Iran’s Gambit in Latin America

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    Irans Gambitin Latin AmericaWashington has been dangerously slow to counterthe Islamic Republics provocations close to home

    By Roger F. Noriega

    IN EARLY JANUARY, Iran caught the

    worlds attention by threatening to close

    the Strait of Hormuz and brandish shore-

    to-sea cruise missiles in what was to be

    a 10-day naval exercise. That same week

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

    announced a five-nation trip through Latin

    America to advance his countrys influence and opera-

    tional capabilities on the doorstep of the United States.It would take a very generous view of the Islamic Re-

    public to dismiss these simultaneous events as mere

    coincidence. Tehran makes no secret of its determina-

    tion to carry its asymmetrical warfare to the Western

    Hemisphere. Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi

    was in Bolivia in May 2011 when he promised a tough

    and crushing response to any U.S. offensive against

    Iran. Such provocations are part of what should be

    understood as Irans five-year push into the Americas.

    The Obama administration and career U.S. dip-

    lomats have been slow to recognize the threat posed by

    this creeping advance. Only after several Republicanpresidential candidates highlighted the problem in a de-

    bate on November 22 sponsored in part by the American

    Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., did President

    Obama say, [W]e take Iranian activities, including in

    Venezuela, very seriously, and we will continue to moni-

    tor them closely. Unfortunately, merely monitoring

    Irans foray into Latin America is not enough. The United

    States must find its way toward adopting new forward-

    leaning policies that will frustrate Tehrans plans to

    threaten U.S. security and interests close to home.

    Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organiza-

    tion of American States from 2001 to 2003 and assistant

    secretary of state from 2003 to 2005. He is a visiting

    fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the founder

    and managing director of Visin Amricas LLC, and a

    contributor to interamericansecuritywatch.com.

    Commentary 29

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    In the last five years, Iran has begun to take fulladvantage of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chvezs

    unprecedented hospitality in the Americas. Chvezs

    petro-diplomacy has enabled Ahmadinejad to culti-

    vate partnerships with anti-U.S. regimes in Cuba, Ec-

    uador, and Bolivia as well. Today, a shadowy network

    of commercial and industrial enterprises in several

    countries affords Iran a physical presence in proximity

    to the borders of its greatest foe. It is increasingly clear

    that Iran intends to use safe havens in these countries

    to deploy conventional and unconventional weaponry

    that pose a direct threat to U.S. territory, strategic wa-

    terways, and American allies.

    Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit

    nuclear program and emboldened by Washingtons

    inattention to its activities in Latin America, Iran is

    looking, logically, for some strategic advantage by con-

    cocting a military threat near U.S. shores. And, as a no-

    torious promoter of international terrorism, it is work-

    ing that angle. Iran is exploiting its intimate ties with

    Venezuelan operatives as well as its Quds Force agents

    connections to a decades-old network in the region to

    proselytize, recruit, and train radicalized youth from

    Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and beyond.We now know that we underestimate Tehrans

    audacity at our own peril. Last October, American of-

    ficials discovered an outrageous scheme by Quds Force

    operatives to use Mexican narco-gangsters to bomb

    the heart of the U.S. capital. The plot came to light

    only because U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

    agents set aside conventional wisdom about the limits

    on Tehrans deadly designs. The plotters had hoped to

    assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States

    in a bombing that would have killed numerous other

    innocents. Even for a country that has made terrorism

    and the violation of international norms vital aspectsof its statecraft, this was a brazen escalation in aggres-

    sive tactics, if not a planned act of war. That it originat-

    ed as an operation to be launched with Latin American

    assistance should have alerted authorities that there is

    an increased menace in our own hemisphere.

    Nevertheless, policymakers in the Obama ad-

    ministration have remained remarkably complacent.

    And the danger of Latin American involvement is mul-

    tidimensional, reaching beyond the assistance of Mex-

    ican foot soldiers. Even as the International Atomic

    Energy Agency (IAEA) affirmed in a recent report thatforeign support is crucial to Irans capability of devel-

    oping a nuclear weapon,U.S. diplomatic, intelligence,

    and security agencies are uncertain whether Iran is

    extracting ore from vast uranium basins in Venezuela

    or Ecuador or whether Argentina has resumed sharing

    nuclear technology with Tehran.

    It is clear that some U.S. policymakers and puta-

    tive experts on Iran and international terrorism have

    been slow to adjust their thinking on Tehrans plotting

    in the Americas. Such figures, for example, often cite

    a 2010 report prepared by the Congressional Research

    Service (CRS) when they are looking to refute claims

    of Irans capabilities and intentions in Latin America.

    For example, when Mitt Romney referred during a

    Republican presidential debate to the Hezbollah net-

    work in Latin America, politifact.com argued that the

    CRS report only mentioned terrorist fundraising as a

    problem there. Remarkably, the only mention of Ven-

    ezuela in that 56-page primer is a footnote referring

    to Venezuelas high-level military complicity with Co-

    lombian narco-terrorists. Policymakers, moreover, re-

    main oblivious to the growing threat because the State

    Department has failed to demand that the intelligencecommunity scrutinize the activities of Iran and Hez-

    bollah in the Western hemisphere.

    An important exception to such neglect is the

    work of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the

    Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of

    the Treasury, which have sanctioned numerous Venezu-

    elan officials and entities for their complicity with and

    support for Iran and international terrorism. Again, ac-

    cording to sources in these agencies, State Department

    officers systematically resist the application of sanc-

    tions against Venezuelan officials and entities, even

    though those persons are playing an increasingly largerole in Irans operational capabilities near U.S. territory.

    In order to facilitate its push into the Western

    Hemisphere, Iran increased the number of its embas-

    sies in the region from 6 in 2005 to 10 in 2010. The real

    game-changer, however, has been the alliance devel-

    oped between Ahmadinejad and Chvez.

    Hugo Chvezs track record of anti-Americanism

    and support for terrorist groups, such as the Revolu-

    tionary Armed Forces of Colombia, is well established.

    In recent years, moreover, Venezuelas Margarita

    In order to facilitate its push into the Western hemisphere,Iran has increased the number of its embassies in Latin

    America from 6 in 2005 to 10 in 2010.

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    Island has become the principal safe haven and centerof Hezbollah operations in the Americas. As a terror-

    ist extension of the regime in Tehran, Hezbollah exists

    primarily to do Irans dirty work abroad.

    Research from open sources, subject-matter

    experts, and sensitive sources within various govern-

    ments have identified at least two parallel, collabora-

    tive terrorist networks growing at an alarming rate in

    Latin America. One is operated by Venezuelan collabo-

    rators, and the other is managed by the Quds Force.

    These networks encompass more than 80 operatives

    in at least 12 countries throughout the region, with the

    greatest areas of focus being Brazil, Venezuela, Argen-

    tina, and Chile.

    Ghazi Nassereddine, a native of Lebanon who

    became a Venezuelan citizen about 11 years ago and is

    now Venezuelas second-ranking diplomat in Syria, is

    the most prominent Hezbollah supporter in Venezue-

    la, because of his close relationship to Chvezs Justice

    and Interior Minister, Tarek el-Aissami. Along with

    at least two of his brothers, Nassereddine manages a

    network to expand Hezbollahs influence in Venezuela

    and beyond.

    Nassereddines brother Abdallah, a former mem-ber of the Venezuelan congress, uses his position as the

    former vice president of the Federation of Arab and

    American Entities in Latin America and the president

    of its local chapter in Venezuela to maintain ties with

    Islamic communities throughout the region. He cur-

    rently resides on Margarita Island, where he runs vari-

    ous money-laundering operations and manages much

    of the business dealings of Hezbollah in Latin America,

    according to documentary evidence obtained from

    Venezuelan sources.

    Younger brother Oday is responsible for estab-

    lishing paramilitary training centers on Margarita Is-land. He is allegedly recruiting Venezuelans through

    local crculos bolivarianos(neighborhood watch com-

    mittees composed of the most radical Chvez follow-

    ers) and sending them to Iran for further training.

    Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the

    cultural attach at the Embassy of the Islamic Repub-

    lic of Iran in Buenos Aires, oversees a parallel Hezbol-

    lah recruitment network from inside Iran. Rabbani is

    currently the international-affairs adviser to the Al-

    Mostafa Al-Alam Cultural Institute in Qom, which is

    tasked with the propagation of Shia Islam. Rabbani,referred to by the influential Brazilian magazine Veja

    as the Terrorist Professor, is a die-hard defender of

    the Iranian revolution and the mastermind behind the

    two notorious terrorist attacks against Jewish targets

    in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 which killed 144 peo-

    ple. At the request of Argentina, Interpol issued inter-

    national extradition warrants for Rabbani and others

    in March 2007.

    At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as a cul-

    tural attach at the Iranian embassy in the Argentine

    capital, which he used as a staging ground for extrem-

    ist propaganda, recruitment, and training that cul-

    minated in those two attacks. In fact, he continues to

    exploit that network of Argentine converts to expand

    the reach of Iran and Hezbollah by leveraging them in

    identifying and recruiting operatives throughout the

    region for radicalization and terrorist training in Ven-

    ezuela and Iran (specifically, the city of Qom).

    At least two mosques in Buenos AiresAl Imam

    and At-Tauhidare run by Rabbani disciples. Sheik

    Abdallah Madani runs the Al Imam mosque, which

    also serves as the headquarters of the Islamic-Argen-

    tine Association, one of the most prominent Islamiccultural centers in Latin America.

    Some of Rabbanis disciples have taken what

    they have learned from their mentor in Argentina and

    replicated it elsewhere in the region. Sheik Karim Ab-

    dul Paz, an Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied

    under Rabbani in Qom for five years and succeeded

    him at the At-Tauhid mosque in Buenos Aires in 1993.

    Abdul Paz is now the imam of a cultural center in San-

    tiago, Chile.

    Another Argentine convert to radical Islam and

    Rabbani disciple now in Chile is Sheik Suhail Assad,

    currently a professor at the University of Santiago. Helectures at universities throughout the region and ap-

    pears frequently on television. Most recently, he was in

    El Salvador establishing relationships within the Mus-

    lim community.

    But the real prize for the Rabbani networkand

    Hezbollah in generalis Brazil, the economic power-

    house of the Americas and home to some one million

    Muslims. One of Rabbanis brothers lives there: Mo-

    hammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, the founding father

    of the Iranian Association in Brazil, whom he visits and

    Commentary 31

    The real prize for Hezbollah is Brazil. The economicpowerhouse of the Americas and home to some onemillion Muslims is becoming a hub for terrorist activity.

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    coordinates with systematically. Another principal col-laborator is Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sunni radical

    from the Sao Paulo Guarulhos mosque. Taki Eldyn, who

    is active in ecumenical activities with the Shia mosques,

    also serves as the secretary general of the Council of the

    Leaders of the Societies and Islamic Affairs of Brazil. A

    sensitive source linked that mosque to a network des-

    ignated by the U.S. Treasury Department as providing

    major financial and logistical support to Hezbollah. As

    far back as 1995, Taki Eldyn hosted al-Qaeda leader Osa-

    ma bin Laden and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mo-

    hammed. According to sources in Brazilian intelligence

    cited by Veja, at least 20 operatives from Hezbollah, al-

    Qaeda, and the Islamic Jihad are using Brazil as a hub

    for terrorist activity.

    American and other government authorities have

    identified and sanctioned some of the leaders of these

    networks, and U.S. law-enforcement agenciesled by

    the Drug Enforcement Administrationhave made

    great efforts to assess and confront this threat by build-

    ing cases against foreign officials and sanctioning com-

    mercial entities that support this criminal terror orga-

    nization. This dangerous network, however, requires a

    whole-government strategy, beginning with an inter-agency review to assess the transnational, multifaceted

    nature of the problem, educate friendly governments,and implement measures unilaterally and with willing

    partners to disrupt and dismantle their operations.

    Ahmadinejads visit in January to Venezuela and

    elsewhere in the region was clearly intended to shore

    up Irans interests in Latin America as Chvez suc-

    cumbs to cancer. Iran can be expected to make com-

    mon cause with Cuba, Russia, and China to protect its

    safe havenif necessary, by encouraging Chvezs left-

    ist movement to scuttle the October 2012 elections in

    Venezuela. If the United States were more vigilant at

    this critical post-Chvez transition phase, it might be

    possible to spoil Irans plans by supporting a peaceful,

    electoral solution.

    Having fallen dangerously behind in its effort to

    stop Irans quest for nuclear weapons, Washington can

    scarcely afford to cede ground to the Islamic Repub-

    lic in what is, in global terms, the United States own

    backyard. Iran, emboldened by its success in eluding

    significant Western sanctions and keeping American

    military force at bay, is becoming more provocative.

    If Washington does not transition from monitoring to

    acting against Iranian advances in Latin America, it

    may find itself confronting a grave and growing threatthat it can neither diminish nor evade.q

    If the United States were more vigilant at this critical post-Chavez transition phase, it might be possible to spoil Iransplans by supporting an electoral solution in Venezuela.

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