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Interpersonal Verbs andInterpersonal ExperiencesJu Young Lee a & Joseph Kasof ba Department of Psychology , University of SouthernCalifornia , USAb Department of Sociology , University of Texas atAustin , USAPublished online: 30 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Ju Young Lee & Joseph Kasof (1992) Interpersonal Verbs andInterpersonal Experiences, The Journal of Social Psychology, 132:6, 731-740, DOI:10.1080/00224545.1992.9712103

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The Journal of Social Psychology, 132(6), 731-740

Interpersonal Verbs and Interpersonal Experiences

JU YOUNG LEE Department of Psychology

University of Southern California

JOSEPH KASOF Department of Sociology

University of Texas at Austin

ABSTRACT. This study investigated differences in the latency and duration of inter- personal experiences named by two different verb types: “experiencer-stimulus verbs,” for which the experiencer is the subject and the stimulus is the object of a sentence, and “stimulus-experiencer verbs,” for which the experiencer is the object and the stimulus is the subject of a sentence. Forty-five U.S. undergraduates re- sponding to a questionnaire estimated that experiences named by experiencer- stimulus verbs generally develop more gradually and endure longer than do experi- ences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs.

RESEARCHERS STUDYING IMPLICIT CAUSALITY have distinguished between two types of verbs that name interpersonal experiences: stimulus- experiencer and experiencer-stimulus verbs (Brown & Fish, 1983b). The two verb types differ in the grammatical position of their semantic cases. Stimulus-experiencer verbs are interpersonal experience verbs for which the “stimulus” (the person provoking the experience) is the subject of the sen- tence and the “experiencer” (the person who is having the experience) is the object of the sentence. Examples of stimulus-experiencer verbs are fascinate, shock, exasperate, and deceive, as in the sentences John fascinates Robert, John shocks Robert, John exasperates Robert, and John deceives Robert; in each of these sentences, John (the subject) is the stimulus and Robert (the object) is the experiencer.

Address correspondence to Ju Young Lee, Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, or Joseph Kasof, Department of So- ciology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, 1x 78712-1088.

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132 The Journal of Social Psychology

Experiencer-stimulus verbs, in contrast, are interpersonal experience verbs for which the sentence subject is the experiencer and the sentence object is the stimulus. Examples are admire, dislike, respect, and dread, as in the sentences John admires Robert, John dislikes Robert, John respects Robert, and John dreads Robert; in each of these sentences, John (the subject) is the experiencer and Robert (the object) is the stimulus.

Existing evidence suggests that the two verb types are linguistic univer- sals. Researchers have found them in all languages searched thus far, includ- ing Afrikaans (Vorster, 1985), Chinese (Brown & Fish, 1983a), English (e.g., Au, 1986; Brown & Fish, 1983b; Brown & Van Kleeck, 1989; Van Kleeck, Hillger, & Brown, 1988), German (Fiedler & Semin, 1988), Italian (Franc0 & Arcuri, 1990), and Japanese (Brown, 1986).‘ In addition, both verb types are comprehended by both children and adults (Au, 1986; Corri- gan, 1988) and are understood in sentences worded in either the active or passive voice (Brown, 1986; Brown & Fish, 1983b).

Although researchers have carefully studied the differing causal impli- cations of the two verb types, as yet no effort has been made to search for underlying differences in the interpersonal experiences named by the differing verb types. It seems to us that the two verb types name two different types of experience, distinguishable in terms of latency (how quickly they begin) and duration (how long they last). Stimulus-experiencer verbs seem to name ex- periences that arise somewhat rapidly in the course of interaction and that also decay somewhat rapidly.

By contrast, experiencer-stimulus verbs seem to name experiences that develop more gradually and also endure longer. Whereas stimulus- experiencer verbs refer to experiences of specific, discrete actions, experien- cer-stimulus verbs seem to name subjective states that are abstracted from and temporally detached from specific identifiable actions. For example, experi- ences of deceit, shock, astonishment, and offense (stimulus-experiencer) are evoked with immediacy by a single episode of behavior and are relatively transient; love, respect, dread, and admiration (experiencer-stimulus) gener- ally take longer to develop, arise not from single instances of behavior but rather from a series or repetition of behaviors, and persist long after they arise. Whereas isolated acts of lying, criticism, or flattery can immediately induce experiences of deception, offense, or attraction, they seldom in and of themselves induce experiences of loathing, dread, or love.

To test this hypothesis, we conducted a questionnaire study in which U.S. undergraduate subjects were asked to give their impressions of the la-

‘The two verb types have sometimes been referred to as “state action verbs” and “state verbs” (Mannetti & De Grada, 1991). In Semin and Fiedler’s (1988) Linguistic Category Model, stimulus-experiencer verbs are categorized as “interpretive action verbs” and experiencer-stimulus verbs are categorized as “state verbs.”

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tency and duration of various experiences named by stimulus-experiencer and experiencer-stimulus verbs. We hypothesized that subjects would judge ex- periences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs to have shorter latency and duration than those named by experiencer-stimulus verbs.

Method

Forty-five undergraduates (16 male, 29 female) at the University of Texas participated in the study for extra credit in an introductory course on social psychology. Their ages ranged from 20 to 37 years, with a mean age of 22.8 years.

Subjects received two questionnaires-one measuring impressions of the latency and another measuring impressions of the duration of various in- terpersonal experiences. Each questionnaire contained a list of 28 interper- sonal experience verbs in simple, active sentences of the form John [verb] Robert. The 28 interpersonal experience verbs encompassed 13 experiencer- stimulus verbs and 15 stimulus-experiencer verbs used in Brown and Fish’s (1983b) study and Brown and Van Kleeck’s (1989) study (see Table 1). The 28 sentences were placed in a different random order in the two questionnaire forms, which were presented to subjects in a counterbalanced order. The names used in each sentence, John and Robert, were selected from a list of same-sex given names equivalent in attractiveness and connotations of age, race, and intellectual competence (Kasof, in press) and were randomly as- signed to the positions of sentence subject and object.

For the latency questionnaire, subjects examined the entire list of sen- tences and then indicated whether each experience was more likely to occur “suddenly, in reaction to relatively few behaviors on the part of the person being experienced [i.e., the stimulus]” or “gradually, in reaction to a longer series of behaviors on the part of the person being experienced [i.e., the stim- ulus] .” Respondents indicated their judgment by marking the dichotomous options “suddenly” or “gradually” after each sentence.

For the duration questionnaire, subjects examined the entire list of sen- tences and then indicated whether each experience was more likely to be “short-lived” or “long-lived” by selecting one of these dichotomous options after each sentence.

ReSUltS

We analyzed data for individual experiences by using chi-square tests modi- fied with a Yates correction to take conservative accounts for a degree of freedom of 1 (Minium, 1978). We used chi-square analysis to test the homo- geneity within each verb type.

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TABLE 1 Perceived Latency and Duration of Interpersonal Experiences (n = 45)

Latency Duration Obtained Obtained

Verb type Sudden Gradual x2 score Short Long x2 score

Experiencer- stimulus

Abhor Admire Despise Detest Dread Enjoy Esteem Honor Like Loathe Notice Pity Respect

Stimulus- experiencer

Astonish Astound Attract Bore Charm Deceive Delight Exasperate Fascinate Impress Influence Repel Shock Trouble worry

7 6 2

10 5

14 5 6

14 2

42 27 0

40 33 39 16 38 24 29 25 26 38 5

29 43 11 16

38 39 43 35 40 31 39 39 31 43 3

18 45

5 12 6

29 7

21 16 20 19 7

40 16 2

34 29

17.42*** 22.76*** 35.56*** 12.80*** 25.68 ** * 5.69*

24.20* * * 22.76*** 5.69*

35.56*** -32.09*** - 1.42 43.02***

25.68* * * 8.88**

22.76*** - 3.20 20.00*** 0.08 3.20 0.36 0.80

20.00*** - 25.68***

3.20 35.56***

- 10.76*** -3.20

7 1 5 5 7 6

15 20 2 4

43 24 0

41 43 29 22 37 35 35 37 23 35 12 21 45 33 27

38 17.42*** 44 39.20*** 40 43.02*** 39 24.20*** 38 20.00*** 39 22.76*** 30 12.80*** 25 0.36 43 35.56*** 41 28.80***

21 0.08 45 43.02***

2 -35.56***

4 28.80'** 2 35.56***

16 3.20 23 0.00 8 17.42"" *

10 12.80*** 10 I2.80*** 8 17.42

22 0.00 10 12.80*** 33 -8.88** 24 0.08

12 8.88** 16 2.22

0 43.02** *

Nore. Negative chi-square scores indicate that the direction of the differences was opposite to the prediction. * p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < ,001.

Latency. As we had hypothesized, the respondents estimated that experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs had shorter latencies than those named by experiencer-stimulus verbs (see Table 1). Of the 13 experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs, 11 (85%) were judged by most respondents to

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develop gradually rather than suddenly, ~~(44, N = 45) = 4.92, p < .05. These directional differences were significant for 1 1 of the 13 experiences (see Table 1) . Furthermore, latency ratings for the 13 experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs were significantly homogeneous, xZ(44, N = 45) = 217.63, p < .001. Across all 13 experiences, a mean of 10 re- spondents judged them to develop suddenly, whereas a mean of 34 subjects judged them to develop gradually, ~~(44, N = 45) = 12.02, p < .001.

In contrast, of the 15 experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs, 1 1 (73%) were judged by most subjects to develop suddenly rather than grad- ually, ~~(44, N = 45) = 2.4, ns. Directional differences were significant for 6 of these 1 1 experiences (see Table 1 ) . Furthermore, latency ratings for the 15 experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs were significantly ho- mogeneous, ~~(44, N = 45) = 97.68, p e .Owl. Across all 15 experi- ences, a mean of 27 respondents judged them to develop suddenly, whereas a mean of 18 respondents judged them to develop gradually, ~~(44, N = 45) = 1.42, ns.

We also analyzed data between the two verb types. A chi-square test of the hypothesis of independence indicated a highly significant association be- tween verb type and latency rating, ~~(44, N = 45) = 14.90, p < .OO01. For both the “suddenly” and “gradually” response categories, respondents’ ratings differed significantly between the two verb types. Significantly more respondents selected the “suddenly” response for experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs (M = 27) than for experiences named by exper- iencer-stimulus verbs (M = lo), ~~(44, N = 45) = 6.92, p < .01. Like- wise, significantly more respondents selected the “gradually” response for experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs (M = 34) than for experi- ences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs (M = 18), ~~(44, N = 45) = 4.33, p < .05. Taken together, these data indicate that the two verb types differed significantly in perceived latency.

The latency ratings can also be analyzed by using the binomial distribu- tion. That 1 1 of 15 experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs were judged by most respondents to develop suddenly rather than gradually was found to be significant below the .05 level using the binomial distribution with the null hypothesis that most respondents would judge half the experiences to develop suddenly and half to develop gradually. Directional differences were significant in the predicted direction for all 1 1 of these experiences, with the null hypothesis that each experience would be judged by half the respondents to develop suddenly and by half to develop gradually. Across all 15 experi- ences, the mean of 27 respondents judging them to develop suddenly differed significantly from the mean of 18 respondents judging them to develop grad- ually, p < .05, with the null hypothesis that, on average, half the respondents would judge the experiences to develop gradually and half would judge them to develop suddenly.

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In contrast, that 1 1 of the 13 experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs were judged by most respondents to develop gradually rather than sud- denly was found to be significant at below the .005 level. Directional differ- ences were significant in the predicted direction for all 1 1 of these experi- ences, with the null hypothesis that each experience would be judged by half the respondents to develop suddenly and by half to develop gradually. Across all 13 experiences, the mean of 10 respondents judging them to develop sud- denly differs significantly from the mean of 34 respondents judging them to develop gradually, p < .0001.

Duration. As we hypothesized, the respondents estimated that experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs had shorter duration than those named by experiencer-stimulus verbs (see Table 1). Of the 13 experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs, 1 1 (85%) were judged by most respondents to be long-lived rather than short-lived, ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 4.92, p < .05. These differences were significant in the predicted direction for 10 of the 13 expe- riences (see Table l). A homogeneity test indicated that duration ratings for the 13 experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs were significantly consistent, ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 251.66, p < .0001. Across all 13 experiences, a mean of 1 I respondents judged them to be short-lived, whereas a mean of 34 respondents judged them to be long-lived, ~~(44, N = 45) = 10.76, p < .0001.

In contrast, of the 15 experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs, 12 (80%) were judged by most respondents to be short-lived rather than long- lived, ~~(44, N = 45) = 4.27, p < .05. Directional differences were signif- icant in the predicted direction for 8 of these 11 experiences (see Table 1). Further, duration ratings for the 15 experiences named by stimulus- experiencer verbs were significantly homogeneous, ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 186.12, p < .0001. Across all 15 experiences, a mean of 32 respondents judged them to be short-lived, whereas a mean of 13 respondents judged them to be long-lived, ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 7.2, p < .01.

We also analyzed data between the two verb types. A chi-square test of independence indicated a highly significant association between verb type and duration rating, ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 19.78, p < .0001. For both the “short- lived” and “long-lived” response categories, respondents’ ratings differed sig- nificantly between the two verb types. Significantly more respondents se- lected the “short-lived” response for experiences named by stimulus- experiencer verbs (M = 32) than for experiences named by experiencer- stimulus verbs (M = 1 l), ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 9.30, p < .01. Likewise, sig- nificantly more respondents selected the “long-lived’ response for experi- ences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs (M = 34) than for experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs (A4 = 13), ~ ~ ( 4 4 , N = 45) = 8.51, p

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Lee & Kasof 737

< .01. Taken together, these data indicate that the two verb types differ sig- nificantly in perceived duration.

The duration data can also be analyzed by using the binomial distribu- tion. That 12 of 15 experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs were judged by most respondents to be short-lived rather than long-lived is signif- icant below the .01 level using the binomial distribution with the null hypoth- esis that most respondents would judge half the experiences to be short-lived and half to be long-lived. Directional differences were significant in the pre- dicted direction for 11 of these experiences with the null hypothesis that each experience would be judged by half the respondents to be short-lived and by half to be long-lived.

Across all 15 experiences, the mean of 32 respondents judging them to be short-lived differed significantly, p < .001, from the mean of 13 respon- dents judging them to be long-lived with the null hypothesis that, on average, half the respondents would judge the experiences to be short-lived and half would judge them to be long-lived. In contrast, that 11 of the 13 experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs were judged by most respondents to be long-lived rather than short-lived is significant at below the .005 level. Direc- tional differences were significant in the predicted direction for all 1 1 of these experiences, with the null hypothesis that each experience would be judged by half the subjects to be short-lived and by half to be long-lived. Across all 13 experiences, the mean of 1 1 subjects judging them to be short-lived differs significantly from the mean of 34 subjects judging them to be long-lived (p < .0005).

Discussion

Interpersonal experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs were gener- ally perceived by our respondents to have greater latency and duration than those named by stimulus-experiencer verbs. This study marks our first at- tempt to study underlying differences in the experiences named by the two verb types. Past research on implicit causality has been concerned only with the causal implications of the two verb types, but in the present study, we asked subjects to describe rather than explain interpersonal events named by the verbs.

Although this study was concerned only with differences in latency and duration, experiences named by the two verb types may differ in other impor- tant ways as well. If experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs have greater latency and duration, then it seems likely that in such experiences the stimulus and experiencer are more temporally or spatially detached than in experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs. As an extreme example, people who have died can still be respected, hated, or esteemed by the living, but they obviously cannot deceive, charm, or shock their survivors.

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Because proximity is one source of salience, the stimulus should gener- ally be less salient in experiences named by experiencer-stimulus verbs than in those named by stimulus-experiencer verbs. This relation is exactly what we found in our 1992 questionnaire study in which undergraduates estimated the salience of the subjects and objects of sentences of the John [verb] Robert type. Because salient stimuli are perceived as causal (Taylor & Fiske, 1978), the stimulus should also be perceived as more causal in experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs than in those named by experiencer-stimulus verbs; this prediction is also supported by the results of our 1992 study. Furthermore, because exposure to salient stimuli increases arousal (Eysenck, 1982), experiences named by stimulus-experiencer verbs should generally be more arousing than those named by experiencer-stimulus verbs.

Consider the experiences of passionate and companionate love (Hatfield, 1988). Passionate love, also known as infatuation, is a sudden, transitory, highly arousing experience that occurs at the beginning of a romantic rela- tionship, often on the basis of such limited interaction that the infatuated per- son has major illusions about his or her lover; “love at first sight” is passionate love. An individual experiencing passionate love somewhat constantly fo- cuses attention on his or her lover and feels quite out of control (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986). Companionate love, by contrast, is more gradual in devel- opment, more enduring, and less arousing. An individual experiencing com- panionate love commonly focuses attention on stimuli other than his or her lover and does not feel especially out of control.

Given these differences in latency, duration, salience, perceived causal- ity, and arousal, passionate love would seem more likely to be named with stimulus-experiencer verbs and companionate love with experiencer-stimulus verbs. This appears to be true. Passionate love seems to be more commonly named with stimulus-experiencer verbs such as infatuate, enrapture, enthrall, enamor, attract, captivate, enchant, and dazzle. Companionate love, on the other hand, seems to be more commonly named with experiencer-stimulus verbs such as love, adore, and cherish.

This study also suggests a new dimension for research on implicit cau- sality. Past research on implicit causality has addressed only the locus dimen- sion of causality. Given sentences such as Ted [verb] Paul, respondents attrib- uted the event to Ted or to Paul.* The results of our experiment suggest that interpersonal verbs imply differing values not only for the locus dimension but also for the stability dimension of causality. Stimulus-experiencer verbs

2Some experiments framed the dependent variable in terms of dispositional (i.e., both internal and stable) rather than merely internal causes, thus unintentionally con- founding locus and stability. Respondents could attribute interpersonal events to stable causes within the subject of the sentence or to stable causes within the object of the sentence but not to unstable causes within the subject or object.

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generally seem to imply lower “consistency” values than do experiencer- stimulus verbs. Because consistency information affects the stability of causal attributions (Kelley, 1967; McArthur, 1972), stimulus-experiencer verbs should generally imply less stable causes than should experiencer-stimulus verbs. It seems likely, moreover, that a verb’s implicit causal stability is re- lated to its transformation into derived dispositional adjectival forms (cf. Brown & Fish, 1983b; Hoffman & Tchir, 1990). The causal stability implied by interpersonal verbs is a new topic ripe for future research.

Finally, this study has several limitations that may be addressed in future research. First, because we used a very restricted subject sample (U.S. under- graduates), we strongly encourage other investigators to use other languages and age groups to determine whether the phenomenon documented herein is truly universal, as implicit causality appears to be. Second, we used a limited number and variety of interpersonal experience verbs. We encourage further researchers to use a wider variety of interpersonal experiences, especially be- cause in our study some experiences (e.g., influence, notice) clearly differed from the general pattern (cf. Au, 1986; Corrigan, 1988; Hoffman & Tchir, 1990). Third, we used only a single research method. Further research should be directed toward testing the present phenomenon by using a variety of other measurement methods. Fourth, in this study, we were directly concerned only with the comprehension and not the production of sentences. Whether inter- personal verbs are produced in the same manner as our respondents compre- hended them would be valuable to know.

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