IRAN AFTER KHAMENEI AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK

The election of moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani surprised both external and

internal observers of the Iranian election last June. Rouhanis willingness to engage with

the West has been met with tentative optimism throughout the ongoing P5+1 talks, as

the prospect of ending thirty-four years of mutual hostility between the US and Iran

hangs tantalisingly throughout the negotiations. As the talks continue, the world is

focused on whether a successful conclusion to the nuclear negotiations will be reached,

which could in turn positively affect the role Iran plays regionally and its relationship

with the international community.

The significance of Rouhanis victory and his initiation of negotiations over Irans

nuclear programme should not be understated. However, it is important to bear in mind

that all of Irans key strategic decisions ultimately lie with Ayatollah Khameneithe

Supreme Leader, the commander-in-chief and Irans top ideologue.1 Khameneis views

ultimately shape Iranian foreign and domestic policy, and any power granted to

Rouhani during the ongoing P5+1 talks is entirely contingent on Khameneis blessing

which could be retracted at any time.

The pivotal role Khamenei plays in determining the strategic direction of the

Islamic Republic means it is important to consider how the face of the Islamic Republic

will change once Khamenei leaves office. This is especially critical to address as

1 A. Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs, (Sep.-Oct. 2013 Issue), [Accessible at:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139643/akbar-ganji/who-is-ali-khamenei, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

Khamenei is now 74 years old and rumours of his ill health have abounded in recent

years.2 The next Supreme Leader (assuming there will be another Supreme Leader) will

determine both the face and the future of the Islamic Republic. It is therefore important

for the international community to assess the potential opportunities and threats which

may arise once Khamenei leaves office.

This essay outlines three plausible scenarios for post-Khamenei Iran, which are

used to examine potential threats, opportunities and implications for the UK. Before

addressing these scenarios, it is first necessary to outline some key factors which will

probably affect the process of succession based on current facts on the ground in Iran.

These assumptions are essentially an interpretation of the current socio-political and

economic dynamics in Iran, rendering them entirely subject to change. It is therefore

important to note that fluctuations in these trends will result in important changes in

the plausibility of the subsequent scenarios.

Internal Dynamics: How will the succession process be determined?

Since assuming power, Khamenei has transformed the political landscape of Iran

in order to maximise his authority over the Islamic Republic.3 His marginalisation of

constitutional institutions compounded by the elevation of groups such as the Iranian

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will have a profound impact on the next succession

process.4 In theory, Irans Assembly of Experts is entrusted with supervising, dismissing

2 The Times of Israel, Iranian reports say Supreme Leaders health worsening, (October 13, 2013), [Accessible

at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-reports-say-supreme-leaders-health-worsening/, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014]. 3 A. Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs.

4 A. Nader, D. Thaler, S. R. Bohandy, The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

(RAND Corporation, 2011), p 7.

and electing the Supreme Leader.5 It is unlikely, however, that this body will ever

exercise its power of dismissal over Khamenei, rendering his death the most plausible

catalyst for succession. Like the majority of institutions in Iran, the Assembly of Experts

is highly loyal to Khamenei, who has built up a powerful network of support during his

twenty-five years as Supreme Leader. This support base is comprised of various

political, military and economic institutions, which Khamenei continually pits against

one another in order to ensure that no faction becomes too strong or ultimately

challenges his authority.6

Elements of Khameneis network will seek to influence the succession process,

especially the IRGCwhich has grown exponentially under Khamenei and is now

generally regarded as the most powerful political and economic bloc in Iran.7 With such

a high stake in the future of the Islamic Republic, the IRGC will possibly be the most

important external influence on the official succession procedure. However, the

organisation faces severe internal divisions, decreasing the likelihood that it will

unanimously support one candidate for Supreme Leader and potentially reducing its

influence over the succession process.8

The dynamics between rival factions within Khameneis network are in constant

flux, and even the manner in which Khamenei dies has the potential to determine each

factions influence over the next succession process. If Khamenei believes his death is

approaching he is likely to make adequate preparations in order to preserve his legacy.

He may announce a successor (privately or publicly) in advance which would greatly

5 D. Thaler, A. Nader, S. Chubin, J. Green, C. Lynch, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian

Leadership Dynamics, (RAND Corporation, 2010), p 28. 6 A. Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs, (Sep.-Oct. 2013 Issue).

7 R. Safshekan and F. Sabet, The Ayatollahs Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009

Election Crisis, Middle East Journal, (Vol. 64, No. 4: Autumn 2010), p 543. 8 A. Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, The Iran Primer, [Accessible at:

http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

reduce the risk of a power vacuum in the wake of his death, as his decision is likely to be

respected by the more powerful elements of his support base, facilitating a swift

transition process.9

The consequences are a lot less certain if Khamenei dies unexpectedly, as such an

event could trigger a struggle for power between rival institutions hoping to exercise

control over the succession process. Infighting at the elite level would decrease the

prospect of a swift transition, with a potentially destabilising effect on the Islamic

Republic. A smooth transition process, however, does not necessarily guarantee the

regimes stability in the post-Khamenei era. Even if transition is swift, the power of the

new Supreme Leader will depend on his ability to consolidate his position, both by

gaining the trust of the Iranian people and building a coalition of support. Irans most

powerful actors are loyal to Khamenei as opposed to the office of the Supreme Leader,

meaning the new leader may find himself in an initially insecure position.

The following scenarios do not aim to predict the future for Iran in the post-

Khamenei era. Rather, they seek to outline plausible visions of reality based on an

interpretation of past trends and current socio-political dynamics, in order to

extrapolate information which can help the UK prepare for a future inevitably defined

by uncertainty.

9 T. Karasik, Thoughts on Irans post-Khamenei future, Al Arabiya News, (December 5, 2013), [Accessible at:

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/12/05/Thoughts-on-Iran-s-post-Khamenei-future.html, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

SCENARIO 1: SMOOTH TRANSITION / WEAK SUCCESSOR

The next Supreme Leader is selected swiftly, perhaps because Khamenei announces

a successor in advance which defuses rivalry between competing stakeholders and

facilitates a smooth transition process. However, Khameneis successor finds himself in an

initially weak position. He does not automatically inherit Khameneis powerful support

base, and he does not command enough popular support to ensure that his authority is not

challenged.

The way in which the new Supreme Leader decides to consolidate his position will

be based on his calculation of internal dynamics at the time. Like Khamenei, he may turn

inwards in order to entrench his position by building a coalition of support among Irans

most powerful. Depending on whether the hardliners or moderates hold more political

influence, he may instead choose to look outwardsseeking to buttress his position by

fostering relations with the international community and inviting foreign investment. This

would also depend on his assessment of the public mood, and whether the notion of

increased international engagement remains as popular at the point of succession as it

does today.

IMPLICATIONS

The weakness of the Supreme Leader in this scenario presents the UK with

certain opportunities and threats. If the hardliner camp is the most powerful voice at

the time of succession, the Supreme Leader may capitalise on this by building support

accordingly. This could result in a resurgence of political intransigence, increased

isolation from the international community and an escalation of Irans nuclear

programme. In contrast, if the moderate narrative of engagement with the West retains

its current strength, Khameneis successor may seek support via this avenue instead.

In this scenario Irans next Supreme Leader is not an ideologue, or at least he is

not in a position to act on ideology alone. His primary interest is based on preserving

power, which provides the UK with a fragile opportunity for increased engagement. If

Khameneis successor can be convinced that his interests are best preserved through

increased engagement with the international community, Iran may begin to embrace

the globalised world with positive repercussions on both its domestic affairs and the

role it plays regionally.

SCENARIO 2: POWER STRUGGLE / ENCROACHING MILITARISATION

Khamenei dies unexpectedly, resulting in a power struggle between competing

stakeholders seeking to control the succession process. As Irans most powerful institution,

the IRGC prevails and successfully propels a candidate from its own camp to power.10

While the infrastructure of the Islamic Republic ostensibly remains intact, the regimes

traditional institutions are marginalised under the new Supreme Leader, who increasingly

consolidates power with the IRGC and its supporters.

Although the IRGC holds a vast amount of power in Iran, the organisation is highly

factionalised and does not speak with one voice.11 The new Supreme Leaders position may

therefore be insecure at first, as he is unlikely to have gained the IRGCs unanimous

support and may also face hostility from the Islamic Republics traditionalist camps

particularly the clergy. In order to bolster his authority, the new Supreme Leader may

surround himself with the powerful, hardline factions of the IRGC, allowing him to actively

suppress opposition while establishing his own position.

IMPLICATIONS

Based on Irans internal power dynamics as they stand today, IRGC intervention

in the succession process is a likely scenario. This is an immediately daunting prospect

from the UKs perspective, but it is important to note that the IRGC is not a monolithic,

solely hardline organisation. As Mehdi Khalaji argues, not all IRGC commanders are

10

Irans constitution stipulates both the process for succession and legal candidates for Irans leader. However, the legal procedure was overlooked in the case of Khameneionly a mid-ranking cleric when elected as Supreme Leader, which was technically illegal at the time. It is unlikely that the constitution will be strictly adhered to in the future; especially if a body as powerful as the IRGC decides to intervene directly in the succession process. 11

F. M. Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, (RAND Corporation, 2009), p 15.

intransigent ideologues and in the post-Khamenei era some will even seek to open Iran

up further to the West.12 If military leaders gain increased decision-making power in the

post-Khamenei era, there is a chance that they will seek engagement with the West in

order to gain international legitimacy and internal popularity, while restoring Irans

broken economy.13 This prospect depends critically on the behaviour of the

international community today, which has the potential to delegitimise the hardline

narrative and promote the likelihood of an Iran willing to open up fully to the West in

the future.

SCENARIO 3: POWER VACUUM / REGIME CHANGE

The previous scenarios presume that another Supreme Leader will inevitably follow

the death of Khamenei; an assumption which ought to be investigated. Although

predictions of a power vacuum in the wake of Khomeinis death were overestimated, there

is evidence of popular dissatisfaction with the regime which has the potential to crystallise

into widespread protests given the right circumstances (as the world witnessed in the

aftermath of Irans controversial 2009 elections).14

In this scenario, an extended transitional period following Khameneis death results

in some social unrest. Heightened concerns about the stability of the regime during the

succession process lead the IRGC to react with disproportionate force. This crackdown

triggers public outcry and provides a catalyst for widespread protests which the IRGC

cannot ultimately quash. Protests escalate into an uprising which concludes with either

the fall or radical transformation of the Islamic Republic. Iranian youth, who tend to be

highly politicised, highly educated and comprise the bulk of the states population, will

likely be the most important bloc throughout these protests, just as they were in the post-

election protests of 2009 and the student protests of 1999.15

12

M. Khalaji, Supreme Succession: Who Will Lead Post-Khamenei Iran?, The Washington Institute, (Issue 117, February 2012), p 2. 13

Ibid., p 2. 14

C. Addis, Irans 2009 Presidential Elections, (DIANE Publishing, 2009), pp. 7-11. 15

S. Khosravi, Young and Defiant in Tehran, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p 140.

IMPLICATIONS

This is both the most transformative and the least likely scenario based on

current socio-political dynamics. The threats and opportunities for the UK which

emerge from the fall of the Islamic Republic are inevitably steeped in uncertainty.

Optimism that the Arab Spring would be a force for democratisation was short-lived,

but a future for Iran in which politics is defined by democracy and increased

engagement with the West should not be automatically discounted. Iran has a strong

civil society, a highly educated population and a generation under thirty which tend to

favour normalised relations with the West.

Perhaps these factors will not result in a revolution, but dissatisfaction rates as

they currently stand are arguably not sustainable if the Islamic Republic is to continue

as we know it today. It is therefore prudent for the international community to consider

the transformation of the Islamic Republic as a viable scenario in Irans future.

Preparing Today For An Uncertain Tomorrow: Engage, Delegitimise, Empower.

The Foreign Offices mission statement for Iran states that the UK wishes to see

Iran reform internally, play a constructive regional role, and reach a negotiated solution

to the nuclear issue.16 Steps should be taken by the UK today in order to promote the

achievement of these policy options in the long-term, and in a future without Khamenei.

The above scenarios have emphasised the importance of supporting Irans moderate

16

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Mission Statement in Iran [Accessible at: www.gov.uk/government/world/iran, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

camp today in order to facilitate the sustained delegitimisation of the hardline narrative

into the future.

There are several steps the UK can take today which may positively contribute to

Irans internal and external outlook in a future without Khamenei. As the scenarios

highlight, the initial position of the next Supreme Leader will probably be nominal,

meaning he will likely look to consolidate his position based on the influences of

powerful political players and the mood of the general population. It is important that

the moderate camp remains powerful in Iran and the Iranian population does not

become disenchanted with the notion of engagement with the West; objectives which

the UK should seek to attain.

The UK is already progressing in the right direction. The government has not

ignored the election of Rouhani, and diplomatic relations have steadily improved in the

past year. Indeed, the UK recently announced that it was set to re-open the British

embassy in Iran, which has been closed for three years.17 However, in order to

demonstrate to the Iranian people that the Rouhani administrations reformist posture

is not being ignored by Western state-actors, further steps ought to be taken. The UK

should respond to the Iranian populations receptiveness to relations with the West by

aiming to improve business, education and cultural links. For instance, the UK could

capitalise on the fact that it remains one of the prime destinations for Iranians seeking

higher education abroad, by fostering closer links with Iranian universities or

embarking on joint research ventures. If tangible measures can be offered to the Iranian

population, the UK could play a role in delegitimising the hardline camp, which

perceives the West as fundamentally distrustful.

17

UK to re-open Iran embassy says Hague, BBC News, (June 17, 2014), [Accessible at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27882932, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014).

The UK cannot directly impact when or how the next succession process will

play out, but it can defend against uncertainty by developing its relationship with Iran

today. Since Rouhanis election, relations between Iran and the West have sat at a

critical juncture, and actions taken now have the potential to vastly impact the future of

Iranian-Western relations. As the National Iranian American Council argues, the success

of Rouhanis counter-narrative is dependent upon the policies and behaviour of the US

and Europe.18 Any failures in current negotiations, for example, will be capitalised on by

hardliners as evidence that engagement with the West is an inevitably fruitless pursuit,

in an attempt to deflate the moderate support base. The UK should therefore focus on

making choices today which empower Irans moderate camp, delegitimise the hardline

narrative and offer tangible results to the Iranian people by engaging directly with the

population. Such actions have the potential to vastly influence the future of Irans

relationship with the international community as well as its internal postureeven into

the post-Khamenei era.

18

B. Khajehpour, R. Marashi and T. Parsi, Extending Hands & Unclenching Fists, National Iranian American Council, (December 2013), p 16.

REFERENCES

- Addis, C. Irans 2009 Presidential Elections, (DIANE Publishing, 2009).

- Khajepour, B. Marashi, R. and Parsi, T. Extending Hands & Unclenching Fists: Reorienting Irans Outlook Beyond the Nuclear Deal, National Iranian American Council, (December 2013), pp. 1-28.

- Khalaji, M. Supreme Succession: Who Will Lead Post-Khamenei Iran?, The Washington Institute, (Issue 117, February 2012) pp. 1-22.

- Khosravi, S. Young and Defiant in Tehran, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

- Nader, A. Thaler, D. Bohandy, S. R. The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran, (RAND Corporation, 2011).

- Safshekan, R. and Sabet, F. The Ayatollahs Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis, Middle East Journal, (Vol. 64, No. 4: Autumn 2010), pp. 543-558.

- Thaler, D. et al, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, (RAND Corporation, 2010).

- Wehrey, K. M. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, (RAND Corporation, 2009).

Websites

- Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Mission Statement in Iran [Accessible at: www.gov.uk/government/world/iran].

- Ganji, A. Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs, (Sep.-Oct. 2013 Issue), [Accessible at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139643/akbar-ganji/who-is-ali-khamenei].

- Karasik, T. Thoughts on Irans post-Khamenei future, Al Arabiya News, (December 5, 2013), [Accessible at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/12/05/Thoughts-on-Iran-s-post-Khamenei-future.html].

- Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, The Iran Primer, [Accessible at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards].

- The Times of Israel, Iranian reports say Supreme Leaders health worsening, (October 13, 2013), [Accessible at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-reports-say-supreme-leaders-health-worsening/].

- UK to re-open Iran embassy says Hague, BBC News, (June 17, 2014), [Accessible at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27882932].