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INTRODUCING E-‐MOBILITY: EMERGENT STRATEGIES FOR AN
EMERGENT TECHNOLOGY
Ambition, Structure, Conduct and Performance
Summary, Conclusion and Reflection
July 2014
Netherlands School of Public Administration (NSOB)
Authors: Dr. Martijn van der Steen (NSOB)
Rogier van Schelven MSc. (Kwink Groep Consulting) Janine Mulder MSc. (Kwink Groep Consulting)
Prof. dr. Mark van Twist (NSOB)
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1. Introduction
All over the world, countries, regions and cities are attempting to ignite and/or support the transition to
e-‐mobility. However, regardless of the continued efforts the introduction of electric driving is a complex
and unpredictable process. It encompasses more than merely introducing a new type of vehicle or dis-‐
covering the best charging technology; electric driving requires a change in how all of of the relevant
stakeholders in the market think and act with regards to mobility. From the purchase of a vehicle, to
behaviour in charging; or the use of alternatives for driving, such as public transport, walking or cycling;
or the allocation of scarce resources and the uptake of risks by the automobile industry and the provid-‐
ers of financial and/or operational services around mobility. E-‐mobility requires a wide range of actors
to do something different, something new, and – as many will perceive it – something strange.
Therefore, e-‐mobility is more than a change in consumption-‐pattern or a different assortment
offered by the automobile industry. Electric driving requires a transition to a different system of mobili-‐
ty; a technology with new applications in vehicles and chargers as we know them, but also with with far-‐
reaching changes in the underlying physical, economic and social infrastructure. E-‐mobility is all about
cars, but not only about cars; e-‐mobility requires an array of systemic changes in infrastructure, industry
and networks. Bringing out new vehicles to the market is one, the installation of sufficient chargers is a
crucial other. And there are many other steps to be taken, each with new opportunities but also with its
share of creative destruction. Electric driving does not slide smoothly and quietly into the existing mobil-‐
ity system, but crashes violently into it. Rising EV-‐sales shares compete directly with sales of regular
combustion vehicles. Investment in research on batteries is re-‐allocated from programs that improve
fuel-‐efficiency; EV’s are marketed at the expense of other cars; dealers make micro-‐decisions to direct
their customers towards an EV or to a ‘normal’ car. Just as the benefits for EV-‐drivers usually come at
the expense of others in the public space; free parking for EV’s and express-‐lanes in the most traffic-‐
jammed areas of the inner city directly affect those driving regular cars. Tax-‐money and public space can
only be spent or used once; in that sense, mobility is a zero-‐sum game, where a turn in favour of EV’s
usually also means a loss for regular cars. Therefore, in the field of mobility, electrification is both an
opportunity and a threat. For many there is much to win, but for many others there is an equal much to
lose. As a consequence, the transition to e-‐mobility is not only complex, but also contested; there are
many actors involved, with very different interests, stakes, and strategies.
Because the transition to electric driving is both fundamentally complex and contested, it is not
likely to occur all by itself; opposition power is strongly vested, the current market structure benefits
continuation of regular cars, and consumers have not yet adapted to the different patterns and behav-‐
iours of e-‐mobility; in fact, many have not ever seen or driven an EV, let alone considered buying one.
Due to expensive battery packs EV’s require a large capital investment upfront, with uncertain value
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after years of use; that makes EV’s expensive to purchase, even if the total cost of ownership is probably
lower than a regular car. Also, EV’s produce uncertainty for drivers, mostly because of limited battery
range and the uncertain availability of a charger when needed. And if there are chargers available, there
are issues such as inter-‐operability, maintenance, and the required time to charger. Problems that can
be overcome and that eventually will be solved, but nonetheless withhold consumers from stepping in
the market for EV’s. In time, they probably will, but there probably isn’t that much time; studies of
emerging markets learn that if the initial phase is not overcome fast enough, there is a good chance the
entire development will break down. There is solid momentum for the change towards e-‐mobility, but
at the same time the development is fragile and requires support to grow into a self-‐sustaining path.
Government action is one of the possibilities to support an early market in overcoming the
problems and dilemmas of an emerging market. In fact, there is a wide array of policy options available
that can support the introduction of EV’s and charging infrastructure. Intervention requires choice; the
question for any government willing to intervene is which policy to choose, which group or sector to
target, what the most effective size and scope of interventions should be, and what timing best accom-‐
modates the emerging process of the market. The possibilities are many and often come with dilemmas.
Incentives can support the market, but are also distortions to normal market developments; they may
just as well hold the market back. There are many possible instruments for governments to choose
from, but the real question is how to choose the right instrument; how to apply an instrument in such a
way that intended effects are maximized, and that there is maximal space for unanticipated effects. In a
transition the latter is just as important as the first; the essence of the introduction of EV’s is that it is an
uncertain and unpredictable process. Therefore, policy should leave room for emergent, unanticipated
developments to flourish; in other words, policy should intentionally search for unexpected and unin-‐
tended positive outcomes. In that sense, EV-‐policy programs are paradoxical phenomena; they “sup-‐
port” a system that is not yet known, promise to “deliver” results that are caught in clear numbers but
without a clear picture of what those numbers will represent; policy-‐strategy for EV must be thought-‐
through and planned, but at the same time should take into account the many unknowns of it.
This project addresses the question of what the available policy-‐options are for governments
that want to support the further introduction of EV’s? In order to answer this question, we look back at
what a selected group of governments were doing over the past few years to incentivize the introduc-‐
tion of EV’s, how that fits into the specific characteristics of their environment, and if and how the policy
has generated the expected results. In doing so, we want to give an empirical answer to the research
question; we gather the policies we can find in the selected countries in our data set and present them
to the reader as possible ways for policy-‐making.
In doing so, the project maps the different policies by governments at different levels. We sys-‐
tematically gather the interventions and strategic goals and actions of governments from different levels
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of government (federal, national, regional, local), describe them in as much detail as possible, categorize
them in a framework and note the effects that emerge in practice. This has resulted in three types of
insight that are presented in this main report and in an accompanying background report:
1. An overview of the policies that different governments follow in their attempts to support the
introduction of e-‐mobility;
2. Insight in patterns and mechanisms in EV-‐policy: relations between different strategic options
and actions that are often used together, patterns in strategic actions, and basic principles that
seem to underly these different strategic options (e.g. pro-‐active versus re-‐active; vehicle-‐
centred versus infrastructure-‐centred; economic-‐incentives versus regulation-‐centred);
3. Insight in performances of policies: over time, as more information about the actual results of
strategic policy interventions come available, we will be able to link outcomes to policy-‐inputs;
this may help to discern relations between structural elements and successful policy strategies;
what works under what circumstances?
However, in describing all of the different policies we have seen, we also developed ideas of possible
next steps for EV-‐policy. In this main report we do not limit our answer to the research question to our
empirical findings, but we also take the liberty to look ahead and beyond the empirical data, and formu-‐
late strategies that we consider especially promising. Therefore, apart from a summary of the empirical
findings we discovered when looking back (that we have summed up in full in the background report)
this main report also looks ahead, at the possible next steps in EV-‐policy.
Governance dilemmas surrounding electric driving
Some consider the transition to e-‐mobility a technical and economic issue. However, we consider it a
policy issue that requires good quality governance; beyond economic and technical factors are underly-‐
ing characteristics that are beyond the challenges of technical design and economic reasoning. Most
importantly, the introduction of electric driving is at the same time a complex and a contested topic; it
generates opportunities but produces risks as well. It creates a new market, but in part at the cost of
existing positions; it provides room for new players, but not without challenging the incumbents; it
strongly supports some public values (e.g sustainability, clean air, ‘green growth’, oil-‐independency) but
at the cost of other values. Also, there are serious time lags in the distribution of costs and benefits of
policies; policies cost now and will only produce benefits for future generations. Furthermore, policies
that help on the short term hamper the process on the longer-‐term. In fact, the introduction of EV’s
involves a two-‐phased development; small steps now to help the process underway and move beyond
the problems of early market introduction, followed by policies to support the required giant leap in
sales and market-‐share towards a mature market. The good governance in this phase is to take small
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steps now that will lead to giant leaps in the longer term, and to balance the dilemmas of governance of
the wicked policy issue that the introduction of e-‐mobility is.
Each of these dilemmas has the same basic characteristics. There is (1) a good reason (political goals) for
government intervention and (2) there are numerous opportunities (possible policies) to intervene. At
the same time, (3) due to the inherit complexity, expected reflexivity and emergence of the issue, inter-‐
ventions can lead to many results (unpredictable outcomes). The government can create markets, but it
can just as easily destroy them. Government may reduce taxes for EV’s for consumers, but that may
easily lead to images of EV’s as deficient “alternative” vehicles that need subsidies in order to be com-‐
petitive the superior “normal” cars. The government can select and support technology, but as a result it
may accidentally destroy an innovative new start-‐up that was about to enter the market. It can adopt
private partners that role-‐out a technical infrastructure, but that may easily lock the market in to the
partners’ closed-‐shop technology and distort competiveness for years to come. And for each of these
dilemmas goes that it is (4) always unclear beforehand what the results will be in the longer term (tim-‐
ing). And, (5) despite of the uncertainty and ambiguity governments must make choices and act.
Research in action: action-‐supporting research
This project is based on an interaction between research and practice; it is research-‐in-‐action. We did
not only study governance dilemmas and bundled policy options, but did so in close contact with practi-‐
tioners. Now that the project is finished, the goal for this report to add practical value to the policy-‐
makers who are in the process of designing strategies for the furthering of e-‐mobility in their country or
region. We hope that the insights in this report help policy ahead and also to push the academic agenda
further.
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2. Model and Metrics
In this report we analyze the introduction of Electric Vehicles (EV’s). EV’s are defined as passenger car1 plug-‐in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and battery electric vehicles (BEV’s). The introduction of EV’s is analyzed by answering four basic question for each of the countries in our data-‐set:
• What are the ambitions of the government of this country with regards to EV’s and chargers? • Within what kind of structural context relevant for EV’s are these ambitions to be realized? • What is the government in this country in fact doing to achieve these ambitions? • What are the performances of the introduction of EV’s in this country?
Ambition refers to the goals set by the country/region for the introduction of e-‐mobility. For instance, the number of public chargers in a given year; the share of EV-‐sales; or the perceptions of people to-‐wards EV’s (e.g. likeliness to buy an EV). In this category we look for the formally stated ambitions of governments in relevant policy-‐documents.
Structure refers to the elements of a system that matter for EV’s, but cannot be directly influenced by policy or by individual actors. Therefore, structure as a category deals with elements that are “given”. That can mean given in the sense that they are physical or natural (e.g. climate, geography, distance) conditions uncontrollable by man; but they can also mean economical or psychological factors, also beyond the level of control – at least not on the short to medium term. Economic wealth for instance is to some extend controllable, and may successfully improved over a longer period of time, but as a factor for the introduction of EV’s we consider it a structural factor; it may be of influence for the introduction of EV’s, but cannot directly be controlled or influenced. The same goes for psychological factors. A pub-‐lics’ general attitude towards mobility is not an act of nature, but it is deeply embedded in a countries culture and therefore hard to change by policy-‐makers. These structural characteristics could change over time, but not within the time-‐span that we are looking at.
The conduct category consists of all acts of policy; it is the activities by government to stimulate the introduction of EV’s, whether or not explicitly mentioned as such. Some policies are directly intended to stimulate EV’s, but others are indirectly related to it. We do not only look at policies that bare the name “ev-‐policy”; we take into account each policy that is directly or indirectly related to the introduction of electric mobility.
Performance refers to the number of EV’s and chargers along with a number of other relevant parame-‐ters, which represent the progress in the introduction of e-‐mobility. These are numbers of chargers and vehicles, but also more subjective outcomes, such as perceptions about EV’s and perceived likeliness to ever buy an EV. It is important to note that although the category performance suggests that these per-‐formances are the “effects” of the combination of ambition, structure and conduct. However, we do not measure causal effects. Performance shows the progress a country or region is making in introducing EV’s, it does not show the effectiveness of policy.
A way to order and reproduce complexity
The four research questions enable a systemic analysis of the activities and conditions relevant for the introduction of electric mobility in the consumer-‐market (including fleets and company-‐cars). It takes
1 Passenger vehicles with a designated seating capacity of 10 or less and multipurpose vehicles with a designated seating capacity of 10 or less that is constructed either on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-‐road operation.
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into account the wide variety of factors, places them in a coherent framework, and sort relevant factors. The framework does not work as a causal model. It sums up and sorts all that we have found that was relevant for EV-‐policy, but does not indicate what leads to what. The research does not attempt to pro-‐duce causal clarity, but to reproduce the complex social reality of EV-‐policy and present that to policy-‐makers and other researchers.
Figure 1 shows our four research questions.
Figure 1. Ambition, Structure, Conduct, Performance
For the ambition-‐category, for reasons of comparison we mostly looked at the number of vehicles and the number of chargers countries formally mention as ambition. However, different countries use dif-‐ferent sub-‐categories for vehicles and chargers. Some count all hybrids as EV’s, although the early Prius has only a very small battery that is mostly used for parking. Some countries have highly diversified sub-‐categorized targets for public chargers, fast chargers, home chargers and other possible variants. Others merely count chargers as a whole and do not make any distinction between them. As researchers we have reproduced those categories in the data-‐set and have translated into comparable categories in the analysis-‐document. As a whole, the ambition-‐section of the model remains close to the categories used by countries themselves; the advantage of that is that makes the findings recognizable for countries, but at the price of less comparability.
For the structure-‐category we formulated four categories of structural elements. We take into account the market environment, infrastructure readiness, consumer readiness and operating environment. Table 2 presents the sub-‐categories of these four elements of structure.
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Category 1: Market environment Category 2: Infrastructure readiness
‘Market characteristics’ that facilitate, require or other-‐wise incentivize EV’s. This category is built-‐up by four indicators.
Presence of automotive industry 1. R&D intensity: Gross domestic expenditure on 2.
R&D (% share of GDP -‐ GERD)
CO2 / GHG emissions per capita 3.
Infrastructure readiness enables the operation and im-‐pact of e-‐mobility. This category is built-‐up by three indicators.i
Investments in Smart Grid projects 4. Electricity reliability and outages 5. Electricity generated from renewable sources 6.
(% of gross electricity consumption)
Category 3: Consumer readiness Category 4: Operating environment
Consumer readiness generates and secures the demand for electric vehicles and is therefore viewed as a key driver for the introduction of e-‐mobility. Consumer read-‐iness is built-‐up from three indicators.ii
Air quality and pollution levels 7. Penetration of HEV’s and PHEV’s 8. Wealth (GDP per capita in PPS) 9.
The operating environment ensures the practical applica-‐tion of EV’s and is largely immune to typical (short term) policy efforts. As EV and charging technologies improve, some elements of the operating environment will be-‐come less critical and others will increase in importance. The operating environment is built-‐up by five indicators.iii
Energy prices and payback period 10. Weather conditions 11. Degree of urbanization 12. Population density (inhabitants per km2) 13. Land relief 14.
Table 2. Explains the different categories and indicators.
In this research, all of the policies and instruments that governments use for the introduction of e-‐mobility are categorized as Conduct. We use various analytical lenses to order all of these possible poli-‐cies.
Policy as Tools
Based on Hood & Margetts (2007)iv classic “tools of government”-‐study we recognize four types of gov-‐ernment tools for the introduction of e-‐mobility. The table below explains these four categories.
Tools of government
Legal All of the rules and directives designed to mandate, enable, incentivize, limit or otherwise direct subjects to act according to policy goals. E.g.: legal requirements, local parking legislation, European legislation for standards for charg-‐ing-‐station accessibility, limited access to urban areas or roads.
Financial The policy instruments involve either the handing out or taking away of material resources (cash or kind), in order to incentivize or disincentivize behavior by subjects. The difference between financial and legal measures is that those affected are not obliged to take the measures in-‐volved, but are incentivized to do so by economic means. E.g.: purchase grants, tax benefits for consumers of EV’s, government funding for battery re-‐search, subsidies on home chargers, or free electricity for public charging.
Communication Instruments that influence the value-‐chain of e-‐mobility through to the communication of ar-‐guments and persuasion, including information and education. E.g.: education in schools, government information campaigns.
Organization Actions by government that provides the physical ability to act directly, using its own forces to achieve policy goals rather than others. This includes the allocation of means, capital, resources, and the physical infrastructure needed to act. E.g.: government acting as a launching customer, buying an own fleet of EV’s, government in-‐stalling public chargers.
Table 3. Tools of government
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Policy aimed at a certain element of the Value Chain of E-‐Mobility
Following earlier researchv vi we use a value chain approach to analyze the use of governmental tools. We consider both the value-‐chain of the electric vehicle (vehicle-‐perspective) and the value-‐chain of the charging-‐infrastructure (grid-‐perspective). A third value chain is referred to as the ‘network’; this in-‐cludes steering instruments that focus on connecting all stakeholders in the EV / infrastructure value-‐chain. We recognize four segments in the value-‐chains.vii The tables below explain these segments of the value chains.
Figure 2. Value chains
Value chain – electric vehicle
R&D Instruments focused on influencing the research and design of electric vehicles and EV compo-‐nents.
Production Instruments focused on influencing the production of electric vehicles and vehicle components such as batteries and other hardware (original equipment manufacturers). This segment of the value-‐chain also recognizes the software used in electric vehicles.
Services Instruments focused on influencing service-‐providers for electric vehicles. Different service providers are recognized, such as car dealers, mechanics, insurance companies, etc.
Customers Instruments focused on influencing customers of EV’s. We recognize individual consumers (end-‐users), but also fleet-‐owners (leasing companies) and government agencies (promoting consum-‐erism).
Table 4. Electric vehicle value chain
Value chain – charging infrastructure
R&D Instruments focused on influencing the research and design of the complete charging-‐infrastructure.
Production Instruments focused on influencing the production of charging-‐stations and components such as the electricity network, energy production, etc.
Services Instruments focused on influencing service-‐providers for charging-‐stations. Different service providers are recognized, such as energy suppliers, power plants, grid managers, software de-‐velopers, etc.
Customers Instruments focused on influencing customers of charging-‐stations. By ‘customers’ we refer both to users (consumers) and owners (consumers, companies, government). The different types of charging-‐stations (private, public, fast, normal) require different types of steering by governmental units.
Table 5. Infrastructure value chain
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Value chain – Network
Network These are all of the instruments that focus on connecting stakeholders in the EV / infrastructure value-‐chain. For instance, efforts intended to intensify contacts between different stakeholders, in order to improve value-‐chain alignment and a more efficient functioning of the entire value-‐chain. In addition to the value-‐chain, this includes other policy measures aimed at the e-‐mobility ecosystem, which are taken into consideration. For instance, policy measures aimed at realizing Smart Grids, Smart economies and Smart mobility Beeton (2012)viii
Table 6. Network value-‐chain
Policy at a certain Level of government
Finally, we look at policy from three different levels of government; national, regional, and local policy. Different countries work from different systems, with other levels of government that are responsible for e-‐mobility. The model takes this into account, in order to be able to analyze the differences in vari-‐ous countries. Some may organize policy from the local level, while others may have a strong central and national policy only marginally supplemented by local or regional policies.
Our final category, performance, looks at a number of performance indicators that the countries we studied use. Based on a meta-‐analysis of research reports on the introduction of EV’s and expert-‐judgment we have established a number of performance indicators, which can be influenced by the available governmental steering instruments. We look at categories that monitor EV performance and others that count infrastructure performance. From these two main-‐categories, we have made two groups of metrics that we found in our data. Table 7 explains the different categories and their metrics.
Category 1: EV performance Category 2: Infrastructure performance
EV performance refers to the achievements of the intro-‐duction of electric vehicles which can be influenced by government steering. This category is built-‐up by three performance indica-‐tors: � Number of electric vehicles � EV penetration � EV sales share
Infrastructure performance refers to achievements regarding the introduction of an adequate charging infrastructure which can be influenced by government steering. This category is built-‐up by three performance indica-‐tors: � Number of charging-‐stations � Number of fast chargers � Carbon intensity of energy supplied by charging-‐
stations
Table 7. Categories performance
Methods
In order to collect our data we have first gathered all the documents we could find for the seven case-‐countries in our project; Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and the UK. Also, we have looked at various other countries to be used as reference points; Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, and the State of California in the US. To collect the documents we “snowballed” our way through the pile of policy. Many documents contained references to other studies and sources that we than looked up and included in our model. All in all, we selected and analyzed over 300 policy measures in this first round of the empirical research.
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With this first selection of documents we “filled” our database and ran a first scan of results. We created a separate analysis of the policies of each different country and asked local resource persons to take a critical look at the document; we asked them to correct the document where necessary and sent us links to or copies of other relevant documents. We analyzed this second set of documents and improved our country-‐analysis on the basis of the feedback from the local resources. After that, we finalized our find-‐ings. During 2013 we kept collecting new documents, in order to be able to keep the database up to date with new policies and new data about performances.
As a third round, we organized feedback sessions were representatives of the various countries could reflect on our findings. In these ‘feedback session’, we presented a selection of the findings that were relevant to the particular audience (country). After that, we discussed if they recognized our findings and there was room to talk about the implications of the findings. Each of the feedback sessions indicat-‐ed recognition of our findings; also, the discussions about the implications provided some relevant new insights in the dilemmas of electric mobility policy-‐making. In this report, we attempt to think through some of those dilemmas and come up with directions for the near future of electric mobility policy-‐strategy.
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3. Findings and observations
Three forms to present our findings
We collected a large amount of data regarding performance indicators, structural and contextual fac-‐tors, ambitions and policy actions. We use three ways to present it to readers and users. The first and most “raw” version of the data is that we make available the database that contains all of the items for external use. Users can see all the data and use it themselves for whatever purpose they see in it.
Secondly, we have composed a report that contains the compiled data; this report presents our analysis for each of the different discerned categories.
Thirdly, in this report we reflect on the findings and discuss the strategic implications of the data. There-‐fore, whereas in the first two reports the data “speaks for itself” in this report we as authors and re-‐searchers are more interpretative; we reflect on what we have seen and heard, and look beyond the data at what the possible next steps in EV-‐policy may be (chapter 4).
Outline of this chapter This section presents the main findings of the study. We make a distinction between two types of re-‐sults: findings and interpretations. Findings represent the data as it is, interpretations add meaning to the findings.
In paragraph 3.1 we present a comparative analysis of the EV and charging-‐infrastructure ‘performance’ of the different NSR-‐countries. In short, we found that EV and charging-‐infrastructure performance vary amongst different countries. In the following paragraphs we look for indications explaining the variance of the performance indicators. In paragraph 3.2 we analyze different structural and contextual factors which could influence the performance indicators. In paragraph 3.3 we compare the ambitions set by the different countries regarding e-‐mobility. Finally, in paragraph 3.4 we look for explanations in the ‘policy-‐actions’; the instruments different governments use to support and contribute to the introduc-‐tion of e-‐mobility.
1.1. Performance
1.1.1. Findings and interpretations of EV Performance The output of EV’s and chargers differs greatly in different countries. Each country we studied is actively attempting to introduce e-‐mobility, but with very different results. The table below shows the perfor-‐mance with regards to the vehicles. The number of EV’s sold in 2013 ranks the countries. Findings in-‐clude passenger cars only. We also included EV sales in Q1 2014. The latest numbers show that all mar-‐kets are in an upward spiral compared to Q1 2013.
Country Findings and interpretations EV’s registered 1-‐1-‐2014
EV sales in 2013
EV sales Q1 2014
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Netherlands In January 2013 7.500 BEV’s and PHEV’s where registered in the Netherlands. The goal set for 2015 is to have 20.000 ‘electric vehicles’ registered, a goal already reached by the end of 2013 with 23.149 registered vehicles. The Netherlands has one of the highest EV-‐penetration rates of all NSR-‐countries (0,094% in 2012; 0,381% in 2013). EV-‐sales share in 2014 is 5,55% (total number of cars sold: 416.895). EV per-‐formance in the Netherlands is very high. However, most registered vehicles are PHEV’s. The score for BEV’s is much lower even though the conditions in the Netherlands are very favorable for BEV’s. There are for instance already a fair number of chargers and fast-‐chargers installed.
30211 23.149 (19.673 PHEV’s)
5.802 (approximately 4.752 PHEV’s)
Norway Norway is achieving positive scores for EV-‐adoption. Number of EVs on the road in July 12, 2012 is 7.220, which is a rela-‐tively high number. The EV penetration is 0,17% on January 1, 2012. The EV-‐sales share is higher, which indicates the market is still developing. EV-‐sales share is 3,1%, the highest of all NSR-‐countries. Compared to the Netherlands the number of BEV’s is much higher. In the Netherlands mostly PHEV’s are sold, in Norway this is the other way around. BEV’s are amongst the best selling new cars in Norway.
20486 8.666 (486
PHEV’s)
7.399 (approximately 700 PHEV’s)
Germany Germany had 5.555 EV’s on the road by January 2013; more than twice as much as the objective (2200), but not that much given the size of the countries’ fleet. However, sales have been increasing since, and the number of EVs is pro-‐gressing according to projections. Like the Netherlands, the 2013 sales are almost entirely made up of PHEV’s. Also, the German domestic production of EV’s has not yet taken flight, although there are new models coming out soon in 2014 like the much anticipated Volkswagen e-‐Golf and e-‐UP.
10446
6.711 (445
PHEV’s)
3.340 (approximately 800 PHEV’s)
UK The UK had 2600 EV’s registered on January 2011. In 2012, almost 3.000 cars were sold. Progress is rather slow, especial-‐ly when projected towards the ambition of 1.400.00 EV’s in 2020, which is 5% of the entire fleet. At the moment, the 2020 ambition seems unachievable. In 2013, sales share improved and that may indicate that the market is develop-‐ing. All in all, EV-‐penetration remains low and there are little indicators for improvement.
7871 3.739 (1.102 PHEV’s)
2.209 (666 PHEV’s)
Sweden The observations for Sweden on EV performance are positive because of the number of EVs and the growing EV penetra-‐tion. However, EV-‐sales share lags behind on other NSR-‐countries. After a good start Sweden somewhat lost momen-‐tum.
4395 1.906 (1.103 PHEV’s)
1.292 (910 PHEV’s)
Belgium In 2012, only 730 vehicles were on the road in Belgium, which is the lowest number of vehicles in the NSR. The EV penetra-‐tion and the EV sales share are only average or below aver-‐age; Belgium does not have a very aggressive ambition for EV’s, but still it will not be able to reach the goals by the current pace.
2500 824 (210
PHEV’s)
724 (387 PHEV’s)
Denmark Denmark had 1274 registered EV’s in the road by January 2013. Compared to the year before, the number almost dou-‐bled. However, EV-‐penetration remains average compared to other countries, and EV sales are slightly below average with a percentage of only 0,31%. Also, it is interesting to see how the collapse of Better Place plays out in Denmark, as the battery-‐swap concept was an important building block in the countries’ EV-‐strategy.
1370 522 (7
PHEV’s)
419 (2 PHEV’s)
Table 8. EV-‐Performance NSR countries.
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Figure 3. EV-‐performance.ix
In order to put the scores of the NSR-‐countries in perspective we also incorporated other European countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain, France and Austria) and the state of California. The state of California is considered a ‘frontrunner’ in the electrification of transportation and is therefore selected as a case to compare the European findings. In table 9 the sales in 2013 and EV sales in Q1 2014 of the reference countries and California are listed. Noteworthy is that in the European reference countries the number of PHEV’s sold compared to the total number of EV’s is often much lower than in the NSR countries. France has the highest EV sales of the EU reference countries in 2013 and Q1 2014. Interestingly France shows a strong focus on the internal car market. The Renault Zoe and Renault Kangoo ZE are the best-‐selling EV’s. The status of California as a ‘frontrunner’ in the electrification of transportation is con-‐firmed by the EV sales in 2013 and Q1 2014. Comparable to the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden a large portion of EV sales consists of PHEV’s.
Other European Countries
EV sales in 2013
EV sales Q1 2014
Austria 833 (87 PHEV’s)
326 (27 PHEV’s)
France 14.905 (880 PHEV’s)
3.748 (269 PHEV’s)
Italy 1.441 (162 PHEV’s)
313 (10 PHEV’s)
Spain 1.274 (35 PHEV’s)
111 (21 PHEV’s)
Portugal 224 (12 PHEV’s)
58 (11 PHEV’s)
23149
8666 67113739 1906 824 522
5,55%6,10%
0,23%0,17% 0,71%
0,17% 0,29%0,42% 0,98%
0,02% 0,03%0,10%
0,05% 0,07% 0,00%
1,00%
2,00%
3,00%
4,00%
5,00%
6,00%
7,00%
0250050007500
10000125001500017500200002250025000275003000032500
Netherlands Norway Germany UK Sweden Belgium Denmark
EV-‐performance
Number of EV's registerd on 1-‐1-‐2014
EV-‐sales in 2013
EV-‐sales share in 2013
Market share of EV's in total fleet in 2013 (estimate based on latest available data total fleet)
30211
20486
104467871
43952500 1370
15
Californiax 29.028 (13.615 PHEV’s)
10.521 (5.065 PHEV’s)
Table 9: EV-‐performance in other European Countries and California.
1.1.2. Findings Infrastructure performance Like in the number vehicles on the road, the number of chargers differs substantively between coun-‐tries. Table 10 presents the results regarding infrastructure-‐performance. We found that data on the number of charging-‐stations is highly ambiguous; countries differ in how they “count” chargers. Firstly, the methods of registration differ; some only count public charging stations, others also count semi-‐public chargers. Studies show that most EV charging currently takes place at home.xi However, no com-‐parable data on the number of home charging units was found. The national Government of the Nether-‐lands estimated are 18.000 home chargers installed for over 30.000 EV’s (1-‐1-‐2013). Like the interna-‐tional EV Outlook 2013, we refer to non-‐residential chargers unless stated otherwise. Secondly, the data is incomplete for some countries; to some extent, this is also an interesting finding as it reflects the lack of standardization of a systematized approach between countries.
Given the limitations in the availability of comparable data on infrastructure performance we used data from an open source vehicle charge point map website for comparison between countries. Based on a review of electric vehicle charge point map websites in the North Sea Regionxii we’ve used Chargemapxiii to compare the infrastructure performance between countries. Chargemap is based on user-‐generated content. This could explain the differences found between the number of chargers stated by ‘official’ sources and the numbers found on Chargemap. However, chargemap clearly differs between outlets (plugs) and chargers. In official sources this distinction is often not clear.
Country Findings and interpretations
Netherlands The Netherlands has the highest number of charging stations installed. The Dutch government estimates an 18.000 private chargers installed by the end of 2013 (there is no data available to verify this claim). The scores on the indicators forming EV-‐performance are very positive. Com-‐pared to other countries the number of publicly available charging-‐stations is high. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 5389 -‐ Number of outlets: 9191 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 113
Norway In Norway infrastructure performance is positive overall. Norway installed 1336 public chargers, not including semi-‐public chargers. Also, there are 47 fast chargers installed. Charging seems to be on schedule for the stated ambition of 5.000 public chargers in 2020. That said, it is question-‐able whether or not that is enough for the fleet by that time. In Norway the carbon intensity of the electricity used to charge EV’s is very low. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 1336 -‐ Number of outlets: 4936 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 47
Germany By the end of 2011, Germany had one of the highest numbers of charging stations installed (1.324 public, 613 private) in the NSR. However, it did not retain this lead. Germany currently has 2435 publicly accessible chargers. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 2435 -‐ Number of outlets: 6975 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 197
UK According to official government data the UK currently has the largest number of public chargers
16
available (approximately 8.600). In this case the number of charging points even exceeds the number of EV’s. According to Chargemap the number of chargers is much lower. Carbon intensity of electricity in the UK is amongst the highest in the NSR-‐countries. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 1727 -‐ Number of outlets: 3890 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 235
Sweden The number of chargers in Sweden is low. Chargemap.com indicates Sweden has 399 publicly accessible charging stations. Carbon intensity of energy in Sweden is very low, which is highly favorable for e-‐mobility. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 399 -‐ Number of outlets: 469 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 36
Belgium Compared to other countries the number of public chargers in Belgium is very low. As in EV’s, Belgium is slowly progressing towards EV-‐adoption. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 496 -‐ Number of outlets: 1579 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 19
Denmark We did not find official data on the number of chargers installed. According to Chargemap the number of charging points is 268 (July 2014). This low number is partly explained by the initial focus on battery swap stations (Better Place). The number of fast charging stations is also low. Denmark now has to make up for the setback of the collapse of Better Place. Chargemap July 2014
-‐ Number of chargers: 268 -‐ Number of outlets: 957 -‐ Number of fast chargers: 18
Table 10. Infrastructure performance NSR countries.
17
Figure 4. Findings on Infrastructure performance for NSR and other countries.xiv
Overall, the EV-‐ and infrastructure performance varies across the NSR-‐countries (and the benchmark countries). Norway and the Netherlands are front-‐runners in the introduction of EV’s and the charging infrastructure. Germany and the UK score high in realizing the charging-‐infrastructure, but score less on EV-‐performance. Belgium and Denmark are lagging in the introduction of e-‐mobility. Compared to other NSR-‐countries, both have low scores on EV-‐ and infrastructure performance.
As we have shown, the introduction of e-‐mobility differs greatly in the NSR-‐countries. Some do relatively well both in terms of EV’s and chargers, whereas others excel in either EV’s or chargers. Other countries lag in both categories, with few EV’s and chargers “out”.
Notable, the number of chargers is often highest in the countries with the highest carbon intensi-‐ty’(Netherlands, Germany, UK). In order to further increase the potential for emission reduction these countries have to invest in renewable electricity generation.
In the next paragraphs we explore some of the possible factors that may explain the variance in EV-‐ and infrastructure performance in the NSR-‐countries.
1.2. Structure
E-‐mobility is not only a new power train for cars but a transition to a different system of mobility; with new applications, but also with far-‐reaching changes in underlying physical, economic and social infra-‐structures. Based on a meta-‐analysis of research reports on the introduction of EV’s and expert-‐judgment we identify a number of structural characteristics, which we think are likely to influence the
5389
1336
24351727
399 496 268
113
47
197
235
36 191810,5%
104,3%
23,6%
10,8%
60,0%
11,1%
38,7%
0,0%
20,0%
40,0%
60,0%
80,0%
100,0%
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Netherlands Norway Germany UK Sweden Belgium Denmark
Infrastructure performance
Fast chargers
Chargers
Carbon intensity: electricity generated from renewable sources (% of gross electricity consumption)
18
introduction of e-‐mobility. Taken together, these characteristics compose a countries ‘starting position’ for the introduction of EV’s. The starting position could be one of the explanations for the differences in the performances of the introduction of EV’s. In this paragraph we present our analysis of the different structural characteristics of countries. In order to compare countries, we have assigned scores to the characteristics of each country and we use these scores to present our findings.2
1.2.1. Operating environment Due to relatively low fuel-‐prices and high electricity-‐prices, the characteristic ‘energy prices and payback period’ is scored as low in Belgium (which lengthens the payback period for EV’s). Norway has the high-‐est score (highest fuel prices in Europe and relatively low electricity prices). Both very hot and very cold weather influence the range of batteries available for an EV; therefore, of the NSR-‐countries Norway and Sweden score low because of the relatively coldest winters. The population density is relatively high in most NSR countries, except for Norway and Sweden. Land relief is favorable in most NSR countries; only Norway scores relatively low, because of the large differences in terrain altitudes.
Figure 3. Findings on operating environment for NSR and other countries.
1.2.2. Market environment Germany has the largest automotive industry in Europe. We regard this as a positive contextual factor for the introduction of EV’s there (indicating the likelihood for internal market gains). Denmark and Norway have low scores due to their small automotive industries. Germany also scores relatively high on ‘R&D intensity’. Together with Sweden and Denmark it has one of the highest R&D expenditures calcu-‐lated as percentage of GDP. This indicates that these countries are more likely to invest (upstream) in research and development regarding e-‐mobility. Belgium and the Netherlands have high CO2 emissions per capita. Hence, these countries also score high in this category; e-‐mobility is often seen as a driver to lower CO2 emissions per capita.
2 The structural characteristics are scored on a scale ranging from 1 – 5. If a characteristic scores ‘1’ it is likely to have a highly negative effect on the introduction of e-‐mobility. Likewise, if it scores 5 it is likely to have a highly positive effect. In appendix B the scores of the structural indicators are explained.
19
Figure 4. Findings on market environment in NSR-‐countries.
1.2.3. Infrastructure readiness EV’s can be used for peak-‐shaving in smart-‐grids, and there are other possible profitable applications of EV’s on a smart-‐grid. Therefore, investment in smart-‐grid is counted as a favorable condition for EV’s; investments in smart-‐grid projects are relatively low in Belgium and Norway and as a result they score low on this characteristic. Electricity reliability and frequency of outages score high in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark; this is considered favorable for EV’s. The electricity generated from renewable sources scores high in Scandinavian countries and (much) lower in countries like Belgium, the Nether-‐lands and the UK; energy from renewable sources is considered a favorable condition for the introduc-‐tion of EV’s, as it allows “real” zero-‐emission driving. 3 In this perspective it’s interesting to com-‐pare the external costs of electricity production between countries.4 The average external costs of elec-‐tricity in the EU represent between 1.8-‐5.9 Eurocent/kWh. These costs are significant and reflect the continued dominance of fossil fuels in the generation mix. External costs in the UK are relatively high, Sweden has the lowest external costs.xv
Figure 5. Findings on infrastructure readiness for NSR-‐countries.
3 The life-‐cycle impact of EV’s raises significantly from the use of coal produced electricity.3 4 External costs for electricity are those that are not reflected in its price, but which society as a whole must bear.
20
1.2.4. Consumer readiness The structural characteristic ‘air quality and pollution levels’ has a low score in Austria, Portugal, Spain and Norway. We hypothesize that countries with low air-‐quality and high pollution levels are more likely to stimulate and facilitate the introduction of e-‐mobility in order to (locally) improve air quality. The UK, Germany and Italy have the worst air-‐quality in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and thus have the highest score for this characteristic (highest urgency). The penetration of HEV’s and PHEV’s is highest in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. Consumers in these countries are therefore most likely to be familiar with ‘battery powered vehicles’. Wealth (GDP per capita in PPS) shows little variation between the NSR-‐countries. Most score high on this characteristic.
Figure 6. Findings on consumer readiness for NSR countries.
1.2.5. Overall: favorable structural characteristics in NSR-‐countries All in all, every NSR-‐countries has favorable conditions for EV-‐readiness. NSR-‐countries score slightly better than most of the reference-‐countries we have taken into account (their scores can be found in the Background report). Denmark shows very favorable structural scores. However, Denmark has not yet capitalized on this favorable starting position in terms of EV-‐ and infrastructure performance. Strangely enough, in Norway this seems to be the other way around. Norway scores less favorable on the structural characteristics but is doing very well in EV-‐ and infrastructure performance. In spite of less favorable conditions the sales of EV’s and the rollout of chargers is going fine.
Both Germany and the Netherlands have a high overall score on the structural characteristics and also score high on EV-‐ and infrastructure performance. However, The Netherlands are currently doing better in the introduction of EV’s. In spite of favorable conditions Germany is not doing that well yet. Graph X [see below] shows the aggregated scores of the structural characteristics of the countries we studies [NSR and non-‐NSR]. The analysis of these structural conditions does not match the actual performance of countries.
0
1
2
3
4
5
Air quality andpollution levels
Penetration of HEV’s
Wealth (GDP percapita)
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
UK0
1
2
3
4
5
Air quality andpollutionlevels
Penetration of HEV’s
Wealth (GDPper capita)
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Note. Belgium and Denmark score identical.
21
Figure 7. Aggregation of the scores on structural characteristics.
1.3. Ambition
Ambition refers to the goals set by countries regarding the introduction of e-‐mobility. All of the NSR-‐countries we studied stated formal ambitions for EV deployment. Ambitions were usually formulated in output measures, such as ‘number of electric vehicles’ and ‘number of charging-‐stations’. Sometimes ambitions were stated more in terms of outcomes of EV-‐deployment; for instance, a lower level of CO2 emissions, increased quality of life, or a relieved dependence on fossil fuels. For this study we compare ambitions at the output level; this allows for comparison between countries.
Example – measurable societal contribution of EV’s, from output to outcome: The Netherlands relates the contributions of 200.000 EV’s to a range of other goals.5 This is an interesting example of an attempt to translate the abstract numbers of vehicles and chargers to other benefits of e-‐mobility to society. The government in The Netherlands mentions the following targets: -‐ Savings of 0.5 PJ in power; -‐ A reduction of 0.5 MTON’s in CO2 emissions; -‐ An improvement in the quality of life in town centers and inner cities (in terms of air quality), because NOx
emissions will be reduced by 50 tons and fine dust emissions will be reduced by 10 tons; -‐ An improvement in the quality of life in towns and cities because the vehicle will produce no emissions and
therefore do not need to be excluded from the towns; -‐ Less dependence on fossil fuels, making a difference of 1mln barrels of oil; another aspect that is at least as
important – there is an alternative: e-‐mobility.
Table 11 [see below] lists the ambitions of the NSR-‐countries we found in the official policy-‐documents; other European countries and California are also taken into account, as reference to NSR-‐countries’ ambitions.
5 Source: http://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/bijlagen/Action%20Plan%20English.pdf.
0
5
10
15
20 Aggregabon of the scores on structural characterisbcs
Market environment Infrastructure readiness Consumer readiness Operaqng environment
22
NSR-‐ coun-‐tries
Ambitions References
Belgium � Pilot project with 600 EV’s and 250 chargers in 2015. � No ambitions were found for charging infrastructure.
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-‐en-‐publicat-‐cat-‐ies/rapporten/2012/07/23/elektrisch-‐vervoer-‐in-‐nederland-‐in-‐internationaal-‐perspectief.html
Denmark � 2014: double number of EV’s (1-‐1-‐2014: 1.300 EV’s) � 150 battery swap stations in 2012. No further ambitions
were found for charging infrastructure. Germany � 500.000 EV’s and 500.000 fuel cell vehicles in 2020. 6
million EV’s and fuel cell vehicles in 2030. � No ambitions found for charging infrastructure.
Netherlands � 20.000 EV’s in 2015, 200.000 EV’s in 2020 and 1 million EV’s in 2025.
� In 2035 all vehicles sold have zero-‐emissions. � 10.000 public charging stations (50 rapid charging sta-‐
tions) in 2013. Norway � 200.000 EV’s in 2020.
� In the realization phase (2015) Norway plans to have 5.000 charging stations.
Sweden � 18.000 EV’s in 2020. All cars replaced by EV’s in 2030. � No ambitions found for charging infrastructure.
United Kingdom
� 5% of the total UK car fleet and 16% of all new cars con-‐sist of EV’s and PHEV’s.
� No ambitions found for charging infrastructure.
http://www.ieahev.org/assets/1/7/IA-‐HEV_2010_annual_report_6MB.pdf (p. 323)
Other coun-‐tries
Ambitions References
Austria � 2,5% market share of electric vehicles in 2020. 5% BEV and 5% PHEV in sales share (approximately 200.000 vehi-‐cles) in 2020.
� No ambitions were found for charging infrastructure.
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-‐en-‐publicat-‐cat-‐ies/rapporten/2012/07/23/elektrisch-‐vervoer-‐in-‐nederland-‐in-‐internationaal-‐perspectief.html
France � 4.000 EV’s in 2012, 100.000 EV’s in 2015 and 2 million EV’s in 2020.
� 400.000 charging points in 2020.
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-‐en-‐publicat-‐cat-‐ies/rapporten/2012/07/23/elektrisch-‐vervoer-‐in-‐nederland-‐in-‐internationaal-‐perspectief.html
Italy � 130.000 PHEVs and BEVs in 2015. � 125.000 charging sites in 2020.
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-‐release_MEMO-‐13-‐24_en.htm?locale=FR
Spain � 250.000 PHEVs and BEVs in 2015. 2.500.000 EV’s in � 10.500 charging sites in 2020.
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-‐en-‐publicat-‐cat-‐ies/rapporten/2012/07/23/elektrisch-‐vervoer-‐in-‐nederland-‐in-‐internationaal-‐perspectief.html
Portugal � 200.000 EV’s in 2020. � 25.000 charging sites in 2025.
California (USA)
� 200.000 EV’s in 2020. 1.5 million zero-‐emission vehicles by 2025.
� No numerical ambition found for charging infrastructure. However, the Zero-‐emission vehicles action plan states that the provided infrastructure should be sufficient to support up to 1 mln. ZEV’s by 2020.
http://opr.ca.gov/docs/Governor's_Office_ZEV_Action_Plan_(02-‐13).pdf
Table 11. List of output ambitions that were formulated by NSR and other countries.
23
Overall: two sides of the same coin Charging and vehicles are two sides of the same coin. It is rather obvious that the one is pointless with-‐out the other. However, the inherent inter-‐relatedness of the both is hardly reflected in the stated am-‐bitions we found. Most countries state separate ambitions for vehicles and chargers and show little attention for how they see the relation between both of them. In fact, in almost every country the ambi-‐tions for vehicles are far more specific than those for charging. Apparently, charging is more considered to follow the number of vehicles and to be less a factor to drive the transition. Another explanation may be that charging is more seen as a matter of spatial planning; charging is than more a local issue than a national policy issue, which is the level we have primarily studied.
Countries differ in their levels of ambition: Sweden and Belgium seem somewhat reticent in their ambitions for EV’s; the goals they state are much more modest than those of other countries in our set. Germany and the Netherlands have set ambitious long-‐term goals, which require an exponential growth over the coming years. Similarly, the United King-‐dom has an extended ambition scenario, which says that 5% of the total UK car fleet and 16% of all new cars on the UK roads in 2020 consist of electric and plug-‐in hybrids. Based on calculations from the UK’s car fleet in 2011, converting 5% of the total fleet towards EV’s would mean that the country is hoping for 1.4 million electric and plug-‐in hybrids on the road by 2020. That is very ambitious when related to the current number of vehicles currenlty out.
Countries differ in how they state ambitions: Some countries state qualitative ambitions, such as “a matured market”, while others mentions very specific quantitative goals, even for the (very) long term. Several countries are neutral about the tech-‐nology needed to achieve the ambition; others specifically target EV’s. The majority does not differenti-‐ate between PHEV’s and BEV’s. Germany’s ambition focuses on both EV’s and fuel cell vehicles; the goal of clean mobility can be achieved along both those lines. In the Netherlands, the long term goals are not only quantified as numbers of vehicles and chargers, but also calculated in terms of the contribution to other policy goals.xvi
Most countries do not state (long-‐term) ambitions regarding charging-‐infrastructure: Ambitions regarding the charging-‐infrastructure are usually more ambiguous than EV-‐ambitions. In none of the analyzed countries, ambitions regarding the charging-‐infrastructure are equivalent to ambitions for the number of EV’s. In the NSR-‐countries Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, no ambitions were found for charging infrastructure. Some countries have set short-‐term ambitions regard-‐ing the number of chargers. Norway’s ambition is to have 5.000 charging stations installed in 2015 and the Netherlands is aiming to have 10.000 public charging stations in 20126. Ambitiousness of the ambitions and performance It is interesting that the countries that have stated the most “ambitious ambitions” also score highest on actual performance. The Netherlands, Germany, Norway and California are ambitious in both short and longer-‐term statements of ambition for EV’s; they also show highest on performance. Less ambitious countries such as Denmark, Belgium and Sweden score low on performance as well. Apparently, the ambition itself is a relevant factor for the rollout of EV’s. At the same time, there is more to introducing
6 This ambition was not met in the Netherlands: in 2012 a total number of 3611 (semi-‐)public chargers and 63 public chargers were installed.
24
EV’s than ambition alone. In the next chapter we will look at how ambitions are translated into policies by the different government, to see if these can further explain the variety of outcomes in different NSR-‐countries.
4. Conduct
In this chapter we compare the variety of policies at different governmental levels in different countries. The analysis is based on the analytical framework presented in our background report.7 In order to cre-‐ate an overview of the policy instruments used by NSR-‐countries we have assigned scores to countries’ focus. We use scores to create an overview and establish the policy focus of a country. An explanation of the data collection and scoring is presented in appendix C.
1.3.1. Conduct: Type of policy-‐actions
Most NSR countries focus on financial and organizational instruments Countries seem to adopt very similar financial policies. Financial policies are often conducted by the national government and are mostly fiscal in nature (registrations bonus based on emissions, income tax measures and opportunities for businesses to relieve the cost of an EV against taxable profits). Also, governments apply a considerable number of organizational-‐instruments. Especially at the regional and local levels we see a lot of ‘organization tools’. Local and regional governments install many local project organizations that, for instance, carry out grant applications and launching consumer initiatives. This generates extra dynamics to the incentives and benefits set out by the national government. The focus on legal and communication instruments in most NSR-‐countries is very limited compared to financial and organizational instruments. However, Norway, California, Spain and Portugal seem to focus more on regulatory tools. An example of such an intervention found in many countries is the introduc-‐tion of Low Emission Zones (LEZ’s). In these zones, high emission vehicles are restricted from entering the area, or are required to pay a fee. Many legal instruments are also accompanied by financial conse-‐quences, such as tax benefits for EV use, exemption from parking fees or a reduction of annual road tax.
Type of policy actions NSR-‐countries Legal Financial Communicative Organizational Belgium + ++ + +++ Denmark + +++ + ++ Germany + ++ + +++ Netherlands + +++ + +++ Norway ++ +++ + ++ Sweden + ++ + +++ UK 0 ++ + ++ Non NSR-‐countries Austria 0 +++ 0 + California ++ +++ + + France + ++ 0 ++ Italy + + 0 ++ Spain + ++ + ++ Portugal ++ + 0 ++ 0 = Limited information found / available + = Limited focus ++ = Strong focus
7 “INTRODUCING E-‐MOBILITY: EMERGENT STRATEGIES FOR AN EMERGENT TECHNOLOGY, Background report”
25
+++ = Prevalent focus area
Table 12. Type of policy actions.
Examples of organizational incentives used in different countries. Organizational incentives in NSR countries Belgium Platform:
• The Belgian Platform on EV’s was created to inform and bring together all relevant stakeholders from the e-‐mobility field. Between 2010 and 2011 the platform has organized several events.
Project organization: • In the Flemish region the project Electric Vehicle started in 2011 and will run until 2014. The budget
for this project is 16,3 million Euros. The goal is to put 600 EVs and 600 charging points in place. Project organization: • The Living Labs Electric Vehicles. Living Labs was launched by the Flemish government in 2010 and
will run until 2013. This programme was established to facilitate and accelerate the innovation and adoption of EVs in the Flemish region through five experimental platforms: o Volt Air. The goal is to support innovations and support the integration of EV’s in company fleets
and in the company micro grids. The project is coordinated by Siemens. The city of Kortrijk is in-‐volved in this project. Project started in 2011 and will run three years with a budget of €2.8m.
o Olympus. This project consists of three parts. The first part is an ICT platform on which all infor-‐mation on EVs and CI will be shared. The second part is a trial with EVs and electric bikes in Flem-‐ish cities which will be available to users on the train stations. The last part is the integration of the CI with the energy supply in train stations. There are several Flemish cities involved in this project which has a budget of 2,2 million euros and will be coordinated by B Holding
o Imove. A large part of this project is subsidised by the government with 4,1 million Euros, the subsidised part consists of 83 passenger cars and 33 company cars and 144 Charging points. The project is coordinated by Umicore.
o EV TecLab. This platform is the coordination of Punch Powertrain and is a consortium of ten Flemish companies and research institutions and will focus on new technologies for electric heavy-‐duty vehicles like vans, trucks and buses. The vehicles will be used for freight and public transport in daily operation and will be used in the Imove project. The project received 3,8 mil-‐lion Euros in subsidies from the government.
o EVA. This project is an initiative of public and private partners to stimulate electric driving. This project is an open platform for researchers, entrepreneurs and governments who here can find support for their innovative initiatives. The project is funded with 3,3 million Euros of public funds and consists of the largest CI in the Flemish region with a network of over 200 Charging points, and a large test fleet of 161 EVs.
Denmark Platform: • Information Centre. In cooperation with the Danish Energy Agency, the Centre for Green Transport
has established an information centre to exchange experiences on EVs between local communities in Denmark.
Project organization: • Centre for Green Transport. The Centre for Green Transport was established by the Danish Transport
Authority (part of the Danish Ministry of Transport) in April 2009 to “create the framework for a Dan-‐ish centre in the field of sustainable transport and to manage these initiatives”.
• Copenhagen Electric. Copenhagen Electric focuses on strengthening the capital region's international competitiveness and ensuring greater cooperation in the Øresund Region and other regions in Europe by providing objective information about electric vehicles to municipalities, companies and private in-‐dividuals. Also projects, campaigns and partnerships on EV’s are initiated.
Germany Project organization: • Model regions:
o Elektromobilitat Model Region (Hamburg). The testing of diesel hybrid buses on lines. Innova-‐tive energy storage for rail vehicles. The use and development of electric cars and charging infra-‐structure. The use of electric vehicles in commercial traffic. These are the priorities of the pro-‐jects in the model region Hamburg.
o Model region Bremen/Oldenburg. In the model region Bremen/Oldenburg the cooperation be-‐tween the University of Bremen and the University of applied science is another building brick in the development in electric vehicle technology. Mercedes Werk will use the scientific knowledge to produce these new technologies.
o Model region Bremen/Oldenburg. The cooperation between the University of Bremen, the Uni-‐
26
versity of applied science and Mercedes Werk resulted in the plans to convert a tractor to an E tractor, to demonstrate the use of Electric Vehicles in daily use.
• Future offensive Electromobility. In 2008 the Bayern government and industry started a future offen-‐sive called Electromobility to concentrate the activities on Electric Mobility. The goal of these two par-‐ticipants is to work together with other partners like academics and government to test future tech-‐nologies and economic concepts of Electric mobility.
Launching customership: • Public procurement. The federal government strives for a 10 % share of vehicles which emit less
than 50g CO2 per KM of their new purchased or leased vehicles in 2013. Netherlands Project organizations / organizational units established at national level:
• AutomotiveHouse. The AutomotiveHouse is the Center of activities for promoting and strengthening the Dutch automotive industry. Both Physically and programmatically. The AutomotiveHouse forms the central hub within the Hightech automotiveCampus and, as such, provides an important stimulus to marketbased cooperation between government bodies, industry and knowledge institutes in the field of automotive engineering.
• Formule E Team. The Formule E Team is the ambassador of electric mobility in the Netherlands. The Formule E Team consists of partners from the government, knowledge institutes and business. The Formule E Team inspires partners to cooperate in finding solutions for problems with electric mobility.
• RDW. The RDW (governmental road transport agency) is being encouraged by the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management to advance its leading international position in Euro-‐pean type approvals of electric vehicles and to develop testing facilities and knowledge and skills for electric driving.
• RijksWaterStaat (RWS). RWS launched the 'e-‐rijden' programme which focusses on the exploitation of EV’s and the needed permits for creating charging points at the highways. RWS also has the ambition to have a 25% share of electric vehicles in their fleet by 2015
• NL Agency. The NL Agency is part of the ministry of Economic affairs, Agriculture and Innovation and executes programs on innovation, sustainability and international business and cooperation for gov-‐ernment organisations. Most programs of the Action Plan are executed by the NL Agency.
Project organizations / organizational units established at the regional and municipal level: • Focus area Noord-‐Brabant. Within the province of Noord-‐Brabant there experimental areas will be
created to gather information and experience on zero emission cars. As a result, companies get the opportunity to explore and improve their EVs use in their own local market.
• Foundation Limburg Elektrisch. (R) The foundation Limburg Elektrisch is an independent non-‐profit organisation. Her daily task is to collect facts around the sustainable driving debate beyond feelings and opinions. In order to accelerate development the foundation cooperates with the Platform Lim-‐burg Elektrisch which consists of Province Limburg, Zuyd Hogeschool and LIOF.
• Metropolregion Amsterdam Elektrisch (MRA-‐e). MRA-‐e is a project of the city of Amsterdam and several partners. Goal is to stimulate Electric mobility. The organization focusses on realizing a charg-‐ing-‐infrastructure and stimulating the adoption of EV’s by companies and governmental organizations.
• Utrecht Elektrisch. The city of Utrecht already owns electric vehicles in their fleet and they will con-‐tinue to increase this number. By 2014 the city wants to have replaced at least 60 cars in the fleet by electric cars and also the scooters will be replaced.
Public procurement initiatives: • Demonstration programme. For demonstration purposes the government ran a subsidy programme
with a budget of 10 million euros in the first quarter of 2010. 9 demonstration projects for testing a total of 231 battery EVs and PHEVS in a number of applications have been running from 2010 until 2012.
• Launching customer 'S-‐Hertogenbosch. In the Paleiskwartier district of ’s-‐Hertogenbosch, local com-‐panies and institutions have created a shared fleet of different types of electric vehicles to increase the durability of the district and test the first smart charging system.
• Launching customer Rotterdam. Rotterdam’s municipal fleet aims to be clean, a first mover, and to set an example for city inhabitants and other cities. By 2014, at least 25 percent (about 400 vehicles) of the fleet should consist of electric or hybrid vehicles.
Norway Project organizations: • Gronn Bill. Set up to facilitate the introduction of 200.000 EVs and PHEVs on Norwegian roads by
Energy Norway, Novatran, regional authorities and ZERO by 2020. • Transnova. Transnova is the public body assigned to reducing CO2 emissions from the transport
sector. Transnova was established in 2007 after a suggestion by ZERO. Today Transnova has a budget of NOK 75 million per year.
Platforms: • ZERO. Zero Emission Resource Organization (ZERO) is involved since 2002 in activities to reduce the
emission of greenhouse gasses. The Norwegian Government supports Zero financially by 20% of the total budget of the organization.
• Norstart. Norstart is the national department of AVERE. Norstart consists mainly of EV users and Norwegian EV industry and distribution companies. Norstart works on creating the right politics and promoting EVS and renewable energy through campaigns in the market, and will take part in scientific
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projects funded in Norway of through the EU. • Electric Mobility Norway. The Electric Mobility Norway (EMN) project is being developed in the
Kongsberg-‐Drammen-‐Oslo region. It is led by Kongsberg Innovation with the support of Trans-‐Nova (which is managed by the Norwegian Public Roads administration) and Buskerud County Council. The main objective is the “establishment of an innovation and knowledge arena in that region''
Sweden Project organizations: • Network of Swedish clean vehicle cities. Stockholm is part of the network for Swedish clean vehicle
cities which make joint procurement decisions, lobby national government to change obsolete legisla-‐tion and carry out joint studies on behaviour, safety, emissions etc.
• Green Higway initiatives. The construction of quick charging stations for EVs in municipal centres along the green highway. There are two quick charging stations already and four more are under con-‐struction. The first quick charging station opened in April 2011 and the second one in January 2012. 94 charging stations for EVs and more than 240 charging points (slow charging) were placed along the green highway. The city of Sundsvall (Sweden) and Trondheim (Norway) have created the ''green highway'', together with several businesses who wanted to invest in sustainability, a 447 km long highway with charging stations. The highway opened in 2009.
Platform: • The vehicle strategic research and innovation programme. The vehicle strategic research and innova-‐
tion program was started in 2009 as a cooperative effort between the government and the Swedish automotive industry. The program finances common research effort, innovation and development ac-‐tivities. Public funds amount to SEK Million per year (approximately 105 million Euro.
UK Project organizations: • OLEV (Office for Low Emission Vehicles). Established in 2009. Cross-‐government effort to manage the
programmatic and regulatory efforts to decarbonize UK road transport. This includes development of ultra-‐low emission vehicles through research, development, and demonstration efforts, as well as promoting consumer uptake of such cars. OLEV includes staff and personnel from DfT, BIS, and also the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). OLEV has oversight of programmes worth £400m (until 2015).
• PIP (Plugged-‐In-‐Places). Intends to support the development and consumer uptake of ultra-‐low car-‐bon vehicles by creating electric car hubs in six key British cities or hubs with the installation of charg-‐ing points in various locations. The PIP programme expects the eight projects to install an additional 8.900 charging points during years two and three. Charging infrastructure will be installed in homes, at workplaces, on street, and in private and public car parks.
• Demonstration Programme. In 2009 the Ultra-‐low Carbon Vehicle Demonstrator Program operated by the TSB made £25 million of funding available to consortia of major and niche vehicle manufactur-‐ers, local authorities, power companies and universities for LCV real world testing.
Platforms: • UKH2Mobility. The UK recognizes that there will be a portfolio of solutions for the decarbonisation of
rad transport. This is why UKH2Mobility brings together the Government and industrial participants from the utility, gas, infrastructure and global car manufacturing sectors. UKH2Mobility will evaluate the potential for hydrogen as a fuel for ultra-‐low-‐carbon vehicles in the UK before developing an ac-‐tion plan for an anticipated roll-‐out to consumers during the time period of 2015-‐2015.
• NAIGT (New Automotive Innovation and Growth Team). (N) NAIGT is a quasi governmental though independent group which was established to explore the potential for LCVs (Low Carbon Vehicles). The NAIGT was formed in April 2008 by BERR (Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform).
• Low Carbon Vehicles Innovation Platform. (N) In 2007 £200 million was set aside for a range of R&D projects associated with LCV (Low Carbon Vehicles-‐). technology by the TSB under the Low Carbon Vehicles Innovation Platform. These R&D projects fall under The Integrated Delivery Programme.
• CENEX. Centre of Excellence for Low Carbon and Fuel Cell Technologies. CENEX´s remit was to pro-‐mote UK market development in low carbon and fuel cell technologies for transport applications, principally by focusing on market transformation projects linking technology providers and end users.
Table 13. Organizational incentives – examples.
1.3.2. Conduct: Governmental level Interpretation: Most NSR-‐countries initiate policy from the national government level This observation needs to be explained further. Often, when taking a closer look at these national policy measures, we find that they actually effect change on a local or regional scale. For instance, the ‘Green Deals on e-‐mobility’ policy in the Netherlands was founded by the national government, in order to stimulate and support bottom-‐up innovation aimed at sustainability. There are a number of Green Deals focusing on e-‐mobility. Typically, these deals are initiated by local or regional governments (for instance,
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Green Deal Metropolitan Region Amsterdam Electric and Green Deal Zero-‐emission public buses, which is overseen by the provinces of Brabant, Limburg, Utrecht and the city region of Eindhoven).8 In Germa-‐ny we see a similar example in the ‘Electric Mobility Model Regions' and Denmark relies heavily on local initiatives such as in the Copenhagen area. The objective of the eight selected model-‐regions in Germa-‐ny was to connect application-‐oriented research with customer-‐focused daily use of electric vehicles. €115 million Euros was made available and then divided across the 8 model regions into 220 projects. This is an example of how a large national government program is effectively carried out and put into practice at the regional and local projects.
Government level Country National Regional Local Belgium + +++ + Denmark + +++ +++ Germany +++ ++ + Netherlands ++ ++ ++ Norway +++ + + Sweden +++ + + UK +++ ++ + Non NSR-‐countries Austria ++ ++ ++ California ++ ++ ++ France ++ ++ ++ Italy +++ + + Spain +++ 0 + Portugal +++ 0 + 0 = Limited information found / available + = Limited focus ++ = Strong focus +++ = Prevalent focus area
Table 14. Government level
1.3.3. Conduct: Policy focus Interpretation: In most NSR-‐countries policy focuses on vehicles rather than charging Policy instruments mostly focus on the EV-‐value chain; e.g. most financial policies focus on EV’s. This focus is consistent with the findings regarding the ambitions that generally prioritize vehicles over chargers.
A large share of policy interventions is focused on connecting stakeholders in the EV / infrastructure value-‐chain (network). For instance, policies attempt to intensify contacts between stakeholders to improve value-‐chain alignment. EV-‐adoption requires different parties to collaborate and coordinate efforts, whereas they often do not see each other as natural partners or even as a part of the same value chain. ‘Network instruments’ primarily consist of project organizations and demonstrations pro-‐jects. These often focus on both vehicle and electric grid. However, most programs focus on vehicle (for instance demonstration projects for EV-‐driving), with charging as a by-‐product.
We also found steering instruments without specific focus on EV’s or the electric grid in the network category provided that, in the opinion of the researcher, the instrument had the capacity to stimulate and facilitate the introduction and increased use of e-‐mobility in general or as a “whole”. One example 8 The national government supports these ‘Green Deals’ by subsidies, launching customership, giving access to capital markets, directing the different initiatives and changing (when possible) laws and regulations which form bottlenecks.
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of such an instrument is the Formula E-‐team in The Netherlands (a team of ambassadors for the intro-‐duction of e-‐mobility founded by the national government).
1.3.4. Conduct: EV-‐value chain Interpretation: EV Policy instruments in most countries seem to be targeted downstream of the value chain. However, some countries have a more upstream focus.
Policy focus in the EV-‐value chain Country R&D Production Services Customer Belgium + + + ++ Denmark +++ 0 + ++ Germany +++ ++ + +++ Netherlands + ++ + +++ Norway ++ + + +++ Sweden ++ + + ++ UK ++ + + ++ Non NSR-‐countries Austria + + + +++ California +++ ++ + ++ France + + + +++ Italy ++ ++ 0 + Spain + ++ + ++ Portugal 0 + + +++ 0 = Limited information found / available + = Limited focus ++ = Strong focus +++ = Prevalent focus area
Table 15. Policy focus in the EV-‐value chain.
Upstream (R&D, production) Germany is one of the countries with a strong focus on R&D in EV policy. This could be explained by the presence of major vehicle manufacturers in Germany (which collectively comprise the largest automo-‐tive industry in Europe). Sweden also has a strong focus on R&D. Over one-‐third of the policy instru-‐ments found in Sweden focuses on stimulating Research and Development. In France Renault has teamed up with the CEA (French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) to work on elec-‐tric vehicles, new energies and cleaner combustion engines.
Examples of upstream financial incentives for EV’s
Financial incentives -‐ upstream of the value chain (R&D and production focussed)
Belgium Research funding: • The Expertise Centrum does research on energy storage, induction charging and electric power sys-‐
tems in cars. This research is funded by regional funds.
Denmark ‘Real world testing and experimenting’: • Part of the Energy Agreement for 2008-‐11 is that DKK 10 mill. per year for 2008-‐09 and DKK 5 mill. per
year for 2010-‐12 is to be appropriated for a test scheme for electric cars. • DKK 15 million has been earmarked for the continuation of the electric-‐car pilot scheme in 2013-‐2015. • 3 Million Euro was granted by the Centre for Green Transport for the ChoosEV project to field-‐test 300
mass-‐produced EVs. • 230.000 Euro was granted by the Centre for Green Transport to field-‐test fuel cell EVs in Copenhagen.
Germany Research funding: • The storage battery programme is founded to build capacities in Germany for implementation
throughout the whole supply chain in the production of storage batteries. The programme runs from
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2009 until 2012, the government has granted 35 million Euros to this project. • The third mobility and transport research programme (BMWI) sets out the goals, for instance to
research in drive technology. Special importance is attached to developing new vehicle concepts and technologies for reducing energy consumptions and pollution in road.
• Through the BMBF ICT 2020 research for innovation, EENOVA receives 100 million Euros for research on energy management in EVs.
• The Lithium ion battery alliance is a project to substantially increase the energy and performance density of lithium ion batteries and to accelerate the possible use in production. The federal govern-‐ment has granted 60 million Euros to this project.
‘Real world testing and experimenting’: • The BMVBS (Federal ministry of Transport, Building and Urban development) funds a project which
demonstrates the use of electric vehicles. The project explores the possibilities of new business mod-‐els through real users from the field. The project runs from 2011 until 2014.
• Testing in electro mobility model regions. In the years of 2010 and 2011 local projects in the model region Hamburg were funded with 12 million Euros from the federal stimulus package to build charg-‐ing infrastructure and to test Evs in the field.
• In 2008 the Bayern government and industry started a future offensive called Electromobility to concentrate the activities on Electric Mobility. The goal of these two participants is to work together with other partners like academics and government to test future technologies and economic con-‐cepts of Electric mobility.
Netherlands Research funding: • Through two HTAS (Hightech Automotive Systems) Tenders, the government contributes 20 million
euros to development and research on EV’s. • Innovation vouchers e-‐mobility. From January first until 31th of December 2013 entrepreneurs who
want to develop a new product in the field of Electric mobility but have insufficient means of knowledge, can get an innovation voucher. These vouchers are worth 5.000 euros and the budget for the total of a maximum of 100 vouchers is 500.000 euros.
• Entrepreneurs who want to start pilots and innovation projects with EVs can get governmental subsi-‐dies through the IPC (Innovation Achievement Contracts). In 2012 the ministry of Economic affairs has earmarked 17 million euros for the IPC program.
Norway ‘Real world testing and experimenting’: • RekkEVide is a project which tests the use of EV in Northern weather circumstances.
Sweden Research funding: • Energy Systems in Road Vehicles, a research programme for batteries, fuel cells and other compo-‐
nents for Evs, was founded. This programme is managed by the Swedish Energy Agency. • The government invested SEK 240 Million to partially finance research into environmentally friendly
vehicles. The Swedish Energy Agency invested SEK 20 Million. One of the projects in which is invested by the Swedish government is a project that is set up to develop and demonstrate EV’s.
• The vehicle strategic research and innovation programme was started in 2009 as a cooperative effort between the government and the Swedish automotive industry. The program finances common re-‐search effort, innovation and development activities. Public funds amount to SEK Million per year (ap-‐proximately 105 million Euro).
• Swedish Hybrid Vehicle Centre Programme focusses on developing a competitive R&D centre for hybrid and electric vehicle technology through continuous cooperation between industry and academ-‐ia.
• Environmental Vehicle Development Programme aims to contribute to global leadership within vehi-‐cle electronics & software and increase expertise in the efficient design of vehicles.
• In 2011 the Swedish Energy Agency granted 24 Million SEK to Volvo Powertrain AB for the project ''Slide in Technique for continuous transfer of energy to electric vehicles''.
UK ‘Real world testing and experimenting’: • In 2009 the Ultra-‐low Carbon Vehicle Demonstrator Program operated by the TSB made £25 million of
funding available to consortia of major and niche vehicle manufacturers, local authorities, power companies and universities for LCV real world testing.
Production funding: • The Low Carbon Economic Area (LCEA) North East was designated as the provider of EV expertise /
production. To reach this goal the national and EU governments granted funds to the region. In addi-‐tion ONE North East invested some £30m in the sector.
Research funding: • In 2010 the Midlands became a LCEA for Advanced Automotive Engineering and received £19.5 million
of governmental funding to invest in a programme of projects, partnering with industry and universi-‐ties, developing low carbon solutions for key technologies such as motors and aerodynamics.
• In 2007 £200 million was set aside for a range of R&D projects associated with LCV (Low Carbon Vehicles-‐). technology by the TSB under the Low Carbon Vehicles Innovation Platform. o R&D competition ‘Ultra-‐Efficient Systems for the Market Advancement of Electric and Hybrid Ve-‐
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hicles’, offered £10m of funding. This competition recognised R&D in the electrification of road transport as critical to achieving the longer term vision of decarbonisation of vehicles.
o Second R&D competition allocated £15m to fund highly innovative collaborative research and development projects and proof-‐of-‐concept studies.
o Also EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council), is managing a £3m strategic re-‐search competition. The competition targets small-‐scale, short-‐term, basic research feasibility projects exploring future technologies that might contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions from the UK vehicle market and so help support the uptake of low carbon vehicles.
Non NSR-‐countries Austria
Lighthouse Projects Initiative (LPTI). (N) The project is conducted under the funding programs of the Klima-‐ und Energiefonds (Climate and Energy Fund). The budget of the LTPI is approximately €6 million (US$7.9 million) in 2011. The objective of these programs is to demonstrate new technologies in the area of electric mobility. The programs cover the demonstration and implementation of large-‐scale proposals that can involve various required infrastructure facilities and people, including developers, producers, downstream operators, and future users. The LTPI funds R&D and demonstration projects in the field of electric mobility for technologies that are still not ready for the market. VECEPT -‐ All Purpose Cost Efficient Plug-‐In Electric (Hybridized) Vehicle. (N) The aim of the project is the development and testing of an everyday use, inexpensive plug-‐in hybrid vehicle (PHEV) as a solid model for the world market. Eisenstadt. (L)The concept for the model region in Eisenstadt foresees the shift of taxi services to electric vehicles as well as the implementation of E-‐car sharing and E-‐carpooling business models. This project was approved for 2011–2013 and is funded with €560,000. eMORAIL -‐ Integrated eMobility Service for Public Transport. (N) The aim of the project is to design an innovative, environmentally friendly and kostengünstigen Mobilitätslösung for commuters. For this purpose the integrated transport services for commuters in 2 ländlichen regions (hunchback world, Leibnitz) and an intermodal eCarsharing / eBike offer in 2 cities (Vienna, Graz) is implemented and tested.
Non NSR-‐countries California
Research funding: • Envia Systems, Inc. will create a low cost, high energy density, high performance battery system for
electric and plug-‐in hybrid electric vehicles. Grant amount $9 million from CEC & $4 million from American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
• Advanced cells and design technology for electric drive batteries. This project will develop next gener-‐ation, high-‐energy lithium ion cells leveraging silicon anodes, doubling the capacity of state of the art vehicle batteries. $4,986,984.
• Advanced cells and design technology for electric drive batteries. This project will develop high-‐energy cells using a lithium metal anode and a proprietary solid polymer electrolyte that significantly reduces battery cost and size, and improves life and safety. $4,874,391.
• Advanced cells and design technology for electric drive batteries. This project will develop next gen-‐eration high-‐energy lithium ion cells leveraging, high voltage composite cathode materials and silicon based anodes doubling the capacity of state of the art vehicle batteries. $4,840,781
• Advanced Energy Storage technologies research programs. Research portfolio is focused on battery module development and demonstration of advanced batteries to enable a large market penetration of Electric Driven Vehicles (EDV) within 5 to 10 years.
• Fundamental basic energy research on enabling materials for batteries through the Energy Frontiers Research Centers.
• Transformational research on revolutionary, “game-‐changing” energy storage technologies. EDV-‐related projects include metal-‐air, lithium sulfur, magnesium ion, advanced lithium-‐ion, and solid state batteries, as well as ultracapacitors.
• Grid Energy Storage & Battery Secondary Use. The Luskin Center is developing innovative strategies to enhance PEV value through secondary use of PEV batteries. This includes both vehicle-‐to-‐grid power (V2G) and post-‐vehicle repurposing of used PEV batteries (“second life”) into stationary energy-‐storage appliances (B2G).
Production funding: • Sales Tax Exclusion: Advanced Manufacturing (CAEATFA program). Provides a Sales and Use Tax Exclu-‐
sion Program for advanced manufacturing projects. Effective since January 1, 2013. ‘Real world testing and experimenting’: • EV Readiness research. With funding from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and CEC, California’s
major regions are assembling PEV Readiness plans. The Luskin Center is the prime research contractor. This research is aimed at informing the strategic development of public and other charging infrastruc-‐ture necessary to effectively support a transition to PEVs in Southern California. Additional related projects include examining PEV parking policies.
• Clean fuel program provides funding for research, development, demonstration, and deployment projects that are expected to help accelerate the commercialization of advanced low emission trans-‐portation technologies. South Coast. Approximately $10 million annually.
Non NSR-‐countries France
R&D and demonstration projects. The France government announced to dedicate € 400 million for R&D and demonstration projects over 2008-‐2012 on low carbon vehicles. This budget covers many R&D and demonstration activities for the development of vehicles and charging infrastructure.
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National Strategy 2009. Renault will establish a lithium-‐ion battery factory in Flins that will produce 100.000 batteries a year . The investment here will be 625 million Euros, of which 125 million will be pro-‐vided for by the French government and the government will also loan Renault 150 million Euros for this project. National Strategy 2009. A group of companies including La Poste, EPA, Air France, EDF Energy, France Telecom and more and the French government, will commit to buying electric vehicles with a range of at least 150km. It is hoped to have 100.000 vehicles by 2015. Agreement Renault and CEA. Renault has teamed up with the CEA (French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) to work on electric vehicles, new energies and cleaner combustion engines. The CEA is funded by the French government with a focus on technological research across three fields: energy; infor-‐mation and health technologies; and defence and security. This agreement was made in 2010. The two will co-‐operate at several sites and will identify areas of synergy as well as approving a three-‐year research and development programme. Investissements d'Avenir (Investments for the future). In 2010 the programme Investments for the future was created under the National Loan Plan. This research is designed to go beyond demonstration by provid-‐ing companies with the support they need to pilot new technology into the experimental phase and vali-‐date it prior to commercialization. The total budget for the Investments for the future plan were 35 billion Euros.
Non NSR-‐countries Italy
No upstream incentives found
Non NSR-‐countries Spain
CENIT VERDE. Cenit Verde is a technological collaboration of 15 companies and 14 universities with the goal to develop the technologies and components of hybrid and electric vehicles. The total budget of this project is about 40 million Euros. ZEM2ALL. Málaga is the place where the international ZEM2ALL (Zero Emissions Mobility to All) project is being launched. This four-‐year, 60 million euro project spearheaded by Endesa in Spain will enable the mass market rollout of the new e-‐mobility services and benefits. The project aims to make e-‐mobility a reality through new services like recharging management, dual directionality of the load from the grid to the vehicle and back (V2G) and strategically-‐placed rapid charging points, all of which globally interconnected.
Non NSR-‐countries Portugal
MOBI.CAR. Flagship project within the competitiveness pole for the mobility industries, which aims to fully engineer and design a light electric vehicle that embodies the green car revolution.
Table 16. Upstream financial incentives – examples.
Downstream (consumers, services) Most countries focus their policies downstream in the value chain; they adopt a large number of finan-‐cial incentives, at different government levels (tax incentives, rebates, subsidies, local benefits, etc.). For instance, in Denmark, one-‐third of the steering instruments in the EV value chain focusses on consum-‐ers.
A significant part of the downstream policy focused at consumers consist of tax incentives. All NSR-‐countries have adopted a number of tax incentives focused on EV’s. For instance the amount of vehicle tax is often based on tailpipe emissions. In the Netherlands company purchase of EV’s is made very attractive through a number of tax schemes. For instance, entrepreneurs can receive a subsidy for pur-‐chasing an EV or installing charging infrastructure. They can relieve costs of an EV against taxable profits. In Norway Registration tax is calculated according to weight, motor power and CO2 emissions. Heavy and powerful vehicles are hence heavily taxed. EVs are exempt from this tax making the Tesla Model S a very attractive option for people who want to buy a high performance saloon car.
Different levels of government implement downstream policies. Subsidies and tax incentives are usually implemented at national level. However, also local governments provide financial incentives, often cash but mostly ‘in-‐kind’. Examples are free or preferential parking, access to toll lanes, free charging, free access to ferries. At first glance these are small incentives. However, their impact should not be over-‐looked. In a recent Californian survey 59% of the respondents indicated that access to the High-‐occupancy vehicle lane (HOV-‐lane) was extremely or very important in their decision to purchase an EV (making it the most important motivator for purchase found in the survey) .xvii
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Examples of ‘downstream’ financial incentives for EV’s
Financial incentives -‐ downstream of the value chain (consumer focussed)
Belgium9 Tax incentives: • 120% of the purchase costs are deductible for companies under corporate tax system for EV’s. 100%
for PHEV with CO2 < 60g/km (for companies under corporate tax system). • Individuals receive a subsidy of 30% of the price of the EV up to 9.190 Euros. (via taxes, not directly
from invoice) In Wallonia the motor vehicle tax for low emission cars is the lowest of all the taxes. In the Flemish region EVs are exempt from motor vehicle tax
Rebates / subsidies: • Bonus Malus. In the Walloon Region EVs are being promoted through an extra subsidy of 3.500 Euros
through a bonus malus system. • Subsidy. Through the subsidy the city of Gent receives of the CIVITAS demonstration programme. The
city grants funds to individuals, taxi and courier services and also to car sharing companies to pur-‐chase EVs
Denmark Tax incentives: • In Denmark BEVs are exempt from registration tax until 2015. That amount is 105 % of the price of the
car for the first 10.000 Euros en 180% for the rest of the amount. • BEVs and fuel cell vehicles are exempted from annual tax until the end of 2015. Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • Parking. In Denmark several cities (Copenhagen) have reduced the parking fee for EVs and in some
cities EVs are exempt from paying. • Toll Roads. (N) Free use of toll roads for EVs.
Germany Tax incentives: • Exemption of annual circulation tax for EV’s bought during the period of May 18th 2011 until Decem-‐
ber 31th 2015. The federal government has decided that the exemption period will be doubled from 5 to 10 years.
• In Germany the motor vehicle tax is determined by the amount of CO2 emission, which is a pro for EV’s.
Rebates / subsidies: • The German government grants subsidies up to 5.000 Euros for EV buyers. Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • Parking. In several cities in Germany EVs have privileges for parking.
Netherlands Tax incentives: • EVs are exempt from the registration tax and from the yearly road tax. Fuel cell EVs follow the same
ruling. • For leased cars, an income tax measure makes EVs and HEVs attractive. A normal tariff of 25% of a
leased car's value that is added to the yearly income tax is eliminated (7% from 2014) for zero-‐emission cars (less than 50g CO2/km) or will be 14% or 20% according to the fuel type and CO2 emis-‐sions if the cars are fuel-‐efficient.
• Tax relief regulation for purchasing commercial electric vehicles. • Through the MIA and VAMIL regulation of the central government, entrepreneurs can receive a subsi-‐
dy for purchasing an EV or installing charging infrastructure. They can relieve costs of an EV against taxable profits.
Rebates / subsidies: • The city of Amsterdam grants subsidies up to 5.000 euros to purchase EVs which are being used for
business and up to 10.000 euros for purchasing electric taxi's and courier cars. Norway Tax incentives:
• EV’s are exempt from non-‐recurring vehicle fees. • EV’s are exempt from sales tax • EV’s are exempt from annual road tax. Tax free allowance given for this tax (calculated as NOK/km) i.e.
for trips to/from working places and for business trips is considerable higher for EVs. Reduction for companies: 75% for EV and 50% for HEVs.
• EV’s are exempt from taxation for company car benefit tax from 1 January 2009 • Registration tax is calculated according to weight, motor power and CO2 emissions. The vehicles are
classified by groups per CO2 'tax'. EVs are exempt from this tax. • Reduced tax for leasing EV’s. Rebates / subsidies: • Grants for individuals. The Norwegian government grants subsidies (approximately €4.000) to indi-‐
9 In Belgium, unlike most of the studied countries, measures such as tax rates are a regional responsibility. Since 2002 the Belgian regions (Flanders, the Brussels Capital and the Walloon Region) are responsible for the vehicle tax base, tax rates and exemptions.
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viduals who buy an EV or HEV class N1 or M1. • Grants for companies. To purchase EVs the funding is 50% of vehicle’s price; up to 50% are given to
companies. Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • Domestic Ferries. EV’s have free use of domestic ferries. • Free Access. EV’s have free access to public areas. • Free Parking. EV’s can park for free in public parking places. This measure has been in place since the
beginning of the 1990s. • Toll Roads. EV’s can use the toll roads for free. • Use of Bus and Taxi lanes. EV’s are permitted in bus and taxi lanes. This measure has been in place
since 2003. Sweden Tax incentives:
• Taxation is based on the amount of CO2 emission. This tax has been raised with 33% in 2011 to stimu-‐late the use of EVs.
• Hybrid vehicles with CO2 emissions of 12 G/KM or less and EV’s with an energy consumption of 37 kwh per 100 km or less are exempt from the annual circulation tax for a period of five years from the date of their first registration starting on 1 January 2010.
• For EVs and Hybrid vehicles the taxable value of the car for the purposes of company car taxation is reduces by 40% compared with the corresponding or comparable petrol or diesel car.
Rebates / subsidies: • A clean vehicle premium of 40,000 SEK (approximately € 4.500) has been introduced for vehicles
emitting less than 50 g CO2 per km. Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • Parking. In about 50% of the 70 cities in Sweden where you have to pay to park EVs get a discount or
can park for free. (Parking. In about 50% of the 70 cities in Sweden where you have to pay to park EVs get a discount or can park for free).
• Toll. EV’s bought before 1 January 2009 are exempt from paying toll tax in Stockholm until 2012. Cars bought after 2009 are not exempt. From August 1 2012 this incentive has been cancelled.
• Congestion Charge scheme. A congestion-‐charging scheme applied in central Stockholm since the summer of 2007. A fee is charged during times of traffic congestion. PHEV’s and EV’s are exempt.
UK Tax incentives: • Vehicle Excise Duty (UK's Circulation Tax). Electric vehicles exempt. VED for other vehicles is gradu-‐
ated by CO2 emissions (for tailpipe emissions < 100 g CO2 per km). • Company Car Tax. Employees and employers exempt from income and national insurance contribu-‐
tions. • Van Benefit Charge. Exemption for electric vans from income and national insurance contributions
(maximum of £3.000). • Fuel benefit Charge. Electric Vehicles exempt. • Enhanced capital allowances. 100% first-‐year allowance: business can relieve entire cost of an electric
car or van against taxable profits in the year of acquisition. Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’) • Parking Charges. Some local authorities provide exemptions or a reduced charge for electric cars. • London congestion charge. 100% discount for EV's saving up to £2,000 per annum. Rebates / subsidies: • Plug-‐In Car Grant. Purpose of this grant programme is to enable the purchase of ultra-‐low carbon
vehicles. This Subsidy programme has a £43m consumer incentive scheme for EV’s and PHEVs, up to 2015. This grant, first available from January 2011, reduces the cost of eligible cars by 25% up to a maximum of £5,000 for both private and business buyers.
• Plug-‐In Van Grant. Aimed at light truck (N1) vehicles that fulfil qualifying criteria, these grants will enable purchasers to receive 20% off the cost of a van up to a maximum of £8.000.
• Local grants. Funding through the Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF) will replace the Local Transport Plan funding stream, with £560m available for 2012-‐15
Non NSR-‐countries Austria
Tax incentives: • The purchase of EVs is exempted from the NoVA (Normverbrauchsabgabe) tax for new vehicle pur-‐
chases. This tax can increase a vehicle’s price by a maximum of 16% (of the vehicle’s value). • BEV’s are also exempted from the motor-‐based insurance tax. Since January 2011, a stepwise increase
in tax has been applied for each additional gram of CO2, as follows: Emissions over 160 g CO2/km: Tax increase is €25 /g CO2. Emissions over 180 g CO2/km: Tax increase is €50 /g CO2. Emissions over 220 g CO2/km: Tax increase is €75 g CO2. This tax will be followed by a further tax increase for each addi-‐tional gram of CO2.
Rebates / subsidies (regional): • Rebates Burgenland. 30% of the cost (up to 750 EUR) with purchase of a new electric car or conver-‐
sion to all-‐electric operation. The funding amount is limited to EUR 300,000. The promotion ends with the consumption of funds no later than 31.12.2013.
• Rebates Kärnten. 12% of each sale price for electric cars (including battery-‐rent for 60 months, unless
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batteries are not included in the purchase price), but a maximum of 3,500 euros. The electricity de-‐mand must be generated from renewable energy sources (CO2 neutral): through participation in a civ-‐il power station or by the establishment of a single photovoltaic plant. Hybrid vehicles and range ex-‐tenders are not supported. The promotion is limited to 66 electric cars.
• Rebates Salzburg. The promotion heights are per car € 2.000,-‐ when using electricity from conven-‐tional energy sources, € 3.000 when using electricity from renewable sources or € 4.000 in proof of the creation of additional green power capacity (photovoltaic system). € 1.000 for an hybrid.
Non NSR-‐countries California
Tax incentive • Tax credits for purchasing electric vehicle (between $2,500 & $7,500 per vehicle, depending on bat-‐
tery capacity). Rebates / subsidies • A credit equal to 10% of cost up to a maximum of $4,000 is available for kits that will convert a stand-‐
ard vehicle to plug-‐in EV. • Clean Vehicle Rebate Project offers rebates for the purchase or lease of qualified vehicles. Rebates up
to $2,500 per vehicle. Non NSR-‐countries France
Subsidy: • There was a 5.000 euros cash incentive for any electric car sale in France, no matter if the buyer is an
individual or a company. In 2012 Grants for electric cars increased from 5.000 to 7.000 Euros and up to 4.000 Euros for hybrid vehicles, increased from 2.000 Euros.
Non NSR-‐countries Italy
No downstream financial incentives found in this category.
Non NSR-‐countries Spain
Tax incentives: • In Spain the registration tax is based on CO2 emission. Rates are classified as follows: 0% up to 120
g/km CO2 emission, 4.75% between 121 g/km and 160 g/km CO2 emission, 9.75% between 161 g/km and 199 g/km CO2 emission, 14.75% equal and higher 200 g/km CO2 emission.
Rebates / subsidies: • Purchasers of a new car emitting maximum 140 g/km and costing maximum 30.000 EUR can obtain an
interest-‐free loan up to 10.000 EUR if they have a car that is 10 years old and more (or has a mileage exceeding 250,000 km) scrapped simultaneously.
• In 2010 the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade has announced a plan for stimulating the pur-‐chase of electric vehicles with a budget of 8m EUR. The aid will range between 750 and 20,000 EUR depending on the type of vehicle (motorcycle, car, bus or truck). The fund will cover between 15% and 20% of the price of cars depending on their energy efficiency. To qualify for this aid buyers must con-‐tact a seller or choose any of the vehicles stated in the catalogue published on the website of the Insti-‐tute for Diversification and Saving of Energy.
• Municipalities having more than 50,000 inhabitants (145 cities) have 20% subvention in the acquisi-‐tion of electric cars (max. 6.000 € / EV). This implies a total amount of 240 million Euros.
• In Aragon, Asturias, Baleares, Madrid, Navarra, Valencia, Castilla la Mancha, Murcia, Bastilla y Leon buyers of EV receive 2.000 EUR for purchasing a Hybrid and 6.000 EUR for electric vehicles.
Non NSR-‐countries Portugal
Tax incentives: • Corporate tax deduction for fleets that include EVs. • Exemption of EV's from vehicle acquisition tax and circulation tax. Rebates / subsidies: • Direct incentive for EV acquisition of 5.000 euro. • Private customers that buy one of the first five thousand electric cars from 2010 onwards will be
entitled to an incentive of five thousand euros. This incentive will be deducted directly by electric ve-‐hicles sellers without requiring any involvement by the buyer.
• Scrappage Incentives. Incentives for buying an electric car may be as high as 6.500 euros if the new EV replaces an end-‐of-‐life vehicle.
Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • Parking. Preferential parking areas for EV's in Urban centers.
Table 17. Downstream financial incentives – examples.
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1.3.5. Conduct: Charging infrastructure value chain Interpretation: Few countries focus on charging infrastructure. Also, grid-‐oriented policies focus less downstream and target more upstream elements (production and services). Policy focus in the charging infrastructure value chain Country R&D Production Services Customer Belgium 0 + ++ ++ Denmark ++ + + ++ Germany ++ ++ + + Netherlands + +++ + + Norway + ++ + ++ Sweden ++ + + + UK + ++ ++ ++ Non NSR-‐countries Austria + + + ++ California + ++ + ++ France ++ ++ + + Italy ++ ++ 0 + Spain + ++ + + Portugal 0 + + + 0 = Limited information found / available + = Limited focus ++ = Strong focus +++ = Prevalent focus area
Table 18. Policy focus in the charging infrastructure value chain.
The focus on production can be explained by the relatively large number of policies that focus on the installation of (semi)-‐public charging points (mostly by regional and local governments). Many of those instruments focus on the installation of (semi-‐) public charging points. The UK national government has initiated the PIP (Plugged-‐In-‐Places) program. It intends to support the development and consumer uptake of ultra-‐low carbon vehicles by introducing electric-‐car hubs in six key British cities.
A majority of the policy instruments established in Norway are focused on the installation of (semi-‐)public charging points. Different governmental levels concern themselves with the installation of charg-‐ing points. However, closer examination of the data shows that most of the funding for the charging infrastructure comes from the national government.
Services A significant number of instruments in the UK focus on services, e.g. the Road Map Charging Infrastruc-‐ture. In 2012, the UK Government’s Ministers of Transport and Business announced that a National Chargepoint Registry would be developed by POD Point – a UK-‐based charge-‐point manufacturer – and will include a publicly accessible database of charging points across the UK. An example of a policy in-‐strument that focuses on service is EDISON. The Danish government finances part of the EDISON pro-‐ject, which links a pool of EVs to charging stations powered by wind energy. Most steering instruments in Sweden that are found in the charging-‐infrastructure focus on the ‘customers’.
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Examples of ‘downstream’ financial incentives for charging infrastructure Financial incentives for charging -‐ downstream of the value chain (consumer focussed) Belgium Tax incentives:
• When a private actor installs a charging point on the outside of his house they are entitled to 40% tax deduction with a maximum of 260 Euros for the year 2013.
• Additional deductibility of 13.5% on the investment in charging infrastructure (for companies under corporate tax system).
Denmark No downstream financial incentives found in this category. Germany No downstream financial incentives found in this category. Netherlands Tax incentive:
• Through the MIA and VAMIL regulation of the central government, entrepreneurs can receive a subsi-‐dy for installing charging infrastructure.
Rebates / subsidies: • Drive4Electric (province Friesland) introduced a subsidy on the creation of charging points. Customers
and companies which create charging points on private space, can get a discount of 500 Euros per charging point.
• The Rotterdam Electric Program supports the first 1.000 EV owners with an electric charging point. On private property, a charging point is partly subsided.
Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • In Rotterdam and Amsterdam EVs can recharge for free.
Norway Local benefits (‘non-‐fiscal incentives’): • Free use of Charging Infrastructure. EV users can use the public charging infrastructure for free. • Grants. The Norwegian government has granted 11,9 Million Euro for new recharging stations.
Sweden No downstream financial incentives found in this category. UK PIP (Plugged-‐In-‐Places). Intends to support the development and consumer uptake of ultra-‐low carbon
vehicles by creating electric car hubs in six key British cities or hubs with the installation of charging point in various locations (also funds for charging-‐points on streets, in retail, leisure and car parks).
Non NSR-‐countries Austria
Rebates / subsidies: • PV Stromtankstellen-‐Förderun Nieder Österreich. Funding for northeast communities, depending on
the variant subsidy up to 75% of the net investment cost and max. € 7.500, -‐. The promotion is valid until 31.12.2013
• Rebates Kärnten. E-‐Charging station promotion for businesses. When buying a "life Kärnten" -‐ charg-‐ing station companies are supported with a 20% promotion.
Non NSR-‐countries California
Rebates / subsidies: • PEV Home Charger Deployment Program. Provides incentives for up to 2,750 residents who purchase
a new plug-‐in electric vehicle and install Level 2 EVSE from qualifying vendors in Bay Area. • Free charging equipment. ECOtality offers EV Supply Equipment at no cost to individuals in the Los
Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas. 1,786 EVSE in California installed. 2,785 in total project. Value of the project is $230 million.
• PEV Charging Rate Reduction. Southern California Edison (SCE) offers a discounted rate to customers for electricity used to charge EVs. Two rate schedules are available for PEV charging during on-‐ and off-‐peak hours.
• Charger Installation Rebate. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) provides rebates of up to $2,000 for the first 1,000 residential customers who purchase or lease a qualifying EV and in-‐stall a rapid, Level 2 charger and a separate time-‐of-‐use meter at their home. Program expires June 30, 2013.
• ChargeUp LA. LADWP provides rebates to residential customers for the cost of EV chargers and instal-‐lation. The rebate will cover up to $2,000 of out-‐of-‐pocket costs.
• PEV Charging Rate Reduction. In Sacramento Municipal Utility District this rate option is for residen-‐tial customers who own or lease EV’s.
• PEV Charging Rate Reduction. The LADWP offers a $0.025 per kilowatt discount for electricity used to charge EV’s during off-‐peak times. Discount only applicable for first 500 kilowatt-‐hours in month.
Non NSR-‐countries France
No downstream financial incentives found in this category.
Non NSR-‐countries Italy
No downstream financial incentives found in this category.
Non NSR-‐countries Spain
Super Valley tariff. The national government has created a “super valley” tariff to promote re-‐charging at night.
Non NSR-‐countries Portugal
No downstream financial incentives found in this category.
Table 19. Downstream financial incentives for charging – examples.
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Overall: policy Policy focus is on EV’s. Also, most countries adopt policies focusing downstream of the EV value-‐chain (especially consumer oriented). Especially Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands have strong financial downstream incentives. Three types of financial downstream incentives focusing on EV’s are most prev-‐alent: tax incentives, rebates / subsidies and local benefits. In Norway a broad spectrum of policies was found focussing on the latter. The Netherlands and Norway all have a large number of tax incentives making it very attractive for both businesses and consumers to buy and lease EV’s. Interestingly, Den-‐mark has similar financial downstream incentives but a much lower score on EV performance. In part, this could be explained by policies that incentivize other types of cars; Denmark has strong subsidies for small petrol cars that are hard to match for EV’s. Few countries seem to focus explicitly on charging infrastructure. Also, in most cases infrastructure policies focuses more upstream in the value chain (stronger focus on government purchasing and tenders). The two countries that perform best both focus on EV’s as well as on infrastructure (Norway and the Netherlands). Policy can deliver an important con-‐tribution to putting EV’s and chargers out.
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4. Implications for Policy and Strategy 4.1 Effects Each country in our data set has formulated policies to accommodate the transition to e-‐mobility. Typi-‐cally, policy combines efforts to keep the market open, stimulate investment in technologies required for EV’s, and to stimulate demand for EV’s and chargers. The underlying principle is that government cannot “create” a market for EV’s, but that it can the necessary support; e-‐mobility cannot be forced into the market, but the market can be nudged into it. The government can be active, but cannot be the centre of the movement; it can help, but not take over. Government has a role in introducing EV’s, but it is a supporting role behind many more important others.
The countries we have studied all have ambitions for e-‐mobility. Some have very high ambitions while others set more modest targets. All have translated ambitions into policy goals, in an attempt to trans-‐late the ambitions into a concrete set of policies that support the introduction of EV’s. This report brings together all of these policies and categorizes them. Furthermore, in an attempt to understand how well countries are doing we look at the performances in the introduction of e-‐mobility; how many EV’s are out on the road already, what is their account of annual sales of new cars, how many chargers have until now been installed? Also, we look at a set of structural conditions that may be of influence for the suc-‐cess of the introduction of EV’s. Some contextual factors make it easier to drive an EV; others are unfa-‐vourable for electric driving. In doing so, we have gathered an interesting set of data about what gov-‐ernment is doing about e-‐mobility, about the structural conditions of these countries or areas, and about the currently realized numbers of electric vehicles and chargers “out there”.
This report does not evaluate if and how a specific policy has worked under certain particular circum-‐stances. The web of potential causes and effects is too varied, too diverse, and too broad to do that; there are simply too many policies in our data set and too many variables and disturbance to establish a sustainable causal model for such an analyses. Also, the stated goals of policy vary in time; the short-‐term goals are entirely different from the long-‐term goals, as most countries have projected growth-‐paths that resemble the figure below [see figure 8].
Figure 8. Projected growth path (based on Rogers, 2003).xviii
Take-‐off
Small steps
Giant leap?
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The shape of the development in figure 8 poses two important questions for statements about policy and performance.
First of all, the question is what performance in this context means. Is it a direct effect of an identifiable policy, a causal effect of an intervention by a policy maker in the local context of a country? Or is it more an issue of correlation, where there are certain developments – EV’s on the road, chargers placed – that appear in places where there are certain policies. In other words, are EV-‐sales shares and installed chargers seen as effects of policy, or are they part of a development of which policy is not the instigator or even the driver, but simply as one of many factors. Policy attempts to influence the introduction of e-‐mobility and it would be cynical to deny the contribution of policy to that development; but defining EV’s and chargers as the linear outcomes of policy would also somewhat naively exaggerates the role of it. Therefore, we see policy as part of the development towards e-‐mobility, and do not isolate it as the driver of it.
Secondly, an interesting question is what an appropriate time-‐horizon is for looking at EV-‐policy and e-‐mobility. As we saw in the chapter about ambitions, every country projects a so-‐called “hockey-‐stick model” of growth. In order to realize their long-‐term ambitions countries require an exponential growth-‐curve; not merely annual growth of sales-‐shares, but rather an annual doubling of sales. Alt-‐hough impressive for now, the relative successes of sales and penetration rates of EV’s in The Nether-‐lands and Norway hardly tell anything about the chances of achieving the exponential growth required on the long term. Just as the relatively lagging position of countries like Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the UK has little predictive value for the long term. Some of the countries we studied have done very good in this first phase, and it is very likely that a good mix of public policy played an important part in that success; it gives those countries an advantage over others, but the next phase will be entirely dif-‐ferent. For the long term, the odds are even. Statements about EV-‐policy are necessarily bounded by the time-‐horizon they take into account.
Taken together, these two questions lead to four different perspectives for research. Our report focuses on the bottom half of the table. The data that we presented in the previous chapters provides answers to the lower-‐left blue quadrant. In this final chapter, we look deeper into that data; we reflect on it, and attempt to draw some conclusions for the lower-‐right green quadrant. We attempt to translate the lessons of today’s policies and today’s results into ideas and strategies for the near future of EV-‐policy; in short, we look for answers to the question as to how the government can help the change to e-‐mobility move from the first steps towards the required giant leap?
Short term
Long term
Performance: direct causality be-‐
tween intervention (cause) and performance (effect)
Is there an identifiable relation
between a policy and an effect on the short term?
Long term effects cannot yet be
measured or otherwise identified.
Dynamics: correlation of interven-‐tions (factors, amidst others) and
developments (outcomes, next phase in a process)
Are the goals that policy wants to achieve identifiable on the short
term?
Are there signs of leverage and/or dynamic that is necessary for the
long-‐term development?
Table 19. Four perspectives for policy-‐research into e-‐mobility.
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4.2 Reflection on the findings: what works and why?
What exactly is the incentive: understanding the jump and plunge of PHEV-‐sales in The Netherlands
December 2013 showed a record sale of EV’s in The Netherlands. More than 25 % of the total new cars sold were electric – BEV and PHEV. As a whole, 2013 was a remarkably good year for EV-‐sales in the Netherlands, although the market for new cars was bad. The record sales of 2013 put the country at a path that easily outperforms the ambitions for 2015.
One particular policy seems especially important for the jump in sales; the tax incentive for drivers of company cars – the so-‐called “bijtelling” – was extremely positive for EV’s. In The Netherlands, there are over a million company cars {called “lease-‐car” in The Netherlands); it is a common extension of regular wage-‐schemes that many companies use for their staff. For a lease car, a fixed percentage of the cata-‐logue-‐value of the car is added to the salary of the employee and is therefore subject to income tax. The government uses the percentage to incentivise fuel-‐efficient cars; regular cars are subject to a 25% value added to the income before taxes; fuel-‐efficient cars 20%, and Hybrids such as the Prius 14%. Until the end of 2013 EV’s were in a special 0% category; BEV’s and PHEVs included. For a full size SUV such as the Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV or the also popular Volvo V60 PHEV the net benefit amounts to over 400 euro per month (!). For a Tesla Model S the benefit is even higher, around 700 euros per month. The deduction is fixed for 5 years, guaranteeing that every driver is in that tariff-‐category for 60 months. Also, the deduction is based on the characteristics of the car, not the actual behaviour of the driver; PHEV-‐drivers can get the full deduction even if they do not drive a single electric mile.
An important driver for the sudden rush to the EV-‐market at the end of 2013 was the governments’ announcement to raise the tariffs for PHEV’s. From January 1 2014 the 0% rate for full BEV’s is increased to 4%. PHEV’s pay a 7%, which is about 200 euro per month for a Mitsubishi Outlander, or 250 euro for a Volvo V60. People rushed to the market to be able to register their new lease car in 2013, to assure their 60 months tax-‐free (without further requirements) PHEV. Mitsubishi Outlanders and Volvo V60’s were entirely sold out and dealers could not deliver to demand. People offered to pay extra in cash to dealers in order to secure one of the few last cars available in the 2013 window; 2013 showed a record sale. However, in January 2014 the sale of both PHEV’s dropped dramatically. The “success of 2013” was quickly reframed as “a one-‐off wonder” and typical example of a “failed policy”; a smart use of a loop-‐hole in the income tax system, hardly representing an underlying willingness of the public to buy (or lease) an EV. Some criticized the government for the overly beneficial scheme and for the absence of any rules for actual EV-‐mileage; government was handing out extra pay checks to drivers that could just as well never drive a single electric mile, and were in fact driving a fuel-‐inefficient full size SUV (in case of the Outlander). Others criticized the government for the exact opposite reason; why did the govern-‐ment stop a policy that was so successful? By scaling down the incentives, it destroyed the momentum in the market, whereas it would have been wiser to wait some more years and see the tax benefits as an investment towards more clean mobility.
A layered policy analysis: what caused the PHEV-‐sales?
What does the case of the fiscal incentive on company cars in The Netherlands tell us? First of all, it is especially interesting that the rush began by the end of 2013; by that time the scheme was already in place for two years, but it worked especially well in the last months before 2014. Apparently, the fact that it was about to be ended was an important incentive for lease-‐drivers; lease-‐drivers were more incentivized by the same financial benefit in December 2013 than they were in February of that same year. Apparently, timing and sequencing are just as important elements of an incentive as the financial benefit.
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Secondly, the rush to the market shows that there is a strong message in clearly identifiable monthly benefits. The incentive-‐scheme works especially well for lease-‐drivers, who are accustomed to counting the costs of their car as the amount on their monthly pay-‐check; for them the “bijtelling” is monthly. The total advantage of the lease car incentive amounts to a large sum, but it could very well be that not the total amount but the monthly benefit was most persuasive. Perhaps the case shows that especially a net monthly benefit is “felt” very strongly by consumers; they intuitively value 200-‐euro net extra disposa-‐ble income, and apparently count that as substantial and valuable; perhaps even more than a total of 10.000 euro benefit over the length of 5 years. Therefore, the lesson of the Dutch example could be that incentives work better if they remain close to the “budget-‐in-‐the-‐mind” rather than the budget people actually annually have.
Thirdly, another explanation of the Dutch example is that it may not even have that much to do with the incentive itself. A large body of literature from the fields of social psychology, socio-‐economics, and recently also from the policy-‐literature, suggest that decision of people or driven by group dynamics and social processes rather than economic calculation. “Follow the herd” and “the fear to miss out” are two very strong mechanisms that drive people in making decision about what to do, what to buy, where to spend money on, and where to take risks. The explanation for the Dutch run on the EV-‐market could be that once consumers saw how colleagues profited from the tax-‐incentive and heard of others doing the same thing, they became afraid of being left out. The fact that the incentive was scaled down triggered this feeling even further; what counted for them was not primarily that they would acquire an extra benefit of 400 euro, but that they would otherwise “loose” 200 euro in benefits. What triggered their behaviour was not a gain but a risk of loss. They could have gotten the benefit for long, but the risk of loosing it was new to them; that may be why they liked the Outlander and V60 PHEV better by the end of the year than at the beginning of 2013. And once they saw large groups of peers move – and some very important ones, such as colleagues, bosses, and neighbours – they decided not to be the one to be left behind. The lesson of the Dutch case than is that what “works” in policy is not the economic ration-‐ality of it, but the psychological processes it triggers.
Fourthly, the EV-‐policy in the Netherlands is part of a broader discourse about mobility. For a long time, EV’s were outliers in the spectrum; they were available as an exotic possibility, but only for those who were really committed to being “green” or who wanted to try out something new. The run on the mar-‐ket changed that. In part because of the run itself; more vehicles sold meant that EV’s became a more common sight on the road. However, with the run also came news stories, reports, stories from users, advertising, reviews, and blogs; the EV became not only a more common sight on the street, it also en-‐tered the everyday discourse. People heard about it, talked about, discussed the incentive, and a narra-‐tive about EV’s, BHEV, and fuel cars started to grow. That narrative was not necessarily positive, but the EV solidified as a “normal” mode of auto-‐mobility. Many people did not agree with the incentives and perhaps even considered them as unfair; however, in this case bad publicity is not necessarily bad. Max-‐imizing government incentives is often considered “smart” and a sensible thing to do; it is a way to out-‐smart the government. Furthermore, the fact that people were talking about EV’s gave it a new status. Even more when user-‐experiences seem to be good – and definitely not bad -‐; there were hardly any “terrible accidents” with electric cars burning down, and they were not seen standing broken down on the road. Many people actually quite liked the car and the “sound” of a PHEV driving by without the sound of an engine was a new and interesting experience, even for the critics. Definitely, the line be-‐tween a good narrative and an image of the PHEV-‐incentive as a “waste” of valuable tax-‐money, or a hobby of leftish-‐green parties is dangerous for EV’s. But up till now, the story seems opposite. Partly due to the incentive, and probably as an unintended consequence, the narrative about EV’s was developing and the EV’s become a common element of the popular discourse about cars, mobility. Not yet “main-‐stream”, but at least a common image to be seen out on the road, in any neighbourhoods’ street, and to
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appear in discussion about the personal finance of friends, colleagues, or relatives. The phrase “have you ever considered an EV” used to be the same as to suggest someone looking for a car to take the train; in 2013 it became a common option that could easily be suggested as part of a normal conversa-‐tion, to be weighed in a balance costs, preferences, and requirements. Therefore, the lesson from the Netherlands is also that for incentives and policies to work EV’s literally have to become part of the conversation first. Apart from sales, the incentive for lease-‐cars could be a success because it has achieved that. Sales are important, but stories may matter even more.
Taking all this into account, there are many different answers to the simple question what a policy ex-‐actly is and to what exactly works when a policy is successful. Is the economic incentive as such; or is it the timing and sequencing that matters most; or maybe even more the social-‐psychology of people who see others move and are afraid to be left behind; is the incentive the prospect of receiving money what triggers consumers to the dealership, or is the risk to lose out on the incentive what actually moves them; and do people account the total of benefits, or do they first and foremost “feel” the monthly sum, so that 100 euro per month can mean more for them than 1500 euro per year; and what about the narratives the incentive produces, that generate the legitimacy and “normalcy” for the EV that many consumers favour over exotic experiments of other “extravagancies”. The only good answer can be that in the case of The Netherlands, we do not know; it may be the collective of each of these factors. What we do know is that the fiscal incentive alone is a much too narrow way of thinking about what policy-‐interventions are and how they work. This may be crucial for our understanding of policy, especially as the process of the introduction of the EV moves into the next phase from the “small steps” to the “giant leap”. That phase requires leverage and self-‐propelling dynamics to achieve the numbers stated in the formal ambitions.
Incentives that “add-‐up”, or initiate a chemical reaction
The case of the PHEV-‐incentive in The Netherlands draws attention to how incentives relate to each other; how to see a mix of policy incentives? Do incentives add up, as stockpiles of benefits for EV’s that at some point simply outweigh the barriers people perceive? Or is the relation more dynamic; perhaps some incentives multiply each other, while others neutralize other incentives. Our research cannot an-‐swer that question, but the data does pose the question. Findings at least suggest that there is more to mixing policies than just adding them up and raising the benefits high enough. Measures interact; bene-‐fits for purchase may be neutralized by uncertainty over a permit for a private charger, or about the lack of financial incentives for the purchase of a charger. Just as people do not simply count all of the possi-‐ble incentives, but consider some more important than others; and also take into account incentives or polices that are not about EV’s at all. For several countries we found that incentives for EV’s were almost neutralized by other incentives for other fuel-‐efficient cars. The case of the PHEV’s in The Netherlands must be understood in the context of years of economic crisis, where people hardly received a raise in salary and probably became more “open” to other ways to raise their monthly income. The incentive of the “0% bijtelling” was persuasive financially, but became especially tempting in the context of stagnant wages and people looking closer at their personal finances.
All this calls into mind the idea of policy not working as a piling up of arguments to choose an EV, but rather as a loop of incentives, contextual factors, and “unrelated” other reasons that interplay, strength-‐en each other, neutralize other arguments, and sustain their own dynamic. In that case, policy works as a causal loop, in a dynamic relation between cause and effect, where effects become causes themselves as well; the “effects” that there are EV’s out on the road “causes” people to more easily consider an EV that is now less a rarity and a more common choice for a car. The question for policymakers is than to find a mix of policies that interacts in a positive loop; a self-‐sustaining dynamic, that moves towards the intended policy goals. Policy is not about stacking, but about mixing, tuning, and adapting the incentives
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to the dynamics that is unfolding in practice. The latter is important, as adopting the perspective of loops implies that the causal relations between cause and effect become fuzzy; it is hard to tell what exactly causes what, and for how long, other than it is apparently happening. Policy-‐making means to sustain the positive loops and to attempt to redirect negative loops; that means fine-‐tuning as the sys-‐tem goes, rather than designing a package that will have to do the job for the coming years. Also, the loop perspective is inherently local; effects are the result of the interaction between local factors and policy-‐interventions, and can only be understood in their local context. Reproducing policies in other contexts is not the rolling-‐out of guaranteed recipe for success, but an attempt to instigate similar dy-‐namics in another context.
Which level should be in the lead?
The loop perspective also puts forward the question what the most suitable level is for EV-‐policy. Our study shows that most policies are national in most of the countries we studied. However, there are important differences. Also to be taken into account is the explanation for the dominance of national policy; many policies are fiscal policies, which are often directed at the national level. The same goes for R&D-‐policy and other upstream-‐policies; again, these are typically national policies in most countries, perhaps strengthened by local budgets for regional companies or institutions. Furthermore, in most countries “mobility” is part of a policy-‐field that is related to infrastructure and road-‐policy. Also, these are often national policy domains, where the national level is in the lead and municipal and regional authorities can work from that framework on more localised solutions.
However, if we take into account the perspective of loops, and take a close look at the policies in place in countries, the local and regional level may be a more logical locus for policy-‐making. Fiscal policies can still be national policy, but in order to develop strong loops it is important that local policy-‐makers com-‐plete the mix of policy-‐measures to local needs. If a local company wants to invest in chargers but is having problems with permitting the municipality could quickly step in to solve the problem. Many if the current policy programs for E-‐mobility focus on the big policies and big schemes – subsidies, R&D, tax benefits – whereas the concept of loops suggests that the interplay between measures is most im-‐portant. A quick reply to an answer from a local citizen, a fast response to queries about a public charger, and smart use of local circumstances to promote electric driving – e.g. opening up a local bus-‐lane for EV’s or freeing parking spaces in popular local lots for EV’s. These can be rather “small” measures, but they may greatly enhance the effectiveness of the total mix op policy. In other words, national and “expensive” fiscal policies only become effective if local measures help to instigate the positive loop. That does not make EV-‐policy inherently local, but does raise the question about which level should be in the lead; if local measures are not the “add-‐ons” to national policy, but are at the hearth of the effect of the entire mix, there is much to say for more local autonomy and local attention for E-‐mobility.
Big Bazooka or Patchwork Policy?
Our findings suggest two perspectives for thinking about policy-‐strategies for the introduction of e-‐mobility. Apparently, effects of policy have something to do with the “size” of policy-‐programs; coun-‐tries that invest substantial resources to the introduction of EV’s tend to do well. Norway, The Nether-‐lands, and Sweden have important programs for incentivizing EV’s; size matters in EV-‐policy. Without some sort of commitment of capital and government resources the introduction of e-‐mobility will fall through.
However, EV-‐policy is not about size alone. The differences between countries’ performance cannot be explained by the amount of capital alone. They do not simply have the largest financial incentives, nor do they subsidize EV-‐drivers the most. As we mentioned before, EV-‐policy is not about piling up incen-‐
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tives, but about the interaction of the mix of instruments; financial capital, but also regulation, quick response of local government to local issues, swift permitting, smart use of spatial measures (bus-‐lanes, reserved parking, etc.). The success of policy is not so much defined by the size but rather the shape of the mix; policy-‐strategy is not a matter of piling, but about constructing and maintaining a mix of policies that have an optimal interplay. The label for the first strategy (piling up) is that of the Big Ba-‐zooka; that term was used during the fiscal crises, and referred to the Stability Fund that guaranteed the solvability of banks and countries. The fund would only work if it were big enough to absorb any shock and could not be depleted. Any fund smaller than this “Big Bazooka” would not ensure the trust of the market and would be ineffective; the Bazooka can only be effective if it is big enough to blow away any possible opposition. If we project that image to EV-‐policy the pile of incentives and stimulating policy needs to be high enough. Policy-‐makers should focus on finding as many ways possible to add new mass to the pile, in order to persuade as many possible drivers to consider an EV. This pile has to be main-‐tained until the market itself has enough economies of scale to reduce the cost of EV’s (and chargers) to compete with normal cars, and for technology to improve and to increase range. A large pile, deep pockets, and endurance are the most important aspects for a Big Bazooka style of EV-‐policy.
The second perspective for EV-‐policy (mixing) is that of a complex Patchwork of interrelated interven-‐tion and incentives. The power of the patchwork is not the sum of it, but is defined by the interplay between elements in the mix; incentives leverage each other, increase the effects of other measures, or neutralize negative effects of policies. The process is dynamic, which means that policy making over time is not a matter of adding new stacks to the pile, but should be adapted to the actual “real time” developments in the system. If the system responds well to free-‐parking or to access to bus-‐lanes during rush hour, that could be an incentive to further invest in; if there are signs that the effect is dying-‐out or fading, policy-‐makers should move quickly to intervene. The key to success in a Patchwork approach to policy is that policy-‐makers invest in the combination of incentives and measures that enable a positive self-‐sustaining feedback loop. Patchwork policy is partly about the policy-‐mix itself, but the policy-‐mix gains meaning in its interaction with the local context. The same mix of policies will work differently in Denmark than in Norway, just as the same instrument will have different outcomes in various Länder in Germany. Good patchwork requires a sharp eye and a good analysis of local dynamics and local contex-‐tual factors that could leverage or mitigate the effects of policy measures. Large incentives are still very helpful, but the perspective of Patchwork Policy sees them as part of the interplay with other measures and contextual factors. Denmark is exemplary; although there are good incentives for EV’s, they can hardly compete with other also high incentives for small fuel-‐efficient cars. There is nothing wrong with the size of the policy, the mix is the problem; the incentive for fuel-‐efficient cars neutralizes the effects of the incentive for EV’s. Another example from Denmark is the free-‐parking initiative in the Copenha-‐gen region; the local government agreed on free parking in the inner city for EV’s, but was called back because of national laws that prohibit unequal tariffs and regimes in different areas of the country. Instead of leveraging each other, policies here neutralize one another.
4.3 Next steps for EV-‐policy: small steps towards a giant leap?
In this report we mapped all of the EV-‐policies that the countries and regions in our dataset have put in place, and we linked them to the local context of each country. Most of the countries we studied are close to achieving their short-‐term policy goals. They are about to achieve the stated numbers of EV’s and chargers and can all safely say that the EV-‐movement is in their country underway. Some go faster, but all are moving. However, the important question that remains is what these early successes mean for the near future; are the policies that are currently in place the ones to reach the targets of the next phase of e-‐mobility, or is something different needed to achieve that?
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The first phase of e-‐mobilty was important to take, but it is the first of many further and much larger steps; the introduction of e-‐mobility now requires e a giant leap. The “S-‐curve” that is suggested in the ambitions of countries requires an exponential growth in the sales and use of EV’s and chargers. We think that the policy-‐measures that worked for the first phase are not the ones that will lead the system into that second phase; what helped to take the first steps is not sufficient to achieve the leap. The available resources are not sufficient to incentivize the number of vehicles and chargers necessary for the long-‐term goals; the scale of innovation that is required from the industry can only be achieved from an inherent investment-‐strategy by the industry itself and the entrance of new parties to the market. Policy is still highly relevant, but it cannot be at the forefront of the “giant leap”.
Therefore, there are some interesting findings in this report that could provide clues for sensible policy strategies for the next phase of e-‐mobility. We have seen that especially the mix of policy and the inter-‐play between policies and contextual factors is important for achieving results. Also, we have used the case of the Dutch PHEV-‐incentive to show that policy is not only about the economic rationality, but psychological factors and group-‐dynamics are just as important. If we take these findings and place them in the perspective of the Patchwork Policy strategy, than an interesting direction for future ev-‐policy emerges. Policy should be designed in such a way that it maximizes the opportunity of a self-‐sustaining positive loop to emerge; and because of the emergent and adaptive nature of that process, policy-‐design is something that continuous through time, that requires maintenance, adaptation, and small or larger fixes to problems that arise or opportunities that appear. Apart from still substantial financial instruments and regulatory space, we suggest that it is especially promising to tap into the power of the social-‐psychological perspective on policy. In this last section of our report we present a series of possible measures that could help to initiate the loop towards mass-‐adoption of EV’s.
A. Position the EV as the default instead of a deviate option
As it is now, policy is made to compensate for the deviation of an EV; “gasoline is normal, an EV is dif-‐ferent”. Policy is framed as a benefit for consumers to overcome the downsides of this deviate option; policy is there to bridge the gap between the standard and the reality of EV’s. Our analysis suggests that default or deviate are not outcomes but inputs of the process; government can take deliberate action to position the EV more as the default option rather than the deviate. Policy should not bridge the gap, but reframe the gap itself and turn that around; it is normal to drive a clean, zero-‐emission vehicle that is cost-‐efficient in driving and maintenance, and that is more convenient than a gasoline vehicle. The next generation of policy instrument should be aimed at setting the EV as the default.
B. Redesign the commonly used calculation of costs and benefits: total cost of ownership, monthly bene-‐fits
One way to do this is to intervene in the “common way” in which people currently calculate the costs of a car; most people look at the price of the car that has to be paid at the counter. From that perspective, EV’s are expensive cars; the cost of batteries is too high to compete with “normal” cars. Also, there is uncertainty in the market over the value of EV’s after their first cycle of ownership; what is the second hand value of an EV? This makes the EV an unattractive option in a classical calculation of costs and benefits. However, seen from a different perspective, the calculation looks different. EV’s are efficient in terms of costs for driving, maintenance, and the total cost of ownership. Even in an early market phase, EV’s are quite competitive. EV’s become more attractive if the calculation of costs is redirected more towards total costs of ownership and less at capital investment upfront. Introducing a new perspective for calculation of costs and benefits makes the EV more attractive, even without a single incentive by the government. People decide for themselves how they calculate their costs and go about their per-‐sonal budgeting; however, perhaps government can nudge these calculations, for instance by develop-‐
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ing trusted standards and/or certificates that show the total cost of ownership right besides the price of a car.
C. EV as standard in Spatial Planning and Design
Another important step towards the self-‐sustaining loop in e-‐mobility is policy that sets e-‐mobility as the default-‐option. We already mentioned that in terms of framing and branding, for instance in the choice of words when speaking about cars; not “normal cars versus EV’s”, but EV’s as the new normal. Equally important is that people interact as much as possible with EV’s in the public space. That requires charg-‐ing to become much more a normal and given element in public streets, public parking, and other shared spaces in the public sphere. As it is know, charging infrastructure and benefits for EV’s are care-‐fully woven into the existing infrastructure; they are presented as an add-‐on to the existing infrastruc-‐ture. The current infrastructure is confirmed as the default, in which space is made for EV’s. The EV’s are the guest in an infrastructure that is build around another technology. Perhaps, setting the EV as the default requires spatial interventions that confirm the EV as the default. The “normalcy” of electric mo-‐bility is strengthened by a further visibility in the public sphere.
D. EV is no longer painless, and therefore more political
An important consequence of setting the EV more as the default option is that the idea of “painless” policy must probably be abandoned. As for now, EV-‐policy is presented as an add-‐on; it is nice for those driving and EV of PHEV, but not directly at the expense of others in fuel-‐cars. At some point, the EV should not only be incentivized but the regular car must also face serious disincentives. Not just finan-‐cially, but perhaps even more physically; there is much to say for cities that close of the inner city for “tail pipe emission vehicles”, just like it is no longer allowed to smoke in most buildings or even on pub-‐lic streets. Access can be an important leverage for government policy; however, the consequence of the choice for this type of policy is that it will mobilize public resistance. The advantage of the current strategy is that EV-‐policy goes largely unnoticed for normal drivers; possible jealousy is the only negative consequence they have from EV-‐incentives. As soon as policy becomes more stringent in setting EV’s as the default in the public space, it will also begin to “hurt” others. That requires more political capital than the current policies.
E. The market is the movement; dynamics in the market is key
Also, government should keep a close eye on the developments in the market itself. One risk of gov-‐ernment intervention in an emerging market is that government incentives take away the pressure to innovate. In the case of the electric car, there are two crucial innovations that need to be spurred as much as possible; lowering the price of cars and increasing range. It is in the interest of the sector to attempt to solve these problems and the sector is highly competitive. However, government incentives could slow down that process; purchase subsidies for EV’s take away part of the incentive to lower costs. And PHEV’s with small batteries and minimal range are still subsidized; the sector is hardly incen-‐tivized to build hybrids with a long range and combustion as a truly back-‐up engine. Government policy should be designed to maximize the competiveness of the industry and stimulate the process of innova-‐tion as much as possible. There may be important lessons here form the policies for fuel-‐efficiency; by dynamically raising the bar for fuel efficiency, the mileage per litre has improved dramatically. Perhaps the same type of regime can be applied to battery capacity.
From Piling to Mixing; policy for sustaining a self-‐propelling movement of e-‐mobility
All in all, our research suggests that the next phase in the introduction of EV’s requires an entirely dif-‐ferent type of policy; or more importantly, a different perspective on policy-‐strategy. Not the piling of
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incentives and benefits, but policy that sets in motion the positive feedback loops. In the first steps of the transition the numbers of EV’s were low enough for piling of subsidies; for the next step in the pro-‐cess that is unthinkable. Government funds are insufficient to subsidize millions of cars and chargers. However, government policy can help to make EV’s the default option and redirect the way people think about mobility. Table # shows some of the policy measures that could be used in such a strategy. The first column presents the policies we found in our study to be common and effective. The second col-‐umn presents possible policies in the same category that could help to create the positive self-‐sustaining loops for e-‐mobility that are necessary for the next “leap”. These are measures that seem radical; they are suggested as means to change the default option in mobility, from “normal cars and EV’s”, towards EV’s as the normal cars.
First steps (tested)
Next leap (suggested)
Calculation of costs: an EV is more expensive to purchase than a normal car.
Purchase subsidies to bridge the gap in costs.
Shift towards total costs of owner-‐ship, to incorporate driving and maintenance into the calculation.
Calculate monthly costs rather than cost of purchase.
More lease concepts.
Infrastructure: charging capacity is crucial for EV’s
Build public chargers.
Incentivize home charging.
Make charging a normal part of the public infrastructure; visible, part of everyday life.
Set home-‐charging and charging at the workplace as the standard.
Fully integrate charging in the build environment; not “chargers as add-‐ons to the public street”, but charg-‐ing as an inherent element of that street.
Access to public space: the EV and the existing infrastructure
Reserve regular parking spaces for EV’s.
Be flexible when installing public or private chargers in the public street.
Free or low-‐rate parking for EV’s.
Weave the EV into existing infra-‐structure, without interference with current structures
Close of areas for non-‐electric vehi-‐cles.
EV-‐lanes on highly congested roads; visible benefits of EV’s.
EV as the standard in urban plan-‐ning, gasoline as deviate option.
Gasoline out of sight; less gas-‐stations in densely populated urban areas.
Innovation: the EV has to improve its crucial technology
Stimulate R&D
Government as launching customer
Support front-‐runners with extra benefits and support their standards.
Keep the innovation process and the network open
Secure access of new entrants to the market
Aggressively stimulate continued innovation; raise the bar each time the industry is about to reach it
Discours: sustainable mobility versus The EV as an interesting option Set sustainability as the standard for
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‘normal mobility’
besides the normal option.
Stimulate and support the choice for EV’s.
mobility.
Clean air as a constitutional right.
Zero-‐emission as standard.
Table 20. Tested first steps and suggested next leaps.
4.4 Conclusion
The transition towards e-‐mobility is first and foremost a political decision. However, once the political decision is made policy is necessary to achieve the stated political goals. Our findings suggest that in order to achieve the currently set long term policy goals a different type of policy is necessary; not more of the same, but a different perspective on what makes consumers and producers choose EV’s rather than “normal” cars.
Our analysis shows the policies countries have put in place for the first phase of the transition of e-‐mobility; these are tested policies that have helped most countries in the study to achieve their short-‐term goals. In this final chapter, we have drawn an outline of what the principles and measures for a second generation of policy could be; based on our findings, we pose a series of suggested interventions that help to reach the long term goals the basic assumption for our suggestion is that the next step can only be achieved by a self-‐propelling positive loop. Government cannot “make” such a loop, but policies can help to sustain, maintain, and stimulate it. That requires an active role of government, and an inno-‐vative and adaptive strategy for policy; a strategy of small steps and rapid adjustment to real time de-‐velopments in the field, in order to achieve the giant leap in EV-‐market share.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix A -‐ EXPLANATION OF SCORES for EV-‐ and charging-‐infrastructure performance
The data used for the EV-‐ and charging infrastructure comparisons originates from two sources. Firstly, the Global EV Outlook 2013 published by the International Energy Agency’s Electric Vehicle Initiative (IEA EVI).xix In the EV Outlook primary data on the number of EV’s and charging-‐stations is collected from government agencies in different countries (all NSR-‐countries except Norway joined the Electric Vehicle Initiative). Secondly, data from the European Association for Battery, Hybrid and Fuel Cell Electric Vehi-‐cles (AVERE) is used.xx AVARE collects primary data on the number of EV’s and charging infrastructure across Europe.xxi This combination of data sources presents us with data of all NSR-‐countries (for in-‐stance, EVI doesn’t include Norway, AVERE doesn’t include Germany).
The EV Outlook and the data by AVERE provide the most reliable data and hence these sources is used in order to compare the different countries regarding EV and charging infrastructure performance. The data used for our comparison are from the end of 2012.
EV performance -‐ scoring The scores below are awarded by a relative comparison of the EV-‐performance in the different countries. This means that scores are rewarded based on the performance compared to other NSR-‐countries. Electric vehicles are defined as passenger car plug-‐in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and battery electric vehicles (BEV’s). Number of EVs:
Total number of EV’s registered.
1. <1.000 2. >1.000 – 3.000 3. >3.000-‐6.000 4. >6.000 – 10.000 5. >10.000
EV penetration Number of EV’s registered as a percentage of the total number of passenger cars registered. 1. <0,015% 2. >0,015-‐0,030% 3. >0,030-‐0,050% 4. >0,050-‐0,085% 5. >0,085%
EV sales share Number of EV’s sold as a percentage of the total number of passenger cars sold. 1. <0,1% 2. >0,1-‐1% 3. >1-‐2% 4. >2-‐3% 5. >3%
Table A. Scores on EV performance based on country comparison.
Charging Infrastructure performance -‐ scoring The scores below are awarded by a relative comparison of the charging-‐infrastructure performance in the different countries. This means that scores are rewarded based on the charging infrastructure performance compared to other NSR-‐countries. Charging stations are defined as non-‐residential “slow” and “fast” electric vehicle supply equipment (based on EV Outlook 2013) . -‐ “Slow”: This type of charging (most common) provides alternating current to the vehicle’s battery from an
external charger. Charge times can range from 4 to 12 hours for a full charge. -‐ “Fast”: Also known as “DC quick charging”, fast charging stations provide a direct current of electricity to the
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vehicles battery from an external charger. Charging times can range from 0.5 to 2 hours for a full charge.
Number of charging stations
1. <200 2. >200-‐1.000 3. >1.000-‐3.000 4. >3.000-‐8.000 5. >8.000
Number of fast chargers
1. <5 2. >5-‐10 3. >10-‐20 4. >30-‐50 5. >50
Carbon intensity of electricity supplied by charging stations
The distribution by Eurostatxxii is used to score this variable (percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources). This presents us with the following scores: 1 = < 6,97% 2 = 6,97% -‐ 12.83% 3 = 12.83% -‐ 22.23% 4 = 22.23% -‐ 33.13% 5 = >33.13% Note. We did not find comparable data on the carbon intensity of the electricity supplied by charging stations in the NSR-‐countries. Therefore aggregated data on the carbon elec-‐tricity on national level is used. The researchers do note that several examples of ‘green certification’ of charging stations were found. However, the definitions of green/renewable/sustainable differ and are hence not suited for comparison.
Table B. Scores on infrastructure performance based on country comparison.
Appendix B -‐ EXPLANATION OF SCORES for structural characteristics
Operating environment -‐ scoring Energy prices and pay-‐back period
Low electricity prices for household consumers and high fuel prices are favourable conditions for the introduction of e-‐mobility. Fuel pricesxxiii (EUR per liter) The lowest fuel prices are found in Russia (0.736 per liter). Norway has the highest fuel prices (2.057 per liter) 1 = < 1.60 2 = 1.60 – 1.70 3 = 1.70 – 1.80 4 = 1.80 – 1.90 5 = > 1.90 Electricity prices for household consumers (EUR per kWh)xxiv EU27 average = 0.1281 1 = > 0.1500 2 = 0.1400 – 0.1500 3 = 0.1200 – 0.1400 4 = 0.1000 – 0.1200 5 = < 0.1000 The average score from these two variables is the score.
Weather conditions The climate of Europe is a temperate, maritime climate. Except between the North of Norway, Sweden and Finland and southern regions of the Mediterranean countries the differences are small. This makes it difficult to establish claims regarding this indicator. Countries in our research are very likely to show similar scores. However, countries which are most likely to show ‘extreme temperatures’ (either very hot or cold) score 1 because this is an unfavourable condition for the introduction of e-‐mobility.
Degree of urbanization NSR-‐countries show small differences regarding this indicator (most score between 80% -‐ 85%).xxv
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Population density (in-‐habitants per km2)
EU27 average = 116.6 (2010)xxvi 1 = < 80 2 = 81 -‐ 120 3 = 121 -‐ 160 4 = 161 -‐ 200 5 = > 201
Land relief Land relief in Europe shows great variations within relatively small areas. This makes scoring this indicator on country level difficult. Countries with very little land relief show an advantage for EV usage because the range can be estimated more precisely. In coun-‐tries with greater land relief the range of EV’s is far more difficult to predict. 1 = Very large differences between highs and lows 2 = Considerable differences between highs and lows 3 = Moderate differences between highs and lows 4 = Small differences between highs and lows 5 = Very little to no differences between highs and lows
Table C. Operationalization of operating environment.
Market environment -‐ scoring
Presence of automotive industry
Of the top 50 countries included in the production ranking of Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA).xxvii Countries who don’t make the list score 1. The scores of the countries which make the list are based on a comparison of their ranking.
R&D intensity Research and development (R & D) intensity for a country is defined as the R&D expenditurexxviii as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)xxix. • The average GERD in euro countries is 2.06%. • The highest ranking countries (highest R&D intensity) are Finland, Sweden and Denmark (>
3%) The ranking is based on 2010 numbers (most recent) by Eurostat. xxx
CO2 emissions Average CO2 emissions per capita in Europe is 6.84 tons according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).xxxi Data on CO2 emissions per country from the World Bank are used in our compari-‐son.xxxii
Table D. Operationalization of market environment.
Infrastructure readiness -‐ scoring Investments in Smart Grid projects
Based on the JRC (Joint Research Center) first complete catalogue of EU Smart Grid projects (2011).xxxiii
Electricity reliability and outages
Electricity reliability is measured by two indicators: � SAIDI — system average interruption duration index � SAIFI — system average interruption frequency index The scores are based on the 5th CEER (Council of European Energy Regulators) bench-‐marking report on the quality of electricity supply 2011.xxxiv
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% of gross electricity consumption)
The distribution by Eurostatxxxv is used to score this variable. This presents us with the following scores: 1 = < 6,97% 2 = 6,97% -‐ 12.83% 3 = 12.83% -‐ 22.23% 4 = 22.23% -‐ 33.13% 5 = >33.13%
Table E. Operationalization of infrastructure readiness.
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Consumer readiness -‐ scoring Air quality and pollution levels
Air quality on country level can be compared by indexing the greenhouse gas emissions (base year = 100). Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (in CO2 equivalent) indexed to 1990. This indicator shows trends in total man-‐made emissions of the "Kyoto basket" of greenhouse gases. It pre-‐sents annual total emissions in relation to "Kyoto base year". This indicator is scored based on the distribution made by Eurostatxxxvi. This presents us with the following scores: 1 = 108 – 168 2 = 99.0 – 108.0 3 = 89.0 – 99.0 4 = 64.0 – 89.0 5 = 42.0 – 64.0 EU27 average = 85 EU15 average = 89
Penetration of HEV’s and PHEV’s
The penetration of HEV’s and PHEV’s is different for each country. Several sources have been used.xxxvii
Wealth (GDP per capita in PPS)
GDP per capita in PPS (purchasing power standard) is the indicator of wealth used by Eurostat (European Commission).xxxviii GDP index EU27 = 100. GDP per capita in PPS: 1 = <70 2 = 71 – 90 3 = 91 – 110 4 = 111 – 130 5 = >131
Table F. Operationalization of consumer readiness.
Appendix C -‐ EXPLANATION OF SCORES for conduct The scores were established in three steps:
Data collection In order to collect our data we have first gathered all the documents we could find for the NSR-‐countries and the other case-‐countries. To collect the documents we “snowballed” our way through the pile of policy. Many documents contained references to other studies and sources that we than looked up and included in our model.
First review With this first selection of documents we “filled” our database and ran a first scan of results. We created a separate analysis of the policies of each different country and asked local resource persons to take a critical look at the document; we asked them to correct the document where necessary and sent us links to or copies of other relevant documents. We analyzed this second set of documents and improved our country-‐analysis on the basis of the feedback from the local resources.
Expert judgment and validation As a third step we organized feedback sessions were representatives of the various countries could reflect on our findings. In a ‘feedback session’, we presented a selection of the findings that were rele-‐vant to the particular audience (country). After that, we discussed if they recognized our findings and there was room to talk about the implications of the findings. Each of the feedback sessions indicated recognition of our findings and provided us with information to further develop our findings.
We have established the accents (the number of +’s) of the policy focus by a twofold analysis of the collected policy instruments. On the one hand we have categorized and counted the different instru-‐ments found in order to establish relative accents in the policy focus. This “flat count” of policies does not necessarily represent its’ actual “weight” and therefore this method alone doesn’t provide enough depth to establish the policy focus. We have added “weight” to the policy instruments by taking into
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account distinctive characteristics of the policy instruments. The following factors establishing the “weight” of policy instruments were taken into account:
� Budget. Financial resources are scarce. Therefore, more weight is attributed to policy instru-‐ments with a larger budget (for instance the total available budget for financial incentives such as rebates, subsidies and fiscal policy). We have also taken into account the amount individuals (business and consumer) can receive.
� FTE’s. Naturally, people are also scarce ‘resources’. The number of people deployed in (carrying out) a policy instrument is an indicator of the weight of the instrument.
� Scope. We have looked at the scope of the policy instruments in order to determine their weight. We have looked at the geographical scope of the instrument (does it target one small municipality or a whole region) and the target audience (who portion of the relevant population is targeted? Businesses, consumers or both?).
� Duration. The time a policy instrument is in effect accounts for the weight of the instrument. A ten year tax deduction provides more security / stability than a short-‐term measure or a meas-‐ure for which no duration has been established.
� Compulsory VS non-‐committal. Rules and regulations can differ in de mate in which they are compulsory. More compulsory / strict rules and regulations weigh heavier than those who are more non-‐committal.
Based on this twofold analysis the accents were established:
� 0 = Limited information found / available � + = Limited focus � ++ = Strong focus � +++ = Prevalent focus area
In order to weigh the instruments we are dependent on the available information provided by the policy documents. Not all of the factors are known for each of the different instruments.
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REFERENCES
i Electric Vehicles in America: The question is no longer “whether” they will come but “how fast” and “where first”. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2010. http://www.rmi.org/Content/Files/Electric%20Vehicles%20in%20America.pdf ii Electric Vehicles in America: The question is no longer “whether” they will come but “how fast” and “where first”. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2010. http://www.rmi.org/Content/Files/Electric%20Vehicles%20in%20America.pdf iii Electric Vehicles in America: The question is no longer “whether” they will come but “how fast” and “where first”. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2010. http://www.rmi.org/Content/Files/Electric%20Vehicles%20in%20America.pdf iv The Tools of Government in the Digital Age, second edition. Palgrave Macmillan. C. Hood & H. Margetts, 2007. v Elektrisch Rijden: internationale stand van zaken. Squarewise, 2010. (English -‐ E-‐mobility: international overview). vi Onderzoek naar de rol van de overheid bij de introductie van zonnestroom in Nederland. In ’t Veld et al., 2005. (English – A study on the government role in introducing solar energy in the Netherlands). vii Onderzoek naar de rol van de overheid bij de introductie van zonnestroom in Nederland. In ’t Veld et al., 2005. (English – A study on the government role in introducing solar energy in the Netherlands). viii Electric Vehicle Cities of the Future: A Policy Framework for Electric Vehicle Ecosystems. Beeton, 2012. ix References:
-‐ EV-‐sales: http://ev-‐sales.blogspot.nl/?m=0 -‐ Total number of EV’s:
o http://www.gronnbil.no/nyheter/over-‐20-‐000-‐ladbare-‐biler-‐paa-‐norske-‐veier-‐article366-‐239.html
o www.forum-‐elektromobilitaet.ch/fileadmin/DATA_Forum/EKongress_2013/Denmark_Lodberg.pdf
o http://www.groen7.nl/verkoop-‐groene-‐autos-‐in-‐belgie-‐neemt-‐toe/ o http://www.hybridcars.com/november-‐ev-‐sales-‐12-‐percent-‐norway/ o http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/2343321/report-‐global-‐electric-‐vehicle-‐sales-‐
double-‐in-‐2013 o http://www.rvo.nl/onderwerpen/duurzaam-‐ondernemen/energie-‐en-‐milieu-‐
innovaties/elektrisch-‐rijden/stand-‐van-‐zaken/cijfers -‐ Total car fleet: http://statinfo.biz/Data.aspx?act=1906&lang=2 -‐ Sales share: http://www.abb-‐conversations.com/2014/03/electric-‐vehicle-‐market-‐share-‐in-‐19-‐countries/
x For California the statistics from the Clean Vehicle Rebate Project (CVRP) were used. The number of rebates for
PHEV’s and BEV’s funded by the California Air Resources Board provides reliable statistics on EV-‐sales in California.
http://energycenter.org/clean-‐vehicle-‐rebate-‐project/cvrp-‐project-‐statistics
xi Financial Viability of Non-‐Residential Electric Vehicle Charging Stations. UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation. Snyder et al., 2012. http://luskin.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/Non-‐Residential%20Charging%20Stations.pdf xii North Sea Region Electric Mobility Network. A review of electric vehicle charge point map websites in the NSR. Interim Report. Sara Lilly and Richard Kotter (Northumbria University) and Nathaniel Evatt (Cities Institute, London Metropolitan University). June 2013.
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http://e-‐mobility nsr.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NEWS/Review_of_NSR_charge_point_maps_interim_report_June_2013_final.pdf xiii Global registry of electric vehicle charging locations. Non-‐commercial, non-‐profit, electric vehicle data service. http://chargemap.com/ xiv References:
-‐ Carbon intensity: Electricity generated from renewable sources (% of gross electricity consumption). http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsdcc330
-‐ Charging infrastructure: http://chargemap.com/infos/chargemap
xv External costs of electricity production in the EU, 1990 and 2005.
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-‐and-‐maps/figures/external-‐costs-‐of-‐electricity-‐production-‐2
xvi Electric Mobility gets up to speed. 2011-‐2015 Action Plan. http://www.agentschapnl.nl/sites/default/files/bijlagen/Action%20Plan%20English.pdf. xvii Center for Sustainable Energy California. February 2014 Survey Report. http://energycenter.org/clean-‐vehicle-‐rebate-‐project/vehicle-‐owner-‐survey/feb-‐2014-‐survey xviii Based on the S-‐curve of innovations pioneered by: Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations (5th edition). New York, NY: Free Press. xix Global EV Outlook 2013. International Energy Agency, Electric Vehicles Initiative. http://www.iea.org/publications/globalevoutlook_2013.pdf xxAVERE website. http://www.avere.org/www/ xxi Data collection on number of EV’s and charging infrastructure across Europe. http://www.avere.org/www/Images/files/EV%20Data%20Collection%20AVERE%281%29.pdf xxii Electricity generated from renewable sources. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsdcc330. xxiii The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation) (GIZ) has published a list of worldwide gasoline prices by country every year since 1991: http://www.reisen-‐tcs.ch/etc/medialib/travel/reiseinfos/pdf.Par.0014.File.tmp/EUR_essence.pdf is the most recent list available at the time of this research (06-‐09-‐2012). xxiv Electricity prices for household consumers. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=ten00115 xxv Urbanization. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-‐world-‐factbook/fields/2212.html# xxvi Population statistics at regional level. Eurostat.
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Population_statistics_at_regional_level. xxvii Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_Internationale_des_Constructeurs_d%27Automobiles. xxviii Glossary: Research & Development expenditure. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:R_%26_D_expenditure. xxix Glossary: Gross domestic product. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Gross_domestic_product_%28GDP%29.
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xxx Glossary: Research & Development expenditure. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/R_%26_D_expenditure. xxxi Selected 2009 Indicators for IEA Europe. International Energy Agency. http://www.iea.org/stats/indicators.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=18. xxxii CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita). The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?order=wbapi_data_value_2008%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-‐last&sort=desc. xxxiii EU smart grid projects. Joint Research Centre. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=1410&obj_id=13670&dt_code=NWS&lang=en. xxxiv 5th CEER Benchmarking report on the quality of electricity supply 2011. Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER). http://www.energy-‐regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/CEER_5thBenchmarking_Report.pdf. xxxv Electricity generated from renewable sources. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsdcc330. xxxvi Greenhouse gas emissions. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc100&plugin=1. xxxvii Penetration of HEV’s and PHEV’s per country. Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal, Spain:
-‐ Data collection from June to August 2012. AVERE. http://www.avere.org/www/Images/files/EV%20Data%20Collection%20AVERE(1).pdf
-‐ Passenger cars, by motor energy. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=ROAD_EQS_CARMOT
-‐ Perspectives and impacts of electric mobility in Belgium. http://economie.fgov.be/nl/binaries/FEBIAC_tcm325-‐211359.pdf
-‐ EU transport in figures. Statistical pocketbook 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-‐fundings/statistics/doc/2012/pocketbook2012.pdf
Denmark: Statbank. http://www.statbank.dk/ (prices and consumption – cars – use of cars by families -‐ Stock om passenger cars per 1 January by propellant and tare (1993-‐2013).
Netherlands: Groei aantal hybride personenauto's zet door. CBS. http://www.cbs.nl/nl-‐NL/menu/themas/verkeer-‐vervoer/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2011/2011-‐3299-‐wm.htm
Norway: Trends in Global CO2 emissions. 2012 report. Background Studies. PBL Netherlands Environmental As-‐sessment Agency. http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/PBL_2012_Trends_in_global_CO2_emissions_500114022.pdf
UK: Department for Transport. Business plan indicators impact. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=department-‐for-‐transport
Score California,
-‐ On-‐Road AFVs Made Available by Year. Alternative Fuels Data Center. http://www.afdc.energy.gov/data/tab/vehicles/data_set/10299
-‐ Center for Sustainable Energy California. http://energycenter.org/index.php/incentive-‐programs/clean-‐vehicle-‐rebate-‐project/vehicle-‐owner-‐survey/3460-‐july-‐2012-‐survey
xxxviii GDP per capita in PPS. Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/mapToolClosed.do?tab=map&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&toolbox=types
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About E-Mobility NSR The Interreg North Sea Region project North Sea Electric Mobility Network (E-Mobility NSR) will help to create favorable conditions to promote the com-mon development of e-mobility in the North Sea Region. Transnational sup-port structures in the shape of a network and virtual routes are envisaged as part of the project, striving towards improving accessibility and the wider use of e-mobility in the North Sea Region countries. www.e-mobility-nsr.eu Contact Author: Netherlands School of Public Administration (NSOB) Dr. M. (Martijn) van der Steen Nederlandse School voor Openbaar Bestuur (NSOB) Lange Voorhout 17 2514 EB The Hague The Netherlands phone: 0031 70 3024910 email: [email protected] web: www.nsob.nl/EN Contact Lead Partner: Hamburg University of Applied Sciences Research and Transfer Centre “Applications of Life Sciences” Prof. Walter Leal Lohbruegger Kirchstrasse 65 21033 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49-40-42875-6313 Email: [email protected]