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서울대학교 화학공정신기술연구소
공정시스템 및 안전연구센터
김 구 회
화학공정의 사고 시나리오합성 시스템
Automatic Synthesis of Robust Accident Scenarios for Chemical Processes
Hazard Analysis
HazardIdentification
AccidentProbability
AccidentConsequence
RISK MANAGEMENT
정성적 추론 정량적 추론
공정내 사고로 인한손실 발생
위험영향평가기술
가상사고시나리오사용자의 주관에 의존평가결과의 다양성한계
사고시나리오합성
공정요소 분석장치거동 분석물질특성 고려사고형태 추론
• HAZOP Study
• FMEA
• What-If analysis
• PHA
• FTA
• ETA
• The starting point of analysis
• The direction of inference
• The scope of analysis
전통적인 위험성 평가 방법
• Time consuming
• Labor intensive
• Requiring extensive and multidisciplinary knowledge
• The quality of analysis is dependent on the analyst’ s ability
INFERENCE STRUCTURE using Rule-based method
기존 위험성 평가 방법의 단점
가상 사고 시나리오란?
정성적 안전성평가방법
미국에서 처음 WCS(Worst Case Scenario)의 개념 도입
위험영향평가시스템의 입력값으로 가상사고 시나리오에 따라 결과의 다양성 존재
체계적 방법에 따른 시나리오 추론
공정상태 분석 및 및 발생 강도 고려
제안된 가상사고 시나리오 추론구조
GLOBAL INFERENCE ENGINE
AccidentScenario
KnowledgeBase
USER
Equipment ScreeningAlgorithm
Equipment BehaviorAnalysis Algorithm
Accident ScenarioReasoning Algorithm
Equipment PropertyKnowledge-Base
Material PropertyKnowledge-Base
Process unitKnowledge-Base
Equipment Property KB
- NAME : Feed line valve
- UNIT ID :
- CONNECTED FROM
- CONNECTED TO :
- SAFETY UNITS : PressureTemperatureFlow rate
- MATERIALS :
N/AN/ACONTROLLER BY VALVE1
PIPE 4
PIPE 3
VALVE
Toluene
- FLOW RATE : 5 kg/s
- TEMPERATURE : 298 K
- PRESSURE : 2 kg/cm2...
Material knowledge base
사용된 물질 특성
NFPA rating(Nf, Nr, Nh)
Heat of combustion
Flash point
Boiling point
MF(NFPA material factor)연소열, flash point, boiling point 고려
Material Property KB
NFPA code
• API 750• Dow & Mond Index....
• Nh : Health Hazard Rating• Nf : Flammable Hazard Rating• Nr : Reactivity Hazard Rating
HAZARD INDEX
AMMONIA
Nr = 0Nh = 3Nf = 1
HC = 8,000FP = gasBP = -28
EO
Nr = 3Nh = 3Nf = 4
HC = 11,700FP = -4BP = 51
C3Nr = 0Nh = 1Nf = 4
HC = 19,900FP = gasBP = -44
HC(Heat of Combustion, Btu/lb)FP(Flash Point, ℉)BP(Boiling Point, ℉)
1
3 2
W
Flammability (Red)
4:Extremely flammable3:Highly flammability2:Flammability1:Low flammability0:Not flammable
Health Hazard (Blue)
4:Extremely hazardous3:Highly hazardous2:Hazardous1:Slightly hazardous0:Not hazardous
Reactivity hazard (Yellow)
4:Severe explosion risk3:Explosion risk2:Potentially explosive1:Not violently reactive0:Normal stability
Other hazard (if any)
W:Do not use waterOXY:Oxidizing♦:Radiation hazard
Nf
Nr
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2 3 4
2 2 2 4 6 9
3 3 3 6 9 12
4 4 4 8 12 16
복합 특성의 고려(Multi-property matrix)
화학공정에서의 단위공정 분류
CHEMICAL/ENERGYPLANT
Oxidation, Electrolysis, NitrationEsterification, Aminolysis, Sulfonation,
Alkylation, Polymerization
이송,분배공정
분리, 정제공정냉각, 소각, 열처리,
열가공, 배가스, 폐수,폐기물 처리공정
원료,부산물, 및최종생산물의 저장공정
반응시스템
공급시스템
분리시스템 유틸리티시스템
저장시스템
Process Unit KB-1
Chemical Process Unit Classification
Process Unit
-Feed System, Reaction System,Production System, Storage System,
Utility System
Safety Unit
-Mitigative Safeguard-Preventive Safeguard
Topography
Meteorological data
Characteristic of surrounding area
Process Unit KB-2
Unit 1
materials
Propane(G)
Butane(G)
Water
Air
Composition
Stripper
Air fan
Stripper pump
Number ofAnalysis node
4
Unit 2
materials
Propane(L)
Propane(G)
Butane(L)
Butane(G)
Composition
Dry tank(3)
Heater(2)
Pump(7)
Cavern
Number ofAnalysis node
12
Unit 3
materials
Methanol
Odorant
Nitrogen
Composition
Storage tank
Pump(2)
Number ofAnalysis node
6
Unit 4
materials
Propane(L)
Butane(L)
Composition
Unloading arm
Pump(2)
Number ofAnalysis node
4
Characteristics of Surrounding AreaMeteorological Characteristics
가상사고 시나리오 추론단계
Macro Decomposition(Unit function and topography analysis)
Micro Decomposition(Equipment screening
with equipment knowledge base)
Equipment Behavior Analysis(Root cause and effect reasoning)
Process Unit Selection
Process Equipment Selection
Accident Reasoning(EFaCRA and material knowledge base)
Accident Scenarios at Given Mode
Accident Scenarios Selection
Effect Analysis Emergency Planning And Safety Device
Secondary Equipment
Macro Decomposition Algorithm
시나리오 추론과정의 첫번째 단계 주요 기능시스템의 구분과 정의
Feed system, Reaction system, Production system, Storage system, Utility system
기후적 특성 고려 평균 풍향 및 풍속
Topography 인근지역의 주거비, 지리적 환경
Material Highly toxic, flammable material
Macro Decomposition Algorithm
UnitDecomposition
Detailed Analysis
Macro Decomposition Algorithm
Unit 1Storage unit
Unit 2Reaction unit
Unit 3Reaction unit
Unit 4Storage unit
Unit 5Utility unit
Unit 6Utility unit
Wind Direction
CommercialArea
ResidentArea
Wind Direction
Equipment Screening Algorithm
대상공정에 대한 세부요소 분석 물질의 특성
NFPA rating 3 이상
운전조건 초고온, 초저온상태
액화가스, 압축가스, 가연성물질에 따라 분류
유량 공정에 따른 상대적 유량
안전장치 Preventive safety device
장치의 연수
사고사례
Screening 기준
Equipment Screening Engine(Rule-Based)
Chemical PropertyNFPA rating
Combustion of HeatFlash Point
Operating ConditionPressure
TemperatureFlow Rate
Age(averaging age)
Safety DevicePreventive DeviceMitigative Device)
Accident History Repaired HistoryFailure Rate
(yr-1)
REPAIRED HISTORY
ACCIDENT HISTORY
FAILURE RATE
AGE
SAFETY DEVICE
OPERATING CONDITION
FLOW RATE
MATERIAL PROPERTY
Sequential Reasoning
Consequence Analysis
Probability Analysis
기준에 따른 절대값
상대적 지침
Preventive Safeguard
Failure Probability
최종 우선순위를 위한 참고지침
Screening guideword의 우선순위에
대한 기준
HIRA(Hazard Identification and Ranking) Khan & Abbasi (1998)
Relative ranking method
Two Indices: Fire and Explosion Damage Index (FEDI)
Toxic Damage Index (TDI)
It provides quantitative scores; Easy interpretation of results
Comparison of hazards
Relative Sensitivity Analysis
공정변수들이 시나리오 결과에 미치는 영향의 정도를비교
무차원군으로 표현
±10% change Heat of combustion (i.e., material itself)
Operating pressure
Operating temperature
Quantity (or flow rate)
xy
xx
yy
S yx ln
ln∂∂=∂
∂=
Relative Sensitivity Analysis - Results
Analysis Results (김, 2000)
물질의 종류/양(유속)이 공정 온도/압력보다 더 민감한 변수
±10% ChangesRelative
Sensitivity
Heat of combustion 0.33 (avg.)
Operating pressure under 10E-4
Operating temperature under 10E-4
Quantity (or flow rate): 0.33 (avg.)
Relative Sensitivity Analysis - Results
0
0.5
Relative Sensitivity
Relative Sensitivity Analysis Results
Hc
Temp.
Press.
Quan.
Equipment Screening Algorithm
OperatingCondition
Flow-rate
SafetyDevice
Age
AccidentHistory
MaterialProperty
액화가스 : 2 kg/cm2 이상압축가스 : 10kg/cm2 이상가연성 액체 : 상온 상압 이상
유량 5 kg/s 이상
Interlock system이나 비상밸브의장착 여부
평균수명 이상 되는 장치 여부
유사장치나 공정의 사고 유무
NFPA rating 3 이상(Nh Nf Nr)
A B C D E F G H DESCRIPTIONIGuideword
Component
Equipment Behavior Analysis-1(Equipment Failure and Cause Reasoning Algorithm)
Qualitative analysis 장치의 fail 여부에 따른 분석(Forward,
Backward)
각 장치별로 작성
각 장치의 이상원인과 결과 추론
Property of materials Material의 특성에 따른 등급 부여
Toxicity, Flammability
NFPA rating
Equipment Behavior Analysis-2
Heat Exchanger,High Pressure
Leak Rupture
Fouling
Valve
Open Closed
Rupture Leak
Pump
On Off
Seal Leak/RuptureCasing Leak/Rupture
Equipment Failure and Cause Reasoning Algorithm(EFaCRA)
Failure Mode
Cause Reasoning(Backward) Effect Reasoning(Forward)
Effect Propagation(Internal/External)
Ultimate Effect(Possible Accidents)
Effect Calculation
Preventive Measure/Emergency Plan
Cause analysis for Failure mode(Internal/External)
Root Cause
Safeguard
Equipment Failure and Cause Reasoning Algorithm(EFaCRA)
Fail Closed(No flow)
Internal
ExternalExternal
InternalMotor failure
Malfunction
Indicator error
Electricityshut-down
Sedimentation
Internalhigh pressure
Rapid eddy
No flowExternal stream
Back-flow
Inlet highflow/pressure
Cause Effect
Corrosion
Abrasion
Mechanicalerror
Sensor failure
Abrupt reaction
Impurity upstream
Valve breakage
Downstreamfailure
Downstreamequipmentbreakage
Root Cause Ultimate Effect
Accident Reasoning Algorithm
ACCIDENTANALYSIS
ALGORITHM: RULE
Fire...
Personnel Injury
Explosion
...
Equipment Damage
Toxic Material Release
Accident ScenariosKnowledge Base
Material PropertyKnowledge Base
MaterialHazardIndex
UltimateEffect
EFaCRA
NFPA Rating
Case Study-1
가연성액체 저장 설비 및 loading 설비
Tank truck으로 부터 가연성액체를padding 상태로 T-1에 저장
Valve 7개, 저장탱크 1개, 펌프 1개
PICA-1
TIA-1
LIA-1
PI-1
FICA-1
To the nextprocess
FV-1V-4
P-1
V-31”
4”
V-1
1”
From tanktruck
RV-1
V-6
PV-2
1”
1” PV-1
V-7
To atmosphereNitrogen To flare
Flammable Storage TankT-1
V-2
V-5
Equipment Screening Algorithm
OperatingCondition
Flow-rate
SafetyDevice
Age
AccidentHistory
MaterialProperty
액화가스 : 2 kg/cm2 이상압축가스 : 10kg/cm2 이상가연성액체 : 상압 이상
유량 5 kg/s 이상
Interlock system이나 비상밸브의장착 여부
평균수명 이상 되는 장치 여부
유사장치나 공정의 사고 유무
NFPA rating 3 이상(Nh Nf Nr)
V-1 V-3 V-4 V-5 V-6 V-7 PV-1 PV-2 DESCRIPTIONFV-1Guideword
ComponentV-2 P-1
Equipment Behavior Analysis Algorithm
Equip. Mode
Cause
(Root Cause) EffectUltimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve
(V-5)
on the feed line
Fail open
Motor failure
Malfunction
Sensor failure
Electric shut-down
Excess flow of flammable liquid to the storage tank
High level in the storage tank
May cause tank rupture
due to overpressure
Flam-mable liquid
A
(Fire)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve
(V-5)
on the feed line
Fail
closed
Motor failure
Malfunction
Sensor failure
Electric
shut-down
Sedimentation
Impurity upstream
No flow of flammable liquid to
the reactor
Overpressure of inlet of the pump
P-1
Overpressure of the tank truck
Internal high pressure
back-flow to
the Cavern
May cause tank rupture
due to overpressure
May cause valve breakage
Flammable liquid
Flammable liquid
A
(Equip.damage
/fire)
A (Equip.damage
/fire)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve
(V-5)
on the feed line
Leak Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Small release of flammable liquid to
the surrounding area
Release of flammable liquid
Flammable liquid
B
(Fire)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve
(V-5)
on the feed line
Rup-
Ture
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Large release of flammable liquid to
the surrounding
Area
Release of flammable liquid
Flammable liquid
A
(Fire)
Case Study-2
C3 이송, 저장, 공급시설
해양의 선박으로부터 공급 받아 지하동굴형저장시설(cavern)에 저장한 후, 공급
Cavern, dryer 5개, stripper 2개, odorant storage tank, inhibitor storage tank, heater 3개, pump 26개, valve 67개 등으로구성
C3/C4Storage Tank
Inhibitor Drum
Odorant Drum
C3/C4 Cavern
Dryer
N2 Storage TankAir Stripper
C3/C4 Heater
Boosting Pump
Unloading Arm
Loading Arm Vent Stack
Air
Stripper pump
Methanol Injection Pump
Odorant Injection Pump
C3/C4 transfer Pump
V-1
V-2
V-4
V-3
V-5
V-6
V-7
V-8
V-9
V-10
V-11
V-12V-13
P-1
P-2
P-3
P-4P-5
P-6
H-1
A
B CD E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
C3/C4
Control Room
Utility Area
EducationCenter
OfficeDining &
Rest Room
Power FacilityGate
Unloading AreaSEA
SEA
CavernArea
Residential Area
Air Comp.
Stream
NO.Fluid
Temperature
( C)
Pressure
(kg/cm2G)
Flow Rate
m3/h
(ton/h)
Density
(kg/m3)
A C3 Liquid -45 5.0 2000 585
B C3 Liquid -45 3.4 2000 585
C C3 Liquid -45 9.0 2000 585
D C3 Liquid -45 8.9 2000 585
E C3 Liquid 2 7.6 2000 527
F C3 Liquid 8.8 16.7 1568 517
G C3 Liquid 8.8 16.4 608 517
H C3 Liquid 8.8 14.4 608 517
I C3 Gas 5 6.1 - -
JWater
/C3 Gas7.1 8.3 250 1010
K Water 7.2 0 350 1010
L Nitrogen AMB. 4.0 - -
M MeOH AMB. 24 4.5 0.79
N ROH AMB. 24 0.3 0.84
OperatingCondition
Flow-rate
SafetyDevice
Age
AccidentHistory
MaterialProperty
액화가스 : 2 kg/cm2 이상압축가스 : 10kg/cm2 이상가연성액체 : 상압 이상
유량 600 m3/H 이상
Interlock system이나 비상밸브의장착 여부
평균수명 이상 되는 장치 여부
유사장치나 공정의 사고 유무
NFPA rating 3 이상(Nh Nf Nr)
H1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 V1 V2 DESCRIPTIONV3Guideword
ComponentP1 V4 V5 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13V6
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)
Effect Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve (V-5)
on the line to
the dryer
Fail
open
Motor failure
Malfunction
Sensor failure
Low hydraulic
pressure
Electric
shut-down
Excess flow of Flammable liquid
to the dryer
High level in the dryer
Overpressure in the dryer
May cause
tank rupture
due to over-pressure
C3
(L.G)
A
(Fire/Ex-plosion)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)
Effect Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve (V-5)
on the line to the
dryer
Fail
closed
Motor failure
Malfunction
Sensor failure
Low hydraulic
pressure
Electric
shut-down
No flow of C3 to the dryer tank
Low level in the dry and dry tank
Internal high pressure
Rapid eddy
Back-flow to cavern
High pressure of outlet pump in the
cavern
Inlet pump fail due to high pressure
May cause
tank rupture
in the cavern
May cause
valve
breakage
C3
(L.G)
C3
(L.G)
C
(Pump
Damage)
A
(Fire.Expl-osion)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve (V-5)
on the line to
the dryer
Leak Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Small release
Of C3 to the surrounding
area
Release of C3 C3
(L.G)
B
(Fire/Ex-plosion)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Valve (V-5)
on the line to
the dryer
Rup-
ture
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Large release
of C3 to the
surrounding
area
Release of C3 C3
(L.G)
A
(Fire/Ex-plosion)
Equip. Mode
Cause
(Root Cause) EffectUltimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Heat
exchanger(H-1) on the feed
line to
the
cavern
Leak
(tube
To
shell)
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Over flow rate
or high
pressure of
inlet line
Small release
of C3 to the
shell side
Less flow of C3 to the cavern
High pressure
of water stream
Low pressure of inlet stream to the
cavern
Release of C3 C3
(L.G)
B
(Fire/Ex-plosion)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Heat
exchanger(H-1) on the feed
line to
the cavern
Rup-
ture
(tube
To
shell)
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Over flow rate
or high
pressure of
inlet line
Large release
of C3 to the
shell side
No flow of C3 to the cavern
High pressure
of water stream
May cause
shell side
rupture due
to overpressure
Heat exchange
damage
C3A
(Fire/Ex-plosion)
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Heat
exchanger(H-1) on the feed
line to
the cavern
Leak
(tube
To
Exter-nall)
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Small release
of water to the
surrounding
area
Less flow of
water in the
shell side
Lowering
function of heat exchanger
Heat-
exchanger
damage
Water -
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Heat
exchanger(H-1) on the feed
line to
the cavern
Rup-
ture
(tube
To
Exter-nal)
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Large release
of water to the
tube area
No flow of
water in the
shell side
Malfunction of
exchanger
Heat-
exchanger
damage
Water-
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)
Effect Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Heat
exchanger(H-1) on the feed
line to
the cavern
Plugged
(tube
side)
Sedimentation
Abrupt reaction
Impurity
upstream
Outlet valve fail
No flow of C3
to the cavern
Internal high
pressure
Rapid eddy
Back-flow to the pump (P-1)
High pressure
of inlet pump
Inlet pump fail
due to high pressure
May cause
tube rupture
due to
overpressure
Pump and heat
exchanger
damage
C3 -
Equip. ModeCause
(Root Cause)Effect
Ultimate
EffectMat.
Relative Risk
Ranking
Heat
exchanger(H-1) on the feed
line to
the cavern
Plugged
(shell
side
Abrupt reaction
Impurity in
shell side
Lowering
function of heat exchanger
Heat-
exchanger
damage
- -
결론 및 제안사항
Fault tree analysis와 effect analysis와의 연계 Accident probability와 accident consequence analysis로의
확장
AccidentProbability
HazardIdentification
AccidentConsequence
정량적 추론 정량적 추론
Hazard Analysis
ARA 분석결과의 정량화 가능성
Ultimate effect와 material property의 정량화
Ultimate effect의 고려 Release of material
Equipment failure
Downstream fail
Upstream fail
각각의 ultimate effect에 대한 penalty 크기에 따른 penalty(1-5)
Material property에 대한 penalty 복합 특성 등급 사용(0-16)
Release of material(5)
Equipment fail(3)
Downstream fail(2)
Upstream fail(2)
C3(4)
EO(12)
Am(3)
C3(4)
Magnitude ofPotential Damage
And Possible Accident
물질의 복합특성Ultimate Effect
Material Property(복합물질 등급 또는 MF)
Release of materialEquipment breakage
Upstream failDownstream fail에 대한
PENALTY
발생가능 사고유형 및 등급Fire
ExplosionToxic release
Equipment damage
이상원인에 대한상황 및 근본 이상
원인
이상으로 발생 가능한 상황
ConsequenceAnalysis
Reports
Data 관리 DataBase
실시간 공정 조업 Real-Time DB, PFD
공정 설계 GIS, PFD
공정 관리 Emergency Planning