Interest Group Strategies. Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure

Interest Group Strategies: NavigatingBetween Privileged Access andStrategies of Pressure

Anne BinderkrantzUniversity of Aarhus, Denmark

The literature often contrasts interest groups possessing insider status and outsider groups forcedto seek influence through more indirect means. Drawing on data from a survey of all nationalDanish interest groups, this article demonstrates that most groups have an action repertoire includ-ing both direct contacts to bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as mediacampaigns and mobilizations of members. Different strategies of influence are correlated positively,hence, there is no contradiction between pursuing strategies associated with insider access to decision-making and strategies where pressure is put on decision makers through media contactsand mobilizations. An analysis of four distinct strategies an administrative, a parliamentary, amedia and a mobilization strategy finds interesting variations in the factors that affect the pur-suance of the various strategies of influence. Groups with a privileged position vis--vis decisionmakers have high levels of activities targeting these decision makers, but the lack of a privilegedposition does not lead groups to pursue indirect strategies. Indirect strategies are most intensivelypursued by cause groups and groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with regardto attracting members.

Interest groups with ambitions to influence public policy can choose from a widerange of methods to accomplish this aim. Relevant decision makers can be con-tacted, media campaigns can be launched or members can be mobilized to exertpressure on politicians. The literature has, however, pointed to systematic varia-tions in the methods groups utilize. Notably, a distinction has been made betweeninsider groups enjoying privileged access to decision-making processes and out-sider groups seeking influence through indirect strategies of pressure (Grant,2000a).

There is controversy with regard to the continued usefulness of this distinction.Scholars have argued that today it is possible for any group to gain status as at leasta peripheral insider, and it has been shown that nearly all British interest groupshave one or more insider characteristic (Maloney et al., 1994, p. 32; Page 1999, pp.20910). Further, outsider strategies are becoming more widely used as interestgroups operate in increasingly complex environments (Grant, 2001, pp. 33947;2004, p. 412; Richardson, 2000, pp. 1,0203). Even though insider strategies aregenerally seen as the more effective (Jordan and Maloney, 1997, p. 181), outsiderstrategies seem to be on the rise not only in use, but also in terms of effectiveness(Grant, 2004, p. 412; Richardson, 2000, pp. 1,0113).

The insider/outsider debate has attracted most attention among British political sci-entists, but the described trends seem to be mirrored in other European countries.In Denmark the empirical focus of this article corporatist structures have been

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INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 695

under rupture in the last decades. Groups traditionally regarded as highly privi-leged have complained about being excluded from central decision-makingprocesses, and a wider range of groups is now included in governmental hearingprocesses. Also, the media has gained increasing importance in the political processas well as in the strategies pursued by interest groups (Blom-Hansen, 2001; Christiansen and Nrgaard, 2003a).

Although there is now consensus that strategies targeting the media and mobiliz-ing members are becoming more common, there is not much systematic evidencerevealing exactly how widespread these strategies are. Empirical studies of inter-est groups in Europe have largely focused on their direct interaction with publicdecision makers, while the use of outsider or indirect strategies has receivedless attention. The first task ahead is, therefore, to shed light on the prevalence ofdifferent methods of influence. Upon investigating how widespread strategies are,the article goes on to examine whether or not interest groups combine differentstrategies of influence, and what factors affect the use of strategies.

Wyn Grant, who in 1977 coined the insider/outsider distinction with regard togroup strategies,1 argues that groups can temporarily combine insider and outsiderstrategies, but must eventually opt for primarily pursuing one strategy or the other.Insider groups are expected to behave responsibly and the simultaneous pursuanceof different strategies is likely to compromise group relations with decision makers(Grant, 2000b, p. 32; 2001, p. 343). Other authors have argued that governmentofficials know and understand the constraints under which group leaders operate,and therefore accept that groups loudly criticize governmental decisions withoutdepriving them of insider access (Jordan and Richardson, 1987, pp. 367; Page,1999, p. 212). Further, groups can use different strategies in different stages of thepolicy-making process and for different purposes (Christiansen and Nrgaard,2003b, p. 22). While these arguments are plausible, little evidence exists to sub-stantiate the claims about the compatibility of different strategies.

Drawing on data from a survey of all Danish interest groups, this article demon-strates that both direct and indirect strategies of influence are part of the standardrepertoire of interest groups. Most groups combine different methods, implyingthat groups are perfectly able to engage both in strategies normally associated withinsider status and in strategies of using the media or mobilizing members. Thereare nevertheless important differences between groups in terms of preferred strat-egy of influence. Direct strategies targeting bureaucrats are typically pursued bygroups controlling important revenues; parliamentarians are often contacted bygroups engaged in a wide range of policy areas; and indirect strategies are popularamong groups finding themselves in a competitive situation when it comes toattracting members. Indirect strategies are to be seen not as a fall-back option forgroups excluded from insider politics, but rather as an active choice of groupsneeding to demonstrate high levels of activities to members and potential members.

Classifying and Explaining Strategies of InfluenceTwo main routes are usually identified for groups to achieve their political objec-tives: an insider strategy of close consultation with decision makers and an

696 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

outsider strategy based on public appeals through the media and mobilization ofgroup members and citizens (Gais and Walker, 1991, p. 103; Jordan and Maloney,1997, p. 181; Kollman, 1998, p. 23). While both types of strategies have been onthe American research agenda (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 152), the Euro-pean literature has mainly focused on insider strategies. The terms insider andoutsider reflect the assumption that groups generally prefer insider strategies, aswell as a tendency to equate status as insider or outsider with different strategies(Maloney et al., 1994, p. 181). Strategies are chosen by the group, while insiderstatus is largely ascribed to the group by decision makers. By differentiatingbetween status and strategy, it is possible to examine the relationship between privileges conferred on groups and group choices (Maloney et al., 1994, p. 29).

In order to avoid the connotations of the terms insider and outsider and theassumption that outsider strategies are inferior, it is preferable to distinguishbetween direct strategies where groups approach public decision makers, and indi-rect strategies where influence on policy is sought in more indirect ways. Amongdirect strategies, a further distinction is made between actions directed towardbureaucratic actors and actions targeting politicians and parties. Indirect strategiesare divided into those directed toward the media and those where members or cit-izens are mobilized. Table 1 provides an overview of the four strategies and exam-ples of activities. Strategies of influence are the overall approaches taken by groupswhen they pursue political goals. Empirically, strategies can be observed as com-binations of different activities (Berry, 1977, p. 212; Grant, 2000a, p. 410).

Table 1: Categorization of Influence Strategies and Examples of Activities

Direct strategies Indirect strategies

Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilizationstrategy strategy strategy strategy

Contacting the Contacting Contacting Arranging publicrelevant parliamentary reporters meetings andminister committees Writing letters conferences

Contacting Contacting party to the editor Organizing letter-national public spokespersons and columns writingservants Contacting other Issuing press campaigns

Actively using members of releases and Arranging strikes,public parliament holding press civil disobedience,committees, Contacting party conferences direct action etc. organizations Publicizing and public

Responding to analyses and demonstrationsrequests for research Conducting petitionscomments reports


Large parts of the literature regard the pursuance of indirect strategies as a fall-back option for groups excluded from direct access to decision-making processes.The policy process is described as highly structured, providing some groups withinsider status, which enables them to be continually involved in decision-makingprocesses. Other groups find themselves in less privileged positions and must resortto indirect strategies of pressure. Groups can be outsiders either by necessity or bychoice, but outsider strategies are generally considered less likely to succeed thaninsider strategies, and most groups are assumed to aspire to insider status (Grant,2000a; 2004, pp. 34).

Similar ideas are found in the British network approach, which calls attention tostructured patterns of policy-making within different policy areas and the differ-ent options these structures afford interest groups (Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 79; Marshand Smith, 2001, p. 533; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). The network approach sharescommon ground with the Scandinavian corporatist literature, which describes thedegree of corporatism as varying across policy areas. In this tradition, corporatismis synonymous with the granting of privileged institutional positions in relation topolitical and administrative decision-making processes to certain interest groups(Christiansen and Nrgaard, 2003a, p. 13).2 Depending on how integrated groupsare in these corporatist structures, they have different strategic opportunities. In asimilar vein, Wyn Grant points out how the insider/outsider distinction highlightsthe way the state sets the rules of the game for pressure group activity (Grant,2000b, p. 20).

The implication of the discussed literature is that interest groups will show a pre-ference for either direct or indirect strategies. Privileged groups are expected tostick to approaching central decision makers. Non-privileged groups will resort toindirect strategies. If indirect strategies are thus a fall-back option for groupsexcluded from direct access, the pursuance of different types of strategies shouldbe negatively correlated. Further, the possession of a privileged position can beexpected to shape group strategies in important ways. Among the implications isa negative effect on the tendency to use indirect strategies. With an eye to testingthis, multivariate analyses of the four strategies of influence will be conducted. Inthese analyses a number of other hypotheses drawn from different strands of theliterature will be included in order to investigate more thoroughly the factors thatshape the use of influence strategies by interest groups.

Interest groups are typically described as requiring insider status as part of resourceexchanges between groups and government actors (Grant, 2000b, p. 27; Maloneyet al., 1994, pp. 20, 36). General resources such as members, financial resourcesand staff are important, but in addition, some groups control more specificresources valued by decision makers. A well-known argument is that businessgroups are particularly privileged because they control crucial economic resources(Lindblom, 1977). The argument can be extended to include trade unions andother groups with economic or otherwise central positions in society (Christiansenand Nrgaard, 2003a, p. 139). In particular, groups representing parts of the publicsector such as schools or local authorities control resources and possess specializedknowledge of value to decision makers. In the analyses a measure of generalresources will be included along with a variable constructed to test whether or not


groups in control of specific resources valued by decision makers show a highertendency to utilize direct strategies.

Dense policy-making networks are often found where issues are seen as technicalmatters most appropriately decided upon by experts, bureaucrats and interestedparties. A group that is capable of fixing its political assets within a specific rangeof identifiable problems has good chances of achieving its goals through interac-tion with bureaucrats (Browne, 1991, p. 347). Groups engaged in a narrow rangeof policy areas are, therefore, more likely to achieve insider status and to pursuetheir goals through direct strategies. Conversely, groups engaged in many differentpolicy areas can be expected to rely more on strategies involving politicians, themedia and mobilization. The importance of close, direct interaction between groups and governmental actors is also assumed to be at its highest when generalattention is low. If an issue area attracts attention from various actors, corporatiststructures of policy-making become less central, while other modes of influenceattain increased importance. In order to test these relationships, two measuresrelated to the political involvement of interest groups are included in the analyses.The first is a measure of the scope of policy areas each group is involved in. Thesecond is a measure of the degree of politicization of the policy area that the groupis most active in.

Authors focusing explicitly on the use of indirect strategies argue that these arenot mere fall-back options for groups excluded from privileged access. Rather, theyare chosen because they are instrumental in demonstrating to members or poten-tial members that the group is working actively to promote group goals (Gais andWalker, 1991, p. 105; Jordan and Maloney, 1997, p. 184). Groups with a far-flungmembership united only by support for group goals tend to choose strategies thatwill capture the attention of their diffuse membership and reinforce the loyalty ofgroup members (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 545, 638; Gais and Walker, 1991, pp.1056). Public interest groups or cause groups are thus likely to pursue indirectstrategies of influence (Gais and Walker, 1991, pp. 1134; McFarland, 1984, pp.979; Maloney et al., 1994, p. 35). Furthermore, members of some cause groupsexpect that unconventional methods are used and find it illegitimate for groups todevelop close working relationships with officials (Christiansen, 1999, p. 154;Jordan and Maloney, 1997, pp. 1813; Rommetvedt, 2000, p. 117).

On the other hand, interest groups formed to obtain benefits for specific groups ofpeople are more likely to approach decision makers directly. Their potentialmembers are more readily identifiable, and are mainly interested in the groupsability to secure them goods. Their special interests might also be difficult to justifyto the general public (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 202; Gais and Walker, 1991, p. 120;Grant, 2000b, p. 28; Maloney et al., 1994, p. 36). Finally, these groups often findthemselves in a monopoly situation when it comes to supplying their memberswith certain goods, while groups with more idealistic goals typically experiencecompetition from other groups (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 202, 545, 638).

This last argument centers on the role played by exit opportunities in influencinggroup strategies. The other side of the coin voice with regard to membersoptions to influence group strategies is not discussed very intensively in the inter-est group literature, and it is less clear what strategic choices a high degree of mem-


bership influence may lead to. On the one hand, members want their group todemonstrate a high level of activity and may use their influence to dismiss leaderswho do not pursue public, visible strategies (Grant, 2001, p. 343). On the otherhand, members with high levels of influence can be expected to have insight intogroup affairs, and thus to care more about what the group achieves than about thepublic visibility of the group.

The role of exit and voice is investigated by creating a measure of the degree ofcompetition for members as well as a measure of the influence group membersacquire upon joining the group. In order to test differences between cause groupsand other groups, groups are divided in two groups depending on whether theyare formed to obtain benefits for specific groups of people or can be classified ascause groups working for goals that will not benefit their members or potentialmembers in particular (Berry, 1977, p. 7).

Empirical Approach and Measures of VariablesThe analysis is based on a survey of all national Danish interest groups. Interestgroups are defined as membership organizations working to obtain political influ-ence. Members can be individuals, firms, governmental institutions or even otherinterest groups.3 Limiting the study to membership groups is in accord with thesuggestion by Grant Jordan et al. that a distinction should be made between inter-est groups defined as membership organizations and other actors seeking politicalinfluence (Jordan et al., 2004, pp. 2056).

Identifying the relevant groups is not without problems. Notably, it cannot bedetermined from the names of groups whether they seek political influence or not.Therefore, all groups that might possibly be classified as interest groups were con-tacted. The questionnaire opened with a series of questions asking groups whetheror not they worked to influence different aspects of politics. Groups who reportedno political ambitions were excluded from the survey. A total of 2,465 groups werecontacted of whom 70 percent responded to the survey. Of the responding groups,493 indicated that they did not seek any form of political influence. The completedquestionnaires from the 1,229 groups working to influence public policy consti-tute the empirical basis of the analysis.

Measures of the four strategies of influence are based on questions asking groupshow often during the last year they used a wide range of different methods to gainpolitical influence. These questions were weighted by the degree of importanceascribed to each activity by the group. For each strategy, groups received theiraverage score on all weighted activities related to the strategy in question. Allindexes were coded to range from 0 to 100. Appendix A reports the specific ques-tions used to construct the indexes.4 Groups were asked to bear in mind the situa-tion in the policy area in which they were most active. This enables a test of theeffect of policy area related factors, and avoids asking groups to aggregate theirstrategic choices across different policy areas. Groups are, on the other hand, stillasked to aggregate from the level of specific issues to the level of the policy area(Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 164; 2001). The study is designed to give apicture of the usefulness of the insider/outsider distinction as well as testing a series


of hypotheses regarding factors influencing group strategies. These purposes canbe most effectively met by investigating group strategies at the level of the policyarea.

The independent variables included in the multivariate analyses are briefly dis-cussed here, while details about the construction of indexes for most variables arelisted in appendix A. Indexes constructed for independent variables have beencoded to range from 0 to 100. In order to investigate both direct and indirect effectson the use of strategies, variables are entered into the analyses in four steps. Thefirst model incorporates only basic group characteristics. Based on group namesand descriptions of the kind of members groups appeal to, a dichotomous variablefor cause groups is constructed. The variable assumes the value 1 for cause groupsand 0 for other groups. Also, a dichotomous variable for groups with specificresources is constructed. Trade unions, business groups and groups with institu-tional members such as schools or public authorities are given the value 1, whilethe other groups are given the value 0.

General group resources such as members, finances and staff might also affectgroup strategies. It is not possible to test the importance of the number of members,because the groups examined have different membership types. Measures of othertypes of resources are highly correlated and the number of employees workingwith political issues is chosen as the measure of resources most directly related topursuing strategies of influence. A visual inspection of the relation between thismeasure and group strategies reveals an exponential relationship. The number ofpolitical employees is, therefore, logarithmically transformed.5

Model 2 incorporates two measures of secondary group characteristics. In order totest whether or not groups who find themselves in a competitive situation withregard to attracting members show a preference for indirect strategies, a measureof membership competition is constructed. Similarly, a measure based on ques-tions about the level of membership influence is constructed to investigate pos-sible effects of voice on group strategies. Both measures are indexed based on groupanswers to a number of questions about the internal dynamics of the group.

The third model includes variables related to the political engagement of groups.Groups engaged in only one or a few policy areas are expected to be more likelyto approach relevant decision makers directly than groups involved in many policyareas. The questionnaire included a list of 20 policy areas and asked groups howactive they were within each of these. For each area, groups answering very activewere given 3 points, those that were active to some degree 2 points, and slightlyactive groups, 1 point. Those indicating that they were not involved in the policyarea at all or did not answer the question were given no points. The index for thescope of areas adds together group scores for the 20 policy areas.

This study comprises all groups that seek to influence at least some aspect of pol-itics. Some groups barely live up to this criterion, while others seek influence oneverything from public opinion to everyday decisions by bureaucrats and do soto a very large degree. In order to control for these variations in the general levelof group engagement in politics, an index of the intensity of influence as goal is included in the analysis. Finding an effect of this measure will not be very


interesting in itself, but it must be included as the effects of other variables wouldotherwise be distorted by variations in political ambitions.

Finally, model 4 includes measures of area politicization and group privileges. Toinvestigate whether or not low levels of attention and politicization are associatedwith close consultation between groups and decision makers, respondents wereasked a number of questions regarding the degree of conflict and attention in thepolicy area in which they were most engaged. These questions form the basis foran index of area politicization. Last, but certainly not least, an index of privilegedposition was constructed based on group answers to questions such as whether ornot the group was routinely asked to comment on bills and whether it was repre-sented on public committees.

Even though an analytical distinction can be made between group status and thepursuance of an administrative strategy, it is questionable to regard one as the soledeterminant of the other. The quest for insider status is reinforced by the utiliza-tion of insider strategies, and insider status fosters the use of insider strategies(Maloney et al., 1994, p. 29). A very high bivariate correlation between the levelof group privileges and the use of the administrative strategy (Pearson correlation= 0.740) demonstrates how closely these two variables are related. Because of theambiguity concerning the direction of causality, the measure of group privileges isomitted from the analysis of administrative strategy, but included in the analysesof other strategies where similar problems do not arise.

Investigating Action Repertoires: Are Different Strategies Compatible?The first empirical task is to get a clear picture of the prevalence of differentmethods of influence. Previous research has demonstrated that most groups havecontacts with relevant decision makers (Christiansen and Nrgaard, 2003a), butlittle is known about the prevalence of activities associated with indirect strategiesof influence. As illustrated in Table 2, Danish interest groups have a wide range ofmethods in their action repertoire. Most activities are used by more than two thirdsof the groups, and activities of both a direct and indirect nature are among thosemost commonly used. Contrary to conventional wisdom, that groups concentratetheir efforts on interaction with bureaucrats, the four most widely used tactics areactually indirect. There are more groups approaching reporters and encouragingmembers to contact decision makers than groups contacting public servants andparliamentarians.

Differences between the number of groups reporting the use of methods related tothe administrative strategy, the mobilization strategy and the media strategy aresmall. Targeting parliamentary actors is, on the other hand, less common than othertypes of activities. However, when asked how important they believed differentmethods to be in their attempts to seek influence, parliamentary tactics were givenratings comparable to activities associated with the other strategies (figures notshown). Thus, the overall conclusion is that all four strategies of influence areimportant parts of the action repertoire of Danish interest groups.


A modification of this general picture is warranted because certain methods ofmobilization are rather uncommon. Few groups engage more than occasionally indirect action, public demonstrations, strikes, civil disobedience or in conductingpetitions. A common denominator for these types of mobilization is that they arerather confrontational, indicating that a large majority of Danish interest groups

Table 2: The Use of Different Activities, Percentages

Very often +Very Very often + Fairly often +

Activity often Fairly often Occasionally

Contacting reporters (3) 13.0 35.1 83.9Arranging debate meetings and 14.5 42.5 83.8

conferences (4)Encouraging members and others to 4.8 24.7 79.3

contact decision makers (4)Writing letters to the editor and 9.0 28.0 78.2

columns (3)Actively using public committees and 13.6 34.2 76.3

other bodies (1)Contacting national public servants (1) 14.8 37.7 74.3Contacting the minister (1) 7.7 24.8 72.9Issuing press releases and holding press 9.1 27.8 72.9

conferences (3)Responding to request for comments (1) 19.6 40.4 72.5Contacting parliamentary committees (2) 5.2 19.5 68.8Encouraging members and others to write 3.3 15.1 65.4

letters to the editor (4)Contacting party spokespersons (2) 6.2 20.6 64.5Contacting other members of 3.4 12.1 62.6

parliament (2)Publishing analyses and research 6.0 15.1 57.2

reports (3)Paid advertisements in newspapers, 1.4 6.9 36.9

etc. (3)Contacting party organizations (2) 2.1 6.0 31.7Legal direct action, public demonstrations 1.1 3.2 22.6

and happenings (4)Conducting petitions (4) 1.0 2.3 17.1Strikes, civil disobedience and illegal 0.3 0.7 4.1

direct action (4)

Notes: N = 1,16076. The table reports responses to the question: How often during the last year has the groupengaged in these activities? The groups were asked to bear in mind the situation in the policy area in which it wasmost active. Tactics related to the four different strategies are identified as follows: (1) administrative strategy, (2)parliamentary strategy, (3) media strategy and (4) mobilization strategy. Entries are ordered after the percentage ofgroups respending very often, fairly often or occasionally.


prefer conventional and inoffensive tactics. Even when pressuring decision makersthrough mobilization activities, they tend to choose the least confrontationalmethods such as arranging debate meetings and conferences or encouragingmembers to contact decision makers. With regard to media strategies, Wyn Grantargues that it is possible to combine close relations to decision makers with mediause of a so-called responsible character (Grant, 2000b, pp. 1356). The fact thatmore than two thirds of Danish groups report using a wide array of activitiesdemonstrates that groups are indeed able to combine direct contacts with decisionmakers with mobilization and media-oriented strategies at least if the tactics usedare not too confrontational.

More information about the compatibility of different strategies can be gained bylooking at correlations between strategies. While the analysis above focused on theuse of individual activities, attention is now directed toward the four overall strate-gies of influence. As shown in Table 3, all four strategies are positively correlated.There is, therefore, no indication of a contradiction between seeking a close rela-tionship with government actors and pursuing indirect strategies of influence. On the contrary, it is perfectly possible for an interest group to combine differentstrategies.

These findings might reflect that different strategies are used at different stages ofdecision-making processes and for different purposes (Christiansen and Nrgaard,2003b, p. 22). Possibly indirect strategies are used when groups want to place anissue on the agenda, while groups rely on direct strategies in later stages of decision-making processes. It is also possible that groups combine strategies in moreoutright ways and pressure decision makers through the use of indirect strategies,while simultaneously approaching decision makers directly. It might even be thatindirect strategies are used in understanding with bureaucrats and politicians withan eye to attracting public attention that might favor both interest groups and governmental actors (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002, p. 22).

Either way, decision makers seem to respect that groups seek attention from themedia and the general public without excluding them from access to making their

Table 3: Correlations between Different Strategies of Influence

Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilizationstrategy strategy strategy strategy

Administrative strategy 1Parliamentary strategy 0.622 1Media strategy 0.430 0.600 1Mobilization strategy 0.298 0.498 0.534 1

Notes: Entries are Pearson correlations. All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). N: administra-tive/parliamentary strategy: 1,166; administrative/media strategy: 1,159; administrative/mobilization strategy: 1,153;parliamentary/media strategy: 1,157; parliamentary/mobilization strategy: 1,150; media/mobilization strategy: 1,162.


standpoint heard in decision-making processes (Jordan and Richardson, 1987, pp.367; Page, 1999, p. 212; Richardson, 1993, p. 90). Whether or not this respecteven extends to accepting that groups use direct and indirect strategies simultane-ously remains to be seen, as the analyses do not speak to the details of how groupsnavigate between different strategies. In order to investigate these questions, moredetailed insight into how and when groups pursue different strategies is warranted.This is an obvious area of interest for more qualitatively oriented research in thefuture.

Although the general picture is one of compatibility, certain tactics seem less rec-oncilable. Correlations (Pearsons r) between some of the more confrontationaloutsider activities and a number of tactics related to the administrative strategy arenegative (although not significant). As discussed, confrontational tactics are,however, not very commonly used. Less than 10 percent of groups engage morethan occasionally in at least one of the three types of activities that seem difficultto combine with insider access to decision-making processes. No more than 18groups or 1.5 percent of respondents engage in two or more of these activitiesmore than occasionally. Table 4 demonstrates the relation between engaging inconfrontational activities and contacting public servants. As can be seen, groupsemploying these activities at least fairly often are less likely to contact bureaucratsthan other groups. In fact, a rather large share of these groups do not approachpublic servants at all.

The implication is that the small number of groups routinely engaging in con-frontational activities can meaningfully be characterized as outsiders with regardto administrative decision-making processes. They concentrate their efforts on dis-ruptive tactics without supplementing them with contacts with bureaucrats either

Table 4: Relation between Confrontational Activities and Contacting NationalPublic Servants

Contacting public servants

Number of confrontational Very often +activities engaged in Very often + Fairly often +more than occasionally Very often Fairly often occasionally N

Zero 15 40 75 1,066One 11 42 67 88More than one (17) (22) (56) 18

All groups 15 38 74 1,172

Notes: The table reports responses to the question: How often during the last year has the group engaged in theseactivities? The respondents were asked to bear in mind the situation in the policy area in which they were mostactive. Included as confrontational activities are: (1) strikes, civil disobedience and illegal direct action; (2) legaldirect action, public demonstrations and happenings; and (3) paid advertisements in newspapers, etc. Percentagesin the more than one row are based on a small N.


because their confrontational tactics result in closed doors or because they choosenot to interact with bureaucrats. The number of groups with these characteristicsis too small to draw any definitive conclusions, but a closer examination revealsthat most of them are to be found on the ideological far left. They can thus be con-sidered what Wyn Grant terms ideological outsider groups groups who believein challenging established authorities and institutions (Grant, 2000a, p. 415).

The conclusion regarding the usefulness of the insider/outsider distinction istwofold. On the one hand, while the large majority of groups can be classified asinsiders, it has been possible to identify a small group of outsider groups. On theother hand, distinguishing between insiders and outsiders fails to capture impor-tant variations in the use of different strategies. In particular, it is interesting toinvestigate which groups tend to rely more on approaching bureaucrats and par-liamentarians and which concentrate their efforts on approaching the media andmobilizing members. Even though different strategies are compatible, the remain-der of the article will demonstrate that different factors are important in deter-mining the use of the four strategies of influence.

Explaining the Use of Strategies: Multivariate AnalysesAs discussed, the analyses are conducted in four steps in order to investigate bothdirect and indirect effects of the variables included. Results of the analysis of theadministrative strategy are shown in Table 5. The first interesting finding is thatgroups with many political employees and groups controlling resources valued by decision makers are more likely to engage in an administrative strategy thanother groups. A high level of membership influence also has a positive effect onpursuing the administrative strategy. On the other hand, groups experiencing ahigh level of competition for members are less likely than other groups to targetthe bureaucracy.

Model 3 introduces variables related to the political engagement of groups. Thescope of areas that groups seek to influence does not have a significant effect, butthe measure of the extent to which groups have an ambition to influence politicshas a strong positive effect on approaching bureaucrats. Lastly, model 4 introducesthe measure of area politicization, which has a positive effect on pursuing anadministrative strategy. In this final model, the aforementioned effects of group-related variables still hold. On top of that, when controlling for other variables,cause groups use this strategy somewhat less than other groups.

Table 6 presents the analysis of the parliamentary strategy. The number of employ-ees working with politics has a significant effect on the pursuit of a parliamentarystrategy throughout all four steps. Cause groups seem more likely to pursue a par-liamentary strategy than other groups in the models including only group-relatedvariables, but this effect is weakened when introducing other variables. Themeasure of membership influence at first seems to have a positive effect onapproaching politicians, but the effect disappears when new variables are controlledfor. This indicates that groups whose members have high levels of influence aregenerally more interested in affecting politics but the variable does not have adirect effect.


The nature of the political engagement of the group is an important influence ontargeting parliamentary actors. Groups with strong ambitions to influence politicsand groups active in a wide range of policy areas have high levels of parliamen-tary activity. The introduction in model 4 of the last two variables shows that areapoliticization is not important for the pursuance of a parliamentary strategy, whilethe level of group privileges has a positive effect. Interestingly, the control of spe-cific resources has a small negative effect on pursuing a parliamentary strategywhen all other variables are controlled for. The resources that had a positive effecton approaching bureaucrats thus have the opposite effect when it comes to con-tacting politicians.

The analysis of the first indirect strategy the media strategy shows a patternrather dissimilar to the analyses of direct strategies, and in particular to the admin-istrative strategy. Consistent with expectations, cause groups and groups experi-encing membership competition are more involved in media-oriented activitiesthan other groups. On the other hand, groups controlling specific resources tradeunions, business groups and institutional groups are less likely than other groupsto pursue a media strategy. More in line with the other strategies, group resourcesin terms of political employees are a rather important determinant of this strategy.Initially, a high level of membership influence seems to affect the use of the mediastrategy positively, but consistent with the pattern in the analyses above, this effectvanishes when controlling for the political engagement of the group (Table 7).

Model 3 shows that groups with high ambitions to influence politics are moreprone to use media related activities than other groups, and that engagement inmany policy areas has a positive effect on pursuing this strategy. As expected,groups operating in highly politicized policy areas are also more likely to seek

Table 5: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Administrative Strategy

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Cause group -2.304 -1.711 -4.844* -5.530*Political employees 29.153*** 25.236*** 14.561*** 13.592***

(transformed)Specific resources 8.110*** 6.278*** 4.434** 4.108**Membership competition -0.131** -0.159*** -0.168***Membership influence 0.281*** 0.133*** 0.117***Scope of areas 0.027 0.003Influence as goal 0.538*** 0.520***Area politicization 0.095**Constant 27.643 17.803 -3.135 -5.451

R square (adjusted) 0.206 0.248 0.439 0.443

Notes: N = 1,059. Entries are non-standardized regression coefficients. Levels of significance: * > 0.05 ** > 0.01 *** > 0.001.


Table 6: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Parliamentary Strategy


Cause group 6.341*** 5.827*** 2.538 3.096*Political employees 23.542*** 20.938*** 11.100*** 9.397***

(transformed)Specific resources 0.995 0.891 -0.933 -1.751*Membership competition 0.040 0.005 0.024Membership influence 0.187*** 0.050 0.041Scope of areas 0.203*** 0.177***Influence as goal 0.346*** 0.305***Privileged position 0.098***Area politicization 0.022Constant 15.845 5.089 -8.450 -9.392



Table 7: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Media Strategy


Cause group 9.741*** 8.206*** 5.404** 4.631**Political employees 29.017*** 27.068*** 18.841*** 16.954***

(transformed)Specific resources -1.952 -0.641 -2.272* -2.966**Membership competition 0.188*** 0.158*** 0.151***Membership influence 0.134*** 0.022 -0.003Scope of areas 0.170*** 0.128***Influence as goal 0.286*** 0.247***Privileged position 0.003Area politicization 0.140***Constant 20.037 7.070 -3.864 -7.356




influence through media strategies than other groups. Finally, a privileged positiondoes not have a significant effect on pursuing the media strategy.

As presented in Table 8, the first two steps of the mobilization strategy analysisreveal a pattern comparable to that of the analysis of the media strategy. Causegroups, competition for members and high levels of membership influence havepositive effects on the level of mobilization activities. This is also the case for a highnumber of political employees, while controlling specific resources leads to lowerlevels of mobilization. The effect of the two measures of political engagement issimilar to the effect on the media strategy strong and positive but in models 3and 4 resources in terms of political employees have no significant effect. Finally,operating in a highly politicized policy area makes it more likely that a group willhave high levels of mobilization activities, while a privileged position does not sig-nificantly influence this strategy.

When comparing the four analyses, it is evident that different factors come intoplay in explaining the use of different strategies. The only variable with similareffects on the pursuance of all strategies is the measure of the intensiveness of agroups goal to obtain influence. This finding is in itself rather trivial as it merelydemonstrates that groups with strong ambitions to influence politics engage inmany activities to achieve their aims. It is, however, important for the analysis ofthe other variables that the effect is controlled for.

Of more interest is that having a privileged position vis--vis bureaucrats does notaffect the pursuance of either the mobilization or the media strategy negatively.This sharply contradicts those parts of the literature that view these strategies as

Table 8: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Mobilization Strategy


Cause group 6.916** 5.875*** 3.734*** 3.323**Political employees 7.239*** 4.691*** -1.083 -1.948

(transformed)Specific resources -3.524*** -3.000*** -4.158*** -4.461***Membership competition 0.111*** 0.086*** 0.082***Membership influence 0.178*** 0.101*** 0.089***Scope of areas 0.190*** 0.171***Influence as goal 0.142*** 0.124***Privileged position 0.011Area politicization 0.067***Constant 17.239 5.285 -0.146 -1.819




fall-back options for groups finding themselves excluded from insider options toexercise influence. A privileged position is, on the other hand, closely related topursuing direct strategies.6 The analysis also lends support to the proposition thatinterest groups acquire this privileged position or insider status as part of a resourceexchange with decision makers. Groups who control resources assumed to bevalued by decision makers are more likely to approach bureaucratic actors thanother groups.

Groups in control of specific resources are, on the other hand, less likely to engagein the other three strategies. In particular, the strong negative effect on the mobi-lization strategy suggests that these groups are disinclined to put pressure on deci-sion makers through strategies of mobilization. As discussed above, there is nogeneral contradiction between pursuing different strategies simultaneously. Nev-ertheless, the fact that groups controlling specific resources prioritize an adminis-trative strategy above all others could indicate that for these groups, close relationsto bureaucrats lead to the downgrading of other strategies.

General group resources, measured as the number of political employees, affect allstrategies, but the mobilization strategy positively. When interpreting the magni-tude of this effect, it is, however, important to bear in mind that the variable hasbeen logarithmically transformed (the mean score on the transformed variable is0.27 and the standard deviation 0.33). Group resources have a particularly largeeffect on the media strategy, which makes for an interesting contrast to the mobi-lization strategy, where the coefficient for political employees is negative, but notsignificant. Engaging in a mobilization strategy seems to require different resourcesthan other strategies. An active membership is likely to be among the importantresources, as indicated by the positive effect of a high level of membership influ-ence in pursuing a strategy of mobilization. Interestingly, this variable also has apositive effect on the administrative strategy, implying that an active and influen-tial membership can give rise to different strategic choices. On the one hand, thereis a relation between membership influence and a visible strategy of involvingmembers. On the other, the effect on the administrative strategy suggests thatmembers with influence and insight in the workings of an interest group care aboutthe results achieved through interactions with relevant bureaucrats.

Above it was hypothesized that groups involved in only a few policy areas tendedto be more inclined to pursue a strategy targeting relevant bureaucrats. This is notsupported by the analyses, but the measure of the scope of areas has a positiveeffect on all other strategies. The more policy areas a group is involved in, the moreits political work includes targeting politicians, the media and mobilizing members.Finally and contrary to expectations politicization has positive effects on all butthe parliamentary strategy. A likely interpretation is that it takes more effort togain influence where attention and conflict is high and that groups therefore inten-sify their direct contacts to bureaucratic decision makers as well as their indirectefforts in politicized policy areas.

The strands of the literature emphasizing networks of policy-making and corpo-ratist structures privileging interest groups provide good explanations of the use of the administrative strategy and also go a long way toward explaining the


parliamentary strategy. Other perspectives are, however, required in order to givea sufficient picture of when and why groups choose to engage in indirect strate-gies. As discussed, the nature of the political engagement of groups provide somepieces of the jigsaw. Indirect strategies are thus more commonly used by groupswho work in highly politicized policy areas and who engage themselves in manydifferent areas.

Other important variables affecting the use of indirect strategies are related to thesituation of the group vis--vis its members and potential members. Cause groupsand groups competing intensely for members rely more heavily on indirect strate-gies than other groups. These groups are, on the other hand, less active when itcomes to activities targeting the bureaucracy. In accord with arguments made pri-marily by American interest group scholars, interest groups who find themselvesin a competitive situation when it comes to attracting and maintaining members,show a preference for strategies that are well-suited to demonstrating to membersand the general public that they are highly active. In order to satisfactorily explainthe whole array of strategies, it is thus necessary to call on different strands of theliterature.

ConclusionA well-known distinction is made between interest groups possessing insider statusand outsider groups forced to seek influence through more indirect means. Basedon evidence from a survey of all national Danish interest groups, it has beendemonstrated that most interest groups utilize a wide repertoire of tactics andstrategies, ranging from directly approaching bureaucrats and politicians to influ-encing politics by more indirect means of mobilization or media campaigns. Whilethe insider/outsider distinction entails a contradiction between different strategies,the analysis showed direct and indirect strategies to be positively correlated inter-est groups are perfectly able to combine direct access to decision makers with indi-rect strategies of pressure. The more widely used indirect tactics are, however, allrather conventional. Disruptive tactics such as direct action and strikes are onlyused by a minority of groups. These activities are difficult to reconcile with closecontacts with bureaucrats, and a small number of interest groups can thus be clas-sified as true outsiders. However, the insider/outsider distinction does not capturerelevant variations within the large majority of groups engaging in various combi-nations of direct and indirect activities.

As expected, occupying a privileged position vis--vis public decision makers ishighly correlated with the administrative strategy and has a positive effect on pur-suing the parliamentary strategy. However, in contrast to the assumptions behindthe insider/outsider distinction, not occupying a privileged position does not leadto increased use of indirect strategies. This indicates that indirect strategies are nota fall-back option for groups who find themselves excluded from insider politics.Even though privileged access might lead to some constraints on group actions, itgenerally does not prevent groups from supplementing direct strategies with indi-rect ones. At least in Denmark, interest groups are able to navigate between directinteraction with decision makers and indirect methods like media campaigns andmember mobilization.


Indirect strategies are more accurately seen as an active choice by groups who findthemselves in a competitive situation with regard to attracting members. Mostgroups have both direct and indirect strategies as part of their action repertoire,but cause groups and groups experiencing intensive membership competition relymore on media and mobilization strategies than other groups. These strategies arewell-suited to demonstrating high levels of activity and thus recruiting newmembers as well as reinforcing the loyalty of the present membership. Explainingthe use of indirect strategies requires incorporating insights from those parts of theliterature that have not been preoccupied with studying insider access and densenetworks of policy-making.

The architecture of the political system is among the important determinants ofthe choice of strategies (Goldstein, 1999, p. 30), and the balance between differ-ent strategies is likely to differ over time and from county to country. Therefore,the results about the prevalence of different tactics must be regarded as specific tothe present Danish national context. In particular, the finding that few groups usedisruptive tactics might not be replicated if other European countries were singledout for study. Other results are likely to have wider applicability than the Danishcase. Notably, there is reason to expect different strategies to be compatible in otherEuropean countries as well. If anything, insider access should be harder to combinewith indirect strategies in the Danish political system, which has traditionally beenconsidered among the most corporatist. Nevertheless, similar studies in other coun-tries is an obvious way to shed more light on the use of different strategies of influ-ence and the factors influencing this.

Appendix A: Index ConstructionEach index included in the analyses is based on a number of questions. Depend-ing on their answer to each question, groups were given from one to four points.Indexes were constructed by assigning the mean score on the relevant questionsto each group. Respondents who due to missing answers had scores on lessthan half of the questions included in an index construction were excluded. Wherenothing else is reported, groups could answer: not at all, a little, to some degreeor to a high degree.

Strategies of Influence

Indexes for strategies of influence are based on answers to the following question:Below is a list of activities that interest groups can engage in to gain political influ-ence. Again, we ask you to bear in mind the situation in the policy area in whichthe group is most intensively involved. We ask you to indicate both how impor-tant the activities are when the group seeks political influence and how oftenwithin the last year the group has engaged in the different activities. The acti-vities included in the four indexes are reported in Table 2. With regard to impor-tance, groups could respond: not important, less important, important or veryimportant. With regard to frequency possible answers were: never, occasionally,fairly often or very often. The indexes have values of Cronbachs alpha rangingfrom 0.70 to 0.85.


Measure of Competitive Member Situation

The measure of member competition is based on the following questions:

How many of the present group members have joined within the last year? How large a part of the potential members have actually joined the group?

Groups could answer: a small part, a significant part, most or almost every-body. With regard to the second question, points were given in reverse order.Answers to the following two questions were included in the index as well. Howwell do the following statements characterize the group?

The number of members fluctuates from year to year Other interest groups are competing for the same members

Cronbachs alpha: 0.49.

Measure of Membership Influence

The measure of membership influence is based on the following questions: Howwell do the following statements characterize the group?

The statutes of the group give group members influence on the political workof the group

In reality group members have influence on the political work of the group Members participate actively in the political work of the group There are internal fractions or groupings who disagree on group policy There are contested elections for central positions in the group


Measure of Privileged Position

The index for privileged position is based on answers to the question: How oftendoes the following take place in the policy area in which the group is most inten-sively involved?

The group is asked to comment bills, proposals for administrative decrees or thelike

The group is represented on public committees and similar bodies The group is asked to comment on the statutes for public committees and similar

bodies The group is asked to comment on the composition of public committees and

similar bodies The group is contacted by public officials

Answer possibilities were: never, occasionally, fairly often or very often. Cronbachs alpha: 0.89.

Measure of Area Politicization

The index of politicization of a policy area is based on the question: How well dothe following statements characterize the policy area in which the group is mostintensively involved?


There are other interest groups with whom the group typically agrees There are other interest group with whom the group typically disagrees The policy area is characterized by high levels of media attention The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from politicians The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from the general

public


Measure of Intensiveness of Influence as Goal

The measure of the intensiveness of influence as a goal is based on the question:Does the group work to influence the following?

public opinion the media agenda the political agenda bills or parliamentary decisions administrative decrees decisions made by the public bureaucracy


(Accepted: 11 May 2005)

About the Author

Anne Binderkrantz, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Bartholins All, Bldg331, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark; email: [email protected]

NotesThanks to Frank R. Baumgartner, Jens Blom-Hansen, Jrgen Grnnegaard Christensen, Asbjrn SonneNrgaard, Sren Serritslew, Rune Stubager, Lise Togeby and three anonymous referees for helpful comments.

1 Credit for distinguishing between insider groups and outsider groups must, however, be accorded toE. E. Schattschneider (1935, p. 166).

2 There are many versions of corporatism in the literature. In the Scandinavian literature, which isreferred to here, the term corporatism is used to describe phenomena rather similar to what Amer-ican scholars might refer to as subgovernments and what British authors call corporate pluralism(Jordan, 1984; McConnell, 1966).

3 A small number of groups without formal membership can be considered functional equivalents tomembership groups and are, therefore, included in the study. These groups typically have volunteersrather than members.

4 Factor analyses show that activities associated with an administrative, a parliamentary and a mediastrategy, respectively, can meaningfully be described by one-dimensional measures (the analysesresult in only one factor with an eigenvalue above 1). With regard to the mobilization strategy, theanalysis results in one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.6 and a second factor with an eigenvalue of 1.2 the second factor distinguishing between conventional and confrontational tactics of mobilization.However, the first factor captures a much larger percentage of the variance than the second, all activ-ities have high positive scores on the first factor and all activities are positively correlated.

5 The variable is transformed to: ln (ln [number of political employees +2.718]).

6 The measure was not included in the analysis of the administrative strategy (because of difficultiesin unequivocally determining the direction of causality), but the correlation between a privilegedposition and pursuing the administrative strategy is very high.


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Documents

Interest Group Strategies. Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure