INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED FROMRECENT EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

3 August 1992

Robert David SteeleUSMC Management Analyst

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................. 91

Introduction ................................................... . 94

Bangladesh (Sea Angel)............................................ 95

Grenada (Urgent Fury) ............................................. 97

Liberia (Sharp Edge)..... ........................................... 99

Panama (Promote Liberty) ....................................... 101

Philippines (Fiery Vigil) ............................................ 104

Somalia (Eastern Exit) ............................................. 105

Conclusion............................................................ 108

G lossary............................................................... 109

Command, Control, Communications, Computers,and Intelligence Department

Headquarters, U.S. Marine CorpsWashington, D.C. 20380-0001

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Executive Summary

The following themes emerged across the expeditionary operations:

* Mapping, Charting, & Geodesy (MC&G)

The maps for operations in the Third World simply are not available, eitherbecause they have not been disseminated to forces afloat, because they have notbeen produced, or because the digital mapping data has not been collected.

If the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) and related imagery collectionprograms are subject to cuts, and the MC&G prioritization process continues toemphasize 'worst case" scenarios' rather than "most probable" scenarios, thenMarines will be forced to operate without maps in most of their short-notice ThirdWorld contingencies.

* Global Positioning System (GPS) for Helicopters

In the absence of maps for Third World operations, and particularly in thecase of helicopters required to travel long distances away from shore-basednavigation systems, or in Third World areas where shore-based navigation aids arenot available, the provision of space-based GPS for all helicopters is essential. Thisimplies a requirement to complete the GPS constellation in space as soon aspossible to provide global coverage.

In the absence of maps, GPS for ground vehicles and units is critical.However, GPS is not a substitute for maps--the contour lines and cultural featuresshown on maps are the most fundamental element of the Intelligence Preparationof the Battlefield (IPB) process.

* Stand-off Evaluation of Terrain and Beach Conditions

Our ability to accurately access terrain and beach conditions from space orimagery is limited.

Either increased use of individuals able to conduct reconnaissance "on theground", or new methods, are required.

* Linguist Shortfalls

Linguist short-falls exist, both in terms of individuals with securityclearances able to complete intelligence tasks in a foreign language, and in termsof individuals able to speak various languages and perform non-intelligence taskssuch as evacuee screening, civil affairs coordination, etcetera.

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Marine Corps linguist goals are based on intelligence and foreign areaofficer requirements; services may need to reconsider the basis for their linguistrequirements and modify or expand their requirements to accommodate publicaffairs, civic action, and other capabilities which receive increased emphasis innon-combatant evacuation and humanitarian assistance operations.

* Inconsistency of Intelligence Support to Expeditionary Forces

Short-fused expeditionary operations place a premium on "off the shelf"contingency intelligence support packages, including maps. Such operations alsorequire more intensive and responsive support from theater and national agenciesthan might be the case in conventional warfare where a full range of organicintelligence collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities are fielded.

Increased and sustained emphasis by the Director of Central Intelligence(DCI) on support to military operations is critical, and should include closecoordination with Department of State, theater, and other service componentsresponsible for various intelligence collection, processing, and production tasksessential to the prosecution of Third World operations.

* Liaison to Non-Military Organizations

There are four issues critical to successful expeditionary operations andpertaining to intelligence:

-- inaccurate information from the Department of State regarding locationof its Embassies and related details (marking of landing zones) places U.S. citizensat risk when a noncombatant evacuation must be conducted--accurate andupdated NEO information should be required as a pre-requisite to annual reapprovalof hazardous duty pay differentials;

-- multiple points of contacts for local intelligence from within Embassiescauses confusion and friction--the unwillingness of the established sensitiveinformation coordinators to be forthcoming makes their role as the nominal centralpoint of contact somewhat marginal;

-- Ambassadors must be required to request military planning forexecution of NEOs begin when they first evacuate non-essential personnel, ratherthan when they are "in extremis"; and finally,

-- improved methods of communication and coordination with foreigngovernment and non-governmental organizations are needed if necessaryintelligence and information on local conditions are to be obtained.

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* "Civil' Intelligence Requirements

Expeditionary operations short of war are by definition 'non-conventional"and frequently require much more wcivil' intelligence than is the case whenengaging in straight-forward combat operations. Our traditional national anddefense intelligence capabilities are unsuited for meeting these requirements.

* Need for Additional Scouts and Sensors

Although cited in relation to the only low intensity conflict (LIC) operationwhere patrolling and area monitoring was required, it is clear that "peacetimeengagements and area surveillance requires a higher proportion of scouts andsensors than is now available for conventional combat operations.

* Need for Dedicated Aviation Intelligence Personnel

Although cited in relation to only one of the operations examined, the lackof dedicated aviation intelligence personnel at the squadron level is a problemrequiring attention. When the pilot assigned the additional duty of intelligence isexpected to fly, and the intelligence clerk is not available due to the primacy ofother duties, the squadron ends up operating without intelligence briefings andwithout a capability to debrief pilots and disseminate their observations to higherand adjacent units.

* Combined Staffs

Although practiced in only one case, the full integration of Navy and MarineCorps planning staffs for a NEO in Somalia was so successful as to suggest thatthe combined staff approach merits further examination as a method of operation.

* Value of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Intelligence

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) havemade a noteworthy contribution to the effectiveness of NEOs by any force,through the development of their Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for NEOessential elements of information (EEl).

* Utility of Organic Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Resources

Although cited in relation to only one operation, it is clear that organicsignals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are extremely important for monitoringlocal conditions during short-fused evacuation and assistance operations.

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Introduction

This paper outlines intelligence lessons learned from recent expeditionaryoperations apart from the war in Southwest Asia. Six operations have beenexamined: two noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in Liberia and Somalia;two joint combat operations in Grenada and Panama; and two humanitarianassistance operations in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

The lessons learned are stated from a Marine Corps perspective, and are asidentified by Marine Corps commanders and their staffs actually participating in theoperations and submitting their observations to the Marine Corps Lessons LearnedSystem (MCLLS).1

It is useful to examine the lessons coming from such relatively minoroperations (in comparison to the war in Southwest Asia--Desert Storm/DesertShield) because short-fused expeditionary operations place a premium on "off theshelf" contingency intelligence support packages, including maps and near-real-time responsiveness by national and theater intelligence assets. Organicintelligence assets, in contrast, play reduced roles in those operations where timedoes not permit employment, or political considerations dictated by the local U.S.Embassy, or by the National Command Authority (NCA), preclude employment.

In considering these lessons, it is important to distinguish between thoselessons that can be corrected within the Marine Corps, and those that requirechanged priorities and resource realignments external to the Marine Corps--virtuallyall of the deficiencies noted with respect to intelligence support for contingencyexpeditionary operations require external vice internal adjustments.

The lessons learned as stated represent ingut. Most have obvious merit andhave already generated remedial action or validated requirements which are beingpursued. The Remedial Action Program for Intelligence (RAP-I) is an umbrellaprogram which addresses specific lessons learned and implements specific remedialactions related to those lessons. The RAP-I complements the on-going MarineCorps program to improve intelligence training & education, personnel, structure,and equipment.

1 The executive summary sorts out major issues which appear common to several of theoperations or are of special note. We have not attempted to sort lessons learned within eachoperation, but rather listed them in the order in which they were submitted by those participating inthe operation. Where notes are offered in parenthesis, these are observations by HeadquartersMarine Corps specialists responsible for reviewing this report.

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Bangladesh

Operation Sea Angel, in which a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)served as the foundation for a Joint Task Force (JTF), provided humanitarianassistance to Bangladesh during the period 11-29 April 1991. Almost 7000Bangladeshis were provided medical treatment and 2870 tons of food and othersupplies were distributed during this two week operation. The operation wasnoteworthy for the fragility of the local transportation and logistics infrastructure; avery significant aspect of the JTF's success was its ability to provide sea-basedsupport, with a minimum of personnel and equipment ashore and no establishedshore presence.

Lessons learned included:

* Local liaison and ground reconnaissance were absolutely essential toavoiding a follow-on disaster during relief operations. Early planning to deliver tonsof supplies via Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) required modification when it wasdetermined that the planned drop-off points would require villagers to carry tons ofsupplies manually over at least two miles of foot trails, some of which were underwater. The commander learned that in primitive areas intelligence support forhumanitarian operations must include a total picture of the supply distributionnetwork down to the individual recipient of the supplies.

* In the absence of suitable maps, a privately owned video recorder provedto be an essential means of surveying operational areas and orienting Marine forcesprior to their employment ashore. The commander recommended that theDepartment of Defense (DoD) coordinate with the Department of State to establisha formal product series, "Country Videos", which show embassy grounds, mobilitycorridors, background information, and other material of use in planning NEO andhumanitarian assistance operations. The commander further recommended that allintelligence sections (battalion level and above) be equipped with video recordingand duplicating capabilities.

* Numerous concerns were expressed about the lack of 1:50,000 scalemaps for Bangladesh. These maps are required for both ground operations andhelicopter operations, and are a vital element for combined arms operationswhether or not combat is anticipated. The commander found imagery providedthrough secondary dissemination means (Fleet Imagery Support Terminal, FIST) tobe of marginal quality and not an acceptable substitute for tactical maps. Thecommander recommended a systematic review be undertaken of countries world-wide to determine the availability of maps for expeditionary operations. (Note:such a review was undertaken by the USMC Intelligence Center, with a findingthat for 69 countries of interest to the Marine Corps at the time, 22 had no

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1:50,000 scale maps available, and an additional 37 had only limited coverage(ports and capital cities) which was generally over ten years old and therefore notaccurate with respect to man-made transportation networks and other culturalfeatures.)

* The commander also found that the lack of a Tactical Aviation MissionPlanning System (TAMPS) aboard the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) precluded anyconsideration of flying in digital data and locally producing high-quality sections ofneeded maps. The commander recommended that every major amphibiousaviation platform be equipped with TAMPS and also have a contingency stock ofmaps for all countries of interest. (Note: While this is a good idea, it meritscomment that the digital data is not available for many Third World countries.)

* The commander also recommended that amphibious ships be equippedwith map production capabilities and carry all maps digitally, together with asupply of paper. The commander points out that this would conserve significantamounts of space now taken up by pallets of maps. (Note: Establishing acapability to do color reproduction of maps aboard ship space; space limitationsmay limit what capabilities can actually be installed. An alternative, as nowestablished by DMA's Crisis Support Cell (CSC), is to rapidly produce the maps inthe quantity needed and airlift them to the forces; this alternative is contingent onthe availability of current digital data. A very important supplement to digitalmapping data is commercial multi-spectral imagery (MSI); such imagery, while notable to fully satisfy tactical mapping requirements for surface configuration detail,is a cheap and readily available means up updating existing imagery with currentinformation about cultural features (roads, airfields, buildings).

* With the commander's approval, several lessons learned were submittedfrom aviation components, all centered on the urgent need to equip helicopterswith GPS, and to expand the constellation of supporting satellites to assure 24hour world-wide coverage.

* Force reconnaissance assets, and their rubber boats, proved to be veryvaluable in providing for secondary distribution of relief supplied over floodedterrain. They had difficulty with heavy sea conditions, and could not be used totransport supplies directly from offshore ships to villages. (Note: The Marine CorpsFamily of Boats program will provide craft to perform missions from Over-the-Horizon raids to riverine assault and counter-narcotics actions. The Rigid HullInflatable, with an initial capability slated for fiscal year 1995, will provide theMEU(SOC) commander greater flexibility during high states such as wereencountered during Operation Sea Angel.)

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Grenada

Operation Urgent Fury included Marine forces in the rescue of U.S. citizenstrapped in Grenada. From 25 October through 2 November 1983 Marine forcesconducted operations in an environment where the avoidance of civilian casualtieswas a very high priority.

Lessons learned included:

* Preventive medicine information concerning Grenada was not available.

* Emissions Control (EMCON) and MINIMIZE communications conditionsprevented requested for intelligence and map support; lessons learned includedneed to exempt map and basic intelligence requests from EMCON/MINIMIZErequests, and/or need for parent headquarters to recognize that EMCON/MINIMIZEconditions have shut down intelligence requirements pipeline from tactical forces.When EMCON/MINIMIZE conditions are imposed, higher headquarters must noteand act on behalf of tactical forces in obtaining and delivering necessaryencyclopedic intelligence and maps not available afloat.

* Lack of maps severely constrained coordination of supporting arms(naval gunfire, artillery, tactical aviation). If maps are not available, GPS or someother common point of reference is essential. There were only six relatively crudemaps available to the entire Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at the time of the initiallanding. Ultimately combat operations were conducted using tourist mapsreproduced by a carrier photography laboratory in 16" x 20" sheets.

* Unlike the commander in Bangladesh, the commander of the Marine BLTin Grenada found the FIST provided accurate and invaluable photographs; this was"the most valuable item of intelligence data provided to the ground combatelement for contingency planning and operations ashore."

* Incorrect intelligence appraisals led to an abortive landing for one MarineCompany when surf and coral conditions prevented the company, mounted inAmphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV), from landing during the initial assault.

* Citizens of Grenada were so happy to see Marines that they "beganpouring into the area with information on locations of enemy camps, hiddenweapons, and ammunition dumps". (Note: implied in the lengthy description ofoperations was a requirement for a more extensive network of trained debriefers,and an area wide automated communications and computing capability, to ensureall information volunteered by locals is integrated into the over-all intelligenceestimate, and individual leads are properly prioritized and fully exploited.)

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* "Roads were too restrictive for tanks". Lack of intelligence and terrainanalysis products did not appraise the commander of this limitation until the tankshad already been moved ashore.

* Intelligence support to Marine tactical aviation was poor in that theaviation squadron intelligence officer (S-2) was by table of organization (T/O)structure a pilot with the additional assigned duty of intelligence, and consequentlyexpected to fly combat missions rather than fulfill the responsibilities of the S-2.The S-2 clerk was assigned to other duties throughout the operation. No one wasavailable to brief the pilots prior to their early morning flights, and no one wasavailable to debrief the pilots, evaluate their information, and communicateintelligence to higher and adjacent units. (Note: although there was a carrierpresent, aviation intelligence assistance, which could have included the temporaryassignment of naval aviation intelligence personnel to the unit, was not requested.)

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Liberia

Operation Sharp Edge was a directed NEO and reinforcement of theAmerican Embassy, Monrovia, Liberia. Marine forces arrived off the coast ofLiberia ("Mamba Station") on 3 June 1990; the major element departed 21 August1990 after turnover to Landing Force Sixth Fleet (LF6F) 3-90. These sea-basedforces, operating from the USS Peterson, USS Saipan, USS Ponce, and USSSumter (Amphibious Squadron Four), evacuated a total of 1647 U.S. citizens andforeign nationals during this period.

The Commander of 22nd MEU identified the following intelligence lessonslearned from this operation:

* In combination, the flood of message traffic from various intelligenceorganizations, and the paucity of specific information responsive to thecommander's requirements, suggested the need for a single focal point capable ofproviding collection management and all-source analysis services to thecommander and his staff. Neither Embassy resources nor organic resources(including Navy resources afloat) were adequate to the task of managing multi-disciplinary collection by external agencies, and fusing the flood of raw data intotimely useful reports.

* None of the contingency map blocks available to Marine forces containedMC&G products for Liberia. It took from 26 April 1990, when the commander firstdetermined that a possibility for an operation existed, to 29 May 1990 whenpallets of maps were received from DMIA's CSC. In addition, the MC&G standardissue for a BLT at that time provided for 125 1:50,000 scale maps. Experiencedetermined that a minimum of 175 1:50,000 scale maps were required for BLToperations ashore.

* Organic signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities proved highly effectiveat providing indications and warnings (I&W) of impending or ongoing actions.

* Embassy estimates of the situation proved unreliable and failed tointegrate a thorough understanding of the cultural environment. The incorrectappraisals of impending slaughter and a geometric rate of deterioration misledplanners.

* Competing and sometimes contradictory points of contact for intelligencewithin the Embassy complicated the commander's efforts to obtain a reliableintelligence estimate. The Chief of Military Mission (CMM), the Defense Attache(DATT), the Regional Security Officer (RSO), other government officials,and the Economic Officer all provided varying levels of detail and

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cooperation. Early attempts to establish daily intelligence exchanges among allparties were unsuccessful.

* In the absence of beach studies and terrain studies, inclusion of NavySEAL and Marine Corps reconnaissance representatives in the Forward CommandElement (FCE) proved vital to providing the commander with critical beach andhelicopter landing zone appraisals.

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Panama

Operation Promote Liberty followed Operation Just Cause, and wascomprised of low intensity conflict (LIC) peacekeeping operations from about 31January to 13 June 1990 when Marine forces departed Panama. Marine forcesconducted patrols and generally maintained a presence in their assigned areas.

Lessons learned included:

* A little recognized intelligence problem is that of reliably establishingdegrees of instability in selected areas so as to determine the right force size andmix. This is essential to avoid appearances of excessive force, while also avoidingforces so small they invite attack.

* Sentries and outposts were required to maintain logbooks notingsuspicious activities, license numbers, or other activities of possible intelligencevalue; sentries and outposts were also provided with cameras and telephoto lens toobtain discreet photographs of suspicious vehicles and events. Daily review of thelogbooks, and daily development of the photographs, proved to be a valuable andconstant source of general information about the area of operations. (Implicit inthis observation is the suggestion that digital cameras and notebook computers, ifprovided in quantity and linked to a central server, could automate the kind ofdetailed observations essential to LIC operations.)

* Insufficient linguists were available. "Linguists are worth their weight ingold". Linguists must be provided not only for intelligence billets, but for all billetsdealing with the public and local forces on logistics, legal, sanitation, and othermatters.

* Prior to entering an area of operations to conduct patrols and establishsecurity checkpoints, the Marine commander found it very helpful to send anadvance team of counterintelligence specialists to collect information andcoordinate with Special Forces teams already in the area. This advance effortproved the value of overt human intelligence collection, and was an importantelement in ensuring Marine forces were effective immediately upon arrival.

* When local political leaders expressed opposition to active patrolling intheir areas, the Marine commander developed an alternative means of patrollingwhich was acceptable to the local population--Marines were sent in small groupson "armed liberty", spending personal funds to buy food and other convenienceitems, while conducting a more casual but no less effective patrol of their assignedarea.

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* Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) patrols to collect intelligence wereconstrained by the size of the vehicle (not suitable for small rural towns withnarrow streets) and public fear of the vehicle at night, when it was confused withmore threatening tanks. The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle(HMMWV) was found to be very useful as an alternative to the LAV.

* Significant coordination problems were encountered when Army SpecialForces and Army military intelligence personnel were found to be operating in aMarine Corps area of operations without having established liaison mechanisms.Once specific clearance and coordination procedures were established problemswere resolved. The lesson the commander drew from this was that it wasessential at the joint level to ensure that unconventional and other serviceintelligence forces were clearly instructed on whom to coordinate with whenoperating in Marine areas of operation.

* This operation established that the existing personnel and equipmentstructure for Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) scout teams wasinadequate for LIC operations where foot trails and other less conventional mobilitycorridors must be monitored. Future LIC operations will require augmentation ofthis capability, either from other active forces or from the reserve.

* Problems were encountered in complying with Department of Defenseregulations pertaining to the transport of classified materials. Tape and envelopesneeded to double-wrap were not available, and operational urgency frequentlymade the preparation of an itemized list of contents difficult if not impossible. Theimplicit lesson learned, apart from the obvious one of attempting to enter the areaof operations with an ample supply of wrapping materials, is that bar coding of allclassified materials as well as individual identification cards, and the provision oflightweight portable bar code readers and label machines, would significantly easethe burden of moving classified materials around the area of operations.

* The LAV proved to be a human intelligence "icebreaker" and aided overtHUMINT collection efforts; the integration of "mobile displays" at which leaflets(such as the one with the U.S. and Panamanian flags shown together) aredistributed, with pre-planned and ad hoc HUMINT collection, proved highlysuccessful.

* In combination, the importance of HUMINT for LIC operations, and thelack of sufficient Spanish linguists with intelligence qualifications, required an on-going effort to train and supervise volunteers for overt HUMINT collection. Thelesson learned was the importance of integrating overt HUMINT collection traininginto all training and exercises to familiarize all Marines with their potential andresponsibilities as overt HUMINT collectors.

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* The commander found that counterintelligence (Cl) and Interrogator-Translator (ITT) personnel worked best at HUMINT collection when they werepaired together. 'Separate employment of either would have significantly reducedtheir effectiveness, for neither possessed the skills to operate without the other."(While no elaboration regarding skills was provided, one may surmise that the Clpersonnel may not have had the language skills required, while the ITT personnelmay not have had a deep enough understanding of HUMINT methods.)

* A deficiency was perceived by the commander in the ability of theater aswell as organic assets to provide 'nation building intelligence", and specificallyintelligence needed to undertake civic action and psychological operations. In thepost Just Cause period, "nation-building intelligence became a high priority, andoften overshadowed more conventional combat intelligence requirements." Thecommander, while lacking personnel with expertise in civil affairs and psychologicaloperations, addressed this deficiency by establishing teams with a HUMINT expert,an engineer, and a topographic specialist. These teams traveled throughout thearea of operations assessing requirements for civil affairs projects andpsychological operations.

* The commander determined that the "all source fusion center" conceptbehind the establishment of the MAGTF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC) wasflawed in that it isolated the analysts from the collections representatives (who areassigned to the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, SARC). The commanderfound that a full integration of these individuals, with daily informal exchanges,significantly increased shared insights and the over-all effectiveness of bothcollections and analysis. (Note: this was an internal problem; both the MAFC andthe SARC are under the same commander--both can and should be physically anddoctrinally co-located to optimize necessary sharing of information.)

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PhiliDpines

Operational Fiery Vigil, a humanitarian assistance operation required toprovide relief in the aftermath of a volcanic eruption in the vicinity of Clark AirForce Base, did not result in any formally registered intelligence lessons learned.However, based on our experience in Bangladesh, we can surmise that participantsin this operations learned of deficiencies in our ability to exchange unclassifiedintelligence with foreign government and non-government organizations, and of ourrequirements for additional capabilities for gathering "civil" intelligence necessaryto guide the delivery of humanitarian assistance services.

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Somalia

In January 1991 two Navy ships with embarked Marines were diverted fromtheir duties in support of Desert Shield, and dispatched to conduct a NEO inSomalia. They ultimately rescued 281 people from over 30 nations, including 12heads of diplomatic missions and 39 Soviet citizens. The operation included long-distance night helicopter operations and night refueling.2

Among the lessons learned:

* The information on the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu available to nationaland defense intelligence was very outdated and inaccurate. A regular review ofinformation provided by the Department of State should be conducted to establishthe reliability of existing planning information. It may be necessary to linkhazardous duty differentials to the submission of updated NEO planningdocuments, or establish some other sort of tangible oversight incentive, in order toincrease the accuracy and reliability of these critical materials.

* Intelligence support for the operation was severely constrained by thelast minute call for evacuation from the U.S. Embassy. Planning for NEOs shouldbegin when non-essential personnel are evacuated (in this instance, almost amonth prior to the call for an in-extremis NEO).

* Intelligence support to the NEO requires long-range securecommunications between ships and helicopters, and reliable securecommunications (i.e. common key cards) for use between ships, helicopters,forces ashore, and U.S. Embassy personnel. (Note: secure communicationsrequirements between U.S. military and U.S. civilian organizations overseas is partof a larger problem set, the need for secure communications between U.S. militaryand foreign military and civilian organizations engaged in mutually supportingactivities, such as are characteristic of humanitarian assistance operations.)

* Helicopters require a space-based GPS capability in order to conductlong-distance operations outside the range of their existing land based OMEGAnavigation systems. (Note: this is a critical--absolutely essential--requirement forno-notice operations in the Third World.)

2 Unlike the other sections, which are based on direct examination of MCLLS reports, thissection is based on a Center for Naval Analysis study of lessons learned, Adam B. Siegel's "EasternExit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991'(Professional Paper 512.09, September 1991). However, this section was also reviewed andrefined by LtCol Robert McAleer, ground commander for the evacuation, and Maj Robert Morgan,senior communicator on the ground.

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* Confusion over the severity of the situation, both aboard the shipssteaming toward Somalia, and at intermediate headquarters, caused conflictingdecisions to be made about steaming speed, and could have led to a disaster hadthe helicopters not been launched from 466 nautical miles offshore. All levels ofthe original as well as the operative chain of command must receive the sameintelligence information, or procedures should be established to have a single focalpoint for intelligence support, and a single command point (e.g. the Commander ofthe Amphibious Task Force, CATF) be the final judge of steaming speed and flightdistances required to ensure "timely" operations.

* An inadequate appreciation of the threat caused some support element,notably the Air Force unit responsible for overhead gunship support, to imposepeacetime restrictions on crew rest between missions, interrupting the availabilityof gunship support essential to the protection of the Embassy and the limitedsecurity force placed ashore, and delaying the evacuation.

* The establishment of a combined command center merging Navy andMarine Corps planning staffs significantly improved the sharing of intelligence andother information. Aboard the USS Guam, because there was a very small Navystaff and the "Bravo" staff for 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) waspresent, the Navy had no alternative but to engage in combined staff operations,and this proved to be a significant and positive aspect of the operation.

* Deliberate canvassing of personnel on board identified a Marine warrantofficer who had previously served in Mogadishu--this proved important to theoperation as it was the first indication the Marine commander had of the completeinaccuracy of his information, provided by the Department of State, regarding thelocation of the Embassy (the entire Embassy had moved to a new compound muchfurther inland than the old Embassy compound).

* The lack of secure voice communications with the Embassy caused adelay in obtaining answers to the commander's Essential Elements of Information(EEI). Common cryptographic material is absolutely essential for long-range directcommunications between rescue forces and Embassy personnel. There was also abureaucratic reluctance--external to the task force and not further defined--to opendirect message channels between the Embassy and the approaching task force.

* Correction of the intelligence deficiencies was significantly acceleratedby the availability of NEO SOP and standardized EEI developed by MEU(SOC).

* Terminal guidance for rescue helicopters was inadequate; the Embassywas not prepared to properly mark landing zones, and there was no provision forradio communication from outside the Embassy to the helicopters visible overhead(the Embassy radio operator was in a windowless room.)

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* Imposed constraints on the number of personnel going ashore preventedfulfillment of basic counterintelligence and security functions; for instance,screening was not accomplished, allowing Somalians to infiltrate the groups to beevacuated and an armed individual to board a helicopter. The absence of a properteam for evacuee screening ultimately reduced the number of Marines assigned toperimeter security as some had to be pulled to organize the civilians and completepre-flight safety procedures.

* Initial identification of the Ambassador and other key personnel (bothU.S. and foreign diplomats) could have benefitted from a photograph of theAmbassador and other key personnel transmitted via FIST.

* Numerous foreign diplomats were processed, and required translatorsupport. NEO plans should anticipate a requirement for language skills other thanEnglish and the local language.

* Intelligence about the number of foreign personnel who are potentialevacuees, including women and children, is helpful in planning logistics support.

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Conclusions

Although no cross-walk of these lessons learned has been made with thosealready reported to Congress in relation to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it is clearthat there are both similarities and differences in the lessons learned fromconventional combat and those learned from short-fused expeditionary operations.

Similarities revolve around generic capabilities required by all forces, not justMarine forces. Maps for Third World operations, and the ability to operate withGPS in the Third World, are severely deficient. These deficiencies are external tothe Marine Corps and require changes in national and defense priorities andpolicies.

Differences center on the austere nature of the expeditionary force, and itsneed for tailored intelligence with strong emphasis on civil factors. These also aredeficiencies external to the Marine Corps, requiring a change in national anddefense priorities and policies to correct.

Internal to the Marine Corps, but common to other services, there is a needto revisit the basis for linguist requirements to include non-intelligence functionssuch as public affairs and civic action; to dedicate personnel to aviation intelligencedown to the squadron level; and to significantly increase ground unit capabilities todeploy scouts and sensors in a low-intensity conflict environment requiringsustained monitoring of broad areas of operation.

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gut

BLT.................Battalion Landing Team

CATF ............... Commander Amphibious Task ForceCl ................... CounterintelligenceCMM ............... Chief of Military MissionCSC ................ Crisis Support Cell

DATT .............. Defense AttacheDCI ................. Director of Central IntelligenceDMA ............... Defense Mapping AgencyDoD ................ Department of Defense

EEl .................. Essential Elements of InformationEMCON ........... Emissions Control

FCE ................. Forward Command ElementFIST ................ Fleet Imagery Support Terminal

GPS ................ Global Positioning System

HMMWV .......... High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled VehicleHUMINT ........... Human Intelligence

IMINT .............. Imagery IntelligenceIPB .................. Intelligence Preparation of the BattlefieldITT .................. Interrogator Translator TeamI&W ................ Indications & Warning

JTF ................. Joint Task Force

LAV ................ Light Armored VehicleLCAC .............. Landing Craft Air CushionLIC .................. Low Intensity Conflict

MAFC .............. MAGTF All Source Fusion CenterMAGTF ............ Marine Air Ground Task ForceMCLLS ............ Marine Corps Lessons Learned SystemMC&G ............. Mapping, Charting, & GeodesyMEB ................ Marine Expeditionary BrigadeMEU ................ Marine Expeditionary UnitMS ................. Multi-Spectral Imagery

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NCA ............... National Command AuthorityNEO ................ Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

RAP-I .............. Remedial Action Program-IntelligenceRSO ................ Regional Security Officer

SARC .............. Surveillance and Reconnaissance CenterSIGINT ............. Signals IntelligenceSOC ................ Special Operations CapableSOP ................ Standard Operating ProceduresSTA ................ Surveillance and Target Acquisition

TAMPS ............ Tactical Aviation Mission Planning System

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