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Investment Banking and Capital MarketsMarket Report — Second Quarter 2009
1BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Contents
Overview of second quarter 2009 results 1
Market review• Fixed income and equity trading 8• Underwriting and M&A advisory 12
Focus: Building a lean, efficient risk management organization 17
2BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
The rebound in investment banking performance slowed during the second quarter
After a strong rebound in Q1, revenue growth slowed in Q2• The net revenues of the banks in BCG's performance index totaled $55 billion in Q2 2009, which was nearly 200% above
Q2 2008 ($19 billion) and 13% above Q1 2009 – The rebound was fueled by a significant decline in write-downs, which totaled $11 billion, down from
$16 billion in the prior quarter and $44 billion a year earlier– Excluding write-downs, net revenues climbed to $67 billion, up from $66 billion in Q1, but remained 7% below the
precrisis peak of $72 billion (Q1 07)– For the first quarter since the crisis began, every bank's net revenues were in the black
• Gross operating expenses grew less than revenues, up 8% from the prior quarter– But they were 4% below a year prior and 18% below two years prior
As a result, the BCG Investment Banking Performance Index climbed back to 100 (Q1 2006 = 100)• All but two of the 12 banks in BCG's index generated positive gross operating profits
Performance during Q2 varied widely across major investment banking activitiesFixed income and equity trading• The rebound in fixed income revenues stalled with revenues slipping 5% to $27.2 billion1 during the quarter, $3.8 billion shy
of the precrisis peak (Q1 07) • Equity trading revenues slumped 2% despite an uptick in volumes; they totaled $12.2 billion1, which was far below the
precrisis peak ($20.4 billion Q1 07)Underwriting (ECM and DCM) and M&A advisory• Underwriting revenues surged, nearly doubling to $8.1 billion2 as capital- and credit-hungry corporations hit the market• In sharp contrast, M&A revenues continued to dry up as deal volume fell further (down 23% to $1.9 billion2)
1. Excludes Barclays Capital, BNPP, and Nomura, for which data were not available. 2. Excludes the latter three and Société Générale, Source: BCG analysis.
3BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
The industry's performance is back to 2006 levelsRecording its second profitable quarter in a row since the crisis began
9369
103132 126
-197
-98
-162
82100
-14
100
-293
-392-400
-350
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
Q106 Q206 Q306 Q406 Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109 Q209
Performance Index
BCG Investment Banking Performance Index
Index(Q1/06 = 100)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Note: The index includes Bank of America, Barclays Capital (includes Lehman North America as of Q4 2008), Bear Stearns (through Q1 2008), BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Lehman (through Q3 2008), Merrill Lynch (through Q4 2008), Morgan Stanley, Nomura (includes Lehman APAC and select EMEA operations as of Q4 2008), Société Générale, and UBS. The index tracks gross operating profit.Source: Company reports; BCG analysis.
4BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Lower write-downs and stronger underwriting activity drove revenue growth during Q2 2009
1.8
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1.9
5.6
3.3
5.5
3.6
2.2
3.1 2.9 2.8
0.4
2.2
-2.1
1.9
1.01.8
($B)
6.7
11.0
5.2
7.9
1.2
7.8
2.8
5.7
Net revenues: Q2 2008 vs Q2 2009(in descending order of net revenues for Q2 09, which are in bold)
GS2 JPM Citi DB BoA3 CS BN Bar- MS2 No- UBS SGPP4 Cap mura
Aggregated net revenues1
Underwriting & M&A advisory revenuesTrading revenues including net write-downs
Q2 08 Q2 09
1. Excludes BNPP, for which disaggregated data were not available, and "other" capital markets revenues reported by Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and Citigroup. Includes BarCap.2. Q2 08 ended in May; Q2 09 ended in June. 3. Includes Merrill Lynch for both quarters. 4. Reflects total of both; disaggregated data n.a.Source: Company reports; BCG analysis.
($B)
7
41 4351
57 55
12
8 12
12
812
63
49
Q109
Underwriting & M&A
+13%
Trading excl. write-
downs Trading incl.write-downs
55
Q209Q208
66
Q109
19
Q208
67
Q209
Excluding netwrite-downs
Including net write-downs
5BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Risk exposure remained relatively high
Banks have had mixed results in lowering risk exposure1
Banks have had mixed results in lowering risk exposure1
Banks earned less trading revenues relative to risk exposure
Banks earned less trading revenues relative to risk exposure
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
GSCS
Trading rev./VaR
Q209Q107
MSUBSSGJPMBoADBCiti
(sorted by Q209)
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
DB
Q408-Q209(%change)
VaR
UBS CSSG GS
RWA
MS
1. RWA = risk-weighted assets. RWA for Corp/Investment Bank at UBS, CS, DB; for entire bank at GS and MS. Other banks do not report RWA for CIB.Note: VaR is average for quarter for UBS, CS, DB, and SG and period end for MS and GS.Source: Company reports; BCG analysis.
6BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Operating expenses are rising againHowever, overall revenue growth of 13% outpaced expenses
Few banks achieved positive operating leverage1
Few banks achieved positive operating leverage1
Operating expenses remain below peak levels but are steadily creeping up
Operating expenses remain below peak levels but are steadily creeping up
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
GS DB JPM CS MS Citi BoA BarCap
UBS BNPP
No-mura
SG
Q1 07Q1 09Q2 09
Op.exp. ($M)
Avg. 8% Q109-Q209
(sorted in descending order Q2 09)
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
DB
CS
JPMC
Citi
MS
GS
BoA BNPP
SG
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%-10%-20%-30%-40%
Net rev. ∆ Q1-Q2 (%)
Op.exp. ∆ Q1-Q2 (%)
Costs upRevenues down
Costs downRevenues down
Negative operatingleverage
Positive operatingleverage
Costs upRevenues up
Notes: For GS and MS, Q1 07 ended in February and Q1 09 ended in March. For comparability, BoA includes ML, and JPM includes Bear Stearns across quarters. 1. Excludes Nomura whose net revenue growth is off the chart, 1175% and UBS whose net revenue in Q1 was negative, effectively resulting in a 737% net rev. growth. Source: Company reports; BCG analysis.
7BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Bank performance varied widely, and only two banks improved both revenues and profit margin
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
DB
CS
JPM
Citi2
MS
GS
BoA
BNPP
SG
Nomura1
Net rev. ($M)
UBS1
Pre-tax profit margin (%) LegendBoth margin and revenues declinedBoth margin and revenues improvedOne improved while other declined or remained the same
Q109Q209
Note: BarCap profit margin for 1H is 12%.1. Profit margin for UBS is not meaningful for Q1 09; Nomura's Q1 09 margin = -1075%. 2. Citi's relatively high margin is due to above average net revenue growth (8% compared to -16%, quarterly change between Q2 09 and Q1 07, the industry's peak) and above average cost reduction (-25% compared to -16%).Source: Company reports; BCG analysis.
8BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Contents
Overview of second quarter 2009 results 1
Market review• Fixed income and equity trading 8• Underwriting and M&A advisory 12
Focus: Building a lean, efficient risk management organization 17
9BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Fixed income and equity trading revenues fell slightly
Following a sharp rebound in Q1, revenues from fixed income trading fell slightly in Q2• Net revenues from fixed income trading declined by 5% to $27.2 billion1; they were 12% off the Q1 2007
peak ($31.0 billion)• Revenues were dampened by the continued decline in average weekly US bond-trading volumes (-4%
in Q2 compared to -7% in Q1)• The decline in revenues occurred despite strong client flow in liquid products, sustained market volatility,
and relatively large spreads• Rates and credit generated the strongest results, followed by foreign exchange and commodities
– Asset class performance was not uniform across banks; some banks experienced a decline in rates, FX, and commodities
Likewise, equity trading revenues declined during Q2, despite improving market conditions• Net revenues slipped 2% to $12.2 billion1, far below the precrisis peak of $20.4 billion in Q1 2007
– Most banks reported solid client activity driven by improving market performance and lower volatility
– Several banks, however, reported declining commission revenues and prime brokerage revenues with the latter due to a continued decline in balances
• Trading volumes, however, increased by 13%– Asian markets recorded the strongest growth (48%), followed by Europe (29%)– European market activity, however, remained far off its peak (down 57% from Q3 2007)– In the Americas, trading inched up only 1%, and was nearly 25% below its peak level
1. Revenue figures are for 9 investment banks; figures exclude Barclays Capital, BNPP, and Nomura, for which disaggregates were not available.Source: BCG analysis.
10BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Following a strong rebound, fixed income trading revenues declined
27.228.6
-49.1
-17.5
-8.9
-24.4
-54.4
1.8
28.031.0
23.322.824.9
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
Q406Q206 Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109 Q209
-5%($B)
Q306
Fixed income trading
U.S. weekly average bond-trading volumesU.S. weekly average bond-trading volumes Fixed income trading revenues1Fixed income trading revenues1
0
500
1,000
1,500
Q207
1,277
Q307
1,226
1,411
Q108
1,173
Q208
1,153
Q407
945
($B)
Q109
908
Q209
Corp Bonds
MBS/ABS
Treasury/Agencies
1,018
Q308
-4%
1,070
Q206
1,037
Q306
1,065
Q406
1,148
Q107
1,179
Q408
Note: Trading data are for average weekly primary dealer transactions.1. Revenue figures are for 9 investment banks; figures exclude Barclays Capital, BNPP, and Nomura, for which disaggregates were not available.Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; company reports; BCG analysis.
11BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Equity trading revenues slipped, despite an increase in trading volumes
Equity trading
12.212.4
-3.7
10.1
15.416.817.4
13.6
19.820.4
14.0
9.4
13.4
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Q109
($B)
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109
-2%
Q206 Q306 Q406
Global-exchange trading volumesGlobal-exchange trading volumes Equity trading revenues1Equity trading revenues1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Q406
22.1
Q107
25.0
Q207
27.0
Q307
26.3
Q407
26.2
Q108
24.3
Q208
23.6
Q308
23.5
Q408
18.6
Q109
EMEA
Asia
Americas
+13%
18.7
($T)
Q206
15.5
Q306
18.2
21.1
Q209
Note: Trading volumes single counted, includes investment funds traded at exchanges.1. Revenue figures are for 9 investment banks; figures exclude Barclays Capital, BNPP, and Nomura, for which disaggregates were not available.Source: World Federation of Exchanges; company reports; BCG analysis.
12BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Contents
Overview of second quarter 2009 results 1
Market review• Fixed income and equity trading 8• Underwriting and M&A advisory 12
Focus: Building a lean, efficient risk management organization 17
13BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
A quest for capital and credit drove up issuances, but the global recession stifled M&A activity
M&A activity continued to fall sharply as the global recession persisted• Deal value dropped 41% during Q2 09 to $279 billion, remaining below 2004 levels
– The drop was steepest in the Americas (-63%), followed by Europe (-21%)– In contrast, Asia-Pacific deal value increased 21%
• Revenues fell 23% to $1.9 billion1
– JPMorgan inched past Goldman Sachs to take the highest share of revenues – Competition intensified as four banks gained on these leaders
Underwriting revenues nearly doubled to $8.1 billion1
• ECM Revenues hit $3.8 billion, just 7% shy of their Q2 2007 peak of $4.1 billion– Equity issuances skyrocketed during Q2 (208%) fueled by financial institutions– The US market was the most active, accounting for a third of issuances
• DCM revenues grew 40% to $4.3 billion but remained 27% below the Q2 2007 peak– Revenue growth was driven by higher average margins, which counteracted the slowdown
in issuance– After an exceptional Q1, debt issuances grew only 1%– The big engine – investment grade issuance – stalled, as did government issuance
• JPMorgan had the highest share of underwriting revenues – its revenues doubled during Q2
1. Revenue figures are for 8 investment banks; excludes Barclays Capital, BNPP, Nomura, and Société Générale, for which disaggregates were not available. Source: BCG analysis.
14BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Underwriting revenues surged while M&A revenues slipped
0
5
10
15
DCM 2
M&A
+51%
($B)
8.6
Q305
9.3
Q405
9.5
Q106
10.5
Q206
9.5
Q306
12.6
Q406
10.0
Q107
14.4
Q207
11.6
Q307
12.7
Q407
7.9
Q108
10.8
Q208
8.3
Q308
6.8
Q408
6.6
Q209Q109
ECM
12.5
Global underwriting and M&A advisory revenues1
1. Revenue figures are for 8 investment banks; excludes BNPP, Société Générale, Barclays Capital, and Nomura, for which disaggregates were not available.2. To be consistent with majority of banks, for Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, write-downs and recoveries included in DCM are added back and are deducted from fixed income trading.Source: BCG analysis.
15BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Equity activity rebounded while bond issuance flattened and M&A activity continued to slide
Effective M&A dealsEffective M&A deals Equity issuanceEquity issuance Bond issuanceBond issuance
79
1653
27 31 25
61
43
73
59 54
20
76
29
29
14 21
19
44
106
47
0
100
200
300
Q209
197216
Q407
88
Q108
155
Q208
100
Q308
106
Q408
64
Q109
Asia-Pacific
Americas
EMEA
+208%
($B)
359 406
634
219
691
609 557
690
262
632112 97
125
97
152
659
634
190
0
500
1,000
1,500
Q209
1,483
1,081
Q407
1,060
Q108
1,449
Q208
101
309
331
741
Q308
578
Q408
1,475
Q109
+1%
($B)
498 427265 294 247
154 122
591
288
258302
306
270
101
155
104
9286 156
0
500
1,000
1,500
57
Q209
279
1,244
Q407
819
Q108
615
Q208
682
Q308 Q408
47471
Q109
-41%709
($B)
Source: Thomson SDC; BCG analysis.
16BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Relative share of M&A revenuesRelative share of M&A revenues Relative share of underwriting revenuesRelative share of underwriting revenues
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
JPM GS
BoAMS
UBS
CSCiti
DB
Q208
Q209
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
JPM
BoA1
GSCiti
DBMS
UBS
CS
Q208
Q209
Gained share relative to #1
Lost share relative to #1
Gained share relative to #1
Lost share relative to #1
Competition stiffened and new leaders emerged
#1 Q2 2008
#1 Q2 2009#1 Q2 2009 #1 Q2 2008
(Q209 compared to Q208) (Q209 compared to Q208)
1. For comparability, BoA includes ML and JPM includes Bear Stearns across quarters. Note: Market position expressed relative to market leader (leader = 100). Right chart excludes DB due to write-downs in 1Q08; its revenues were still negative after the write-downs were added back. Disaggregates not available for Barclays Capital, BNPP, SocGen, and Nomura.Source: Company reports; BCG analysis.
17BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Contents
Overview of second quarter 2009 results 1
Market review• Fixed income and equity trading 8• Underwriting and M&A advisory 12
Focus: Building a lean, efficient risk management organization 17
18BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Many large banks are burdened by a large and complex risk management structure
Sub-committeesWorking committees
Board of Directors
Risk Committee Audit & Examining Committee
Senior Risk Mgmt. Committee
Asset Liability Mgmt. Committee
Credit Portfolio Mgmt. Committee
Market Risk Committee
Strategic Risk Committee
Fiduciary Risk Mgmt. Committee
Basel Executive Oversight Committee
Controls Committee
Compliance & Ethics Committee
AML Oversight Committee
Sensitive Issues Oversight Committee
Disclosure Committee
Legal Entity Oversight Committee
Credit Port. Mgmt. –Segment A
Credit Port. Mgmt. –Segment B
Credit Port. Mgmt. –Segment C
Credit Port. Mgmt. –Region A
Credit Port. Mgmt. –Region B
Portfolio Review
Credit & OpRisk Measurement
Risk Quantification & Modeling
Investment
BNYCMI Capital & Commt. AdvisoryNet Interest Income
Intraday Liquidity Mgmt.
Liquidity Contingency Team
European ALCO
Foreign Branch Liquidity
Transfer Pricing
Treasury Risk
FX Hedging
Region A
Region B
Region C
Subsidiary A
Subsidiary B
Enterprisewide technology
Institutional trust
Managed funds
Proxy Policy
Wealth management
US Basel II Steering
Business Practices
International Subsidiary ABC
Region A
Subsidiary A
Subsidiary B
Operational Risk Committee
Other Board-Level Committees...
Asian ALCO
Excessive number of committees and participants are common
• 50+ committees• 250+ voting members• Resulting in thousands of hours spent in
committee
Growing regulations and the financial crisis have led to the proliferation of overlapping control functions
• Boundary between credit, market, and operational risk has been blurring
• Ever more intrusive head-office supervision has resulted in duplication of effort and endless second guessing of division-level risk management
• Mounting regulation (e.g., Basel II, MiFID, and SOX) has led to uncoordinated scope expansion of risk, finance, and compliance, resulting in significant boundary overlap
Illustra
tive
Business units snared in a growing web of restrictions, jeopardizing revenue growth and customer service
19BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
BCG applies a principle-based design approach to streamlining the committee structure
Develop committees based on a blank slate / zero based approach
Get the "committee basics" right• Each committee requires: clear mandate on risk, decision-making, formal communication processes
Eliminate most working committees and replace with processes – increase clarity of individual responsibility
• Embed activities currently occurring in committees into decision making processes (e.g., include sign-off by key decision makers for FX hedging decisions)
• Reduce logistical burden of committees (e.g., regular formal meetings, detailed minutes, tendency for membership bloat, etc.) when not required for proper governance
Limit voting members to key decision makers (e.g., cap at 12)
Ensure line-of-business representation in all committees – ensure lines-of-businesses own risk
Make meeting frequency default quarterly• More frequently if necessary (e.g., significant risk issues)
20BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Banks can improve their risk management structures by reducing the number of committees by 40% to 60%
Other Board-Level Committees
Board of Directors
Risk Committee Audit & Examining Committee
Senior Risk Mgmt. Committee
ALCOEnterprisewide Credit Portfolio
Mgmt.
Basel Executive Oversight
Compliance, Ethics & Fiduciary RiskRegion A Risk
Region B Risk
Operational Risk
Large Projects Review & Approval
Strategic Risk Controls Disclosure
Legal Entity Oversight
Market Risk
Board level committeesSenior mgmt. oversight committees
Sub-committeesWorking committees
Ad hoc – as needed
Recommended committee structure based on key principlesRecommended committee structure based on key principles
Liquidity Contingency Team
Illustra
tive
21BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
An overhaul of the committee structure and clear mandates help to focus the oversight
0
20
40
60
80
100
Total Committees
today
Can be phased out
Can be eliminated
Can be merged
Can be a process
Committees remaining
To be added Final committee
total
# of Committees(indexed)
Phased outcommittees with high level of redundancy/overlap
Eliminatedcommittees with insufficient focus on risk
Mergedcommittees with similar purview/ mandates
Transformedcommittees whose function can be embedded in a process
Client example
Number of committees reduced by nearly half
22BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Overlaps can be reduced by defining distinct levels of control and clear directives
• Identify and rate operational risks
• Report losses• Manage incidents
• Calculate risk limits and control respect of limits at fund level
• Monitor limits at fund level• Identify breaches, support
resolution and escalate to CRD when unsolved
• Calculate performance of funds
• Analyze performance attribution
• Control NAV provided byfund admin
• Calculate performance fees
• Respect permanent controls
• Report and manage breaches
Middle office Second level control
Middle office Second level control
• Implement operational guidelines
• Respect investment limits and defined risk return profile
• Propose new products, limits and investment processes
• Execute investment process and investment guidelines
• Respect regulatory and contractual requirements
Front office First level
control
Front office First level
control
• Review adequacy of operational risk organization to fulfill its mission
• Control standards and policies
• Test comprehensiveness of risk assessment
• Review adequacy of investment risk organization to fulfill its mission
• Review adequacy of PPA organization to fulfill its mission, test application of investment processes
• Review adequacy of internal control organization to fulfill its mission
• Test application of the internal control plan
Operationalrisk
Compliance and
internal control
Perfor-mance risk
and valuation analysis
Marketrisk
Inve
stm
ent r
isk
AuditThird level control
AuditThird level control
Core CRD (Capital Requirements Directive) scope
Group RM and ComplianceSecond level control
Group RM and ComplianceSecond level control
• Define risk policies • Implement risk policies • Review risk procedures• Manage and report escalated
incidents• Monitor business continuity plan
and IT security risks
• Define guidelines• Propose or set risk limits• Ensure consistency of risk profile
with mandate • Analyze limits at aggregated level• Analyze escalated breaches
• Review & report investment processes by (sub)expertise
• Analyze performance at fund or aggregated level
• Define perform. fee models• Define valuation methodology• Control consistency of valuation &
pricing with guidelines
• Identify reg. required procedures• Ensure compliance with regulations • Ensure compliance with internal and
contract requirements• Analyze escalated breaches
23BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
Committee structure overhaul leads to greater efficiency and accountability but requires careful execution
Faster, better decisions • Significantly less management time required: hundreds of hours of senior management time freed up• Turnaround time accelerated: 50% reduction in decision time is feasible• Accountability increased
– The more people own a decision, the less they care about it– Fewer committees result in fewer people accountable, raising sense of accountability and
responsibility• One version of the truth to support decision making
– Consolidate or eliminate overlapping systems– Reduce reconciliation requirements
Costs are minimal: primarily change management.• For a top tier financial institution, an overhaul plan can be developed within three months• Many benefits realizable within three more months; systems changes might take 18-36 months
Careful execution is required and there are several key success factors • Extensive stakeholder buy-in to undertaking principles-based design approach
– 60-100 interviews for a top tier FI• Buy-in from regulators also important. They need to know that this is strengthening risk management not
weakening it• Careful transition planning, including effective communication and training
24BCG Q2_2009_FINAL DRAFT 9-8-09.ppt
How BCG works with clients to develop a risk governance overhaul plan
DeliverablesDeliverables
Baselining – diagnosis
Groundwork for operating model
Target operating model
Risk management dashboard
Deployment preparation
DescriptionDescription
Diagnose the current risk management organization within the group and lay the groundwork to define the target operating model
• Key information collected and analyzed• Key stakeholders interviewed• Non-risk FTEs involved in risk management identified• Key elements of the operating model identified• Preliminary options drafted
Define target operating model, which includes:• Risk governance principles• Global risk committees architecture• Roles and responsibilities along key risk management processes• Central risk organization and interaction with subsidiaries• Engagement model with finance and compliance
Design the risk dashboard template and production process• Which decisions need what information?• Where is this information found? • Is it correct, consistent, appropriate, comprehensive?• What needs to happen to make it so?
Prepare the deployment phase, which includes:• Key initiatives to be launched and high-level calendar• Migration path and gap analysis• Detailed initiatives charters• Communications program
Pha
se 1
(~5
wee
ks)
Pha
se 2
(~5
wee
ks)
Pha
se 3
(2 w
eeks
)