Who are you and how does the IFB organize it Commanders?

My name is Mahir Bakırcıyan, I am a TKP/ML TİKKO fighter and com-mander of the International Freedom Battalion (IFB). A commander’s term is 3 to 4 months, at the end of which the four constituent organisations of the IFB (BÖG, TKP/ML TİKKO, MLKP and IRPGF) meet and choose the battalion commander. WE use a rotational system so every time a member of a different organisation to that of the previous commander is chosen.

The Raqqa operation ended with a historical victory. From Minbic to Raqqa: what is the hstorical importance of it?

The liberation of Raqqa was the culmination of a long and arduous strug-gle against the fascist gangsters of Daiş – a struggle that demanded much sacrifice from the Kurdish and Arab peoples, as well as international volunteers. From the heroic defence of Kobane we moved on to the offen-sive, liberating new territories and thus gaining more ground for the Rojava revolution to take root. Manbij was a strategic objective of seminal importance: it served as a second capital for Daiş, facilitating the trans-portation of their troops, ammunitions and resources from Turkey and throughout the region; guarded Raqqa’s western (and by extension south-western) front and constituted a fundamental obstacle in the struggle for the unification of the cantons. Its liberation was a great victory for QSD, but came with a heavy cost in lives. Unfortunately following this, the planned campaigns for Jarablus and Al Bab were put on hold, due to Turkey’s criminal intervention on behalf of their Daiş allies.

Next came the campaign for Raqqa, a long and difficult drive to the south, from multiple fronts, consisting of both offensive and defensive opera-tions; and IFB was always at the heart of it all. At the beginning of June the hamle (attack) of the city itself began. Applying everything we had learned of city war from Kobane and Manbij, and further developing and adjusting our tactics to facilitate the ever-evolving military doctrines of QSD (e.g. a much more careful approach than earlier campaigns to offensive opera-tions, including the use of smaller numbers of units, innovative use of armoured vehicles and mechanised units and thorough bombardment of the operational areas through the use of heavy weapons, artillery and air-strikes), as well as counter the old and new tactics employed by our fascist enemies (e.g. the use of reconnaissance and bomb carrying drones, improvised weaponry, the heavy use of tunnelling to achieve tacti-cal or even operational surprise and the deployment of mines to deter our advance). After 4 months of intensive operations we liberated Raqqa, striking the decisive blow in our struggle against Daiş in the military/stra-tegic, but also on a symbolic/ideological level.

The revolutionary spirit of the free people of Rojava destroyed an enemy from whom many had fled; and although the threat of Daiş and fascism of different hues remains, the so-called kaliphate is no more. It certainly is a historic victory for Rojava – as well as all the peoples around the globe who suffer from the yoke of fascism in all its forms – and opens up a new phase for the region. Rojava must now consolidate its territorial gains, continue to develop and organise its defences both militarily and ideologi-cally and prepare for the challenges ahead.

What does it mean for the IFB and its revolutionary operations/project? The relationship between military and civil strategy of building up and stabilize the revolutionary process?

IFB was heavily involved in every stage of the offensives towards Raqqa and in the fight for the city itself. It’s important to highlight the key role of international volunteers in the success of IFB’s city hamle, through which we accumulated invaluable military experience and earned a solidreputa-tion within QSD.

IFB remains an important and valued unity project for all the revolutionary organisations and individuals involved. Like the Rojava project as a whole, IFB is in a transitional period, constantly evaluating the ever-changing political/military situation and trying to plan ahead. Although the war against Daiş in its current form is drawing to a close, IFB will remain a hareketli tabur. In the immediate period ahead we aim to focus on training, propaganda, and maybe expand IFB’s work into civil areas. The revolution needs to take root in the areas taken during the offensives. If the local people aren’t invested in the revolutionary struc-tures and the revolution cannot resolve the dire material situation of these people, then we are more likely to be seen as occupiers than libera-tors and resisted.

What did you learn out of its experiences? In a short tekmil: positively to develop and what to avoid in the next steps.

We learned how to consolidate and translate our experiences into an evolving military doctrine that managed effectively to keep pace with the rapidly changing battlefield of Raqqa and that will serve as a legacy to the tabur. We made effective use of our operation tekmil system in order to keep our training programs up to date. However this process should have been in place from the earliest stages of the campaign and for this we must self-criticise. Also, our focus on the immediate military tasks led us to somewhat neglect certain other aspects of the revolutionary struggle e.g. propaganda work.

What will be the future of the IFB? What are the strategies after Raqqa operation for all the military forces (ypj, ypg, IFB) , the next steps?

We are currently investigating the possibility of establishing a permanent military base to house the IFB; we are focusing on communications with potential volunteers and supportive organisations and further systema-tising our propaganda work; lastly we are thinking of expanding our activi-ties into the civil arena and are evaluating potential projects of that nature.

QSD is a military coalition founded with the purpose of defending the gains of the democratic revolution of northern Syria. As such it is com-prised of representative groups of the varied invested constituencies, including YPG/YPJ, HXP, the Manbij, Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor military coun-cils, and former FSA groups. QSD will continue with its internal restructur-ing, finish the Deir Ez Zor hamle and prepare to repel any attacksfrom the imperialist forces acting in the region.

What is the analyses of the actual situation in the region? It seems that the situation become much more complicated and complex …. what do you think of it? Which roles and functions are in this situation of the revolutionary forces like the IFB?

The situation is very unstable and protean. The destruction of Daiş as a territorial entity provided a focus for all the actors in the region. With this accomplished, the different actors will re-evaluate and re-negotiate their respective relationships, a prospect that makes any analysis of the region’s future extremely difficult to carry out. Turkey has been occupying the north Aleppo countryside, has moved into Idlib and is increasing the pressure on Afrin. The PMU is threatening Shengal and the Iraqi border. The Regime remains an ever-present threat and it is currently unclear what its next moves will be. The geopolitical outcome of the Rojava project will depend on the advance of the revolution in the rest of Kurdis-tan and the cessation of the economic blockade on northern Syria.

Despite the changing nature of the geopolitical situation the fundamental tasks of the revolution remain the same, and thus our core mission as well: To defend and deepen the revolutionary processes and promote international solidarity.

Interview with the commander of International Freedom Battalion

Nov. 9 2017 • en.rojava.xyz

Who are you and how does the IFB organize it Commanders?

My name is Mahir Bakırcıyan, I am a TKP/ML TİKKO fighter and commander of the International Freedom Battalion (IFB). A commander’s term is 3 to 4 months, at the end of which the four constituent organisations of the IFB (BÖG, TKP/ML TİKKO, MLKP and IRPGF) meet and choose the battalion commander. WE use a rotational system so every time a member of a different organisation to that of the previous commander is chosen.

The Raqqa operation ended with a historical victory. From Minbic to Raqqa: what is the hstorical importance of it?

The liberation of Raqqa was the culmination of a long and arduous struggle against the fascist gangsters of Daiş – a struggle that demanded much sacrifice from the Kurdish and Arab peoples, as well as international volunteers. From the heroic defence of Kobane we moved on to the offensive, liberating new territories and thus gaining more ground for the Rojava revolution to take root. Manbij was a strategic objective of seminal importance: it served as a second capital for Daiş, facilitating the transportation of their troops, ammunitions and resources from Turkey and throughout the region; guarded Raqqa’s western (and by extension southwestern) front and constituted a fundamental obstacle in the struggle for the unification of the cantons. Its liberation was a great victory for QSD, but came with a heavy cost in lives. Unfortunately following this, the planned campaigns for Jarablus and Al Bab were put on hold, due to Turkey’s criminal intervention on behalf of their Daiş allies.

Next came the campaign for Raqqa, a long and difficult drive to the south, from multiple fronts, consisting of both offensive and defensive operations; and IFB was always at the heart of it all. At the beginning of June the hamle (attack) of the city itself began. Applying everything we had learned of city war from Kobane and Manbij, and further developing and adjusting our tactics to facilitate the ever-evolving military doctrines of QSD (e.g. a much more careful approach than earlier campaigns to offensive operations, including the use of smaller numbers of units, innovative use of armoured vehicles and mechanised units and thorough bombardment of the operational areas through the use of heavy weapons, artillery and air-strikes), as well as counter the old and new tactics employed by our fascist enemies (e.g. the use of reconnaissance and bomb carrying drones, improvised weaponry, the heavy use of tunnelling to achieve tactical or even operational surprise and the deployment of mines to deter our advance). After 4 months of intensive operations we liberated Raqqa, striking the decisive blow in our struggle against Daiş in the military/strategic, but also on a symbolic/ideological level.

The revolutionary spirit of the free people of Rojava destroyed an enemy from whom many had fled; and although the threat of Daiş and fascism of different hues remains, the so-called kaliphate is no more. It certainly is a historic victory for Rojava – as well as all the peoples around the globe who suffer from the yoke of fascism in all its forms – and opens up a new phase for the region. Rojava must now consolidate its territorial gains, continue to develop and organise its defences both militarily and ideologically and prepare for the challenges ahead.

What does it mean for the IFB and its revolutionary operations/project? The relationship between military and civil strategy of building up and stabilize the revolutionary process?

IFB was heavily involved in every stage of the offensives towards Raqqa and in the fight for the city itself. It’s important to highlight the key role of international volunteers in the success of IFB’s city hamle, through which we accumulated invaluable military experience and earned a solid reputation within QSD.

IFB remains an important and valued unity project for all the revolutionary organisations and individuals involved. Like the Rojava project as a whole, IFB is in a transitional period, constantly evaluating the ever-changing political/military situation and trying to plan ahead. Although the war against Daiş in its current form is drawing to a close, IFB will remain a hareketli tabur. In the immediate period ahead we aim to focus on training, propaganda, and maybe expand IFB’s work into civil areas. The revolution needs to take root in the areas taken during the offensives. If the local people aren’t invested in the revolutionary structures and the revolution cannot resolve the dire material situation of these people, then we are more likely to be seen as occupiers than liberators and resisted.

What did you learn out of its experiences? In a short tekmil: positively to develop and what to avoid in the next steps.

We learned how to consolidate and translate our experiences into an evolving military doctrine that managed effectively to keep pace with the rapidly changing battlefield of Raqqa and that will serve as a legacy to the tabur. We made effective use of our operation tekmil system in order to keep our training programs up to date. However this process should have been in place from the earliest stages of the campaign and for this we must self-criticise. Also, our focus on the immediate military tasks led us to somewhat neglect certain other aspects of the revolutionary struggle e.g. propaganda work.

What will be the future of the IFB? What are the strategies after Raqqa operation for all the military forces (ypj, ypg, IFB) , the next steps?

We are currently investigating the possibility of establishing a permanent military base to house the IFB; we are focusing on communications with potential volunteers and supportive organisations and further systematising our propaganda work; lastly we are thinking of expanding our activities into the civil arena and are evaluating potential projects of that nature.

QSD is a military coalition founded with the purpose of defending the gains of the democratic revolution of northern Syria. As such it is comprised of representative groups of the varied invested constituencies, including YPG/YPJ, HXP, the Manbij, Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor military councils, and former FSA groups. QSD will continue with its internal restructuring, finish the Deir Ez Zor hamle and prepare to repel any attacksfrom the imperialist forces acting in the region.

What is the analyses of the actual situation in the region? It seems that the situation become much more complicated and complex …. what do you think of it? Which roles and functions are in this situation of the revolutionary forces like the IFB?

The situation is very unstable and protean. The destruction of Daiş as a territorial entity provided a focus for all the actors in the region. With this accomplished, the different actors will re-evaluate and re-negotiate their respective relationships, a prospect that makes any analysis of the region’s future extremely difficult to carry out. Turkey has been occupying the north Aleppo countryside, has moved into Idlib and is increasing the pressure on Afrin. The PMU is threatening Shengal and the Iraqi border. The Regime remains an ever-present threat and it is currently unclear what its next moves will be. The geopolitical outcome of the Rojava project will depend on the advance of the revolution in the rest of Kurdistan and the cessation of the economic blockade on northern Syria.

Despite the changing nature of the geopolitical situation the fundamental tasks of the revolution remain the same, and thus our core mission as well: To defend and deepen the revolutionary processes and promote international solidarity.

Interview with the commander of International Freedom Battalion

Nov. 9 2017 • en.rojava.xyz