INTERVIEW: KAMEL ABU JABER

Dr. Abu Jaber, formerly professor of economics at the University of Jordan, has been the foreign minister of Jordan since October 1991. The following interview was conducted in Amman on October 31, 1992, by Thomas R . Mattair, the resident policy analyst of the Middle East Policy Council.

MATTAIR: Now that the seventh round of peace talks is over, what is your assess- ment of the progress being made in the talks?

ABU JABER: Considering the depth and the breadth of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whose heart is the Palestinian question, I think that the peace process is on track. This conflict has been going on for at least 100 years on the ideological level and at least 40 to 50 years on the military level. It was peppered with huge battles from 1948 to 1956 to 1967 to 1973 and tens of thou- sands of smaller battles and incidents that have taken place since 1948 among the Arabs and the Israelis. Considering that the Arabs and the Israelis are for the first time engaging in the peace process, it is not unusual that the negotiations are where they are now.

Mr. Shamir said quite openly and without any reservation upon losing the election that he meant for the negotiations to go on for 10 years and then end up in a dead end. So in point of fact during the first five rounds under the Shamir government, as Shamir himself said, the Israeli government had no intention of moving away from its ideological intransigence and rigidity into serious negotiations to resolve the basic issues between the Arabs and the Israelis. Two rounds have taken place-the sixth and the seventh-since the Rabin govern-

ment took ofice. We are still waiting to see whether the euphoria that this government under Rabin created, especially in the Western media, in the Western mind, will be translated into real progress at the nego- tiating table.

Q: You are still waiting to see some progress under Rabin?

A: Yes. Are the Israelis willing to abide by international legitimacy and interna- tional law as expressed by the two major resolutions, U.N. Security Council Resolu- tions 242 and 33Sand 425 as far as Leba- non is concerned-or are they not? Are they going to withdraw, in accordance with these resolutions, or are they going to con- tinue to consider themselves an exception to the rule of international law by creating facts on the ground and then forcing them on us? We have to wait and see. Are they going to withdraw from Arab Jerusalem, something very important to us? Are they going to grant the Palestinians their right to self-determination on their own soil, the Palestinian soil? These questions are basic to the peace process. Until now we are exploring these questions to see what will come out.

Q: Do you find any change in the diplo- matic positions of Israel under Rabin or in Israeli behavior on the ground?

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A: These are two questions. First, the atmospherics certainly are better, and the Western media, in particular, think that some progress has been achieved because of these atmospherics. But as I said, we still have to see that these lofty principles that we talked about are translated into actions at the negotiating table and on the ground. The second question: as you know, the Israeli government has not changed the way it deals with the Palestinians in the occupied temtories. The intifada is still going on, which is an expression of Pales- tinian national aspirations, and the Israelis still mete out the same kind of treatment to them. So really nothing has changed.

Q: Rabin has said he will not withdraw to the 1967 lines, and he has distinguished between political settlements and security settlements and designated the Jordan val- ley and East Jerusalem as areas where security settlements are necessary. Do you think that Rabin may be attempting to implement the Allon Plan, whereby he would esssentially annex 40 percent of the West Bank and leave 60 percent autono- mous but not independent?

A: I don’t know what Rabin has in mind because we have not discovered that yet. It seems that Mr. Rabin is trying to distin- guish between three kinds, not two kinds, of settlements, which is very unusual and terribly dangerous. One is what he calls “political” settlements, the second is “se- curity” settlements, and the third is “set- tlements around Jerusalem,” which no- body is talking of. Jerusalem, after all, constitutes around 30 to 33 percent of the West Bank according to the Israeli thinking right now, so this is exceedingly important. Second, are the Israelis going to start talk- ing sincerely about a peaceful settlement that will give the Palestinians their right of self-determination? Their right of self-de-

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termination, by definition, means that the Israelis must withdraw from the occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem. Third, are the Israelis still in the frame of mind whereby they think they can be ex- empted from the terms of international law or not? This is something that we have to wait and see. To say that they will abide by certain rules but not by others is, in a sense, giving themselves the right to be exempted. That of course is to be left to the interna- tional community. Can a state take for itself that kind of a right or not?

Q: With respect to Resolution 242 and your negotiations with lsrael, the Israelis place great emphasis on the fact that there is no definite article in the language calling for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories [emphasis added] occupied in the recent conflict. ” Do the Jordanians bring their attention to the opening remarks of that resolution, which begins by “em- phasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisi- tion of territory by war?”

A: Of course. We emphasize that at ev- ery bend of the negotiations.

Q: Do you consider that the controlling sentence?

A: Yes. The preamble, of course, gov- erns what follows later on. The whole idea is for Israel to withdraw. Again, is it legiti- mate for a state to acquire territory by force? That’s a question that is of interest not just to the Jordanians or to the Pales- tinians alone, but to the entire international community. Can a state give itself that kind of a right? But the definite article in the resolution, its presence is of course ac- knowledged by us and by the Arab side. [The French text includes the definite arti- cle in calling for “retrait. . . des terri- toires,” or “withdrawal. . . from the terri-

INTERVIEW: JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

tones.”] But the basic question is, does a state have the right to acquire territory by war? I think the answer is definitely nega- tive.

Q: My specijk question is, do you point to that language?

A: Yes, we do.

Q: What kind of answer do you get to that?

A: We get the usual run-around answer that the French version says something, the English version says another thing, and we go through that kind of game. But we take the resolution as a whole and argue that it must be abided by literally and that there is no need, not now or ever, for a new inter- pretation of it. The resolution speaks of application and it must be applied.

Q: Is Israel willing to place on the agenda the Jordanian territory it occupies, not the West Bank, but the Jordanian ter- ritory?

A: Yes, this is one of the items that we are talking about. And here again it is not just the Palestinian or Syrian or Lebanese, but Jordanian territories that are to be with- drawn from. We insist on that.

Q: Are they willing to put it on the agenda?

A: They are, of course. They keep saying that these are lands in dispute. They are not in dispute, of course, they are occupied Jordanian territories.

Q: The press yesterday referred to a document on which Israel and Jordan are near agreement. The Jordan Times referred to it as “an agenda” but also referred to it

as “closer to a statement of willingness to sign a peace treaty.” Can you tell me about that document?

A: We have been discussing the matter of agreeing on a common agenda for exactly one year. Yesterday it was one year. As you stated, it is a “near agreement,” be- cause we still have some ideas regarding the content. But in any case, it is not an agreement that comes out in a vacuum. It is an agreement that, should it be imple- mented, has to come within the framework that the Jordanian side views as absolutely necessary and that abides by international legitimacy, relevant U.N. resolutions and a comprehensive peace settlement.

Q: The Jordan Times referred to it as “a document of intent regarding the peace treaty.” Is that a reasonable way of de- scribing it?

A: An agenda, after all, is a document of intent. We agree, you and I, that we will talk over topics. We will talk about land, about people, about resources, about secu- rity. Any one of these items must be dis- cussed and thoroughly hammered out in later talks and negotiations. So an agenda, by any definition, is a declaration that these are the topics that constitute the framework of our next talks.

Q: I would like to ask you about the final-status talks from the Jordanian point of view. When Crown Prince Hassan was in Chicago, he said that the Israelis could not really expect full acceptance of full legiti- macy unless a Palestinian state emerges. Over the past decade there have been many efforts by King Hussein to reach some understanding with Yasser Arafat, and I understand that Arafat was in Amman a week ago. Speculation is that they talked about what the relationship between a West

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Bank entity and Jordan would be. What really would be in Jordan’s best interest: an independent Palestinian state or a Palestin- ian state in a confederation with Jordan?

A: First, I think it is the right of every human being as well as the right of any national community to look towards their self-determination and to plan for their fu- ture. It is the right of the Jordanians as well as the right of the Palestinians. Now, in view of the very close relationship that has existed and continues to exist between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, it is most natural for them to start thinking about their future, considering their historical as- sociation in terms of language, religion, cultural background, and in fact, interests too. At this moment in history, when we are still at the beginning stage of the peace process, negotiating with a very difficult adversary, who we know is very tough, is it the right moment to introduce another ele- ment into the equation? Is it wise? The Palestinians are discussing with the Israe- lis; we are discussing with the Israelis; the Syrians, the Lebanese are too. Is it wise at this moment, when we still do not know what the Israelis want?

Can you tell me what the Israelis want? Can anybody really tell me what the Israelis want? They say things and then they do otherwise. Several of them say different things at one time. Are the Israelis going to give the Palestinians their right of self- determination or not? On their own soil? After all, when we talk of self-determina- tion, the Palestinians need space to live in, air to breathe, water to drink, resources to sustain themselves and their development. How far are the Israelis willing to abide by international law and legitimacy? Will Is- rael apply the rules of law or will it not? All these questions are still up in the air. No- body can tell me where the borders of Israel are. Is it wise for us right now, while we are

engaged in this very arduous, long, drawn- out process, to start talking among our- selves about what sort of relationship the Jordanian-Palestinian one should be? I think it is a bit premature. When the Israelis withdraw, when they withdraw from Jeru- salem, when they reach a comprehensive settlement, including the right of self-deter- mination for the Palestinians, then it will be natural for us to talk about what kind of relationship we should have. But now it’s still premature.

Q: The American administration seems to think that it should be a step removed from the negotiating process and wait for the parties themselves to reach agreement. Do you believe that is a reasonable stance for the American government to take, or do you think it should be exercising more le- verage over Israel?

A: First, America is a country that has been built upon and around very lofty prin- ciples. Second, this question should be ad- dressed to the Americans, especially in view of my first remark. Third, as far as we’re concerned, we wish that the United States would be more active in the peace process. But this is something to be decided by the Americans themselves, not by us. But while we must talk on our own behalf and defend our own rights and insist on them by removing the damage that has been done not just in Jordan but to the entire area, the United States should have a role in accordance with its own principles.

Q: Some would say that by withholding loan guarantees over the settlements issue the Bush administration influenced the election in Israel. But after that election, the Bush administration released the loan guarantees with understandings that ap- pear to be very generous, that permit Israel to complete a substantial amount of build-

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ing already underway, that are vague about where new security construction may take place and about new construction in Greater Jerusalem. What do you think of the way the Bush administration handled that issue?

A: Again, that question should be ad- dressed to the Americans. The United States has embarked on supporting a new world order towards the end of the century and the beginning of the coming one. And I think the whole Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict should be viewed within its own vision and framework. My assumption is that such a new world order should be governed by the rule of law, international and otherwise.

Q: If international law is not imple- mented, if the negotiations are not success- ful, what will be the consequences over the next 10 years of the failure to resolve this problem, particularly in Jordan?

A: The peace process has implications not just for the Jordanians, the Palestinians, the Syrians and the other delegates. It has implications for the entire region and, in fact, for the world because of oil and the strategic location of the area of conflict. After all, the Arab world encompasses Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz.

Jordan is very sincere about its adher- ence to the peace process, and we have played a central role, whether on the bilat- eral or multilateral level, and we intend to continue to do so with the idea that it must succeed. If this area does not know peace, no one else in the world will know peace. And the damage will continue for a long time. As you know, there are rejectionist forces in the region, and should the peace process falter or halt or fail, they will say “we told you so; the Israelis are intransi-

gent. They had no intention of withdraw- ing, no intention of granting Arab rights.” 1 think we would go back, not to square one, but to pre-square one, in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Now that the area has seen the introduction of weapons of mass destruction, the prospects are terrible. Is- rael, as you know, has nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles, the means of delivery.

There are rejectionist forces in the region, and should the peace process falter or halt or fail, they will say “we told you so; the Israelis are intransigent. They had no intention of withdrawing, no intention of granting Arab rights. ”

The Middle East is also expanding, something nobody is thinking about. The republics that have come about as the result of the break-up of the Soviet Union will sooner or later get dragged into the ongoing disputes. I can’t conceive of the Arabs or their leaders-or the Muslims-ever relin- quishing their legitimate rights in Jerusa- lem. That place will retain its significance and centrality, not just in religious terms but in geopolitical and strategic terms as well.

Q: Speaking about rejectionists and about Central Asia, Zalmon Shoval, Is- rael’s ambassador to the United States, arguing that there needed to be a close Israeli-American strategic relationship, re- cently said, “Is there not a danger that. . . [Central Asia] will become fundamentalist and anti-Western and [pose] a danger to the Middle East greater than the Soviet

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Union once did?” Would you comment on Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic mili- tancy and the difference between them and the extent to which one or the other may be a threat to the West.

1 A: Islam is not a threat to anybody. Islam is a decent, humane religion that regulates man’s relations with man and man’s rela- tion with God. I think the rejectionists are not only fundamentalists; there are rejec- tionists who are secularists. But the Israe- lis, it seems, are trying to say, well, we’ve gotten rid of the Soviet Union as the en- emy, now we have Islamic fundamentalism to replace it. It suits their purposes to do so, but I think that it is shortsighted. Not only Muslims, but the Israelis themselves are fundamentalists. When Shamir or any other Israeli leader thunders down biblical abso- lutes such as “Israel’s Jerusalem is the eternal city and can never be redefined,” is that fundamentalism or not? This is some- thing that one has to address to the entire international community, the international conscience. There are also objective rea- sons for fundamentalism or rejectionism.

Q: But fundamentalism and rejectionism are not synonymous.

A: They are not synonymous at all. But the implication that has been created in the Western mind is that they are synonymous. I think that fundamentalism can be a con- structive force. But as long as the political issues that are the major reasons of con- frontation between Islam and the West, or between the Arabs and the West, are not resolved in a manner that at least meets the minimum requirements of everybody con- cerned, that misperception will continue to grow.

Q: To what extent is Islamic militancy a reaction to the unresolved Arab-Israeli

conflict? I f this conflict were resolved, would it thwart the movement toward rejec- tionism and militancy?

A: Let me address myself first to the Jordanian way. Jordan is unique in its ap- proach to the entire question of dealing with its own “fundamentalists,” although some of them would not like that term. They are in parliament, and at one time assumed political office in many ministries in the government. The way that Jordan handles that kind of question is unique in the Arab world and indeed in the Islamic world. And I think it is a healthy way, too, because the fundamentalists have a point of view which we respect and which we listen to very attentively because they are our cousins and brothers and neighbors.

The next question is about when funda- mentalism arises. When do people turn to absolutes? They turn to absolutes when they are frustrated, in times of trouble. The Middle East has been in trouble since the dawn of this century, especially since the introduction of Zionist fundamentalist ide- ology into the region. When Mr. Shamir speaks in absolute terms, or Begin before him or Golda Meir or other Israeli leaders, their type of fundamentalism provokes re- actions.

But should the basic issue be re- solved-the Arab-Israeli conflict, whose heart is the Palestinian issue, whose heart is Jerusalem-I do not think that everybody will live happily ever after. The area will, however, relax to such an extent that peo- ple will gradually start directing their atten- tion to issues of economic and social devel- opment-building hospitals, roads, univer- sities, intellectual centers.

But there is no question that the Palestin- ian issue must be resolved. Why is Leba- non occupied? Why are the Syrian Golan Heights occupied? Why are Jordanian lands occupied? Because of the Palestinian

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issue. If that question were to be resolved in a manner that is in accordance with international legitimacy, something that we can live with, I think things will begin to relax in the whole region. We are trying in Jordan to rectify the unusual circumstances that have existed in this region for the past ten decades. We want to reach a settlement that is honorable, comprehensive, and du- rable, not just a truce for this generation, but a peace that I can live with and my grandchildren can live with.

Q: Iran seems to be acquiring conven- tional and non-conventional weapons, as- serting its claim to islands in the Strait of Hormuz, and supporting Hezbollah. Tradi- tionally, at least in the United States, Iraq was viewed as a counterweight to Iran. Particularly in the West, Iran is viewed as a potential threat. Do you agree with those assessments, and what do you have to say about American policy toward Iraq, for example the imposition of “no-fly zones” in the north and the south, what could conceivably become the partitioning of Iraq, and the continuing sanctions against Iraq?

A: About Iraq, we worry a great deal about two things: First the territorial integ- rity and the unity of Iraq, because we shudder to think about the consequences of its dismemberment and the kind of black hole this may produce, dragging neighbor- ing and other powers into the fray. The second point is about the Iraqi people. We worry about their suffering. About Iran, that is a question that should be addressed to the Americans, 1 think. We do not pre- sume to interfere in their view of how they should handle that question.

Q: Most Americans do not have a sophis- ticated understanding of the position that Jordan took during the Gulf War. Can you

briefly clarify why Jordan made the deci- sions it made?

A: I think that the Jordanian position was an honorable one in which Jordan abided by international law and international legit- imacy. We asked that the Kuwaiti legiti- mate regime be restored. We asked that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. The only dif- ference between Jordan and probably many other countries is that Jordan continued to insist that the issue be resolved within the Arab world and that Jordan continued to think that such a possibility existed. The final point is that we were afraid of the injection of outside forces into the area because of the wounds that such an injec- tion may create. We still live in the shadow of the Gulf crisis.

Q: I understand the suffering of the Iraqi people, but in a larger sense have there been other lasting wounds due to the out- side intervention?

A: We don’t know. We still live in the shadow of that crisis, and it is difficult to say how deep the wounds are-will they go away? If so, how and when? These are questions that I think will be answered in the future.

Q: How do you assess the prospects for reconciliation between Jordan and Saudi Arabia?

A: The prospects are good. Both the Jordanian and Saudi leadership have enough wisdom that the recognition is there that what affects Saudi Arabia affects Jor- dan and vice versa. Our relations are al- ready good. Trade goes on, people move back and forth, etc. We have our ambassa- dor in Riyadh. We are on the right track, I think.

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Q: What about relations with the United States?

A: They have been very good. With the United States, as you know, we have always had a special relationship. In spite of every- thing, that special relationship continues, in spite of the cloud that has passed, we hope.

Q: The United States has cut economic aid and is interdicting supplies outside of Aqaba.

A: There is enough foresight and wisdom on both sides to realize that such a special relationship should be strong. And it is.

Q: In Israel last week, I once again heard statements from right-wing leaders-some of whom, like Rafael Eitan, may end up in governing coalition again-such as, “the Arabs don’t want us here,” “the Arabs want to drive us into the sea,” “Jordan is Pales- tine; that’s where the Palestinian state ought to be.” How do you address those Israeli fears, and how do you address Israeli interpretations of geography and history?

A: The peace process is trying to address precisely that kind of fear on the part of the Israelis, although I do not know why this is necessary. We should be the ones who are afraid, because they have the power-the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It is obvious who has the military might to inflict damage on whom. So I think their hiding behind the issue of security is wear- ing thin. As far as the geographical inter- pretation, Jordan and Palestine have ex- isted as two separate entities from the dawn of history. There was always something called Jordan. There was always something called Palestine. The fact that the British Mandate over Palestine briefly put them together does not negate historical facts. The Palestinians, for instance, will not be satisfied to be given Canada or Australia or Louisiana or part of Jordan. They are talk- ing about Jerusalem, about international resolutions, about restoring Palestinian rights on Palestinian soil. Not elsewhere. So this kind of obfuscation only confuses the issue.

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