Io Presentation on Bhevioral

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    On this chapter we will try to answer the following

    questions:

    Why do firms in some industries make pure profits?When Oligopolies make pure profits, how come

    entry of new

    firms does not always occur, thereby eliminating all

    pure profits?What can explain mergers among firms in a given

    industry?

    What is and what should be the regulators attitudes

    towards concentrated industries?

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    Concentration Measures

    Compare concentration among differentindustries in the same

    or different countries

    regulating authority would like to intervene or

    prevent

    What is a concentrated industry?

    The number of firms in the industryThe distribution of output among the firms

    , Problems...

    Market share of firm

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    The four firm concentration ratio

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    Merges (takeovers, acquisitions,

    integration)Independently owned firms join under the same

    ownership

    We investigate the gains and incentives to merge

    and consequences on productivity and

    performance

    Three general categories of mergers

    Horizontal merger

    Vertical merger

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    Mergers (takeovers, acquisitions,

    integration) cont:Top 10 M&A deals worldwide by value (in mil.

    USD) from

    1990 to 1999

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    Horizontal Merger

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    Horizontal Merger

    Under Cournot market structure, a merger

    among firms leading to an increase in

    concentration does not necessarily imply an

    overall welfare reduction.

    There exist a trade o between product

    efficiency and thedegree of monopolization

    What would happen if firms play Bertrand?

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    Merger between Supplier of an intermediate good and producer ofthe final good.

    Intermediate-good suppliers is called upstream firms

    Final-good producers is called downstream firms

    Lets think about the case where upstream and downstream

    markets are characterized by a Bertrand price competition.

    Assume Bertrand price competition for the upstream market

    and Cournot quantity competition for the downstream market.

    Vertical Merger

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    Downstream

    Competition

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    Upstream Competition Before the Merger

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    Upstream and downstream

    merge

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    Upstream and downstream merger

    Proposition : A merger between an upstream and

    downstream firms increases the output level of the

    merged firms and reduces the output level of thedownstream firms that does not merge.

    Proposition

    1 .The combined profit of the merging upstream and

    downstream firms increase after they merge.

    2. A merger between the upstream and the downstream

    firms will not foreclose the market of the disjoint

    downstream firms but will only reduce its profit.

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    Horizontal merger among firms producing

    complementary goods

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    Thank you