Ipca Laboratories LTD. - Gujarat Pollution Control Boardgpcb.gov.in/pdf/IPCA_Laboratories_Ltd_Risk_Assessment_Report.pdf · Prepared By Ipca Laboratories Ltd. Page : 3 HSE Department

Prepared By Ipca Laboratories Ltd. Page : 1 HSE Department Rev. : 00

Ipca Laboratories LTD.

Survey no. 99 101, Village Ranu, Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara.

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY For proposed plant

PREPARED BY

VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS

FF-11, Akshat Complex, High Tension road, Subhanpura, Vadodara-390 023

Phone: 9825756467/9427838021 (M)


CONTENTS

SECTION NO.

CONTENTS

PAGE NO.

1 Executive Summary 4 2 Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of

Risk assessment 6

3 Introduction of the unit 8 3.1 Company Introduction 8 3.2 Details of Unit 8 3.3 Project setting 10 3.4 Organisational setup 13 3.5 List Of product 13 3.6 List of Raw material 14 3.7 Details of storage of Hazardous Materials and

control measures provided 16

3.8 Hazardous Properties Of The Chemicals, Compatibilities And Special Hazard

20

3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

22

3.10 Brief Description of process plant 26 4 Hazard identification 27 4.0 Introduction 27 4.1 DOWs Fire and Explosion Index 28 4.2 Identification of Hazardous area 29 4.3 Hazard and operatibility studies ( HAZOP) 29 4.4 Event Tree Analysis 33 4.5 Failure Frequency 33 4.6 Evaluation of Process areas 35 5 Risk Assessment 37 5.1 Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances 37 5.2 Tank on Fire / Pool Fire 37 5.3 Fire Ball 38 5.4 UVCE 38 5.5 Dispersion cases 38 5.6 Identification of High Risk Areas 38 5.7 Modes of Failure 39 5.8 Damage Criteria for heat radiation 40


6 Consequence Analysis 41 6.1 Consequence Analysis 41 6.2 Detail regarding consequences analysis table 80 6.3 Conclusions 83 7 Risk Reduction Measures 84 7.1 Design 84 7.2 Safety Devices 84 7.3 Operation and Maintenance 85 7.4 Recommendations 85 8 Disaster Management plan 87 8.1 On site emergency Plan (OSEP) 87 8.2 Scope of OSEP 88 8.3 Elements of OSEP 88 8.4 Methodology 88 8.5 Emergencies Identified 88 8.6 Others 88 8.7 Emergency Organization 89 8.8 Emergency Facilities 89 8.9 Emergency Escapes 90 8.10 Assembly points 90 8.11 Wind sock 90 8.12 Emergency transportation 90 8.13 Emergency communication 91 8.14 Warning Alarm/ Communication of Emergency 91 8.15 Emergency responsibilities 91 8.16 Mutual Aids 91 8.17 Mock Drill 91


SECTION I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary M/s. Ipca Laboratories Ltd. is a new proposed industry which will be located at Survey no. 99 101, Village Ranu, Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara, Gujarat. 1.1 Experts from Vaibhu Safety Consultants visited the site on 10.03.2011 and subsequently

inspection of site as per site plan and the environs along with collection of relevant information about the proposed installation and the operations of the plant. Also a detailed discussion was held on various aspects including storage facilities, process safety and emergency preparedness with the officers of the company.

1.2 Petroleum product like Methanol, Toluene, Acetone, etc., will be received through road tanker and will be stored in CCOE approved underground storage tank farm area as per Petroleum Act and Rules. Acetic acid, DNS, Acids, Alkalies, Flammable but non petroleum products will be stored in above ground tank farm area. LNG will be received by Cryogenic container and stored in SMPV explosive tank farm area. All safety measures will be provided at design level and foolproof safety features will be provided.

1.3 Some flammable/combustible liquid/solid chemicals will be received in drums or bags or in carboys and it will be stored in drum storage area and in warehouse as per its incompatibility and other properties like flammable, toxic, corrosive and reactive.

1.4 This plant will receive hydrogen cylinders skid through Road trucks. Provision will be made as per explosive licence.

1.5 Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software. Mapping of various scenario are with hazardous distances and safe distances are drawn on site plan for easy understanding of the consequences of the accident/ incident.

1.6 The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are confined to (a) Underground petroleum storage tank farm (b) Above ground storage tank farm area(c) Hydrogen cylinder road truck area (d) Drum storage area. (e) HSD storage tank area. (f) LNG bullet storage area. Various hazardous scenarios have been identified for Risk Assessment and the consequences modeled. The results of the analysis have been summarized in the table appended.

1.7 It is observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any possible spills / leaks for catastrophic failure of storage tanks, road tanker release scenarios would be of large in nature and would be taken care of with the proposed emergency facilities and manpower employed.


1.8 The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be further reduced by implementing the suggestions made in this report.

1.9 Catastrophic failure of storage tanks, road tanker resulting in major disaster due to fire, explosion and toxic releases is very unlikely events barring gross neglect of time tested safety standards and procedures set up by the industry.

1.10 The possibility of occurrence of major disaster due to fire, explosion and toxic release and mishaps are considered very remote.

1.11 However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they may be, associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and emergency preparedness plan.

1.12 Conclusion Based on the 1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems. 2) Discussions with company officials,


CHAPTER II

OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 Objective :

The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study is to determine damage due to major hazards having damage potential to life & property and provide a scientific basis to assess safety level of the facility. The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of specialty fine chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site & off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure safety.

2.2 PHILOSOPHY :

This report is limited to the following: Identification of major risk areas. Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases

o Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure cases

o Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability o Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to

maximum possible extent. Giving pointers for effective disaster management Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk

2.3 Methodology

The procedure used for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is outlined bellow: Identify Credible Loss Scenarios for the facility under the study by discussion with Ipca Laboratories Ltd. Simulate loss Scenarios to determine the vulnerable zones for toxic dispersion, pool fire, Tank on fire (Thermal Radiation ), Flash fire, Explosion over pressure ( Vapour cloud Explosion, Ball fire using software packages HAMSGAP. Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the facilities. The flowchart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page.


RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY FLOWCHART

START

FACILITY, PROCESS AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION

LISTING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS & STORAGE DETAILS

DEFINING OF PARAMETERS FOR EACH OF CHEMICALS & EACH OF HAZARDS

IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS & QUANTIFICATION OF PROBABLE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM

DEFINING RELEASE TYPE (CONTINUOUS OR INSTANTANIOUS ) & DETERMINE RELEASE RATES

SIMULATION OF SELECTED CASES FOR CONSEQUENCE MODELING

PREPARATION OF SUMMERY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISK TO THE SURROUNDING POPULATION

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATION OF MITIGATIVE / REMEDIAL MEASURES

END


SECTION III

INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT

3.1 COMPANY INTRODUCTION

M/s. IPCA Laboratories Limited is a proposed bulk drug project, to be located at Survey No. 99 101, Village Ranu, Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara.. One of the first modern pharma factory of yesteryears was commissioned by IPCA at Mumbai in 1969. The company was originally promoted by a group of medical professionals and businessmen and was incorporated as 'The Indian Pharmaceutical Combine Association Limited' in October 1949. The present management took over in November 1975 when the total turnover of the company was only Rs. 0.54 crores. Currently, this premise where IPCA started its operations, houses the Registered Office of the company. The unit is already manufacturing Guaifenesin, Methocarbamol, Camylofin Dihydrochloride and Prenoxdiazine Hydrochloride. With the increasing demand of its related products in the global market, the company proposes to start its production activities in Gujarat at its proposed site. The proposed project falls under Category : 5(f) A, as per the Environmental Impact Assessment notification, dated September 14, 2006. Proposed site is located at Village Ranu, which is 9 Kms. From Taluka Padra and 18 Kms. From Vadodara Dist. Railway station, Various industries are situated around the unit, most of working on chemical products.

3.2 DETAILS OF UNITS TABLE: 3.1

Sr. No. Particulars

1. Full Name & Address of Unit : M/s. Ipca Laboratories Ltd. Survey no. 99 101, Village Ranu, Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara, Gujarat.

2. Telephone No. : 07412 278321 07412 279083 [email protected]

3. Month & Year of Establishment : Up coming Unit 4. Full name & Address of the

occupier : Manoj Kumar Mittal

Sr. General Manager ( Corporate ) EHS Ipca laboratories Limited , P.O. Sejavta , Ratlam ( M.P.)- 457002

5. Full name & Address of the Factory manager

: Manoj Kumar Mittal Sr. General Manager ( Corporate ) EHS Ipca laboratories Limited ,


P.O. Sejavta , Ratlam ( M.P.)- 457002

6. Man Power

: 400 for upcoming unit

7. No. of shift & Shift timing : Upcoming unit

8. Environs (Nearest Facilities) 1. Railway Station, Vadodara : RANU 3K 2. Police Station, Padra : PADRA 9 KM 3. Fire Station, EICL Umaraya,

Padra : Padra 9 KM

4. Hospitals, OHC, Shroff Foundation, Kalali

: Padra 9 KM

5. Metrological Data

Latitude 2213'21.02" N Longitude 73 0'57.95" E

Temperature

Maximum 40 0 C Minimum 13 0C

9. Total Land at Plant 59.06 Acres

10. Total Built-up area at the Factory 68164 sq.mtr

11. Plant commissioning in the year June 2011

12. Power connection Demand : 2 MW KVA

13. DG Set 2 Nos x 1000 KVA

14. Power plant details : -

15. Water Storage and source 400 M3 from borewell or Narmada Water canal

16. TFH 10 LAC K CAL

17. Boiler Capacity & type & licence: 6 TON X 2 NOS; 10 TONS X 2 NOS

18. Effluent treatment Plant Capacity: 350 M3/DAY

19. Fire water source Bore Or Narmada canal water

20. Fire Water Reservoir capacity : M3 400 M3

21. GPCB/PCB consent (CC & A) New Application

22 Solid waste Disposal Member of Solid Waste disposal site on Nandesari Environment Control Ltd. (NECL) Member of Incinerator of Nandesari Environment Control Ltd. (NECL)


3.3 PROJECT SETTING: Proposed company is located at 73 0'57.17" East longitude & 2213'22.89" North latitude in Village: Ranu, Tal: Padra, Dist. Vadodara in Gujarat State.

Ranu is located at a distance of 18 km to the West of Vadodara District, The State Highway No. 6 passes about 1 km north of the site. The Vadodara Jambusar railway line is about 3 km from the site with Ranu as the nearest railway station. Proposal site is shown as Figure 1.1. & Plot plan is shown in figure 1.2. The Gujarat has four distinct seasons: winter (DecemberMarch), summer (AprilJune), rainy season (JulySeptember), and monsoon season (OctoberNovember). Air temperatures range from an average daily maximum around 40 C, normally recorded in April and May, to an average daily minimum around 13 C in the winter. Relative humidity is quite high, exceeding 70% during rainy season. The sky is mostly cloudy during the rainy season and less cloudy in the postmonsoon months, with clear sky during the other months of the year. Wind speeds are generally low, though they accelerate during the latter part of summer and early southwest monsoons. Wind speeds range from calm to more than 6 km per hour.


Figure 1.1 Google Image


Figure 1.2


3.4 SAFETY ORGANIZATIONAL SET UP

3.5 LIST OF PRODUCTS

TABLE: 3.2

Sr. No. Chemical Quantity MT / Month

Physical state

Storage In

MOC

1. Extraction Of Artemisinin 0.5 Liquid Drum HDPE /FIBER 2. Arte Range Products 4.17 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 3. Frusemide DMF 20 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 4. Losartan Potassium 10 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 5. Allopurinol 10 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 6 Ramipril 2.5 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 7 Lisinopril 1.67 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 8 4,7, DCQ 50 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 9 Amodiaquine HCl / Base 20 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER

10 Chloroquine phosphate 66.67 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 11 Quetiapine Hemifumarate 8.33 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 12 Gabapentene 8.33 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 13 Mesalamine 8.33 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 14 Mycophenolic acid 1.06 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 15 Rapamycin / Sirolimus 0.02 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 16 Serratiopeptidase 2 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 17 Tacrolimus 0.025 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 18 Tramadol 8.33 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 19 Febuxastat 1.67 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER 20 R & D Products 0.1 solid Drum HDPE /FIBER

3.6 LIST OF ROW MATERIAL

SR.G.M. (Corporate EHS)

Manager EHS

Fire Supervisor-1

Firemen -2 & Safety Supervisor-1

OHC Visiting Doctor

Male Nurse Word boy

EHS Officer

PLANT MANAGER


TABLE: 3.3

Sr. No.

Chemical Quantity MT / Month

Max. Storage At a Time at

Site (MT)

Physical state

Storage In

MOC

1. 1-Hydroxy Benzotraizole (HOBT)

2.50 0.5

Solid Drum PVC

2. 2-Chloro ethoxy ethanol 5.25 1.1

Liquid Carbuoy / Drum

PVC

3. 3 APC 14.58 2.9 Solid Drum Fibre 4. 4,7 Dicholoroquine (DCQ) 40.17 8.0 Solid Bag Woven + PP 5. Acetic Acid 12.43 20 KL Liquid Tank SS 6. Acetone 77.25 16 KL Liquid Tank MS7. Acetonitrile 13.96 18 KL Liquid Tank MS 8. Activated Carbon 23.69 4.7 Solid Bag Woven + PP 9. Ammonium Sulphate 2.00 0.4 Solid Bag HDPE 10. Anhydrous Zinc Chloride 24.00 4.8 Solid Bag HDPE 11. Antifoam 0.63 0.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 12. Artemisinin 4.53 0.9 Solid Drum HDPE 13. Artimisinin leaf 100.00 20.0 Solid Bag HDPE 14. Azabicyclo Benzylester 2.08 0.4 Solid Drum HDPE 15. Bacteriological Peptone 0.38 0.1 Solid Drum HDPE 16. Benzoyl Peroxide 3.23 0.6 Solid Drum HDPE 17. Boron Trifluoride Etherate 0.31

0.1 Liquid Carbuoy

/ Bottle HDPE

18. Bromine (Br2) 13.50 2.7 Liquid Bottle Glass Bottle 19. Br-OTBN 11.77 2.4 Solid Drum HDPE 20. Calcium Carbonate 1.63 0.3 Solid Drum HDPE 21. Calcium Chloride 0.38 0.1 Solid Bag HDPE 22. Casein 10.20 2.0 Solid Drum HDPE 23. Casein enzyme hydro lysole 4.50 0.9 24. Catalyst 1.06 0.2 Solid Drum HDPE 25. Catalyst Pd 0.96 0.2 Solid Drum HDPE 26. Caustic Soda Flakes 10.62 2.1 Solid Bag HDPE 27. CDMA 16.00 3.2 Solid Drum HDPE 28. Citric Acid 0.09 0.0 Solid Bag HDPE 29. Cotton Seed Meal 6.00 1.2 30. Cyclohexanone 8.78 1.8 Liquid Drum MS 31. Denatured Spirit (DNS) 22.17 40 KL Liquid Tank SS32. Dextrin 26.00 5.2 Solid Bag HDPE33. Dextrose 23.67 4.7 Solid Bag HDPE 34. Di ethyl ether (DEE) 4.33 0.9 Liquid Drum MS 35. Di Hydro Artemisinin 13.87 2.8 Solid Drum HDPE 36. Di Iso Propyl ether (DIPE) 1.47 0.3 Liquid Drum HDPE 37. Diammonium Phosphate 4.00 0.8 Solid Bag HDPE38. Dicyclo hexyl carbodimide

(DCC ) 3.92

0.8 Liquid carbuoy PVC

39. Dimethyl amine HCL 6.93 1.4 Solid Bag Woven + PP 40. Dimethyl Formamide (DMF) 6.38 1.3 Liquid Drum HDPE 41. Dimethyl Tetrahydro

Pyrimidine (DTP) (IDI010) 6.33

1.3 Solid Drum HDPE

42. Di-Potassium Hydrogen Phosphate

0.90 0.2

Solid Bag HDPE

43. EDTA 0.03 0.0 Solid Bag Woven + PP 44. EMME 26.75 5.4 Liquid Tank HDPE45. Ethanol 169.33 40 KL Liquid Tank MS 46. Ethoxy Carbonyl Phenyl 2.20 0.4 Liquid Drum HDPE


Propyl Alanine (ECPPA) 47. Ethyl 2-(3-formyl-4-

hydroxyphenyl)-4-methylthiazole-5-carboxylate

2.25

0.5

Liquid Drum HDPE

48. Ethyl Acetate 19.20 3.8 Liquid Tank MS 49. Formamide 18.83 3.4 Liquid Drum HDPE 50. Formic Acid 17.08 4.1 Liquid carbuoy HDPE 51. Furfurylamine(FFA) 20.67 2.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 52. Glycerol 10.45 0.0 Liquid Drum HDPE 53. Grignard reagent 0.18 0.0 Liquid Drum HDPE 54. HCl CP grade 0.21 40 KL Liquid Drum HDPE 55. Hydrochloric Acid 136.42 0.4 Liquid Tank MSRL 56. Hydrogen Gas 1.88 0.1 Gas bullet MS 57. Hydroxylamine hydrochloride 0.53 0.3 Solid Drum HDPE 58. Hyflow 1.60 0.0 Solid Bag Poly Bag 59. Iodine 0.01 2.0 Solid Drum HDPE 60. IPA / Acetone 10.00 1.8 Liquid Tank MS 61. Iso Propyl Amine 8.83 6.4 Liquid Tank MS 62. IPAAC 31.75 34.2 Liquid Tank FRP 63. Isopropyl Alcohol 170.75 5.2 Liquid Tank MS 64. Lasamide 25.75 33.4 Solid Bag Woven + PP 65. Light Paraffin Oil 166.75 20 KL Liquid Drum MS 66. Liq. Ammonia 154.58 1.3 Liquid Tank MS 67. L-Proline 04 6.25 0.3 Solid Drum HDPE 68. Magnesium Sulphate 1.63 0.5 Solid Bag HDPE 69. Magnesium turnings 2.37 0.2 Solid Bag Woven + PP 70. Malic Acid 1.15 0.1 Solid Drum HDPE 71. Malt Extract 0.37 2.5 Liquid Drum HDPE 72. Mannich Base 12.25 3.2 Solid Bag Woven + PP 73. MCA 15.75 3.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 74. Meta bromoanisole 15.35 40 KL Liquid carbuoy HDPE 75. Methanol 319.71 0.2 Liquid Tank MS 76. Methyl tertiary Butyl

Ether(MTBE) 1.05

4.2 Liquid Drum HDPE

77. Methylene di chloride 20.85 0.4 Liquid Tank MS 78. N,N Dimethyl Aniline 2.02 20 KL Liquid Drum MS 79. N-Hexane 87.40 5 KL Liquid Tank MS 80. Nitric acid 5.48 2.5 Liquid Tank HDPE81. Nitro compound 12.28 1.1 Solid Bag HDPE82. Novaldiamine 5.25 0.5 Liquid Drum HDPE 83. Para formaldehyde 2.54 0.1 Solid Bag HDPE 84. Petroleum Ether 0.59 4.0 Liquid Drum HDPE 85. Phenol 20.00 7.3 Liquid Drum MS 86. Phosphoric Acid 36.39

8.8 Liquid Tank/car

buoy PVC

87. Phosphorous Oxy-chloride POCl3

43.75 1.3

Liquid carbuoy PVC

88. Piperazine 6.33 0.3 Solid Drum HDPE 89. Poly Ethylene Glycerol 1.70 0.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 90. Poly Propylene Glycol 0.40 0.6 Solid Drum HDPE91. Potassium Carbonate 2.83 0.1 Solid Bag Woven + PP92. Potassium Chloride 0.38 0.6 Solid Drum HDPE 93. Potassium Dihydrogen

Phosphate 3.00

0.7 Solid Drum HDPE

94. Potassium hydroxide 3.50 0.4 Solid Drum HDPE 95. Proline Benzyl Easter

Hydrochloride 2.08

1.9 Solid Drum HDPE

96. Silica gel 9.53 8.4 Solid Drum HDPE 97. Sodium Acetate 42.08 1.2 Solid Bag Poly Bag


98. Sodium Azide 5.88 14.5 Solid Drum HDPE 99. Sodium Bi Carbonate 72.33 0.4 Solid Bag Poly Bag 100. Sodium Boro Hydride 2.08 0.2 Solid Drum HDPE 101. Sodium Carbonate 0.83 11.0 Solid Bag Poly Bag 102. Sodium Chloride 55.00 12.3 Solid Bag Poly Bag 103. Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) 61.56 0.6 Solid Bag Poly Bag 104. Sodium Nitrate 3.10 2.5 Solid Drum HDPE 105. Soluble Starch 12.33 6.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 106. Soya Bean Flour 30.35 1.7 Liquid Drum HDPE 107. Soya Oil 8.40 0.5 Liquid Drum HDPE 108. Soya Peptone 2.47 0.5 Liquid Drum HDPE 109. Succnic Anhydride 2.43 2.3 Solid Bag PVC 110. Sucrose 11.60 20 KL Solid Bag PVC 111. Sulphuric Acid 59.92 0.4 Liquid Carbouy HDPE 112. Tetra Butyl Ammonium

Bromide (TBAB) 2.18

10.5 Solid Drum Fibre Drum

113. Tetra hydro furan 52.67 0.0 Liquid Drum MS 114. TGA 0.07 20 KL Liquid Drum HDPE 115. Toluene 439.92 2.2 Liquid Tank MSRL Tank 116. Triethylamine (TEA) 11.08 3.3 Liquid Drum HDPE 117. Trityl Chloride 16.67 0.1 Solid Drum HDPE 118. Yeast Extract 0.50 0.0 Solid Drum HDPE 119. Zinc Sulphate 0.04 0.2 Solid Bag PVC 120. Iso Butyl Bromide 1.07 0.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 121. Sodium Formade 0.67 Solid Drum HDPE

3.7 DETAILS OF STORAGE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS & CONTROL MEASURES:

TABLE: 3.4

NAME OF

HAZARDOUS

SUBSTANCE

MAX.

STORAGE

CAP.[Qty.]

PLACE

OF ITS STORAGE

OPERATING

PRESSURE

AND TEMP.

TYPE OF

HAZARD

CONTROL

MEASURE PROVIDED

Sulfuric Acid 20 KL X 1 Nos Tank

Tank Farm Area A/G Tank

ATP Ambient

Corrosive Dyke wall will be provided to storage tank Level gauge will provided.

Scrubber will be provided Required PPEs will be provided

to all employees Double drain valve will be

provided to Acid storage tank. Full body protection will be

provided to operator during unloading and handling of Acids

Caution note and emergency first aid measures will be displayed and train for the same to all employees.

Safety shower and eye wash will be provided in storage tank area and plant area.

Total close process will be adopted for Sulfuric acid handling.

Nitric Acid 5 Kl x 1 no Tank


ATP Ambient

Corrosive

Hydrochloric Acid

20 KL X 2 Nos Tank

Tank farm area A/G Tank

ATP Ambient

Corrosive

NAME OF

HAZARDOUS

MAX.

STORAGE

PLACE

OF ITS STORAGE

OPERATING

PRESSURE

TYPE OF

HAZARD

CONTROL

MEASURE PROVIDED


SUBSTANCE CAP.[Qty.] AND TEMP.

Acetic Acid 10 KL X 2 No Tank


ATP, Ambient

Fire Flame proof plant, pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Double Static earthing Dyke wall Tanker unloading procedure. SCBA sets available . Flame proof plant, pumping

transfer, close process, etc. Jumper clips on flanges Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking and

prohibited area. Tanker unloading procedure. Flame arrestor provided on vent

line of the tank Hydrant system

Acetone 16 Kl x 1no Tank

Tank Farm Area U/G Tank

ATP Ambient

Fire

Denatured spirit

20 Kl x 2nos Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

Ethyl Alcohol 20 Kl x 2nos Tank

Tank Farm Area U/G tank

ATP Ambient

Fire

Ethyl Acetate 20 Kl x 1no no. Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

Toluene 20 Kl x 1 No Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

N-Hexane 20 Kl x 1nos Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

IPA 20 Kl x 1No Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

Iso Propyl Amine

20 Kl x 1 No tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

Methanol 20 Kl x 2 Nos Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

Petroleum Ether

20 Kl x 1 No Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

Aceto Nitrile 18 Kl x 1no Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire/ Toxic

SS storage tank will be provided as per IS code.

Dyke wall will be provided to storage tank.

Level transmitter will be provided with low level high level auto cut-off provision.

Vent will be connected to water trap and vent of water trap will be provided with flame arrestor.

Water sprinkler system will be provided to storage tank.

Fire hydrant monitor with foam attachment facility will be provided.

Dumping / Drain vessel will be provided to collect dyke wall spillage material.

FLP type pump will be provided. Nitrogen blanketing will be

provided to storage tank. Double static earthing will be

provided to storage tank. Double Jumper clip will be

provided to pipeline flanges. SCBA sets available .

HSD ( As a Fuel)

10 KL X 1 No. Tank


ATP Ambient

Fire

NAME OF

HAZARDOUS

MAX.

STORAGE

PLACE

OF ITS STORAGE

OPERATING

PRESSURE

TYPE OF

HAZARD

CONTROL

MEASURE PROVIDED


SUBSTANCE CAP.[Qty.] AND TEMP.

Liq. Ammonia 20 Kl x 1 No Tank Farm Area A/G Tank

ATP Ambient

Corrosive Toxic

Level gauge will be provided. Scrubber provided Required PPEs will be provided

to all employees Double drain valve will be

provided to sulfuric Acid storage tank

Full body protection will be provided to operator.

Caution note and emergency first aid will be displayed and train for the same to all employees.

Safety shower and eye wash will be provided in storage tank area and plant area.

Total close process will be adopted for Ammonia handling.

Dyke wall will be provided to storage tank

Hydrogen Gas Skid H2 road truck skid 1500 m3

Ambient 4 kg/cm2

Explosive Hydrogen road skid will be connected to reactor.

PRV station with NRV, SV Auto shutoff valve will be provided.

Non sparking tools will be used for connecting skid to PRV station.

Static Earthing provision will be made.

One by one cylinder rack valve will be opened.

LNG ( As a Fuel)

Bullet Explosive licenced area

Cryogen Storage

Explosive Storage facilities will be made as per SMPV Rules.

Tank farm away from the other facilities.

Safe distances will be maintained Double Safety Valve will be

provided. Double static earthing will be

provided. Level indicator with transmeter

will be provided. Pressure gauge will be provided.


3.8 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES AND SPECIAL HAZARD Table-3.5

SR. NAME OF

CHEMICAL HAZARD FLASH

POINT 0 C

BP 0 C

LEL %

UEL %

SP.GR. 20 0 C

VD SOLUBILITY WITH

WATER at 20 0 C

NFPA H F R

HAZARDOUS COMBUSTION PRODUCT

TLV / TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LC50

CARCINOGENIC

CHARACTERISTIC

ANTIDOT

1. Methanol CAS# 67-56-1

F/T 10 54 5.4 44 0.792 1.1 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour 200 6000 LEL

64000 ppm for 4H rat

No 10 mg diazepam through injection

2. Toluene CAS # 108-88-3

F 4.0 111 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.2 Insoluble 2 3 0 Irritating Vapour

generated

50 2000 400 ppm for 24Hr

Rat

No Diazem 1 mg/Kg.(Intrav

enous), Epinephina,

Efidrine 3. Acetic Acid

CAS # 64-19-7 T / F 44.4 117.9 5.4 16.0 1.015 -- SOLUBL

E 2 2 1 Irritating

Vapour generated

10 40 5620 ppm for 1 Hr Rat

No Sodium Hydro-

Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime

Juice, Milk of Megnesia

4. Sulfuric Acid CAS # 7664-93-9

C NF 340 -- -- 1.84 -- Water reactive

3 0 2 Non combustible

1 mg/m3

15 mg/m3

510 mg/m3 for

2H Rat

No Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime Juice,

Milk of Megnesia

5. Nitric Acid CAS # 7697-37-2

C NF 121 -- -- 1.408 2.5 Soluble 3 0 0 - 4 67 ppm (NO2)/

4H.

260 mg/m3/30

M Rat

Yes Sodium Hydro-

Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime

Juice, Milk of Megnesia

6. Ethyl Acetate CAS # 141-78-6

F -4.0 77.0 2.0 11.5 0.902 3.0 1 ml/10ml water

1 3 0 Irritating Vapour

- 400 200 gm/m3

No Not available

7. Acetone CAS# 67-64-1 99

F - 20 56 2.15 13.0 0.791 2.00 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour 750 25000 LEL

- No 10 mg diazepam through injection


8. Isopropyl alcohol CAS # 67-63-0

F 18.5 82.3 2.3 12.7 0.785 2.1 Miscible 1 3 0 Acid smoke & fumes

400 2000 LEL

- No Not available

9. Acetonitrile CAS #75-05-8

T/F 42 81.6 4.4 16 0.787 1.4 Soluble 2 3 1 Toxic vapor are generated

2.7 40 ppm

4000 ppm

No Cyanide Kit

10. Ammonia liquor CAS #1336-21-6

Toxic - 36 16 25 0.9 1.2 Miscible

3 1 0

Not combustible 25

300 2000 ppm/4-hr

No Wash with Lactic Acid,

Apply soframycin Smelling

Ethanol or Ether 11. Hexane

CAS #110-54-3 F -7 68.7 1.2 7.7 0.659 3.0 - 1 3 0 CO & CO2 50 ppm 5000

ppm - No No specific

Antidot

12. Hydrogen Gas CAS # 1333-74-0

F/E N.A. - 3.0 74 0.0696 - - 0 4 0 Explosive gas - - - No -

13. Iso Propyl Amine CAS # 75-31-0

F -26.1 32.4 2.3 12 0.691 2.04 Soluble 3 4 0 Toxic oxides of nitrogen.

5 ppm 750 ppm

3.28 mg/l for 4 hr rat

No No specific Antidot

Water & Milk 14. Petroleum Ether

CAS # 8000-05-9 T/F -40 30 1.1 5.9 0.75 2.6 Insoluble 1 4 0 Toxic vapor are

generated 400 ppm

1100 ppm

3400 ppm for 4H rat

No Water

15. Ethyl Alcohol CAS # 6417-5

F 55 78.3 3.3 19 0.790 1.6 Soluble 0 3 0 CO & CO2 1000 ppm

3300 ppm


No 2 gm sodium bi carbonate in 250

ml water, Diazepam 10 mg through injection

16. Denatured Spirit CAS # 64-17-5

F 55 78.3 3.3 19 0.790 1.6 Soluble 0 3 0 CO & CO2 1000 ppm

3300 ppm


No 2 gm sodium bi carbonate in 250

ml water, Diazepam 10 mg through injection

17. LNG F & E Highly Flammabl

e

-161 5 15 0.415 at -162C

0.55 Float on water

1 4 0 Not pertinent Not listed

Not listed

Not listed

No Not applicable

F = FIRE T = TOXIC C = CORROSIVE E = EXPLOSIVE R = REACTIVE STEL = SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT BP = BOILING POINT LEL = LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT PPM = PARTS PER MILLION UEL = UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT SP.GR = SPECIFIC GRAVITY VD = VAPOUR DENSITY

ER = EVAPORATION RATE H = HEALTH HAZARD CLASS F = FIRE HAZARD CLASS R = REACTIVE HAZARD BR = BURNING RATE TLV = THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE

NFPA =NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-usa N.A = NOT AVAILABLE N.L =NOT LISTED


3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

Following facilities and system will be installed

3.9.1 Process Safety:

1 Process plant will be made as per USFDA and GMP requirements and

safety will be the first priority to make plant full proof safe. 2 Safety measures will be adopted from the design stage. 3 The reaction will be carried by heating, here the heat energy will be

conducted vide steam through Jackets/Limpet Coils. Low Pressure Steam Line will be connected to these vessels with jackets /Limpet coils appropriately insulated. The vessels will also be fitted with safety valve, pressure indicator for visual periodic checks.

4 Safety Valve and pressure gauge will be provided on reactor jacket. 5 PRV will be provided from steam boiler high pressure line to control

required pressure in reactor jacket. 6 Utility like Chilling, cooling, vacuum, steaming and its alternative will be

provided to control reaction parameters in a safe manner. 7 Control of addition of reactants in to reactor by gravity from day tank or

by manual addition in continuous watching temperature and other critical reaction parameters.

8 Free Fall of any flammable material in the vessel will be avoided. 9 Powder charging through man hole will be avoided and safe hoper with

slotting arrangement will be adopted. 10 Static earthing provision will be made at design stage to all solvent

handling equipments, reactors, vessels & powder handling equipments. 11 Any reaction upsets will be confined to the reaction vessel itself as defined

quantity of charges of raw materials is issued to the reaction vessel/Day tank by metering pumps.

12 Stirrer On- Off position indicators will be provided. 13 Reactor vent line will be connected with reflux unit or condenser in case of

VOC or with scrubber in case of toxic gas generation in reaction. 14 All emergency valves and switches and emergency handling facilities will

be easily assessable. 15 Distillations will be carried out under vacuum fractionation distillations.

Hence the pressure development within the unit will not occur. However since the distillations will be carried out well above the flash point of the mass, vacuum failure alarm will be provided and non return valves will be incorporated on the main vacuum lines to curb vacuum failure in the system.

16 Further all the vessels will be examined periodically by a recognized competent person under the Gujarat Factory Rules 1963-Rule 61(1).

17 All the vessels and equipments will be well earthed appropriately and well protected against Static Electricity. Also for draining in drums proper earthing facilities will be provided.

18 Materials will be transferred by pumping through pipeline or by vacuum from drums.


19 All solvents and flammable material storage tanks will be away from the process plant and required quantity of material will be charge in reactor by pump.

20 Flammable material drum will be also charged by vacuum. 21 Temperature indicators are provided near all reactor and distillation

systems. 22 Jumpers will be provided on all solvent handling pipeline flanges. 23 Caution note, safety posters, stickers, periodic training & Updation in

safety and emergency preparedness plan will be displayed and conducted. 24 Flame proof light fittings will be installed in the plant. 25 All the Plant Personnel will be provided with Personal Protection

Equipments to protect against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage, spillages or splash. PPE like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc. will be provided to the employees. All employees will be given and updated in Safety aspects through periodic training in safety.

26 Material Safety Data Sheets of Raw Materials & Products will be readily available that the shop floor.

3.9.1.1 Hydrogenation Plant:

1. PLC base process controls and operation of plant will be installed. 2. FLP type area will be provided. 3. Total enclosed process system. 4. Instrument & Plant Air System. 5. Nitrogen blanketing in Hydrogenation reactor. 6. Safety valve and Rupture disc provided on reactor. 7. Cooling Chilling and power alternative arrangement have been made

on reactor. 8. Hydrogen and Nitrogen Cylinder bank away from the autoclave

reactor. 9. PRV station with shut off valve, safety valve provision will be made

for hydrogenation reaction safety. 10. Before Hydrogen Gas charging in to reactor and after completion of

reaction Nitrogen flushing will be done. 11. Flame arrestor will be provided on vent line of reactor and it will be

extended up to roof level. 12. Open well ventilated and fragile roof will be provided to on reactor. 13. Safe Catalyst charging method will be adopted. 14. SOP will be prepared and operators will be trained for the same. 15. Static earthing and electric earthing (Double ) provided. 16. Rector vent extended out side the process area and flame arrestor

provided on vent line. 17. Dumping vessel arrangement will be made. 18. Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical

will be provided.


3.9.2 Transportation

1. Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank as per petroleum rules.

2. Road tanker unloading procedure will be in place and will be implemented for safe unloading of road tanker.

3. Static earthing provision will be made for tanker unloading. 4. Earthed Flexible Steel hose will be used for solvent unloading from

the road tanker. 5. Fixed pipelines with pumps will be provided for solvent transfer up to

Day tanks/reactors. 6. Double mechanical seal type pumps will be installed. 7. NRV provision will be made on all pump discharge line. 8. Some chemicals will be received at plant in drums by road truck and

stored in a separate drum store. 3.9.3 For Underground storage tank farm :

9. Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank as per petroleum rules.

10. Tank farm will be constructed as per explosive department requirement and separation distance will be maintained.

11. Static earthing provision will be made for road tanker as well as storage tank.

12. Flame arrestor with breather valve will be provided on vent line. 13. Road tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented. 14. Fire load calculation will be done and as per fire load Hydrant System

will be provided as per NFPA std. and Fire extinguishers will be provided as per fire load calculation.

15. Spark arrestor will be provided to all vehicles in side premises. 16. Flame proof type equipment s and lighting will be provided. 17. Lightening arrestor will be provided on the top of chimney. 18. Trained and experience operator will be employed for tank farm area. 19. NFPA label ( hazard identification ) capacity and content will be

displayed on storage tank. 20. Solvents will be transferred by pump only in plant area and day tank

will be provided. Overflow line will be return to the storage tank or Pump On-Off switch will be provided near day tank in plant.

21. Jumpers will be provided on solvent handling pipe line flanges. 22. Flexible SS hose will be used for road tanker unloading purpose and

other temp. connection. 3.9.4 For Hydrogen skid :

Hydrogen road skid will be received by road and skid will be stored away from process plant.

PRV station provided with shut off valve and safety valve . Flame proof light fitting installed. Static earthing and electric earthing (Double) provided. Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical will be provided. Non sparking tools will be used for hydrogen line fitting.


3.9.5 For LNG :

Storage facilities will be made as per SMPV Rules. Tank farm away from the other facilities. Safe distances will be maintained Double Safety Valve will be provided. Double static earthing will be provided. Level indicator with transmeter will be provided. Pressure gauge will be provided.

3.9.6 For Drum Storage area :

Only general shift material is being handled. FLP type light fittings will be provided. Proper ventilation will be provided in godown. Proper label and identification board /stickers will be provided in the storage area. Drum pallets will be provided. Drum handling trolley / stackers will be used for drum handling. Separate dispensing room with local exhaust and static earthing provision will be

made. Materials will be stored as Compatibility and separate area for flammable, corrosive

and toxic chemical drums in store. Smoking and other spark, flame generating item will be banned from the Gate.

3.9.7 Safety Measures for Acid storage tank area:

Storage tank will be stored away from the process plant. Tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented. Caution note and emergency handling procedure will be displayed at unloading area

and trained all operators. NFPA label will be provided. Required PPEs like full body protection PVC apron, Hand gloves, gumboot,

Respiratory mask etc. will be provided to operator. Neutralizing agent will be kept ready for tackle any emergency spillage. Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit will be provided in acid storage area. Material will be handled in close condition in pipe line. Dyke wall will be provided to all storage tanks, collection pit with valve provision. Double drain valve will provided. Level gauge will be provided on all storage tanks. Safety permit for loading unloading of hazardous material will be prepared and

implemented. TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for transportation

Emergency of Hazardous chemicals. Fire hydrant system with jockey pump as per TAC norms will be installed.

3.9.8 Fire fighting system

400m3store capacity along with a stand by pump also doubles up as emergency water

supply in case of any eventuality. Sufficient numbers of Fire extinguishers will be installed in plant and storage area as

per fire load calculation.


Fire hydrant system as per NFPA norms will be installed in the plant. It is proposed to have a provision for separate Water storage tank for fire water as well

as process water requirement. D.G. Sets will be provided for emergency power.

3.9.9 Pipelines: The various pipelines to transfer i.e. charging, draining etc. in the plant will be periodically inspected for Support, Vibration, Corrosion conditions, Painting, and Colour Code. Pipelines and Flexible pipeline (SS 316/MS) are appropriately earthed to avoid accumulation of Static Electricity. Periodic Checkups of the pipelines will be conducted to curb any chances of mishap due to leakages. Preventive Maintenance Schedules will be in practice.

3.9.10 Emergency Planning: 1. Transport Emergency planning and training to driver and cleaner will

be provided. 2. TREM card will be provided to transporter. 3. On way emergency telephone number list will be provided to

transporter. 4. Acetonitril handling & transportation safety SOP will be prepared and

trained employees. 5. Emergency siren and wind sock will be provided. 6. Scenario base On Site emergency Plan will be prepared. 7. Tele Communication system and mobile phone will be used in case of

emergency situations for communication. 8. First Aid Boxes and Occupational health centre will be made at site. 9. Hydrant system & sprinkler system will be provided as per

requirements. 10. Emergency organization and team will be prepared as per On site-Off

site emergency planning. 3.10 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS.

Process details are provided in EIA report.


SECTION IV

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.0 INTRODUCTION Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and storage of chemicals. In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour under process conditions, and their inventory in process as well as storage and hence helps in identifying vulnerable areas within the complex. Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly classified as fire and explosive hazards and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular activity is fire and explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the materials handled and their properties. It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a prerequisite from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study the hazard indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon the degree of hazard they pose. In a Pharmaceutical manufacturing plant main hazard handling of hazardous chemicals like, Flammable solvents, corrosive and toxic chemicals, coal as a fuel in CPP, the primary concern has always been, fire and explosion prevention and control as these are the main hazard posed by such unit. This concern has grown through the loss of life, property and materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have occurred over the years. Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant. The hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories and vulnerable practices /operations.

The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by chemical process industries and petroleum refineries are checklists and safety reviews. Dow and Mond fire and explosion indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative ranking of hazards, is also extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible accident and consequence analysis etc are employed.


4.1 Dows fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) 4.1.1 Steps in fire and explosion index calculation are given below : 4.1.2 Results of fire explosion and toxicity indices.

TABLE- 4.1 Sr No

Material stored

Storage Qty. (KL)

Nh

Nf

Nr

MF

GPH SPH FEI Degree of Hazard

Radius of Exp.

(ft.)

Th Ts TI Degree of Hazard

1. Methanol 20 Kl x 2 No. Tank

1 3 0 16 2.55 2.35 95.88 Moderate 78 50 50 5.3 Light

2. Hydrogen Skid 0 4 0 21 3.0 2.29 156 Heavy 135 - - - - 3. Ammonia 20 Kl x

1 No 3 1 0 4 3.75 2.91 10.9 Light 8 250 75 10.9 Heavy

4. Sulfuric acid

20 Kl x 1 No

1 3 0 24 2.85 1.5 102.6 Intermediate 87 250 125 20.1 Severe

5. Aceto Nitrile

18 Kl x 1no Tank

2 3 0 16 2.55 2.35 95.88 Moderate 78 50 50 5.3 Light

6. Acetone 16 Kl x 1no Tank

1 3 0 16 2.55 2.3 93.84 Moderate 75 125 50 9.2 Moderate

7. Toluene 20 Kl x 1 No Tank

0 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Intermediate 106 125 50 11.4 Severe

8. IPA 20 Kl x 1 No Tank

1 3 0 16 2.55 2.4 97.92 Intermediate 79 50 50 5.9 Light

9. Nitric Acid

5 Kl x 1 no Tank

2 1 0 4 2.90 3.0 34.8 Intermediate 28 125 75 7.9 Moderate

10. LNG 20 M3 x 2 nos

Bullets

1 4 0 21 1.85 2.94 76.11 Heavy 63 - - - -

Select Pertinent Process

Determine Material Factor

Calculate GPH(F1), General Process Hazards

Calculate SPH(F2), special process Hazards

Determine Hazard Factor F1 X F2 =F3

F3XMaterial Factor =F & E Index

Determine Exposure area


Nh = NFPA Health rating GPH = General Process Hazard Nf = NFPA Fire rating SPH = Special Process Hazard Nr = NFPA Reactive rating FEI = Fire Explosion Index MF = Material Fctor Th = Penalty Factor Ts = Penalty for Toxicity TI = Toxicity Index 4.2 Identification of Hazardous Areas:

A study of process for manufacturing Drugs as given in chapter 2 of the report indicates the following: Process plant will be Batch process and multipurpose and multi utility base plant due to

that at a time inventory of raw material at production area will be very small. All raw material and finished product will be stored in tank farm area and required

material will be charged in process through pump and in close circuit. Batch size requirement chemicals will be charged in to day tank or reactor and empty

drums will be sent back to RM store for neutralization and disposed off. Thus the inventory of the raw material in process area will be limited and for limited time.

Most of reactions are similar type and slight exothermic in nature except hydrogenation reaction area.

Hydrogen reaction area segregates from the other process and storage area. Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in

Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, will be used in small quantities & storage quantities will also very low at process plant.

However some chemicals such as Methanol, Toluene, IPA, Acetone, Acetonitrile, Hexane, LPO, Iso propile amine, Petroleum Ether, Ethanol, DNS, etc., will be used in one or more process and therefore their requirement is slightly higher.

All Class A petroleum products and flammable chemicals will be stored in underground storage tanks in dedicated Explosive licence premises.

Other flammable nature chemicals will be stored in above ground storage tanks as per petroleum rules in dedicated storage tank farm area.

Drums will be stored in licenced drum storage area as per petroleum rules. Maximum six days running products raw material inventory will be kept in drum storage area.

Hydrogen gas will be used in hydrogenation process and road skid will be used for process and it will be directly connected to PRV station.

LNG storage area. List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in Table-3.3. Hazardous

properties are provided in Table-3.4 4.3 Hazard and Operability Studies ( HAZOP) 4.3.1 The basic concept of Hazop is to have an exhaustive review of the plant operation. Hazop

study highlights the hidden operability problems and identifies hazards, which are likely to result from the expected intention of seemingly safe components or methods of operation.

4.3.2 This work utilizes imagination of team members to visualize ways in which a plant can

malfunction or mal-operated. Each part of the plant is subjected to a number of questions formulated around a number of guide words which are derived from method of study technique. In effect, the guide words are used to ensure that the questions which are posed to test integrity of each part of the design to explore every conceivable way in


which that design could deviate from the design intention. This usually produces a number of theoretical deviations and each deviation is then considered how it could be caused and what would be consequences.

4.3.3 HAZOP is a brainstorming approach, which stimulates creativity and procedure for

generating ideas. Possible results of this study are :- (a) Identify and examining many types of risks. (b) Identifying non-optimum system reliability. (c) Suggestive qualitative recommendations regarding control, strategy, material

properties, material releases, alternative design option, operation and maintenance.

4.3.4 The important t terms pertaining to HAZOP study are:- Intention :- The intention defines how the part is expected to

operate. This can take a number of forms and can be either descriptive or diagrammatic. In many cases, it will be a flow sheet (P & ID)

Deviation :- These are departures from the intention which are

discovered by systematically applying the guide words.

Causes :- These are reasons why deviation might occur. Once a

deviation has been shown to have a conceivable or realistic cause, it can be treated as meaningful.

Hazards :- These are the results of the deviations Consequences:- These are the consequences, which can cause damage,

injury or loss. A List of guide words

Guide Words

Meanings Comments

None Complete negation of the intention

No part of the intention is achieved e.g. no flow or reverse flow.

More of Quantitative increase

More of any relevant physical properties than there should be e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity) higher temperature, higher pressure higher viscosity, more heat, more reaction etc.

Less of Quantitative decrease

Less of any relevant physical property than there should be, e.g. Lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature, lower pressure, less heat, less reaction etc.

Part of Quantitative decrease

Composition of system different from what it should be

More than

Qualitative increase More components present in the system that there should be e.g. extra phase present (Vapor, solid), impurities (air, water, acids, corrosion products etc.)


Other than

Substitution What else can happen apart from normal operation e.g. Start up, shutdown, high/low rate running, alternative operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance, catalyst change etc.

Guidewords are applied to the design intention. The design intention informs us what the equipment is expected to do.

4.3.5 A flow chart giving HAZOP procedure is given below:-


4.3.6 HAZOP studies for the Hydrogen cylinder skid to reactor is made and the Hazop study sheets are as under.

HAZOP 1 Parameters GW Causes Consequences Control Measures Recommendation

Provided Temp More Ambient

temperature high H2 being lighter gas may expand on

Safety valve is provided on header

--

Hot work/ Flame in near by area.

heating which may cause cracking,

PRV provided

bursting/weakening of pipe.

Auto shutoff valve provided

Less No hazard Pressure More High Temperature. Process Disturbance Pressure gauge

provided. Thickness monitoring of pipelines to

Valve closed, Jammed.

Shut off valve provided.

be carried out. Reliability study

Shut off valve malfunctioned.

Safety Valve provided

for the high pressure

High pressure in cylinder at filling

PRV station provided

pipeline to be carried out.

station Less Low pressure in

cylinder, Process Delayed No Hazard

Cylinder empty. Flow More Ball valve

malfunction or operates

Process Disturbance In high pressure Exothermic reaction more

Flow meter needs to be provided.

at more then set value.

flow will increase temp. & pressure

Line jammed but alarm/ hooter will be provided with

set temp. & flow of H2

Less Low pressure Process Delayed Reverse Not applicable NRV at PRV to be

provided No Cylinder Empty Valve closed

Other than Puncture in pipeline, flange joints

Explosive mixture will be formed as the line is under positive pressure

Hydrogen gas sensor to be provided

On line Gas detection system needs to be provided in gas handling area.

Power failure

GEB failure, Internal system failure

Process Delayed D. G. Set provided

Conclusion : Above study shown that company has to be adopted and implemented required safety measures to control process hazard and make it safe at maximum level.


4.4 Event Tree Analysis 4.4.1 Different outcomes of a leakage or catastrophic failure are possible depending on, if and

when toxic release incident occurs and the consequences thereupon. ETA considers various possibilities such as catastrophic and Point source release outcomes to occur. From ETA, following incident outcomes and pathways are identified.

4.5 Failure Frequencies 4.5.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories

I) catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and II) ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency. Releases from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc. fall into the first category.


4.5.2 Typical failure frequencies are given below:-

TABLE-4.2 Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies

Atmospheric storage

Catastrophic failure Significant leak

10-9 /yr 10-5 /yr

Process Pipelines < = 50 mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak 8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr 8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr

> 50 mm


TABLE-4.4

4.6 Evaluation of Process Areas :

Process plant will be Batch process and multipurpose and multi utility base plant due to that at a time inventory of raw material at production area will be very small.

All raw material and finished product will be stored in tank farm area and required material will be charged in process through pump and in close circuit.

Batch size requirement chemicals will be charged in to day tank or reactor and empty drums will be sent back to RM store for neutralization and disposed off. Thus the inventory of the raw material in process area will be limited and for limited time.

Most of reactions are similar type and slight exothermic in nature except hydrogenation reaction area.

Hydrogen reaction area segregates from the other process and storage area. Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in

Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, will be used in small quantities & storage quantities will also very low at process plant.

However some chemicals such as Methanol, Toluene, IPA, Acetone, Acetonitrile, Hexane, LPO, Iso propile amine, Petroleum Ether, Ethanol, DNS, etc., will be used in one or more process and therefore their requirement is slightly higher.

All Class A petroleum products and flammable chemicals will be stored in underground storage tanks in dedicated Explosive licence premises.

Other flammable nature chemicals will be stored in above ground storage tanks as per petroleum rules in dedicated storage tank farm area.


Drums will be stored in licenced drum storage area as per petroleum rules. Maximum six days running products raw material inventory will be kept in drum storage area.

Hydrogen gas will be used in hydrogenation process and road skid will be used for process and it will be directly connected to PRV station. Considering this, the risk analysis and consequences studies are concentrated on Explosive U.G licenced area, Drum storage area, Hydrogen Skid location, A/G tank farm area and LNG storage area.


SECTION V

RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1 Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous substances and the parameters to be determined for quantification of such damages.

In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous. In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the outflow time (kg/s.). In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid and liquid in equilibrium with its vapour or solids. Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system. In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.

5.2 Tank On Fire/ Pool Fire In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool. The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to-height ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the following factors:

Distance from the fire The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high

heat-absorbing capacity)


The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with respect to the fire.

5.3 Fire Ball

This happens during the burning of liquid, the bulk of which is initially over rich (i.e. above the upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as combustion is taking place at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a propagating diffusion flame). The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift the cloud form the ground, subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud. Combustion rates are high and the hazard is primarily thermal.

5.4 UVCE

UVCE stands for unconfined apour cloud explosion. The clouds of solvent vapour mix with air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 11 %) may cause propagating flames when ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation intensity is severe depending on the total mass of vapour in cloud and may cause secondary fire. When the flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure or blast effect, resulting in heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such explosion is called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) and is most common cause of such industrial accident.

5.5 DISPERSION CASES :

5.5.1 PLUMES : Plumes are continuous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Smoke from a chimney is an example. Plumes can cause FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS as secondary scenarios.

5.5.2 PUFFS : Puffs are instantaneous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Puffs can give rise to FIRE BALLS and vapour cloud explosions (VCE). A special case of vapour cloud explosion is the Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour Explosion (BLEVE).

5.5.3 SPILLS POOL:

Spills are liquid pools created by leaking liquid chemicals. Spills cause evaporation and dispersal of toxic gases and if the spilled liquid is flammable, then it can catch fire creating a pool fire also the vapours can cause explosion.

5.6 Identification of High Risk Areas :

It is observed that the storage areas pose fire/explosion hazards as it has a substantial inventory of Methanol and Hydrogen, Toxic Gas (Ammonia) and, which may lead to major accident event.


Thus the quantitative risk assessment studies are limited to above ground storage tank farm area.

5.7 Modes of Failure: Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker. Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles /

valves etc. Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios. Gas release due to catastrophic failure of Ammonia cylinder or outlet valve/line

failure.

Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable failure cases:

TABLE-5.1

Event Causes Tank on Fire - Ignition availability Pool fire - Failure of pump outlet-inlet line + Ignition availability Fire Ball/Flash fire - Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank UVCE - Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ tank / - Vapour generation due to substrate and wind - Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of

total vapour mass between the UEL-LEL % - Ignition availability

Considering the quantity of storages & nature of Toxic and Flammable storage, following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed : Catastrophic failure of storage tank which on ignition poses heat radiation hazards to

nearby areas. Catastrophic failure of road tank and presence of ignition source poses heat radiation

hazards to nearby areas.

Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the complex. General probabilities for various failure is provided in Table-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, but consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems fail during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for detailed analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or credible as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies help us evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company.


5.8 Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation:

Damage effects vary with different scenarios. Calculations for various scenarios are made for the above failure cases to quantify the resulting damages. The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed personnel, equipment, building etc. Tank on fire /Pool fire due to direct ignition source on tank or road tanker or catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage facilities or road tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing burns to people depending on thermal load and period of exposure.

All such damages have to be specified criteria for each such resultant effect, to relate the quantifier damages in this manner, damage criteria are used for Heat Radiation. TABLE 5.3 DAMAGE CRITERIA HEAT RADIATION

Heat Radiation Incident Flux KW/m2 Damage 38 100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks 37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment. 25 50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition 14 Damage to normal buildings 12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition 12 Damage to vegetation 6 Burns (escape routes) 4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns 3 1st degree burns possible (personnel only in emergency allowed) 2 Feeling of discomfort 1.5 No discomfort even after long exposure


CHAPTER VI

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

6.1 Consequence analysis.

In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios were quantified and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency planning. Various measures taken by the company and findings of the study were considered for deciding acceptability of risks.

6.1.1 Maximum Credible loss scenarios ( MCLS)

MSCL assume maximum inventory of hazardous chemicals and worst weather condition prevailing at the time of failure. Further, no credit is given for the safety features provided in the facility to determine maximum possible damage from the scenario selected. In reality, leakage of hazardous chemical will be smaller in magnitude. Also the leakage will be detected immediately by plant operating staff then initiate various mitigation measures to prevent any disastrous situation. The maximum credible loss Scenarios (MCLS) identified for plant base on above criteria are listed below:

Table-6.1

Sr. No. Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence 1,2,3 & 4 Road tanker catastrophic

failure. Unloading arm 100

% failure, Un confined Pool Fire, Flash Fire, Ball Fire,

UVCE(Over Pressure), 5 20 KL Class A petroleum

above ground storage tank fire in A/G storage tank farm area

Direct ignition source

Tank On fire

6,7,8 & 9 Catastrophic failure of 20 KL storage tank.

Catastrophic failure Pool fire, Flash Fire, Ball Fire,

UVCE(Over Pressure), 10,11 Drum storage area fire Drum spillage Pool Fire & BLEVE in

drums 12 HSD storage tank pool

fire Catastrophic failure Pool fire

13 Hydrogen cylinder skid to PRV station.

Rupture of 1.0 cm copper pipe line

Diffusion Jet Fire

14 Hydrogen cylinder skid to PRV station

Rupture of 1.0 cm copper pipe line

Over pressure

15,16,17 & 18

LNG Bullet Catastrophic failure

Catastrophic failure Pool fire, Ball fie, Flash Fire & UVCE


6.1.2 Weather Data: Average wind speed : 3 m / sec. Average Ambient Temperature : 35 deg. c. Average Humidity : 60 % Atmospheric Stability : D

6.1.3 Assumption :

6.1.3.1 Basic assumptions For road tanker release scenario

100 % failure of Unloading arm is considered for 20 KL road tanker while unloading work. Total material drain will spread on floor. Immediate ignition will give unconfined pool fire. If there is no ignition source available nearby area, liquid will evaporate and vapour cloud will travel in wind direction, evaporated vapor mass comes in the contact with any ignition source there will be chances of Flash fire , UVCE and BLEVE in road tanker.

6.1.3.2 Basic assumptions For 20 KL storage tank catastrophic failure Catastrophic failure of 20 Kl storage tank or 100 % bottom valve/ line failure and total material drain in dyke wall. Immediate ignition will give pool fire and delay ignition will give Flash Fire, UVCE and BLEVE. Heat Radiation Damage

37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment. 12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition 4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns 1.6 No discomfort even after long exposure

6.1.3.3 For Hydrogen Gas release scenarios

Hydrogen cylinder road skid to PRV station line damage and hydrogen gas release and it will be exploid due to any ignition source. Following scenarios can be possible.

Jet fire Explosion ( Over pressure) We have calculated following hazardous distance for the above

mentioned scenarios. Intensity of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground level (KW /m2)

6.1.3.4 For LNG release scenarios

Catastrophic failure of 20 M3 storage tank or 100 % bottom valve/ line failure and total material Spread out on floor. Immediate ignition will give pool fire and delay ignition will give Flash Fire, UVCE and BLEVE.


6.1.3.5 Evapouration rate calculation Table :

Material

Name

Total

capacity of

storage

Maximum

Spillage

Evapouration

Rate

( Kg/Sec.)

Evaporated

Vapour mass

for 15 minutes

(Kg)

( M3) ( KG ) ER-1 ER-2

Class A

Petroleum

Road tanker

catastrophic

failure

20 17340 0.328 295

Catastrophic failure of 20 KL storage tank.

20 17340 0.154 138

Catastrophic failure of LNG Bullet.

20 900 0.18 253


MCA Scenario 1 Unconfined pool Fire for 20 KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE A For 20 KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker. Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 20 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height 180 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 25(m) Flame centre height 9.6 meter Pool liquid depth 0.1 (m) Maximum Flame width 9.59 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.34 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 58.82 Mims.

Incident Intensity of

Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground level

KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance ( Meters )

Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation

37.5 13.5 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 15.6 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 22.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 39.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 61.6 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 13.5 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In the 22.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 39 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 61.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.


MCA Scenario 2 Fire Ball / BLEVE simulation for 20 KL Class A petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE B For 20 Kl Class A Petroleum Road Tanker Catastrophic Failure

Scenario : FIRE BALL/ BLEVE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL Fire Ball radius 17.11 meter Mass of vapour between LEL-UEL %

295 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat radiation

119 Kw /m 2

Heat of combustion 40550 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy release

703908 Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 3 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release

4.9x106 Kj

Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 6.9 sec.

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 33.0 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 45.0 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant injury.

12.5 65.0 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .


Results In the 33 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In 65 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute. In the 118 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 186 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.


MCA Scenario 3 Flash Fire simulation for 20 KL Class A petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE C For 20KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : FLASH FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL Visible Flash Fire Height 54.02 meter Mass of Gas 295 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 27.01 meter Heat of combustion 42267.5 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 6.99 sec. Fuel-Air volume ratio in Flash fire cloud

0.600 Radius of fuel-air cloud mixture

17.11 meter

Stochiometric Fuel-Air Mixture

0.133 Total energy release 5981125 Kj

Wind speed 3.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m from Flash Fire

232.65 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 1.2928 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.5

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation (IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 45.0 100 % Fatal. Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 56.0 Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact).

12.5 74.5 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st. deg. burn .

4.0 125.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 212 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 45 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In 74.5 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute. In the 125 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 212 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.


MCA Scenario - 4 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion (UVCE) For 20 KL Class A petroleum Road tanker

TABLE D For 20 KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker

Scenario : UVCE In put Data

Stored quantity 20 KL Mass of vapour 651 Lbm TNT equivalent 2.99 Explosion efficiency 0.1 Wind speed 3.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in meter

Over pressure

( psi )

% Fatality lung Rupture

% Eardrum rupture

%Structural damage

% Glass rupture

6.66 67.3 100 100 100 100 8.33 39.5 93.5 100 100 100 15 9.7 0.1 81.4 100 100 35 2.7 0.0 6.7 46.8 100 535 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2

Results

In case of UVCE up to 6.66 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum

rupture radius. Up to 15 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 25 meter distance

for 100 % glass damage area.


MCA Scenario 5 Tank on Fire for 20 KL Class A petroleum storage tank

TABLE E Tank on Fire Simulation for 20 KL tank.

Scenario : TANK ON FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL. Max. IHR at flame centre height 12.50 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 2.35(m) Flame centre height 7.12 meter Pool liquid depth 3.0 (m) Maximum Flame width 4.12 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 5.1 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 8.35 Hrs.


level KW /m 2







Results In the 2.8 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In 3.1 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute. In the 5.5 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 8.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.


MCA Scenario 6 Pool Fire for Class A petroleum storage tank catastrophic failure

TABLE F For Class A Petroleum Storage Tank

Scenario : POOL FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL. Max. IHR at flame centre height 77.07 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 10.0(m) Flame centre height 22.44 meter Pool liquid depth 1.0 (m) Maximum Flame width 11.37 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 5.2 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 8.33 Hrs.


level KW /m 2







Results In the 9.8 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In the 16.9 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 29.6 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 46.7 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.


MCA Scenario 7 Fire Ball simulation for Class A petroleum storage tank catastrophic failure

TABLE G For Class A petroleum storage tank

Scenario : FIRE BALL In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL Fire Ball radius 13.35 meter Mass of vapour Between LEL-UEL%

138 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat radiation

188.53 Kw /m 2

Heat of combustion 40550 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy release

422147 Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 3 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release

2.30035e +006 Kj

Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 5.45 sec.


level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 28.0 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 36.0 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant injury.

12.5 54.0 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn. 4.0 92.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 142.0 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results

In the 28 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10 sec.

In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 92 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 142 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.


MCA Scenario 8 Flash Fire simulation for Class A petroleum storage tank catastrophic failure

TABLE H For Class A petroleum storage tank

Scenario : FLASH FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL Visible Flash Fire Height 45.73 meter Mass of Gas 138 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 22.87 meter Heat of combustion 42267.5 Kj/kg

Documents

Ipca Laboratories LTD. - Gujarat Pollution Control Boardgpcb.gov.in/pdf/IPCA_Laboratories_Ltd_Risk_Assessment_Report.pdf · Prepared By Ipca Laboratories Ltd. Page : 3 HSE Department