Iran Nuclear Crisis

and its Implication Submitted To : Dr. Anand Mathur The nuclear crisis in Iran continues to pose serious challenges to international peace and

security. Since mid-2002, when an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence

publicly of secret nuclear activities in Iran, the world has struggled to develop an

adequate response to the Iranian challenge. Iran‘s repeated threats to annihilate the state

of Israel while it develops the world‘s most dangerous weapons have created an even

more explosive situation. If diplomatic efforts to defuse the situation fail, Israel may see no

other choice than to launch a preventive

strike against Iran‘s nuclear facilities. Furthermore Iran‘s threat to close the Strait

of Hormuz in case of any aggression from Israel or U.S. through which around 20% of

world oil passes which amounts to about 17 million barrels of crude oil daily. In case of

any conflict the world especially developing countries which import oil may face serious

problems in fulfilling their oil needs. Though efforts are being made to solve this crisis

though diplomatic efforts and the efforts have succeeded in bringing some hope but

still the matter remains like fire in control and any specific event may act like oil in fire

bringing the world peace in danger. Manish Kumar Jain 11/4/2012

Project Report

Iran Nuclear Crisis and its Implications

Introduction:

One of the most difficult and politically divisive issues facing the United States and the rest of world which supports NPT is how to prevent Iran from

getting nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed Iran would spur proliferation in the region, increase regional instability, and increase the chance of nuclear

war. The prospect of a Nuclear armed Iran causes acute concern not only in United States and Israel, but also in the Middle East and Europe and most of

the rest part of the world. States with nuclear weapons have developed them in conjunction with their civil nuclear energy programmes.It is the view

of many international actors, including the US administration, the EU and others, that Iran not only must be held to its legal obligations under the NPT

but also must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon capability under the guise of its power programme. Iran‘s ‗dual-use‘ centrifuge enrichment

capabilities can supply fuel for nuclear energy and could also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the NPT and its

safeguards arrangements with the IAEA, Iran has the right to enrich

uranium. Iran could continue its enrichment activities and remain within its obligations under the treaty until such time as it begins to manufacture

nuclear weapons. On the other hand the nuclear issue has been used to cultivate nationalist

feeling in Iran; relinquishing the right to nuclear technology under the NPT would be seen as a national humiliation. Neither reformists nor

conservatives appear willing to contemplate such a move. Iran has a history as a regional power, and its nuclear advances serve as a symbol of Iran‘s

political importance and its modernity. If, as existing states with nuclear weapons argue, such weapons confer

status and provide security through ‗deterrence,‘ some factions in Iran might indeed find the prospect of obtaining nuclear weapons attractive. The

country is situated in a war-plagued region (five major wars in less than 25 years). When Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, subjecting it to the most extensive

use of chemical weapons since the First World War, the international

community turned a blind eye. The conflict cost the lives of hundreds of

thousands of Iranians and remains a major scar on the national psyche to

this day. Iran is located between two regional nuclear weapons powers, Israel and Pakistan and is encircled by US military forces in Iraq,

Afghanistan, Turkey, Kuwait, Qatar and Kazakhstan. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is trying to convince the

world that Iran has made great strides in its nuclear program through its own efforts, that the nuclear issue in dispute is Iran‘s right to peaceful

development of nuclear energy, and that international sanctions against Iran are hypocritical and unjust. Khamenei also wishes to suggest (albeit not

explicitly) to his own people and to potential enemies that Iran could quickly develop nuclear weapons if it chose. Thus making Iran a major player in

regional politics.

Content

This Report includes

Nuclear Crisis in Iran : Development of Iran‘s Policy

Israel‘s Policy U.S. Policy and Impact of Diplomacy and Sanctions

Impact of Iran Crisis on China‘s Foreign Policy Impact of Iran Crisis on India‘s Policy

Impact on Russia Impact on Middle East Countries

Recent Development of talks Conclusion

Nuclear Crisis in Iran

The nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of the

United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation of the United States and Western European governments in Iran's nuclear

program continued until the 1979 Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran. After the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government temporarily disbanded

elements of the program, and then revived it with less Western assistance than during the pre-revolution era.

Since then Iran has invested heavily in nuclear industries in the last twenty years. It has sought a wide range of items overseas, including nuclear

reactors, uranium conversion facilities, heavy water production plants, fuel fabrication plants, and uranium enrichment facilities. The controversy over

Iran's nuclear programs centers in particular on Iran's failure to declare

sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities to the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA). Enrichment can be used to produce uranium for reactor fuel or (at higher enrichment levels) for weapons. Iran says its

nuclear program is peaceful, and has enriched uranium to less than 5%, consistent with fuel for a civilian nuclear power plant. Iran also claims that it

was forced to resort to secrecy after US pressure caused several of its nuclear contracts with foreign governments to fall through. After the IAEA

Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran

suspend its nuclear enrichment activities while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the sanctions are "illegal," imposed by

"arrogant powers," and that Iran has decided to pursue the monitoring of its self-described peaceful nuclear program through "its appropriate legal path,"

the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Many of its overseas purchases were thwarted, such as multiple efforts to

buy research reactors and an attempt to purchase a turn-key gas centrifuge

plant from Russia in 1995.However, in general, Iran found suppliers to provide the wherewithal to build nuclear facilities. A. Q. Khan and business

associates in Europe and the Middle East, commonly called the Khan network, provided Iran the ability to build and operate gas centrifuges.

Without their assistance, Iran would have likely been unable to develop a gas centrifuge program.

After public allegations about Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities, the IAEA launched an investigation that concluded in November 2003 that

Iran had systematically failed to meet its obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement to report those activities to the IAEA, although it also

reported no evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Board of Governors delayed a formal finding of non-compliance until September

2005, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's

noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations Security

Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment programs. The Council imposed sanctions after Iran refused to do so. A May 2009 U.S.

Congressional Report suggested "the United States, and later the Europeans, argued that Iran's deception meant it should forfeit its right to enrich, a

position likely to be up for negotiation in talks with Iran."

In exchange for suspending its enrichment program, Iran has been offered

"a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect

and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." However, Iran has consistently refused to

give up its enrichment program, arguing that the program is necessary for its energy security, that such "long term arrangements" are inherently

unreliable, and would deprive it of its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear

technology. In June of 2009, in the immediate wake of the disputed Iranian presidential election, Iran initially agreed to a deal to relinquish its stockpile

of low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a medical research reactor, but then backed out of the deal. Currently, thirteen states possess operational

enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and several others have expressed an interest in developing indigenous enrichment programs. Iran's position was

endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which expressed concern about the potential monopolization of nuclear fuel production.

After delays, Iran's first nuclear power plant, Bushehr I reactor was

complete with major assistance of Russian government agency Rosatomand officially opened on 12 September 2011

Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin. Iran has also indicated that it will seek more

medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the future.

Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a

nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran‘s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water

nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran.

Despite this pressure, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has

also continued work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Iran‘s current nuclear infrastructure is large and growing. Although many

key facilities are not finished, Iran is close to operating a large power reactor at Bushehr and has started relatively large fuel cycle facilities. Table 1

summarizes the main declared nuclear facilities in Iran. Some of these facilities, such as Kalaye Electric, the formerly secret gas centrifuge R&D site

in Tehran, are closed and others, such as the Arak heavy water reactor and

the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), are under construction. But the list shows that Iran intends to have one of the largest nuclear fuel cycle

programs in the developing world. If Iran finishes its declared nuclear facilities, it would have a capability to produce highly enriched uranium

(HEU) and weapon-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons. Although most of the facilities listed in table 1 will be used for civil purposes,

the fate of others remains difficult to determine. Determining the purpose of these facilities has been complicated, because Iran acquired so many

capabilities in secret and did not fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to declare all its facilities, materials, and activities.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported regularly on

Iran‘s lack of adequate cooperation to allow the inspectors to fully

reconstruct the history of Iran‘s nuclear program. In addition, Iran decided

early last year to no longer implement the Additional Protocol and other transparency measures required by the IAEA. The February 22, 2007 IAEA

report concluded that without more cooperation and transparency, the IAEA ―will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared

nuclear material and activities or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that program.‖

To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-

peaceful uses, Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on its enrichment program including, for example, ratifying the Additional Protocol

to allow more stringent inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, operating the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as a

multinational fuel center with the participation of foreign representatives, renouncing plutonium reprocessing and immediately fabricating all enriched

uranium into reactor fuel rods. Iran's offer to open its uranium enrichment

program to foreign private and public participation mirrors suggestions of an IAEA expert committee which was formed to investigate the methods to

reduce the risk that sensitive fuel cycle activities could contribute to national nuclear weapons capabilities.

Details of the Work going on at these sites are

Arak - Heavy water plant

The existence of a heavy water facility near the town of Arak first emerged with the publication of satellite images by the US-based Institute for Science

and International Security in December 2002. Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear fission chain reaction either in

a certain type of reactor - albeit not the type that Iran is currently building - or produce plutonium for use in a nuclear bomb.

In August 2010, the IAEA visited the IR-40 heavy water reactor site at Arak. It said the facility was still being built but some major equipment had been

installed. Iran told the IAEA the operation of the reactor was planned to start by the end of 2013.

The IAEA said that based on satellite imagery, the heavy water production

plant appeared to be in operation, but had not had access to it to confirm such reports.

Bushehr - Nuclear power station

Iran's nuclear programme began in 1974 with plans to build a nuclear power station at Bushehr with German assistance.

The project was abandoned because of the Islamic revolution five years later, but revived in the 1990s when Tehran signed an agreement with

Russia to resume work at the site. Moscow delayed completion on the project while the UN Security Council debated and then passed resolutions

aimed at stopping uranium enrichment in Iran. In December 2007, Moscow started delivering the canisters of enriched uranium the plant needs.Earlier

in the same month, a US intelligence report said Iran was not currently running a military nuclear programme. There are two pressurised water

reactors at the site.

Gachin - Uranium mine In December 2010, Iran said it had delivered its first domestically produced

uranium ore concentrate, or yellowcake, to a plant that can make it ready for enrichment. Iran's nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi said the first batch of

yellowcake had been sent from Gachin mine sent to a conversion facility at Isfahan. Mining operations started at the Gachin in 2004.Iran was believed

to be running low on its stock of yellowcake, originally imported from South

Africa in the 1970s.

Isfahan - Uranium conversion plant

Iran is building a plant at a nuclear research facility to convert

yellowcake into three forms:

Hexafluoride gas - used in gas centrifuges

Uranium oxide - used to fuel reactors, albeit not the type Iran is constructing

Metal - often used in the cores of nuclear bombs. The IAEA is concerned about the metal's use, as Iran's reactors do not require it as fuel.

Natanz - Uranium enrichment plant

Iran resumed uranium enrichment work at Natanz in July 2004, after a halt during negotiations with leading European powers over its programme. It

announced in September 2007 that it had installed 3,000 centrifuges, the machines that do the enrichment. In 2010, Iran told the IAEA Natanz would

be the venue for new enrichment facilities - construction of which would

start around March 2011.

This is the facility at the heart of Iran's dispute with the United Nations Security Council. The Council is concerned because the technology used for

producing fuel for nuclear power can be used to enrich the uranium to a much higher level to produce a nuclear explosion.

Parchin

One area at Parchin has been identified as a suspected nuclear weapons development facility.

The overall complex is one of Iran's leading munitions centres - for the research, development and production of ammunition, rockets and high

explosives. A limited inspection carried out by the IAEA in 2005 found no proof of any nuclear weapons activity at Parchin.

But according to information from an IAEA report in November 2011, it is

believed the site has also been used for testing high explosives that could be used in nuclear weapons.

Qom - Uranium enrichment plant

In January 2012, Iran said it had begun uranium enrichment at the heavily

fortified site of Fordo near the holy city of Qom. It had revealed the existence of the facility, about 30km (20 miles) north of the city, in

September 2009.Iran initially informed the IAEA that it was constructing the

plant to produce uranium enriched up to 5% - commonly used in nuclear power production.

In June 2011, Iran told the IAEA that it was planning to produce uranium

enriched up to 20% at Fordo - and would subsequently stop 20% fuel production at Natanz.In January 2012, the IAEA confirmed Iran had started

the production of uranium enriched up to 20%.Iran says the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is for use as a fuel in research reactors. Uranium - with a

concentration of 20% or more - is needed to build nuclear weapons.

The IAEA says environmental samples taken from the site at Fordo in April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.

Israel’s Stand

The question of whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will or will not pose

an existential threat to Israel has become an important debate among Israeli leaders. Some Israeli officials express concerns, based on Iranian leaders‘

long-standing pronouncements against the existence of Israel, that Iran might seek to use a nuclear weapon against Israel even if faced with the

prospect of near-certain retaliation from Israel‘s presumed but officially undeclared nuclear .The general view in Israel is concern that a nuclear Iran

would compromise traditional Israeli security doctrine and practices—based on principles of self-reliance and maintaining overwhelming military

superiority—and lead to an unacceptable level of national security uncertainty. This in turn would fundamentally damage the quality of life and

psychological sense of safety that Israelis deem critically important to their country‘s continued viability as a Jewish national home.

Israel "warned that it is prepared to take unilateral military action against Iran if the international community fails to stop any development of nuclear

weapons at the country's atomic energy facilities". It cited Israeli defense

minister Shaul Mofaz stating, "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession".

Some Israelis worry that even if Iran did not attack Israel with a nuclear weapon, mere possession of a weapon or the capability to assemble one

quickly would make it more difficult to deter Iran from pursuing greater regional influence and amplifying threats to Israeli security through proxies

and allies—the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militants in Gaza, and possibly even the beleaguered Asad

regime in Syria

Long-standing Israeli national security doctrine emphasizes Israel‘s prerogative to ―defend itself, by itself.‖ In a January 24, 2012, speech in the

Knesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, in reference to the Iranian nuclear issue, ―In the end, with regard to threats to our very existence, we cannot

abandon our future to the hands of others. With regard to our fate, our duty is to rely on ourselves alone.‖

An Israeli strike against Iran‘s nuclear facilities would not be unprecedented.

Israel has launched preventive air strikes at nuclear facilities developed by hostile states in the past. In June 1981, Israel launched a successful air

strike against Iraq‘s Osiraq reactor and inflicted a major setback on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In September 2007,Israel launched an air strike

against a nuclear facility in Syria that was being built with North Korean assistance. The Israeli warplanes penetrated Syrian air defenses—which

were more formidable than the air defense systems currently protecting

Iranian nuclear sites—with little apparent problem.

Israel could opt to launch a single surprise attack at a limited number of key facilities to disrupt the Iranian nuclear weapons effort. The overall success of

such a mission would depend on the quality of Israeli intelligence on Iran‘s nuclear facilities, the capabilities of Iran‘s air defenses, the accuracy of the

strikes and the capability of Israeli ordnance to penetrate hardened targets. A single wave of attacks would not bring lasting benefits; Israel would have

to launch multiple follow-up strikes to inflict higher levels of damage on Iran‘s nuclear infrastructure.

From Israel‘s perspective, buying even a small amount of time to postpone

an existential threat is a worthwhile endeavor. The 1981 strike on Iraq‘s Osiraq nuclear reactor did not end Iraq‘s nuclear weapons efforts, but it paid

large dividends because Saddam Hussein‘s regime never was able to replace

the reactor. Iraq‘s nuclear program suffered further setbacks due to U.S. air strikes during the 1991 Gulf war and the U.N. sanctions that followed after

Iraq refused to abide by the subsequent ceasefire agreement. An Israeli military operation that delayed the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran also

would have the benefit of delaying the prospective cascade of nuclear proliferation that would accelerate a nuclear arms race among other states

threatened by Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, which would further destabilize the tense region and immensely complicate Israel‘s

security environment. An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would be a much more difficult and complex operation than the 1981 raid on

Iraq‘s Osiraq reactor.

The Iranian dictatorship learned the lessons of Israel‘s 1981 strike on Iraq‘s

nuclear reactor: The Iranian nuclear infrastructure is more decentralized, dispersed, hardened, and protected than was Iraq‘s nuclear program. Some

of the nuclear sites have been located in cities, which would magnify the col- lateral casualties of air strikes. Other sites have been built deep

underground with assistance from North Korea, which has developed world-class tunneling technology.

Israel may not have the specialized ―bunker buster‖ ordnance necessary to destroy some of the hardened facilities buried deep underground. But the

Israelis may strike the entrances of the underground facilities to shut them down, at least temporarily. Israeli warplanes could destroy nearby power

plants to deprive some of the facilities of the electrical power necessary for their operation. The Israeli air force also has trained to destroy Iranian

targets by using low-yield nuclear weapons. But it is doubtful that Israel would break the nuclear taboo attacks with chemical, biological, or

radiological weapons of mass destruction.

Israel has repeatedly signaled a willingness to attack Iran‘s nuclear sites if

diplomacy fails to dissuade Iran from continuing on its current threatening course. The Israel Air Force staged a massive and widely publicized air

exercise over the Mediterranean Sea in June 2008 in which Israeli warplanes, refueled by aerial tankers, simulated attacks on targets that were

more than 870 miles away, approximately the same distance from Israel as Iran‘s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.

From May 31 to June 4, 2009, Israel staged its largest country-wide civil

defense drill, which simulated widespread missile attacks. In late June, an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine transited the Suez Canal for the first time to

deploy in the Red Sea, and two Israeli Saar-class warships followed in July. An Israeli official warned that if Iran failed to halt its nuclear program,

―These maneuvers are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on its

threats.‖

The general perception in Israel can be known from the statement that Israel's leaders cannot countenance even the risk that a regime like that led

by Mahmoud Ahmedinajad will go nuclear, says Bergman an Israeli journalist who has recently completed a long series of interviews with senior Israeli

leaders. "Once you face or you think you face a danger of another Holocaust, a threat of annihilation, then you need to do everything that you can in

order to prevent this threat," he says . "The probability is that Israel will strike during 2012," says Ronen Bergman,

"The military in Israel is preparing for a strike, there is a huge military build-up," he says.

The crisis is coming to a head now because Israel's intelligence agencies are

worried that Iran's nuclear facilities - especially at Fordow, near Qom where they have been enriching uranium - will enter a "zone of immunity" in nine

months' time.

So having the example of Iran in mind and the having an accepted fact that a nuclear Armed Iran is an existential threat to Isreal‘s Sovereignty, Israel

can go to any degree to stop Iran from making a nuclear weapon.

U.S. Policy and Diplomatic Pressure through Sanctions

Despite the diplomatic efforts of several U.S. Administrations, Iran has

repeatedly rejected offers to permanently defuse the long-simmering confrontation over its illicit nuclear weapons program. Tehran temporarily

froze its uranium enrichment efforts from 2003 to 2005, undoubtedly due to fear of possible U.S. military action after American interventions in

neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq.

But once the Iranian regime concluded that the U.S. was bogged down in Iraq, it dropped the charade of negotiations with the EU-3 (Britain, France

and Germany) and resumed its nuclear efforts in 2005 after hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power. The Bush Administration

endorsed the EU-3 diplomatic initiative and later joined the broader P5 +1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany)

diplomatic initiative, but Tehran dismissed these diplomatic offers and ignored three rounds of mild sanctions imposed by the United Nations

Security Council. The Obama Administration sweetened the U.S. diplomatic offer and sought

to engage Iran diplomatically without any preconditions. But President Obama‘s engagement policy has failed to budge Tehran, which has

accelerated its uranium enrichment efforts and again was caught cheating on its legal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by building a

secret nuclear facility near Qom that was revealed by President Obama in

late September. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspects that Iran has additional secret nuclear facilities that it has illegally hidden

from the IAEA. Diplomacy backed by timid U.N. Security Council sanctions is not likely to

dissuade Iran from continuing its nuclear weapons program. It is too late in the game and Tehran has invested too much scarce economic resources,

human capital, and prestige to refrain from taking the final steps to attaining a nuclear capability. Moreover, Iranian hardliners, who have established an

increasingly firm grip on power, are vehemently opposed to better relations with the United States. They fear that improved bilateral relations with the

―Great Satan‖ would pose a threat to their own dominant position within Iran

because it would tempt disillusioned Iranians to join a ―soft revolution‖

against them. They know that three previous Iranian revolutions were aborted after westernized elements defected from the revolutionary coalition

and cooperated with foreign powers. The United States has the advantage of being geographically further away

from Iran than Israel and thus less vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear attack. But it must be sensitive to its ally‘s security perspective. Vice President

Joseph Biden spoke the truth when he said on July 5 that ―Israel can determine for itself—it‘s a sovereign nation—what‘s in their interest and

what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else.‖ Biden recognized that, ―Look, we cannot dictate to another sovereign nation what they can

and cannot do when they make a determination—if they make a determination that they are existentially threatened.‖

President Obama quickly denied that his Vice President‘s comments signaled a green light for an Israeli attack. But Vice President Biden was correct in

assessing that Israel cannot afford to bet on Iranian self-restraint. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, also has warned that ―there is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate‖ a nuclear

Iran. Given this reality and Iran‘s public threats to attack the United States in

retaliation for an Israeli attack, the Obama Administration must be mindful of the fact that the United States inevitably will be drawn into an Israeli–

Iranian crisis. Washington should not seek to block Israel from taking what it considers to

be necessary action against an existential threat. The United States does not have the power to guarantee that Israel would not be attacked by a nuclear

Iran in the future, so it should not betray the trust of a democratic ally by tying its hands now. Although an Israeli attack on Iran‘s nuclear program

will entail increased risks for U.S. interests in the Middle East, these risks would be dwarfed by the threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Not only

would a nuclear Iran pose a much more dire direct threat to the U.S., Israel,

and other allies, but Tehran might pass a nuclear weapon to one of its Islamist terrorist surrogates.

Alternatively Washington could go one step ahead and knowing that the United States is likely to be attacked by Iran in the aftermath of an Israeli

strike anyway, it may be logical to consider joining Israel in a preventive war against Iran. But the Obama Administration is extremely unlikely to follow

this course.

In fact the path chosen by Obama Administration is to put sanctions and

trouble the economy of Iran, in such manner that there starts a general impression on people in Iran to forget about Nuclear Weapon and start

focusing on saving the economy and people.

Numerous nations and multinational entities have imposed sanctions against Iran. Sanctions commonly bar nuclear, missile and certain military exports

to Iran; investments in oil, gas and petrochemicals; exports of refined petroleum products; business dealings with the Iranian Republican Guard

Corps; banking and insurance transactions, including with the Central Bank of Iran; and shipping. The United States imposed sanctions on Iran following

the Islamic revolution of 1979, while more recent rounds of sanctions by the U.S. and other entities were motivated by Iran's nuclear program.

UN sanctions against Iran

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 - passed on 31 July 2006. Demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and

reprocessing activities, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but did not impose sanctions.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 - passed on 23 December 2006. Banned the supply of nuclear-related materials and

technology and froze the assets of key individuals and companies related to the program.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 - passed on 24 March 2007. Imposed an arms embargo and expanded the freeze on Iranian

assets.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 - passed on 3 March

2008. Extended the asset freezes and called upon states to monitor the

activities of Iranian banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and to monitor the movement of individuals involved with the program through

their territory.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835 - Passed in 2008.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 - passed on 9 June 2010. Banned Iran from participating in any activities related to ballistic

missiles, tightened the arms embargo, travel bans on individuals involved with the program, froze the funds and assets of the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and recommended that states inspect Iranian cargo, prohibit the servicing of Iranian vessels

involved in prohibited activities, prevent the provision of financial services used for sensitive nuclear activities

Other Bilateral Sanctions imposed by various other countries

Australia has imposed financial sanctions and travel bans on individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and missile programs

or assist Iran in violating sanctions, and an arms embargo. Canada imposed a ban on dealing in the property of designated

Iranian nationals, a complete arms embargo, oil-refining equipment, items that could contribute to the Iranian nuclear program, the

establishment of an Iranian financial institution, branch, subsidiary, or office in Canada or a Canadian one in Iran, investment in the Iranian

oil and gas sector, relationships with Iranian banks, purchasing debt

from the Iranian government, or providing a ship or services to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, but allows the Foreign Minister to

issue a permit to carry out a specified prohibited activity or transaction.

European Union restrictions have reduced cooperation with Iran in foreign trade, financial services, energy sectors and technologies, and

banned the provision of insurance and reinsurance by insurers in member states to Iran and Iranian-owned companies. On 23 January

2012, the EU agreed to an oil embargo on Iran, effective from July, and to freeze the assets of Iran's central bank. The next month, Iran

symbolically pre-empted the embargo by ceasing sales to Britain and France (both countries had already almost eliminated their reliance on

Iranian oil, and Europe as a whole had nearly halved its Iranian imports).

India enacted a ban on the export of all items, materials, equipment,

goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran's nuclear program. In 2012, the country said it was against expanding its

sanctions. India imports 12 percent of its oil from Iran and cannot do without it. The country sent a "huge delegation" to Iran in mid-March

2012 to further bilateral economic ties. Israel banned business with or unauthorized travel to Iran under a law

banning ties with enemy states.[16] Israel has also enacted legislation that penalizes any companies that violate international

sanctions.[17] Following reports of covert Israeli-Iranian trade and after the US sanctioned an Israeli company for ties with Iran, Israel imposed

a series of administrative and regulatory measures to prevent Israeli companies from trading with Iran, and announced the establishment of

a national directorate to implement the sanctions.[18] Japan imposed a ban on transactions with some Iranian banks,

investments with the Iranian energy sector, and asset freezes against

individuals and entities involved with Iran's nuclear program. In January 2012, the second biggest customer for Iranian oil announced

it would take "concrete steps" to reduce its dependency on Iran. The

country had already reduced its imports by about 20% during 2011, the reductions having been made even after the country's most

powerful ever earthquake of that year. South Korea imposed sanctions on 126 Iranian individuals and

companies. Japan and South Korea together account for 26% of Iran's oil exports. The US was displeased by a March 2012 IEA report that

showed the country had "sharply" increased its imports of Iranian oil at the start of the year.

Switzerland banned the sale of arms and dual-use items to Iran, and of products that could be used in the Iranian oil and gas sector,

financing this sector, and restrictions on financial services. Turkey cut its purchases of Iranian oil by 20% in March 2012, bowing

to US pressure and sanctions that could have locked Turkey's Halkbank out of the US financial system

The United States has imposed an arms ban and an almost total

economic embargo on Iran, which includes sanctions on companies doing business with Iran, a ban on all Iranian-origin imports, sanctions

on Iranian financial institutions, and an almost total ban on selling aircraft or repair parts to Iranian aviation companies. A license from

the Treasury Department is required to do business with Iran. The NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act of 2012) calls for

sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly engage in significant financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or

―designated Iranian financial institutions,‖ a term that refers to Iranian financial institutions whose property interests have been blocked in

connection with Iran‘s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or its support for international terrorism. NDAA sanctions have the

potential to effectively cut off foreign financial institutions from the U.S. financial system by prohibiting the opening of, requiring the

closing of, or imposing strict conditions on, the maintenance of

correspondent or payable-through accounts at U.S. financial institutions.

Effects of these Sanctions

The sanctions bring difficulties to Iran's $352 billion, oil-dominated

economy. Data published by the Iranian Central Bank show a declining trend in the share of Iranian exports from oil-products (2006/2007: 84.9%,

2007/2008: 86.5%, 2008/2009: 85.5%, 2009/2010: 79.8%, 2010/2011 (first three quarters): 78.9%). By March 2012, Iranian production was at a

ten-year low, with the prospect of further falls to levels not seen since the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s. The loss of Iranian oil supply was easily

covered, primarily by an increase in Saudi Arabia's output to a thirty-year

high.

The sanctions have had a substantial adverse effect on the Iranian nuclear program by making it harder to acquire specialized materials and equipment

needed for the program. The social and economic effects of sanctions have also been severe, with even those who doubt their efficacy, such as John

Bolton, describing the EU sanctions (subsequently tightened further and dramatically), in particular, as "tough, even brutal." Iranian foreign minister

Ali Akhbar Salehi conceded that the sanctions are having an impact. China has become Iran's largest remaining trading partner.

Sanctions have reduced Iran's access to products needed for the oil and

energy sectors, have prompted many oil companies to withdraw from Iran, and have also caused a decline in oil production due to reduced access to

technologies needed to improve their efficiency Iran may be annually losing

as much as $60 billion in energy investment. Many international companies have also been reluctant to do business with Iran for fear of losing access to

larger Western markets. As well as restricting export markets, the sanctions have reduced Iran's oil income by increasing the costs of repatriating

revenues in complicated ways that sidestep the sanctions; Iranian analysts estimate the budget deficit for the 2011/2012 fiscal year, which in Iran ends

in late March, at between $30bn to $50bn.The effects of U.S. sanctions include expensive basic goods for Iranian citizens, and an aging and

increasingly unsafe civil aircraft fleet. According to the Arms Control Association, the international arms embargo against Iran is slowly reducing

Iran's military capabilities, largely due to its dependence on Russian and Chinese military assistance. The only substitute is to find

compensatory measures requiring more time and money, and less effective. According to at least one analyst the market for imports in Iran is dominated

by state enterprises and regime-friendly enterprises, because the way to get

around the sanctions is smuggling, and smuggling requires strong connections with the regime. This has weakened Iranian civil society and

strengthened the state.

The value of the Iranian rial has plunged since autumn 2011, causing

widespread panic among the Iranian public, and fell a further 10% immediately after the imposition of the EU oil embargo. "The rial is going

down", remarked former Mossad director Efraim Halevy in March 2012. "It's gone down by over 50 percent. It's almost impossible to describe the

damage done." Former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami emphasised: "When a national currency loses 50% of its value in a matter of weeks,

economic collapse is at hand. Businessmen find it impossible to use the rial even for domestic transactions, because inflation is spiraling out of control.

Commodity prices, moreover, are skyrocketing". In January 2012, the

country raised the interest rate on bank deposits by up to 6 percentage points in order to curtail the rial's depreciation. The rate increase was a

setback for Ahmadinejad, who had been using below-inflation rates to provide cheap loans to the poor, though naturally Iranian bankers were

delighted by the increase. Not long after, and just a few days after Iran's economic minister declared that "there was no economic justification" for

devaluing the currency because Iran's foreign exchange reserves were "not only good, but the extra oil revenues are unprecedented," the country

announced its intention to devalue by about 8.5 percent against the U.S. dollar, set a new exchange rate and vowed to reduce the black market's

influence

Impact on China’s Foreign Policy

After the referral of Iran‘s nuclear issue to the UNSC, China‘s foreign policy

dropped in a dilemma. How to realize a balance between Sino-US and Sino-Iranian relationship and how to keep the image of a ―responsible‖

power as maintaining the friendship with Iran, became great challenges to China‘s foreign policy. As for U.S., persuading China to back up its plan and

making use of China‘s diplomatic resources to give a pressure to Iran are also part of American strategy

For China, Iran‘s nuclear crisis interrupted the normal process of Sino-

Iranian relationship and China had to seek for the balance of the relations with U.S. and Iran. At first, China didn‘t want to recognize it was a crisis and

believed that Iran was pursuing the peaceful nuclear technology by terms of the increasing friendship with Iran. But with the exacerbation of the

international environment toward Iran‘s nuclear issue and the pressure from

U.S., China finally compromised and cast the deliberative vote to support the referral of Iran‘s nuclear issue to the UN Security Council.

Although China agreed to the referral, it still appealed to resolve the crisis by the political and diplomatic ways.

What influenced the attitudes of U.S. and China toward Iran‘s nuclear issue and their different definitions on this crisis is a complicated combination

which includes the national interest, the political experience, and the historical feeling.

Even if they are many similarities between China and Iran, China‘s policy is

determined by the realistic politics in which national interest is the key element. On the one hand, the Sino-American relationship is the priority in

Chinese foreign policy; on the other hand, it is difficult to resist the temptation of the benefits from the close economic relation with Iran. So,

China has to make a hard decision on dealing with Iran‘s nuclear issue. That‘s why China hesitantly agreed on the referral of

Iran‘s nuclear issue to UN Security Council until 2006, four years after the emergence of that crisis.

In addition to balance the relationship of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Iran, how to enhance the image of a responsible power is another important

consideration for China, especially when U.S. criticized that China always don‘t want to take more international responsibility. As a permanent

member of US Security Council, China has the responsibility to support the sanctions against the proliferation country. But how can China to really

sanction a country that has a close connection with its economic

development?

One of the differences of U.S. and China‘s attitudes towards Iran‘s nuclear

issue is that China supported that this crisis should be resolved in the framework of IAEA through the political and diplomatic way while Americans

preferred to the referral of Iran‘s nuclear issue to the UN Security Council by the enforceable sanction. This difference reflected their

divergence on the establishment and functions of various international regimes, such as the Non-proliferation Treaty.

Kevin J. Cooney has said, ―When thinking about the Sino-American

relationship one could easily get the picture of two men hugging each other in ‗friendship‘ with knives poised at each other‘s back waiting for the other to

make a wrong move. Each side needs the other; either trusts the other.‖

It is really a vivid description of the Sino-U.S. relation.

Impact on India

Despite official statements reiterating the important position Iran holds, India has been adopting an ambiguous position on Iran of late. New Delhi

has repeatedly voted in favour of the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) resolutions against Iran on grounds that a nuclear Iran is not in

India‘s interests. However, it also emphasizes that it favours dialogue and diplomacy as a means of resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.

More specifically on the issue of energy relations, India claims that Iran is an important partner as well as an important source for hydrocarbon resources

and that it is keen to further strengthen existing ties. Iran is also one of India‘s largest suppliers of crude oil, and India in turn is also a major

supplier of refined petroleum products for Iran. While the UNSC resolution

does not affect India‘s oil trade with Iran, the US sanctions have had an impact.

The US has been applying pressure against Indian companies which have energy relations with Iran. The most prominent is the Iran-Pakistan-India

(IPI) gas pipeline project. Iran and Pakistan have announced that they will go ahead with the project at a bilateral level for the time being.

India seems to have de-linked from the same though the government

has not officially announced its withdrawal. India claims that security and pricing issue vis-à-vis Pakistan and Iran, respectively, are the main

impediments to its participation though there has been substantial pressure from Washington against proceeding with the project. Some analysts are of

the opinion that as large reserves of natural gas have been discovered in India‘s offshore territory, India is not as concerned about imports. However

given India‘s projected huge and growing demand for gas, it will require

import of gas, least in the future, and Iran is an important source due to its status as the second large reservoir of conventional natural gas. That is

probably why India is not officially closing option on the IPI project. As an Indian official who was closely involved with the negotiation said, barring a

few issues, everything is in place for the project to be brought to fruition. A and when India feels the time is right for implementing the project, it will do

so.

Impact on Russia

Russia has played an important role in helping Iran to complete its Bushehr

Nuclear Reactor. In July 2002, just a few weeks before the major military exercises on the Caspian, Moscow announced that not only would it finish

Bushehr (despite U.S. opposition), but also stated that it had begun discussions on the building of five additional reactors for Iran. It remained

unclear at the time, however, whether the spent fuel would be sent back to Russia so that it could not be made into nuclear weapons.

There appeared to be four central reasons for Moscow‘s unwillingness to

cooperate with Washington on the nuclear issue. First, the sale of the reactor earns hard currency for Russia, and Putin cannot be sure that, even if

President Bush promised large sums of money to Russia, the U.S. Congress would allocate them in a time of escalating U.S. deficits. Second, once the

first reactor begins operating, Iran has hinted repeatedly to Moscow that it

will purchase a number of additional reactors. Third, the Bushehr reactor, and the factories in Russia which supply it, employ a large number of

Russian engineers and technicians and thus help keep Russia‘s nuclear industry alive—something Putin hopes will help not only earn Russia much

needed hard currency, but also help in the high tech development of the Russian economy. Fourth, by standing firm on Bushehr, Putin could

demonstrate to domestic audiences Russia‘s independent policy vis-à-vis the United States, as both the Duma and presidential elections neared.

In case of any war in the Gulf Russia will have huge Economic benefits by

exporting oil at higher prices. Russia has walked a fine line on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Having sold nuclear reactors to Iran it also mixes careful

criticism with praise for its approach to the issue. The EU has imposed sanctions on buying Iranian oil, the natural resource providing more than

80% of Tehran's foreign revenue.

The US has imposed new sanctions targeting Iran's central bank, which strategically thwarts its refiners' ability to buy and pay for crude oil. The

sanctions are linked to Iran's disputed uranium enrichment programme, which the US and its allies suspect is aimed at developing nuclear weapons.

Iran denies the charges, saying the programme is solely about generating energy and research.

Impact on Countries of Middle East

The dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and Israel‘s relative military

superiority, invariably affect the thinking of all the Arab and Persian communities in the region. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons

and long-range missile delivery system is likely to affect its behavior in the region. Obtaining nuclear weapons will give Iranian leaders self confidence

in dealing with thorny policy issues. These weapons in the hands of the fanatic regime in Tehran will grant them a membership card in the open

nuclear club. They will become the ninth member, along with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, India, Pakistan, and North

Korea. A nuclear capability would give Iran the confidence to obstruct and challenge

U.S. power and Western influence in the Middle East. A nuclear capability would also be an immediate guarantee against forcible regime change.

A third motivation for Iran to build a nuclear bomb is their regional

ambitions. Iran seeks to become the indispensable power in the Middle East. Dealing with neighbors from a position of strength and by exploiting

its leverage in the region, Teheran has not abandoned Ayatollah Khomeini‘s vision of becoming the dominant force in the Muslim world either.

Domestic economic pressures and a generally inferior posture with regional competitors dictate a defensive strategy. As the largest and the most

populous country bordering the Persian Gulf, Iranian leaders believe that it is their country‘s natural right and destiny to dominate the geographical region

and the Muslim world. Iran continues developing a sea-denial capability with missiles while cultivating the trust of the Gulf States with confidence-

building measures and talk about new security arrangements. Iran also seeks to be preeminent in supporting the Palestinians while inhibiting Arab

reaction to Iranian policies. This would devastate the stability of nuclear nonproliferation in the world and drastically increase the risk of nuclear war

by opening the floodgates through which Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and

others could flow. The Iranians, as well as other Islamic fanatics, have missile delivery systems and much of the knowledge required to develop

nuclear weapons. Teheran maintained a ―charade‖ of sincerity during negotiations, effectively

delaying progress until international opinion had shifted to its favor. They now seem to believe that they are in a much stronger position due to

the continued need for U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rising oil prices, increased bargaining leverage with oil imports, and its diplomatic

cultivation of China‘s and Russia‘s influence with resolution brought before the United Nation Security Council. Iran‘s new president is firmly committed

to Iran‘s nuclear program and remains determined to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle which would eventually give it fissionable material for

nuclear weapons.

Recent Developments and Agreement to Start Talks

The United States, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom

will hold a critical meeting this week in Istanbul, Turkey, with

representatives of Iran to discuss relations with that country and the

implications of its nuclear development program.

International concern about Iran's program and intentions -- in particular,

whether the program, as it claims, is designed to meet its nuclear energy

and scientific needs or whether it also intends to develop a nuclear weapons

capacity -- has led already to damaging economic sanctions against the

Islamic state with more to come.

In that context the meeting, which starts Friday, is of great economic as well

as political importance since the threat to Iran's petroleum production

capacity posed by the sanctions has already been used by speculators and

even more responsible petroleum market players to run up the price of oil on

the world market.

The continuing rise in the price of gasoline at the pump for Americans is in

no small part due to what operators in the market have been able to do with

both the sanctions against Iran and the threats and exhortations to attack

Iran emanating from Israel and some elements in the United States.

It is obvious that the sensible first step in tackling the problem is for the six

nations -- the five permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council plus Germany, the European Union's most powerful member -- to

meet face to face with the Iranians. A major goal on their side of the table

should be close inspection of all of Iran's nuclear facilities, including those

that are military-controlled, by representatives of the International Atomic

Energy Agency.

Iran suggested at the same time that it agreed to this week's meeting that it

was prepared to see such inspection take place.

On the U.S. side, there are a couple of issues to watch. One is that those in

the Washington political equation who would like to see either the United

States and Israel, or Israel with U.S. support, carry out a military attack on

Iran, which would most likely start a war, are eager for the talks to fail. They

have already tipped their hand by putting the United States, in advance of

the talks, in the role of presenting an opening position that leaves the

Iranians little room to bargain.

Another is the suggestion that the problems for U.S. forces in Afghanistan

are a result of Iranian support of actions there, which is an attempt to

capitalize on growing disfavor and frustration over the Afghan war in the

United States. This claim is unrealistic in the event. The Taliban are firmly

Sunni Muslims; Iran is Shiite. Although Iran might like to pull America's tail

in Afghanistan, in general it is very much to the advantage of Iran, which

has a long border with Afghanistan, to see peace and quiet there.

These talks are important. It shouldn't be the case, but another Middle

Eastern war for the United States may be in play to a degree in a touchy

presidential election year.

Faced with mounting pressure from the world powers over its controversial nuclear program, Iran said last month that it was ready to re-engage with

the IAEA.As a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran has the right, like other countries, to enrich uranium for commercial and research

reactors. But the same facilities that are used for peaceful enrichment can be used to enrich uranium for a bomb. And that's what many Western

countries suspect Iran is doing. Iran insists its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The country suggested over the weekend that it may be willing to reduce the amount of uranium it is enriching at 20%."Based on our needs and once the

required fuel is obtained, we will decrease the production and we may even totally shift it to the 3.5%," Iranian nuclear chief Fereydoun Abbasi said in a

televised interview, according to state-run Press TV.

Iran does not plan to produce 20% enriched uranium for long, Abbasi said, according to Press TV.

Uranium enriched at 20% is typically used for hospital isotopes and research

reactors, but is also seen as a shortcut toward the 90% enrichment required to build nuclear weapons. Nuclear experts say Iran's supply is far greater

than it would need for peaceful purposes.

Iran says there is a medical purpose to its nuclear program.

The Gulf nation's economy has been hit hard by U.S. and European oil and financial sanctions over its nuclear activities.

Israel has threatened to attack Iran's nuclear sites should peaceful

alternatives be exhausted, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterating last month that Israel reserved the right to defend itself from the

threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Conclusion

1. The pessimists predict failure, but there are hints of progress. The last round of talks 15 months ago collapsed after Iran insisted on a

series of ―conditions‖ that were deemed unacceptable by the U.S. and Europe. It is thought unlikely Iran will try this approach again. With the

threat of military action against Iran and worsening Western sanctions, the stakes are high. Tehran surprised observers by even agreeing to attend talks

about the ―nuclear issue.‖ Although the meeting will not produce an immediate breakthrough, there is hope these talks will restart a ―diplomatic

process.‖ The starting of new talks in Turkey appears to be a ray of hope for

the world peace and apparently it might be Iran just buying time. If latter is the case than a conflict seems to be inevitable

2. The sanctions against Iran appear to be hurting.

President Barack Obama gave the go-ahead for the tightest sanctions ever against Iran‘s oil industry. In the past, Iran has been able to survive

sanctions of various kinds, but these latest moves target its pivotal oil industry. They will inevitably cut to the heart of Iran‘s economy. Israel‘s UN

ambassador, Ron Prosor, told reporters that these sanctions against Iran are ―much more effective than people think and. . . might change behaviour

patterns if we continue with them.‖

3. The Americans are working overtime to keep Israel at bay.

There were charges that the U.S. sabotaged an Israeli plan to use Azerbaijan

as a ―secret staging ground‖ for an attack on Iran. An article in the American magazine Foreign Policy quoted unidentified U.S. officials as saying ―Israel

has recently been granted access to airbases on Iran‘s northern border.‖ Former American ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, charged ―this leak is

part of the (Obama) administration‘s campaign against an Israeli attack.‖ In the magazine article, one of the U.S. intelligence sources was quoted as

saying: ―We‘re watching what Iran does closely.

4. Contrary to public assurances, the U.S. and Israel are not on the same

page. There were assurances after summit between Israeli Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu and Obama that their two countries were as one regarding the issue of Iran. But that‘s not quite accurate. Each side still

views the other with suspicion. A revealing illustration of that was evident on March 19, 2012 when two contrasting news stories appeared prominently.

In The New York Times, American military officials leaked the details of a classified war simulation of an Israeli attack on Iran. Their conclusion was

that it would lead to a wider regional war that would draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead. However, Bloomberg News

columnist Jeffrey Goldberg, who has very close connections with the Netanyahu government, reported on the same day that Israeli officials

secretly believe an attack on Iran wouldn‘t lead to a wider war, wouldn‘t result in Iranian retaliation and would ultimately get American support.

5. If there is to be a breakthrough, both sides need to compromise,

big time.

The history of this conflict doesn‘t provide much reason for optimism. After all, there have been decades of misunderstanding between Iran and the

United States. But certain things are emerging from the fog. The U.S. and other Western powers will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. Tehran must

know that by now. Iran, for its part, asserts that nuclear arms are ―sinful‖ and its nuclear ambitions are solely peaceful. The U.S. and the West must

hear that. If these opening talks lead to serious negotiations, one crucial issue for Tehran may be what it secretly offered the United States in its

proposed ―Grand Bargain‖ in 2003, which was rejected. In exchange for solid guarantees regarding nuclear arms, they may require similarly solid

guarantees that the U.S. and the West abandon their desire for ―regime

change‖ in Iran.

References :

IDSA issue Brief US Sanctions on Iran and their impact on India

CARE Ratings Impact of Iran Crisis ACA Iran Nuclear Brief

Congressional Research Services : Iran‘s Nuclear Program CRS Report For Congress : Iran‘s Nuclear Program Recent

Developments CRS Report for Congress : Iranian Nuclear Sites

CRS Israel : Possible Military Strikes against Iran‘s Nuclear Facilities BBC news articles

CNN news articles Wikipedia Articles on Nuclear Program of Iran