Introduction - BERGHAHN BOOKS new neighbours, ... leading to running battles between Kurds, ... non-Germans in cities in which the guest worker population was considered to

Introduction 1

Introduction

new neighbours, new challenges

recognizing diversity

On a cold winter’s day in 1995, the war for Kurdish independence claimed another victim. Activists belonging to the PKK and other Kurdish nationalist organizations fighting the Turkish Army in Eastern Anatolia had decided to go ahead with a demonstration in a large industrial city, despite a ban on such protests imposed by the local police. With scores of Kurds facing off against a similar number of Turkish nationalists in a volatile neighbourhood, the police decided to send in riot squads to break up the demonstration. This only managed to enflame the situation, leading to running battles between Kurds, the police and Turks that spread into the city centre. In the chaos, a policeman surrounded by PKK supporters pulled his gun and fired several shots, hitting and mortally wounding a sixteen-year-old Kurdish activist. As with thousands of similar cases across Turkey, his subsequent funeral was transformed into yet another violent demonstration for Kurdish independence.1

This incident did not take place in Turkey, Iran or Syria. Rather, it marked the climax of a wave of protests organized by Kurdish immigrants in the north German city of Hanover. These demonstrations were part of a wider political campaign waged by the PKK against the Turkish government across the Federal Republic. It included blockades of key Autobahns by Kurdish women and children and public acts of self-immolation by Kurdish activists in several German cities. Losing the guerrilla war in Turkey itself, the PKK hoped that these measures could force the German government to break off diplomatic relations with the Turkish state. In many cities and towns, Germans suddenly saw neighbours, who they had lived next to for years, arrested or questioned by the police as a state crackdown on the PKK widened to include every kind of Kurdish organization.2 Though these measures proved counterproductive, they did manage to raise the profile of the Kurdish war among German journalists and politicians. Together with the growth of Islamic fundamentalist organizations in Muslim immigrant communities, the PKK campaign drew the attention of the German state and public towards the political life of its immigrant population.3

These communities were not the first to engage in widespread and often violent political action in the Federal Republic. Long before Kurdish nationalist or Islamic fundamentalist organizations took centre stage in the 1990s, immigrant political movements were doing their best to attract the attention and support of West German citizens and governments. Rather than being a post-Cold War phenomenon, protest and violence organized by immigrant

2 Fragmented Fatherland

activists has been an established part of West German political life since the first days of the Federal Republic. By 1989, West German government officials and politicians had developed forty years of experience in dealing with many different kinds of immigrant political organizations. As a consequence, the activity of these movements not only shaped the political and social environment of West Germany’s immigrant population, it also had a major impact on the political development of the Federal Republic.

The political parties (SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP), trade union and business federations, security services and bureaucratic institutions, which collectively defined the West German political establishment by 1989, were confronted with immigrant communities that had emerged as a result of several different forms of migration. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, millions of refugees from Eastern Europe found themselves in displaced persons (DPs) camps in the Federal Republic. Though most moved on to North America, some stayed in West Germany in order to live as close as possible to their homelands.4 The second and more numerically significant wave of migration was triggered by a state-backed guest worker programme to ameliorate labour shortages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By 1988, over 5.2 million of these economic migrants, who mostly came from Southern Europe and Turkey, had settled permanently in the Federal Republic.5 Along with the guest worker programme, thousands of other migrants settled in West Germany for many other reasons during this period. Causes as diverse as refugees seeking asylum, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers stationed in West Germany settling there after leaving the army or non-German students staying on after receiving their degrees lay behind the expansion of immigrant communities.6 The successive waves of immigration between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the termination of the guest worker programme in 1975 laid the groundwork for the ethnic and religious diversity that has become such an important aspect of contemporary German society.

Despite the rapid growth in the number of immigrants and refugees, the centre-right Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions (CDU/CSU) as well as many members of the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) remained unwilling to accept that Germany was no longer an ethnically homogeneous society. Though by the early 1990s the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green Party acknowledged the new social and ethnic realities created by mass immigration, the CDU/CSU continued to claim that Germany was not a ‘country of immigration’ until Helmut Kohl was voted out of office in 1998.7 This fixation on ethnic homogeneity was fostered by a national narrative based on shared guilt and suffering during the Second World War as well as assertions of solidarity with ethnic German minorities living in the Soviet bloc.8

The unwillingness of the two largest political parties to grapple with the social implications of mass immigration had a direct impact on policy making throughout the Cold War. In the early 1970s, a backlash among working-class

Introduction 3

voters against what they perceived to be increasing competition for a decreasing number of jobs forced an SPD-led government to end the officially sanctioned recruitment of guest workers in 1973.9 In order to mollify their working class electoral base, SPD politicians repeatedly claimed that they would ‘get tough’ on guest workers and other economic migrants whose work visas or employment contracts had expired. This even included bans on further work permits for non-Germans in cities in which the guest worker population was considered to be too large.10 At the same time, the centre-right CDU/CSU responded to popular malaise about immigration by promising to encourage the repatriation of immigrants to their native countries through a (unsuccessful) system of resettlement grants.11

These measures were the product of a kind of institutional schizophrenia towards immigrant communities that had already begun to take shape in the early years of the Federal Republic. On the one hand, claims made by West German politicians and senior officials that the large-scale presence of non-Germans was temporary ensured that, on both the federal (‘Bund’) and regional (‘Land’) levels of government, very few efforts were made to prepare state institutions and the West German public for the social changes caused by mass immigration. On the other hand, local police, education and welfare authorities were forced to cope with the challenge of integrating large numbers of immigrants and assuaging the concerns of Germans who were learning to live together with new neighbours who possessed very different religious and ethnic backgrounds. The abject failure of SPD and CDU/CSU policies to decrease immigrant numbers before 1989 demonstrated that a remarkably diverse range of ethnic communities had become a permanent part of the German social landscape.

Many of these newcomers did not necessarily conform to the stereotype, held by many Germans to this day, of the immigrant as an impoverished economic migrant. Each immigrant community had its own complex social structure depending on the educational and class background of its members. Though the majority of DPs, guest workers or refugees found work in industrial or menial occupations, many better educated immigrants were academics and professionals, while a number of entrepreneurs also emerged in some of the largest immigrant communities.12

The social diversity of the immigrant population helped foster its politicization. By the late 1960s, many non-German students and academics were heavily involved in radical left-wing movements hostile to both the social democrats and pro-Soviet communists. Moreover, conservative and fervently anti-communist immigrant academics and businessmen openly supported the West German Right.13 Though politicized students often helped less educated compatriots in their dealings with West German authorities, immigrants working in low paying occupations were also able to play a leading role in political organizations. The existence of vigorous workers’ movements in several immigrant homelands also meant that a significant number of guest workers were prepared to join West German trade unions. In the early 1970s, a


series of strikes in Cologne led by Turkish and Greek guest workers in defiance of local union functionaries demonstrated the ability of working-class immigrants to organize themselves independently.14 As immigrants of all social backgrounds began to settle more permanently in major cities, many set up local community organizations that were involved in a variety of national and local issues from the improvement of local schools to environmental conservation projects.15

Despite such considerable ethnic and social diversity, there was one factor that most of these immigrant communities had in common. With the exception of Italy, the countries involved in the West German labour importation programme were governed by authoritarian regimes: Spain and Portugal were ruled by right-wing dictatorships until the mid 1970s; a military junta controlled the Greek government between 1967 and 1974; Turkey experienced three military coups between 1961 and 1985; Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan all experienced colonial domination and, after decolonization, authoritarian government; Yugoslavia was governed by a communist regime whose ambivalent relationship with the West was only ameliorated by its hostility to the Soviet Union. Moreover, East European émigrés had fled from either the USSR or countries under Soviet control in which communist parties were prepared to use force against their internal opponents. Thus, many organizations and parties opposed to the social status quo of these countries did their best to recruit guest workers and refugees to their cause in the relatively open political spaces of the Federal Republic.16

As a result, the majority of immigrant political movements in Cold War West Germany were, like Kurdish nationalist movements, preoccupied with the political development of their homelands, rather than the integration of their members into West German society. The East European émigré communities that had emerged from the displaced persons camps were particularly well organized. DPs and other refugees from the Soviet bloc remained fixated upon achieving regime change in their homelands, in the hope that they could return after the fall of the communist governments that had forced them into exile. Succeeding waves of refugees and students from Third World countries such as Iran were similarly dominated by political organizations affiliated with opposition or insurgent groups in their homelands.17

The transient nature of the guest worker population, a key element of the labour importation programme, strengthened the homeland orientation of most economic migrants. Both West German policy makers and many guest workers themselves believed that the presence of imported labour was only temporary. The former hoped that guest workers could be replaced by Germans once the labour shortages of the early 1960s had been overcome, while the latter hoped to eventually return to their homelands after a few years of work in West Germany. Until the recruitment was stopped by the Brandt government in 1973, forcing many to make a permanent choice, guest workers regularly moved back and forth between West Germany and their country of origin. Even after

Introduction 5

many economic migrants brought their families over to the Federal Republic, most still aimed to return to their old homelands once they had saved up enough money.18 Such a strong fixation on the ‘myth of return’ encouraged many guest workers to continue to take a deep interest in the political fate of their homelands long after they had first arrived in Germany.

These tendencies were aggravated by the many legal and social obstacles that confronted immigrants who wanted to take a direct part in the West German political process. West German state institutions and political parties actively encouraged senior émigrés living in the Federal Republic to concentrate on their own community infrastructure in order to channel them away from German politics.19 Because West German citizenship law made it extremely difficult for anyone without German ancestry to acquire a West German passport, the immigrant workers arriving after 1954 were excluded from the mainstream political process in an even more fundamental fashion. Consequently, most guest workers interested in politics were more likely to participate in organizations focused on the countries of which they were still citizens rather than the country in which they lived and worked.20

This book will examine the responses of West German state and party-political institutions towards such immigrant political movements during the Cold War. Based primarily on written sources from German state archives, the aim of this study is to explore how diaspora politics has affected the position of immigrants in West German society. On a wider level, it will also try to develop a better understanding of how immigration was intertwined with other major social and political trends, which shaped the Federal Republic. Over five chapters, this study will particularly focus on the Ukrainian, Croatian, Algerian, Spanish, Greek and Iranian communities. It will cover the period from the late 1940s, when the state and party-political institutions that confronted immigrants were created, to the aftermath of the termination of the guest worker programme in the mid and late 1970s, which marked a shift in West German attitudes towards immigration.21

The first chapter will examine the relationship of anti-communist émigré activists in the Ukrainian community, one of the largest ethnic groups in the displaced persons camps of the 1940s, with West German state institutions and politicians. Though it contained several political groups, the Ukrainian community managed to maintain a minimum of cohesion, enabling its leaders to use good relations with a variety of senior figures in West German federal and provincial governments to their own advantage. This chapter will consequently show how interaction between the historical legacy of the Nazi era and ideological polarization fostered by the Cold War had a crucial impact on relations between East European émigrés and their German counterparts.

The second chapter will explore the fate of Croatian nationalists in the Federal Republic. After the introduction of the guest worker programme in 1954, community institutions set up by the small group of Croatian émigrés


who had settled in Germany after the Second World War were quickly overwhelmed by a growing number of Croatian guest workers. The Croatian community was therefore the only immigrant group that was made up of both postwar émigrés and guest workers. After 1962, relations between Croatian émigrés and their allies in the CDU/CSU came under increasing strain as militant Croatian nationalists and the Yugoslav state began to fight a proxy war on German territory. This chapter will look at how the willingness of senior Croatian activists to use violence against their opponents affected West German attitudes towards the wider Croatian community. In particular, it will examine the reasons why the use of violent tactics by Croatian activists increased pressure on West German conservatives to distance themselves from militantly anti-communist Croatian groups.

By focusing on Algerian and Spanish communities in the Federal Republic, the third chapter will scrutinize two immigrant groups in which left-wing organizations dominated political life. The first part of this chapter will examine the activity of Algerian nationalists, while the second part will take a look at the extensive links between Spanish opposition groups and the mainstream West German Left. In both cases, the international political context and specific nature of the immigrant communities in which these opposition movements operated imposed certain constraints on mainstream West German politicians who wished to help them. Though Algerian nationalists enjoyed the backing of many individual German liberals and social democrats, they did not acquire the kind of direct institutional support that the SPD or trade union organizations were willing to provide to Spanish socialists.

The fourth chapter will explore the different approaches taken by West German political parties and state institutions towards the activity of militant political organizations within the Greek community. The internal political and social diversity of the Greek community meant that various kinds of left-wing community organizations had to actively compete with each other as well as right-wing groups for the support of their fellow countrymen. The reaction of West German state officials and politicians towards acts of protest and terror committed by members of such an ideologically heterogeneous community were not conditioned by any deep abhorrence of violent action within the West German political establishment. Rather, this chapter will show how the response of West German political and state institutions towards the actions of politicized Greek immigrants was shaped by a combination of strategic ideological concerns on the national level and tactical considerations on a local level.

The fifth chapter will scrutinize the impact of Cold War conflict upon Iranians in the Federal Republic. By transcending cultural and religious differences, the common language of Cold War conflict provided a means with which Iranian political groups opposed to their homeland government could position themselves in the political framework of the Federal Republic. At the same time, allusions to the Nazi regime were used by both supporters and opponents of the Iranian opposition to either glorify or discredit the actions of

Introduction 7

Iranian activists. This final chapter will illustrate how the ideological language of the Cold War shaped the way Iranian activists used such historical comparisons, exacerbating political pressures, which forced Iranians opposed to their homeland regime to work with German organizations outside the parliamentary mainstream of the Federal Republic.

By focusing on ethnic communities with very different social structures, this study will examine the interaction between immigrant networks and West German state institutions as well as the ways in which such patterns of cooperation and conflict differ. In focusing on groups from Italy and the Turkish Republic, the great bulk of academic research on the effect of immigration on the Federal Republic has tended to gloss over the extent to which this extensive period of mass migration drew in students, refugees, ex-soldiers and workers from an extraordinarily wide range of countries. Though it will regularly use Turkish, Kurdish and Italian groups as points of comparison, this study looks at communities that have attracted less academic attention, asking whether assumptions made about immigrant communities in Germany based on studies of groups from Italy and Turkey necessarily reflect the experience of individuals with other ethnic origins.

One of the key issues examined in each chapter of this book is the approach taken by West German security services towards immigrant political movements. While several other state institutions played a significant role in dealing with immigrant activists, the security services had the most regular contact with guest worker and émigré organizations. Thus, the expansion of police and intelligence agencies between 1949 and 1975 had a direct impact on the immigrant population as a whole.22 New bureaucracies quickly engaged in turf battles over spheres of jurisdiction made more complex by the federal structure of the West German state. A whole network of Bundestag (the federal parliament) and Landtag (the regional assemblies) committees had to be set up in order to maintain legislative oversight of this increasingly elaborate security apparatus.23

As in other Western states, there were considerable rivalries between different intelligence services. Conflict over jurisdiction and financial resources undermined relations between the four main West German intelligence services: the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) responsible for external espionage, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), which dealt with counter-intelligence and political extremism, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), which focused on criminal intelligence and the armed forces’ intelligence unit, the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD). While the BND had no equivalent on the provincial (Land) level, the federal (Bund) Interior and Justice Ministries along with the criminal and counter-intelligence services had to compete with their Länder equivalents, the Landeskriminalamt (LKA) and Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz (LfV).24 Although the expansion of the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) in the 1970s transformed the border guard into a kind of uniformed national police force, approaches to frontline policing often diverged radically from Bundesland to Bundesland, since basic policing remained under regional


control.25 The amount of space immigrants and émigrés had to express their own views depended as much on the political constellation of regional and city governments as it did on developments at the national level.

As the internal structure of the radical Right and Left evolved, new measures to protect the constitutional order of the Federal Republic were introduced by Land and Bund governments, which often had unintended consequences. Rigid legal limitations on the right to protest in the 1950s and the 1960s, as well as a law in the 1970s banning anyone suspected of hostility to the constitutional order from state employment, helped to tarnish the image abroad of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a modern democracy, without effectively bringing the radical Right or Left under control at home.26 Each new wave of internal political conflict led to an increase in resources for police and intelligence services at all levels of government. In the late 1940s, social instability after the collapse of the Third Reich enabled local police services to use extremely aggressive tactics, despite attempts by British and American occupation officials to strengthen civil liberties.27 In the 1950s, the Bundesnachrichtendienst and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz were provided with considerable resources as the covert operations run by the Stasi and other East German intelligence agencies fuelled fears that extreme left-wing movements could destabilize the West German state.28 Finally, the street violence of the 1960s and the urban terrorism of the 1970s led to a massive expansion of the Bundeskriminalamt.29

The behaviour of the security services and the other West German state institutions directly or indirectly involved in immigration policy was shaped by the ideological environment in which they operated. The continuing existence of an East German state aligned to the Soviet bloc presented a lasting challenge to the political legitimacy of the Federal Republic. Any West German involved with East German or communist organizations was treated as a potential security threat by the security services and by state institutions such as the Auswärtiges Amt, the Bonn Foreign Ministry. The extensive and often successful efforts undertaken by the Stasi and KGB to place their agents in major West German institutions, including political parties, nongovernmental organizations and even intelligence agencies, indicate that such concerns were well grounded.30 Such an environment also put immense pressure on the SPD and other left-wing groups loyal to the constitution to prove that they were not tainted by association with the kind of socialist ideology propagated by the Soviet bloc.31

Intertwined with this inter-German ideological rivalry was the necessity to reassure West Germany’s American, British and French allies that the democratic experiment in the Federal Republic could resist pressure from the extreme Right.32 Yet the effort to keep nationalist or neo-Nazi groups under control took up considerably less state resources than the underground war against the East German regime. After the Sozialistische Reichspartei was banned in 1952, the campaign to keep the extreme Right under control lost

Introduction 9

momentum as many Germans tried to put the wartime past behind them.33 For figures such as the head of Adenauer’s secretariat, Hans Globke, the founder of the BND, Reinhard Gehlen, or even one of the most powerful officers in the BKA, Paul Dickopf, more than questionable careers under the Nazi regime did not hinder their rise to senior positions in government. In the many turf wars between ministries and agencies on both the Land and federal levels, such contacts often proved useful, although they also provided the Stasi with a means with which to discredit the West German political establishment.34

Similar continuities in personnel could also be found in other state institutions that exerted influence over immigration policy. In the 1950s and 1960s, the senior echelons of the Auswärtiges Amt were largely made up of officials who had worked in similar positions during the 1930s and 1940s. With the small policy units responsible for international relations in Land governments also run by members of this ‘old guard’, most officials formulating foreign policy during the Adenauer era had been heavily involved in the expansionist projects of the Nazi regime. Émigrés or immigrants lobbying the Auswärtiges Amt in order to influence West German policy towards their homelands had to regularly deal with such holdovers from the pre-1945 era. Confronted with immigrants from across Europe and the Third World, other ministries on both the Land and federal levels consulted heavily with Auswärtiges Amt officials who were considered to be the main repositories of information on the culture and attitudes of non-Germans.35 The ideological outlook of the Auswärtiges Amt and its personnel was therefore another key factor shaping West German responses to immigrant political movements.

State welfare agencies and social services also played a significant role. As Albrecht Funk has pointed out, the expansion of the social welfare system in the 1960s and 1970s encouraged state institutions to develop methods or technologies that could help gather information on those who needed state aid and track its social impact.36 At a local level, immigration offices, known as Ausländerämter, controlled by city governments, had the power to intervene in almost every aspect of an immigrant’s life. In Bonn, the Federal Interior Ministry (or Bundesministerium des Innern), which was responsible for immigration issues, remained fixated upon differentiating between ‘legitimate’ migrants with the legal right to reside in Germany and ‘illegitimate’ migrants who had either overstayed their visas or had entered the country illegally. Immigration officials on every level of government were therefore accustomed to cooperating with the police and other security services.

Such West German state institutions helped their political masters to set up the labour importation programme without anticipating the far-reaching political consequences of allowing hundreds of thousands of economic migrants to enter the Federal Republic on an annual basis. As we have seen, the CDU/CSU and significant elements within the SPD continued to claim that the Federal Republic was not a ‘country of immigration’ until the mid 1990s, long after guest workers had started settling permanently.37 Yet, beyond general


worries among most West German voters over the economic and cultural consequences of the guest worker programme, attitudes towards immigration and immigrant communities varied across the political spectrum.

Many supporters of the centre-right parties feared that the guest worker population might become a dangerous potential recruiting ground for communist movements. The establishment of the Kampfverband zur Schutz ausländischer Arbeiter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland by the East German trade unions, an organization designed to coordinate the actions of communist parties from labour exporting countries, hardened suspicions within the CDU/CSU that the guest worker population contained communist infiltrators.38 A surprisingly large number of grass-roots members of the SPD and West German trade unions believed that a permanent immigrant population would only benefit the ‘capitalist class’ and might lead to a rise in support for the radical Right.39 Conversely, business circles that supported the guest worker system claimed that by increasing the wealth of their home countries, guest workers would keep them from succumbing to Soviet communism.40 For many in the left-liberal social milieu from which the Green Party emerged, the successful integration of immigrants could prove that Germany had truly broken with its Nazi past.41 The fierce debates over immigration between these different sociopolitical groups, fuelled as they were by divergent perceptions over its impact on German society, have had a major impact on most academic studies dealing with these issues.

Once historical research exploring the national socialist system began to widen in scope during the 1960s and 1970s, some historians started to examine the Nazi regime’s use of foreign labourers to compensate for labour shortages in Germany during the Second World War. Forcibly deported to the Third Reich, living and often dying in terrible conditions, by 1944 over seven million foreign workers could be found in German factories.42 Some historians saw parallels between this wartime importation of labour and the guest worker programme of the late 1950s. With the first guest workers subject to curfew and housed in barracks, Ulrich Herbert and Joachim Lehmann began to look at the role of migrant labourers in twentieth-century Germany in this wider historical context.43 The mass expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe also inspired several major studies on German emigration throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which gradually shifted towards broader work on the migration process itself. Through this route, migration specialists such as Barbara Dietz and Klaus Bade began to examine the impact of immigration on the Federal Republic.44

As these initial migration specialists shifted their attention towards the guest worker programme, the main focus of their research remained remarkably uniform. This was largely because the aim of most immigration scholars in the 1970s was to prove to Germans who still wanted to believe that Germany was an ethnically homogeneous society that economic migrants were settling permanently in the Federal Republic. The fraught nature of the immigration

Introduction 11

debate in the 1970s and 1980s, along with the fact that until 1990 many politicians and government officials did not accept the fact that immigrants had become a permanent presence, makes this tendency to concentrate on the immigrant population as a whole rather than on individual ethnic groups entirely understandable.45 Moreover, sociologists such as Stephen Castles became particularly disturbed by the manner in which disparities in economic growth between Northern and Southern Europe were adversely affecting the socio-economic position of immigrants.46 As a result, the considerable numbers of immigrants at the lower end of the social hierarchy and their growing economic marginalization after the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s reinforced a tendency among those working on immigration issues to frame their arguments in class terms.47 By contrast, most studies on guest worker immigration have ignored the DPs, despite the considerable amount of research conducted on displaced persons and émigrés in postwar Europe by historians and political scientists such as Wolfgang Jacobmeyer.48

Though the impact of immigrant political activity on the development of guest worker communities was not entirely neglected, these first academics conducting research on immigration focused on other issues that they believed to be of greater significance to the fate of immigrants in the Federal Republic. For Stephen Castles, the ability (or inability) of the West German education system to cope with an influx of newly arrived children who did not speak German was one of the crucial factors shaping the internal development of immigrant communities.49 The many legal obstacles to the acquisition of West German citizenship that immigrants had to face was of central importance to the research of immigration scholars such as Reinhard Lohmann,50 while the work of academics such as Hartmut Esser focused on the high levels of unemployment and lack of social mobility in certain immigrant communities.51 Many of these studies examined the fate of individual guest workers in certain city neighbourhoods (often ignoring their particular regional or ethnic backgrounds) in order to underline statistical conclusions made about the immigrant population as a whole. At the same time, immigration historians such as Klaus J. Bade52 and Ulrich Herbert53 examined the relationship between mainstream German society and successive waves of immigrants and migrant workers rather than exploring the considerable political and social divisions that existed between and within immigrant communities.

Parallel to this research on the socio-economic position of immigrants, West German political activists following the lead of lawyers including Hans Heinz Heldmann54 and academics such as Albrecht Funk,55 who were examining structural changes in the judiciary and executive, began to scrutinize the treatment of immigrants by the police and in the courts. These studies drew attention to the manner in which the civil rights of the immigrant population were curtailed by the extensive powers conferred upon the police and social services by West German immigration law.56 Though it does focus upon the individual experiences of immigrants, much of this work does not investigate


how the political life of their communities may have shaped the attitude of the West German state institutions they were confronted with. These studies also overestimate the ability of the West German state to control the movement of guest workers and the internal development of immigrant communities. In fact, documents that have recently emerged in German state archives demonstrate that the security services often knew very little about developments within the immigrant communities they were trying to keep under control.57

These initial academic approaches towards immigration issues tended to treat immigrants as a uniform bloc, glossing over the possibility that each ethnic community might develop its own individual relationship with its host society. They also reflected a mistaken underlying assumption that Germans did not differentiate between various ethnic minorities.58 Though they played a vital role in making immigration a serious topic of historical research in Germany, these first guest worker studies are problematic in four ways:

1. When looking at immigration, researchers in the 1970s and early 1980s were usually preoccupied with migration-related social problems in labour-importing countries and their impact on the attitude of the indigenous population rather than the internal social and political structures of immigrant communities.

2. Because of their visibility and size, those communities whose origins lay in Italy and the Turkish Republic attracted the greatest attention from researchers. Yet to see the impact of migration entirely through the filter of Turkish or Italian communities is to underestimate the level of ethnic and religious heterogeneity that has emerged in the Federal Republic over the last half century.

3. Though this first wave of immigration scholarship made a perfunctory nod to the potential relevance of different historical or political traditions within the immigrant population, few have made any attempt to take a closer look at how these traditions could have influenced the integration of these communities into West German society.

4. Most of this work tends to look at the immigration process in isolation, focusing upon its specific economic and social effects rather than looking at how it related to other major developments in West German politics.

This neglect of diversity within the immigrant population was mirrored by a tendency towards overgeneralization when it came to theoretical analyses of the impact of mass migration in the work of political scientists such as Rogers Brubaker and Yasemin Soysal. Brubaker59 insisted that the entire German political class was culpable in the propagation of the myth that Germany was ‘not a country of immigration’. Yet this overlooked major shifts in the attitude of many social democrats over the course of the 1980s as the parliamentary Left began to accept the possibility that immigrant communities had become a permanent presence.60 In the mid 1990s Soysal claimed that immigrants in

Introduction 13

Germany were developing a form of postnational identity that would foster their integration into West German society despite the lack of easy access to German citizenship. Yet this theoretical model does not take into account the possibility that, rather than conforming to some standard pattern, the relationship between immigrants and their wider social environment might be shaped by their own individual ethnic and political backgrounds.

Partly in reaction to the generalizing tendencies of much of the initial academic work on immigrants in Germany, in the late 1980s and early 1990s an increasing amount of research was conducted on individual immigrant communities in the Federal Republic. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, a gradual shift in emphasis in the state’s approach to immigrant communities has been mirrored by a more differentiated approach towards the immigrant experience among a wide variety of historians and sociologists. Heavily influenced by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, many of these studies focus on specific cultural symbols in order to develop a more nuanced sense of social relationships within ethnic groups. Sociologists such as Ayse Caglar61 have scrutinized such key cultural issues as the wearing of headscarves or the construction of mosques,62 or analysed social hierarchies within individual neighbourhoods.63

More concerted efforts were also made to examine the political and cultural development of individual ethnic communities, particularly those from Turkey and the Kurdish regions.64 One of the most detailed studies of Turkish and Kurdish organizations in Germany and their influence on political conflict in Turkey is a study by Ertekin Özcan. Özcan’s comprehensive analysis is both a sociological study of the Turkish community and a look at how the Turkish experience in Germany may have affected Turkey itself.65 More recently, Eva Østergaard-Nielsen,66 Vera Eccarius-Kelly67 and Martin Sökefeld68 have built on this work by analysing the impact of certain homeland-oriented left- and right-wing political groups in the 1980s and 1990s on social structures within the Turkish community. As the collapse of the Soviet bloc led to a new influx of economic migrants from Eastern Europe along with ethnic Germans and Jews from the former Soviet Union, researchers used a similar approach when trying to gauge how this form of migration was going to affect a reunified Germany. The research work of Barbara Dietz, among others, helped to renew academic interest in the postwar expellee generation and pointed out some of the parallels between the integration of expellees and that of guest workers. It also drew attention to the fact that the generosity of West German state institutions towards ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union when it came to the acquisition of citizenship had increased tension between this new community and more established Turkish or Italian immigrants.69

There have also been several historical studies of West German immigration policy in the last decade. With almost forty years having elapsed between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the signing of the first guest worker treaties in 1954, the guest worker programme itself was increasingly seen as a historical phenomenon. One of the most significant historical studies of the 1990s was


produced by Karen Schönwälder, who has looked at how popular images of immigrants shaped political discourse over immigration issues in the 1960s in both the Federal Republic and the U.K.70 At the same time, there was also a growth in interest in the internal culture of the DP camps among historians specializing in diaspora studies, such as Wsewolod Isajiw71 and Wolodymyr Kulyk.72 These studies have contributed towards a more complex understanding of the political and social impact of migration in the first decades of the Federal Republic.

Yet neither this historical research nor the sociological work of Özcan and Østergaard-Nielsen have really grappled with the effects that ethnic, social and political diversity within the immigrant population had on the relationship that guest workers and émigrés had with the West German state. By largely focusing upon immigrants of Turkish and Kurdish origin, these studies do not explore whether ethnic communities with other political or cultural traditions were treated differently by West German state institutions and political parties. This compounded the tendency among historians and sociologists such as Soysal and Caglar to conflate the experience of the Turks in Germany, who were one of the largest immigrant communities, with that of other Muslim or even non-Muslim groups. As a result, many studies that were partly designed to increase academic and public awareness of the effects of immigration on Germany did not engage with many of the political and social implications of ethnic diversity.

These underlying problems with sociological studies of immigrant communities often reflect an unwillingness to construct any kind of historical narrative. While the older generation of immigration specialists do construct a narrative of sorts, their abiding interest is in the migration process, rather than the immigrants themselves, creating an image of the average guest worker as distortedly uniform as any to be found in the press or popular stereotypes. Sociological studies covering the new ethnic minorities may have helped to counteract these distortions, but they neglect any sense of how these communities may have developed over time. By looking at immigration-related issues in isolation, both approaches fail to develop an understanding of how immigration may have become intertwined with other important social or political issues in West German public discourse.

More recently, another factor that has distorted aspects of academic research on migrants and migration policy in the Federal Republic has been an emphasis on radicalization and political violence shaped by the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York. On a theoretical level, however much many of them have developed a more differentiated approach towards structures of political violence, scholars such as Alexander Straßner73 or Kai Hirschmann74 have compared and contrasted the impact of Islamist as well as other radical immigrant networks with ‘indigenous’ political movements such as the Red Army Faction, which had focused on a coordinated assault on state institutions. Yet not all of the migrant networks that were prepared to use violent tactics during the Cold War period saw the West

Introduction 15

German state as their primary target. In several of the case studies explored in the following chapters, migrant movements either only confronted the German security services when they got in the way, or even saw themselves as covert allies of the West German state. At least in the Cold War period, this kind of immigrant political violence was not automatically a product of discrimination and marginalization by an ethnic German majority.

Moreover, the specific focus on violent Islamist groups in the past decade, particularly in influential studies by David Kilcullen75 and Peter Neumann,76 has led to an emphasis on the transnational nature of terrorist networks, which becomes increasingly fixated on violence as an end in itself regardless of whether they are based on, secular, religious or ethno-nationalist ideologies. However, such an approach is problematic because, for several immigrant political movements examined in the course of this study, forms of violence were just one of a variety of different tactics, the use of which did not necessarily inevitably have to lead to organized terror. Moreover, though the immigrant political movements explored in this study were heavily tied into wider transnational diasporic networks, their methods of operation and strategic alliances were often heavily influenced by the specific national or regional political spaces in which they interacted with their German counterparts. Rather than providing a more nuanced understanding of how the emergence of immigrant political networks has reshaped the political landscape in Germany and beyond, this stronger focus on political violence after 2001 has only proven as reductivist as preceding theoretical approaches towards immigrant political life in the Federal Republic.

Only very recently have historians and political scientists such as Roberto Sala, Vera Eccarius-Kelly, Karen Schönwälder, Martin Sökefeld and Simon Green acknowledged the ethnic complexity of the immigrant population in the Federal Republic in their research. Green in particular has emphasized the unwillingness of West German politicians and academics to come to terms with the fact that immigrants might not all respond to state measures designed to foster their integration or assimilation into West German society in quite the same way.77 In turn, Schönwälder has pointed to some of the continuities in the way in which DPs or East European émigrés and guest workers were perceived by the West German public while underlining the different social and political status these various types of immigrant had in the Federal Republic.78 Of the three, Roberto Sala’s work on radio and television programmes for guest workers in the 1960s takes the most direct look at how the different political and ethnic backgrounds of those involved in this project shaped their relationships with West German broadcasters and government officials. Yet this focus on guest worker communities in Sala’s work as well as that of Eccarius-Kelly and Sökefeld does not grapple with the quite distinct experiences and internal divisions within other immigrant groups.79 Moreover, since both Green and Schönwälder are primarily interested in the approach taken by the German policy makers towards the immigrant population as a whole, the implications


of political and ethnic diversity within immigrant communities have not been the central focus of their work.

By concentrating on the experience of immigrant political movements in a variety of ethnic communities, this study addresses some of the challenges that ethnic diversity posed for West German governments. For the ethnic diversity of the immigrant population in the Federal Republic was not articulated in a political vacuum. There were two major sociopolitical trends in particular that affected the relationship of the Ukrainian, Polish, Croatian, Algerian, Spanish, Greek and Iranian communities with West German state institutions and political parties. One common factor that managed to cut across differences in national culture and religious tradition in an increasingly ethnically diverse society was the political language of Cold War conflict. The ideological polarization between the American and Soviet blocs, which found its most extreme manifestation in German division, could be found in every state exporting labour to the Federal Republic. Another major sociopolitical issue that affected the relationship of West German political institutions with immigrants and their homeland states was the historical legacy of the Nazi regime.

Through the exploration of the impact of these and other political factors upon immigrant political movements, each chapter will show how West Germans have dealt with the challenge of ethnic diversity from the very first days of the Federal Republic. In every year of the West German state’s existence, debates, demonstrations and disturbances involving politicized immigrants have openly, and at times violently, contradicted the myth that Germany is a culturally homogeneous society. The West German response to immigrant political and ethnic diversity examined in the following chapters will therefore shed new light on how immigration as a social phenomenon fits into the wider context of German history in the Cold War period.

Notes

1. S. Falk. 1998. Dimensionen Kurdischer Ethnizität und Politisierung: Eine Fallstudie Ethnischer Gruppenbildung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 71.

2. G. Stein. 1994. Endkampf um Kurdistan?: Die PKK, die Türkei und Deutschland, Munich: Aktuell, 114–18.

3. Falk, Dimensionen Kurdischer Ethnizität und Politisierung, 79–80.4. P. Panayi. 2000. Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany: Jews,

Gypsies, Poles, Turks and Others: Themes in Modern German History, Harlow: Longman, 201–3.

5. K.J. Bade. 1994. Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl: Eine Bestandsaufnahme, Munich: Beck’sche Reihe, 34.

6. C. Leggewie. 1990. Multikulti. Spielregeln für die Vielvölkerrepublik, Berlin: Rotbuch.7. Panayi, Ethnic Minorities, 258–61.8. R.G. Moeller. 2001. ‘Remembering the War in a Nation of Victims: West German Pasts in the

1950s’, in H. Schissler (ed.), The Miracle Years: a Cultural History of West Germany 1949–1968, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2–8.

Introduction 17

9. D.L. Bark and D.R. Gress. 1993. A History of West Germany (Part 2): Democracy and its Discontents 1963–1991, Oxford: Blackwell, 47–52.

10. H. Esser. 1983. ‘Gastarbeiter’, W. Benz (ed.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Band 2 – Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verl., 138–39.

11. T. Faist. 1994. ‘How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse 1978–1992’, in M. Baldwin-Edwards and M. Schain (eds), The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, Newbury-Portland: Frank Cass, 50–71.

12. D. Adineh and M. Schuckar. 1992. ‘Iraner in Deutschland’, in Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung (ed.), Ethnische Minderheiten in Deutschland: Arbeitsmigranten, Asylbewerber, Ausländer, Flüchtlinge, regional und religiöse Minderheiten, Vertriebene, Zwangsarbeiter, Berlin: Parabolis Verlag, 3.1.5.-1–3.1.5.28.

13. R. Lohmann. 1974. ‘Politische Auswirkungen auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in R. Lohmann and K. Manfrass (eds), Ausländerbeschäftigung und Internationale Politik, Munich: Oldenbourg, 125–29.

14. M.J. Miller. 1981. Foreign Workers in Western Europe: an Emerging Socio-political Force, New York: Praeger, 106–11.

15. U. Schöneberg. 1985. ‘Participation in Ethnic Associations: the Case of Immigrants in West Germany’, International Migration Review 19(3), 426–31.

16. D. Reynolds. 2001. One World Divisible: a Global History since 1945, London: Penguin, 30–36, 96–97, 339–47.

17. M. Ghaseminia. 1996. Zur Lebensituation und Integration Iranischer Staatsangehöriger in Niedersachsen, Hanover: Universität Hannover, 36–39.

18. U. Herbert and K. Hunn. 2001. ‘Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic’, in H. Schissler (ed.), The Miracle Years – a Cultural History of West Germany, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 187–98.

19. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (B.K.), B 106, Nr. 63084, Loseblattsammlung des Bundesministerium des Inneren, Re.: ‘Vorwort’, Bonn, 1960.

20. R. Brubaker. 2001. ‘The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany and the United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 24(4), 535–39.

21. Herbert and Hunn, ‘Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic’, 187–89.

22. U. Wölker. 1987. Zur Freiheit und Grenzen der politischen Betätigung von Ausländern, Berlin: Springer Verl., 6–7.

23. J. Katzenstein. 1990. West Germany’s Internal Security Policy: State and Violence in the 1970s and 1980s, Cornell: Western Societies Program (Cornell Centre for International Studies nr. 28), 27–29.

24. H. Prantl. 2002. Verdächtig: Der starke Staat und die Politik der inneren Unsicherheit, Hamburg: Europa Verl., 53–4.

25. M. Winter. 1998. Politikum Polizei – Macht und Funktion der Polizei in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Münster: LIT (Politische Soziologie, Band 10), 21–26.

26. A. Funk and W.-D. Narr. 1984. Verrechtlichung und Verdrängung: Die Bürokratie und Ihre Klientel, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verl., 250–51.

27. R.J. Evans. 1996. Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany 1600–1987, Oxford: Penguin, 752.

28. Katzenstein, West Germany’s Internal Security Policy, 18–31.29. B. Rabert. 1995. Links- und Rechtsterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1970 bis

Heute, Berlin: Bernard & Graefe Verl., 214–18.30. M. Mueller and P.F. Müller. 2002. Gegen Freund und Feind – Der BND: Geheime Politik und

Schmutzige Geschäfte, Hamburg: Rowohlt Verl., 254–60.31. C. von Braunmühl. 1973. Kalter Krieg und Friedliche Koexistenz: Die Außenpolitik der SPD in

der Großen Koalition, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp Verl., 38–42.


32. T. Naftali. 2004. ‘Berlin to Baghdad: the Perils of Hiring Enemy Intelligence’, Foreign Affairs 83(4), 127.

33. D. Schenk. 2003. Die Braunen Wurzeln des BKA, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verl., 304.34. Ibid., 286–93.35. See, for example, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (Pol. A.A.Ber.), B 40, Nr.

111, Aufzeichnung, Re.: ‘Interministerielle Besprechung im Bundesministerium für Vertriebene über Förderungsmassnahmen für osteuropäische Emigranten, am 12. Dezember 1962’, Bonn, 14 December 1962.

36. Funk and Narr,Verrechtlichung und Verdrängung, 167–74.37. Panayi, Ethnic Minorities, 258–61.38. Bonner Rundschau, ‘Trick mit Fremdarbeitern’, 2 December 1963.39. K. Schönwälder. 2001. Einwanderung und Ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und

öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren, Essen: Klartext, 174–77.

40. This sentiment was reflected in a succession of press articles in the early 1960s expounding on the benefits and dangers of the guest worker system, such as, Süddeutsche Zeitung (S.Z.), ‘Vier Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik: Lob und Tadel im deutschen Gästebuch’, 24/25/26 December 1962; or Die Welt (D.W.), ‘Pablos Freunde ließen nicht locker – Das rote Netz der Dolores Ibarruri – Kommunistische Agenten beeinflussen spanische Gastarbeiter’, 8 July 1962.

41. B. Winkler. 1994. Was Heißt denn Hier Fremd?: Thema Ausländerfeindlichkeit und Verantwortung, Munich: Humboldt Verl., 122–23.

42. U. Herbert. 1986. Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland: 1880–1980, Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz, 154–56.

43. J. Lehmann. 1988. ‘Die Hypothek der Vergangenheit: Das Verhältnis der Bundesrepublik zu Spanien’, Hispanorama, 50; or Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland.

44. K.J. Bade. 1984. ‘Die Ausländerbeschäftigung in der Bundesrepublik zwischen Arbeitswanderung und Einwanderung’, in K.J. Bade (ed.), Auswanderer – Wanderarbeiter – Gastarbeiter, Ostfieldern: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag,11 – 15 and B. Dietz. 1997. Jugendliche Aussiedler: Ausreise, Aufnahme, Integration, Berlin: Spitz.

45. Lohmann, ‘Politische Auswirkungen auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, 130–33.46. S. Castles. 2000. Ethnicity and Globalisation, London: SAGE Publications, 46–51.47. H. Korte. 1984. Die etablierten Deutschen und ihre ausländischen Aussenseiter – Macht

undZivilisation (Materialien zu Norbert Elias’ Zivilizationstheorie 2), Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 261–79.

48. W. Jacobmeyer. 1985. Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Ausländer: Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland 1945–1951, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

49. Castles, Ethnicity and Globalisation, 52–60.50. Lohmann, ‘Politische Auswirkungen auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, 134–35.51. H. Esser. 1980. Aspekte der Wanderungssoziologie: Eine Handlungstheoretische Analyse,

Darmstadt: Luchterhand.52. Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl, 53–89.53. Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland.54. H.-H. Heldmann. 1972. ‘Araber-Hatz in der BRD: Schlimme Neuigkeiten aus unserer

Fremdenrechtspraxis’, Vorgänge 10(11), 298–303.55. Funk and Narr, Verrechtlichung und Verdrängung.56. A good example is H.-E. Schultz. 1990. ‘Politische Justiz gegen eine “Auslandsvereinigung”

und die Rolle des “Kronzeugen” als zentrales Beweismittel in schauprozeßartigen Mammutverfahren: Der PKK-Prozeß in Düsseldorf’, in H. Janssen and M. Schubert (eds), Staatssicherheit: Die Bekämpfung des politischen Feindes im Inneren, Bielefeld: AJZ Verl., 158–69.

Introduction 19

57. Pol. A.A.Ber., B 42, Nr. 1007, Konsularische Angelegenheiten, Re.: ‘Berichte des Konsulates Zagreb über Arbeitnehmer aus Jugoslawien, Gastarbeiter und Studiengruppen’, 23 September 1963–8 February 1968.

58. R. Münz, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland. Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 187–190.

59. R. Brubaker, 2001. ‘The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany and the United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 24(4), 537–539

60. Y. Soysal. 2000. ‘Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Postwar Europe?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(1), 1–15.

61. A. Caglar. 1991. ‘Das Kultur-Konzept als Zwangsjacke in Studien zur Arbeitsmigration’, Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien (31), 93–105.

62. R. Mandel. 1989. ‘Turkish Headscarves and the “Foreigner Problem”: Constructing Difference through Emblems of Identity’, New German Critique 46, 27–46.

63. A. Pitsela. 1986. Straffälligkeit und Viktimisierung ausländischer Minderheiten – Dargestellt am Beispiel der Griechischen Volksgruppe, Freiburg: Max-Planck Institut für Strafrecht, 119–28.

64. H. Beste. 2000. ‘Feindbildkonstruktionen und Bedrohungsszenarien – Die Kurden’, in H. Beste (ed.), Morphologie der Macht, Opladen: Lesle und Budrich, 415–20.

65. E. Özcan. 1989. Türkische Immigrantenorganisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin: Hitit Verl.

66. E.K. Østergaard-Nielsen. 1998. Diaspora Politics: the Case of Immigrants and Refugees from Turkey Residing in Germany since 1980, Thesis (D.Phil.), Oxford: University of Oxford, 11–27.

67. V. Eccarius-Kelly. 2008. ‘The Kurdish Conundrum in Europe: Political Opportunities and Transnational Activism’, in W. Pojmann (ed.), Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 57–80.

68. Martin Sökefeld. 2008. Struggling for Recognition: the Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space, Oxford: Berghahn Books.

69. Dietz, Jugendliche Aussiedler, 24–37.70. Schönwälder, Einwanderung und Ethnische Pluralität.71. W.I. Wsewolod (ed.). 1992. The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World

War II, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.72. V. Kulyk. 2003. ‘The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Émigré Community:

Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War’, in R. Ohliger and K. Schönwälder (eds), European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945, Aldershot: Ashgate, 214–18.

73. A. Straßner. 2004. ‘Terrorismus und Generalisierung – Gibt es einen Lebenslauf Terroristischer Gruppierungen?’, Zeitschrift für Politik 4(51), 368–71.

74. K. Hirschmann. 2001. ‘Terrorismus in neuen Dimensionen: Hintergründe und Schlussfolgerungen’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 51, 8.

75. D. Kilcullen. 2005. ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28(4), 599.76. P.R. Neumann. 2009. Old and New Terrorism, London: Polity Press, 47–49.77. See S. Green. 2004. The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in

Contemporary Germany, Manchester: Manchester University Press.78. Schönwälder, Einwanderung und Ethnische Pluralität, 217–30.79. R. Sala. 2005. ‘“Gastarbeitersendungen” und “Gastarbeiterzeitschriften” in der

Bundesrepublik (1960–1975) – ein Spiegel internationaler Spannungen’, Zeithistorische Forschungen 3, 366–371.

Documents

Introduction - BERGHAHN BOOKS new neighbours, ... leading to running battles between Kurds, ... non-Germans in cities in which the guest worker population was considered to