IPC-IEA-Cr PC

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OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY

Culpable Homicide and Murder

Homicide (Latin homa- man, cide- I Cut) is the killing of a human being by a human

being. Causing the death of an animal is not murder. It might amount to the offence of

mischief or to cruelty to animals. Homicide may be lawful or unlawful. Lawful

homicide (cases falling under General Exceptions- Sec. 76-106)) is of two types —

excusable and justified homicide.

Lawful homicide.—Homicide may be either (1) lawful or (2) unlawful.

In the first case, law will set the culprit free; in the second case he will be held

criminally responsible for his criminal act. The distinction between lawful and unlawfu

homicide depends on whether the offender’s act was intentional, careless or otherwise

Lawful homicide may further be classified into:—

(i) Excusable homicide, and

(ii) Justifiable homicide.

Excusable homicide Justified homicide Unlawful Homicide

Accident (Sec- 80) Mistake of fact U/S

76and 79

Culpable Homicide

(Sec- 299, 301 and 304)

Act of Minor, Insane,

Intoxicated Persons

( Sec- 82, 83, 84, and85 )

Judicial Act U/S 77and

78 and also Includes

Necessity under Sec- 81

Murder U/S 300

Act in good Faith as in

Sec- 87, 88 and 89 and

sec- 92)

Act of Private defence

U/S 96 to 106

Culpable Homicide not

amounting to Murder

(Sec- 300 Exceptions 1

to 5 )

Unlawful homicide.—An unlawful homicide may be classified into different categori

according to the nature and gravity of the offence and its heinousness in order to attach

a suitable punishment for each type viz.:—

(a) Culpable homicide (sections 299, 301, I.P.C.);



(b) Murder (section 300, I.P.C.);

(c) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5);

(d) Death by negligence (section 304A, I.P.C.)

(e) Dowry Death (section 304B, I.P.C.);

(f) Abetment of suicide and attempt to commit suicide (sections 305, 306 and 309,

(g) Attempt to murder and attempt to commit culpable homicide (sections 308, I.P.C.)

(h) Attempt to suicide (section 309, I.P.C.).

The distinguishing features of these different categories of

unlawful homicides are: the degree of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with whic

a particular homicide is committed. If the probability of death resulting from a bodily

injury is of a very high degree (i.e., where death is a certainty) this constitutes murder,

and if the probability is not of that order, it is culpable homicide and if murder is

committed under grave provocation and consent, it is culpable homicide not amountin

to murder’ For instance, if A attacks B with a sharp-edged knife in his heart, resulting i

B’s death, A would be guilty of murder.2 On the other hand, if A causes injury to B wia stick fracturing his skull, resulting in B’s death, A would be liable for culpable

homicide not amounting to murder.3 In the first case, from the nature of the injury and

the instrument used for the purpose, it is certain that the injury will cause the death of

the victim; this is not so in the second case.

Culpable homicide—Meaning.—The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide

simpliciter (section 299, l.P.C.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is th

genus, and then murder (section 300, I.P.C.) which is a species of culpable homicide.

The residuary of culpable homicide after the special characteristics of murder have bee

removed from it, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 300,

Exceptions I to 5).

Culpable homicide may broadly be classified into two classes:—

(i) Culpable homicide amounting to murder ( section 300), and

(ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5).

As explained by Shuarfuddin, J., in Reaz-ud-din Shaikh v. Emperor,

All murder is culpable homicide, but all culpable homicide is not murder. Subject to th

five exceptions to section 300, Indian Penal Code every act that falls within one or mo

of the four clauses of that section is murder, and also falls within the definition of

culpable homicide in section 299, Indian Penal Code. Every act which falls within anyone or more of the four clauses of section 300, Indian Penal Code in respect of which

there co-exist one or more of the sets of circumstances described in the five exceptions



of that section is, by that fact taken out of section 300, Indian Penal Code but the act n

withstanding continues to be within section 299, and since it is not murder, it is

culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Every act that falls within section 299 an

does not fall within section 300, since it is not murder, is culpable homicide not

amounting to murder.

For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic

offence, the Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide, These are:—

(i) Culpable homicide of the first degree, which is the gravest form of culpable

homicide and is termed ‘murder’. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under

section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added.

(ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to

murder) as defined in section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299, clauses (i) and (i

is punishable under section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonmen

of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, to either of which fine

may be added.(iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree, which is defined in section 299, clause (iii)

and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with

imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both.

Culpable homicide—Meaning.—The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide

simpliciter (section 299, l.P.C.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is th

genus, and then murder (section 300, I.P.C.) which is a species of culpable homicide.

The residuary of culpable homicide after the special characteristics of murder have bee

removed from it, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 300,

Exceptions I to 5).

Culpable homicide may broadly be classified into two classes:—

(i) Culpable homicide amounting to murder ( section 300), and

(ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5).

For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic

offence, the Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide, These are:—

(i) Culpable homicide of the first degree, which is the gravest form of culpable

homicide and is termed ‘murder’. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under

section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added.(ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to

murder) as defined in section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299, clauses (i) and (i



is punishable under section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonmen

of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, to either of which fine

may be added.

(iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree, which is defined in section 299, clause (iii)

and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with

imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both.

Essential ingredients of C.H :- (a) Causing of death,

(b) by doing an act,

(c) the act of causing death must be done:—

(i) with the intention of causing death,

(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or

(iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.

Thus though an act may cause death, it will not amount to culpable homicide unless th

above conditions are satisfied.’A. Causing death.—In order to hold a person liable under the impugned section there

must be causing of death of a human being as defined under Section 46. ( The word

"death" denotes the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the

context). The causing of death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide as state

in Explanation 3

The causing of the death of child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may

amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that

child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been

completely born.

appended to section 299, I.P.C. But the person would not be set free. He would be

punishable for causing miscarriage either under section 312 or 315, I.P.C depending o

the gravity of the injury. The act of causing death amounts to culpable homicide if any

part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or

been completely born. The clause ‘though the child may not have breathed’ suggests

that a child may be born alive, though it may not breath (respire), or it may respire so

imperfectly that it may be difficult to obtain clear proof that respiration has taken plac

Causing of death must be of a living human being which means a living man, woman,child and at least partially an infant under delivery or just delivered.



Death caused of person other than intended.—To attract the provisions of this section

suffices if the death of a human being is caused whether the person was intended to be

killed or not. For instance , A counsels B to poison his mother. B accordingly obtains

poison from A and gives it to his mother in a roasted apple. The mother gives the appl

to a child of B, not knowing it contains poison, and the child eats it and dies. The act o

A amounts to murder by B, though he never intended to kill the child (section 301,

1.P.C.). Similarly, illustration (a) to section 299 says that a person can be guilty of

culpable homicide by causing the death of a person whose death he did not intend.

B. By doing an Act.—Death may be caused by a hundred and one means, such as by

poisoning, drowning, striking, beating and so on and so forth. As explained under

section 32, I.P.C. the word ‘act’ has been given a wider meaning in the Code inasmuch

as it includes not only an act of commission, but illegal omissions as well. Hence, deat

may also be caused by neglect of duty, such as a parent not supplying food and medicacare to his child, a husband starving his wife,’ that results in the voluntary causing of

the child’s and wife’s death. For instances, where a Life Guard on Swimming poll, not

following his duty and that’s caused death of person.

Death caused by effect of words.—There may be instances whereby death can be

caused by the effect of words in the particular circumstances of a case or as resulted

into nervous shock which cause death. In such a situation the accused will be liable to

the same extent as in the case of a physical assault causing death. For example, in the

reasonable course, is to consider speaking as an act, and in that a loud sound by

suddenly awake the old age person or can cause a heart attack intentionally willamounting to Offence of culpable homicide

Death caused inadvertently without intention while doing an Unlawful Act— The Pen

Code has made it clear in illustration (c) attached to section 299, I.P.C. that a person

will not be liable for culpable homicide, if he causes the death of a person while doing

an unlawful act, provided he did not intend to kill or cause death by doing an act that h

knew was likely to have that effect. For instance, if A while shooting at a fowl with the

intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a bush, A is not liable for B’s death.

When an act is in itself innocent, to punish the person who does it because of bad

consequence, which no human wisdom could have foreseen, it would be in the highest degree barbarous and absurd. Thus, when a person engaged in the commission of an

offence causes the death of another person by pure accident, he shall suffer only the



punishment of his offence, no addition on account of such accidental death. A, a

pickpocket attempts to take out purse of B, while B, was boarding a train. B has a

loaded pistol in his pocket. As soon as the thief puts his hand into B’s pocket, the pisto

goes off and B is shot dead. The thief will be liable for attempt to pick pocketing

(stealing purse) and not for murder or culpable homicide. The death of B is purely on

account of an accident or misfortune for which thief is not accountable

Intention—. The intension means expectation of consequence in question. Intention is

a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties (viz. nature of the

weapon used, the part of the body on which the blow was given, the force and number

of blows, etc.). The legal maxim is that everyone must be presumed to intend the

normal consequences of his act. Intention does not imply assume the, existence f some

previous design, it means an actual intention, the existing intention of the moment. Th

a deliberate firing by a loaded gun at once leads to inference that the intention was to

cause death. The existence of intention is not to be inferred unless death follows as anatural and probable consequence from the act

An intention also includes foresight of certainty. A

consequence is deemed to be intended though it is not desired when it is foreseen as

substantially certain. Intention of causing death is not the intention of causing the ‘dea

of any particular person. Illustration (a) to this section shows that a person can be guilt

of culpable homicide of a person whose death he did not intend .

With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death - It means

an intention to cause a particular injury, which injury is, or turns out to be, one likely tcause death. Thus, where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused, it is

immaterial to go into the question of whether the accused had intention to cause death

The connection between the ‘act’ and the death caused by the act must he direct and

distinct; and though not immediate it must not be too remote. If the connection betwee

the act and death is obscure or if it is obscured by concurrent causes, ‘or if it is broken

by the intervention of the subsequent causes, or if the time gap between the act and th

death is too long, the above condition is not fulfilled.

The difference between the two

expressions ‘intention of causing death’ and ‘intention of causing such bodily injury a

is likely to cause death’ is a difference of degrees in criminality. The latter is a lower



degree of criminality than the former. But as, in both the cases, the object is the same,

the law does not make any distinction in punishment.

The expression ‘intention to cause such bodily

injury as is likely to cause death’ merely means an intention to cause a particular injury

which injury is, or turns out to be. one likely to cause death. It is not the death itself

which is intended, nor the effect of injury. It is not necessary that the consequences., o

the injury are foreseen.

With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death - Knowledge in

comparison to intention is strong word-and imports a certainty and not means a

probability. Knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. A person who

voluntarily inflicts injury such as to endanger life must always, except in the most

extraordinary circumstances, be taken to know that he is likely to cause death (e.g. whe

the accused fired his gun in the air to scare away the opposite party and in the act one

stray pellet caused gunshot wound to a person killing him). The word ‘knowledge’includes all cases of rash acts by which death is caused, for rashness’ imports a

knowledge of the likely result of an act which the actor does in spite of the risk. in som

cases, gross negligence may amount to knowledge. For example, where The accused

kills a person by hitting him under the belief that he was hitting at a ghost.

Section 300. Murder

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by

which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-

2ndly:- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-

3rdly:- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the

bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death, or-

4thly:- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that

must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, an

commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such

injury as aforesaid.



Clause (1) Intention of Causing Death:- As of C.H

Clause 2—With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender know be

likely to cause death.—In case of an offence falling under this clause the mental attitud

of the accused is two-fold. First, there is intention to cause bodily harm and secondly,

there is the subjective knowledge that death ,will be the likely consequence of the

intended injury. Here the offender knows that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is

likely to cause death of the person. It applies to those special cases where the person

injured is in such a condition or state of health that his death would be likely to be

caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound

health and where the person inflicting the injury knows that owing to such condition or

state of health, he is likely to cause the death of the person injured. A case would fall

under this clause if the offender, having knowledge that a person was suffering fromsome disease or was of unsound health, causes hurt to him which may not have been

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death had the deceased been of

sound health, but which with the special knowledge of the diseased condition of the

deceased, his assailant must have known to be likely to cause his death. Here

knowledge on the part of the offender imports certainty and not merely a probability.

Clause 3.”Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause. death”.—

Where a man intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course

of nature to cause death, he would be liable for murder. If the probability of death ‘isvery great then the requirement of third clause are satisfied and the fact that a particul

individual may because of specially ski1led treatment or being in possession of a

particularly strong constitution have survived an injury, which would prove fatal to the

majority of persons subjected to it, is not enough to prove that such an injury is not

“sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” to cause death.

Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465

Facts: The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. There wa

only one injury on his person, which was a result of a spear thrust. The doctor said thathe injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.



Medical Report: The injury was a punctured wound 2- x transverse in direction on th

left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the

inguinal canal. Three coils of intestine were also coming out.The appellant was

convicted by the first court under section 302 IPC and his conviction was upheld by th

High Court. He was granted special leave to the Supreme Court on the following:

Issue: On the finding of High Court what offence is made out as having been

committed by the petitioner

The court gave a four-point test which prosecution must observe and prove in order to

bring the case under this section:

i) First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

ii) Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective

investigations.

iii) Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodil

injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind

of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry

proceeds further and,

iv) Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the

three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of natur

This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do withthe intention of the offender.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burde

is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, thirdly.

This four point test is applied in many such subsequent cases . It is mainly after this

judgment that clear guidelines were provided for the application of this section. These

observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. Under clause thirdly of

Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are

satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causingdeath or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury



intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It

must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which

in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. that the injury foun

to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

The intent requirement

The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a

given case whether offence involved is murder or not . Supreme Court also discussed

the intent element required for this section in great detail. The argument that

prosecution must prove an intention to inflict only that kind of injury that was sufficien

to cause death in the ordinary course of nature was found to be fallacious by the court.

It was argued that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to th

bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be

inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.? Court totally

disagreed with such an argument calling it to be a fallacious argument. According to thrule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the

infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature,

and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder.

Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

The court read the clause 3 of section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intention

being read as linked to the second part in the following way::- If there is an intention t

inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then th

intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the ac

would fall under the first part of the section, namely - "If the act by which the death iscaused is done with the intention of causing death."

In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to th

offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person." It

must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injur

must be established. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference o

deduction and to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question

of intention, that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an

intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present.



Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause - "and the bodily injury intend

to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The first

part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section.

So the crux is that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to

inflict the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but that

he had an intention to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the

body of the deceased. Then it is the later part of the enquiry which is objective in natur

to find out that whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death or not. Thus, intention is only linked up and is restricted to the causing of

the bodily injury and not to the knowledge or intention of causing such bodily injury

that is sufficient to cause bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary

course of nature. What needs to be proved is that the accused had an intention to cause

the same bodily injury found to be present on the person of deceased which was later

found to be sufficient to cause death. Such a principle is based on broad lines of common sense because if intention is considered to be of causing an injury which is

sufficient to cause death; then any person could always plead that he never had an

intention to cause such a injury and it would have been very difficult to prove him

wrong.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is

murder under s. 300, thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause

death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind

that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It does not even matte

that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once thintention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be proved, the rest of the enquiry

is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective

inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No on

has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the

ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict

injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it ca

be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise

unintentional.

Clause 4—Knowledge of imminently dangerous act.—This clause comprehends

generally the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all probability



cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When such an act is

done with the knowledge that death might be the probable result and without any

excuse for including the risk of causing death or injury as is likely to cause death, the

offence is murder, This clause applies to cases of dangerous action without an intentio

to cause specific bodily injury to any person, e.g., furious driving or firing at a target

near the public road.’ However, the act done must be accompanied with the knowledg

that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (i) death,

or (ii) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Further, the accused must have

committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of (a) causing death or (b)

such injury as is likely to cause death. Thus a man who strikes another in the throat wi

a knife, must be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to the life

of the person at whom he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to cause

that person’s death.

Difference B/W Culpable Homicide and Murder:- According to Sir James Stephenthe definition of culpable homicide and murder are the weakest part of the Code, as the

are defined in forms closely resembling each other and at times it becomes difficult to

distinguish between the two, ‘as the causing of death’ is common to both. Further, ther

must necessarily be criminal intention or knowledge in both culpable homicide and

murder. However, the difference between culpable homicide and murder is real though

very fine and based upon a very subtle distinction of the intention and knowledge

involved in these crimes. The true difference lies in the degree, there being the greater

intention or knowledge of the fatal consequences in the one case than the other. The

four cases describing the offence under section 300, I.P.C. attempt to explain this

difference.

In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide i

genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.

Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is

culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment,

proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three

degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of

the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in

Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the secondegree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable

homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the



punishment provided for it is, also the lowest among the punishments provided for the

three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of

Section 304. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not

amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts

losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these

sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of

approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep i

focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300, the following

comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the

two offences.

Culpable Homicide section 299 Murder Section 300

. A. With the intention of causing

death;

(1) With the intention of causing

death;

B. with the intention of causing

bodily injury as is likely to cause

death

(2) With the intention of causing

such bodily

injury as the offender knows to be

likely to cause

the death of the person to whom the

harm is

caused;

3. If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person

and the bodily injury intended to be

inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary

course of nature to cause death, or-

c. with the knowledge that the act is

likely to cause death

4. If the person committing the act

knows that it is so imminently

dangerous that it must, in all

probability, cause death or such

bodily injury as is likely to causedeath, and commits such act without



any excuse for incurring the risk of

causing death or such injury as

aforesaid.

Reg Versus govinda:-

(i) Death caused intentionally: Murder: Clause (a) to section 299 I.P.C. and

clause (1) to section 300, LP.C. show that where there is an intention to kill,

the offence is always murder. [Illustration (a) to section 300(1).

(ii) Injury caused resulting in death knowing the peculiar conditions of the victim

— Murder: Clause (2) to section 300: The essence of clause (2) to section

300, I.P.C. is found in the italicized words. The offence is murder, if the

offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from

peculiarity of constitution, or immature age or other special circumstances

could be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. As give

in Illustration (b) to section 300, where A knowingly with intention of causin

death strikes Z, who is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to

cause his death, and Z dies in consequence of the blow, A is guilty of murde

although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.

(iii) Risk to human life resulting in Death (a) if death likely result—Culpablehomicide (b) if ostjrbablyj1t—Murder: Clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C. and

clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C.: Clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C. and clause

(4) to section 300, I.P.C. is intended to apply to cases in which there is no

intention to cause death, nevertheless death has resulted. In such a case

whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon degree of

risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide

[Illustration (b) to 299]; if it is the most probable result, it is murder

[Illustration (d) to 3001. For example, death caused as a result of furious

driving will be culpable homicide; whereas death caused as a result of firing

a mark near a public road would be a case of murder under section 300, I.P.C



(Abdul waheed khan V/s state of Andhra Pradesh)

(iv) Injury likely to cause death—Culpable homicide: and Injury sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Murder clause (b) to section

299 and clause (iii) to section 300: It is on a comparison of clause (b) to

section 299 and clause (iii) to section 300 that the decision of doubtful cases

like the present must generally depend. It is culpable homicide if the bodily

injury intended is likely to cause death; it is murder, if such injury is sufficie

in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The word ‘likely’ means

‘probably’. When the chances of the happening of a thing are fifty-fifty, it

may be said that the thing may ‘probably happen’; when the chances of its

happening are almost certain, it is said that it will ‘most probably happen’.

Sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature

and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is

intended, the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used,sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused, and sometimes

both are relevant. The determining factor is the international injury which

must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If the

intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of natur

to cause death, that is to say, the probability of death is not so high, the

offence does not fall within the definition of murder but Culpable homicide

not amounting to murder or something less.( Virsa Singh V/s state of

Punjab) and ( jagriti Devi V/s State of Himachal Pardesh )

(v) Distinction between section 299(c) and section 300 clause (4); Relate to theDegree

of knowledge of the consequences.—The Code contemplates in clause (c) to

section 299,

I.P.C. and clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C. as to when an act is culpable

homicide and murder by reason of the act being done with the knowledge

described in the respective clauses. The knowledge used in clause (c) to

section 299, I.P.C., and clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C. refers to personal

knowledge. The difference between the two clauses relate to the words: (i)

‘likely to cause death’ in section 299 clause (c); and (ii) ‘must in all probability cause death.’ (under section 300, clause (4).

The fourth clause to section 300 contemplates the doing of an imminently



dangerous act in general and not the doing of any bodily harm to any

particular individual. It is designed to provide for rarest of rare cases wherein

the accused puts, in jeopardy lives of many persons as envisaged in

illustration (d) to section 300, I.P.C. and the like. This clause is usually

invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause death of any

particular person, but the act is done with such callousness towards the resul

and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the

act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. For example, where death is

caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd [vide lllustratiod7], or by

poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water, or by

opening the grid of a bridge just as a railway passenger train is about to pass

over it. In such and like cases, the imminently dangerous act, the extreme

depravity of mind regardless ness of sanctity of human life, and property tha

place the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by intention.(William Slaney case)

Knowledge v. Intention:- The distinction between knowledge and intention.

Knowledge in the context of Section 299 would, inter alia, mean consciousness

or realization or understanding. The distinction between the terms 'knowledge

and 'intention' again is a difference of degrees. An inference of knowledge that

is likely to cause death must be arrived at keeping in view the fact situation

obtaining in each case. The accused must be aware of the consequences of his

act. Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intentio

connotes a conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity an

summed up into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a

particular and specific end which the human mind conceives and perceives

before itself. 'intention' is different from 'motive' or 'ignorance' or' negligence'.

It is the 'knowledge' or 'intention' with which the act is done that makes

difference, in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide

or murder. Therefore, it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressionsas used in these provisions. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are

subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered



from the circumstances, such as the, weapon used, the ferocity of attack,

multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers o

the code designedly used the words 'intention' and 'knowledge' and it is

accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an

act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensueFirstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been

aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. But

that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such

consequences should ensue. As compared to 'knowledge', 'intention' requires

something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely the

purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end."

Kesar singh versus state of Haryana Air 2008 SC

Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder:-

As stated earlier, section 300, I.P.C. after laying down the cases in which culpable

homicide becomes murder, states certain exceptional situations under which, if murder

is committed, it is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable

under section 304, I.P.C. and not under section 302, I.P.C. The exceptions are:—

(1) Grave and Sudden Provocation;

(2) Private Defence;(3) Exercise of Legal Power;

(4) Without Premeditation in a sudden fight; and

(5) Consent.

In general the onus of proving the guilt of the accused

always rests upon the prosecution. But the burden of proving the existence of

circumstances bringing the case within an exception under section 300, I.P.C. (as .in

case of general exceptions) lies upon the accused.

Exception I: Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to theaccused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the



accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject

to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind..

The test of grave and sudden provocation is

(i) Whether a reasonable man, belonging, to the same class of society as the accused,

placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be provoked as to lose

his self-control.

(ii) In certain circumstances words and gestures may also cause grave and sudden

provocation.

(iii) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken int

consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden

provocation, for committing the offence.

(iv) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from tha

provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise

giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

It may he stated that the defence of provocation is further limited by the following thre

provisos. That is to say, the Exception is not available:—

(i) If the accused courts (gives) provocation or uses it as an excuse for assaulting

another; or

(ii) If the act is legally done by a public servant in the exercise of his legal right as a

public servant; or (iii) If the act is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

Grave and Sudden Provocation—Meaning.— : what amounts to grave and sudden

provocation, in consequence of which the accused is deprived of his power of self-

control which will entitle him to the benefit of the exception, is still undefined in IPC

and even court cant succeed to answer it completely ,and it changes from facts to facts

and circumstances to circumstances,

The answer to this depends on a number of factors and is mainly a question of fact to b

decided according to the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not all provocation

that will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter (culpable homicide) Provocation



to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the

power of self-control, as the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes

death.

The test to be applied is

that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid down by the Cou

of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Lesbini,3 so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious

individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary

person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance to:

(a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a

reasonable man time to cool, and

(b) take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected.

Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions explained the rationale behind the doctrine

in the following words:—

The whole doctrine relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or maycause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice, which is the

formation of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived.

Consequently, where the provocation inspires an actual intention to kill.... or to inflict

grievous bodily harm, the doctrine that provocation may reduce murder to manslaught

seldom applies.’

Reasonable man’s — Test :- The Supreme Court in KM. Nanavati v. State of

Maharashtra , has extensively discussed the law relating to provocation in India and

observed that— (1) The test of ‘grave and sudden provocation’ is whether a reasonable man, belonging

to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused

was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.

(2) In India, words and gestures may also under certain circumstances, cause grave and

sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first exception to

section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

(3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into

consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden

provocation for committing the offence; and(4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from tha



provocation and not after the passion has cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise

giving the accused room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

The Court further said: What a reasonable man will do in certain

circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values, etc.

in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an

accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to

the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any

standard with precision; it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the

relevant circumstances.

Muthu: The Supreme Court in Muthu v. State of Tamil Nadu,2 on 5th November, 2007

held that constant harassment may lead to deprivation of the power of self control

amounting to grave and sudden provocation. The accused Muthu angered by a rag

picker Shiva’s daily habit of throwing waste into his shop, took ouL a knife and stabbehim to death. Differentiating between a pre-planned crime and a crime resulting from a

fit of rage the court said this was not a murder but C.H not amounting to murder.

Words and Acts amounting to provocation.—It is important to note that Indian cour

have not maintained the distinction between words and acts in the application of the

doctrine of provocation, The cases in which the defence of provocation are placed may

be considered from two angles, namely:—

(1) Whether words or gestures unaccompanied by acts can amount to provocation; and

(2) What is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and thecommission of the offence.

Offender deprived of his power of self-control--It must be shown distinctly that the

act was done while the person doing it was deprived of the power of self-control. It

must have been done under immediate impulse of the provocation. It must be of such a

nature as deprives a reasonable man of his. power of self-control. The power of self-

control should not have been lost as a result of anger or other emotion. The provocatio

must be such as will upset not merely a hasty and hot-tempered or hyper-sensitive

person but one of ordinary sense and calmness.4 It must be shown not only that the ac

was done under the influence of some feeling which took away from the person doing

all control over his actions, but also that the ‘feeling had an adequate cause. If it appea



that the party, before any provocation is given, intended to use a deadly weapon

towards anyone who might assault him this would show that a fatal blow given

afterwards was not to be attributed to the provocation and the liability would be for

murder. However the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the

provocation.

Exceptions:- First Proviso.—This proviso requires that ,provocation must not have bee

sought by the accused, instead provocation must come to him. In a case the accused w

told one night that his sister and her paramour were together in a... He knew of their

intimacy for a long time. On getting the above

information he broke into that house with an axe and killed both of them. He was held

liable for murder because the provocation was not sudden and it had also been sought

by the accused.’ Provocation is an external stimulus which must be looked at as such.

Grave and sudden provocation does not arise merely by use of the defamatory words.-

Second proviso.—It is clear from second proviso that f the act is legal, any oppositionto it would be illegal/ —

Third Proviso.—Provocation is! not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of

the right of private defence. For example, if a person forcibly seizes a thief and confin

him till the arrival’ of police, the thief here cannot complain of any inconvenience that

he suffers.

Exceeding the Right of Private Defence.—Exception 2 deals with those cases

wherein a person exceeds the right of private defence. If the excess is intentional, the

offence is murder, if unintentional, it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

That is to say, this exception would apply, if the accused caused the death of a person

without premeditation and that, when the accused caused the death of the deceased, he

had no intention of causing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of defence

(even if he caused more harm than was necessary for the purpose of private defence),

and that the act was done in good faith.. The following conditions must be fulfilled :-

1.Act must be done is exercise of right of private defence of person or property.

(2) Act must have been done in good faith. /

(3) The person doing the act must have £exceeded his right given to him by law andhave thereby caused death.

(4) Act must have been done without premeditation and without any intention of



causing more harm than was necessary in self-defence.

The law contained in this exception is based on the rule that in a case in which the law

itself empowers an individual to inflict any harm short of death, it ought hardly to visit

him with the highest punishment if he inflicts death

Kashi ram and Others V/s state of Rajasthan AIR 2008 Supreme court.

Exception III: Public servant exceeding his powers.—This exception has been

provided to protect a public servant or a person aiding a public servant, if either of

them exceeds the power given for the advancement of public justice. The exception

clause will not apply if the act is illegal or against public policy and not authorised by

law, or the person glaringly exceeds the power given to him by law. the following

conditions must be fulfilled(1) Offence committed by a public servant, or by some other person acting in the aid o

such public servant, in the advancement of public justice.

(2) Public servant or such other person exceeds the powers given to him by law. c—

(3) Death is caused by doing an act which he in good faith believes to be lawful and

necessary for the discharge of his duty as such public servant. ,_—‘

(4)’ The act must have been done without any ill-will towards the person whose death

caused. L_—

This exception shall not apply where the act of a public servant is illegal and

unauthorized by law or if he glaringly exceeds the powers entrusted to him by law.

In Dukhi Singh v. State, the appellant, a constable of the RPF (Railway Protection

Force), while on duty arrested a man under suspicious circumstances, who was standin

near a goods wagon while the train had stopped at Hadida Khas Station near Allahabad

and took him to his compartment. When the train had moved a few paces, the arrested

man jumped down from it. As’ soon as he escaped the appellant followed him with a

rifle. Suspecting that the train fireman had concealed th thief he enquired from the

fireman where the culprit was and further said that he would shoot him. The fireman

asked the appellant why he would shoot the thief, whereupon the appellant shot him

with his rifle. The fireman later died.The appellant pleaded that he had been given orders, by Havildar Kashi Singh to shoo

at the thief and further contended that it was a case of pure accident that instead of



hitting the thief he hit the fireman. Held that, in effecting his arrest after the escape the

police officer had not had the right to cause the death of the suspected thief. Further

held, that the appellant exceeded the powers given to him by law, and he caused the

death of the fireman by doing an act

Exception IV: Sudden fight—Meaning.--—This exception applies to cases wherein

death is caused in a sudden fight without premeditation in the heat of passion upon a

sudden quarrel; so long as the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, the accused,

irrespective of his conduct before the quarrel, earns the mitigation provided for in

Exception 4 to section 300, I.P.C. subject to the condition that he did not in the course

of the fight take undue advantage of or act in a cruel or unusual manner.1

Essential ingredients.—To invoke the benefit of this clause, death must be caused:

(i) in a sudden fight;

(ii) in the heat of passion without premeditation, arising out of sudden quarrel;(iii) without the offenders having taken undue advantage;

(iv) the offender should not act in a cruel or unusual manner; and

(v) the fight must have been with the person killed.

(i) Sudden Fight.—The most important element under this clause is that there should b

a sudden fight. The word ‘fight’ has not been defined in the Code. In ordinary parlance

the word ‘fight’ means a combat between two or more persons, whether with or withou

weapons. But a mere verbal exchange of words preceding a stab with a knife will not

invoke the application of Exception 4 to section 300, I.P.C. Similarly, when the accusehad beaten the son of the deceased in a quarrel and the deceased came to scold him and

was struck dead, it was held that there was no fight and the act of the accused did not

fall under Exception 4 to section 300, l.P.C.

(ii) Death caused in the heat of Passion without Premeditation:- Suraj mal V/s U.T.

chandigarh it was held that when injury is caused resulting in death in a sudden fight

without premeditations and in the heat of passion and no undue advantage was taken b

the accused, nor had he acted in a cruel manner the case would fall under Exception 4

section 300, I.P.C. punishable under section 304, I.P.C., Part I.



(iii) Without taking any undue advantage: In Man/ce Rem v. State of Haniana) the

appellant who was a police inspector invited his subordinate, the deceased, to a drink i

his room. When they were drinking the nephew of the deceased came to the room and

called him for dinner. As the deceased got up to go the appellant got annoyed and

hurled abuses on the deceased in filthy language to which the deceased objected. This

further infuriated the appellant and a fight ensued between the two. The appellant

picked up his service revolver which was kept nearby and fired two shots at the

deceased causing his death. The appellant was convicted under section 302, I.P.C. and

awarded life imprisonment by the trial court which was confirmed by the High Court.

Accepting the appellant’s contention that it was because of the sudden provocation in

the heat of passion that the fight started and the deceased was killed. The Supreme

Court held that since both the persons were inebriated there was every possibility that

their action was beyond their control. Accordingly, considering the totality of the

factual matrix, the Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Exception

4 to section 300 because the incident took place in heat of passion.

(iv)Cruel and Unusual Manner: In Ghapoo Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesl the

apex Court held that dispute having been arisen without premeditation in a sudden figh

upon a Sudden quarrel between the two groups, the infliction of injuries and their natu

proved the intention of the accused appellant but the manner of causing of such injuri

could not be termed either as cruel or unusual. It was found that only one injury out of

seven was of grievous nature which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death of the deceased. The accused appellant had not come prepared and armed

for attacking the deceased. It was noticed that in the heat of passion upon a sudden

quarrel followed by a fight the accused had caused injuries on the deceased, but had no

acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The Court accordingly gave the benefit of Exceptio

4 to section 300, l.P.C. to the accused-appellant reducing his criminality to section 304

Part I, I.P.C. and custodial sentence of 10 years was imposed in place of life

imprisonment.

Exception V: Consent.—The last exception to section 300, I.P.C. deals with causing

death by consent which is commonly known as euthanasia (mercy killing). The

exception is justified on the ground that a man’s life is not only valuable to himself, bualso to the family members, state and society. A man is therefore not entitled to give u

his life by consent; though consent has unquestionably the effect of mitigating the



intensity of crime, it can never exonerate the offender. For instance: The motives whic

prompt men to the commission of this offence are generally for more respectable than

those which prompt men to the commission of murder. Sometimes it is the effect of a

strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense of honour, not infrequently

of humanity. The soldier who, at the entreaty of a wounded comrade, puts that comrad

out of pain, the friend who supplies laudanum (sedative) to a person suffering the

torment of a lingering disease, the freedman who in ancient times held out the sword

that his master might fall on it, the highborn native of India who stabs the females of h

family at their own entreaty in order to save them from the licentiousness of a band of

marauders, would, ... scarcely be thought culpable

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