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Iran: a hIstory of IgnorIng world demands
Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has legally foresworn nuclear weapons. But for more than 25 years, Iran has pursued a covert nuclear program in direct violation of its treaty obligations.
Iran’s continuing refusal to answer the concerns raised by the evidence of its covert activities, including evidence of specific military applications, demonstrates that Iran cannot be trusted. To restore that trust, Iran must comply with six mandatory United Nations Security Council resolutions that require suspension of its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, as well as provide full answers to the questions posed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning Tehran’s suspicious nuclear activities. Iran must fulfil these obligations to create the minimal conditions for a successful negotiated outcome.
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“ We have made clear that if Iran lives up to the obligations that every nation has, it will have a path to
a more prosperous and productive relationship with the international community. ”– President Obama
While negotiations with Iran continue, Washington must not forget Iran’s long history of exploiting negotiations to buy time to advance its nuclear program. In any negotiations, the United States must make clear that it will prevent Iran from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, or the capability to quickly produce a nuclear weapon at a time of its choosing.
Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would mark a significant new regional danger, as Tehran would be able to use its status as a nuclear-capable state to increase its power and threaten U.S. national security. To stop Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, the United States must dramatically quicken the pace and scope of sanctions while bolstering the credibility of its option to use force. The United States cannot rely on a policy that seeks to contain a nuclear Iran.
www.aipac.org/Iran www.aipac.org/Iranthe threat from Iran
The ThreaT From Iranwww.aipac.org/Iran www.aipac.org/Iran
Access tO nucleAr fAcilities
requirement: Resolution 1737—passed in 2006—and subsequent
resolutions require Iran to provide the IAEA access to requested
nuclear sites.
Violation: Iran has repeatedly denied IAEA inspectors access to the
Arak heavy water reactor and refused inspectors access to documents,
individuals and locations needed to carry out their duties. The regime
has also refused IAEA access to the Parchin military facility for
four years.
enrichment ActiVities
requirement: Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions require
Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development.
Violation: Iran continues enrichment activity and, according to IAEA
physical inventories, has now acquired enough low-enriched uranium
that—if further processed—would be sufficient for the cores of four to
five nuclear weapons.
weAPOns exPOrts
requirement: Resolution 1747—passed in 2007—requires Iran to
cease all weapons exports.
Violation: More than a dozen nations have intercepted Iranian
weapon exports destined for Syria, Hizballah, Hamas and other Iranian
allies. American and allied forces have repeatedly seized Iranian arms in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
rAtify AdditiOnAl PrOtOcOls
requirement: Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions require
Iran to ratify and to act in accordance with the provisions of the
Additional Protocol to the NPT.
Violation: Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol and has refused
to abide by its provisions, including unfettered no-notice nuclear
inspections and the prompt provision of design information for
new facilities.
heAVy wAter reActOrs
requirement: Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions require
Iran to suspend all work on heavy water-related projects, including the
construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water.
Violation: Iran continues construction of a heavy water reactor at
Arak, according to IAEA inspections and satellite imagery. The reactor—
once operational—could be used in combination with a reprocessing
facility to produce plutonium for the core of a nuclear weapon.
bAllistic missiles
requirement: Resolution 1929—passed in 2010—requires Iran to
refrain from any activity related to ballistic missiles, which are capable
of delivering nuclear weapons.
Violation: Iran is busy developing a highly operational arsenal of
ballistic missiles, with constantly increasing ranges. “Iran continues
to test ballistic missiles and undertake research and development
activities,” according to the U.N. Panel of Experts on Iran.
nuclear nonprolIferatIon treatyIn 1970, Iran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). By ratifying this agreement, 185
countries agreed to forego nuclear weapons and accept comprehensive safeguards put in place by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Despite ratifying the NPT, Iran has pursued a path to nuclear weapons, through an illicit program that
violates its NPT commitments.
mAnufActuring weAPOns
commitment: Iran committed not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons.
Violation: Iran has carried out extensive work that has no civilian
purpose, including tests on nuclear triggers and technology used
to simulate nuclear explosions, according to a November 2011
IAEA report.
receiVing inAPPrOPriAte nucleAr AssistAnce
commitment: Iran committed not to seek or receive any assistance for
the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Violation: Iran confessed to the IAEA in 2004 that it had received
substantial assistance in the development of key technologies
needed to produce nuclear weapons, including from the father of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon, A.Q. Khan.
building new nucleAr fAcilities
commitment: Iran is required to provide design information to the
IAEA for any new nuclear facilities “as early as possible before nuclear
material is introduced…”
Violation: Iran has repeatedly built secret nuclear facilities, including
the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom. Iran only notified the
IAEA about Natanz in 2002 and Qom in 2009, after the facilities were
revealed to the press.
imPOrting urAnium
commitment: Iran is required to report the import of nuclear material
and place the material under IAEA safeguards.
Violation: In 1991, Iran imported uranium from China without
declaring this to the IAEA.
nucleAr sAfeguArds
commitment: Iran must provide the IAEA with information
“concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards … and the features
of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.”
Violation: Beginning in the early 1990s, Iran acknowledges it carried
out uranium conversion experiments without notifying the IAEA and
allowing for monitoring.
u.n. securIty councIl resolutIonsSince 2006, the United Nations Security Council has adopted six resolutions demanding Iran suspend
uranium enrichment and heavy water activities, cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about
its earlier activities, end weapons shipments and suspend ballistic missile work. To date, Iran has
refused to comply with any of the mandatory requirements of the Security Council.