pressure increases

I.....f--------------- Decision to abort

Off-n omin altime USE Uncontained Start Failure

_____-.~I Excessive gas spin flow

-------',,::;~~~n;gjglirKne!irUiup;lttures Iocaly, explodes ~&~fra;gl1T1~e~n~~=~Fault

Initiator

Threat/hazardousenvironment

Structural tank failure

Propellant mixes

__-'.1 Explosion occurs


7442.9

S&MA Value Added - System Safety

• Recommended move of pressurization line out of the FirstStage cable tray to reduce risk to LSC and avionics

Influenced common bulkhead monitoring

• Influenced valve design for LH2 and L02 pressurization tomaintain fault tolerance

• Opened issue for mitigation of overboard G02 venting


7442.10

S&MA Value Added - Up-Front Quality Involvement

• Manufacturing layout

Robotic welding tool procurement/acceptance

• Manufacturing Execution System

• Drawing Review

• Phased array ultrasonic weld inspection

• Workmanship Standards

• Process FMEA for TPS (in work)

• S&MA actively engaged in the process


7442.11

S&MA Today

• Receiving respect for technical expertise

• Becoming an organization where NASA's best and brightestwant to work

Bringing unique engineering expertise to the table insupport of programs and projects

• Programs see us as a must-have - not a forced-to-have group and programs request S&MA support beginning with programformulation

• S&MA can help make systems safer and more reliable; earlyrecognition of vulnerabilities results in fewer re-design efforts

• Actively training and developing its people

• Not only identifying issues, but also helps identify solutions

• Rewarding and acknowledging superior performance


7442.12


Testing Strategy

• "Test as you fly" strategy

• Ground, flight, and orbital tests

• Ares I-X• April 2009• Suborbital flight test• Combination of operational and

mockup hardware• Demonstrate ability to control

Ares I vehicle

• Additional Ares tests• Ares 1-Y: First flight of five

segment RSRB• Orion 1: First flight of J-2X

and Orion• 2015: First crewed flight to

International Space Station• 2018: First flight of Ares V

7442.13


Ares I-X Mission Overview

• Demonstrate the ascent flightcontrol system

• Characterize and mitigating the rolltorque due to first stage motorperformance for a vehicledynamically similar to theoperational vehicle

• Demonstrate nominal firstand upper stage separationand clearances

• Test the First Stage parachuterecovery system andseparation/entry dynamics

• Validate assembly and processingflow, as well as launch andrecovery operations

7442.14

• Meetings conducted for eachvehicle element to incorporatean additional 60 days ofschedule margin

• Events consisted of identifyingthe following activities:

• The current state• The ideal state• A realistic future/target state• Assumptions, decisions, and/or

actions to be taken to achievethe future state

• Meeting outputs

• Assuming 60-day changecould be made, Ares I-XMMO managing to the earlierlaunch date

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Lean Practices Applied toAres I-X Schedule

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7442.15

Lean Practices in Ares I-X


OJ

• Identified management needfor Lean processes:

• Different parts of Ares I-Xorganization had conflictingnotions of safety conservatismsin flight test

• Resolution: Combined all AresI-X activities under one MissionManagement Office (MMO)under the Constellation Program

• Lean activities also reducednumber of review boards by 60%

7442.16

Lean Event Results

• First Stage• Actions: Changed hardware

delivery schedule, pre-drilled somehardware for quicker assembly, anddeferred avionics testing until thehardware reached Kennedy SpaceCenter (KSC)

• Result: Reduced amount of touchlabor time by as much as 4 to 30days, depending on hardware

• Avionics• Actions: Established hard

deadlines for delayed items;condensed and reduced number ofcheck points; verified work on-site atKSC; and rescheduled delivery ofsome components

• Result: Met 60-day goal

• Roll Control System• Action: Procured support hardware

prior to the element's CriticalDesign Review (CDR)



• Upper Stage Simulator ICommand Module I Launch AbortSystem Simulators

• The USS and CM/LAS schedulesalready supported a 60-day pullback

• Ground Systems IGround Operations

• Actions: Streamlined procurementprocess with United Space Alliance(USA) by reducing the legal reviewtime from 42 to 28 days; reorderedactivities on the launch pad, reducingpad flow from 7.5 days to 5.5 days


• Systems Engineering & Integration• Actions: Streamlined (reduced

number of) review cycles forIntegrated Design and AnalysisDevelopment Flight Instrumentation,and Assembly Integration and Test


7442.17


Lean, Six Sigma, and Kaizen Practicesin the Ares Projects Office

• Leadership commitment

• Ares Projects Office (APO) leadersvisited Boeing to learn about 787'smarket share improvement throughlean practices

• APO leaders requested in-house trainingfor all managers on Lean and Kaizen

7442.1 B

Lean and Kaizen Success Stories

• Lean success stories• Integrated Safety & Mission Assurance earlier in design process• Developing and improving manufacturing processes for Ares I Upper Stage• Improved communications between vehicle element offices• Trained Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives on value stream mapping

• Kaizen process improvement success stories• Improved the workforce planning process• Reduced the length of project integration meetings• Improved APO's risk management process• Improved requirements change, trade study, and design review processes

• Kaizen new process development success stories• Optimizing the ground support equipment flow for handling the Ares I Upper Stage• Merging the manufacturing flows at the Michoud Assembly Facility• Resolving differences in welding and manufacturing processes between NASA

and the Upper Stage prime contractor (Boeing)• Optimizing the cleaning and corrosion protection processes• Automating task description sheets


7442.19


Ares Six Sigma Practices

• Ares I Upper Stage Friction Stir Welding Tool• Uses high rotational speed and frictional heat to

crush, "stir" together, and forge a bond betweentwo metal alloys

• At the end of the weld, the single-piece pin tool isretracted and leaves a "keyhole"

• To overcome these drawbacks, a Marshall Centerwelding engineer helped design an automaticretractable pin tool to prevent keyholes

• Manufacturing and assembly team applied SixSigma processes to design an experiment to findthe optimum machine settings for ensuring anominal weld

• The analysis developed a set of values fordetermining the proper settings for welds, as wellas determining the effectiveness of a weld if thesettings are known but off-nominal

• Result: Unprecedented level of accuracy andminimization of weld stress

7442.20

Ares Team Norms andS&MA Team Messages

• Treat others with dignity and respectHAW RlNOnce In • ear_ oppoftul\lty~

.,. runnIng .....,.thon. not • apnn' - not In 24n .......gency mode n .,....

..SNCT OUIl FAIlIUD AND OUU.LWS - H.-THY _LANe. "~.NWOIlK AND FAMILY IS ....NTIAL

INnOlllTY IS .XPllenD"Looll each oth.r attalght ,n It>e eye•••n the Irulll. lun dladosu""

~_IS.".NTIAL

" 'Our' onsl ed of 'my' 'we' 1/1 eed 01 'I' 'Ua' ,.'her than 'me' ',. aU Important' "

• Make sure your people have thetools they need to be successful

INT.GltAnON AJIIION4I TM~CTAND WITH MItTN.1l OIlOANlZAnONS (LO.,.NOIN...INO, S&IIA, ontall c:aNT'aU, PIlOOIlAIIIPIlOJ.CTS) IS ....NT1AL

Com _. commuo"", WIth each ott>«DonI on_ 110 ....111_

NO IlAUelOUS INTaNT)

eONSTitUCTlW eONFLleT L 1'0~ (CLOSUIl.) AND ONe.IIA_ DON"T eAIlIlY IT NIlSCMIALLY • IT DID NOT GO YOUIl WAY

• At the end of the day, makesure that everyone's hard workis acknowledged

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FAIWIl. IS AeeaPTAtIUI DUIlINO D."..,...NTWe era _'ng 110 Ie e C111cul.led naka 10 further our kno....cIge

"lIJUILY ID NTIFleATION AND HIOHUOHT OF IOU."


7442.21

S&MA in Ares Design - Summary

• Providing more resources to support Ares design work

• Making S&MA more independent for objective assessments

• Improving discipline expertise as well as training and mentoringopportunities for new employees

• Adding value through Failure Mode Effect Analyses (FMEAs)

• Using the Ares quantitative safety and reliability requirement toenforce the "Design for reliability and safety" paradigm shift

• Improving system safety by using a functional analysis systemapproach to model and understand integrated system failuressimilar to the Shuttle foam problem.

• Improving design reliability by using Probabilistic engineeringphysics-based modeling

• Evaluating and understating design uncertainty and designmargins using probabilistic engineering techniques

• Getting involved in quality up front using Lean, Six Sigma, andKaizen practices

Receiving respect for technical expertise

• Becoming an organization where NASA's best and brightest wantto work

• Bringing unique engineering expertise to the table in support ofprograms and projects


7442.22


Questions?

www.nasa.gov/ares

7442.23

Documents

Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance in Design › archive › nasa › casi.ntrs.nasa.gov › 200800189… · National Aeronautics and Space Administration Agenda • Leveraging