1. Marbury vs Madison

Facts: William Marbury was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

Issues: 1. Whether the Supreme Court has judicial review power.

Held: Yes, but not in the instant case. The Judiciary Act of 1789 clearly gives the Supreme Court judicial review over writs of mandamus.  However, Article III of the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court authority to review the writs.  Therefore, the two laws are in conflict.  As such, the Supreme Court – being charged with upholding the Constitution – must adopt Article III’s application.  Justice Marshall argued that there would be no point for the Supreme Court to exist were it not to uphold the Constitution and strike down laws adopted by Congress that necessarily conflict with the Constitution itself.  In so doing, Marshall established the principle of judicial review.

2. Angara vs Electoral Commission

Facts: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

3. Caltex vs Palomar

Facts: In 1960, the petitioner, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., launched a promotional scheme called "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump of each Caltex Station will dispense within a specific period. Such contest is open to all motor

vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is no required fee or consideration, and there is no need for the contestants to purchase the products of Caltex.  The forms are available upon request at each Caltex Station and there is a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.  Then, seeing the extensive use of mails for publicizing and transmission of communication purposes, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest.  But then, the Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, denied the request of Caltex in view of Sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code.  The aforesaid section prohibits the use of mail conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme. Consequently, Caltex invoked a judicial intervention by filing a petition of declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, ordering the Postmaster General to allow the petitioner to use the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public and that the aforesaid contest is not violative of the Postal Law.

Issue: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.

Held: No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest.  For, construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.  Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent or prohibit.

4. Spouses Gauvain vs CA

Facts: This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land foreclosed by the petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.

Issue: 1.Whether or not Pe could repurchase under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 2. Whether from the date of the foreclosure sale or from the expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property

Held: The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by the decision for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.” They are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.” The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on rulings when they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or 13 years ago. Hence, the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby reversed and set aside. The complaint for repurchase under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended is dismissed.

5. Barrera vs Barrera

Facts: Respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico of the Court of First Instance of Cavite was cited for contempt and asked why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for hurling the accusation that this

Court had delegated to its Clerk a power which under the Rules of Court appertained to its Chief Justice, an accusation made in the context of an explicit avowal that he was in no mood to accord recognition and respect to a binding decision of this Court, which for him was obsolete and no longer authoritative. Counsel for the plaintiff in Barrera v. Barrera, a civil case pending in the Court of First Instance of Cavite requested "that the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 111, presided over by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico be authorized to continue with the hearing of the above-entitled case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court." Why such request was made was explained by counsel in these words: "The said case is pending trial. The plaintiff has one more witness to present and thereafter, she intends to rest her case. Unfortunately, on May 22, 1969, when this case was set for hearing, the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, the Hon. Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed as District Judge for the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on said date, he did not hold court session. Because of this, the trial of this case was left pending, and it was only in the month of July when it was reset for hearing on August 6, 1969. However, on this date, this case was not again heard because the new Presiding Judge did not arrive due to bad weather."

Issue: Whether or not Judge Alfredo Catolico is cited for contempt and should disciplinary action would take against him

Held: Judges are not expected to be wholly in agreement with every decision of this Tribunal. Nor are they required to keep locked up within their breasts their own views on such matters. Doubts and skepticism about the continuing validity of doctrines announced by us may under appropriate, ventilated. As a matter of fact, they should not be discouraged for the progress of the law may very well depend on a more searching inquiry as to the continuing validity of certain assumptions and "Presuppositions uncritically accepted. Nonetheless, as long as our rulings constitute authoritative precedents, the duty of obedience is cast on inferior court judges. Nor is respondent Judge to be held responsible for the manner in which he gave expression to his thoughts. Wherefore, respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico is reprimanded by this Court for the above offense.

6. Villena vs Sps. Chavez

Facts: In a Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages filed on October 15, 1998, the repondents alleged that they are the owners of 4 parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 164, 165, 166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey of Angeles City, and covered respectively by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 83247, 83246, 83248 and 83249, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Angeles City. These four parcels of land have been consolidated and subdivided into several blocks and lots and are now collectively designated as Bagong Silang Phase III-C. By mere permission and tolerance of the respondents, the petitioners have occupied and erected their homes on four of the said lots.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II and of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 both of Angeles City2. Whether or not the Honorable Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case3. Whether or not the non-inclusion of the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association Inc., is fatal to respondent’s cause of action

4. Whether or not ejectment is proper in the case at bar

5. Whether or not the absence of contractual relation[s] between the respondents and the petitioners bar[s] the filing of any action by the respondents against the petitioner.

Held: The Petition is meritorious. The CA ruled that petitioners’ possession or occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of respondents.  Hence, once petitioners failed to pay the agreed amount as equity, their right to continue occupying the lots was lost. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is overturned. Consequently, the decisions of the MTC and the RTC of Angeles City are reinstated.

7. Olaguer vs Military Commission

Facts: In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Olaguer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; arson of nine buildings; attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

Held: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. In as much as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer and the decision it rendered still continues to subsist.

8. Development Bank of the Philippines vs La Campana Development Corporation

Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47097 promulgated on 21 September 1998 and 25 February 1999 respectively. La Campana prayed that the consolidated titles in the name of DBP be declared null and void, and that it be declared to be the registered owner of the same.  It likewise prayed that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be ordered to cancel the consolidated titles in the name of DBP and to reinstate its cancelled titles.

Issues: .1. Whether the foreclosure sale was held on June 30, 1975 or on March 25, 1976 2. Whether or not DBP’s right as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale has been extinguished by prescription 3.Whether or not DBP’s right to deficiency judgment has prescribed.

Held: The causes of action, and logically, the issues in the two cases, are crystal clear, very much different, requiring divergent adjudications.  In short, while there is identity of parties, there is no identity

of subject matter and cause of action.  This being so, different causes of action and circumstances in different cases would make reliance on the doctrine of res judicata misplaced. Res judicata cannot be interposed to bar the determination of a subsequent case if the first and second cases involve different subject matters and seek different reliefs.

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.

The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Wherefore, finding no reason to disturb the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 21 September 1998 and its Resolution promulgated on 25 February 1999, both are hereby affirmed.

9. Sps. Sy vs Young

Facts: Petition originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by respondent Genalyn D. Young. Genalyn alleged that she is the legitimate daughter of spouses George Young and Lilia Dy. When George died, he left an unregistered parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 91-48929 in San Roque, San Pablo City, Laguna. On September 3, 1993, Lilia executed a Second Supplemental to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. The property was adjudicated solely in Lilia’s favor in the partition. Lilia represented Genalyn, who was then a minor, in the execution of the document.

Issue: 1.Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC Orders dated August 30, 2001, January 4, 2002 and January 16, 2002 which dismissed the case for non-suit and

2. Whether or not the CA erred in not holding Genalyn guilty of forum shopping in the CA’s Decision dated March 30, 2005 and Resolution dated August 8, 2005.

Held: The present action is barred by the law of the case. In denying the petition, we necessarily must reiterate our ruling in Young which constitutes as the controlling doctrine or the law of the case in the present case. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Wherefore, the petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.