Interpacific to Catuira

8/13/2019 Interpacific to Catuira

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INTERPACIFIC VS ALVES

Facts:

In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private respondents herein, it

was alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its

trust and confidence, they collected from its various clients payments for airway bills in theamount of P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfullyconverted to their own personal use and benefit. 1

At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received

by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting. This was done in, the

course of the direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. 2The defense objectedto their presentation, invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit

the original airway bills in due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed themarking of the said documents a s Exhibits "B" to "OO." The e prosecution n did submit the

original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondaryevidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally were

offered,3

in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.

The respondents were acquitted of criminal liability, and the court held that the certifiedphotocopies of the airway by were not admissible under the rule that "there can be no

evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writingitself." This is being the case, the court ruled that no evidence of civil liability was shown.

Issue:WON the certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been considered bythe court

Ruling:

Yes.

There is no question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were notadmissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the

other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting these

copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an equally importantprinciple long observed in our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.

This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it isformally offered. as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature.

It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of documentary

evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and isaccompanied by the marking of the evidence an an exhibit. The second is done only whenthe party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document isIdentified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of

the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this willadvance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, thetrial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized to consider it.


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Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not

earlier. The Identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not

constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it.Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to

the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection tothe document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.

In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private

respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being Identified for marking bythe prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that theoriginal airway bills would be submitted later. it is true that the originals were never

produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits

as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequentlyadmitted by the trial court.

PHILAMGEN VS SWEET LINES

A maritime suit 1was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American

General Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against privaterespondents Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc.

(DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line (The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E.

Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or

damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to

defendants' negligence.

Tagum Plastics is the consignee of a shipment of bags of polyethylene, which it insured with

Philamgen. The respondents are the carriers. When Tagum Plastics received the shipment,

only 5000 out of the 7000 bags of polyethylene were in good condition.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, but this was subsequently reversed by the Court

of Appeals on the ground of prescription based on certain bills of lading. Petitioners contend

that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the appealed decision on the supposed

ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof and that

the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a

court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence.

Issue: WON prescription can be maintained as such defense when the bills of lading

embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence

Ruling:

Yes.

In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its

answer, 17except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered inevidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can bemaintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of

mere references thereto.


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As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as

contained in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable

documents which under the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action ordefenses, 18and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless

specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. 19The rules on actionable documentscover and apply to both a cause of action or defense based on said documents. 20

In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is a

prescriptive period, respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense inits answer. Petitioners failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and theaforequoted provisions therein, hence they impliedly admitted the same when they merelyassailed the validity of subject stipulations.

Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due

execution, of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions,verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other

proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same,and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or

that no such admission was made.

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Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness ofan instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a

specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidencefor it may be considered an admitted fact.

CATUIRA VS CA

On 8 June 1990, two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M.

Catuira with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for having issued two (2) checksin payment of her obligation to private complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no

sufficient funds to cover the same, which checks upon presentment for payment weredishonored by the drawee bank. 2

After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira filed aMotion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence) under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the 1985Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 3Petitioner contended that the testimony of private

respondent Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when

she was called to testify as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules onEvidence.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit; this was affirmed by the CA.Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it accepted the testimony of privaterespondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not offered at the time she was called to

testify; her testimony should have been stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule132, which prohibits the court from considering evidence which has not been formally

offered.

Issue:WON the court is precluded from considering the testimonial evidence which was nottimely offered.

Ruling:

No.


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Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be

inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere

privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliestopportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver ofobjections. 8

Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony whenprivate respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error

by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection becamereasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any prioroffer having been made by the proponent.

She should have objected to the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first

offered upon calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already

finished testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the Court in hearing thetestimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And for her failure

to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect waswaived.

Documents

Interpacific to Catuira