Into the Labyrinth:

An Exploration of Insurgent Groups and their Network Neighbourhoods

Amanda Elizabeth Lennon

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Studies,

The University of Auckland, 2005

ABSTRACT

Although references to networks are a common feature in the current discourse on

terrorism, the bulk of attention thus far has been focused upon the al Qaeda

phenomenon, with little effort having been made to date to explore the extent to which

other insurgent groups have also cultivated network links.

As the first step towards redressing this imbalance, this study investigates six currently

active insurgent groups that are typologically different with respect to their origins,

location, ideology and goals.

Through the application of a combined qualitative and quantitative research design that

utilises the latest organisational network analysis tools, this study observes that all six

groups are indeed embedded somewhere within network structures of varying breadths

and depths.

What is more, the research identifies a number of other organisations that have a

seeming ubiquitous presence across almost all of these disparate networks.

While the observations made in this study are limited by the narrow comparative small

n case study approach, they reinforce the argument that more intensive research and

mapping needs to be conducted in the future in the attempt to discover the full extent of

networked insurgency around the globe.

ii

DEDICATION

For my mother

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must first express my eternal gratitude to my Supervisor Dr. Paul Buchanan for all the

support, patience, and good humour given to me throughout this research project.

Many thanks also to friends and fellow students James Liddell, Shireen Hawkins, Judie

Hammond-Moores, Stephen Groves; and Christian Fjelstadt, whose encouragement and

assistance helped see me through the difficult times.

Finally, I wish to thank Warren Wells, my sunshine man, for gallantly attempting to

enforce the kind of discipline regime I needed to get the job done – “Beautiful Mate!”

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................ii

DEDICATION.................................................................................................................iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................iv

LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................................vi

LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................................vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................vii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................1

APPROACHES TO NETWORK ANALYSIS...........................................................10LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................................18RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.......................................................35

CHAPTER 2 CASE STUDIES..................................................................................45

Case Study 1 ABU SAYYAF......................................................................................47Abu Sayyaf Network Neighbourhood.........................................................................51Case Study 2 COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA-MAOIST.....................................54Communist Party of India-Maoist Network Neighbourhood......................................59Case Study 3 JAMIAT UL-ANSAR...........................................................................62Jamiat ul-Ansar Network Neighbourhood...................................................................67Case Study 4 KONGRA-GEL.....................................................................................70Kongra-Gel Network Neighbourhood.........................................................................73Case Study 5 LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM.....................................75Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Network Neighbourhood......................................79Case Study 6 REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA.................81Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Network Neighbourhood........................86

CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSION........................................................................................90

SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS.........................................................90RESULTS....................................................................................................................92DISCUSSION..............................................................................................................92LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH.......................................................................95SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH...........................................................98

BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................................................................................100

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Summary of Network Measures Assigned to Individual Actors in this Study..43

Table 2. Summary of Network Measures Assigned to Describe Networks in this Study.........44

Table 3. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators..................................51

Table 4. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics........................................................51

Table 5. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators..................................59

Table 6. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics........................................................59

Table 7. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators..................................67

Table 8. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics........................................................68

Table 9. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators..................................73

Table 10. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics......................................................73

Table 11. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators................................79

Table 12. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics......................................................79

Table 13. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators................................86

Table 14.. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics.....................................................86

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Supplementary coding symbols used in case study graphs to follow..............46

Figure 2. Graphic representation of alleged past and present ABU SAYYAF ties.........50

Figure 3. Graphic representation of alleged past and present COMMUNIST PARTY OF

INDIA-MAOIST ties.......................................................................................................58

Figure 4. Graphic representation of alleged past and present JAMIAT UL-ANSAR ties

.........................................................................................................................................66

Figure 5. Graphic representation of alleged past and present KONGRA GEL ties........72

Figure 6. Graphic representation of alleged past and present LIBERATION TIGERS OF

TAMIL EELAM ties.......................................................................................................78

Figure 7. Graphic representation of alleged past and present REVOLUTIONARY

ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA ties........................................................................85

vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

313 Front 313ABNES Akhil Bharat Ekta SamajaJF Al Jihadal B Al Badral F Al FaranANCL African National CongressARCF Asif Reza Commando ForceAS Abu SayyafATTF All Tripura Tiger ForceBCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce InternationalBCP(MLM) Pura Bangla Communist PartyBersatu United Front for the Independence of PattaniBKI Babbar Khalsa InternationalBSD(ML) Bangladesh Samyabadi Party – Marxist-LeninistCCOMPOSA Coordination Committee of the Maoist Parties of South AsiaCDC Colombian Drug CartelsCIA US Central Intelligence AgencyCPC(Maoist) Communist Party of CeylonCPEB(ML) Purba Bangla Sarbahara PartyCPI-Maoist Comm Party of India-MaoistCPI-ML Comm Party of India M-LCPN-Maoist Comm Party oF Nepal-MaoistCCP Colombian Communist PartyDGFI Bangladesh Director General of Forces IntelligenceDHKP-C Devrimci SolEJG Egyptian Jihad GroupELN National Liberation ArmyEROS Eelam Revolutionary OrganisersETA Basque Fatherland and LibertyFARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of ColombiaFRF Ricardo Franco FactionGAM Free Aceh MovementGARI International Revolutionary Armed GroupsGLO Gurka Liberation OrganisationGLTF Gorkha Liberation Tiger ForceGNLF Gurkha National Liberation FrontHIG Hizb-I-Islami GulbuddinHM Hizb ul MujahideenHUJI Harkat ul-Jihad-al-Islami HUJI-B Harkat ul-Jihad-al-Islami - BangladeshIG Islamic GroupIGERF Islamic Great Eastern Raiders FrontIIF International Islamic Front Against the Jews and CrusadersIILF Indonesian Islamic Liberation FrontIIRO International Islamic Relief OrganisationISI Pakistan Inter-Services Intel AgencyISYF International Seikh Youth FederationJeI Jamiat-e-IslamiJeM Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujahideen E-TanzimJI Jemaah Islamiyah

vii

JiI Jamaat-e-IslamiJKLF Jammu Kashmir Liberation FrontJRA Japanese Red ArmyJuA Jamiat ul-AnsarJuI-F Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam, Fazlur Rehman FactionKFH Kurdistan Freedom HawksKLF Kashmir Liberation FrontKLO Khalistan Liberation OrganisationKLO Kamtapur Liberation OrganisationKMM Kampulan Mujahidin MalaysiaKPU Kurdish Patriotic UnionKR Khmer RougeKZF Khalistan Zindabad ForceLeJ Lashkar-I-JhangviLeT Laskar-e-ToibaLJ Laskar JihadLTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil EelamMILF Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMJC Muttahida Juhad Council (United Jihad Council)MKP Maoist Communist Party of TurkeyMNLF Moro National Liberation FrontNDFB National Democratic front of BodolandNDFB National Democratic Front of BodolandNLFT National Liberation Front of TripuraNSCN Nationalist Socialist Council of NagalandPBSB(MLM) Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party Marxist-Leninist-MaoistPBSP(CC) Proletarian Party of Purba BanglaPBSP(MPK) Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party -MaoistPCP Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestinePGPC Pakistan Gurudwara Prabandhak CommitteePKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Kongra GelPIRA Provisional Irish Republican ArmyPLO Palestine Liberation OrganisationPPL Free Homeland PartyPULO Pattani United Liberation OrganisationRAW Research and Analysis Wing - Indian Intelligence Service RCCI(Maoist) Revnary Comm Centre of India-MaoistRCCI(MLM) Revnary Comm Centre of India- Marxist-Leninist-MaoistRIM Revolutionary Internationalist MovementRSM Rajah Solaiman MovementSSP Sipah e-Sahapa PakistanSWAPO South West Africa People’s OrganisationTC Tijuana CartelTiJ Tehreek –I-JihadTNG Tamil Nadu GroupsTULF Tamil United Liberation FrontULFA United Liberation Front of Asom

viii

“Oh what a tangled web we weave, when we practice to deceive”

Sir Walter Scott, ‘Marmion’

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The devastating air attacks upon the US World Trade Centre and Pentagon on

September 11, 2001 were the catalyst for a global change in perception regarding the

threats and challenges posed by some networks of non-state actors regarding issues of

security within the international political environment of a globalising world.

In November of that year, TIME Magazine published a Special Report i on al Qaeda, the

organisation charged with masterminding this event, which explored the alleged reach

of this group’s own peculiar brand of “Worldwide Web [through which] Osama bin

Laden’s network of influence reaches across five continents, creating a complex tangle

of men, money and murder” (Elliott 2001, 32-33). Whilst its commentary was

dominated by a visual identifying the parts of the globe that were said to be home to

known or suspected al Qaeda activity, or where states had placed alleged al Qaeda

suspects into custody, the investigation fell short of informing the reader of the central

issue: what actually constituted the al Qaeda ‘network’ in this context. While

moderately helpful inasmuch that it impressed upon the reader the scope of al Qaeda’s

supposed reach, what appeared on the pages in diagrammatic form was merely a one-

dimensional colour-coded map of the states of the world, accompanied by a list of

activity-related coded flags. This, however, was not a representation of a network: it

was little more than a legend of attributed incidents by geographic area.

i Michael Elliott, “Hate Club”, Special Report. Inside al Qaeda: bin Laden’s Web of Terror TIME Magazine, November 12, 2001,.30-42

1

Additionally, with commentary on this organisation continuing to feature prominently

in media coverage of international terrorist events, it could be construed that either al

Qaeda was the first insurgent group to organise itself transnationally in this manner, or

even that al Qaeda is the only example of this form of organisation in the current world

environment of insurgent groups. While it certainly appears that al Qaeda has evolved a

particularly hardy, extensive and flexible organisational structure, it would be premature

to assume that this particular organisation is indeed the best or only example of a covert,

militarised, transnational network active today.

Further complicating the issue concerning the network parameters of al Qaeda, various

other assertions have been made in recent years regarding possible collusion between it

and other insurgent groups with their own distinct identities and that in most cases are

espousing ideologies and goals that diverge considerably from al Qaeda’s. For example,

al Qaeda has been associated with various Colombian guerrilla organisationsii, ETA and

N17iii, Hezbollahiv, Abu Sayyafv, and Jemaah Islamiah.vi The distinction between in-

group and out-group when it comes to the alleged al Qaeda network structure in

particular appears upon closer scrutiny and even with all the research and publicity this

group has amassed, to be weakly explored and perhaps even misrepresented. This may

in part be due to the seeming tendency to classify the actions of groups associated with

the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF), of which

al Qaeda is a founding member, as being al Qaeda operations.vii These al Qaeda

examples prove useful in highlighting the problem of discriminating between the

internal and external organisational structures associated with an organisation. By this it

is meant that clarification is needed as to the question of how it seems to maintain what

has been described as essentially a traditional, compartmentalised vertical hierarchy at

its core, whilst having managed also to develop functioning internal and external

networked structures alongside it.ii Martin Arostegui, “Search for bin Laden links Looks South”, United Press International, Cubanet, 18 October 2001, http://www.cubanet.org/Cnews/y01/oct01/18e9.htm (accessed 25 June, 2005)iii Atmane Tazaghart, “The ‘globalization’ of terror networks”, Daily Star, Lebanonwire, 20 August 2002, http://www.lebanonwire.com/0208/02082103DS.asp (accessed 15 March 2004)iv “Have Al Qaida and Hezbollah formed a terror pact?”, Jewish Bulletin News of Northern California, 12 July 2002, http://www.jewishsf.com/bk020712/i14.shtml (.accessed 15 March, 2004)v Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.” Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, 25 January 2002. http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RL31265.pdfvi “Jamaah Islamiah”, Center for Defense Information, 18 October 2002, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1159 (accessed 5 April 2005)vii “al Qa’ida”, Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm (accessed 9 December, 2004)

2

These issues aside, while talk of al Qaeda currently dominates academic and media

discourse surrounding insurgent groups, scant attention seems to have been paid thus far

to the exploration of relationships among other similar groups.

To illustrate this point, one needs look no further than the 1960s and 1970s to find

evidence of network formation between outlawed groups and other parties. For

example, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established in 1964 as an

umbrella organisation that united a number of leftist or leftist-Islamic hybrid pro-

Palestinian and pro-Arab groups with differing allegiances and agendas. The PLO

Executive in 1971 consisted of Fatah: the pro-Iraq Palestine Liberation Front (PLF): the

Arab Liberation Front (ALF); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP);

the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF); the Palestine Popular Struggle Front

(PSF) the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and the Palestine Communist Party.viii The

dramatic terrorist exploits of member groups of this organisation between 1971 and

1974 “helped the PLO join a global network of such groups and gain Soviet bloc

support” (Rubin 1994, 38), a network united by their opposition to what they all saw as

Western (and Zionist) imperialism. The other groups in this network included the

Japanese Red Army (JRA)ix, June 2nd Movement, the Red Brigades, and ‘the Carlos

gang’. This “loose coalition of autonomous groups” (ibid., 147) – operating under their

own names, or in the case of exceptionally violent or politically delicate operations via

ad hoc organisationsx - included groups that worked cooperatively as part of a conscious

attempt to establish a some kind of new internationalist force.

Even back in 1966 Cuba hosted the Tricontinental Conference, whose attendees

included the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Iranian Liberation Front, the Provisional

Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Baader Meinhofxi and the Turkish Revolutionary

People’s Liberation Front. At this conference “participants agreed to set up an

international network which included economic and financial cooperation, the exchange

of intelligence, sharing safe houses, joint training programmes and arms purchases”

(Napoleoni 2004, 70). Inspired by this approach, the then-leader of the PFLP, George

Habash, in 1972 hosted another international summit with the aim of forming a

common front against Zionism and Western imperialism.

3

Later, in the 1980s, the Red Army Faction (RAF) and Action Directe (AD) tried

(unsuccessfully) themselves to unite and coordinate their own PLO-like organisation –

“an anti-Imperialist front of Western European guerrillas” (Hoffman 1998, 83), and this

decade also reportedly saw the expansion of the PLO training programme towards

welcoming Italian and German anti-Zionist fascist groups.xii

During this time period, what is also interesting is that alliances and agreements were

not just being forged between relatively like-minded groups, but also between groups

whose goals and ideologies clashed. For example, one of the PLO’s alliances was with

Germany’s far right Hoffman Group, and Hoffman himself even called for a truce

between right and left so that both could focus on fighting ‘the system’ instead of each

other.xiii This approach was also enacted in Italy, where Libya and Syria funded both

leftist and rightist organisations against the state. Connected to the issue of state support

of ideologically opposed groups, and to illustrate the broad nature of the Cold War

politics that dominated the international scene in the last half of the twentieth century, in

1990 newly unified German government discovered that the East German Stasi had

given shelter to German neo-Nazis.xiv

It can be argued therefore that foundational to the nature and scale of the ‘new

terrorism’ born of the 1960s was the parallel development of new networked strategic or

tactical alliances between groups or other agents (such as states) united by a common

enemy – precursors of the “odd hybrids and symbioses” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b,

7) that are said to be manifesting themselves in today’s even more interconnected world

and that will be explored later within this research project.

Underpinning this argument is the belief that the nature of organisational structure is

increasingly becoming a strategic component of irregular group activity and relates

directly to operational scope and efficacy. “Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation

to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and

ambiguity dominate.” (Murray and Grimsley 1994, 1, as quoted by Gray 1999, 19). This

definition is offered by Gray in his attempt to stress that “ … the process of strategy-

making can be critical to the quality of strategic performance. Intellectual historians,

even those in the field of war and strategy, are not apt to see strategy expressed in

organisation and process” (Gray 1999, 19).

4

Accordingly, Gray identifies ‘organisation’ as one of the 17 dimensions “essential for

superior strategic performance.” (ibid., 34)

The time period within which these alliances were being forged coincided with what

was came to be termed the “new age of terrorism”. (Kegley 2003, 4) This term was

based upon the opportunistic change in operational tactics enacted by some of the

groups discussed above, where thanks to such globalising events as the rapid growth in

transcontinental airline traffic and mass communications media such as television in the

late 1960s, insurgent groups saw the potential for garnering publicity for their cause on

a global level through instigating spectacular attacks. In fact Hoffman (1998, 67) claims

that 22 July 1968 was the birth date of modern terrorism, when the PFLP hijacked an

Israeli El Al passenger aircraft (this was the twelfth hijack event of 1968) flying from

Rome to Tel Aviv – because this hijack was consciously and primarily planned as a

publicity event, and because the target selection was not opportunistic but deliberate.

Associated with the early beginnings of this new terrorist model came a marked

increase in state sponsorship of these violent covert groupsxv, along with the

development of “commissioned terrorism” (ibid., 1998, 187)xvi and the establishment of

guerrilla training camps where training was for sale to any leftist group from around the

world that was prepared to pay for the service.xvii

This expansion in the means and forms of early networked agency through transnational

interconnectedness and activismxviii - both overt and covert - can be argued as being

facilitated by the globalisation process. Globalisation has been variously defined as the

“the shrinkage in space and time that the world has experienced in consequence of the

technological revolutions in transport, communications and information processing”

(Helleiner 2001, 243),xix or, as is more relevant to this research paper, the “historical

process which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions,

generating transcontinental or inter-regional networks of interaction and the exercise of

power” (Held & McGrew 1998, 220). Either way, most commentators agree that it is a

process that has been going on for centuries, but has been facilitated by the rapid

development of technology in recent decades.

5

One consequence of these technological advancements in communication has been a

marked increase (both in real and value terms) in the growth of new forms of domestic,

regional and transnational non-state organisations that are constituted to act

complementarily, in parallel, or conflictually in response to or in an attempt to influence

either individual states or the growing number of intergovernmental organisations.

Whereas once it was the case that the expansion of a movement or enterprise was halted

in most instances at a state border by the state itself, or a neighbouring state, the co-

dependent relationship between technological progress and the neoliberal economic

agenda was given further impetus and perhaps even a kind of moral justification at the

end of the Cold War, and is creating a more malleable global environment. State

borders have become more porous and fewer institutions such as business ventures are

now tied to or confined within the mother state and any other territories that state might

control by virtue of war or economic domination. In other words, it is now the case that,

the Multinational corporation and the transnational terrorist network both utilize the existing global economic, transportation and communication systems to organize and manage far-flung subsidiaries and to move funds, men, and material from one location to another” (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 97).

When confronted with a challenge, this more ‘organic’ form of organisation that is

“networked, though still stratified” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001a, 7) is thought “more

suited to dealing with rapidly changing conditions and unforeseen contingencies” (ibid.,

7). From terrorist groups to drug cartels to pro-democracy civil society actors, the trend

within globalisation is seemingly towards “network forms of organization, doctrine,

strategy, and technology” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, Preface, v).

It is the aim of this research project to investigate the network phenomena as it pertains

to covert, insurgent groups. It argues that while there are many references both in the

media and in academic circles concerning the emergence of new transnational network

structures across various organisations and activities both overt and covert, and

seemingly universal agreement that we are experiencing on many levels a challenge to

hierarchical forms of organisation, communication and transaction by these new

networked organisational forms, there has been insufficient empirical analysis regarding

6

these issues within the security field, particularly in relation to contemporary insurgent

groups outside or on the periphery of the al Qaeda sphere of activity.

There are many hundreds of groups by this definition active in the world today, a

number far too great to explore adequately within the confines of this brief research

project. It can be argued, however, that through interrogating a limited yet varied

selection of groups in this instance, evidence can be gathered that will either justify or

diminish the argument that a more in-depth study would be worth undertaking in the

future. The purpose, therefore, of constructing this model is twofold: to facilitate greater

understanding of how some insurgent groups may have organised and positioned

themselves to act or interact in the current world environment, and to explore the

contribution that network analysis – primarily organisational network analysis - may be

able to offer security studies to the study of intra- and inter-group functionality. This

study is therefore premised upon the belief that there is value in exploring both the

internal organisational structures of insurgent groups as well as looking for the

existence and nature of alliances formed between such groups.

It is first necessary to scope the universe of currently active irregular groups in order to

select a number of different case study examples, and highlight a number of candidates

for analysis from this extensive pool of organisations. In selecting the case study

groups, no account has deliberately been taken of any previous determination that may

have been given them regarding their supposed domestic or transnational status (more

about this in the research design and methodology section to follow). Additionally,

largely due to the vast amount of coverage already allocated to al Qaeda both in the

media and in professional journals, some reverse selection bias must be acknowledged

in that al Qaeda has been deliberately excluded as a case study subject in this instance –

although this action does not necessarily mean that the organisation will not have a

presence within one or more of the six mapping scenarios as an associated group, or that

organisational themes pertaining to this group specifically will not be addressed when

discussing the structures of other groups or networks.

It will be the goal of this study to discover to what extent this is the case by

interrogating a small number of case study analyses furnished by information that is

7

available in the public domain, with the assistance of network analysis tools and graphic

models.

It is also necessary to stress that this study will focus primarily upon the structures and

relationships associated with the covert groups chosen for the case studies rather than,

for example, dwelling upon group ideology past its influence upon group structure and

process, or the nature of the violent and non-violent activities perpetrated by these

groups – for example, whether a certain act can be described as ‘terroristic’ by whatever

definition has been given to this much-disputed subject. Information of this type will

only be included if it serves a useful purpose in either describing the organisation or

illustrating an observation that relates to organisational structure and process.

In order to draw a conclusion as to the scale and form of any networked alliances

identified (assuming that these networks prove to be the reality – there are those who

argue that recent discourse regarding terrorist network phenomena is a blind acceptance

of an homogenising framework that through repetition and lazy thinking has been

accepted as the rule rather than the exceptionxx), the findings will be expressed through

the actual graphic mapping of organisational relationship models based around the case

study groups selected. This decision was made because it was felt important to offer the

reader a visual display that synthesises the disparate material that is often utilised in the

exploration of the components of a network. These visual representations of

organisational interconnectivity will seek to identify as much as is possible both the

breadth and nature of a group’s internal structures and inter-group alliances where

possible.

This study has been divided into three distinct sections. This first chapter serves to not

only introduce the background and motivation for this research project in general terms,

but also provides overall context to the study through the inclusion of a number of

varied but complementary sections that together set the scene for the case study exercise

in Chapter Two. In the sections below, the general theory and process behind network

analysis will be introduced. This will be followed by a literature review section that will

provide comprehensive backgrounding in the form of three separate literature reviews

of material pertinent to this subject, namely what can be generally referred to as the

literatures of terrorism, global civil society, and network analysis pertaining to covert

8

groups. The final part of Chapter One will be an explanation of the methodology used in

this study, which is a synthesis of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Chapter Two will focus solely on the case studies. Six insurgent groups will be

researched qualitatively and the findings presented in written and graphic form. The

groups that will be examined are Abu Sayyaf (AS) – Philippines; the Communist Party

of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) – India; the Kurdistan Workers’ Party - recently renamed

as Kongra-Gel (PKK) - Turkey; Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) – Pakistan; the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – Sri Lanka; and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

(FARC) – Colombia. All but one of these groups (CPI-Maoist) have been designated as

‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ by the US Congress, although this group is a very new

entity whose origins will be explained in the case study discussion, and whose

constituent groups were outlawed in India under their 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act

(POTA).

The final section of this study, Chapter Three, will be a comprehensive and expansive

discussion based upon the observations and analysis undertaken in the study. As well as

discussing the findings, there will be a section in this chapter that examines the value of

potential future research as an outcome of this study.

Before embarking on an exploration of what constitutes network analysis, however, it is

first necessary to define and explain the reasoning behind a key term utilised within this

study. The term ‘insurgent group’ has been chosen in this study over other possibilities

such as ‘terrorist group’ or ‘irregular group’ due to the fact that although insurgency

involves armed struggle, the “combination of guerrilla action, propaganda, subversion,

and political motivation” (Beckett 1999: xiii) that is associated with insurgency

provides a more expansive framework of analysis.

In other words, it could be argued that a drug cartel may have the resources to fight

unconventionally, or to use terror tactics to further its agenda, but it would be hard to

argue that a predominantly criminal gang is motivated by any strong political ideology

around which the group has built itself. Similarly, labelling a group as terrorist also has

the effect of denying any political or social structures that group has constructed. Since

terrorism is merely one tactic within an unconventional arsenal of tactics open to a wide

9

variety of agents (be they insurgent group, state or cult) – and not a strategy – it would

also be overly simplistic and even misleading to use this term, popular though it now is.

This research project thus sets out to further the understanding of covert networks of

insurgent groups in the current world environment.

APPROACHES TO NETWORK ANALYSIS

AN OVERVIEW OF NETWORK ANALYSIS

Networks, and the systematic examination of their properties both by academics and

business analysts, are not a new phenomenon. Since Moreno published his sociogram in

1953 - a model depicting the interpersonal dynamics of small groups - there has been

considerable progress made in the development of sociometry and social network

analysis as a research tool in the social sciences from a number of different perspectives

– particularly during the last fifteen years .xxi

The decades that followed the publication of Moreno’s model saw the rapid

development of technology that in many ways transformed the world. One of the key

drivers of this transformation was the creation in the 1960s of what was later to become

known as the internet. Developed in a Cold War setting by the US Defense Department

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initially as a means to counter

conventional communication breakdown in the US as a result of Soviet nuclear

bombardment, Castells offers the analogy that “To some extent, it was the electronic

equivalent of the Maoist tactics of dispersal of guerrilla forces around a vast territory to

counter an enemy’s might with versatility and knowledge of terrain” (2000, 6).

Castells argues that this new technological paradigm underpins our new “informational

society” (ibid., 61) due to its having the following five characteristics: namely that

“information is its raw material” (ibid.); its pervasive effects upon human activity; its

networking logic which is inclined towards increasing complexity and “unpredictable

patterns of development” (ibid.); its flexibility in that it shows that organisations can be

10

modified or altered by the rearrangement their components; and its propensity towards

technological convergence where hitherto separate processes such as

telecommunications and computing are becoming more and more integrated. Because of

this, Castells argues “Networks are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations

are and will be made” due to “the informational power provided by the new

technological paradigm” (ibid.,168). Additionally, “Networks are open structures, able

to expand without limits, integrating new nodes as along as they are able to

communicate within the network, namely as long as they share the same communication

codes (for example, values or performance goals)” (ibid., 470).

While the networking process itself has existed for a long time, information technology

is enabling this process to become far more pervasive. Castells (1996) makes the point

that “the power of flows takes precedence over the flows of power. Presence or absence

in the network and the dynamics of each network vis a vis others are critical sources of

domination and change” (ibid., 469) and technological processes are consequently being

reflected through changes in human interaction and forms of organisation.

An aspect of the new changes wrought upon the world by this technological revolution

was the restructuring of capitalist dynamics. The traditional corporation with its vertical

hierarchy began to morph into the horizontal corporation and came to be “characterized

by greater flexibility in management; decentralization and networking of firms both

internally and in their relationships to other firms” (ibid., 1). This is said to facilitate an

improvement in the organisation’s ability to adapt to unpredicted events (ibid., 164). In

other words, the argument is that the information revolution favours networks over

hierarchies – especially all-channel networks where every node is connected to every

other node, creating a fully dynamic multiorganizational structure (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt 2001, 1). Networks are open structures, able to expand without limits. Through

their innate ability to be dynamic and open, they possibly are more able to risk

innovation without threatening the survival of the entire structure. It was the belief that

these new forms of interrelationship could be understood in much the same way as

Moreno’s small group dynamics that fuelled the further development of network

analysis tools. Network analysis has been developed with the surety that it is “an

analytical technique that enables researchers to represent relational data and explore the

nature and properties of those relations ” (Monge and Contractor 2003, 35).

11

Prior to discussing in more specific terms the intricacies of network analysis, it is useful

to offer definitions and explanations of some key concepts and processes used in the

field.

In the abstract, a network “is a set of interconnected nodes” (Castells 1996, 470). A

node is the unit level actor, entity or process being examined, irrespective of the

analytical perspective pursued. Network linkages are produced when nodes are

identified as being connected by one or more ties through some kind of relationship.

The relations - namely the nature of the links, being mapped - are determined in

advance by the researcher. One or more relationship dimensions can be examined

within the same network group, and thus relational approaches are termed as being

either uniplex or multiplex in scope. Additionally, up to five different levels of network

breadth can be interrogated – individual actor, dyad, triad, subgroup and global.

Monge and Contractor (2003) determine three areas of measurement within the network

analysis process. These are the qualities of ties (also called links or arcs),xxii the

measurement and analysis criteria given to individual nodes within a network, and the

measurement tools assigned to measure and describe the network as a whole.

Tie qualities can be measured in turn by whether they are direct or indirect; the

frequency of the connection; its stability over time; the level of multiplexity of the

connection (meaning the number of differing forms of ties that two nodes may share);

tie strength; and directionality – meaning that some inter-nodal ties may be

unidirectional (or asymmetric) while others may show an exchange in both directions

(deemed symmetric) across the same criteria.xxiii

The measurement criteria of these ties between nodes can in turn be measured by some

or all of the following means: degrees – the number of direct connections a node has

with other nodes; betweenness – the extent to which a node mediates between two other

nodes; and closeness – the extent to which a node reaches all other nodes within the

network and can thus monitor flows or transactions.

12

These three readings analysed together give an indication of centrality – the extent to

which a node or actor is central to a network. Taking directionality (asymmetry) into

account, nodes can also sometimes be given a prestige rating based on the flow

direction of the relationship at issue, or a power rating - based on the specific

calculations made from actually merging betweenness and closeness scores. High

centrality scores demonstrate power and influence within a network. As Castells

reiterates, “the network morphology is also a source of dramatic reorganization of

power relationships. Switches connecting the networks … are the privileged instruments

of power. Thus, the switchers are the power holders” (1996, 471).

Finally, the network itself is measured by some or all of the following criteria: size;

connectivity – the extent to which nodes within the network are linked by both direct

and indirect ties; density – comparing the actual number of links within the network to

the potential maximum possible; centralisation – a ratio calculated from identifying the

most central individual node in the network and comparing it to all other nodes’

individual centrality ratings; and symmetry – the ratio of symmetric links to either the

asymmetric links, or the total number of links within a network. Once calculated,

network data is usually represented as either matrices (in this context, often called

sociomatrices) or graphs. xxiv

Practitioners of network analysis identify three forms of network: grid-based; social;

and organisational. xxvOf interest in this study are the latter two forms, particularly the

organisational. But it is still worthwhile to describe the basics of social network analysis

in order to facilitate better comprehension of the organisational-level analysis approach.

Social network analysis is premised on the belief that all social relationships exist

within some kind of network, irrespective of whether the unit actors are conscious of

this or not. This approach allows for the construction of relationship models around

‘passive’ units as well as consciously participative actors, and through the belief in the

structural inevitability of activity social network analysis techniques have interestingly

also been used to map such events as patterns of disease spread through populations.

Social network analysts also believe that relationships between nodes in a study can

usually be categorised into one of the following typologies: the chain or line model,

13

where end-to-end communication between actors, or nodes, must travel through the

intermediate nodes; the hub, star, or wheel model, where a set of separate actors are tied

to a central actor and must go through that node to communicate with one of the other

actors; and the all-channel or full matrix model, where every actor is connected to every

other actor, and where the opportunity for collaboration is greatest.xxvi In addition to

these three main typologies, a number of others have also been identified, namely the

lattice; centre-periphery; clique; hybrid; and embedded models.

Additionally, attributes of interest to the network analyst include nodes that are

boundary spanners (that is, that take advantage of ‘structural holes’ in the network) –

nodes whose position in a network creates the only link between two groups (or sets of

groups); and peripheral players – nodes who are situated in an outlaying position on a

network graph but may themselves be boundary spanners between the network being

studied and other as yet unexplored networks.

This approach stresses the importance of location (is it an actor’s centrality or their

peripheral placement that renders them more powerful?); the types of linkages between

actors; and issues of reciprocity. It also tends to focus on the micro aspects of

relationships such as the formation of dyads, triads and small subgroups.xxvii Social

network analysts tend towards mathematical modelling which is often hard for the

layperson to comprehend, and is one of the motivating factors behind this project in its

drive to create a visual model that is immediately comprehensible and not obstructed by

algorithmic representation.

Organisational network analysis, an approach generated primarily by organisational and

economic sociologists, takes a crucially different approach – focusing on self-conscious

intent and participation in network formation. To the organisational network analyst, a

functioning network requires two fundamental attributes – connectedness (the structural

ability for nodes to clearly communicate with each other); and consistency (with respect

to the degree of shared goals).

Each node within a system could be an individual, group, organisation, or part of an

organisation or state for example. The ‘division of labour’ within a network may be

14

segmentary or specialized, meaning that all nodes may either look alike and do similar

things, or independently specialise.

Organisational network analysis also allows for components of networks to be both

autonomous and dependent vis a vis the network. Additionally, some actors may also be

a part of other networks, and therefore of other systems of means aspiring towards other

goals.

An organisation has been defined by network practitioners as “a system of means

structured around the purpose of achieving specific goals.” (Castells 1996, 171). He

identifies two types of organisational forms, “organizations for which the reproduction

of their system of means becomes their main organizational goal; and organizations in

which goals, and the change of goals, shape and endlessly reshape the structure of

means” (ibid., 171). In other words, the former is describing a bureaucracy, and the

latter an enterprise.

Regarding relationship typologies, while organisational network analysts acknowledge

the same structural forms as do social network analysts, proponents such as Ronfeldt

and Arquilla (2001a; 2001b) argue that the boundaries of organisational networks may

be either well defined or blurred, and often can be typological hybrids – for example, a

network may consist of an all-channel directorate at core that controls a hub

configuration for specialised tasks. They also acknowledge that some or all individual

nodes within networks may themselves individually be organised via a combination of

hierarchy and network form. Regarding issues of leadership within a network, its

organisation may appear leaderless (acaphelous), or hydra-headed (polycephalous).xxviii

Castells offers a supplementary way of categorising forms of organisational

functionality. He distinguishes between two models, namely “the multidirectionality

inherent in networks of small and medium businesses, and secondly, the licencing or

subcontracting model under an umbrella corporation” (1996, 160 – italics in original

text) which like Ronfeldt and Arquilla’s hybrid still allows for a combination vertical

and horizontal management structure based on set of core-periphery relationships.

15

While this section has been included to provide a brief overview of network analysis

and its processes in order to establish some backgrounding to an important part of the

particular methodological process undertaken in this study, it is also worthwhile to

summarise Monge and Contractor’s (2003) own brief literature review regarding the

state of the discipline, as they make some important points that have been taken on

board in this current study. Monge and Contractor (1996, Preface, xii – xiii) make five

observations of note. First, they argue that too few studies to date have utilised theories

in their construction of research hypotheses, and when they do, the tendency has only

been to apply single theories. Secondly, most research has focused itself at the

individual or dyad level, ignoring multiple level network analysis such as either

examining a network’s multiple levels at a single point in time, or taking into account a

network’s historicity, or ignoring other networks to which the focal network relates.

Thirdly, they argue that network analysis processes need to integrate theories of

complexity, chaos and catastrophe into their machinations. Fourthly, they criticise the

static cross-sectionality of most network analysis projects at the expense of developing

more “dynamic simulations of network evolution” (ibid., xiii). Lastly, they stress the

importance of empirically testing hypotheses through computer modelling. In response

to their observations, the authors have developed a multitheoretical approach that they

argue would “compare and integrate diverse theories and increase the explanatory

power of research efforts” (Ibid., xii).

While the above introduction to network analysis is sufficient to provide a framework

from which to comprehend the quantitative qualities of the research undertaken in this

project, there is still one sub-field of network analysis that deserves investigation due to

its direct applicability to the work undertaken: the concept of “netwar” (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt 2001a; 2001b).

NETWAR

The concept of netwar presents “an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal

levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms

of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the

16

information age” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001a, 4). This is a social concept that seems

to have parallels with the military concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), where

because of asymmetric weakness, insurgents choose to take the battle around (rather

than through) their enemy’s forces, blurring the distinctions between what is war and

peace, battlefields and civil space, civilian and military.

Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2001a; 2001b) argue that the majority of these netwar actors will

be non-state, and even stateless; they may be sub-national or transnational. Some of

these actors may be agents of a state (‘war’ by proxy), and some in turn may try to turn

states into their agents.

Often, actors within this netwar model will share similar principles, goals, or ideologies,

facilitating “a central ideational and operational coherence that allows for tactical

decentralization” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 9). While technical sophistication

especially in the area of communications is important, what is of greater value is social

cohesion and trust within the structure, an attribute that is often based upon long-

established ethnic or kinship ties and that makes a group, and hence the network, far

more difficult to undermine. The emphasis here is on culture over technology.

Ronfeldt and Arquilla argue that odd hybrids and symbioses are likely to evolve. For

example, a network may consist of an all-channel directorate at its core, but with a hub

or chain organisational structure at a lower level for tactical operations. Alternatively,

groups could function as a hybrid of both hierarchy and network for maximum

efficiency.

As well as networks being constructed around long-term strategic goals, they can also

be tactical – where for instance groups choose to band together, perhaps only

temporarily – for the coordination of a specific activity. The actors, or nodes, in this

case being insurgents and criminals (along with civil society activists) structure

themselves and their actions in ways that seek to challenge, undermine or destroy other

actors such as rival groups, corporates or governments.

Ronfeldt and Arquilla suggest five levels of analysis for organisational networks – the

structure of the organisation, the narrative that sustains its identity and values, its

17

structural and functional doctrine of practice, the efficiency of its technological and

communication systems, and the quality of interpersonal trust shared between individual

group members (2001a, 10-21). Elements of these suggestions have been taken into

account in the description of group attributes included in Chapter Two of this study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The first of the literatures to be examined is that which deals specifically with insurgent

and terrorist phenomena. This particular body of literature will be appraised first due to

the fact that it focuses directly and specifically on insurgent groups from a number of

different perspectives, and is the largest body of work to be critiqued.

There has been a post-September 11 boom in the literature on terrorism with an al

Qaeda focus, and a plethora of books and articles of varying quality have swamped both

the public and academic communities. This literature review will of course take account

of many of these newer works to the degree that they tackle issues of organisational

structure both internal and external, but will also pay due attention to many works

published earlier, including a number of books that date back to the 1970s. The

rationale behind this approach is that like most consumables, publishing houses and

academic journals respond to general trends of customer interest and demand, and the

literature on insurgency and terrorism is not immune to the forces of fashion. A second

reason for including older works that may for example include case study analyses of

groups no longer in existence, is that it is useful to identify what aspects of the subject

these works saw as being important in previous times. Thirdly, a number of the case

study groups in this research project have their origins in the 1960s, and so it makes

sense to include works that were written often with these groups in mind. Lastly and

most importantly, it is useful in exploring a selection of works produced over the last 30

or 40 years in order to determine whether any changes have taken place concerning the

nature of what issues and factors are deemed worth emphasis within the discipline. This

process will take place through the identification of any changes – omissions, additions

18

or re-conceptualisations – in the terminology utilised across all this literature regarding

both intra-group or inter-group organisational dynamics, and insurgent group

typologies.

It will also be noticeable that for the first time the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ will

be frequently referred to in this study. As this is a review and critique of expert

observation and opinion on the subject of covert insurgent groups and how they operate,

it would be inappropriate to not integrate the terminology these authors have chosen

themselves to use to describe their subject matter – and in most instances references

have been frequently made in the works discussed to the terrorist phenomenon. This

review will honour these authors’ choice of terminology.

The last point to make here is that as this study is focused specifically upon

organisational structures, and in particular the possible evolution of insurgent networks,

this literature review is naturally selective in the material chosen from the publications

to reflect these processes. In other words, interesting material concerning, for example,

the specifics of high profile attacks or kidnapping operations has in most cases not been

included due to their lack of relevance to the current discussion. Regarding the factors

that will be examined, the review process will in general terms begin with an overview

of the literatures’ appreciation of the immediate ‘big picture’ issues such as networks

and transnationalism, and gradually hone down its focus from the inter-group level, to

intra-group functionality, to the appreciation of basic characteristics of analysis.

Regarding literature selection, it is also worth noting that there will be a number of

works referenced in the case study chapter that will not appear in the review below. The

rationale for this omission is that the majority of these works are not analytical, but

rather supply factual information about the specific groups being studied and so would

offer very little to a thematic exploration of the subject matter. Additionally, it is a goal

of this study to minimise repetition, so the internal default logic of this study is in

favour of the case study chapter as it is this portion of the research project that the entire

work revolves around and supports.

19

THE LITERATURE OF TERRORISM STUDIES

It is certainly the case that the more recent the literature, the greater mention there is of

network forms of organisation (exceptions being Kegley 2003; Pearlstein 2004). Books

and articles concerning al Qaeda that were published post-September 11 (Farley 2003;

Gunaratna 2002; Kegley 2003; Napoleoni 2004; Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vralsted

2004; Pearlstein 2004; Sageman 2004; Schweitzer & Shay 2003; Smith and Weeding

2003; Stern 2003; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002) all naturally make reference to this high-

profile group’s network form, but to varying degrees of appreciation and complexity.

While some of these publications (Gunaratna 2004; Napoleoni 2004) show a

commendable appreciation and make a good attempt to describe the al Qaeda network

structure in some detail regarding its organisational motivations and internal processes,

others seem content merely to make reference to the issue while offering the reader little

or no definitional explanations whatsoever (Schweitzer & Shay 2003; Pearlstein 2004;

Kegley 2003; Nyatepe-Coo and Zuisler-Vralsted 2004; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002),

while at the same time stressing the important implications of this (largely unexplained)

new organisational form, and which at least one work ties to the globalisation process

(Schweitzer & Shay 2003). A key criterion for measuring the quality of any work is

through its attention to defining the key issues within its area of interest; lack of

adherence to this basic criterial requirement is highly disappointing.

When it comes to the usage of network terminology, and the appreciation of different

forms of networked agency, the pool of literature is even further diminished. For

example, while Gunaratna (2002, 97) shows some familiarity with network dynamics

and makes reference to such factors as cells and cellular regeneration (as an interesting

cultural and metaphorical aside, he informs the reader that the Egyptian world for cells

in this context is ‘anquds’ – a bunch of grapes – when picked, its loss would not impact

the other bunches), the division of labour within al Qaeda, and associate groups that

feed into al Qaeda’s internal network, he nonetheless appears vague and almost

contradictory at times – for example when he describes al Qaeda’s network as being

based around a cellular (cluster) model, when previously he had determined the group

as been organised into four distinct entities, one of them being a pyramidic strategic and

tactical centre of command. Sageman (2004) should also be singled out as a work that

talks specifically to the issue of terrorist networks – although its title is rather

20

misleading in that it is not a generic study of this phenomenon but rather an exploration

of what he terms the “global Salafi jihad” (Preface,VII) from a socio-historical

perspective. His work focuses on possible individual and group motivations and

dynamics, but nonetheless is supported by an appreciation of social network analysis.

Interestingly, in a reported interview, Sageman also referred to al Qaeda as a movement

(Wright 2004). Zanini (Jones 2004) on the other hand shows a commendable

appreciation of network definition. Perhaps influenced by his information technology

background, Zanini is successful in blending the theoretical dimensions of network

process and analysis within his discussion concerning traditional and modern

representations of organisational form. He also refers to a wide number of groups to

illustrate his points, and shows familiarity with the netwar concept discussed earlier in

this chapter, one that will be revisited again later in this review. Taking a different

approach, Stern (2003) likens the running of a terrorist network to that of running a

traditionally-conceived non-governmental organisation (NGO). She expands the

concept by arguing that like with an NGO, the mission is not static, funding sources are

important, the terrorist group is out to sell a ‘product’ and operates on a cost-benefit

approach, specialisation is encouraged, and that each group is in effect competing with

similar others for ‘market share ’(2003, 142). Stern also shows herself as being aware of

the network theory and the netwar concept (one chapter of this work is devoted to

networks), and she criticises one aspect of it in her work, namely swarm theory.

In contrast, works whose publication years pre-date the September 11 attacks

(Alexander & Swetnam 2001; Bodansky 2001; Hanle 1989; Harmon 2000; Hoffman

1998) offer the reader a different emphasis and choice of terminologies when it comes

to the network phenomenon. While Alexander and Swetnam’s work describes al Qaeda

as “a truly international network with links in some 55 countries” (2001, 31) and Prabha

(2001) takes a brief look at the networked organisation of a selection of groups that pose

a threat to Indian security, none of the other works make detailed references to networks

at all. While one of the pre-September 11 books on al Qaeda (Bodansky 2001, 51) does

make passing reference to networks when describing the type of organisation bin Laden

was building, no explicit emphasis was placed upon this term, with the alternate term

“movement” (ibid.,. 15) being given equal emphasis. What is also interesting about

Bodansky’s book is that even though it represents itself as a study of bin Laden himself,

great attention is actually given to the vital role of agencies, especially state agencies,

21

that have supported and guided him towards constructing the type of organisation al

Qaeda is today, particularly the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). In

representing bin Laden and his followers as one piece of an intricate jigsaw, and not

even using the al Qaeda name, content and context in this work varies considerably

from later works with its more holistic appreciation of agency. It could be argued that

this was the case because networks did not exist before the 1990s and these books

reflected the organisational realities of the time. But as this study’s introduction

demonstrates, there were attempts being made by many insurgent groups to forge

alliances even back in the 1960s, which begs the question: what really is the difference

between a series of alliances and a network? Granted, it can be argued that there is a

distinction between a networked internal organisation of a single group such as al

Qaeda, and the type of external alliances these aforementioned groups were trying to

establish with each other. But when the literature on al Qaeda fails often to convince the

reader (though not always – see Stern 2003 for example) that it understands and can

differentiate between what parts of the ‘al Qaeda network’ belong to al Qaeda and what

belong to the umbrella group IIF of which al Qaeda is a member, then this criticism is

still a moot point.

Thus, what this review identifies is that many, particularly early, works do indeed pay

attention to internal and external organisational structures that could in turn have been

identified as networks if the term was in more common usage at that time.

Some other works talk specifically to alliances and inter-group transactions, but do not

present this information within a network framework (Cronin 2002; Kartha 2000). One

work (Pearlstein 2004) approaches the issue by marrying terrorism, international

relations theory and globalisation. In this work Pearlstein classifies terrorist groups with

three distinct typologies, namely first, second, and third generation terrorist

organisations (2004, 3), defining the new global system he sees emerging as “polyplex

…a global system in which many global actors, and many types of global actors,

interact tightly in an exceedingly difficult, unruly, congested, shrinking, nonpolar, and

swiftly evolving world” (ibid., 12 - italics in original). Something to keep in mind,

however, is Pearlstein’s insistence that new transnational terrorist organisations are self-

sufficient inasmuch as they are not state-funded, pursue their own interests

transnationally, and lack sovereign territory. Other commentators (for example,

22

Bodansky 2001) would probably beg to differ regarding the first two points in

particular.

There is also a selection of recent books that offer a detailed historical overview or

analysis of a particular situation or issue (Ali 2002; Bergen 2001; Napoleoni 2004;

Stern 2003). While these books do not identify themselves as offering commentary on

the network phenomenon per se, they succeed in very detailed ways in describing the

intricacies of network links and flows – in addition to supplying some important data to

a number of the case study events. All three are quality works, well researched and well

presented. Bergen (2001) writes a rather informal account of the history of bin Laden,

Ali (2002) offers the reader insight and context regarding the evolution of Islamic

fundamentalism, while Napoleoni (2004) examines the networks of covert money flows

and how these intersect with and support contemporary terrorist groups. Stern (2003) in

turn looks at the motivations behind religious terrorists and how these are utilised by

varying insurgent groups from the small-scale to the fully transnational.

A key term utilised in earlier works that points to external networking practices under

another name is ‘internationalism’. A few of the authors (Harmon 2001; Lacquer 2004)

write extensively around this term, with Lacquer noting a marked evolution in the

internationalism of terrorist groups in the 1960s and 1970s, through the increases in the

use of foreign nationals, the creation of ad hoc special-purpose organisations, and ‘third

country operations’. Harmon (2001) reminds us that traditional socialist or Marxist-

Leninist groups have always displayed an inherent internationalism, citing the IRA, and

Sendero Luminoso’s association with the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement

(RIM), as examples of this (2001, 86). He argues that other international links forged

are due to cultural similarities, such as ETA’s links with groups in Latin and Central

America, and Cuba.

As mentioned in the introduction, some authors (for example, Harmon 2001) have noted

that some groups began to make links and set up truces with other groups whose central

ideologies they opposed or whose specific goals they had no direct interest in (Karmon

2000). It appeared to be the case that consensus regarding a common enemy became a

more important factor than the myriad differences between them. Other works also hint

at this (Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vralsted 2004) in their assertions that, for example, al

23

Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah may be working together, that Hezbollah has formed a

“strange fellowship with drug smugglers in the tri-border area of South America –

Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay” (2004, 59) and through the assertion that “In recent

years, increased communication and coalition building among groups that previously

operated independently have occurred” (ibid., 51). These types of alliance should

perhaps be described as tactical alliances. Alliances identified as more strategic are also

explicitly identified in some of the literature (Gunaratna 2002), although it is argued

that operations are planned so that al Qaeda attacks strategic targets, and its associate

groups attack tactical targets. Whether this is true or not remains to be examined, but

this theory seems to be flawed inasmuch as it does not take into account the importance

of the other IIF co-founders and the status of particular individuals within these other

organisations such as Zawahiri.

When discussing the role of the state in the activities of terrorist groups, a number of

works address this issue (Chellaney 2001; Gunaratna 2002; Harmon 2001; Hoffman

1998; Nyatepe-Coo & Zeisler-Vralsted 2004; Quillen 2000; Shahar 2000; Simonsen and

Spindlove 2004; Stern 2003;; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Winchell 2003), sometimes

through case study analyses. As mentioned earlier, Harmon notes the assistance the East

German Stasi offered to West German right wing groups, and Takeyh & Gvosdev argue

the point that global terrorist networks need failed states within which to base

themselves. They also make reference to Guillermo O’Donnell’s “brown zones”xxix that

can be located within Western societies - areas where state governments are reluctant to

intervene for domestic political reasons. This raises the possibility of an expanded

concept of ‘brown banks’ and ‘brown places of worship’ – concepts not explored in any

of the works explored in this review but that may be worth pursuing in another study.

Some assumptions behind assertions made, however, are questionable. For example,

Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) argue that global terrorist organisations need failed states

from which to manage their operations. This prompts the question: what then of al

Qaeda in a post-US invasion of Afghanistan world? If it has shifted major figures of its

management structure into Pakistan or Iran as some have argued, then are these failed

states in some way? And was a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan a less legitimate state than its

current Kabul-entrenched successor regime? Of course Takeyh and Gvosdev may be

proven correct instead by the dissipation of al Qaeda’s threat perception and capability

over time, due to the lack of a safe haven as they have argued.

24

There was a noticeable tendency within the earlier literature to both mention and

explore in greater detail the commonalities of organisational design across leftist

insurgent groups (Lacquer ?; Harmon 1998; Hoffman 1997), although this aspect is still

noted at least in passing by later authors (Schweitzer & Shay 2003; Jones 2004;

Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vralsted 2004; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). For example,

Lacquer (2004) and Harmon (2000) stress the tendency of leftist organisations to have a

strong central command structure with strong leadership – although Lacquer makes the

point that the best system probably involves some kind of strategic centralisation and

tactical decentralisation so that local membership can plan operations taking local

conditions into account. Harmon also remarks that some organisations have over time

lost their revolutionary purity, and cites FARC as an example of this– although others

(Ortiz 2002) would dispute this as a rather simplistic analysis of this group’s evolution,

instead arguing that FARC is merely responding creatively to changing domestic and

international conditions. Harmon (2000) also reminds us that cell-based structures date

back to at least the early Bolshevik days, and were also utilised by various resistance

movements during World War Two.

As far as non-ideologically situated descriptions of groups’ internal structures are

concerned, almost all (with the exception of Pearlstein for example) the literature

attempts to tackle this important matter to varying degrees of accuracy and specificity.

Many authors identified the differences between hierarchical and less centralised

leadership structures across groups (Alexander & Swetnam 2001; Drake 1996; Hanle

1989; Harmon 2000; Lacquer 2004; Gunaratna 2002; Jones 2004; Kedgley 2003;

Nyateoe-Coo and Zeisler-Vralsted 2004; Takeyh and Gvosdev ) and the differing

effects on process and potential efficacy these structures may provoke in relation to

their tasks (Moghadam 2003), sometimes within a case study-based analytical

framework (Cragin & Daly 2004).

Drake (1996) differentiated between hierarchical groups with a strong leadership core

that tended towards bureaucratic management styles, groups where the membership

enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, and groups that operated under an umbrella

organisation. Interestingly, he makes the unique observation in discussing Italy’s now-

defunct Red Brigades,xxx stating that while it was definitely an example of an

25

hierarchical group, many of its decisions came from its lower ranks, with the

implication that even hierarchies can have dual-directional flows of power and

influence. He also discusses the existence of diffuse networked groups such as the

United Kingdom’s Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Germany’s Revolutionary Cells,

where cells were completely self-contained and rarely interacted. These groups were

able to sustain this type of structure, which could be described as more of a movement,

due to the clear identification of what was the ‘enemy’ and what were the group’s (or

movement’s) long-term strategic goals. This approach would also assure the overall

security of the group, because if one cell was discovered, in addition to it being

unwilling to divulge intelligence regarding the group as a whole, it would also be unable

to do so. This type of group structure has interesting overlaps with some descriptions of

larger transnational or regional groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas regarding how they

manage their operations – although Drake also makes the point that with this level of

diffusion there is little opportunity for larger, coordinated actions that might have

greater impact. Thus Drake (1996) concludes that there is an intrinsic tension between

the need for centralised control, and the safety of decentralisation.

In a similar vein, while Harmon (2000) describes cells as being embedded within a

hierarchy where direction comes from a single point of contact above, and where cell

members may not in fact know some or all of their fellow cell members. He also makes

the point that cells may act in ignorance of the strategic purpose of the action, or may

not even know all the details even from a tactical perspective (that is, individuals in

cells may only receive information on a need-to-know basis). In a similar vein, Stern

educates us about such structures as ‘leaderless resistance’ – a structure usually

associated with right wing groups, which she also describes as “virtual networks”

(2003, 151), lone wolves, and “terrorist armies” which she also terms “commander-

cadre organizations” (ibid., 141), freelancers (she is one of the few to acknowledge the

role of freelancers) and “franchises” (ibid., 144).

Regarding organisational descriptions of al Qaeda, most of the recent literature (Gueli

2003; Gunaratna 2002; Smith 2002) is congruent regarding this issue. All authors agree

that Al Qaeda is built around a central command structure consisting of an oversight

committee (in this case, the majlis al shura), a military committee, business committee,

religious office, media committee and travel office – a vertical hierarchy – supported by

26

a more informal horizontal support and operations structure. Some authors (Gunaratna

2002) also make the point that this structure was borrowed from the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood movement. What is interesting, however, about this description is that it

very closely resembles the central management structures of most Marxist-Leninist

organisations among others, which generally consist of a politburo to guide a military

command structure (normally divided by geographic zone), and an important

propaganda office. Is it possible that modern fundmentalist insurgent groups have taken

on board the kind of organisational structures that were hitherto the domain of

established Marxist-Leninist or Maoist groups? Gunaratna quotes the now-deceased al

Qaeda co-founder Abdullah Azzam describing al Qaeda as being the “pious group and

pioneering vanguard” (2002, 4). Additionally, an article supposedly written by a key al

Qaeda strategist in 2002 acknowledges detailed familiarity with the great military

theorists. In excerpts from the article, Abu ‘Ubeid Al-Qurashi states “In addition to the

religious obligation – become an integral part of the means to triumph in fourth-

generation warfare. Old soldiers such as von Clausewitz and Mao Zedong, have

already indicated this.” (The Middle East Media Research Institute 2002)xxxi. This article

also frankly outlines al Qaeda’s supposed combat doctrine, and shows appreciation of

other military concepts such as preventive deterrence.

Countering literature that displays often almost a tacit abstract appreciation of the al

Qaeda organisational threat, is a small body of work that is not so impressed by its

supposed organisational successes (Marquardt 2003) and supposed all-channel network

structure (McAllister 2004), or the network structures of other groups. Marquardt

criticises the US for tending to blame all Islamic-driven attacks on al Qaeda, arguing

that there are many different types of groups that pose a threat to the US, and that an

over-obsession with this one group leaves the state vulnerable to attack from others.

McAllister’s (2004) analysis criticises the supposed objective facts of al Qaeda’s

networked capacity, and is reassuring in that it dares to reinterpret the same information

used by other commentators along with network theorists in a critical and logical way.

Another work (Raufer 2003) re-examines the al Qaeda threat from a number of different

standpoints, highlighting some possible contradictions of network structure and

functionality, and challenging the assumptions made about the destructive inclinations

of Salafists. Gunaratna (2002) also seems to be downplaying al Qaeda’s ongoing

destructive capabilities in a recent work.

27

One of the earlier books is largely written on the tactical role of terrorism from a

theoretical military perspective. Hanle (1989) appears to have taken a unique approach

when compared to other commentators who on the whole do not display a familiarity

with military processes. Tackling issues such as Clausewitz’s second great principle of

war – “the center of gravity” (1989, 187) he applies these theories to the subject of

insurgent agency and terrorism, showing an appreciation in the process for not only the

military aspects of any insurgency, but also its social dimensions. This holistic

appreciation of the process and practice of unconventional warfare in many ways

displays a deeper appreciation than in many works of the non-military means by which

wars can be fought. One would have thought that the appreciation of cultural factors and

the human psyche would be more prominent within non-military focused case studies,

but it seems the reverse is the case.

The depth of analysis concerning the extent of internal group structures only seems to

surface in case study works built around a particular group (Ortiz 2002; Radu 2001).

This is disappointing, as issues of group structure are important. Instead, most writers

seem to prefer to write descriptive generalisations about the terrorist phenomenon, and

only refer to specific groups in passing to illustrate their points. While thematic

explorations have their usefulness, it seems a pity to sacrifice in-depth research in

favour of grand themes and often vague generalisations. One positive effect of the

almost obsessive focus on al Qaeda in the most recent literature is perhaps that it brings

the focus round to issues concerning the complexity of an individual group, and perhaps

this will now be reflected in other works that may in turn focus their attention upon

other major insurgent groups individually.

In conclusion, while each of the works cited above has a contribution to make to the

overall discourse regarding the terrorist enterprise, only some of the later works attempt

to define what they mean by terrorist networks, while earlier works tend not to use the

term at all, even when what they are describing could be construed as such. While some

works show awareness of network analysis tools, very few have taken the step to start

integrating these processes within their studies.

28

The network concept is not new: it has been at the heart of many of the descriptions of

group alliances and activities since at least the 1970s, but explored with different

terminologies. This begs the question of what are the new dimensions, if any, that the

modern network reflects, apart from the influence of new technological advances in the

form of fast communications, encoding software (such as PGP – pretty good privacy,

and steganography) and global funds transfers.

Additionally, the focus in the literature tends to be either upon individual case study

groups, or addresses the issue from a generalist perspective, with neither approaches

fully exploring issues at the mid range, such as taking a regionalist perspective, that

might include examining the interesting issue of the role of ‘umbrella group’ oversight,

where coordinating groups have been formed to manage communications and joint

projects between groups – usually at the regional level. The only group that really gets

any attention is the PLO, but other ones in existence possibly fall under the radar due to

either their indirect association with acts of violence, or the fact that they are neither

strictly an insurgent group nor a sponsoring state.

It is also disappointing that so little of the literature shows an appreciation of theories of

unconventional warfare, as apart from explaining the possible utility of a particular

guerrilla tactic, some of these theories can facilitate greater understanding of how

organisations may arrange themselves in the pursuit of their goals – the example of Che

Guevara’s foco theory springs to mind here as an example, with the organisational

implications of strategic centralisation and tactical decentralisation.xxxii

It also seems apparent that almost all the analysts are interested in al Qaeda at the

moment, at the expense of most of the myriad groups currently active today. It seems

particularly the case that Islamic groups are receiving far greater attention than, say,

powerful Maoist groups with regional ambitions. Perhaps September 11 coupled with

the end of the Cold War put paid to the notion of the ‘Communist threat,’ at least to

analysts in the Western world.

THE LITERATURE OF NETWORK ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM

29

While aspects of this literature collection obviously have a commonality with that

reviewed above, it has been presented separately within this section due to the fact that

these works are using terrorist groups as a means of exploring the applicability of

network analysis techniques, and it could be argued that the measurement tools utilised

are the subject of these studies, rather than the terrorist groups themselves. These works

will also be explored in more detail than those previously, owing to the fact that they are

few, and because of their immediate relevance to the backgrounding and choice of

research design in this project. Ronfeldt and Arquilla’s (2001) article ‘Networks,

Netwars, and the Fight for the Future’ has not been included in the work to be reviewed,

owing to it being the basis for an earlier sub-section of this Chapter. Another work of

theirs, however, will be included.

Two of the works (Klerks 1999; Krebs 2002) focus their efforts at the individual level,

using social network analysis. Krebs used software tools to retrospectively piece

together published information regarding the links between the September 11 hijackers

and others, acknowledging the likely incompleteness of this information among other

problems. He also chose to grade three tie strengths within this process, depending upon

the length of time and number of transactions shared between any two or more of these

individuals. While noting that his metrics scored Mohammed Atta the highest on some

of the measurements, he acknowledges that these alone do not confirm his leadership

role, and the likelihood that there are other as yet unidentified actors whose addition to

the matrix could change the figures. Lastly, he lists four related areas of focus for future

study at the individual level: trust (from data relating to prior family and social

contacts); task (through interrogating phone records, meeting attendance and suchlike);

money and resources (through examining bank account, credit card and money transfer

records); and strategy and goals (through travel records, web site visits, or possession of

videos). Admitting that this is no simple task for any researcher, he suggests the

compromise approach that intelligence agencies share more information with each

other, and at least pay attention to those individuals who are identified in multiple

different ego-networks.

Klerks’ work actually discusses the application of social network analysis tools to the

identification of criminal networks rather than insurgent ones. Like Krebs, he also

argues for the identification of those individuals who are the connectors between two

30

otherwise separate networks. He also suggests network mapping can help in identifying

other processes, such as recruitment flows. And again like Krebs, he suggests that only

networked law enforcement agencies can undermine networked criminality.

Another paper (Rothenberg 2002) takes a more general exploratory approach. While

identifying individual roles within groups – “planners and doers” (ibid., 37) –

Rothenberg also acknowledges the existence of more traditional command hierarchies

at least at the strategic level. While noting that many organisational issues are still

unanswered, he posits a number of grand hypotheses that need future exploration and

that are relevant to this research project, such as “The entire global network is a

connected component” and “The network is redundant on every level” (2002, 38) – in

other words, that individual actors can reach each other by a number of different routes

so that if one path is removed, the ‘message’ makes it to the recipient by an alternative

means, or that it is managed so that the removal of a leader among leaders has little

impact.

There is only one work to date that talks to issues at the organisational level (Fellman

and Wright 2002). While this work is largely a general exploration of what network

theory offers the analyst, along with a summary of Kreb’s research at the level of

individual links mentioned above, it also acknowledges the importance of group-level

dynamics within terrorist groups, taking into account a number of theories of social

interaction such as the structural implications of social cohesion and adhesion

processes. The article therefore argues that it is time that security agencies stopped

focusing on individuals and instead attuned their intelligence collection and analysis

systems terrorist groups at “an intermediate or organizational level” (2002, 4).

Finally, one book to date has been published on the subject of the social and

organisational network properties of covert and activist groups (Ronfeldt and Arquilla

2001b), looking at these factors from both issue and case study-based perspectives. For

example, the book’s chapters cover such activities as cyber-activism, the Zapatista

movement, the coordination behind the anti-globalisation protestors in Seattle, and

terrorism. None of these studies, disappointingly, actually tests network analysis

approaches with any kind of data manipulation.

31

In conclusion, it is worth re-emphasising that the scientific mapping of the relationships

within terrorist networks is a very recent phenomenon, with the most interesting and

valuable explorations being produced by social network analysts within the fields of

management, criminal policing and sociology. All these works, however, are brief and

raise more questions than they answer, which is no surprise considering the newness of

the approach.

THE LITERATURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALISATION

This literature has been chosen for brief review due to its focus on the theories and

practices of domestic and transnational activist civil society groups that are said to be

challenging the dominance of nation states. Books and articles within this genre tend to

associate themselves with one of two related terminology-based conceptions, global

civil society (Cox 1999; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Smith 1998), or social movements

(Brecher 2000; Cohen & Rai 2000; Khagram et al 2002; Goodwin and Jasper 2003;

Mertes 2004), or both (Kaldor 1999; Kaldor 2003; Josselin & Wallace ?).

Enthusiasts of global civil society celebrate that ‘people-power’ is constructing new

“networks, knowledges and practices that entail a reshaping of the political architecture

of international relations” (Pasha and Blaney 1998, 418), or at least have the potential,

others argue, to challenge the current state system politically, economically or socially

(Held & McGrew, 220).

Some (like Keck & Sikkink 1998) focus positively on the networking capacity of non-

state actors such as human rights, environmental, and anti-violence groups, describing

these “transnational advocacy movements” (ibid., 1) as networked, which they in turn

define as “forms of organisation characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal

patterns of communication and exchange” (ibid., 8). These organisations “share values

and frequently exchange information and services” (ibid., 9) through “fluid and open

relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue

32

areas” (ibid.,.8). Keck and Sikkink argue that these networks are not powerful in the

traditional sense, so seek to use the power of their information, ideas and strategies to

alter value contexts in the world.

Others (like O’Brien et al 2001), use the study of global social movements as a way to

explore changes in the governance processes of multilateral economic institutions,

therefore drawing attention to the relationship between civil society, macro-economics

and global governance.

Khagram et al (2002) distinguish between three levels of transnational action – network,

coalition and movement (2002, 9) – where the network form, which they say has been

built solely as a communication device, is the simplest of the three. This is an

interesting suggestion, but this working definition of what constitutes a network is

unsubstantiated, and seems to confuse form with function. One work (Brecher et al

2000), when discussing the challenges associated with ‘globalisation from below’

instead defines a movement as a “network of networks” (ibid., 89), and argues that

networks facilitate the flow of both human and material resources. Yet another (Mertes

2004) takes this imagery even further with its very title, ‘A Movement of Movements’ –

only to be countered by an alternate approach (Goodwin and Jasper 2003) which tears

the tiers back down again with differentiations between social movements,

revolutionary social movements and radical social movements. While the conceptual

framework of this work is intra-state in focus, these are interesting categories for

exploration with regard to the transnational terrorist phenomenon, particularly in light

of al Qaeda being described by Sageman (2004) as being more of a movement than a

discrete organisation. Of relevance to this study also is Goodwin’s description of

organisations in which he argues that “organisations themselves are more than

instruments for attaining goals. They also carry symbolic messages in their very

structures” (2003, 167).

Although it is hard to place within any of the literatures, there is one work that is best

probably given special mention here. Criticising organisational sociologists for focusing

too much on economic organisations such as corporates over other types of

organisational forms (which is the rationale behind why this study did not encompass

the literatures of sociology and management studies in its review process) which now,

33

he says, have become the fodder for other research fields (such as the one we are

currently reviewing), Mayntz (2004) laments the lack of scholarship concerning the

internal organisational structure of illegitimate or covert groups (ibid., 5) by either the

specialist terrorism or ‘peace studies’ literatures - a categorisation in which he places

Kaldor (ibid., 8). He argues that “hierarchy, organization, and network are crucial

categories” (ibid., 8) which need explicit investigation, and suggests the best way to

accomplish this is through “an analytical framework of structural properties, with one

focal dimension ranging from the end-point of an exclusively (ideal typical)

“hierarchical to the other extreme of a purely “networked” structure.” (ibid., 10) –

owing to the likely hybridic nature of extant groups (ibid., 11). Mayntz (2004, 16)

suggests that examinations such as this could ultimately assist in the development of

interorganisational theories through providing a framework for comparative analysis – a

suggestion very much at the heart of this preliminary investigation, and which although

remains undeveloped in this study, should play a part in the discussion concerning

future directions.

Other works (Kaldor 1999, 2003; Josselin & Wallace 2001), while still supportive of the

positive potential of social movements, acknowledge possible non-normative alternate

conceptions of the term. While Josselin and Wallace examine the broad notion of global

civil society from a not uncritical perspective, Kaldor (2003) acknowledges possible

non-normative alternate conceptions of the term from a postmodern dialectic

perspective that pits civility against incivility, individualism against communalism,

where it may be within the remit of global civil society to transform, transcend or

destroy.xxxiii Kaldor is also unique in that she extends her examination of civil society

and its impact into the realm of war, identifying “network warfare; armed networks of

non-state and state actors” (2003: 119, italics in original) as a new warfare type, with

“nodes in advanced industrial countries” (ibid., 121). She describes networks in this

context simply as “loose horizontal coalitions” (ibid., 121).

From the brief exploration of this literature, it is clear that a tension exists between

those authors that exclude insurgent groups from global civil society discourse, and

those that believe this kind of ‘activism’ needs to be at least acknowledged. As this is an

emergent literature (most works on the subject have been produced post-1990), there are

also issues regarding the use and definition of even commonly used terms across the

34

works, which is natural for a social science sub-field that is still in effect defining itself,

but nonetheless confusing for the researcher looking for clear meanings behind

concepts.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This is an ambitious research project regarding both its aims and means, and

consequently the research design process, which utilises both qualitative and

quantitative research methods, is explained in detail to follow.

This research project has been constructed around the theory that it has become the

proclivity of insurgent groups for reasons of either survival or expansion to make

alliances with other groups or organisations in order to gain ideological support or

facilitate transactions, and that the organisations with which they interact are also

motivated by ideology or need – which in the case of states can mean by foreign policy

goals.

In order to explore this theory, it is necessary to produce a testable hypothesis. The

hypothesis in this instance is simple and yet is not without massive implications: that all

insurgent groups active today, no matter what their ideological of geographic focus, are

to some extent embedded within networks.

Within this brief research project, it will not be possible to test this hypothesis across

the entire universe of active insurgent groups. Rather this study will be an exploratory

comparative small n case study analysis of six insurgent groups to ascertain the value of

embarking upon a wider and more detailed study in the future. This study will utilise

35

both qualitative and quantitative research methods, and will take an hypothesis-testing

approach. Grounded in descriptive inference, the case study-driven examination will

follow a ‘logic of discovery’ approach. In practice, this study will take on some of the

attributes of a pilot study, due to this being the first time that a hypothesis of this nature

has been put forward for testing in this manner. A pilot study typically samples from the

wider population of interest, and serves as a testing mechanism towards the refining of

the data collection and issue identification processes.xxxiv

The hypothesis will be tested via the utilisation of the vast resources of secondary and

tertiary research materials available in the public domain on the subject of insurgency

and terrorism. While it must be acknowledged that it would be preferable to acquire

primary data on these groups, it is the very ‘nature of the beast’ that since many groups

have been proscribed as terrorist organisations, access is not often possible, let alone the

voluntary sharing of sensitive information. The justification for continuing with this

study in the face of such a difficult data-collection challenge is that insurgency and

terrorism are important issues in today’s security environment, issues too important to

leave solely to state apparatuses to analyse. There is a role for the independent analyst,

unburdened by state foreign policy goals and restrictions, and ideally unburdened also

by their own lack of embeddedness within any bureaucratic structure and internal

culture that may incline itself towards group-think.

Owing to the lack of access to restricted intelligence material, a myriad of public

sources that will vary in their credibility levels will need to be explored for any

evidence of links between groups, as it appears that no works have been produced that

focus in any depth on describing what could be considered the rather mundane attributes

of insurgent groups. Thus the search for relevant information is a rather time consuming

activity. The sources being utilised include websites – governmental, institutional, and

those associated with some of the groups themselves; newspaper reports; academic

journals; and specialist books. Attempts will be made to triangulate (cross check) the

information collected in the hope that multiple sourcing can assist in the data

verification process (it is not unusual, however, to notice plagiarism across sources

regarding some information, so even triangulation may not serve a confirmatory role in

this instance). It must also be acknowledged that in addition to the absence or

incompleteness of information, both covert groups and government agencies can

36

disperse misinformation or disinformation as part of their operational or counter-

intelligence processes. These issues are worrisome, but not to the extent that withdrawal

from this project is necessary.

Data that will be used as evidence of links between the focus groups and others is

deliberately very broad and will come from references in the material to the wide

variety of relationships and transactions to follow: known factions, splinter groups,

criminal connections, funding sources, public statements of allegiance, formal coalition,

combined operations, allegiance or connection to certain political or religious groups,

associations with charitable trusts, state support, sub-state entity support, alignment

under an umbrella organisation, material transactions, shared membership, use of

freelancers, and the use of legitimate and illegitimate front organisations and

companies.

In addition to this, note will also be made of historical links between the focal groups

and others. The rationale behind this is two-fold. Firstly, it is possible that individual

actors from groups no longer officially in existence or from states no longer wishing to

be associated with certain groups may still be positioned to offer assistance to extant

groups. Secondly, sometimes when information from different sources is contradictory

as to the current state of association between two groups, it would be irresponsible to

dismiss the connection entirely and so a judgement may need to be made regarding the

probable current nature of the relationship. If that judgement concludes that a previously

active link has probably been severed, it should still be included due to the

inconclusiveness of the evidence. The combination of these two factors therefore

necessitates the inclusion at some low level of historical factors in inter-group activity.

The research process followed will be primarily linear, although since this is an

exploratory study to determine the utility of a more comprehensive research project in

the future, the process of final analysis and suggestions also feeds into the concept of

the research wheel approach. It remains linear, however, in that once the hypothesis has

been formulated, the data and means of data-collection of the sample groups have been

specified, and the data gathered for both qualitative analysis and quantitative coding,

this will lead to the final analysis process that combines analytic induction with data

presentation.

37

The discussion in the final chapter of the study, however, will likely take on a cyclic

dimension as it returns to the issue of the original theory and its associated hypothesis.

The data findings are likely to present a new and improved set of criteria that will need

to be incorporated into any later research, or a collection of hypotheses to replace or

augment the single hypothesis around which this initial study has been built.

This research will be primarily of a qualitative nature, in that it will be based around the

collection of in-depth information concerning six insurgent groups and their operational

environment. While a qualitative investigation does not lend itself to generalisation due

to its small sample size, a small-n approach is nonetheless is the most appropriate means

through which to collect the type of data required to fulfil this type of investigation.

Analysis of this data may offer insights that in the future could be explored through

other research processes more amenable to generalisation.

The comparative critical case study approach enables the case study data to be analysed

both qualitatively and quantitatively without resorting to unsubstantiated

generalisation.xxxv All six of the case studies will be interrogated for the same

information regarding attributes, ties, and secondary ties, along with some general

historical information about the focal group and a brief summary of the nature of their

militant activities.

The comparative nature of the research process is fulfilled through taking a ‘most-

similar’ approach with the selection and analysis focus of the case study groups. A

study is deemed comparative when it makes comparisons across cases selected “on the

basis of some stimulus being absent or present” (Burnham et al 2004, 60), and where

controls for variables are not capable of being as tight as with, for example, the

experimental method. The key variable types (factors) that need identification within

the comparative approach are the dependent variables (DV), the independent variables

(IDV) and other variables, a number of these will be explored in the identification

process to follow.

‘Most similar’ research designs compare cases “that are as different as possible in terms

of the independent variable(s) and as similar as possible on all the spurious and

38

intervening variables (‘backdrop variables’)” (ibid., 63). “Dependent variables are the

phenomena that we want to explain in the research” (ibid., 62). For this investigation the

dependent variable is the community of active relationship/s (or lack of) the case study

groups have with other groups. In other words, this dependent variable is a state of

being relative to others - the issue being whether each of the case study groups is part of

a network or not. The independent variables, “the things we suspect influence the

dependent variable” (ibid., 62) must also differ across each other, and in this instance

will therefore be the case study groups themselves, whose very existence has been

empirically confirmed by official government decree and which would be constituent

parts of any network structure identified. These six groups thus comprise the

independent variables due to their established a priori existence separate to this research

project and wide inter-group variance as will be discussed in the exploration of group

typologies later in this section.

Regarding the category of other variables, a number of these must be acknowledged and

incorporated into the research. The key variable type from this broad category are

intervening variables, those which have “some bearing on the relationship between the

dependent and independent variables” (ibid.). Two levels of intervening variables have

been identified in this study – external and internal. The external intervening variables

can be summarised as the impact of major external events on all insurgent groups (the

primary example being the fall-out from the September 11 attacks and the impact this

has had upon the global security environment with the tightening and hardening of

various state and inter-state security apparatuses, and the attempts by these entities to

themselves develop their own networks of action and intelligence-sharing); and the

internal intervening variables are the attributes identified for exploration across all six

case studies, namely: ideology; goals (long and short term if applicable); classification

type; internal organisational structure; group size; and geopolitical focus.

What must always be avoided in ‘most similar’ comparative research is selecting on the

dependent variable (Geddes, 1990, 134-141). What this means is that case study groups

“should not be included or excluded on the basis of their values on the dependent

variable” (Burnham et al. 2004, 63). In other words, the research should be designed

around the hypothesis to be tested prior to choosing any case studies, so that there can

be no accusations of active agency in result manipulation to either confirm or falsify a

39

hypothesis. This advice has been heeded in the variable identification process due to the

dependent variable being a complete unknown prior to the research process, and the

independent variables have been selected due to their typological, geographic and

situational differences.

Other variables that may be worth taking into account are antecedent variables –

variables that existed prior to and can themselves influence the independent variables –

such as the domestic political situation from which a group originates, or a group’s

origins being through a state sponsor that may have built the group’s organisational

structure around a model that ensured the state’s ability to influence or control its

actions for example. Multicollinearity issues can also impact research, where two or

more case study groups may be highly interlinked and so may distort the results,

meaning that what is presented as two distinct sets of results may in fact be basically

from the same single group and inadvertently duplicated.

At the conclusion of the individual case study analyses, an inter-group comparison

based on these criteria and the observations that have been made from them will further

enhance this research project. The comparative aspects of this study will also serve to

point out any inferences regarding causality that may be forthcoming from this small

data set, all feeding into the decision-making process concerning the potentiality of

future research.

Mindful of the risk of even accidentally selecting on the dependent variable, the case

study groups themselves were selected through the following process: from the universe

of active insurgent groups it was deemed necessary to open the hypothesis up to

falsification by selecting groups that represented a wide variance of typologies

including decade of origin, size, geographic location, general classification type,

ideology and geopolitical goals. The final groups chosen include two whose origins

were in the 1960s, two from the 1970s, and a final two whose origins lay in the late

1980s or early 1990s. Of the first two groups, one has its origins in Marxism-Leninism,

and the other in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, while the groups that emerged in the

1970s were influenced by Marxism-Leninism. The final two groups have been most

commonly categorised as fundamentalist Islamic groups. Of these, a number have in

turn been classified as revolutionary, and others as secessionist. Some are considered to

40

be ethno-nationalists, while others have been classified as ideologically or religiously

motivated. There was also a deliberate choice made in the selection process not to be

influenced by the popular assumption that there is a distinction between domestic,

international and transnational groups. In reality, the common classifications assigned to

each group tend to over-simplify their typological reality.

Some bias within the case study selection process must be acknowledged, with the

conscious decision to exclude al Qaeda from the potential case study pool for reasons

that include its current over-exposure and frequent association with the network

enterprise. Additionally, covert non-state organisations that do not utilise extreme

violence have been excluded, along with domestic single-issue pressure groups (such as

the United States’ Army of God, or the United Kingdom’s Animal Liberation Front).

Whilst the overall structure of this project is driven by the demands for good qualitative

research, the information collected was also transformed into data that was presented

and analysed quantitatively through the application of the ‘Inflow’ network analysis

software programmexxxvi. The metrics offered within this programme offer the analyst

measurements at the individual, dyadic, triadic, subgroup and global levels. The

emphasis here is on three of these levels: the single group level, with particular regard

to the relationships of the case study groups (and any interesting relationships noticed

concerning other key actors in a network); the dyadic, with respect to the geodesics

information; and the global, wherein a network’s density is measured.

At this point it is necessary to make clear that as this research is case study-based, it was

prudent to define some uniform rules concerning the parameters for all six of the

groups’ potential network neighbourhoods. For that reason, the following limitations

were placed upon the data collection process: only linkages up to two steps out from the

focal groups would be noted – in other words, only primary and secondary links where

the analogy of ‘two degrees of separation could be applied’; within this restricted

universe, all cross-links between any of the groups listed are also permitted to be noted;

in the possible instance that one of the case studies turns up a link with another of the

case study groups, the second group’s own set of links would not be re-entered into this

second matrix and thus clutter the observations through repetition; if the research

uncovered links at state level, no secondary links associated with these states would be

41

noted, except in exceptional circumstances where their omission would negatively

impact the quality of the overall case analysis process.xxxvii This rationale has also been

applied in regard to the identification of humanitarian non-governmental organisations

and financial institutions within the matrix. Lastly, as this is a study of relationships at

the mid-range rather than at the individual level, no independent operatives will be

included. It must be stressed that the decision to make these rules of containment is not

driven by the assumption that these additional associations are of less importance than

groups of other kinds. Rather, it has been driven by the need to keep this initial

exploratory study as focused as possible on the immediate network neighbourhood of

the case study groups.

In this particular research project, the data interrogation and manipulation process was

as follows: following the collection of any relevant information from the various

secondary and tertiary sources, two Excel files are created – a ‘nodes’ file containing a

list of any entities the case study group (which is also included on this list) has been

identified as having some kind of relationship with either directly or indirectly, and a

‘links’ file that works its way through all the connections identified through identifying

a ‘from’ node, a ‘to’ node, the link strength (which can be scaled from 1 to 5), and a

network number (from 1 to 16). The network number correlates to the number of unique

questions regarding the nature of relationships that can be asked within the single

mapping process.

Due to the exploratory nature of this project, some of these features will be utilised only

minimally. All six case study mapping exercises will contain the same network number

of ‘1’, due to the deliberate decision to ‘ask’ each group the very simple question: ‘With

which entities has the case study group been reported to have ties?’ This decision was

made because it was considered preferable at this stage merely to determine the

existence of - or lack of - ties between the case study groups and their immediate

network neighbourhood – that is, from the independent variables to the question of the

existence and nature of the dependent variables and how they differed across case

studies.

In line with this approach, only 2 of the 5 possible strengths will be utilised: a strength

rating of ‘1’ will be given to all historical ties, and a strength of ‘5’ will be given to all

42

current ties, that is, ties logged from an affirmative response to network question

number ‘1’. This decision was made because allocating a strength rating to a particular

type of relationship within this exploratory research project would essentially have been

an arbitrary exercise at this stage. The goal for this study is to establish whether or not

ties exist across these groups, not to become enmeshed in creating and justifying a

second-level scale of analysis around the rating of the intervening variables – a task for

possible future projects.

Following the data gathering process, the information was entered and then imported

into the software programme for processing. It was possible from this point to arrange

the nodes and their links in any number of visual styles, although in this instancexxxviii it

was considered best to auto arrange the dialogue (between linked nodes) through a

randomising process that was directed to produce a visual that distributes itself around

the case study group while not compromising the data facts.

From this point it was possible to measure the data. In the case studies to follow the data

has been interrogated to show the metrics listed in Tables 1 and 2 to follow. All metrics

are normalised and range between 0 and 1(Krebs).

Table 1. Summary of Network Measures Assigned to Individual Actors in this Studyxxxix

Measure Definition

Centrality Extent to which an actor is central to a network. Can be

measured by degrees, betweenness and closeness.

Degrees Number of direct links with other actors. Measures

activity within the network.

Betweenness Extent to which an actor is positioned between any other

two actors on the shortest path between those actors.

Measures control - of how much an actor controls flows

within the network.

43

Closeness Extent to which an actor is close to all the other actors in

the network. Measures access – how quickly a node can

access all other nodes via a minimum of steps.

Power Measure of informal power. Combines betweenness and

closeness to find nodes that have quick access yet stand in

the way of other nodes’ access. Nodes with high power

ratings are also called boundary spanners.

Table 2. Summary of Network Measures Assigned to Describe Networks in this Studyxl

Measure Definition

Group Size The number of actors in the network

Potential Ties The number of possible links within the network

Actual Ties The actual number of links within the network

Density Ratio of the number of actual links to the number of

possible links

Computing Geodesics The shortest path, the network’s connectivity or

reachability, that connects any two actors within the

network. Also includes the weighted average path length

based upon the average distance of any two actors within

the network

Average The mean score across all the metrics in the column

Centralisation The difference between the centrality scores of the most

central actor and those of all the other actors in a network

is calculated, and then used to compute a ratio comprising

of the actual sum of the differences compared to the

maximum sum of the differences

This explanation of the research design and methodology process will now conclude on

a cautious note. Like other analysts (Krebs 2002), this research acknowledges the work

of Malcolm Sparrow (1991) regarding the problems associated with mapping covert

networks. These problems are incompleteness – “the inevitability of missing links and

nodes” (Krebs 2002, 2), fuzzy boundaries – “the difficulty in deciding who to include

44

and who not to include” (ibid.), and network dynamics – “these networks are not static,

they are always changing” (ibid.).

Thus it must be stressed that networking is more of a process than a destination. This

has implications for this study in that it can only profess to present an imperfect

snapshot in current space and time, and to which deletions, additions and relationship

developments should be added as newer and better information becomes available.

CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDIES

The case studies to follow will focus on what is known about each group’s internal

organisational and chain-of-command structures, and also their external relationships

with various other groups.

As mentioned in the research design and methodology section in Chapter One, the six

case studies selected for this exploratory combined qualitative and quantitative analysis

have been chosen due to their representative qualities over a number of different areas,

including their varying geographic origins and interests, and classification types. The

case studies will be presented alphabetically based upon the English rendition of each

group’s name, rather than on outcomes, or any other classification criteria.

It must also be made clear that the information presented here about each group by no

means is a summary of the totality of information available in the public domain.

Rather, what has been include is primarily a selection of empirical information about

each group as it pertains to the focus of this study, namely information on internal

organisational structure and external alliances. In order to provide context, however, a

brief synopsis is included to offer the reader a summary of each group’s origins and

alleged evolution over time, along with some other supportive information.

Each case study has been approached in the same way, and the information gleaned has

been categorised under identical headings across the case study analyses. Obviously,

45

since we are dealing with an incomplete information base due to the covert nature of the

groups being studied, the information available concerning certain aspects of some

groups is greater in some cases than in others. As a general rule, it seems to be the case

that the older the group, the more information that has been collected about them,

especially concerning internal organisational structures. Also, because it seems to be the

case that the newer, religious, groups have formed as offshoots of older more

established groups before splitting completely from the mother group – and, in one of

the two cases, is the current product of a long series of group splits and mergers – the

internal organisational structure remains in an inevitably constant state of flux, making

it difficult to classify. This, however, is not enough reason to abandon scrutiny of these

newer groups. Rather, given the ongoing impact of their activities, it provides greater

impetus for identifying knowledge gaps that must be filled.

The case study exercise will follow a number of separate yet interrelated steps. First of

all, qualitative information will be provided for each of the six groups concerning group

origins and history, ideology, goals, organisational structure, geopolitical focus and

links with other groups. This information will be utilised to develop a series of figures

modelling the known internal dynamics of these groups, and also as the basis for

constructing a series of models depicting the placement of each of the case study groups

within a specific network environment, with the aim of identifying any correlations

between the two structures. Each of these six network environments will be analysed

quantitatively in order to identify any other relevant factors that impact the qualitative

observations. The case study groups will be scrutinised for similarities and differences

identified through the interrogation process.

As the research process undertaken has acknowledged historical as well as current links,

the figure (H) will be placed within the written sections of each case study to

communicate this. In addition, refer to Figure 1 below for the line and colour coding

key that will assist in the easy identification of basic nodal link and group

characteristics.

46

Historical link Current link

Case study group Umbrella group

Insurgent group Bank

State entity Charitable trust

Figure 1. Supplementary coding symbols used in case study graphs to follow

Case Study 1

ABU SAYYAF (Also known as Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyyah, Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters,

Bearer of the Sword)

History of Organisation Founder Abubakar Janjalani, fought in Afghanistan in the

1980s, and had met with Osama bin Laden. Upon his return to the Philippines he

established Abu Sayyaf with the help of Ramzi Yousefxli on the Muslim-dominated

island of Mindanao in order to fight for the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state in

the south of the country (in Minanao and the Sulu Archipeligo), as part of a global

agenda to reassert an Islamist agenda.xlii Between 1991 and 1998 the group expanded its

attack capabilities. Following Janjalani’s death (along with his second-in-command) in

a shootout in 1998, the organisation lost its chief ideologue and planner, and while not

withering away, instead fractured into “more a confederation of loosely coordinated

commands”(Cronin et al. 2004, 4) with the closest thing to a leader of the group being

Janjalani’s brother Khaddafi Janjalani who now heads one of the alleged five separate

units.xliii

While in recent years Abu Sayyaf has turned its hand more to what seems to be

publicity-grabbing and money-making criminal activities such as the kidnapping of

foreigners, it has been argued that the group still officially chooses to identify itself with

Islamic revolution through armed struggle, an example being that in addition to a

considerable ransom demanded from foreign tourist kidnappings in 2001, the group also

called for the release of certain high-profile Muslims imprisoned in the US on terrorist

charges. xliv The group appears, however, to use terror more for financial profit than

political gain. It has remained a comparatively small - though occasionally powerful –

47

group, but has always been forced to compete against the much larger Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF).

Ideology Politico-religious; ethno-nationalist (secessionist); criminal.

Goal To establish a separate Islamic state in the Southern Philippines.

Organisational Structure Originally more centralised, when the older Janjalani

(now deceased) was leader and chief ideologue. Currently seems to operate as a number

of largely autonomous units that each operate with their own independent agendas

under different commanders.

Geopolitical Focus Southern Philippines and Malaysia.

Areas of Operation Philippines (its strongholds are the Mindanao and Sulu

regions – although the group has also been active in Manilaxlv) and Malaysia. The group

controls large areas in Mindanao, which it uses for training and arms storage.

Strength Membership is estimated to be between 200-500,xlvi and is drawn from

the home community in which the group operates, with its overarching Moro ethnic

identity and bonds of kinship (making penetration by outside agents virtually

impossible).

Alleged Links

STATE LEVEL

Libya - Libya was involved in the negotiation process towards the release of the

kidnapped hostages in 2000. Libya is said to have forged links with AS in order to

further Libyan Islam, and to spread Qaddafi’s brand of internationalist anarchism – in

addition to merely being a Libyan tool of harassment against the US.xlvii

Philippine Army - there have been claims that the AS has been used by the Philippines

Armed Forces “as a kind of agent provocateur” (Manolo 2004, 30).

48

INSURGENT GROUPS

al Qaeda – while the group was supposed to have received al Qaeda funding and

training in the early 1990s through Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammad

Jamal Khalifa, and AS was implicated in the highly ambitious but scuttled ‘Operation

Bojinka’ along with al Qaeda operative Ramzi Yousefxlviii - who allegedly also trained

AS in the use of explosivesxlix - many observers now believe that the two groups are

unlikely to have maintained contact, due largely to Abu Sayyaf’s more criminally-

inspired profiteering activities following the death of founder Janjalani.l The Philippine

military, however, disagree, and say that even in 2001 al Qaeda was in contact with the

group, seeking to further develop the relationship.li At least one analyst has concluded

that even though AS seems to have been proven to have had sporadic contact with al

Qaeda, it is most unlikely that the latter group would want to be associated with an

organisation condemned by other Islamic groups as acting in an un-Islamic fashion lii

Link has been historical for this study; Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) –

most of AS’s early recruits were defectors from MNLF. Has distanced itself from AS in

recent yearsliii; Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – another MNLF splinter

group. While MILF has also declared no ties to AS,liv and indeed have even signed an

interim agreement to combine efforts to clear them from their strongholds lv was said to

have allowed AS use of territory and training camps under its control as late as 2001 lvi:

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – supposedly has connections with both MILF and ASlvii:

Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF) – historical links alleged; Kampulan

Militan Malaysia (KMM)lviii; Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM).lix

CRIMINAL

Unknown.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) – some connection in the late 1990s

– run by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden.lx Classified

as an historical link in this study.

SECONDARY LINKS OF INTEREST

MILF and al Qaeda MNLF; KMM and JI, LJ and PULOlxi; PULO-Bersatu.lxii

49

Saudi Arabia

Bersatu

MILF

PULO

GAM

LJ

JI

MNLF IIRO

IILF

Philippine army

RSM

Libya

KMM

al QaedaAS

50

Figure 2. Graphic representation of alleged past and present ABU SAYYAF ties

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

Abu Sayyaf Network Neighbourhood

Group Size 16 Computing geodesicsPotential Ties 240 44 paths of length 1Actual Ties 44 112 paths of length 2Density 18% 94 paths of length 3

44 paths of length 4 32 paths of length 5 0 paths of length 6

Weighted Avg. Path Length: 2.72

Table 3. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators

CENTRALITY METRICSDegrees Betweenness Closeness Power

0.600 AS 0.619 AS 0.625 AS 0.622 AS0.333 al Qaeda 0.195 al Qaeda 0.577 al Qaeda 0.386 al Qaeda0.267 GAM 0.190 GAM 0.536 KMM 0.351 KMM 0.267 KMM 0.167 KMM 0.484 IIRO 0.330 GAM0.200 IIRO 0.148 PULO 0.484 Libya 0.309 IIRO0.200 JI 0.133 IIRO 0.469 GAM 0.275 Libya0.200 PULO 0.067 Libya 0.441 JI 0.257 PULO0.133 LJ 0.057 LJ 0.405 LJ 0.231 LJ0.133 Libya 0.005 JI 0.405 MILF 0.223 JI0.133 MILF 0.000 Bersatu 0.405 MNLF 0.203 MILF0.133 MNLF 0.000 IILF 0.395 IILF 0.203 MNLF0.067 Bersatu 0.000 MILF 0.395 Philippine army 0.197 IILF0.067 IILF 0.000 MNLF 0.395 RSM 0.197 Philippine army0.067 Philippine army 0.000 Philippine army 0.366 PULO 0.197 RSM0.067 RSM 0.000 RSM 0.333 Saudi Arabia 0.167 Saudi Arabia0.067 Saudi Arabia 0.000 Saudi Arabia 0.273 Bersatu 0.136 Bersatu

0.183 Average 0.099 Average 0.437 Average 0.268 Average

51

0.476 Centralisation 0.555 Centralisation 0.416 Centralisation

Table 4. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

ANALYSIS

Even though there are doubts about just how important this group now is within the

Asian region, and questions over its motivations, Abu Sayyaf still has a number of

active links with groups that themselves are embedded within the wider South East

Asian network of Islamic insurgents.

These measurements rate Abu Sayyaf with the highest metrics across all centrality

indicators, although these figures have been impacted by the large number of probable

terminated past links that are no longer active.

What the graph does show is that Abu Sayyaf lies at the centre of a ‘star’ network

configuration, where some of the other actors must utilise AS as a go-between should

they need to interact. There are also smaller ‘stars’ within this graph, such as the one

that surrounds KMM, as well as elements of the chain model communication process.

The only example of a possible active all-channel sub-structure is the relationship

between al Qaeda, KMM and GAM.

Internal intervening variables of interest here must include the changes in the

organisation’s structure following the death in 1998 of the Abu Sayyaf founder and his

second-in-command, which precipitated the fracturing of the group into a number of

loosely connected autonomous units each under the control of its own commander. The

financial successes of the group as a result of their utilisation of kidnapping for ransom

practices may well also have impacted the group’s operational focus and the type of

recruits attracted to the organisation – which may in turn influence the strategic

ideology of the group.

52

What is of interest in the metrics is the high rating of al Qaeda, KMM and GAM. While

from the perspective of the case study group al Qaeda may be relatively insignificant,

when one looks at the network overall this group rates very highly across the centrality

metrics, and does have active relationships with both KMM and GAM. Al Qaeda should

perhaps be considered an important antecedent variable in relation to Abu Sayyaf, in

that it appears it used to have some kind of relationship with the group, and even though

this relationship has probably been severed at least at the group level (individual

members of al Qaeda may still be in contact with some Abu Sayyaf members), the part

an historical association of importance plays in a group’s acquired strategies,

capabilities and self-perception should not be underestimated.

There seems to be no distinct peripheral players of interest within this graph, except

perhaps for JI and al Qaeda – but the identification of these two groups is more to do

with the quantity of qualitative information that is known about these groups than their

actual positioning on the graph – an observation which perhaps gives justification for an

analytical approach that combines both qualitative and quantitative processes as is the

case here.

There are also indications that within this discrete network KMM may be described as a

potential structural hole due to its placement between AS and JI, al Qaeda and LJ and

AS and LJ. Of course further research would be required to confirm the apparent lack of

ties between each of these dyads, but this does not deny the utility of the network

analysis process regarding its role of identifying actors for further scrutiny.

53

Case Study 2

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA-MAOIST

History of Organisation Formed in September 2004 as the result of a merger

between two major Communist groups in India, the Maoist Communist Centre of India

(MCCI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War (CPI-ML),

following almost 10 years of negotiation over political, ideological and organisational

issueslxiii probably mediated by leaders of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement

(RIM)lxiv and including strong support from the CPN-Maoist of Nepal. This follows the

earlier merger in 1998 of CPI-ML People’s War with CPI-ML Party Unity under the

banner of the former group’s name (both were splinter groups of the original CPI-ML

that formed in 1969) which was directly associated with an increase in insurgent

activities.lxv People’s War argues that since its inception in 1980 it has pursued an

agenda to unite all ideologically similar (currently around 40 groups) predominantly

Naxalitelxvi groups in this fashion.lxvii In the 1990s, however, territorial and leadership

clashes between the MCCI and CPI-ML has resulted in the deaths of civilians and

hundreds of group supporters from both sides – a period of time now referred to as the

“Black Chapter”.lxviii But largely due to a marked increase in state-level operations

against Maoists in Bihar from 2000 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) of

2002, the two groups realised the advantage in uniting to fight a common enemy.lxix

54

Ideology Marxism-Leninism-Mao thoughtlxx, with a belief in the destruction of

class enemies through extreme violence. Ideological differences between the two groups

had first to be resolved, however, with CPI-ML rooted in Marxist-Leninist thought,

while the MCCI was a Maoist organisation. Maoism won out, with CPI-ML officially

embracing Maoism as the higher stage of Marxist-Leninist philosophy) of protracted

armed struggle, dismissing any notion of participation in ‘bourgeois’ state elections.

The means advocated is via Protracted People’s War via the People’s Liberation

Guerrilla Armylxxi, with the countryside as the “center of gravity of the party’s work,

while the urban work will be complimentary to it.”lxxii Secondly, and this is a

development within the new group, the acceptance of protracted war denies the

possibility of sufficient mass consciousness and that power is so be seized immediately,

and so greater emphasis is so be put into both building up the party and its supporters at

the grassroots level through a more nuanced reading of the political and social ‘terrain’

of the regions concerned. lxxiii

Goals Long Term To seize powerlxxiv and ultimately establish a voluntary

Union of Socialist Republics of India through new democratic revolution.lxxv

Short Term Creating a revolutionary corridor, the Compact

Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) of control extending from Nepal, through northern and into

central and parts of southern India.

lxx “Joint Declaration”, http://www.wpb.be/guests/india.htmlxxi Nihar Nayak, “Left Wing Extremism: Synchronized Onslaught”, 2, The PLGA itself is also divided into three sub-armies.lxxii Communist Party of India-Maoist, Left-wing Extremist Group, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/CPI_M.htm (accessed 28 March 2005), 3lxxiii Ibid., 2lxxiv Ibid.lxxv Ibid.

55

Organisational Structure While some sources state that the new group’s

organisational structure is unconfirmed except for the position of General Secretary, one

source believes that it remains a hierarchical structure, with a Central Committee,

Regional Bureaux, Zonal or State Committees, District or Division Committees and

Squad Area Committeeslxxvi much like that of the CPN-Maoist. If this is the case, then

like the Nepali Maoists military orders will come from the Central Committee through

the regional or state level commanders who will also be members of the Central

Committee (or the more elite Politburo, should the Central Committee have one) right

down to cell committee level. With the increased emphasis on ‘hearts and minds’

activities since the latest merger, and the utilisation of grassroots part-timers it is also

likely that as with the CPN-Maoist, there will be further developments regarding the

parallel development of military and non-military educational structures working

complementarily.

The leadership is said to be educated and ambitious, and not necessarily from the poorer

classes, while the cadres are largely from deprived backgrounds.

Geopolitical Focus Primarily India - the newly merged group is active in 156 districts

of 13 states, including Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarth, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Uttar

Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu,

Utteranchai and Kerala. Attempts are also reported being made to establish a presence

in Gujurat, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh.

Strength A combined membership of around 6500 cadres is estimated.

Alleged Links

STATE LEVEL

Pakistani Inter-Services Agency (ISI) – this agency is charged with having a role in

developing the links between the Nepalese and Indian Maoists.lxxvii

lxxvi Ibid.,3. This source names CPI-ML General Secretary ‘Ganapathi’ as being appointed as leader of the new combined grouplxxvii “Nepal Terror Groups – Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist”, South Asia Terrorism Portal,http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/counties/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.htm (accessed 28 March, 2005)

56

UMBRELLA GROUPS

Coordination Committee of the Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia

(CCOMPOSA) – formed in 2001 to unite the revolutionary groups of this region lxxviii –

in other words, a united front that encompasses South Asia, including India, Nepal,

Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).lxxix

INSURGENT GROUPS

Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-Maoist) – now operating to varying extents

within 68 of the 75 districts of Nepal. The groups are said to have made contact around

1990, leading to the sharing of knowledge between the groups concerning guerrilla

warfare training and bomb manufacturing techniques;lxxx Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE) – links alleged, perhaps pertaining to cooperation over arms

procurement and training; National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB); Sendero

Luminoso (PCP) – CPI-Maoist allegedly has some connections with the Peruvian

Communist Party, more commonly known as Shining Path, possibly through RIM.

CRIMINAL

Unknown.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Unknown.

SECONDARY LINKS OF INTEREST

CCOMPOSA – other members of CCOMPOSA include PBSP (CC) Bangladesh, CPEB

(ML) Red Flag Bangladesh, CPI-ML Naxalbari India, RCCI (MLM) India and CPI

(Maoist) Nepal. Additionally, there are two associated groups, PBSB (MBRM)

Bangladesh and the newly formed Bhutan Communist Party (MLM).lxxxi

RIM – in addition to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), members include the

Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist), Communist Party of Afghanistan, Communist Party

of Bangladesh (Marxist-Leninist), Communist Party of Peru (Shining Path), Communist

Party of Turkey (Marxist-Leninist), Marxist-Leninist Communist Organisation of

Tunisia, Maoist Communist Party of Italy, Proletarian Party of Purba Bangla,

57

Revolutionary Communist Group of Colombia, Revolutionary Communist Party of

USA and the Communist Party of Iran.lxxxii

CPN-Maoist – said to have connections with other Indian insurgent groups including

the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation

(KLO), the Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and the Gurkha Liberation

Organisation (GLO), and Akhil Bharat Ekta Samaj (ABNES) – officially a Nepalese

welfare organisation, but suspected of having close ties with CPN-Maoist. lxxxiii

Additionally, CPN-M is said to have links with Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE).

58

MKP

PBSB(MLM)

ABNES

KLO

ULFARIM

RCCI(MLM)

RCCI(Maoist)

PGPCPCP

PBSP(MPK)

PBSP(CC)

NSCN

NDFB

LTTE

LeT

ISYFISI

Habib Bank

GNLF

GLTF

GLO

CPP

CPN-Maoist

CPI-ML

CPI-Maoist

CPEB(ML)

CPC(Maoist)CCOMPOSA

BSD(ML)

BCP(MLM)

Figure 3. Graphic representation of alleged past and present COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA-MAOIST ties

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

Communist Party of India-Maoist Network NeighbourhoodGroup Size 31 Computing geodesicsPotential Ties 930 84 paths of length 1Actual Ties 84 396 paths of length 2Density 9% 576 paths of length 3

160 paths of length 4 0 paths of length 5

59

Weighted Average Path Length: 2.67

Table 5. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators

CENTRALITY METRICSDegrees Betweenness Closeness Power

0.433 CPN-Maoist 0.563 CCOMPOSA 0.638 CPN-Maoist 0.570 CCOMPOSA 0.400 CCOMPOSA 0.470 CPN-Maoist 0.600 CPI-Maoist 0.554 CPN-Maoist0.333 CPI-Maoist 0.320 CPI-Maoist 0.577 CCOMPOSA 0.460 CPI-Maoist0.267 ISI 0.256 ISI 0.484 ISI 0.370 ISI0.133 ULFA 0.014 ULFA 0.441 ULFA 0.227 ULFA0.100 KLO 0.002 NDFB 0.435 KLO 0.217 KLO0.100 PCP 0.000 ABNES 0.423 PCP 0.211 PCP0.100 RIM 0.000 BCP(MLM) 0.423 RIM 0.211 RIM0.067 ABNES 0.000 BSD(ML) 0.417 ABNES 0.208 ABNES0.067 ISYF 0.000 CPC(Maoist) 0.417 LTTE 0.208 LTTE0.067 LTTE 0.000 CPEB(ML) 0.395 GLO 0.199 NDFB0.067 LeT 0.000 CPI-ML 0.395 GLTF 0.197 GLO0.067 NDFB 0.000 CPP 0.395 GNLF 0.197 GLTF0.033 BCP(MLM) 0.000 GLO 0.395 NDFB 0.197 GNLF0.033 BSD(ML) 0.000 GLTF 0.395 NSCN 0.197 NSCN0.033 CPC(Maoist) 0.000 GNLF 0.380 CPP 0.190 CPP0.033 CPEB(ML) 0.000 Habib Bank 0.380 MKP 0.190 MKP0.033 CPI-ML 0.000 ISYF 0.370 BCP(MLM) 0.185 BCP(MLM)0.033 CPP 0.000 KLO 0.370 BSD(ML) 0.185 BSD(ML)0.033 GLO 0.000 LTTE 0.370 CPC(Maoist) 0.185 CPC(Maoist)0.033 GLTF 0.000 LeT 0.370 CPEB(ML) 0.185 CPEB(ML)0.033 GNLF 0.000 MKP 0.370 CPI-ML 0.185 CPI-ML0.033 Habib Bank 0.000 NSCN 0.370 PBSB(MLM) 0.185 PBSB(MLM)0.033 MKP 0.000 PBSB(MLM) 0.370 PBSP(CC) 0.185 PBSP(CC)0.033 NSCN 0.000 PBSP(CC) 0.370 PBSP(MPK) 0.185 PBSP(MPK)0.033 PBSB(MLM) 0.000 PBSP(MPK) 0.370 RCCI(MLM) 0.185 RCCI(MLM)0.033 PBSP(CC) 0.000 PCP 0.370 RCCI(Maoist) 0.185 RCCI(Maoist)0.033 PBSP(MPK) 0.000 PGPC 0.333 ISYF 0.167 ISYF0.033 PGPC 0.000 RCCI(MLM) 0.333 LeT 0.167 LeT 0.033 RCCI(MLM) 0.000 RCCI(Maoist) 0.330 Habib Bank 0.165 Habib Bank 0.033 RCCI(Maoist) 0.000 RIM 0.330 PGPC 0.165 PGPC

0.090 Average 0.052 Average 0.407 Average 0.230 Average

0.366 Centralisation 0.528 Centralisation 0.486 CentralisationTable 6. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

ANALYSIS

This network visual shows the existence of four interconnecting ‘star’ configurations of

varying sizes. These surround the focal group (CPI-Maoist), a similar Nepal-based

60

group (CPN-Maoist) and two other entities – a state agency (the Pakistani ISI) and an

umbrella group (CCOMPOSA). Of the four sub-networks, the only link that does not

exist is between ISI and CCOMPOSA, and thus excludes this subset of groups as

comprising an all-channel network.

This case study is an interesting example of a largely regional network that shows

strong association with an important umbrella organisation that appears to wield

considerable power. The groups associated with CCOMPOSA seem to appreciate the

utility of joining together in developing a strategic alliance, and the creation of CPI-

Maoist from a merger between two previously conflictual groups under the probable

facilitation of CCOMPOSA, shows that practicality is winning over ideological divides.

The official adoption of the Maoist approach to insurgency over the more rigid Marxist-

Leninist view is also an interesting (but none too surprising) development. Only time

will tell, however, as to whether CPI-Maoist was created as a defensive or offensive

alliance.

Regarding centrality metrics, CPI-Maoist does not rate highest in any of the four

measurements, this honour being shared by CPN-Maoist and CCOMPOSA – with

CCOMPOSA being the outright winner through its topping of the ‘Power’ metrics. ISI

runs a constant fourth in all categories, rating much higher than the averages in all but

‘Betweenness’. From a critical point of view concerning the methodology this is

affirming, in that it demonstrates at least some success in proving that data collection

was not intentionally biased in favour of the case study group.

It appears that either CPI-Maoist or CPN-Maoist could be identified as possible

structural holes in the network, controlling any communications between the ISI and

any number of groups including CCOMPOSA, as they are both placed centrally within

potential chains of communication from ISI to these outlaying groups.

Regarding peripheral players, it is worth noting the inclusion of the LTTE in this graph

– a observation that will be expanded upon at the end of this section.

The intervening variables of interest within this network configuration, apart from the

influence of umbrella and state groups, seem to be the belief that the short term goal of

61

setting up some kind of expansive compact revolutionary zone is possible (that is,

gaining control of territory) – providing incentive for more intensive inter-group

cooperation (which in turn increases the influence of CCOMPOSA and perhaps the

more powerful groups within it as a consequence) which has the potential of

diminishing strategic and tactical autonomy at the group level.

Case Study 3

JAMIAT UL-ANSAR

(Also known as Harakat ul-Mujahideen, HuM, Harakat ul-Ansar, HuA,, Al-Hadidlxxxiv,

Partisans Movement in Kashmir, Party of the Volunteers, Movement of Holy Warriors)

lxxxiv See ASIO

62

History of Organisation A Sunni Islamist group based in Pakistan and currently

operating primarily in Kashmir. May have its origins in Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, a group

formed in Pakistan in the 1980s to coordinate volunteers fighting the Soviets.lxxxv An

alternate history states that it was founded in Pakistan as a breakaway faction of Harkat-

ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI)lxxxvi in order to fight in Afghanistan by Fazlur Rehman Kahlil

in 1985 under the original name Harkat ul-Mujahedeen.lxxxvii

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the group switched its focus to

the Kashmir region.

In 1993 with the alleged assistance of the Pakistani ISIlxxxviii it remerged with Harkat-ul-

Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI) to become Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), and then in 1997 changed its

name back again to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in response to HuA being designated a

terrorist organisation, and allegedly signed the IIF declaration in 1998. In 2001,

following the updated redesignation of HuM as a terrorist organisation by both the US

and Pakistan, it changed its name again this time to Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA)lxxxix and was

again outlawed by the Pakistani government in 2003.xc

Ideology Politico-religious (pan-Islamic); secessionist; revolutionary.

Goals Short Term To bring about the secession of Jammu and Kashmir from

India.xci

Long Term The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to a Pakistan under

Islamic rule. xcii

Organisational Structure Little has been written about JuA’s internal management

structure, except for the identification of Khalil as being its current Secretary General,

and Maulina Farooq Kashmiri its Chief.xciii It is also said to mount operations under a

number of different aliasas that may include Al-Faran and Al-Almi.

63

Geopolitical Focus Based in Muzaffarabad (capital of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir),

its primary focus is the Jammu and Kashmir region. It is also said to have been active in

Bosnia, Chechnya, India, Myanmar, the Philippines and Tajikistan.xciv

Links

STATE LEVEL

Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) - Multiple sources charge that JuA has

connections with the ISI that originated during the Afghan war with the Soviets, and is

credited by many as working in conjunction with the CIA to transport weapons to the

mujahideen,xcv transferring funds through the now-defunct Bank of Credit and

Commerce International (BCCI).xcvi

Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam, Fazlur Rehman Faction (JUI-F) - JuA is said to be aligned with

this radical Pakistani political party

UMBRELLA GROUPS

United Jihad Council (MJC) - JuA is also a member of the United Jihad Council (also

known as the Muttahida Jihad Council), an umbrella organisation allegedly established

by the ISI in the early 1990s in order to coordinate more successful militant operations

in the Jammu and Kashmir region, and to foster ‘muwakhaat’ (‘agreement on the basis

of brotherhood’) – an end to inter-group distrust and dysfunction – between the various

groups.xcvii At some point in time the MJC was restructured to both increase ISI control

and improve its command and control capabilities (such as to introduce the rule that no

members would be allowed to launch an attack without prior Council approval), and a

number of militant groups merged with each other (for operations in that region only) to

simplify operations.xcviii

INSURGENT GROUPS

International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF) - As a

signatory to the IIF fatwa, JuA is charged with maintaining links with this organisation,

but their nature is unclear; al Qaeda – JuA supposedly share members with the group

commonly known by this namexcix. JuA reportedly trained al Qaeda fighters in their

camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan until the latter were bombed by the US in 2001;

64

Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem (JeM) – Also known as Army of the

Prophet, Mohammed. Shortly after his release from an Indian prison following the 1999

HuA airline hijacking, Azhar announced the formation of a new HuA faction, JeM,

endorsed by the heads of three religious schools in Pakistan and again assisted by the

ISI, and which split from HuA in 2001 and to which many HuA militants switched their

allegiance (severely weakening the parent organisation).c Although formed through

splitting off from HuA, and based in Karachi,ci it is said to have links with JUI-F as well

as a sharing members with 313, HuM, HuJI, Lashkar-I-Omar;cii Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-

Islami – Bangladesh (HUJI-B) - led by Shauqat Osman, an organisation that aims to

establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh.; Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) – also known as Army of

the Righteous, the armed wing of Pakistani-based religious organisation Markaz-ud-

Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI) that was formed in 1989 or 1990. It is also sometimes known

as Jamaat ud-Dawa. As well as freeing Kashmir from Indian control, the group has also

hinted that its long-term aim is to establish Islamic rule in India also, and so is a pan-

Islamic organisation.ciii In 2002 an important al Qaeda figure, Abu Zubaydah was

captured in an LeT safehouse in Pakistan. In 2003 the group split into two independent

wings under separate leadership, one politico-religious and the other military. That same

year also saw the FBI arresting 11 suspected LeT supporters in Virginia, USA.civ; 313 –

a separate Pakistani terrorist group formed out of individuals who are members of other

groups including LeJ, HuM and JeM. It does not focus its operations on the Jammu and

Kashmir regions, but to date has concentrated on attacking either Pakistani government

officials or members of the Pakistani Shi’ite community.cv; Sipah I-Sahaba Pakistan

(SSP)cvi; Lashkar I Jhangvi (LeJ): Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) ; Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eealam (LTTE ).

CRIMINAL

Unknown.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Al-Akhtar Trust - runs medical centres in Pakistan, was also accused by the US in 2003

of moving supplies and fighters into Afghanistan in conjunction with another charity,

the al Rashid Trust. It is also said to have links with JeM, LeT and LeJ.

65

SECONDARY LINKS OF INTEREST

MJC - Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Jihad, Al-Barq, Ikhwan-ul-

Mussalmin, Tariq-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al-Badar, Tehrik-I-Jihad; JUI-F –

links with Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI), also known as the Movement of Islamic

Holy War, a militant group of the Deobandi school.; HUJI – links with HUJI-

Bangladesh (HUJI-B) led by Shauqat Osman, that aims to establish Islamic rule in

Bangladesh.; HUJI-B – said to have been established in 1992 with direct finance from al

Qaeda. Linked to Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), ISI, LeT and HuJI. Trained by

25-man Taliban team in 2001. cvii; JeM - For fundraising, JeM joined with the anti-Shia

group Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and its military arm, Lashkar e Jhangvi.cviii JM is

also said to have strong support from some individuals within the ISI

viii Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?: the Politics and History of the PLO (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994)ix Also known as the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). See Japanese Red Army (JRA), Terrorist Group Profiles, Naval Postgraduate School, http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/jra.htm (accessed 24 February, 2003)x Such as the Munich Olympic Games hostage siege, where responsibility was claimed by the hitherto unknown Black Septemberxi The Baader Meinhof group later morphed into what came to be known as the Red Army Faction (RAF)xii C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (New York: Palgrave, 1998), 77xiii Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today, (London : Frank Cass, 2000), 90xiv Ibid., 200xv Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998), 186-189xvi Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 187. Hoffman’s examples include Libya’s hiring of the JRA, and the operations Abu Nidal performed on behalf of either Syria, Iraq or Libya. Give some egs here re. alleged commissioned terrorism –eg JRA?IIBxvii Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 82xviii This term is used here in a non-normative sense to describe the motivations of actors, be they individuals or groups, who are working energetically in the pursuit of political or social goals.xix It must be acknowledged that this definition is one of two attributes Helleiner ascribes to globalisation. The second attribute is consequentially linked to the first, in that the form globalisation takes will be the outcome of the choices made by humankind regarding how to respond to this time-space shrinkage regarding political, economic and social issuesxx For example, see Carlyle A. Thayer, “No Al Qaeda isn’t everywhere”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 August 2003, Vol. 166, Issue 33, 20; Kimberly A. McCloud and Adam Dolnik, “Debunk the myth of Al Qaeda”, Christian Science Monitor, 23 May 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p11s02-coop.html (accessed 15 April, 2003); Erich Marquardt, “Al-Qaeda’s Exaggerated Organizational Strength”, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/terrorism/2003/0902exaggerated.htm (accessed 15 February, 2005)xxi Peter R. Monge and Noshir S.Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Foreword, viiixxii Peter R. Monge and Noshir S.Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks, 35xxiii Ibid., 31xxiv Peter R. Monge and Noshir S.Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks, 36xxv John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future”, First Monday, 2001a, http://www.firstmonday.org/ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html (accessed 22 July, 2004)xxvi John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future”, 8xxvii Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), Introduction, viiixxviii John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND 2001b), 9

66

LeT – links to former Taliban regime and al Qaeda. Also to other Sunni militant groups

in Pakistan, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jangvi (LeJ), and

the Kashmiri Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). As well as the ISI, LeT is also supposed to

receive assistance form the Pakistani Army.

xxix They refer us to Guillermo O’Donnell, On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems (A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countires), working paper no. 192 (Notre Dame, Indiana: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1993)xxx Though a new group, the New Red Brigades, is now suspected to have established itself in recent yearsxxxi MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series – No. 344, February 10 2002, athttp://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP34402. Date of access 8 September, 2003xxxii For example, see Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 1998xxxiii Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity Press 2003), 1-12. Kaldor offers five different versions of the civil society concept: societas civilis, bourgeois society, activist, neoliberal and postmodern. She herself identifies herself as most strongly identifying with the activist conception, where through the development of and participation in what she terms “a global public sphere” (8) where the focus is upon the active distribution of state power and the internationalisation of the growing supra-state issue of governance.xxxiv Peter Burnham et al, Research Methods in Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 39xxxv Ibid., 31xxxvi Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.comxxxvii The rationale behind this decision being that the issue of state sponsorship of insurgent groups is a massive subject in its own right, and any attempt to integrate it in overly-simplistic terms would not do justice to the issue, and would serve to distract the focus away from the case studies themselvesxxxviii As recommended by the software designerxxxix Based on a synthesis of the definitions provided by Monge and Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks (2004), 35 and Valdis Krebs , “An Introduction to Social Network Analysis,” http://www.orgnet.com/sna/html (accessed 6 May, 2005)xl Ibid.xli Eusaquito P. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group”, (computer printout of Masters Thesis approved for public release, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004), http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/manalo.pdf. (accessed 28 March, 2005), 67. Ramzi Yousef was convicted of masterminding the 1993 bombing of the US World Trade Center, and was also said to be involved in both the “Oplan Bojinka’ plot and plans to assassinate Pope John Paul II on his visit to the Philippinesxlii Eusaquito P. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group”, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/manalo.pdf. (accessed 28 March, 2005), 74xliii Eusaquito P. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group”, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/manalo.pdf. (accessed 28 March, 2005), 72xlivEusaquito P. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group”, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/manalo.pdf . (accessed 28 March, 2005), 68xlv Manny Mogato, “Blasts in Philippine Capital, South Kill 10”, Reuters, 14 February 2005, http://www.tiscali.co.uk/news/newswire.php/news/reuters/2005/02/14/world/atleast10dieinphilippineblasts.html (accessed 26 June, 2005)xlvi “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002” US Department of State, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/ 2002 / (accessed 26 June, 2005), 102; Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World”, RAND (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004), www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1782/MR1782.sum.pdf (accessed 26 June, 2005), 77xlvii Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today, 11 xlviii Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat”, 78xlix Ibid.

67

ISI – also accused of training members of non-Islamic Indian insurgents in India such as

the Babar Khalsa International (BKI) and the International Seikh Youth Federation

(ISYF), who have been violently agitating for decades for a independent Seikh state,

Khalistan, in what is Indian Punjab. Interestingly, it is alleged that the ISI has also been

keen on creating alliances between the Khalistani and Kashmiri groups,cixalthough

another source declares the opposite.cx The ISI also allegedly has some connection with

Tamil groups in India, as well as the CPI-Maoist and CPN-Maoist.

l Audrey Kurth Cronin et al., “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”, Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ (accessed 26 June, 2005), 4li Eusaquito P. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism?’, 80lii Ibid., 78liii Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”, Congressional Research Service, 25 January 2002, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/index.html (accessed 26 June 2005), 5liv Ibid.lv “MILF agrees to ‘interdict’ criminals, syndicates”, luwaran.com, 29 December 2004, http://www.luwaran.com/ (accessed 30 December, 2004)lvi Eusaquito P. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism?’, 86lvii “Jemaah Islamiah”, Center for Defense Information, 18 October 2002, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1159 (accessed 5 Apri,l 2005)lviii “The Terror Lurking Within Asia”, , , 11 October 2001, http://special.scmp.com/waronterrorism/comment/ZZZ39X1XMSC.html (accessed 26 June, 2005)lix “Troubled return of the Faithful”, Special Report, Philippine Center for Incestigative Journalism, April-June 2003 Issue, http://www.pcij.org/imag/SpecialReport/balik-islam3.html (accesses 26 June 2005)lx Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Bearers of the Sword: Radical Islam, Philippines Insurgency, and Regional Stability”, Military Review, March-April 2002, Http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/sword.htm (accesses 15 February, 2005)lxi Terrorist Group Profile – KMM, Terrorism Knowledge Base, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), http://www.tkb.org?group.jsp?groupID=4401lxii Terrorist Group Profile – Bersatu, MIPT, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3569 (accessed 20 June, 2005)lxiii “Joint Declaration by Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist People’s War, and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Party Unity”, Press Release,http://www.wpb.be/guests/india.htm (accessed 28 March, 2005)lxiv Nihar Nayak, Institute for Conflict Management, “Left Wing Extremism: Synchronized Onslaught”, South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 2, Number 28, January 26, 2004, South Asia Terrorism Portal,http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_28.htm. (accessed 28 March, 2005), 1lxv Ibid.lxvi B. Rahman, “Maoists Gain Momentum in India”, Paper 1251, South Asia Analysis Group, http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1251.html. (accessed 28 March, 2005). The term ‘Naxalite’ is derived from the eastern Indian town of Naxalbari where the original CPI-ML party was born. At least one commentator has suggested that this term has been used by Indian authorities in preference to the term ‘Maoist’ so as not to offend China and possibly undermine India’s improved relationship with that state.lxvii For a more in-depth exploration of the history of this group, see ‘Left-wing Extremist Group: Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) online at the South Asia Terrorism Portal,http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/CPI_M.htm. (accessed 28 March, 2005)lxviii “South Asia: a living volcano of proletarian revolution”, http://cpnm.org/new/ccomposa/cco_news/cops2.htm. (accessed 28 March, 2005). For the Communist Party of Nepal’s ‘spin’ on this event.lxix Nihar Nayak, “Left Wing Extremism: Synchronized Onslaught”, 2; “South Asia: a living volcano of proletarian revolution”, 3lxxviii “South Asia: a living volcano of proletarian revolution”, 4

68

lxxix RIM homepage, http://www.awtw.org/rim/ (accessed 16 December, 2004)lxxx “Nepal Terror Groups – Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/counties/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.htm. (accessed 28 March, 2005)lxxxi See Endnote 65lxxxii RIM, http://www.awtw.org/rim/ (accessed 16 December, 2004)lxxxiii ABNES, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/ABNES.htm (accessed 5 May 2005)lxxxv Sources are unclear regarding this matter. For example, while Loretta Napoleoni states that Harkat-ul-Ansar’s original name was Hizb-ul-Mujahedin (HM), and gives its formation date as 1980 in Karachi, Pakistan, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) merely list HM as a group with which JuA has cooperated, and FAS states that it is mainly comprised of ethnic Kashmiris and names Syed Salahuddin as its leader. The group still exists, and is described by Stern as being the largest Kashmiri militant group. Salahuddin is also identified by Stern as head of the United Jihad Council.lxxxvi Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Terrorist Group Profile, MIPT, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=50 (accessed 5 January 2005)lxxxvii Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 192lxxxviii “Terrorist Groups: An Overview”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/index.html (accessed 19 April, 2005)lxxxix “Jaish, Harkat change names: Report”, Rediff, http://www.rediff.com/news/news/2003.mar/12pak.htm (acessed 7 January 2005)xc “Harakat ul- Mujahidin”, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hum.htm (accessed 12 September 2004)xci “Harkat ul-Ansar”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorit_outfits/harkat_ul_ansar (accessed 19 April 2005)xcii Ibid.xciii “Harakat ul Mujahidin”, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, (Congressional Research Service, 2004)xciv Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 192xcv Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc. 177xcvi Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms London: Verso, 2002), 209xcvii “Muttahida Jehad Council”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terorist_outfits/mjc.htm (accessed 19 April 2005)xcviii SATP - MJCxcix “Terrorist Organization: Harakat ul-Mudjahidin”, MIPT Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/MoreRelatedGroups.jsp?groupID=50 (accessed 23 April, 2005)c “Harakat ul Mujahidin”, Foreign Terrorist Organizationsci SATP - JeMcii “Jaish-e-Mohammad”, Terrorist Group Profile, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=58 (accessed 23 April 2005)ciii Kshitij Prabha, “Terror Enterprise: Organisation, Infrastructure and Resources”, Strategic Analysis, Volume 25, Number 9, December 2001civ “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba”, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 56cv “313”, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3902

69

Saudi Arabiaal Rashid Trust

al Akhtar Trust

al F

MJF

aJF

313

IF

al B

JiI

JKLF

HeI

Pakistan army

IG

JuI-F

KZF

NDFB

ATTF

NLFTDGFI

CIA

JuU

EJG

ARCF

ULFA

TiJ

Taliban

SSPMJC

LTTE

LeT

LeJJuA

JeM

JeI

ISYF

ISI

IIF

HUJI-B

HUJI

HM

HIG

BKI

BCCIal Qaeda

313

Figure 4. Graphic representation of alleged past and present JAMIAT UL-ANSAR ties

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

Jamiat ul-Ansar Network NeighbourhoodGroup Size 46 Computing geodesicsPotential Ties 2070 170 paths of length 1

70

Actual Ties 170 828 paths of length 2Density 8% 1642 paths of length 3

938 paths of length 4 72 paths of length 5 0 paths of length 6

Weighted Avg. Path Length: 2.98Table 7. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators

CENTRALITY METRICSDegrees Betweenness Closeness Power

0.333 LeT 0.364 ISI 0.563 LeT 0.460 ISI0.311 JuA 0.292 MJC 0.556 ISI 0.408 LeT0.267 ISI 0.253 LeT 0.536 JuA 0.402 MJC0.267 MJC 0.209 HM 0.511 MJC 0.354 HM0.222 HM 0.172 DGFI 0.500 HM 0.349 JuA0.222 JeM 0.163 JuA 0.484 JeM 0.284 HUJI-B0.200 HUJI-B 0.132 IIF 0.459 HUJI-B 0.278 DGFI0.156 IIF 0.109 HUJI-B 0.417 al Qaeda 0.273 JeM0.156 SSP 0.062 JeM 0.413 SSP 0.270 IIF0.156 al Qaeda 0.028 SSP 0.409 IIF 0.220 SSP0.133 LeJ 0.022 BCCI 0.402 LeJ 0.213 al Qaeda0.111 DGFI 0.022 CIA 0.395 BKI 0.204 LeJ0.089 313 0.010 al Qaeda 0.395 ISYF 0.197 BKI0.089 Taliban 0.009 313 0.395 KZF 0.197 ISYF0.089 al Rashid Trust 0.006 LeJ 0.388 Taliban 0.197 KZF0.067 BCCI 0.002 JeI 0.388 al Rashid Trust 0.195 BCCI0.067 CIA 0.001 HUJI 0.385 DGFI 0.195 CIA0.067 JuI-F 0.000 313 0.375 JuI-F 0.194 Taliban0.044 BKI 0.000 ARCF 0.369 BCCI 0.194 al Rashid Trust0.044 HUJI 0.000 ATTF 0.369 CIA 0.188 JuI-F0.044 ISYF 0.000 BKI 0.369 LTTE 0.187 3130.044 JeI 0.000 EJG 0.366 313 0.184 LTTE0.044 KZF 0.000 HIG 0.363 Pakistan army 0.181 JeI0.044 LTTE 0.000 HeI 0.360 JeI 0.181 Pakistan army0.044 Saudi Arabia 0.000 IF 0.352 al Akhtar Trust 0.176 al Akhtar Trust0.022 313 0.000 IG 0.341 313 0.170 3130.022 ARCF 0.000 ISYF 0.341 IF 0.170 IF0.022 ATTF 0.000 JKLF 0.341 MJF 0.170 MJF0.022 EJG 0.000 JiI 0.341 TiJ 0.170 TiJ0.022 HIG 0.000 JuI-F 0.341 aJF 0.170 aJF0.022 HeI 0.000 JuU 0.341 al B 0.170 al B0.022 IF 0.000 KZF 0.341 al F 0.170 al F0.022 IG 0.000 LTTE 0.336 HIG 0.168 HIG0.022 JKLF 0.000 MJF 0.336 HeI 0.168 HeI0.022 JiI 0.000 NDFB 0.336 JKLF 0.168 JKLF0.022 JuU 0.000 NLFT 0.336 JiI 0.168 JiI0.022 MJF 0.000 Pakistan army 0.324 HUJI 0.162 HUJI0.022 NDFB 0.000 Saudi Arabia 0.317 ARCF 0.158 ARCF0.022 NLFT 0.000 Taliban 0.292 EJG 0.146 EJG

71

0.022 Pakistan army 0.000 TiJ 0.292 IG 0.146 IG0.022 TiJ 0.000 ULFA 0.292 JuU 0.146 JuU0.022 ULFA 0.000 aJF 0.280 ATTF 0.140 ATTF0.022 aJF 0.000 al Akhtar Trust 0.280 NDFB 0.140 NDFB0.022 al Akhtar Trust 0.000 al B 0.280 NLFT 0.140 NLFT0.022 al B 0.000 al F .280 ULFA 0.140 ULFA0.022 al F 0.000 al Rashid Trust 0.273 Saudi Arabia 0.136 Saudi Arabia

0.082 Average 0.040 Average 0.373 Average 0.206 Average

0.262 Centralisation 0.331 Centralisation 0.393 Centralisation

Table 8. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

ANALYSIS

The largest of the networks created within this research project, this case study analysis

demonstrates the sheer number of groups operating in and around Pakistan today, and

provides a good example of the impact of antecedent variables in that many of these

groups were either founded in response to or as a result of the anti-Soviet guerrilla war

in Afghanistan in the 1980s – a war that shaped their perceptions and provided

extensive educational opportunities at both the strategic and tactical levels.

The graph itself demonstrates an all-channel network at its centre, surrounded by a

number of ‘star’ configurations. Note that LTTE is a peripheral player in this network.

Although the graph was built around the case study group Jamiat ul-Asar, this group

only rates highly on the ‘Degrees’ metrics, sharing the top spot with fellow insurgents

Laskar-e-Toiba. Other agents with high ratings include the Pakistani ISI, the MJC and

HM – all at the centre of the three main ‘star’ configurations noted above. Overall, the

ISI has the highest ‘Power’ rating within the graph – an interesting position for a state

agent to be in even in its local environment, especially given Pakistan’s official position

on the ‘war on terror’. There are interesting issues here regarding either Pakistan’s

official and unofficial foreign policy goals, or concerning continuing issues of internal

division between or within Pakistan’s state agencies.

72

Again, these results affirm to some extent the lack of bias in the data collection process.

As mentioned above, MJC scored very highly across all metrics. This is an important

umbrella organisation, set up (allegedly by the ISI as a proxy agent) to coordinate the

various Pakistani groups in their activities in the Kashmir region, and so the issue of

multicollinearity must be raised.

There are indications of other possible examples of multicollinearity within this case

study, as many of the groups share members as well as occasionally undertaking

operations together, in addition to many of the actors merging the Kashmir divisions of

their groups under the umbrella MJC.

External intervening variables of particular interest might include the influence of

entities such as MJC and the ISI on the case study group, the tensions between different

sectors of the Pakistani government regarding both their domestic and external interests

and responsibilities, and the sheer number of groups alongside which Jamiat ul-Ansar

must operate and compete for support.

Case Study 4

KONGRA-GEL

73

(Other names include Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, KADEK, Kongra-Gel, Kurdistan

Freedom and Democracy Congress?

History of Organisation Founded in 1978 by former Chairman Abdullah Ocalan,

Kongra-Gel, better known by its earlier name, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), set

out to destroy the Turkish government as the means toward the establishment of a

Kurdish state, United Democratic Kurdistan.cxi The Kurdish region, however, crosses

into a number of nation states including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Armenia and Syria. After

spending some years establishing the organisation, and competing against other Kurdish

groups for dominance, the group began its armed activity against both the Turkish

authorities and the traditional Kurdish elite who maintained their dominance through

supporting the state. In 1999 Ocalan was arrested in Kenya and extradited to Turkey

where he now remains in a Turkish jail. In jail Ocalan announced that the PKK should

halt its militant activities, and in 2002 the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan

Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) supposedly in acquiescence to his request

and announced a 3-stage path to the peaceful gaining of Kurdish autonomy – but

maintained its military training programme. In 2003 the group changed its name again,

this time to Kongra-Gel.

Ideology Ethno-nationalism; Marxism-Leninism.

Goals Secession - the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in south

eastern Turkey – although another source states its aim is to establish a larger

independent ‘United Democratic Kurdistan’ that includes not only south eastern Turkey

but also includes parts of Syria, Iran and Iraq.cxii

74

Organisation The group was established around the leadership of one man,

Abdullah Ocalan, who micro-managed every action Stalin-style, and whose instructions

had to be obeyed.cxiii Original members of the group who might have challenged his

authority were allegedly killed off,cxiv and intellectual prowess was discouraged within

the organisation.cxv The rural tradition of subservience to one’s feudal or tribal lord was

encouraged to transfer to Ocalan as unchallenged leader. The group became the centre

of its members’ lives.cxvi Nevertheless, groupings of the PKK did operate in different

parts of the countrycxvii under various guerrilla commanders.cxviii

Geopolitical Focus Turkey, although the group is said to largely base itself over the

border in Iran.

Links

STATE LEVEL

Syria (historical) - the PKK was allowed to establish training camps in the Syrian-

controlled Lebanese Bekaa Valleycxix until the group’s eviction in 1998.

INSURGENT GROUPS

Devrimci Sol (DHKP-C), also known as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-

Front – a Marxist revolutionary group who believes the Turkish regime is controlled by

the West and must be overthrown;cxx Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA-C) –

Ally;cxxi Maoist Communist Party (MKP), formerly known as the Turkish Communist

Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) – a relatively small and obscure communist, anti-

Western guerrilla group that is a member of RIM ; Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (KFH) –

a suspected splinter group of the PKK; Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IGERF) ;

Kurdish Patriotic Union (KPU) – another suspected PKK splinter group.

CRIMINAL

The PKK ‘taxes’ ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Unknown.

75

SECONDARY LINKS OF INTEREST

None.

RIM

MKP

KPUIGERF

DHKP-C

KFHSyriaPKK

Figure 5. Graphic representation of alleged past and present KONGRA GEL ties

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

76

Kongra-Gel Network Neighbourhood

Group Size 8 Computing geodesicsPotential Ties 56 16 paths of length 1Actual Ties 16 32 paths of length 2Density 29% 8 paths of length 3

0 paths of length 4

Weighted Average Path Length: 1.86

Table 9. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators

CENTRALITY METRICSDegrees Betweenness Closeness Power

0.857 PKK 0.857 PKK 0.875 PKK 0.866 PKK0.429 MKP 0.286 MKP 0.636 MKP 0.461 MKP0.286 DHKP-C 0.000 DHKP-C 0.583 DHKP-C 0.292 DHKP-C0.143 IGERF 0.000 IGERF 0.500 IGERF 0.250 IGERF0.143 KFH 0.000 KFH 0.500 KFH 0.250 KFH 0.143 KPU 0.000 KPU 0.500 KPU 0.250 KPU0.143 RIM 0.000 RIM 0.500 Syria 0.250 Syria 0.143 Syria 0.000 Syria 0.412 RIM 0.206 RIM

0.286 Average 0.143 Average 0.563 Average 0.353 Average

0.762 Centralisation 0.816 Centralisation 0.772 Centralisation

Table 10. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com

ANALYSIS

77

As is made obvious in the graph, the PKK is an example of an insurgent group that has

made very few links with other entities and, one could argue, may have paid the price

for this approach.

This graph resembles a ‘star’ configuration with the PKK at its centre. With only one

exception, all communication between the other groups must be brokered through the

PKK – which gives this group a lot of relative power within the network. Nearly all the

other actors within this network, are small domestic Turkish organisations with little

power, and the state that once offered PKK leader Ocalan a safe haven has long since

abandoned both him and his group in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

Thus, while the PKK rates extremely highly across all four indications of centrality, this

does not necessarily mean much when one looks at the wider environment within which

the PKK is operating. This case therefore serves as a good example of how data can

produce measurements that on their own look impressive, but after the addition of

qualitative analysis can nonetheless be rendered insignificant.

The second group of interest here is the MKP, which rates second in the centrality

metrics. Although no other relationships were uncovered between this group and any

others, the fact that it also has links to the DHKP-C and the internationalist RIM,

coupled with its Communist ideology (which is internationalist in outlook) indicates

that this group deserves greater scrutiny.

The internal intervening variable of most interest is probably the management processes

of the PKK. As noted earlier, PKK leader Ocalan was a dictatorial leader, which could

have influenced the group when it came to forging external alliances. This was not a

man who was willing to cede his power and authority, and by this it could be construed

that he may have feared this outcome should his group align with any external insurgent

groups more powerful than his own. Although he now languishes in a Turkish jail, it

appears his organisation still defers to his will and so this situation persists. This

suggestion of the relationship between internal management structures and the external

environment is an important one, and deserves further investigation.

78

Case Study 5

LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

(Also operating under known front organisations including the World Tamil Association

(WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils

(FACT), Ellalan Force, Sangillan Force, Tamil Centre for Human Rights, Tamil

Information Centre)

History of Organisation Founded in 1976 by its leader Velupillai Brabharakaran,

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been described as the dominant ethnic

Tamil (Hindu) separatist group in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was basically in a state of civil

war from 1983 until 2002 when the Norwegian government was successful in brokering

a cease-fire. Internal political strife within the government of the day, however,

destabilised the peace process, with the Sri Lankan President accusing the Norwegians

of pro-Tamil bias, and refusing to support the development of any kind of federal

system that would diminish Sri Lankan state sovereignty.

Considered, at least until 2001, to be the world’s most ruthless and comprehensive para-

state terrorist organisation, it has been described as “the prototype for the type of

insurgent organization that the world is likely to witness in the next decade” (Chalk

2000, 8). The LTTE maintains an elite fighting wing, an air force, an amphibious group,

a suicide commando group, a women’s division, cxxii an intelligence group, an

international procurement group, and a political office. It is the only terrorist group to

have assassinated two heads of state.cxxiii

Ideology Ethno-nationalist; Marxist-Leninist.

79

Goals Long Term Secession - the establishment of an independent state,

Tamil Eelam, in what is currently the Tamil-dominated northeast region of Sri Lanka.

Short Term Limited autonomy - in recent years the group has softened

its demands regarding complete rights of secession, and has indicated that it would be

satisfied with being granted rights of regional self-determination, with the possible

granting of an autonomous Tamil-run area within a Sri Lankan federal structure.

Organisational Structure The LTTE is said to be organised along a two-tier

structure with a dominant military wing supported by a subordinate political wing.

Oversight of both elements is managed by a Central Committee, which also supports an

International Secretariat that is responsible for raising funds, purchasing and shipping

supplies of weapons, and for garnering favourable publicity outside of Sri Lanka.

Prabhakaran maintains his position as Chairman of the Central Committee and

Commander of the LTTE armed forces,cxxiv and encourages a ‘cult of personality’

around his leadership, which includes his supposed hand-picking of all suicide

recruits.cxxv

All LTTE members are said to be fighting cadres, with the exception of only a few

advisors. Management of the LTTE is handled through dividing its activities into at

least six strategic areas, namely political, military, intelligence (which includes internal

security and counter-intelligence as well as deep penetration, the planting of sleeper

agents and front line intelligence-gathering), women, finance and procurement. The

organisation is then further divided geographically into seven commands under district

commanders who answer to Prabhakaran, with the fighters within each command sub-

divided into various political and military wings and by their specialist skills.

Operational commanders within the military wings are said to command their fighters

from the front so as to maximise all opportunities in real time.

The group plans for redundancy in its operations outside LTTE safe areas, sending a

number of independent squads out with the same mission so that if one group is

captured or killed, another may still get through.

Cellular intelligence networks are cultivated in hostile areas and coordinated from

LTTE-controlled areas where the ‘handler’ is safe. A parallel LTTE military

80

intelligence network utilises agents in the Sri Lankan security forces to verify

intelligence gathered. Small support cells are used for ‘Black Tiger’ suicide attacks.

Outside Sri Lanka the LTTE is said to have built a considerable support ‘network’ that

operates in more than 40 countries, with international coordination at least until recently

being run from the UK and France.

Geopolitical Focus The LTTE control significant areas in the northern and eastern

provinces of Sri Lanka, where they are able to openly recruit, train, and store munitions.

The group effectively functions as a para-state organisation, with its own civil

administration that includes the provision of banks, postal services, broadcasting

stations, police, courts and taxation services. The LTTE have been militarily active in

other parts of Sri Lanka including the capital Colombo, and India.

Strength The group is estimated to have a guerrilla force of around 8,000 - 14,000

members trained for unconventional or semi-conventional combat. The LTTE is also

said to be developing its conventional force capability.

Links

STATE LEVEL

Tamil National Alliance, Indiacxxvi - a collection of Tamil political groups.

INSURGENT GROUPS

Historical links with some Palestinian groups, including Hamas and Hizbollah, the

PLO, Morocco’s Polisario, and with the socialist Palestinian Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP) in particular which provided early training of troops and supplied

arms; Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist); Communist Party of Nepal-

Maoist; (CPN-Maoist); the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and

the Khalistan Liberation Front (KLF).

CRIMINAL

There are allegations that the group traffics narcotics through its international arms

smuggling network, although nothing has been proven except at an individual

membership level. The LTTE navy has also been accused of running arms to Abu

81

Sayyaf (AS) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on behalf of Jamiat ul-Ansar

(JuA), and of accepting arms from the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Agency

(ISI),cxxvii the Pakistani equivalent of the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA).

SECONDARY LINKS OF INTEREST

See discussion below.

TNG

MJC

EROS

Myanmar

SWAPOANCL KR

HM

APWG

Syria

TULF

ULFA

PMK

RAWPKK

JRA

JuA

MILF

AS

PLO

PFLP

Polisario

KLF

Libya

FARC

CPN-Maoist

ISICPI-Maoist

LTTE

82

Figure 6. Graphic representation of alleged past and present LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM ties

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com)

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Network NeighbourhoodGroup Size 29 Computing geodesicsPotential Ties 812 64 paths of length 1Actual Ties 64 606 paths of length 2Density 8% 188 paths of length 3

8 paths of length 4 0 paths of length 5

Weighted Average Path Length: 2.16

Table 11. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators

CENTRALITY METRICSDegrees Betweenness Closeness Power

0.893 LTTE 0.978 LTTE 0.903 LTTE 0.940 LTTE 0.107 EROS 0.140 PFLP 0.519 PFLP 0.329 PFLP0.107 HM 0.034 HM 0.509 HM 0.272 HM0.107 JuA 0.034 JuA 0.509 JuA 0.272 JuA 0.107 PFLP 0.001 EROS 0.500 EROS 0.251 EROS 0.071 MJC 0.000 ANCL 0.491 PLO 0.246 PLO0.071 PLO 0.000 APWG 0.491 RAW 0.246 RAW0.071 RAW 0.000 AS 0.483 ANCL 0.241 ANCL0.036 ANCL 0.000 CPI-Maoist 0.483 APWG 0.241 APWG0.036 APWG 0.000 CPN-Maoist 0.483 AS 0.241 AS0.036 AS 0.000 FARC 0.483 CPI-Maoist 0.241 CPI-Maoist0.036 CPI-Maoist 0.000 ISI 0.483 CPN-Maoist 0.241 CPN-Maoist0.036 CPN-Maoist 0.000 JRA 0.483 FARC 0.241 FARC0.036 FARC 0.000 KLF 0.483 ISI 0.241 ISI0.036 ISI 0.000 KR 0.483 KLF 0.241 KLF0.036 JRA 0.000 Libya 0.483 KR 0.241 KR0.036 KLF 0.000 MILF 0.483 Libya 0.241 Libya0.036 KR 0.000 MJC 0.483 MILF 0.241 MILF0.036 Libya 0.000 Myanmar 0.483 Myanmar 0.241 Myanmar0.036 MILF 0.000 PKK 0.483 PMK 0.241 PMK0.036 Myanmar 0.000 PLO 0.483 Polisario 0.241 Polisario0.036 PKK 0.000 PMK 0.483 SWAPO 0.241 SWAPO0.036 PMK 0.000 Polisario 0.483 Syria 0.241 Syria0.036 Polisario 0.000 RAW 0.483 TNG 0.241 TNG0.036 SWAPO 0.000 SWAPO 0.483 TULF 0.241 TULF

83

0.036 Syria 0.000 Syria 0.483 ULFA 0.241 ULFA0.036 TNG 0.000 TNG 0.346 JRA 0.173 JRA0.036 TULF 0.000 TULF 0.346 MJC 0.173 MJC0.036 ULFA 0.000 ULFA 0.346 PKK 0.173 PKK

0.079 Average 0.041 Average 0.487 Average 0.264 Average

0.874 Centralisation 0.971 Centralisation 0.877 CentralisationTable 12. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.comANALYSIS

The LTTE’s external network is a clear example of a ‘star’ configuration, with the

LTTE sitting in a clear central position within this matrix, topping all centrality

measurements with ratings well above the other groups.

When viewing this particular case study graph, however, it is important to be mindful of

the data input rules established for this project and explained in some detail in the

methodology section. Closer inspection of the graph and the groups within it will show

that a good number of these constitute the case study groups themselves but whose own

networks are excluded from this network as a means of containing the studies and

avoiding repetition. In fact, when the historical links are removed as well, then little

remains.

This approach has therefore rendered the metrics for this case study almost irrelevant

(though not invalid, under the rules of the study) when these two points are taken into

account. But by putting more emphasis into analysing the qualitative data, some useful

observations and ideas for future quantitative study may still be generated.

It is obvious both from the brief exploration of the group’s internal structures that in

themselves also resemble networks, and from the nature of the groups identified within

this graph, that the LTTE is a very powerful organisation both domestically and

globally. If one visualises what an integrated graph would look like – a network of all

the case study networks – one can see that the LTTE is likely to exist as an important

structural hole, a relationship broker across myriad groups and networks. Given the

qualitative information known about the group, especially concerning its international

shipping capabilities and its wide network of overt and covert front organisations, lobby

84

groups, and affiliated organisations, it can be construed that probably out of all the six

case study groups, it is the LTTE that deserves a much deeper level of investigation.

Case Study 6

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA

History of Organisation The largest guerrilla group in Colombia, and the oldest in

the Latin American continent.cxxviii Formed in 1964 by Manuel Marulanda Velez and

some other members of the Communist Party of Columbia originally as a Marxist,

rural-based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army.cxxix During the 1980s it expanded its

predominantly rural membership to include militants from the urban middle classes.cxxx

After the end of the Cold War it is said to have “underwent a deep and complex

strategic transition” that encompassed its profile, ideology, and political and military

operational processes.cxxxi In 1998 the Colombian government granted FARC a

‘demilitarised zone’ of 42,000 square kilometres as a goodwill gesture after reaching a

ceasefire with the groupcxxxii - an act that assisted FARC to present itself as almost a

parallel state,cxxxiii or a state within a state - although this has now been retracted (FARC,

however, still controls the area). FARC is now said to operate over about 40% of the

country, including the capital city Bogota. Peace negotiations with the government

ended unsuccessfully in 2002. In 2002 FARC was still being described as the world’s

largest and richest terrorist organisation.cxxxiv

Ideology Marxist-Leninist – although over time has focused on presenting a more

inclusive ‘Bolivarian’ nationalist-leftist message, with greater emphasis on critiquing

the government’s inadequacies than on a socialist revolution that would overthrow a so-

called illegitimate regime type.cxxxv

85

Goals Long Term Originally, FARC’s goal was the revolutionary overthrow

of Colombian regime and the establishment of a Marxist state. Now, its message is a

little vague as to its long term aspirations in that it seems to want to be considered a

credible alternative to the current government.cxxxvi

Short Term Maintenance and expansion of FARC’s financial and

territorial control within Colombia, and the continuing destabilisation of the Colombian

government.cxxxvii

Organisational Structure FARC is said to be run by a Secretariat of seven

individuals, including a leader (while FARC Founder Pedro Marin is still described as

the group’s leader, another source identifies former leader of FARC’s southern front,

Jorge Briceno, as FARC’s new military and ideological head. cxxxviii At least one of the

seven is said to be responsible for military affairs, and another for international

relationships. Its command and control system is said to consist of “a hierarchy of

midlevel leaders who meet periodically to formulate basic strategic guidance, allowing

the leaders discretion in the way that they achieve their overall objectives” (Cragin and

Daly 2004, 41). Communication of these general objectives to the local leadership is

said to be made through radio transmission stations.cxxxix There have, however,

reportedly been some problems in the communication process between top and mid-

level leaders.cxl

The organisation has a military-type structure, allegedly divided into several fluid and

moveable urban fronts – and from 1996 adding at least four mobile blocks. It also is

said to divide its members into small cells that are not in contact with each other, but

that each have communication links with some level of FARC central command

through which they receive their operational instructions.cxli Unlike most other guerrilla

armies, FARC militants wear uniforms.

FARC’s innovative new “decentralized organic” (Ortiz 2002, 127) organisational

structure has been attributed as one of the key reasons for its growth and

consolidation.cxlii

86

Membership Approximately 4,500cxliii to 18,000cxliv armed combatants plus perhaps

thousands more members.cxlv

Geopolitical Focus Primarily Colombia (the FARC has been described as a state-

shell organisation in that it displays four of the suggested nine main characteristics of a

modern statecxlvi), although is said to also operate in the border areas of Venezuela,

Panama, Peru, Brazil and Ecuador. It is alleged that FARC has also been identified as

present in Venezuela, Panama and Ecuador, and of maintaining offices in Cuba, Mexico

and Europe.cxlvii FARC also supposedly does business in the notorious Paraguayan

‘Triborder Region’cxlviii city of Ciudad del Este – “a Mecca for terror and crime

organisations” (Napoleoni 2004, 229) including IRA, ETA, Hizbollah and Islamic

Jihad.

Links

STATE LEVEL

Cuba - FARC was said to at one point have had ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba, cxlix

and the Cuban connection may still be active with the allegation that Cuba is supplying

military training to both FARC and the ELN on its soil;cl Colombian Communist Party

(CCP) – remains associated with FARC, although the CCP now disputes any formal

relationship.cli FARC was also involved in setting up an electoral alliance called the

Union Patriotica (UP) with other leftist groups including the CCP, from which FARC

later withdrew.clii

INSURGENT GROUPS

Ricardo Franco Faction (FRF) – a criminal faction of FARC; National Liberation

Army (ELN) – a group that is both a rival and an ally of FARC. It has been alleged that

these two groups met in the mid-1990s to discuss the next phase of the Colombian

insurgency programme;cliii Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) – alleged in

2001 when three supposed IRA explosives experts were caught travelling in Colombia

with false passportscliv - all of them with past or present ties to Sinn Fein.clv Interestingly,

after 2001 there seemed to be a marked improvement in bomb-making, urban tactics

and targeting that may or may not be linked to this visit. Other commentators suggested

that the men were there to teach urban warfare techniques to a hitherto primarily rural-

focused insurgent group.clvi Initial contact was alleged to have happened in Cuba (the

87

IRA also supposedly made contact in Cuba with FARC’s leftist guerrilla adversary in

Colombia, the ELN), and at least 15 IRA members are alleged to have travelled to

Colombia since 1998. The alliance was said to be based around a deal where either

cocaine profits,clvii money or weaponsclviii were exchanged for training assistance;

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) – allegedly has links with FARC, supposedly

sharing weapons technology;clix Free Homeland Party (PPL) of Paraguay – suggested

to be a mainly economic alliance;clx Japanese Red Army (JRA) – the Japanese Red

Army has allegedly been detected as providing training for FARC, possibly made

possible through the FARC’s relationship with Hezbollah;clxi Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Ealam (LTTE) – it was asserted in 1995 that the LTTE and FARC had established

links, possibly through the LTTE’s alleged acquisition of larger, ocean-crossing

vessels.clxii

CRIMINAL

Colombian Drug Cartels (CDC) – FARC’s alliances with Colombian drug cartels are

estimated to reap the group US$200-400 million annually.

Tijuana Cartel, Mexico (TC)– FARC was accused of being involved in a guns-for-drugs

swap with this criminal group in 2000.clxiii

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Unknown.

SECONDARY LINKS OF INTEREST

ETA with Herri Batasuna – the (now outlawed) Spanish political party, commonly

referred to as ETA’s political wing; Haika – in 2000 the ETA-aligned Spanish Jarrai

(youth) organisation merged with its France-based counterpart, Gazteriak, to form

Haika;clxiv Cuba – it has been alleged that some ETA members have received sanctuary

in Cubaclxv; Internationalist Revolutionary Armed Groups (GARI) – ETA is suspected

to be associated with this umbrella organisation.

IRA with ETA – the IRA and ETA are alleged to be building closer ties,clxvi perhaps

through each group’s political wings;clxvii Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) –

88

following an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operation in the Jenin refugee camp, an

allegation surfaced that the pipe bombs discovered there show remarkable similarity to

IRA bomb technology.clxviii The Jenin refugee camp, referred to in some circles as the

‘suicide capital’ of the Palestinian Territories,clxix is said to be home to a number of

Palestinian insurgent groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah/Tanzim/al

Aqsa and Hamas.clxx

89

CCP-UP

HB

TCFRF

PFLP

PLO

QLC

PRT

M-19 GARI

Libya

CDC

PPL

Cuba

Hezbollah

JRA

FMLN

LTTE

Haika

ETA

PIRAELN

CGSB

FARC

Figure 7. Graphic representation of alleged past and present REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA ties

(Inflow 3.1 Software, Copyright © 1988-2005, Valdis Krebs, http://www.orgnet.com

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Network Neighbourhood

Group Size 24 Computing geodesics

90

Potential Ties 552 68 paths of length 1Actual Ties 68 264 paths of length 2Density 12% 320 paths of length 3

78 paths of length 4 0 paths of length 5

Weighted Avg. Path Length: 2.56

Table 13. Summary of nodal, dyadic and network level indicators

CENTRALITY METRICSDegrees Betweenness Closeness Power

0.609 FARC 0.746 FARC 0.719 FARC 0.732 FARC0.304 ETA 0.282 ETA 0.548 ETA 0.415 ETA0.217 CGSB 0.173 CGSB 0.535 Cuba 0.331 CGSB0.217 Cuba 0.089 PIRA 0.523 PIRA 0.306 Cuba0.217 PIRA 0.078 Cuba 0.489 CGSB 0.306 PIRA0.130 ELN 0.068 LTTE 0.469 ELN 0.264 LTTE0.130 JRA 0.040 JRA 0.460 LTTE 0.246 JRA0.130 LTTE 0.020 M-19 0.451 JRA 0.236 ELN0.130 M-19 0.005 PLO 0.442 Hezbollah 0.221 Hezbollah0.087 Hezbollah 0.003 ELN 0.426 CCP-UP 0.213 CCP-UP0.087 Libya 0.003 PFLP 0.426 CDC 0.213 CDC0.087 PFLP 0.000 CCP-UP 0.426 FMLN 0.213 FMLN0.087 PLO 0.000 CDC 0.426 FRF 0.213 FRF0.087 QLC 0.000 FMLN 0.426 PPL 0.213 PPL0.043 CCP-UP 0.000 FRF 0.426 TC 0.213 TC0.043 CDC 0.000 GARI 0.390 M-19 0.205 M-190.043 FMLN 0.000 HB 0.371 Libya 0.188 PLO0.043 FRF 0.000 Haika 0.371 PLO 0.185 Libya0.043 GARI 0.000 Hezbollah 0.359 GARI 0.180 GARI0.043 HB 0.000 Libya 0.359 HB 0.180 HB0.043 Haika 0.000 PPL 0.359 Haika 0.180 Haika0.043 PPL 0.000 PRT 0.343 QLC 0.172 QLC0.043 PRT 0.000 QLC 0.333 PFLP 0.168 PFLP0.043 TC 0.000 TC 0.333 PRT 0.167 PRT

0.123 Average 0.063 Average 0.434 Average 0.248 Average

0.530 Centralisation 0.713 Centralisation 0.60 Centralisation

Table 14.. Summary of nodal level centrality metrics

ANALYSIS

91

From an historical perspective, it appears that the early FARC forged its links with two

distinct types of group: with fellow insurgents active on the domestic Colombian scene,

and with sympathetic ‘Communist’ states, primarily through Cuba – the USSR’s main

representative in the Americas. Around the same time as receiving some state

sponsorship, FARC was a member of the CGSB, an umbrella group that brought

together all the active leftist groups within Colombia in order that they be in a position

to negotiate with the Colombian government. This group rated highly across the

centrality scores, and yet did not survive into the present day. FARC had already

withdrawn from the group, however, some time before its eventual disbandment, and

this departure may have been a contributing factor. Many of the CGSB member groups

are now no longer in existence.

Instead, as a consequence of a long-term internal restructuring programme, coupled

with a diminishment in state support, FARC expanded its relationship horizons to

include a number of well-established primarily European insurgent groups such as

PIRA and ETA, along with the LTTE and at least two groups from the Middle East with

a known presence in Latin America. If correct, the JRA connection is particularly

interesting as this long-standing internationalist group that was thought to be based

within the formerly Syrian-controlled Bekka Valley region of Lebanon, has been rarely

heard of for a number of years.

This graph, like the others, shows multiple ‘star’ configurations, the largest in the

constellation belonging to FARC, but with other smaller stars around both PIRA and

ETA. There also appears to be a small all-channel network between these three groups,

and PIRA’s position also indicates that it is a structural hole – a potential broker

between either FARC or ETA, and the PLO (which is, as explained in Chapter One, an

umbrella group itself, and embedded in its own vast networks of networks).

The metrics show that FARC has the highest centrality scores within the identified

network, as demonstrated by its topping of degrees, betweenness and closeness, and

power. FARC’s scores, when compared to the averages of these three measurements,

underline the strength of these observations. This means that as well as having the most

direct links with other actors, FARC also serves as the ‘broker’ between many of the

peripheral groups, a position that grants it high relative power within this network

92

structure, although PIRA’s position appears stronger within the overall international

environment.

ETA, in comparison, although coming second to FARC across all three centrality

metrics, lags way behind on the degrees and betweenness ratings, which results in a

much lower overall power rating.

Cuba and PIRA also rate reasonably highly across the measurements in relation to both

their closeness to the case study group, and their relative power within the network as it

has been identified. Cuba may have been weakened by the collapse of the USSR, but

these metrics demonstrate that it is still a key supporter of insurgency both in Europe as

well as the Americas.

It seems, however, that FARC’s relationship with PIRA - while there must be some

ideological symmetry - is primarily a transactional one, with bomb-making expertise

coming from PIRA and being traded possibly for money or drugs that PIRA can on-sell.

In Colombia itself, although FARC still seems to have on-going contact with its

ideological ally and rival the ELN, FARC has chosen to work very closely with

Colombian drug cartels – both for financial reward, and probably because this type of

arrangement also serves to increase regional destabilisation.clxxi It can be logically

construed that these cartels in turn are nodes in their own extensive criminal networks

that would need to have been established for the transport and sale of narcotics across

the globe.

As part of FARC’s consolidation process, and perhaps what makes it attractive to some

of these groups, is its control over territory – which means therefore that access itself is

controlled by the group, rendering these zones no-go areas for state military and

intelligence services and safe-havens for any ‘invited guests’.

The question of the influence of intervening variables needs to be addressed. It could be

the case that FARC has solidified its position through its control over territory, its

strong financial position or the ideological adaptations it has made in the past decade

and the subsequent changes this has had upon group structure and strategic preferences.

93

Further investigation would be required to attempt to rate these (or other) characteristics

any order of importance.

94

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESSThis research project was the result of recognising that there could be knowledge gained

through the application of ‘new tools’ to ‘old information’. Much data exists in the

myriad books, articles and online resources pertaining to terrorism and insurgency, and

although in many instances it is incomplete - or the result of expert conjecture rather

than verified fact - much also seems to have been under-utilised by security analysts.

This study was designed as the first step in an attempt to address this.

The rationale behind the methodological approach taken to view aspects of this public

information afresh, was that it seemed inconceivable that when it came to networking

that al Qaeda could be the only group (or movement) actively pursuing this

organisational approach across the bubbling mass of insurgency, revolt and revolution

that constitutes the contested international system in which we live. Surely if leftist

groups in particular had been striving to forge both strategic and tactical alliances at

least as far back as the 1960s, then it was likely that this process was still going on in

today’s increasingly interconnected environment?

Through taking on board this assumption, it became clear that it constituted the

foundation of a theory that needed to be tested, a theory that argued that insurgent

groups were highly likely to have made and be continuing to make alliances with other

organisations insurgent and otherwise in an attempt to further their own ends, or at least

not to see their power diminished.

An hypothesis was formed to test this theory. It argued the simple case that all currently

active insurgent groups, no matter what their geographic or ideological location, are

consciously embedded within networks.

As it was both premature - and unrealistic in a practical sense - to fully test this

hypothesis across the hundreds of insurgent groups currently in existence within the

95

confines of this short study, it was nevertheless an issue well suited to preliminary

testing through a comparative small n case study approach, where six publicly identified

and diverse insurgent groups would have the information known about them closely

scrutinised for information that alleged the existence of links. Along with this important

information, other general group attributes would also be noted – attributes that all

groups had in common– in order to produce a brief yet informative case study data set.

As far as can be understood from the literature and from expert opinion (Valdis Krebs,

personal communication, 21 June, 2005),clxxii it appears that while works have been

published that promote the application of network analysis approaches to covert groups,

nothing has been published to date that attempts to apply these tools empirically to

actual case study research.

For the purposes of this unique study that set out to determine from a ‘most similar’

comparative approach both the existence and then the breadth of any networked links

across legitimate and illegitimate groups, the six proscribed case study groups

themselves were determined to be the independent variables, thus avoiding any

criticism of selecting on the dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study

(and the focus of the study was to determine this) was specified as being any

relationships identified between the independent variables and other groups –

relationships that at the beginning of the exercise existed only hypothetically.

Following the layering of the various background components that included an

explanation of network theory, the reviews of relevant literatures, and a detailed

methodology section, the focus of the study turned to the actual case studies themselves.

After the collection of information around the six groups, the data was entered onto

‘Inflow’ for quantitative analysis, and the quantitative results interpreted qualitatively.

The results and their implications will be discussed and appraised in the discussion that

follows:

96

RESULTSThe research process undertaken in this study supports the hypothesis to the extent that

all six insurgent groups examined were shown to be embedded within networked

relationships.

DISCUSSIONThe validation of this hypothesis gives weight to the theory that insurgent groups

operating in the current environment are predisposed towards forging alliances with

other groups in order to further their goals, whether these goals be long or short term in

nature.

Each of the six groups studied were shown to have forged links either within their

immediate domestic environment, regionally, or globally.

Within the confines of the collection rules discussed in the methodology, including for

example the fact that only links of up to two steps out from the case study groups were

to be included in the study, the size and shape of each network varied considerably.

One of networks for example consisted of only 8 entities, while the largest displayed 46

organisations. These compare with the average number of nodes across the six groups

of 25.7clxxiii organisations.

The average weighted path length across all the groups averaged out at 2.5clxxivsteps, this

figure being the shortest path length between any two groups in the network. The

individual results of each case study matched this figure fairly closely.

Network density across the groups ranged from 8% to 29%, with an average density of

14%. There is a correlation between the size of the group and its density with the larger

networks displaying small density ratings, and the smaller networks rating more highly,

which is to be expected, as the larger the group the more potential the cross-ties.

The ‘star’ configuration type dominated the graphs (although mention must be made

again here of the inaccuracy of the LTTE map for reasons discussed in the analysis of

97

this group’s measurements), although all-channel and chain models were also

represented though to a lesser extent. This may indicate some accidental bias regarding

the case study groups chosen in that they all turned out to be reasonably large and well-

established groups within their home environments. Alternatively, this could suggest

that it is the ‘star’ model that may somehow dominate the landscape of insurgent groups

through some kind of propensity within groups to cluster with equitable or weaker

entities, be this driven by group-level psychological factors or structural inevitability.

The dominance of the ‘star’ model may also, for example, may be genuinely universal

as an indicator of when groups reach a certain size or strength, as they perhaps court

numbers of weaker groups while at the same time forging a few key alliances with

similar or larger sized groups who may be rivals as well as allies. It is worth noting here

that groups with high ‘Power’ ratings can either be conduits or suppressors of

transaction flows between other groups, a position that would be coveted. The “Power’

metrics are a synthesis of the ‘Betweenness’ and ‘Closeness’ ratings - ‘Closeness’

giving an indication of the level of autonomy a group enjoys within the network, and

‘Betweenness’ depicting the strength of the position a group holds with regard to the

other groups and their inter-group interactions.

The ‘star’ models are supported by pockets of all-channel relationships in key strategic

areas, with chain models perhaps demonstrating alliances built around short-term needs,

and which may have the potential to be transformed into either of the other two

configurations over time as trust is built and needs dictate.

The case study approach also had the side effect of drawing attention to other groups

within the graphs, in these cases usually either the groups that rated surprisingly highly

across the centrality metrics, or those identified at the periphery of more than one of the

cases. In at least two of the case studies the focal groups did not rate the highest in the

qualitative analysis section - results which were reassuring methodologically speaking -

and also valuable in the identification of possible ‘key players’ within a network that

deserve deeper scrutiny.

Other groups, or types of groups, whose presence or position across a minimum of two

graphs indicate a potential level of importance worth investigating. Some groups have

98

been shown to rate highly in more than one graph and the implication is that that may

have connections to other networks as yet unexplored. Additionally, with the

identification of some groups (such as the LTTE or ISI) as peripheral players across a

number of graphs, these groups also can be singled out for future research.

The other area of interest is the role of umbrella organisations – groups that usually

themselves are not well known or that have not often been publicly associated with acts

of violence. Umbrella groups such as the MJC and CCOMPOSA seem to perform

important coordinating functions across their members, and could be seen to be acting

as ‘force multipliers’ in some instances. It is yet to be seen just how influential these

organisations are in affecting overall processes at the nodal level, and just what

individuals may actually comprise the umbrella group – that is, whether member groups

themselves are present in the umbrella groups’ management teams, or whether they are

run by ‘outsiders.’

This research also demonstrates the ongoing involvement of state support and

facilitation of insurgency. While some commentators have argued that ‘new’ terrorist

groups are notable by their self-sufficiency, it could be argued that in some cases this

seems far from the case, and that just as in the 1960s and 1970s, states or sub-state

entities are utilising armed covert groups as the means towards achieving their own

foreign policy goals.

The issue of territorial control is also present in this study. A number of the groups that

score high centrality metrics also currently have, or are close to having, control over

large swathes of land within which they are in effect the de facto government. These

central government no-go areas are safe-havens for not only the groups themselves, but

this condition also makse alliances with these groups attractive to other organisations

whose hospitality they may use to their advantage.

In concluding this discussion, it must be acknowledged again that this has been a study

reliant upon the quality of information in the public arena. While the existence of the

dependent variables has been established in all six instances, it is still the case that the

actual nature – the qualities – of these dependent variables has not been made clear. The

99

next section of this conclusion will explore the limitations and weaknesses of the

research process undertaken, with regard to both its methodology and findings.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

This study was an exploratory comparative small n case study analysis of six insurgent

groups using qualitative and quantitative methods, designed primarily to test an

hypothesis, but also to establish the utility of employing network analysis in future

studies, whether this be to a deeper level within the same six case study groups and their

networks, or across a larger number of case study groups.

While the research design methods used proved to be successful tools in the process

undertaken to either prove or invalidate the hypothesis, it could be argued that due to

the small number of case studies interrogated, the hypothesis has in reality been only

partially proven. What is meant here is that the validation of the hypothesis in this

context has merely satisfied the conditions of being a necessary step, but not yet a

sufficient one. To be both necessary and sufficient, the hypothesis would have to be

applied to the universe of insurgent groups in existence – a research project of massive

proportions.

Along with the insights that potentially can be generated through the network analysis

process, there are a number of issues of concern in this particular research approach

which need to be addressed.

In this exploratory exercise smaller, insignificant groups were ranked with the same

status as larger ones within the measurements, which had the knock-on effect of

contributing to a moderately significant actor appearing more important than the actual

qualitative information inferred. The implementation of a more nuanced collection of

questions in any further studies (which correspond to a network number – the software

used in this study allows up to 16 questions to be ‘asked’) may help to alleviate this, as

multiple or uni-directional links will increase the status of certain nodes over others.

100

Secondly, with the construction of models that show both past and present links,

sometimes an historical actor received a high centrality score, which seemed

inappropriate when either a link does not exist any more, or when an agent no longer

exists. This may be overcome in future research project either by the full utilisation of

the strengths categories (rating an historical link as ‘1’ alongside higher ratings of 2 to

5), or by splitting up the research of each group into a series of temporally-specific time

periods in a longitudinal study so that current relative importance is not distorted and

changes in the network structure are observed over time.

Lastly, it is important to stress the general point that the network identification process

when it comes to covert groups is only as good as the data – so vital nodes and links can

be missed. Each map in some ways creates a ‘false world’ as much as it reveals a real

one, because with only creating discrete ‘worlds’ there is no place for the ‘network of

networks’ within which these isolated examples may be embedded

What also is not clear is evidence that the networking arrangement necessarily leads to

the satisfaction of a group’s operational goals. While it does appear to be the case that

there is a correlation between the size and breadth of a network and individual group

efficacy, more nuanced research would need to be undertaken to establish this.

While the existence of networks was conclusively proven across all case studies, little is

yet known about the actual attributes of the networks. While some information was

forthcoming in the research regarding the nature of links between at least some of the

groups, a conscious decision was made not to code the nature of these transactions with

strength ratings in this study. This decision was made for three reasons. The primary

rationale was due to the simplicity of the hypothesis that did not require this information

in order for it to be answered. Secondly, the allocation of strength ratings to different

types of transactions (such as arms for drugs deals, financial support, or joint

operations) can only really be described as an arbitrary process with a high degree of

subjectivity. This does not mean that this process should not be attemptedclxxv, only that

the strength allocation process deserves a good deal of attention before being

implemented. Lastly, the fact that the quantity and quality of the information varied

greatly across the case studies made it likely that while some networks would show

great depth regarding quality of attributes, others would offer poor representation. This

101

in turn would negatively impact the overall research project, as there would be too much

variation across what could be considered the intervening variables. It would then

undermine the positive aspects of a ‘most similar’ comparative approach.

The research also did not focus on the internal differences between groups across the

case studies. The descriptive information provided for all groups - for example their

ideology, breadth of geopolitical focus, size, command and control structure, operations

or goals - could also be described as potential intervening variables. For example, it

could be the case that that correlations exist between the nature of a group’s internal

structure and the type of alliances it forms. Conversely, through being part of a network

a group’s internal structures and processes may be transformed. It is even possible that

these flows of influence flow in both directions simultaneously. Although correlation

does not imply causation, or the direction of the causality, unless these issues are

explored, and any confounding variables also identified, the process of group formation

and evolution within (and possibly without) of a network structure will not be fully

understood.

There is also the issue of active rivalry between groups, which cannot be determined

within the ‘inclusive’ network analysis approach of the type performed in this study.

The ‘strengths’ measurement does not calculate in the negative to demonstrate

destructive interactions between groups. While it may be the case that networks may

contain groups that harbour extreme animosity towards each other, mistakes could be

made in trying to recognise this merely through the lack of evidence of any constructive

transactions between them – as this may be more the consequence of the machinations

of a third group that holds a high ‘Power’ rating and whose interests are served by

keeping two potential allies apart.

Also not examined here is any analysis at the individual level. During the research

process it became apparent some groups had strong links with individuals rather than

groups, and some of these individuals were members of more than one group. It could

be hypothesised then that the actions and bonds across individuals also may serve to

influence group dynamics both within and without. This study does not explore these

factors.

102

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Through the cautious appreciation of the results obtained in this particular study, this

research project concludes with the recommendation that it would be a worthwhile

venture to amend and extend the methodological processes utilised herein in order that

they be applied to future research.

The focus of this research could be directed in one of two directions. On the smaller

scale, a new comparative case study analysis could be designed around the same six

groups, this time taking a ‘most different’ comparative approach, paying far more

attention to identifying and stressing the differences between the intervening variables

than in this study where it was their similarities that were stressed. In a ‘most different’

approach, similarities across the independent variables are stressed, which means that in

this case for instance it would not be the differing typologies of the groups that would

be taken into account, but rather their insurgent nature would be the key point of issue

regarding their similarities. Shifting the focus around across the same set of variables

would provoke a deeper rather than more general piece of research. To this end, should

the same ‘Inflow’ software as described in the methodology section be used, the full

repertoire of both network numbers and link strengths should also be utilised. By this it

is meant that a good number of discrete questions should be asked of the groups, such as

“With which groups do you collaborate with on projects?;” “ From which organisations

do you receive financial assistance?;” or “From whom do you receive training?”.

The software is also capable of taking directionality into account, meaning that flows

can be logged as being either uni-directional or bi-directional within each of the

questions. The more the number of links of different types between groups noted, the

greater the metrics will be for the most active groups. In addition to this, the strengths of

the links can be logged, for instance if assistance was known to be a one-off, then the

strength rating would be low – say a ‘1’ on the scale of one to five. If two groups were

formally aligned and were known to meet regularly to coordinate activities, then the

strength ratings would be closer to the top end of the scale. An approach like this (which

of course, as mentioned above, would be dependent on the quality of information

103

discoverable in the public arena), would produce a mapping result that again would be

narrow, but also deep.

An alternative approach would be to keep the methodology at the basic level that has

been used in this study, but to extend the pool of groups wider. The first step of this

process would logically be the inclusion of all six groups within a single mapping

project, keeping the same 2-step rule in place so that this integrated ‘network of

networks’ is still kept manageable. The insights gained from this wide and shallow

approach would give the clearest indication of exactly what groups hold the greatest

positions of ‘Power’ across multiple networks – and so isolate them for further scrutiny.

From a counter-insurgency or ‘counter-terrorism’ point of view, this could be a useful

exercise in isolating the groups that ‘feed’ key elements in the network. Striking at these

groups could have the effect of starving the network from without, saving time and

energy by avoiding the targeting many groups individually and in piecemeal fashion.

While it is not the purpose of this study to prognosticate as to the practical application

of responses to the insights made herein, this example has been given to illustrate in

general terms the practical consequences of what this research may provide.

Neither of these new approaches have even taken into account the agency of the

individual. As in reality it appears that relationships and transactions operate

concurrently at both these levels, and the best approach in the long term would be to

develop analytic tools that can integrate both approaches within a 3-dimensional model

that marries network graphs with venn-style diagrams which can demonstrate

overlapping subsets of sets. As organisational network analysis itself is but in its

infancy, this synthesising of the social and the organisational approaches is likely a long

way off, but is an idea for software developers to consider into the future.

In conclusion, as Kegley (2003, Preface, p. VII) states, “There is arguably a notable lag

between the perceived new realities and issues and topics addressed by much of the

existing literature”. This unique research project was designed specifically as one small

way to respond to this challenge, and it does not rely on myths to impart the knowledge

that there is indeed a monster in the Labyrinth.

104

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Monographs

Alexander, Yonah. Palestinian Secular Terrorism. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers,

2003.

Alexander, Yonah, and Michael S. Swetnam. Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a

Terrorist Network. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2001.

Ali, Tariq. The Clash of Fundamentalisms. London: Verso, 2003.

Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars. Santa Monica: RAND,

2001b

Beckett, Ian F.W. Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare. Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 1999

Bodansky, Yossef. Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. New York:

Prima, 2001

Boriotti, Susan, and Donna Dennis, eds. Foreign Terrorist Organizations: History

Tactics and Connections. New York: Nova Science, 2004.

Brecher, Jeremy, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith. Globalization from Below: The

Power of Solidarity. Cambridge: South End Press, 2000

Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell,

2000

Cohen, Robin, and Shirin M. Rai, eds. Global Social Movements. London: The Athlone

Press, 2000

105

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. Foreign Terrorist

Organizations. Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress, 2004.

Davies, Barry. Terrorism: Inside a World Phenomenon. London: Virgin, 2003

Dershowitz, A. M. Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the

Challenge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002

Esposito, John L. Unholy War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper. The Social Movements Reader: Cases and

Concepts. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003

Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia

University Press, 2002

Hanle, Donald. Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare. New York: Pergamon Brassey,

1989

Harmon, Christopher C. Terrorism Today. London: Frank Cass, 2000

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998

Jones, David Martin, ed. Globalisation and the New Terror. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Publishing, 2004.

Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1999.

Kaldor, Mary. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

Kean, John. Global Civil Society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

106

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. New York: Cornall

University, 1998.

Kegley, Charles W. Jr. The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls.

Upper Saddle Rivre: Prentice Hall, 2003

Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. Restructuring World

Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 2002

Monge, Peter R. and Noshir S. Contractor. Theories of Communication Networks.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Napoleoni, Loretta. Terror Inc. London: Penguin Books, 2004

Nyatepe-Coo, Akorlie A., and Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted. Understanding Terrorism:

Threats in an Uncertain World. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004

Pearlstein, Richard M. Fatal Future? Transnational Terrorism and the New Global

Disorder. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004

Pettiford, Lloyd and David Harding. Terrorism: The New World War. Leicester:

Arcturus, 2003

Rapoport, David C., ed. Inside Terrorist Organizations. London: Frank Cass, 2001

Rubin, Barry M. Revolution until Victory?: the Politics and History of the PLO.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Scott, W. Richard. Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems. Upper Saddle

River: Prentice Hall, 1981

107

Schweitzer Yoram, and Shaul Shay. The Globalization of Terror. New Brunswick:

Transaction Publishers, 2003.

Simonsen, Clifford, and Jeremy R. Spindlove. Terrorism Today: The Past, the Players,

the Future. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004

Sparrow, Malcolm K. “The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence:

An Assessment of the Prospects.” Social Networks 13 (1991): 251-274

Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God. New York: Harper Collins, 2003.

Wasserman S. & K. Faust. (1994). Social Network Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Wasserman, S., and J. Galaskiewicz, eds. Advances in Social Network Analysis.:

Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994.

Articles and Chapters

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future.”

First Monday 6 (2001a). http:// www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/

(accessed 22 July 2004).

Bagley, Bruce Michael. “The State and the Peasantry in Contemporary Colombia.”

Latin American Issues 6.

http://webpub.allegheny.edu/group/LAS/LatinAmIssues/Articles/Vol6/LAI_vol_6.htm

(accesses 5 May 2005)

Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant, Zig Layton-Henry. Research Methods in

Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2004. Chapter 2.

108

Carpenter, T., and George Karakostas and David Shallcross. “Practical Issues and

Algorithms for Analysing Terrorist Networks.” Telcordia Technologies.

http://fano.ics.uci.edu/cites/Document/Practical-issues-and-algorithms-for-analyzing-

terrorist-networks.html (accessed 9 December 2004)

Cox, Robert W. “Civil Society at the turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an

Alternative World Order.” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 3-28

Chellaney, Brahma. “Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History.”

International Security 26, iss. 3 (December 2001): 94-117

Cox, R. ‘Civil Society at the turn of the millennium: prospects for an alternative world

order’, Review of International Studies (1999), 25, pp.3-28

Cragin, Kim, and Sara A. Daly. “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of

Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World.” RAND. Project Air Force.

www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1782/MR1782.pdf

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Globalization and International Terrorism.” International

Security 27.3 (2002-2003): 30-58

Dekker, A. “Applying Social Network Analysis Concepts to Military C4ISR

Architectures.” Connections 24, iss. 3 (2002): 93-103.

Desmond, Edward. “The Insurgency in Kashmir (1989-1991).” Contemporary South

Asia 4, iss. 1 (1995): 5-17

Dombroski, M. & K. Carley. “NETEST: Estimating a Terrorist Network’s Structure”,

Graduate Student Best Paper Award, CASOS 2002 Conference

http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/events/conferences/student_papers/Dombroski.pdf.

(accessed 7 December 2004).

Elliott, Michael. “Hate Club”. Special Report: Inside al Qaeda: bin Laden’s Web of

Terror TIME Magazine, November 12, 2001:.30-42

109

Ehrenfeld, Rachel. “IRA+PLO=Terror.” National Review, 21 August 2002.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-ehrenfeld082102.asp (accessed 22

September 2003).

Ergil, Dogu. “Suicide Terrorism in Turkey.” Civil Wars 3, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 37-54

Farley, Jonathan David. “Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of

Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide to Risk Assessment and Decision Making).”

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26 (2003): 399-411

Fellman, Philip Vos, and Roxana Wright. “Modelling Terrorist Networks – Complex

Systems at the Mid-Range.” Institute of Social Psychology. London School of

Economics. www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/.Conference/FellmanWright.pdf

(accessed 7 June 2003)

Freeman, Linton C. “Visualizing Social Networks. “Journal of Social Structure.

http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume1/Freeman.html (accessed 7 January

2005).

Filler, Alfredo L. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society.”

Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 131-162

Gueli, Richard. “Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: Challenging the Assumptions of

Transnational Terrorism.” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 25, iss. 2 (2003): 22-55

Gunaratna, Rohan. “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil

Insurgency.” International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, 2 December 1998.

http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57 (accessed 5 April 2005).

Gunaratna, Rohan. “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda.” Washington Quarterly 27, iss.

3: 91-100

Hoffman, Bruce. “Change and Continuity in Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism 24 (2001): 417-428

110

Hoffman, Bruce. “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11.” Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism 25 (2002): 303-316

Hoff, Peter D., Adrian E. Raftery, and Mark S. Handcock. “Latent Space Approaches to

Social Network Analysis.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 97, iss. 460

(December 2002): 1090

Jamieson, Alison. “Transnational Organized Crime: A European Perspective.” Studies

in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (2001): 377-387

Jenkins, Brian. “Terrorism and Beyond: 1 21st Century Perspective.” Studies in Conflict

& Terrorism 24 (2001): 321-327

Jones, David Martin, Michael L.R.Smith, and Mark Weeding. “Looking for the Pattern:

Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia – The genealogy of a Terror Network.” Studies in Conflict

& Terrorism 26 (2003): 443-457

Joshi, Manoj. “On the Razor’s Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.” Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism 19 (1996): 19-42

Kartha, Tara. “Countering Transnational Terrorism.” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 11

(2000).

Klerks, P. “The network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical

Nitpicking or a relevant doctrine for investigators? Recent developments in the

Netherlands”. Connections 24, iss. 3 (2001): 53-65,

Krebs, Valdis. “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks.” First Monday.7, no. 4 (April 2002),

http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/krebs/index.html (accessed 7 June 2003).

Iacovou, Christos. “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf: The Radicalisation of Islam in the

Philippines.” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 11 July 2000

http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=116 (accessed 16 February 2005)

111

Jensen, Carl J. III. “Beyond the Tea Leaves: Futures Research and Terrorism.”

American Behavioural Scientist 44, iss. 6 (2001): 914-938

Laqueur, Walter. “The Terrorism to Come.” Policy Review online. Policy Review no.

126. http://www.policyreview.org/aug04/laqueur.html (accessed 28 June 2005).

Mayntz, Renate. Organizational Forms of Terrorism: Hierarchy, Network, or a Type sui

generis?” Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/4,

2004. http://:www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de

McAllister, Brad. “Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologising the Network.”

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 297-319

McCloud, Kimberly A., and Adam Dolnik. “Debunk the Myth of Al Qaeda.” Christian

Science Monitor, 23 May 2002.http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p11s02-

coop.html (accessed 14 April 2003)

Lacquer, W. ‘The Terrorism to Come’. Policy Review, August 2004, at

http://www.policyreview.org/aug04/lacquer. Date of access 12 August 2004

Looney, R. (2002). ‘Following the Terrorist Informal Money Trail’, Strategic Insight,

National Security Affairs Department, US Naval Postgraduate School

Karmon, Ely. “Strange Bedfellows – An examination of the coalitions among terrorist

organizations.” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2000

http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=20

Marquardt, Erich. “Al-Qaeda’s Exaggerated Organizational Strength.” Global Policy

Forum. Power and Interest News Report, 2 September 2003.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/terrorism/2003/0902exaggerated.htm (accessed 15

February 2005)

Mishra, Shitanshu. “Exploitation of Information and Communication Technology by

Terorist Organisations.” Strategic Analysis 27, iss. 3 (2003)

112

Moghadam, Assaf. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations

and Organizational Aspects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26 (2003): 65-92

Niksch, Larry. “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.”

Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, 25 January 2002.

http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RL31265.pdf

Ortiz, Roman D. “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25 (2002):

127-143

Pasha, Mustapha Jamal, and David Blaney. “Elusive Paradise: The Promise and Peril of

Global Civil Society.” Alternatives 23 (1998): 417-450

Prabha, Kshitij. “Terror Enterprise: Organisation, Infrastructure and Resources.

Strategic Analysis 15, no. 9 (December 2001).

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_dec01prk01.html.

Quillen, Chris. “State Sponsored Terrorism: A Growing Threat?” Discussion paper. The

Terrorism Research Center, 2000. www.terrorism.com.

Radu, Michael. “The Rise and Fall of the PKK.” Orbis 45, iss. 1 (Winter 2001): 47-63

Raufer, Xavier. “Al Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26

(2003): 391-398

Rogers, Steven. “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf.” Foreign Affairs 83, iss.1 (2004): 15-21

Rothemberg, R. “From Whole Cloth: Making up the terrorist network”. Connections 24,

iss. 2 (2002): 36-42

Sagarin, Raphael. “Adapt or Die.” Foreign Policy (September/October 2003).

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fp/fp_sepoct03c.html.

113

Shahar, Yael. “Seeking a New Image, or Polishing an Old One?” International Policy

Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2000. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?

articleid=427 (accessed 22 May 2005)

Smith, Jackie. “Global Civil Society?” American Behavioral Scientist 42, no. 1

(September 1998): 93-108

Smith, Paul J. “Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new

realities.” Parameters 32, iss. 2: 33-47

Takeyh, Ray and Niklas Gvosdev. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?” Washington

Quarterly 25:3 (Summer 2002): 97-108

Tazaghart, A. “The ‘globalization’ of terror networks.” Lebanon Wire, 20 August 2002.

http://www.lebanonwire.com/0208/02082013DS.asp (accessed 5 April 2005)

Thayer, Carlyle A. “No, Al Qaeda Isn’t Everywhere.” Far Eastern Economic Review

166, iss. 33 (2003): 20-22.

Turbiville, Graham H. “Bearers of the Sword: Radical Islam, Philippines Insurgency,

and Regional Stability.” Military Review, March-April 2002. Foreign Military Studies

Office. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/sword.htm (accessed

15 February 2005)

Watts, D. “Networks, Dynamics, and the Small-World Phenomenon.” American

Journal of Sociology 105, iss. 2, (Septmeber 1999):.493

Whine, Michael. “The New Terrorism”. International Policy Institute for Counter

Terrorism, 2002. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=427.

Whitaker, Raymond. “If they Capture Bin Laden or his Deputy will al-Qa’ida fall?”

Independent, 21 March 2004. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/story.jsp?

story=503423.

114

Williamson, Hugh, and Manik de Silva. “To Catch a Tiger.” Far Eastern Economic

Review 161, iss. 15: 29

Winchell, Sean P. “Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government.” International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16 (2003): 374-388

Electronic Resources

Arostegui, Martin. “IRA men held in Colombia linked to Cuba.” United Press

International. The Cuban American National Foundation, 17 August 2001.

http://www.canf.org/News/archived/010817newsb.htm (accessed 22 September 2003)

Center for Defense Information. “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection.”

5 June 2002. http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1563

(accessed 5 April 2005)

Center for Defense Information. “Jemaah Islamiah.” 18 October 2002, .

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1159 (accessed 5

April 2005)

Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist. “South Asia: a living volcano of proletarian

revolution.”10 April 2004. http://cpnm.org/new/ccomposa/cco_news/cops2.htm

(accessed 28 Match 2005)

Council on Foreign Relations. “Terrorism Questions & Answers.”

http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/ (accessed 20 February 2003)

cvi “In the Spotlight: Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan”, Center for Defense Information, 9 July 2004, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2308 (accessed 5 April 2005)cvii South Asia Assessment 2003, athttp://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/index.html. (accessed 29 March, 2005) and http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm. (accessed 28 March, 2005)cviii Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc. 195

115

Federation of American Scientists. “Liberation Movements, Terrorist Organizations,

Substance Cartels, and Other Para-State Entities.” http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/

(accessed 9 December 2004).

Gibson, Helen. “Global Networking: Trading in Terror?” TIME Europe, 25 August

2003. http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/printout/0,9869,172708,00.html (accessed

22 September 2003)

cxxviii Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post_Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 25, 2002, 127cxxix See http://exastricientia.fateback.com/terrorists.htm. Date of access 1 October 2003cxxx Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 135cxxxi Ibid.,. 130cxxxii The DMZ is also said to be “a Club Med for terrorists” – see “Memory, Truth and Justice: Comparative Perspectives on National Reconciliation”,http://memoria.fiu.edu/memoria/documents/terror.htm (accessed 1 October, 2003)cxxxiii Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 136cxxxiv Mark F. Wong, “The IRA in Colombia – the Global Links of International Terrorism”, lecture before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, April 24, 2002,http://wwwa.house.gov.international_relations/107/wong0424.htm (accessed 22 September, 2003)cxxxv Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 130cxxxvi Ibid.cxxxvii “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia”, Terrorist Group Profile, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=96 (accessed 30 April, 2005)cxxxviii Ibid.cxxxix Kim Cragin and Sara A.Daly, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat”, 41cxl Ibid.cxli “Memory, Truth and Justice: Comparative Perspectives on National Reconciliation”, http://memoria.fiu.edu/memoria/documents/terror.htm (accessed 1 October, 2003)cxlii Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 127cxliii National Security Institute, Terrorist Profiles, http://nsi.org/Library/Terrorism/profterr.txt (accessed 5 October, 2004)cxliv “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, 2002, 120 estimates 12,000 combatants, while Ballentine and Sherman say 18,000 combatantscxlv “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”, Congressional Research Service, FARC, 81cxlvi See Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc.,87 as she credits Professor Christopher Pierson’s identification of nine characteristics of statehood, namely sovereignty, constitutionality, rule of law, impersonal power, legitimacy of authority, monopoly on the means of violence, territoriality, taxation and public bureaucracy - the latter four being shared with state-shells. By this definition, however, a number of legally-recognised states in the modern world would also not be considered legitimatecxlvii Foreign Terrorist Organizations”, Congressional Research Service, FARC, 81cxlviii “Memory, Truth and Justice: Comparative Perspectives on National Reconciliation”, http://memoria.fiu.edu/memoria/documents/terror.htm (accessed 1 October, 2003)cxlix “Global Terrorism”, 76cl Martin Arostegui, “IRA men held in Colombia linked to Cuba”, 17 August 2001, The Cuban American National Foundation, http://www.canf.org/News/archived/010817newsb.htm (accessed 22 September, 20030cli Bruce Michael Bagley, “The State and the Peasantry in Contemporary Colombia”, Latin American Issues (online), Volume 6, 22 at http://webpub.allegheny.edu/group/LAS/LatinAmIsssues/Articles/Vol6/LAI_vol_6.htm.(accessed 5 May, 2005)clii Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 134cliii Christian Gutierrez, “Colombia at War”, April 2003, unpublished Thesis, Central Connecticut State University, http://fred.ccsu.edu:8000/archive/00000126/02/etd-2003-17.htm (accessed 5 May, 2005)cliv “Memory, Truth and Justice: Comparative Perspectives on National Reconciliation”,

116

Global Guerrillas. “Mapping Terrorist Networks.” 23 April, 2004.

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/04/mapping_terrori.html

(accessed 1 December 2004).

Gould, Harold A., and Franklin C. Spinney. “Fourth Generation Warfare Is Here.”

Defense Week, 15 October 2001.

http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/gould_spinney_4GW.htm (accessed 9

September 2003).

http://memoria.fiu.edu/memoria/documents/terror.htm (accessed 1 October 2003). It must be acknowledged, however, that the three men were found not guilty in their eventual trialclv Helen Gibson, “Global Networking: Trading in Terror?”, TIME Europe, 25 August 2003, http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/printout/0,9869,172708,00.html (accessed 22 September, 2003)clvi Nigel Vinson, Security Analyst, quoted in “Global Networking”, TIME Europeclvii “Memory, Truth and Justice”clviii Helen Gibson, “Global Networking”, TIME Europeclix Ibid.clx “The Long Reach of Colombia’s FARC”, Stratfor, February 16, 2005, http://www.stratfor.info/Print.neo?storyId=244214 (accessed 23 February, 2005)clxi Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 139clxii Rohan Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency”, 1998, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 14, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57 (accessed 5 April, 2005)clxiii Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies”, 138clxiv “Gazteriak”, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3508 (accessed 30 April, 2005)clxv “Basque Fatherland and Liberty”, Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists,http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/eta.htm (accessed 9 December, 2004)clxvi Helen Gibson, “Global Networking”, TIME Europeclxvii “ETA”, Exastriscientia, http://exastriscientia.fateback.com/terrorists.htm. (accessed 1 October, 2003)clxviii Paul Berry, “Palestinian/IRA similarities in bomb making revealed in recent report”, http://paulberry.org.uk/assemblydetail.asp?id=13 (accessed 10 May, 2005), and Rachel Ehrenfeld, “IRA+PLO=Terror”, National Review Online, 21 August 2002, http:// www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-ehrenfeld082102.asp (accessed 10 May, 2005)clxix “Jenin The Capital of the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Center for Special Studies, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/jenin/jenin_e.htm (accessed 10 Ma,y 2005)clxx “Palestinian Terror Operatives arrested or killed in the Jenin refugee camp”, 23 April 2002,http://kokhavivpublications.com/2002/isreal/09/0204232120.html (accessed 10 May, 2005)clxxi “The Long Reach of Colombia’s FARC”, Stratfor, 16 February 2005, http://www.stratfor.info/Print.neo?storyId=244214 (accessed 23 February, 2005)clxxii Valdis Krebs indicated in an e-mail response to the author’s enquiry regarding the possible existence of any other similar studies, that while it is likely that some classified studies of this nature exist, he is unaware of any in the public domain internationally, and believes this study will be the firstclxxiii The actual average number of nodes was 25.66, calculated up to the next decimal pointclxxiv The actual figure was 2.49, and was calculated up to the next decimal pointclxxv See Valdis Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells”, Connections, Volume 24, Issue 3, 44 for the rationale he used in coding the strengths of the ties between the September 11 hijackers

117

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. Center for Special Studies. “Jenin: The

Capital of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists.”

http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/jenin_e.htm (accessed 5 October 2005)

International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism. “Terrorist Organization Profiles

from the ICT Database.” http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/org.cfm.

Middle East Information Center. “Non-Muslim Terrorist Groups of the World.”

http://middleeastinfo.org/forum3996 (accessed 5 October 2004)

National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Terrorism Knowledge

Base. http://www.tkb.org/ (accessed 30 April 2005)

National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism “Kurdistan Workers’

Party.” Terrorism Knowledge Base. http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=63

(accessed 23 April 2005).

Naval Postgraduate School. “Terrorist Group Profiles: Index of Groups. Dudley Knox

Library. http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/tgpndx.htm.

Raman, B. “Maoists Gain Momentum in India.” South Asia Analysis Group. Paper no.

1251. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1251.html (accessed 28 March

2005).

Simon, Sheldon W. “The War on Terrorism: Collaboration and Hesitation.” Pacific

Forum CSIS, 1st Quarter 2002. http://www.csis.ord/pacfor/cc/0201Qus_asean.html.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Terrorist Group Profiles.” http://satp.org/satporgtp/

(accessed 19 April 2005)

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.”

http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/Ltte.htm (accessed 23 April

2005).

118

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Communist Party of India-Maoist.”

http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/CPI_M.htm (accessed 28

Match 2005).

Spinney, Chuck. “Is 4GW al-Qa’ida’s Official Combat Doctrine?”. http://www.d-n-

i.net/fcs/comments/c438.htm (accessed 9 September 2003).

Strategic Forecasting, Inc. “The Long Reach of Colombia’s FARC.”

http://www.stratfor.info/Print.neo?storyId=244214

Strategic Forecasting, Inc. “Colombia: A Resurgent, Lethally Effective FARC.”

http://www.stratfor.info/Print.neo?storyId=243527

Strategic Forecasting, Inc. “Terrorist with Bin Laden Connections Arrested in

Colombia.” Global Intelligence Update.

cix SATP – ref both groupscx Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, Terrorism Today: The Past, the Players, the Future, 2nd

edition, (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 287)cxi Dogu, p. 41cxii “Kadek”, Terror Organisations in Turkey, FORSNET, http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/turkey/separatist/pkk/aim.html. (accessed 22 September, 2003)cxiii Dogu Ergil, “Suicide Terrorism in Turkey”, Civil Wars, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2000), 39cxiv Ibid., 37cxv Ibid., 40cxvi Ibid., 42cxvii Ibid., 46cxviii Ibid.,. 47cxix “Kurdistan Workers’ Party”, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=116 (accessed 30 April, 2005)cxx MIPTcxxi MIPTcxxii Called, respectively, the Charles Anthony Regiment, the ‘Air Tigers’ (although they are said to not be operating any aircraft at present – their focus is more defensive, with their maintenance of anti-aircraft weapons), the ‘Sea Tigers’, the ‘Balck Tigers’, and the ‘Freedom Birds’ cxxiii Namely Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Plus the partial blinding of the current Sri Lankan President cxxiv See Peter Chalk, ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eealam’s (LTTE) International Organisation and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis’, Canadian Security Service, 17 March 2000, p. 3, athttp://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/comm77_e.html. Date of access 12 September 2003. An almost identical account can be found at South Asian Terrorism Portal, athttp://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/Ltte.htm. Date of access 23 April 2005.cxxv Charu Lata Joshi, “Ultimate Sacrifice”, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 1, 2000. Volume 163, Issue 22, 66cxxvi Ranga Jayasuriya, “Tigers lament internationalisation”, Daily News, Sri Lanka, 27 June 2003,http://www.dailynews.lk/2003/06/27/fea03.html. (accessed 1 October, 2003)cxxvii B. Raman, “THE LTTE: The Metamorphosis”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper number 448, 29 April 2002, http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper448.html (accessed 23 April, 2005)

119

http://informationwar.orf/terrorist_network/terrorist_arrested_in_Colombia.htm

(accessed 5 April 2005)

Notes

120