IVMUN2015

The International Vietnam Model United Nations Conference

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE OF HISTORICAL CRISIS SIMULATION (HCS): WAR OF 1812

Document HCS-001/1641-150721By decree of His Right Honourable, the Executive Director of

IVMUN Historical Crisis Simulation

This Document must be studied before any other material as it serves as a guide to the Historical Crisis

Simulation Committee.

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Table of contents

Chair Biographies 2

I. Basic Information 4

II. Topic of discussion: The War of 1812 6II.1. The History 6

II.2. The Origins – Established Facts 7II.2.1. British Goals 7II.2.2. American View 8

II.2.2.1. American expansionism 8II.2.2.2. Violations of American rights 10

II.2.2.2.2. British Support of Indian Raids in North America 10II.2.2.2.3. Impressment by the Royal Navy 10

II.2.2.3. American economic motivations 11II.2.2.4. Internal political conflict 11

II.3. The Declaration of War 11

Recipients 13

Chair BiographiesChair -

Co-chair - Bui Van Anh

I’m Bui Van Anh. I’m from VNU-HCM High school for the gifted and a member of class E1417. Really glad to know you all. I am designated as Co-Chair of Historical Crisis Committee and our topic will be the War of 1812. Honestly, this topic came as a complete surprise to me, but it has given me a chance to find out more about American history, a fascinating subject that I have never cared about. I’ve once been in the MUN conference of Abundance 2015 as a delegate. This time, joining IVMUN as a co-chair, I expect to develop myself in many ways including confidence, knowledge, communication skills and teamwork skills to name a few. Also, my hope is to bring out the best in the delegates and make them feel more responsible to improve the world we’re living in. I’m really grateful to be a part of IVMUN 2015.

Director - Bui Minh Duc

Co-director - Nguyen Tue Thy

My name is Nguyen Tue Thy and I am in 11th grade at Hanoi – Amsterdam High School for the Gifted. Previously, I have only had the opportunity to attend one Model UN conference but through it, I have gained the skill and knowledge needed for me to further understand and analyze topical events as well as to enhance my prospects for the future. Model UN has changed me in such a profound way that I hope to bring to this year’s IVMUN delegates. Crisis Committees are still novel to Vietnam’s past Model UN conferences, so I feel it my duty as co-director of the Historical Crisis Committee to assist delegates in comprehending the format and tasks at hand and also generate a new and stimulating experience. I expect that all delegates attending will be diplomatic and sensible in their judgments as well as enthusi-astic to debate and propose ideas. I am excited to meet all of you and I wish you the best of luck.

Co-director - Vu Thu Phuong Honorable Chairs and Distinguished Delegates, My name is Vu Thu Phuong and I am currently a student of class 11A2 in Hanoi – Amsterdam High School. It is truly a great honor to have the opportunity to participate in IVMUN as one of the co-di-rectors of the Historical Crisis. My MUN experience, including the previous attendances of HMUN and VYMUN, is comparatively humble. My participation in MUN purely stems from my profound affinity and passion for MUN, as well as my great desire to acquire more knowledge of the diplomatic field. It is my firm belief that the innovative IVMUN will offer all chances to broaden our knowledge, sharpen our diplomatic skills, which really come in handy not only in formal situations but also in daily life, and

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make friends with wise and talented individuals. As a humble part of IVMUN, I would like to whole-heartedly contribute to the success of this conference. I am eagerly anticipating many heated debates at this IVMUN 2015.

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I. Basic InformationI.1. On the Crisis Committee of MUN. The Historical Crisis Simulation is a concept recognised by Model United Nation events but is not officially an event in the authen-tic United Nations. Therefore it has no basic guidelines and allows for IVMUN to draw up its own format. The format will be detailed in the next section.

I.2. On the Format of IVMUN-HCS. Delegates taking part in the HCS will join the Simulated Electoral College and War Cabinet of the United States in 1812 as a mem-ber of the US Congress or the US Senate.

I.2.1. The Committee will act as a simulated version of 1812’s US Electoral College.

I.2.1.1. The Electoral College will be tasked with deciding on actions concerning domestic and international political, economic and military aspects of the United States of America.

I.2.1.2. The Electoral College will receive briefings of events from the Rhetorician (His Right Honourable Executive Director of Historical Crisis Simulation). Delegates are not allowed to protest the events provided by the Rhetorician.

I.2.1.3. The Electoral College will operate and vote on decisions. These decisions are to be subsequently submitted to the Rhetorician. Delegates are not allowed to protest the results provided by the Rhetorician.

I.2.1.4. The Electoral College will be divided into two Parties. Each Party may elect a mem-ber as Majority and Minority Leader whose task is to submit bills (resolutions). After Ma-jority/Minority Leader speeches, the Electoral College Debate will convene, in which both sides defend their positions.

I.2.1.5. Each member of the Electoral College will be allowed one vote. A bill is decided by the First Past the Post system.

I.2.1.6. Each member is allowed to switch parties and vote independently of their party.

I.2.1.7. Parties may not persecute their members.

I.2.1.8. Members are allowed to form a bipartisanship.

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I.2.2. Sixteen (16) delegates will be allowed to choose from the roles of real-life mem-bers of the Electoral College with their own motives and agenda.

I.2.3.1. The Electoral College will be presented with information from the Popular Vote, but Electoral Votes can be independent from the Popular Vote. Popular Votes are only ad-visory.

I.2.3.2. The Voting system is First Past the Post and only applicable to Electoral Votes.

I.2.3. The Presidential Election of 1812 will be simulated to take place right after the declaration of war.

I.2.4. One delegate will be voted President by the Presidential Election referred to in I.2.3.

I.2.4.1. If over 70% of the Electoral College decide unanimously upon removing the Presi-dent from office, an emergency election will be held to vote for a provisional President.

I.2.4.2. The President is allowed to issue two (2) executive orders without the approval of the Electoral College.

I.2.4.3. The President is allowed to veto bills passed by the Electoral College. The Electoral College is allowed to recall a vote and the bill will be decided if the approval rating exceeds 70%.

I.2.4.4. The President is not allowed to resign by his own volition.

I.2.4.5. The President is not allowed to remove members of the Electoral College from of-fice.

I.3. On the Content of IVMUN-HCS. The topic will be the War of 1812, and the goal is to maximise gains and minimise loss for the United States in the war. Depending on the orientation of each delegate’s chosen persona, each member may adopt their own approach on the situation.

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II. Topic of discussion: The War of 1812.

own right, it is frequently seen in Europe as a theatre of the Napoleonic Wars, as it was caused by issues related to that war . The war resolved many issues which remained from the American Revolutionary War but involved no boundary changes. The United States declared war on June 18, 1812 for several reasons, including trade restrictions brought about by the British war with France, the impressment of American merchant sailors into the Royal Navy, British support of Indian tribes against American ex-pansion, outrage over insults to national honor after humiliations on the high seas, and possible Ameri-can interest in annexing British territory in modern-day Canada.

The war was fought in three principal theatres. Firstly, at sea, warships and privateers of each side attacked the other’s merchant ships, while the British blockaded the Atlantic coast of the United States and mounted large raids in the later stages of the war. Secondly, land and naval battles were fought on the American–Canadian frontier, which ran along the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence River and the northern end of Lake Champlain. Thirdly, the American South and Gulf Coast also saw big land battles, in which the American forces defeated Britain’s Indian allies and a British invasion force at New Orleans. At the end of the war both sides signed the Treaty of Ghent and both parties returned occupied land to its pre-war owner and resumed friendly trade relations.

With the majority of its land and naval forces tied down in Europe fighting the Napoleonic Wars, the British used a defensive strategy in the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, repelling initial American invasions. Early victories over poorly led American armies such as the Battle of Queenston Heights, demonstrated that the conquest of the Canadas would prove more difficult than anticipated. Despite this, the Americans were able to inflict serious defeats on Britain’s native American allies, end-ing the prospect of an Indian confederacy and an independent Indian state in the Midwest under Brit-ish sponsorship. US forces were also able to make several gains on the Canadian frontier; taking control of Lake Erie in 1813 and seizing western parts of Upper Canada. However a large-scale American at-tempt to capture Montreal was repulsed in November 1813, and serious American attempts to conquer Upper Canada were ultimately abandoned following the bloody Battle of Lundy’s Lane in July 1814.

In April 1814, with the defeat of Napoleon, the British adopted a more aggressive strategy, send-ing larger invasion armies and tightening their naval blockade. However, with the end of the Napole-onic Wars in Europe, both governments were eager for a return to normality and peace negotiations began in Ghent in August 1814. In September 1814, the British invaded and occupied eastern Maine. In the south-west, General Andrew Jackson destroyed the military strength of the Creek nation at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. The British victory at the Battle of Bladensburg in August 1814 allowed them to capture and burn Washington, D.C, but they were repulsed in an attempt to take Baltimore. Ameri-can victories in September 1814 at the Battle of Plattsburgh repulsed the British invasions of New York,

II.1. The History

T he War of 1812 was a military conflict, lasting for two-and-a-half years, fought by the United States of America against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, its North American colonies, and its American Indian allies. Seen by the United States and Canada as a war in its

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attempt to take Baltimore. American victories in September 1814 at the Battle of Plattsburgh repulsed the British invasions of New York, which along with pressure from merchants on the British govern-ment prompted British diplomats to drop their demands at Ghent for an independent native buffer state and territorial claims that London previously sought. Both sides agreed to a peace that restored the situation before the war began. However, it took six weeks for ships to cross the Atlantic so news of the peace treaty did not arrive before the British suffered a major defeat at New Orleans in January 1815.

In the United States, late victories over invading British armies at the battles of Plattsburg, Bal-timore and New Orleans produced a sense of euphoria over a “second war of independence” against Britain. The Federalist Party had strongly opposed the war effort and prevented New England from providing much in the way of soldiers and troops; it now virtually collapsed. The war ended on a high note for Americans, bringing an “Era of Good Feelings” in which partisan animosity nearly vanished in the face of strengthened U.S. nationalism. The war was also a major turning point in the development of the US military. The poor performance of several American armies during the war, particularly during the 1812-13 invasions of Canada and the 1814 defence of Washington, convinced the US government of the need to move away from its Revolutionary-era reliance on militia and focus on creating a more professional regular force. Spain was involved in fighting in Florida, but was not an official belligerent; some Spanish forces fought alongside the British during the Occupation of Pensacola. The U.S. took permanent ownership of Spain’s Mobile District.

In Upper and Lower Canada, British and local Canadian militia victories over invading Ameri-can armies became iconic and promoted the development of a distinct Canadian identity, which includ-ed strong loyalty to Britain. Today, particularly in Ontario, memory of the war retains its significance, because the defeat of the invasions ensured that the Canadas would remain part of the British Empire, rather than be annexed by the United States. In Canada, numerous ceremonies took place in 2012 to commemorate the war, offer historical lessons and celebrate 200 years of peace across the border. The war is scarcely remembered in Britain, being heavily overshadowed by the much larger Napoleonic Wars occurring in Europe.

II.2. The Origins – Established Facts.II.2.1. British Goals

The British were engaged in a life-and-death war with Napoleon and could not allow the Ameri-cans to help the enemy, regardless of their lawful neutral rights to do so. As Horsman explains, “If pos-sible, England wished to avoid war with America, but not to the extent of allowing her to hinder the British war effort against France. Moreover...a large section of influential British opinion, both in the government and in the country, thought that America presented a threat to British maritime suprema-cy.” The British had two goals: All parties were committed to the defeat of France, and this required sailors, and it required all-out commercial war against France . On the question of trade with America the British parties split. As Horsman argues, “Some restrictions on neutral commerce were essential for England in this period. That this restriction took such an extreme form after 1807 stemmed not

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only from the effort to defeat Napoleon, but also from the undoubted jealousy of America’s commer-cial prosperity that existed in England. America was unfortunate in that for most of the period from 1803 to 1812 political power in England was held by a group that was pledged not only to the defeat of France, but also to a rigid maintenance of Britain’s commercial supremacy.” That group was weakened by Whigs friendly to the U.S. in mid-1812 and the policies were reversed, but too late for the U.S. had already declared war. By 1815 Britain was no longer controlled by politicians dedicated to commercial supremacy, so that cause had vanished. The British were hindered by weak diplomats in Washington who misrepresented British policy and by communications that were so slow the Americans did not learn of the reversal of policy until they had declared war. When Americans proposed a truce based on British ending impressment, Britain re-fused, because it needed those sailors. Horsman explains, “Impressment, which was the main point of contention between England and America from 1803 to 1807, was made necessary primarily because of England’s great shortage of seamen for the war against Napoleon. In a similar manner the restrictions on American commerce imposed by England’s Orders in Council, which were the supreme cause of complaint between 1807 and 1812, were one part of a vast commercial struggle being waged between England and France.”

II.2.2. American View

There were several immediate stated causes for the U.S. declaration of war.

II.2.2.1. American expansionism

Historians have considered the idea that American expansionism was one cause of the war. The American expansion into the Northwest was being blocked by Indians and that was a major cause. More problematic is the question whether an American war goal was to acquire Canadian lands, or whether it was planned to seize the area temporarily as a bargaining chip. The American desire for Canadian land has been a staple in Canadian public opinion since the 1830s, and was much discussed among historians before 1940, but is rarely cited by experts any more. However, historians are not in agreement and there is still dispute as to whether American expansionism was a factor in the war. Some Canadian historians propounded the notion in the early 20th century, and it survives among Canadians.

Stagg argues that Madison and his advisors believed that conquest of Canada would be easy and that economic coercion would force the British to come to terms by cutting off the food supply for their highly valuable West Indies sugar colonies. Furthermore, possession of Canada would be a valuable bar-gaining chip. Stagg suggests frontiersmen demanded the seizure of Canada not because they wanted the land, but because the British were thought to be arming the Indians and thereby blocking settlement of the west. As Horsman concludes, “The idea of conquering Canada had been present since at least 1807 as a means of forcing England to change her policy at sea. The conquest of Canada was primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it.” Hickey flatly states, “The desire to annex Canada did not bring on the war.” Brown concludes, “The purpose of the Canadian expedition was to serve nego-tiation not to annex Canada.” Burt, a Canadian scholar, but also a professor at an American university, agrees completely, noting that Foster, the British minister to Washington, also rejected the argument

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that annexation of Canada was a war goal. However, Foster also rejected the possibility of a declaration of war, despite having dinner with several of the more prominent War Hawks, so his judgement in these matters can be questioned.

However, historian J. C. A. Stagg states that, “... had the War 1812 been a successful military venture, the Madison administration would have been reluctant to have returned occupied Canadian territory to the enemy.” Other authors concur, one stating, “Expansion was not the only American ob-jective, and indeed not the immediate one. But it was an objective”, and that “The American yearning to absorb Canada was long-standing...In 1812 it became part of a grand strategy.” Another suggests that “Americans harboured ‘manifest destiny’ ideas of Canadian annexation throughout the nineteenth century.” A third states that “he belief that the United States would one day annex Canada had a con-tinuous existence from the early days of the War of Independence to the War of 1812 was a factor of pri-mary importance in bringing on the war.” Another says that “acquiring Canada would satisfy America’s expansionist desires” . Historian Spencer Tucker tells us that “War Hawks were eager to wage war with the British, not only to end Indian depredations in the Midwest but also to seize Canada and perhaps Spanish Florida.”

John Randolph of Roanoke said, “Agrarian greed not maritime right urges this war. We have heard but one word - like the whipporwill’s one monotonous tone: Canada! Canada! Canada!”The majority of the inhabitants of Upper Canada were Americans, some of them exiled and most of them recent immigrants. The Loyalists were hostile to union with the U.S., while the other settlers seem to have been uninterested and remained neutral during the war. The Canadian colonies were thinly populated and only lightly defended by the British Army, and some Americans believed that the many in Upper Canada would rise up and greet an American invading army as liberators. The combination implied an easy conquest. Once the war began retired president Thomas Jefferson warned that the Brit-ish presence posed a grave threat, pointing to “The infamous intrigues of Great Britain to destroy our government....and with the Indians to Tomahawk our women and children, prove that the cession of Canada, their fulcrum for these Machiavellian levers, must be a sine qua non at a treaty of peace. Jeffer-son predicted in late 1812, “the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us the experience for the attack on Halifax, the next and final expulsion of England from the American continent.”

Maass argued in 2015 that the expansionist theme is a myth that goes against the “relative con-sensus among experts that the primary U.S. objective was the repeal of British maritime restrictions. He argues that consensus among scholars is that The United States went to war “because six years of eco-nomic sanctions had failed to bring Britain to the negotiating table, and threatening the Royal Navy’s Canadian supply base was their last hope.” Maass agrees that theoretically expansionism might have tempted Americans, but finds that “leaders feared the domestic political consequences of doing so. Notably, what limited expansionism there was focused on sparsely populated western lands rather than the more populous eastern settlements .”

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The long wars between Britain and France led to repeated complaints by the U.S. that both pow-ers violated America’s right as a neutral to trade with both sides.

II.2.2.2. Violations of American rights

II.2.2.2.1. Violation of Neutrality in Trade Rights.

Furthermore Americans complained loudly that British agents in Canada were supplying muni-tions to hostile Native American tribes living in United States territory. Indians based in the Northwest Territory, comprising the modern states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, had or-ganized in opposition to American settlement, and were being supplied with weapons by British traders in Canada. Britain was not trying to provoke a war, and at one point cut its allocations of gunpowder to the tribes, but it was trying to build up its fur trade and friendly relations with potential military allies. Although Britain had ceded the area to the United States in the Treaty of Paris in 1783, it had the long-term goal of creating a “neutral” or buffer Indian state in the area that would block further American growth. The Indian nations generally followed Tenskwatawa (the Shawnee Prophet and the brother of Tecumseh). Raiding grew more common in 1810 and 1811; Westerners in Congress found the raids intolerable and wanted them permanently ended.

II.2.2.2.2. British Support of Indian Raids in North America.

Starting in the mid-1790s the Royal Navy, short of manpower, began boarding American mer-chant ships in order to seize American and British sailors from American vessels. Although this policy of impressment was supposed to reclaim only British subjects, the law of Britain and most countries defined nationality by birth whereas the United States allowed individuals who had been resident in America for some time to adopt American citizenship. There were, therefore, large numbers of individ-uals who were British by British law but American by American law. The confusion was compounded by the refusal of Jefferson and Madison to issue any official citizenship documents: their position was that all persons serving on American ships were to be regarded as US citizens and that no further evidence was required. This stance was motivated by the advice of Albert Gallatin, who had calculated that half of American deep-sea merchant seamen - 9,000 men - were British subjects. Allowing the Royal Navy to reclaim these men would destroy both the US economy and the vital customs revenue of the govern-ment. Any sort of accommodation would jeopardize these men, and so concords such as the proposed Monroe-Pinkney Treaty between the U.S. and Britain were rejected by Jefferson.To fill the need for some sort of identification, US consuls provided unofficial papers. However, these relied on unverifiable declarations by the individual concerned for evidence of citizenship, and the large fees paid for the documents made them a lucrative sideline. In turn, British officers- short of personnel and convinced, not entirely unreasonably, that the US flag covered a large number of British deserters- tended to treat such papers with scorn. Between 1806 and 1812 about 6,000 seamen were impressed and taken against their will into the Royal Navy of which 3,800 were subsequently released.

II.2.2.2.3. Impressment by the Royal Navy.

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II.2.2.3. American economic motivations

The failure of Jefferson’s embargo and Madison’s economic coercion, according to Horsman, “made war or absolute submission to England the only alternatives, and the latter presented more ter-rors to the recent colonists. The war hawks came from the West and the South, regions that had sup-ported economic warfare and were suffering the most from British restrictions at sea. The merchants of New England earned large profits from the wartime carrying trade, in spite of the numerous captures by both France and England, but the western and southern farmers, who looked longingly at the export market, were suffering a depression that made them demand war”.

II.2.2.4. Internal political conf lict

While the British government was largely oblivious to the deteriorating North-American situ-ation because of its involvement in a continent-wide European War, the U.S. was in a period of signifi-cant political conflict between the Federalist Party (based mainly in the Northeast), which favored a strong central government and closer ties to Britain, and the Republicans (with its greatest power base in the South and West), which favored a weak central government, preservation of slavery, expansion into Indian land, and a stronger break with Britain. By 1812, the Federalist Party had weakened con-siderably, and the Republicans, with James Madison completing his first term of office and control of Congress, were in a strong position to pursue their more aggressive agenda against Britain. Through-out the war, support for the U.S. cause was weak (or sometimes non-existent) in Federalist areas of the Northeast. Few men volunteered to serve; the banks avoided financing the war. The negativism of the Federalists, especially as exemplified by the Hartford Convention of 1814–15 ruined its reputation and the Party survived only in scattered areas. By 1815 there was broad support for the war from all parts of the country. This allowed the triumphant Republicans to adopt some Federalist policies, such as a national bank, which Madison reestablished in 1816.

II.3. The Declaration of War An Act Declaring War between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the De-pendencies Thereof and the United States of America and Their Territories was passed by the United States Congress on June 18, 1812, thereby beginning the War of 1812. This is where the established facts end, for the sake of our simulation. From this point on, the proceedings of the US Government and the turn of events are up to the members of the committee.

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Recipients:All members eligible for the Historical Crisis Simulation Committee.IVMUN Board of Directors and Senior Secretariat.His Honourable Director of IVMUN HCS, Mr. Dao Vu Quang.His Right Honourable, the Executive Director of IVMUN, Mr. Bui Minh Duc.IVMUN Official Archive.

Hanoi, 21 July, 2015(signed)

His Right Honourable, the Executive Director of IVMUN-HCS.

The International Vietnam Model United Nations Conference