Introduction to African Security IssuesSeminar Hosted by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies

National Defense UniversityInternational Perspectives: Involvement of Non-Western States

30 September 2010

Remarks by David H. ShinnAdjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs

George Washington University

Introduction

China is the most important non-western actor in Africa today. For that matter, China has become the principal non-African presence—western or non-western—in a number of Africa’s fifty-three countries. Other non-western countries are also rapidly expanding their activities on the continent. Most notable in this regard is India, which has long-standing ties to eastern Africa and South Africa. A growing economic power in Latin America—Brazil—is coming on strong in Africa. Russia, better described as a developed country, is returning to Africa following its much reduced activity after the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Iran has increased its engagement with a number of countries and Israel recently revived its attention. Turkey and several Gulf States are showing significant interest in Africa, especially the northeastern quadrant. Cuba, following major Cold War military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia, virtually absented itself from the continent but is slowly returning. Even countries like North Korea and Vietnam, which were never much involved in Africa, are beginning to make their presence known. Other non-western countries in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America are giving Africa a closer look. I will limit my remarks to China, India, Brazil, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Vietnam.

China

China has a long history in Africa; modern China shifted its focus from support for African liberation movements and ideologically like-minded governments that began in the mid-1950s to an emphasis by the mid-1990s on commercial ties and practical political collaboration. China has four principal interests in Africa:

Maintaining and/or increasing access to oil, minerals, timber and agricultural products.

Developing good relations with all African countries so that China can count on their support in regional and international forums.

Ending Taiwan’s official diplomatic presence and replacing it with recognition of Beijing.

Increasing significantly China’s exports as African economies become stronger and Africans become wealthier. Looking at these four interests in sequence, China imports about one-third of its

total oil imports from Africa. It is important, however, to keep this statistic in perspective. China’s imports constitute only about 13 percent of total African oil exports

while the United States and Europe each import about one-third of Africa’s total oil exports because of their much higher total demand. China is, however, interested in more than African oil. It imports about 90 percent of its cobalt, 35 percent of its manganese, 30 percent of its tantalum, and 5 percent of its hard wood timber from Africa. These imports of raw materials and those from other parts of the world sustain China’s rapidly growing economy. Without strong continuing economic growth, the current leadership of the Chinese Communist Party would be hard pressed to remain in power. China has a long-term strategic interest in African natural resources.

Africa’s fifty-three countries constitute well over one-quarter of the United Nations’ 192 members. While China holds a veto power in the Security Council, Africa has three non-permanent seats on the Council. Africa is also well represented in organizations of interest to China like the UN Human Rights Council and the World Trade Organization. The Africans do not, of course, vote as a block, but China makes every effort to cultivate the maximum number of African countries on all issues of interest to Beijing that arise in international forums. In some cases like-minded African governments use the Chinese just as the Chinese use them, for example when contentious issues affecting China or a particular African nation arise in the Human Rights Council. When Tibet became an issue in 2008, China leaned on the Africans to remain silent or even make supportive statements. They did. African countries can depend on China to avoid raising controversial African human rights issues in the UN Human Rights Council and perhaps even to support them when they are criticized by western countries.

The position of Taiwan in Africa is more important to China than most observers appreciate. Beijing has never retreated from the overwhelming attention it has given over the years to the “One China” policy. Equally important, China has never forgotten the fact that African states were instrumental in 1971 in replacing Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Security Council. Since then, Taiwan has witnessed a sharp decline in the number of African countries that recognize it. When Malawi switched in December 2007 from Taipei to Beijing, this left only four African countries that still have relations with Taiwan—Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Säo Tomé and Principe. Near the end of 2008, following the election of a new President in Taiwan, Taipei and Beijing reached an unofficial truce whereby they agreed not to actively solicit countries that recognize one country to switch to the other.

In 2009, due to the decline in the price of oil, total China-Africa trade fell back to $96 billion from $107 billion in 2008. As the decline in the price of oil had an even greater impact on U.S.-Africa trade, however, China became in 2009 Africa’s most important trade partner for the first time. Nevertheless, only about 4 percent of China’s global trade is with Africa while more than 10 percent of Africa’s total trade is with China. Until 2009, Africa maintained a small trade surplus with China; in 2009, it experienced a huge trade deficit. More importantly, there are large country-by-country disparities. Some fifteen African oil and mineral exporters have large surpluses with China, while thirty-two African countries have significant deficits. The poorest African countries tend to have the largest trade deficits. Five African oil and mineral exporting nations account for about 85 percent of Africa’s exports to China.

While these are China’s principal interests in Africa, they are not the only ones. Foreign investment is becoming more important. The West still accounts for about 90 percent of all foreign direct investment in Africa, but China has been more aggressive

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than western countries in recent years. It now has at least $20 billion in investment on the continent, most of it in oil and extractive industries. This figure constitutes, however, only about 4 percent of China’s global FDI. The main recipients of Chinese investment are South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria and Sudan. Chinese companies have also demonstrated a greater willingness than western companies to take risks in Africa. This may be explained by the fact that most of China’s larger companies are state-controlled.

One of the tactics for increasing its influence in Africa is a growing assistance program. China is not transparent with its aid statistics, and it is difficult to equate Chinese assistance to the OECD definition. By most estimates, however, Chinese OECD-type aid has been running at about $1.5 billion in recent years. One particularly successful program dating back to 1963 is the sending of medical teams to African countries. By 2009, China had sent 17,000 medical personnel to forty-seven different countries and treated, it says, 240 million patients. China has also started a program that looks a little like the U.S. Peace Corps; it is sending some 300 volunteers to a half dozen African countries.

While China’s grant aid to Africa is growing modestly, the headline grabbing deals are largely low interest loans tied to infrastructure projects implemented by large Chinese companies. African governments welcome China’s unconditional low interest loans that are used to build infrastructure. Of course, the recipients must accept the One China policy and implementation of the projects by Chinese companies. Except for the concessionary nature of the loans, however, they are really commercial transactions rather than aid projects. In recent years, China has provided Angola with $13 billion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) $9 billion, Niger $5 billion and Ethiopia $2.5 billion in low interest loans. The Angolan government pays back the loans as it ships oil to China. The DRC loan will function similarly with minerals. The loan for Niger is based on the development of its oil fields. It is not clear how Ethiopia will pay off the loan as it exports to China only sesame seeds, hides and skins and a little coffee. It will take a lot of sesame seeds and goat skins to repay $2.5 billion. There is always the possibility, of course, that China will eventually write off some of the debt. It has previously cancelled substantial debt in the case of the poorest African countries. China also has a close assistance relationship with countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe that are treated as pariahs by many western nations.

The hallmark of China’s relations with African countries is its excellent state-to-state ties. China has an embassy in forty-eight of the forty-nine countries that recognize Beijing. The only exception is Somalia where security conditions do not allow an embassy. Of the forty-nine, only the Comoro Islands does not have an embassy in Beijing. China relies heavily on high-level personal contact to consolidate its relations with African leaders. President Hu Jintao has made six trips—two as vice president and four as president—to Africa visiting multiple countries. Premier Wen Jiabao has been equally visible in Africa. Beginning in 1991, China’s foreign minister has made his first overseas visit every year to Africa, a practice that has been noted and appreciated by African governments. All elements of Chinese leadership are frequent visitors to Africa. In turn, Beijing often invites African leaders to China. During the period from 2002 to 2005, Chinese Communist Party officials made sixty-four visits to Africa while African political party officials made sixty-nine visits to China.

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China and Africa have formalized their relationship in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which meets at the summit level every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African capital, and ministerial level in other years. The last meeting took place in 2009 in Egypt. This has become an important and seemingly effective mechanism for coordinating the China-Africa relationship. The dilemma is that China can speak with one voice while the African countries still tend to speak with fifty-three voices.

China also uses a range of soft power techniques for expanding ties with Africa. The official news service, Xinhua, has more than twenty bureaus in Africa. There are twenty-two Confucius Institutes. China is stepping up its radio transmission to Africa in various languages, has a transmitting facility in Kenya and various rebroadcast arrangements. It trains a variety of Africans, including diplomats and journalists, and increased to 4,000 in 2009 the number of scholarships that it offers to African students.

Compared to countries on its periphery, Europe and North America, Africa occupies a low security priority for China. Nevertheless, Africa is increasing in importance because of China’s growing reliance on the import of raw materials from the continent. China has a policy of no military bases in Africa but has some security interaction, however modest, with all forty-nine African countries that recognize Beijing. There is a loose correlation between Chinese military cooperation and resource rich African countries. China’s share of the conventional African arms market in Sub-Saharan Africa is about 15 percent. It is higher for small arms and light weapons. High level exchange military visits are an important part of the security relationship.

Twenty-eight African countries have defense attachés in Beijing while sixteen Chinese defense attaché offices in Africa are accredited to some thirty African countries. China is playing a growing and constructive role in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. It currently has more UN peacekeepers in Africa than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council—about 1,600 compared to about thirty for the United States. China continues to send two frigates and a supply ship to the international naval force that is combating Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden. As China expands its presence into African conflict zones like the Niger Delta, western Sudan and Ethiopia’s Ogaden, it is beginning to experience the same kinds of attacks on its nationals that western countries encounter.

China also faces some challenges in Africa. Although it has developed excellent relations with governments and done well with most of the business community, it has been much less successful with civil society, opposition political parties and labor unions. Areas where China’s engagement in Africa draws criticism include:

Democracy and good governance. Human rights practices. Transparency and corruption. Questionable environmental practices. Purchase of illegally harvested African timber, ivory and endangered species. Poor worker safety and fair labor practices. Export to Africa of harmful and counterfeit products. Reluctance to provide training and support to African manufacturing so that it

can compete more effectively in the global market. Inadequate control over arms sales to Africa.

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India

In some respects, India, the world’s largest democracy, is more of a direct challenge to China in Africa than is the United States. There is a long history of Indian communities in parts of Africa. The eastern side of the continent borders the Indian Ocean, which India perceives within its sphere of influence. India has a common colonial experience with many African countries and has long ties with those that are members of the British Commonwealth. Like China, India was a strong advocate for the struggle against colonialism and a leader of the non-aligned movement. India’s primary interest in Africa today, like China, is access to energy and minerals. Its most important trade relationship is with Nigeria where India-Nigeria trade is almost twice that of China’s trade. India imports about 15 percent of its oil from Africa but its trade with Africa constitutes only about 8 percent of total Indian trade. It exports cheap manufactured goods to Africa, resulting in some of the same criticism that China experiences. India also seeks African support in international forums and maintains cordial relations with pariah states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.

India has some advantages over China. It is physically closer to Africa. Its form of government is more appealing to aspiring democracies on the continent. Indians speak a common language with English-speaking African countries. Indian culture, especially movies, are understood and appreciated in much of Africa. India’s important private sector, which accounts for about 70 percent of its GDP, is an attractive feature in some African countries. Like China, India has an impressive GDP growth rate—about 8 percent—that is viewed with envy by many Africans. Indian communities in Africa have both plusses and minuses. While they are well-established, they have not always been well-received and are often accused by Africans of isolating themselves. India has a long standing policy of engaging people of Indian origin in Africa; China’s policy towards people of Chinese origin is more ambivalent.

India has begun to formalize its collaboration with Africa, although not to the extent that China has done. The first India-Africa summit took place in New Delhi in April 2008. Attended by thirteen African leaders, this was well under the forty-eight who attended the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing. India’s trade with Africa soared to $37 billion in 2008, but still remains only about one-third the level of Chinese trade with Africa. India anticipates that its trade with Africa will reach $100 billion in five years. The size of India’s economy is well behind that of China, and it does not have the capacity to compete effectively with China because of the greater resources that Beijing can bring to the table. India has twenty-six embassies in Africa vs. forty-eight for China.

Some of India’s policies towards Africa are similar to China’s; others are different. India follows a “no strings attached” policy in its relations with Africa but does not highlight the policy as China does. Both countries have instituted a duty-free tariff preference scheme for exports from poorer African countries. India has extended a line of credit to African countries over the last five years valued at more than $2 billion and has promised to increase the amount to $5.4 billion over the next five years. New Delhi hosted in 2009 the Fifth EXIM Bank of India Conclave on India Africa Project Partnership. The Export-Import Bank of India has offices in Dakar, Durban and Addis Ababa to monitor its projects throughout the continent. Indian investment in Africa

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targets Indian businessmen and joint ventures rather than tying the loans to large, state-owned companies as with China. Indian firms integrate into African domestic markets and tend to draw on local resources while Chinese firms tend to source imports from China. Africans have expressed some concern with plans by India to purchase large tracts of land to grow good to feed Indians.

Indian aid emphasizes training for 1,000 Africans annually through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation program. An additional 15,000 African students attend colleges and technical schools in India each year. India sends an impressive number of teachers to Africa. India has also become an important location where African elites obtain medical care. India plans to provide $500 million in aid to Africa over the next five years.

Although selectively focused on Africa’s Indian Ocean islands and countries bordering the Indian Ocean, India has a more aggressive security relationship with Africa than China. India has superior naval capacity in the Indian Ocean and is sensitive to Chinese naval expansion in the region. India has signed defense agreements with Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique and has initiated joint training programs with Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles cooperate on maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. India provides training for African military personnel in Indian military academies and seeks to expand arms sales to Africa. India has developed a particularly close alliance with South Africa that also includes Brazil. Naval vessels from the three countries take part in joint exercises off South Africa, most recently in September 2010. Indian ships have also joined the anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. India has almost 7,500 military and police personnel assigned to four of the seven UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Brazil

Brazil is home to at least seventy million people of African descent. Many Brazilians trace their ancestry to Nigeria and Benin; African culture has survived in Brazil and helps strengthen ties to Africa. Nigeria is home to Brazilian communities concentrated in Lagos formed by the descendents of former slaves who returned during the 19th century. Although Brazil has a natural affinity with Africa’s Lusophone countries—Angola, Mozambique, Säo Tomé and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde—, it has in recent years significantly expanded its involvement in Africa.

Brazil maintains embassies in thirty-four African countries across the continent. It is a member of the twenty-four-state South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone established in 1986 to encourage regional cooperation in the areas of development, peace and security. Twenty-one countries in west and southern Africa belong to the organization. Brazilian President da Silva has made ten trips to Africa since he took office in 2003, visiting twenty-five of Africa’s fifty-three countries. His most recent visit took place in July 2010, when he also attended the Brazil-Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) summit in Cape Verde. ECOWAS is becoming an important partner for Brazil in Africa.

India, Brazil and South Africa created in 2004 a strategic alliance known as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum that has potentially important implications for Africa. This association of three middle powers seeks to take advantage

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of existing international rules to promote a more just, representative and equitable distribution of power in the international system. The three IBSA chiefs of state held their third summit meeting in Delhi in 2008.

Brazil’s trade with Africa reached $26 billion in 2008. Brazil seeks African markets for its exports and investment opportunities for its companies. It depends heavily on Africa for minerals and energy to supply its expanding economy. Nigeria, which supplied Brazil with $8 billion of oil in 2008, is Brazil’s major African trade partner in Africa. The two countries have developed an important economic and political relationship. Nigeria even sailed two navy vessels to Rio de Janeiro in 2007. Brazil is developing a surprisingly strong relationship with Sudan and has a small number of peacekeepers assigned to the UN mission in southern Sudan.

Brazil looks to Africa for help in obtaining a permanent UN Security Council seat. It solicits support from African countries, which, for example, strongly backed it in the World Trade Organization on a generic medicine dispute. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), Brazil’s premier agriculture and bio-tech research agency, has opened four offices in Africa. African countries are turning increasingly to Brazil for technical and scientific assistance. Brazil is positioning itself as a major African partner to help insure its food security and energy needs.

Russia

The Cold War witnessed major competition between the Soviet Union and both the United States and China in Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and decline of Russia’s economy led to a sharp decline in Russian-African relations beginning in the late 1980s. At the end of the Cold War, Russia did maintain its diplomatic presence in most African countries and today still has embassies in forty of them. It has only been in the last several years, however, with the revival of the Russian economy that Moscow has returned to Africa as a major player. Former President Putin’s September 2006 visit to South Africa, the first by a Russian leader, signaled new attention for the continent. The Russian prime minister followed Putin in March 2007 with visits to Angola, Namibia and South Africa. President Medvedev traveled to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola with a 100-strong business delegation in 2009 to consummate energy, mining, construction and telecommunication deals.

In terms of engagement with Africa, Russia is well behind both the United States and China. Its trade with the continent is only about $9 billion. In 2008, Russia announced a preferential tariff regime for developing countries, which grants duty-free access for African products. Since 2000, Russia has purchased more than $5 billion in African assets. In addition, Russian oil companies have signed exploration deals in Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Egypt worth more than $3 billion. Lukoil purchased 63 percent of a field off the Ivory Coast in a production-sharing agreement with Nigerian owners. Russia’s Gazprom is pushing for control of the Nigerian gas market.

Business has become the central focus of Russian interest in Africa. In 2009, Egypt signed a ten-year strategic cooperation agreement that includes a proposal to build Egypt’s first nuclear power plant. Russia tends to emphasize minerals such as nickel and gold in South Africa; aluminum in Guinea, Nigeria, and the DRC; and diamonds in Guinea, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the DRC. In 2010, Russia agreed to invest $1

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billion in uranium exploration in Namibia. South African President Jacob Zuma visited Moscow in 2010 when he signed an agreement for the supply by Russia of low-enriched uranium. Russia is pursuing cooperative banking arrangements in Angola, Namibia and South Africa. It signed an agreement with South Africa to establish a command and control center for the Russian Space Agency, to train South African space personnel and to build communications satellites. It will launch a satellite for Angola.

Russian aid to Africa remains exceedingly modest although it did increase from $50 million in 2003 to $210 million in 2007. Moscow has cancelled $20 billion in African debt. Russia announced that it has committed more than $1 billion to aid the poorest African countries during 2010-2011 to fight infectious diseases and poverty and improve energy and education. Russia says it will try to provide $400-500 million of aid annually to Africa in the near future.

Russia has resumed large scale arms sales to African countries, much of it outside official channels, including charges that it is supplying arms to protagonists in the Great Lakes region. Between 2000 and 2007, Russia sold more than $1 billion of arms to African countries. Recent energy deals with Algeria included a $7.5 billion Russian arms sale. Russia is the largest arms supplier to Sudan, including a sale of twelve MiG 29s. Not surprisingly, Sudan publicly supported Russia’s “legitimate” right to defend its citizens in Georgia. In 2009, Russia significantly increased the attention that it gave to Sudan and has named a special envoy for Sudan’s conflicts. Ethiopia signed several military cooperation agreements with Russia in 2002 and continues to rely heavily on Russia for the supply of weapons.

Russia has not been a significant contributor of peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa, but its 350 personnel are still ten times the American contribution. Russia has concentrated its peacekeeping engagement in southern Sudan, where it has a team with four MI-8 helicopters. A Russian Air Force helicopter group supported a peacekeeping mission to Chad to sustain a force along the Chad-Darfur border. Russia is training hundreds of African civilian policemen and law enforcement personnel for peacekeeping operations. Russian naval vessels are part of the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden. Russia also expressed interest in 2009 in renewing its political, military and cultural ties with the Seychelles.

Russia’s director for the Center of Russian-African Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences Africa Institute commented in 2008 that Russia must expand relations with Africa. He explained that Russia is experiencing a shortage of manganese, chromium, silicon and other minerals that are too costly to mine in Russia. Former President Putin concluded in mid-2007: “Russia’s cooperation with Africa has taken on a new dynamic in recent times. The level and intensity of contacts is increasing. We are carrying out ongoing work to expand and deepen our mutually beneficial cooperation in trade and the economy, science and technology, humanitarian and other areas.” Russia seems committed to regaining its influence in Africa.

Iran

While Iran has had an interest in Africa for many years, it stepped up its engagement about six years ago. Isolation by the West and a desire to undercut Israel in Africa probably account for much of this recent activity. Africa’s one billion inhabitants

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are almost half Muslim, but they are virtually all Sunni Muslim. Iranian Shiites do not have any inherent advantage in wooing Africa’s Sunnis. For that matter, Iran has not limited its efforts to predominantly Muslim African countries. Iran has an embassy in twenty-four African countries.

Iran established the Iran-Africa Cooperation Headquarters in 2004, which agreed to create four free trade zones in Africa, to develop banking ties with African countries, to form an Iranian-African Merchants Council and an Africa Research Center affiliated with Iran’s Teacher Training University. Although it appears that Iran never followed up in creating these institutions, it still pursued African countries vigorously on a bilateral basis. President Khatami visited Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Benin, Zimbabwe and Uganda in 2005. There have been numerous exchange visits between African and Iranian leaders ever since. Sudan has been the centerpiece of Iran’s effort in Africa with cooperation at all levels, including the possibility of sharing nuclear technology and assistance to the military sector. Senegalese President Wade visited Iran in 2006 and 2008. He announced that Iran would build an oil refinery, chemical plant and an $80 million taxi assembly plant in Senegal. Iran has held talks with Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania on defense cooperation and in 2009 sent warships to the Gulf of Aden to join the anti-piracy coalition.

In recent years, Iran has made a special effort to build ties with countries in northeast Africa in addition to Sudan. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and the Comoro Islands have been the subject of considerable Iranian attention. Eritrean President Isaias visited Tehran in 2008, when the two countries signed four agreements. According to one unconfirmed report, Iran will renovate Eritrea’s oil refinery at the Red Sea port of Assab in exchange for the deployment of Iranian forces there. Zimbabwe has been another focus of Iran’s interest. Iran has also been active recently in Libya, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Mauritania, Guinea and Malawi. In 2009, Iran and Gabon agreed to reopen their respective embassies. Iran’s foreign minister went to Addis Ababa in 2010 to meet with African counterparts on the sidelines of the African Union summit, where Iran has observer status.

Most of this interaction with African countries has concerned trade and investment. In 2008, Iran exported $4.6 billion worth of goods, mostly oil, to Africa but imported only $376 million from Africa. South Africa was by far the most important trading partner. While there may be more rhetoric than substance to Iran-Africa ties, it is a relationship worth watching. Underscoring this point, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited Kenya, Djibouti and the Comoro Islands in 2009 when he signed five agreements in Djibouti, two in Nairobi and four in Moroni. In 2010, he visited Mali, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya, the Comoro Islands and Uganda. He also hosted the Iran-Africa summit in Tehran, which was attended by representatives of forty African countries, including the presidents of Malawi and Senegal. Ahmedinejad offered to host a summit in Tehran for all the African Union states. Iran regularly requests and often obtains from its African interlocutors public statements supporting its nuclear program.

Turkey

Turkey has been quietly following developments in Africa for many years but stepped up its engagement in 2005 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

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proclaimed a year of Africa and then became the first Turkish head of government to visit Africa south of the equator. Turkey subsequently accredited its ambassador in Addis Ababa to the African Union. Erdogan visited Sudan the following year and addressed the African Union summit in 2007. President Abdullah Gül went to Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania in 2009 and Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010. Turkey held its first Turkey-Africa Cooperation summit in 2008 and now has twenty embassies in Africa. In 2010, Turkey and the United Nations co-hosted a three-day conference on Somalia in Istanbul and the Turks agreed to help train forces for the Somali Transitional Federal Government.

Turkey’s trade with Africa reached an impressive $17 billion in 2008. It supports development projects in thirty-seven African countries from regional offices in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar. Some 400 Turkish companies have invested more than $500 million in different African countries. Turkey is currently deploying more than 100 soldiers, police or experts to six of the United Nations’ seven peacekeeping missions in Africa. Since 2009, Turkey has deployed half dozen frigates as part of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151 that is conducting anti-piracy operations off Somalia.

Vietnam

The government of Vietnam laid out its national program for promoting better relations with Africa at the first Vietnam-Africa International Forum in Hanoi in 2003. South Africa and Vietnam signed three agreements in 2004 aimed at establishing a Bi-National Commission. South African President Thabo Mbeki visited Vietnam in 2007 when he heaped praise on the country and its past and present leaders. Vietnam has diplomatic relations with all African countries except Liberia, Malawi and the Comoro Islands and expects to establish ties with them. It has opened embassies or offices in nine African countries. The presidents of Nigeria and the Central African Republic and prime minister of Tanzania and premier of Morocco recently visited Vietnam. In 2010, the president of Vietnam went to Algeria and Tunisia. Vietnam hosted the second Vietnam-Africa International Forum in 2010.

Although Vietnamese trade with Africa remains modest, it increased from $360 million in 2003 to $2 billion in 2009, most of it Vietnamese exports to Africa. Investment is on the rise, especially in countries with an early history of socialist principles such as Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique and Namibia. PetroVietnam has a 40 percent share in a consortium with Algeria’s Sonatrach for oil and gas exploration and signed an agreement with Sudan’s state oil company to jointly invest in oil and gas. Vietnam sent agricultural specialists to Benin and Congo-Brazzaville and 340 physicians and teachers to Angola.

Conclusion

The diplomatic playing field in Africa has become much more crowded. A growing number of non-western nations are intensifying their contact with African countries. As the United States and the West generally pursue their own agendas on the continent, they will have to take account of this significant new development.

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