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Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of-Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University [email protected] Website: http://www.cs.clemson.edu/~jmarty 1

Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

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Page 1: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of-Service in Broadband Access Networks

Dr. Jim MartinAssociate ProfessorSchool of ComputingClemson [email protected]: http://www.cs.clemson.edu/~jmarty

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Page 2: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Talk Overview

Introduction Background Network Denial of Service (DoS) Example Research Projects

– CyberTiger– Wireless HetNet

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Page 3: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Clemson’s School of Computing

To address the importance of computing throughout all fields, we evolved from a ‘Department’ to a ‘School of Computing’ with Three Divisions– Computer Science– Human Centered Computing– Visual Computing

Page 4: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Academic partnersAcademic partnersBusiness partnersBusiness partnersGovernment agenciesGovernment agenciesResearch & Medical centersResearch & Medical centersLibraries, MuseumsLibraries, MuseumsPolicyPolicy

BiometricsBiometricsClouds, Clusters, Data centersClouds, Clusters, Data centersLarge facilities: turbineLarge facilities: turbine windmills, generatorswindmills, generatorsSensorsSensors – river, forest, – river, forest, human, automotive, …human, automotive, …

Analytics , ForecastingAnalytics , ForecastingAccess, ManagementAccess, ManagementDatabases, File systemsDatabases, File systemsData Intensive computingData Intensive computingMiningMining

Broadband accessBroadband accessCampus test bedsCampus test bedsCybersecurityCybersecurityInternetworkingInternetworkingMobile and wireless systemsMobile and wireless systems

Applications, Middleware, SystemsApplications, Middleware, SystemsInterfacesInterfacesMobile applicationsMobile applicationsSoftware engineeringSoftware engineeringTrustworthy computingTrustworthy computingVirtual environmentsVirtual environments

AccessibilityAccessibilityHuman computer interactionHuman computer interactionLearning technologiesLearning technologiesSimulation and modelingSimulation and modelingSocial computingSocial computingEducation, outreach, trainingEducation, outreach, training

EducationEducationDiscoveryDiscovery

InnovationInnovation

Clemson Computing Research EcosystemClemson Computing Research Ecosystem

Algorithms, TheoryAlgorithms, TheoryComputational scienceComputational scienceDigital Production ArtsDigital Production ArtsEye tracking, GraphicsEye tracking, GraphicsHigh Performance ComputingHigh Performance ComputingVisualizationVisualization

ExpertiseExpertise

OrganizationsOrganizations

Scientific InstrumentsScientific Instruments

ComputationComputationDataData

NetworkingNetworkingSoftwareSoftware

Page 5: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Networking Lab’s Mission

Vision Statement:– Computing and the Internet are converging– Traditional broadcast video (Cable/Satellite) is converging with the Internet– Networks are becoming more and more ‘heterogeneous’– The scope of the lab’s interests is more than networking, it includes operating systems,

distributed systems, secure and trustworthy systems, and next generation Internet. Collectively these define the term ‘cybersystems’

The networking group focuses on a range of problems that are at the heart of developing and analyzing emerging cybersystems. The mission of the lab is to support cutting edge research in cybersystems AND to train researchers to address the needs of the changing world.

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Page 6: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Background: Broadband Internet Access

Wired technologies:– DSL, Cable, Fiber-to-the-home

Wireless– 3G, WiMAX, 4G

Trends– Bigger pipes (Comcast and Verizon both now offer 50 Mbps access connections!)

Concern: the Internet works well because core routers serve thousands of flows at any given time. The behavior of one flow is insignificant. The concept applies at the access network. This is changing….

– Emerging wireless networks will involve multiple technologies (femtocells, 802.21 heterogeneous networks)

Concern: wireless systems traditionally have been single, closed systems. Future systems will involve more open, cooperative wireless networks.

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Page 7: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Network Denial of Service (shared medium access networks)

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MAC Layer DoS: A DoS that leverages a MAC layer vulnerability. Example: a vulnerability of centralized broadband access schemes (like

cable, WiMAX, and emerging 4G systems) have relatively inefficient methods for supporting low bandwidth upstream flows.

Intentional DoS: A large number of 4G subscriber station’s are infected with malicious

software that is part of a botnet.

Unintentional DoS:

In a cable access network, a subscriber consumes all available channel bandwidth causing ‘over-the-top’ VoIP calls (e.g., Vonage) by other subscribers to experience poor call quality.

Page 8: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Example Research Projects (intentional DoS)

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“DoS Vulnerabilities in WiMAX networks” (R. Brooks, J. Martin, Student: J. Deng): Question: how sensitive is the choice of WiMAX system

parameters to the effects of DoS attacks caused by infected subscriber computers?

“Death by Scanning: Analysis of Worm-like Scanning in a cable network” (J. Martin, Student: Jordan Jueckstock) Question: what is the impact of the scanning activity of

modern botnets such as Slammer and Conficker on a cable network?

Page 9: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

CyberTiger Creative Inquiry Engage undergrads to work with PhD students on projects that develop applications that facilitate the study of large scale broadband wireless systems•Current focus is building tools (server back end, smartphone apps) that provide a measurement and assessment capability of broadband cellular and WiFi data services•Recent activities include a report to the FCC on the LACK of cellular infrastructure in SC outside of populated areas•CyberTiger serves as a Honeypot – partnering with Clemson’s CCIT, the goals are:

• To entice and monitor bad guys to attempt to break in

• Detect infected smartphones on behalf of our user community

One contribution of this work is the broader impact on society- we want to ensure everyone in the USA has equal access to measurably robust wireless services

CyberTiger Creative Inquiry

Page 10: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Building Cooperative Heterogeneous Wireless Networks With Re-Configurable Devices

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InternetAccess Network Exit

SmartPhoneGlobal Resource Controller

Autonomous Wireless Systems

Open Spectrum

Future handhelds will contain multiple radios that can be used concurrently AND that are reconfigurable.

Future wireless networks will be heterogeneous with cooperative mechanisms in place (early examples are femtocells and WiFi off loading)

Page 11: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Results and Discussion – Spectral Efficiency

• Use Case 1• No co-operation between the two carriers• Users use multiple static radios that can

connect to its own carrier’s access technologies

• Use Case 2• Co-operation exists between the two

carriers• Reconfigurable radios are used to support

access technologies implemented by the other carrier

05

1015

2025

0

0.5

10.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

Spec

tral

efficie

ncy (

bits/

s/Hz

)

Use Case 2

Use Case 1

R. Amin, J. Martin, J. Deaton, L. DaSilva, A. Hussien, A. Eltawil, "Balancing Spectral Efficiency, Energy Consumption, and Fairness in Future Heterogeneous Wireless Systems with Reconfigurable Devices", To appear in the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas In Communications, 2013.  J. Martin, R. Amin, A. Eltawil, A. Hussien, “Spectral Efficiency and Energy Consumption Tradeoffs for Reconfigurable Devices in Heterogeneous Wireless Systems”, Proceedings of the IEEE WCNC2012 Conference, (Paris, France, April 2012).

Page 12: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Simulation Topology

Signa l

Power

Etherne t

Wire les s

Gateway

Sink Node

Stationary User 1

Stationary User 2

Mobile User

802.11e APStart Stop

802.16e BS

Rogue Users

Topology Key802.16e Coverage Radius: 1 Km

802.11e Coverage Radius: 150 m

# Stationary Users: 2# Mobile User: 1# Rogue Users: 0-30 (increments of 5)

Stationary/Mobile User Traffic: Downlink CBR TCP (From Sink Node to Stationary/Mobile User)

Rogue User Traffic:Uplink CBR UDP (From Rogue User to Sink Node)

Talking points:•Goal is for the 4G operator to benefit when using an open network•Can a hierarchical allocation scheme work when faced with potential ‘DoS’ ?

Page 13: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Wrap Up…..Final Message

Trends in Internet access networks:– Bigger pipes– Heterogeneous wireless networks

These advancements are exposing new DoS concerns.– The impact of one user can be significant.– MAC layer vulnerabilities in emerging access networks, particularly

in heterogeneous wireless systems, need to be studied. This motivates our research in intentional and unintentional DoS in

broadband access networks.

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Page 14: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Supplemental Slides

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Page 15: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Simulation Details

Stationary users 1 and 2 always use the 802.16e radio (400 seconds)– Receives infinite downlink traffic from Sink Node (15 Mbps TCP CBR Flow)

Mobile user starts out using 802.16e radio (70 seconds), then uses 802.11e when it moves inside 802.11e coverage area (300 seconds) and finally switches back to 802.16e (30 seconds) when it moves outside of 802.11e coverage

– However, due to Denial of Service attacks by the rogue users, if mobile user cannot connect to 802.11e even when it is in 802.11e coverage, it will fall back to 802.16e usage

– Receives infinite downlink traffic from Sink Node (15 Mbps TCP CBR Flow) Rogue users always use 802.11e radio (400 seconds)

– Impact of 3 different packet generation rates studied for rogue user UDP CBR traffic flows in uplink direction – 500 kbps, 1000 kbps, 1500 kbps

Mobile User Traffic: – High Priority (over 802.11e) – CWMin = 7, CWMax = 15

Rogue User Traffic:– Low Priority– CWMin = 31, CWMax = 1023 (same as regular 802.11g CWMin and CWMax settings)

Page 16: Intentional and Unintentional Denial-of- Service in Broadband Access Networks Dr. Jim Martin Associate Professor School of Computing Clemson University

Simulation Results – Mobile User Throughput

Talking points:•preliminary results