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International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

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Page 1: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

International Se-curity and Peace

The 1st Gulf War

Jaechun Kim

Page 2: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

GULF WAR  Major Characteristics of Gulf War

First post-cold war crisis; the first limited war in post-Cold war era – to preserve “New World Order”

Most efficient war (military campaign) - 148 KIA. Vietnam war 48k; Korean war 35k

Coalition war – coalition of 32 countries (largest military op since WWII); 630k coalition troops

Unfinished war (??) – Saddam was still at large after the war…

War by “remote control” – power of smart weapons; Preci-sion-Guided Munitions (PGMs) of surgical precision anti-septic view of war; illusion of bloodless war…

TV war (CNN)

Page 3: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim
Page 4: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

Why did Saddam attack Kuwait?

Iraq – formerly, part of the Ottoman empire… then a British protectorate, then a kingdom, and then a totalitarian state…

Saddam became the president in 1979… Saddam attempted to gain hegemony over the Persian Gulf

region expanded military power; WMD… Iran-Iraq War Iraq became dominant military force after the

war…but with price… Saddam borrowed from neighbors…from Kuwait… In 1990 Kuwait lowers oil prices and increase production.

Saddam wanted to renegotiate the term of loans from Kuwait, but Kuwait rejects…

Iraqi Attack of Kuwait - August 2nd in 1990; led by Republican Guard

What does King Fahd of Saudi Arabia do? Uncle Sam!

Page 5: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim
Page 6: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

American Response

Operation Desert Shield – US deploys ground and air forces and also sends navy ships.. to Saudi… to defend Saudi Arabia

Operation Desert Storm - January of 1991 Bush goes on offensive… to recover Kuwait Air War - 38 days (January 18, 1991 – two days after UN

deadline for withdrawal) Ground War - on 24 February 1991

Page 7: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim
Page 8: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

**Five different versions for this argument!

Air power pinned down Iraqi ground forces and prevented them from maneuvering. If this is correct, the Iraqi forces should have been stationary during the ground war. But during the ground war, virtually all of Iraq’s mobile divisions were on the move.

Air power neutralized Iraqi forces by disrupting their C3I. So they were not able to coordinate their defense… But the Iraqi senior military commanders retained good command and con-trol throughout the war. Also reasonably good intelligence…

Why did the coalitional forces led by the US win so easily? Why did the American limited military campaign go so well? Conventional Wisdom: American air power

won the war. But why?

Page 9: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

Air strikes cut their supply lines. Iraqi forces were looking for food… But when the ground war began, Iraqi supplies in the KTO were plentiful. They made a lot of underground bunkers…survived the air war…

Air power destroyed enough of their equipments and killed enough of their soldiers (attrition of enemy forces). Not enough Iraqi solders when the ground war began. But when the ground war started, they still had enough sol-diers. They also had enough tanks and other armored vehi-cles to defend themselves.

Air attacks broke morale of Iraqi soldiers. During the ground war, their morale was surprisingly high. (cf. frontline infantry)

Page 10: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

BL : Air-power didn’t win the war. Then what win the war for the coalitional forces?

Iraqis were simply outmatched by superior ground forces. ..state of the art armored protection and thermal sights… equipped better! American soldiers were trained bet-ter. And the Terrain was ideal!

Even if there hadn’t been no significant air campaign, the ground war would not have been substantially different! At the end of the air war, Iraqis could still maneuver, had the C3I, supplies, numbers, and morale…

Implications for military reality

Myth: We can wind the wars from the air… heavy ground forces are obsolete… Our air power will provide us cheap vic-tories… But is it true?

Aerial bombing in Iraq and Kosovo (1999) weren’t as effective as they claimed to be.

Page 11: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

Aerial Bombing in KOSOVO (1999) examined…

Serbian ground forces survived 11 weeks of aerial bomb-ing… but 2,000 Serbian civilians were killed…

Why?

Because both Iraqis and Serbs were in static defensive positions… Mobile forces depend heavily on supplies and C3I…

Air power can be very lethal against enemy ground forces on the move.

But air power has limited effectiveness against defen-sively oriented ground forces…hard to detect the tar-gets..

Page 12: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

New Strategic Environment of Gulf War Changed Post-Cold War security environment

And need for new national security strategy… Bush calling for new strategic framework (1990, 8.2.)

Powell Doctrine of 1992 = Weinberger Doctrine of 1984 = Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: 6 tenets

It deals with under what circumstances US military forces should be used and how…

1. We should not commit military forces abroad unless the par-ticular engagement is deemed vital to our national interests.

2. If we decide to commit our forces abroad, we should do so with the clear intention of winning.

Page 13: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

3. If we decide to commit our military forces abroad, we should have clearly defined political and military objec-tives. We should know how our forces can accomplish those goals. We should also send the forces needed to do that.

4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces (means) we have committed must be continually reassessed and adjusted.

5. Before the we commit military forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people.

6. The commitment of American troops should be a last resort

Page 14: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

How did W-P Doctrine play out in the Gulf War?

Did Hussein create problem, which can be identified as threat to the American vital national interests? (Doctrine #1) Disruption of peace (and BOP) in the Middle East Threat to the New World Order? Preserve the status quo… Threat to our economic interest, etc. Saddam could control

about 20 % of the world’s oil reserves..

Did the US commit itself to winning? (Doctrine #2) The US started with 200,000 deterrent forces to protect Saudi,

and engaged 700,000 for the attack… Gradual escalation in Vietnam and Iraq (2003~ )

Page 15: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

Did the US have clearly defined goals? (D #3) unconditional withdrawal of Iraqis from Kuwait… Securing supply of oil…

Relationship between political goals and military means continually coordinated? (D #4) no civil-military conflict.. Proper means employed… cf. 2nd Gulf War

Were there supports from the American people and the US Congress? (D #5) Hill and Knowlton (H&K)

Was War a last resort? Did the US try other alternatives? What could have been other alternatives? Would they have worked? (D #6)

Gulf War – Success or Failure?

Page 16: International Security and Peace The 1 st Gulf War Jaechun Kim

Bush, Saddam and Schwarzkopf