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International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D.

International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

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Page 1: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

International FinanceFINA 5331

Lecture 9:

Exchange rate regimes and financial crises

Read: Chapters 2Aaron Smallwood Ph.D.

Page 2: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Euro Area

• Austria Denmark• Belgium Latvia• Cyprus Lithuania• Estonia• Finland• France• Germany• Greece Bulgaria• Ireland Czech Republic• Italy Hungary• Luxembourg Poland• Malta Romania• Netherlands• Portugal Sweden• Slovenia UK• Spain• Slovakia

EU

Page 3: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

EU countries that are not part of the ERMII

• EU countries that will eventually adopt (or plan to):

– Bulgaria– Czech Republic– Hungary – Poland– Romania

• EU countries (not part of ERMII) with no stated intention of adopting the euro

– Sweden– UK

Page 4: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

ERM II Countries

• That will adopt:• Latvia• Lithuania

• The have no stated intentions of adopting• Denmark

Page 5: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

EMU Countries

– Austria (in 1999) - Netherlands (in 1999)

- Portugal (in 1999)– Belgium (in 1999) - Slovenia (in 2007)– Cyprus (in 2008) - Slovakia (in 2009)– Estonia (in 2011) - Spain (in 1999)– Finland (in 1999)– France (in 1999)– Germany (in 1999)– Greece (in 2000)– Ireland (in 1999)– Italy (in 1999)– Luxembourg (in 1999)– Malta (in 2008)

Page 6: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Debt crisis

• On April 27 ,2010, Greece sovereign debt is downgraded to “junk” status by Standard & Poors. Facing a strong probability of default, the EMU and IMF approve a €110 billion rescue package for Greece on May 2, 2010.

• In May 2010, the European Financial Stability Facilty is formed. In conjunction with the IMF, up to €750 billion is available for countries potentially facing a crisis.

• In Ireland, the Anglo-Irish Bank is effectively nationalized in December 2008. On November 21, 2010, Ireland reaches an agreement for a bailout. On March 30, 2011, Ireland announces that it will need an additional €24 billion from the IMF and EFSF to aid ailing banks. The total bailout for Ireland has reached €70 billion.

• The Portuguese government released figures on March 30, 2011, indicating that the deficit had reached 8.6% of GDP.

• On April 6, 2011, the Portuguese government asks the EMU for a bailout.

Page 7: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Debt crisis continued (2011)

• July 2: A compromise is reached so that an installment of the €110 billion can be made. European leaders call on private bondholders to contribute to the bailout.

• July 21: A new bailout is approved for Greece. Originally valued at €109 billion, the totally has recently increased to €130 billion.

• August 7: The ECB begins to actively intervene to aid bond markets in PIIGS countries.

• October 26: In a summit of EU leaders, a grand plan is put together, where bondholders indeed agree to take up to 50% losses on holdings of Greek debt.

• As a result of severe political pressure, prime ministers George Papandreou (Greece) and Silvio Berlusconi (Italy) resign in November.

Page 8: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Debt crisis continued

• December 9: In a summit in Brussels, an intergovernmental treaty is agreed to, which among other things, cements more rigid rules for broaching thresholds on deficit and debt to GDP levels.

• December 21: The ECB announces that it will provide€489 billion in three-year loans to more than 500 banks in the EMU.

• As of January 4, 2012, with Italian sovereign debt hovering around 7%, the dollar price of the euro is $1.2923.

Page 9: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Debt crisis

• In late January, the “fiscal pact” agreed to in December is signed by all EU members except the UK and the Czech Republic.

• On February 12, Greece’s parliament passes an austerity bill in anticipation of receiving additional bailout funds.

• On March 13, the eurozone agrees to an additional bailout of Greece totaling €130 billion.

• According to the WSJ, earlier this week, French voters elected Socialist Party candidate François Hollande, an opponent of austerity, as their new president. In Greece, voters rejected austerity policies backed by the two incumbent parties. The dollar price of the euro closed at $1.3089 on Monday.

Page 10: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Benefits of joining currency unions

• Reduction in transactions costs such as the bid-ask spread.

• Increased transparency (traders throughout the eurozone immediately know the costs of goods and services with no need for currency conversion)

• Deeper financial markets

• Potential for increased political harmony

Page 11: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Costs of being in a currency union

• Loss of monetary policy independence– Lacking fiscal federalism, policy responses to

asymmetric shocks can be limited

• Loss of exchange rate as an automatic adjustment mechanism.– Greece’s currency today is likely stronger

than it would if Greece was not part of the EMU.

Page 12: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Major currency crises

• EMS crises of 1992-93.– Following German re-unification contractionary monetary policy caused

the currencies of German trading partners to become overvalued.

• Mexican peso crisis 1994-95.– An overvalued exchange rate, policy mistakes, and political turmoil led

to collapse of the peso, a severe recession and inflation before an IMF and US led bailout.

• Asian currency crisis (1997-98)– Contagion

• Argentina (2001-02)– Failure to use fiscal restraint and inflexibility in labor markets led to the

collapse in this board system.

Page 13: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Overvalued/Undervalued?

• How would we know if a currency was overvalued or undervalued?

• Most economists use “real exchange rates”.• According to the law of the one price:

Pt(FC ) = St

(FC /$)Pt$

⇒St

(FC /$)Pt$

PtFC =1

Page 14: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Real Exchange Rate

• The real exchange rate is defined as:

• Take Mexico as an example: Suppose St is relatively stable but, Pt

Mex increases much more rapidly than Pt

US. The result, Rt increases. The Mexican peso appreciates in real terms.

Rt =St

(FC /DC )PtDC

PtFC

Page 15: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Real Exchange rate

• If a country’s real exchange rate rises, some combination of the following three are occurring:– The nominal exchange rate is appreciating– Domestic prices are rising rapidly– Foreign prices are falling.

• ALL THREE LIKELY LEAD TO A DECLINE IN THE DEMAND FOR EXPORTS

Page 16: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

The Asian currency crisis

• On July 2, 1997, Thai Baht is devalued.• July 11 Philippines devalues the peso• July 14: Malaysia floats the ringgit• July 17: Singapore devalues• August 14: Thailand moves to a float• October 14: Taiwan devalues• November 14: Korea floats• August 17, 1998: Russia abandons its peg• Hong Kong: At one point, Hong Kong monetary

authority raises rates to 500%.

Page 17: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Asian currency preview: The causes

• Liberalization of capital markets in a weak domestic financial environment.– Crony capitalism– Surge in risky real estate investment– Maturity mismatch

• Secondary cause: Over-valued real exchange rates.

Page 18: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Review: Asian currency crisis

• Crony capitalism: A very close connection between government leaders and private enterprise, “lending decisions were often influenced by political considerations” (page 49, Eun and Resnick).

• Violation of the trillema

• Maturity mismatch:– Given capital inflow, Asian economies become reliant on short

term debt instruments.

• Aftermath: Average economic growth of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (source: Krugman and Obstfeld, 6th Edition):

• 1996: 7.0% 1997: 4.5% 1998: -8.1%

Page 19: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Financial Crisis

• Overview:• In an era of lax monetary policy and rising home

prices (a “housing boom”) with questionable mortgage underwriting practices, banks originated loans that were securitized. When housing prices stabilized, interest rates rose, defaults rose, and mortgage backed securities, held by many investment banks, dramatically lost their value.

Page 20: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Housing Prices

Page 21: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

US Monetary Policy

Page 22: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Additional Background

• From Sept 2002 – Aug 2004, the targeted Fed Funds rate was no higher than 1.25%

• Under Bush administration, expansionary fiscal policy is used.

• As seen in the graph, housing prices steadily rose from 1995-2004.

• Subprime loans grow: • In June 2004, 40% of conventional single family

mortgages were “ARMs.”

Page 23: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

The subprime issue

• According to Demyanyk and Hermet:

• “Rapid appreciation in housing prices masked the deterioration in the subprime mortgage market and thus the true riskiness of subprime loans.” St Louis Federal Reserve Working paper.

Page 24: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Regulatory Background

• “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief,” Alan Greenspan (speaking before Congress on Oct 23).

• A new banking model:• In a largely unregulated environment, banks are

encouraged to originate loans. The loans are then “securitized.”– The securitized share of the sub-prime market was 75% in

2006 as compared to 54% in 2001 (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2008, St Louis Fed working paper).

Page 25: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

A new banking model: Originate to Distribute

• MBS: Mortgage backed securities. Investment banks demand is high for MBS: they are also poorly leveraged. Investment banks borrow to acquire MBS.

• CDS: Credit default swaps: Buyer makes regular payments and receives a payoff if an underlying credit instrument (like an MBS) goes into default.

Page 26: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

The bubble bursts

• In 2005, housing prices stabilize and begin to fall. ARMs begin to reset…Defaults and foreclosures are up. According to Realty Trac, foreclosures were up 79% in 2007 from 2006.

• Almost instantly, liquidity freezes. Credit ratings of several investment banks and insurance companies come under scrutiny.

Page 27: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Aftermath

• February 2008: President Bush signs into law the Economics Stimulus Act.

• March 28, 2008 Bear Sterns is acquired by JP Morgan in a deal brokered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (for $1.2 billion).

• On Aug 22, 2008, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s credit rating is reduced by Moody’s. In September, Fannie and Freddie Mac are placed under legal authority of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

• On Sept 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers declares bankruptcy.

• In Sept Merrill Lynch is acquired by Bank of America. Washington

Mutual declares bankruptcy.

Page 28: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Aftermath

• In September, the Federal Reserve bails out AIG, supplying an emergency loan of $85 billion. In exchange, the US government obtains an almost 80% ownership claim in AIG.

• In Oct, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorizes the Treasury Department to spend up to $700 billion to purchase MBSs

• November 2008: Quantitative Easing (round I) is launched. Under this program the Federal Reserve will purchase up $500 billion in mortgage backed securities backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

• February 2009: President Obama signs the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act into law. The total size of the bill is $787 billion.

• March 2009: The Federal Reserve expands the total size of QE1 to $1.25 trillion.

Page 29: International Finance FINA 5331 Lecture 9: Exchange rate regimes and financial crises Read: Chapters 2 Aaron Smallwood Ph.D

Aftermath

• April 2010: QE1 ends.

• Nov 3 2010: QE2 is announced. The Federal Reserve will purchase $600 billion in longer term government securities beginning in the first quarter of 2011.

• June 2011: The second round of QE2 ends as planned.