IraqWarPart1 Timeline

7/25/2019 IraqWarPart1 Timeline

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THE IRAQ WAR -- PART I: T h e U . S. Pr e p a r e s f o r C o n f l i c t , 2 0 0 1

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 326

Timeline

By Joyce Battle

1985 Academic Albert Wohlstetterintroduces Iraqi expatriate Ahmad Chalabito Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle,neoconservatives later influential in theGeorge W. Bush administration.1

1989 -- Petra Bank of Amman, foundedby Ahmad Chalabi and influential throughits strategic lending to prominentJordanians, including the king of Jordansbrother, is seized by the government for

alleged irregularities. Chalabi flees thecountry in the trunk of a car. Two yearslater he is convicted in absentia forembezzlement and fraud and sentenced to22 years in prison.2

1990 Prominent neoconservativeacademic Bernard Lewis meets AhmadChalabi and becomes one of his leadingadvocates.3

August 2, 1990-- Iraq invades Kuwait,

accusing it of conspiring with the U.S. toboth steal its oil and drive down oil prices.

August 2, 1990-- Kuwaits ruling familyhires Hill & Knowlton to lobby for a U.S.war against Iraq; the companycoordinates the work of a number ofpublic relations firms including the RendonGroup. Polls to identify themes mostlikely to win public support for war findthat depicting Iraqi leader SaddamHussein as a dangerous madman whocommits atrocities against his own people

is most effective.4

September 1990-- Rep. Stephen Solarz(D-N.Y) sets up the Committee for Peaceand Security in the Gulf to lobby for waragainst Iraq with support fromconservatives and some hawkishDemocratic activists, along with Saudiambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar. A

supporter, neoconservative Richard Perle,reportedly raises most of the groupsfunding from defense contractors and aright-wing foundation. Bandar attractssupport from several Jewish organizationsby telling them that if Saddam Husseinwere eliminated other governments in theregion would deal with the Arab-Israeliconflict on more pragmatic terms."5

October10, 1990-- An informal

association called the CongressionalHuman Rights Caucus holds a hearing onreported Iraqi atrocities. The associationis chaired by Tom Lantos (D-CA) and JohnPorter (R-IL) who also head theCongressional Human Rights Foundation,which is headquartered in free office spaceat Hill & Knowlton's Washington, D.C.office. At the hearing a 15-year-oldKuwaiti girl says she witnessed Iraqisoldiers leaving babies on the floor to diein order to steal incubators; the story is

widely repeated as fact. In reality the girlis the Kuwaiti ambassadors daughter andwas coached by Hill & Knowlton in whatwas later shown to be false testimony.6

Late1990-- President George H.W. Bushdecides to drive Iraq out of Kuwait withmilitary force. As the heads of the JointChiefs of Staff and the Central Command,Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf arein charge of war planning, but DefenseSecretary Dick Cheney is displeased withtheir work. He has DOD official Paul

Wolfowitz work with his aide Scooter Libbyand Henry Rowen, also of DOD, tosecretly draw up an alternative plan.While Powell is traveling abroad Cheneypresents the alternative to Bush, whorejects it.7

February 2,1991 At the end of thePersian Gulf War U.S. propaganda outlets


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in the region encourage Kurdish andShiite insurrections in Iraq that arequickly suppressed. The Bushadministration is criticized for not invadingIraq but its defenders, like Dick Cheney,say this would have left the U.S.

entangled in a long-term occupation. TheU.S. sets up no-fly zones over northernand southern Iraq and many in theadministration expect, wrongly, that acoup will soon overthrow SaddamHussein.8

April 3, 1991 --U.N. Security Councilresolutions impose sanctions on Iraq toforce it to destroy its nonconventionalweapons programs. The sanctions lastuntil 2003 and devastate Iraqs economy,infrastructure, and society; this includesdoubling its child mortality rate.9

Around May 1991 --George H.W. Bushsigns a top secret directive authorizing aCIA covert operation to overthrowSaddam Hussein, using any meansnecessary including lethal force. Theagency concludes at the outset that thereis no chance of success since it has noreliable assets in Iraq.10

Around May11, 1991 --The CIA hires

the Rendon Group for propagandaoperations against Iraq. Rendonassembles anti-government Iraqis underthe rubric Iraqi National Congress, andhelps install Ahmad Chalabi, recentlyconvicted in Jordan for fraud andembezzlement, as INC chief.11

February1992 Defense Departmentpolicy under secretary Paul Wolfowitz hashis deputy Zalmay Khalilzad secretly drafta paper, Defense Planning Guidance,outlining military planning for the next

century. It calls for the Pentagon toestablish and protect a new order todeter any possible rivals from even tryingto compete with a hegemonic U.S. andcontemplates preemptive use of nuclear,biological, and chemical weapons, even inconflicts that do not directly engage U.S.interests. The draft is leaked to the New

York Timesand causes the Bushadministration major embarrassment.12

March 4,1992 Future George W. Bushadministration official Douglas Feith andhis fellow neoconservative Frank Gaffney

write a Washington Timescommentaryexcoriating the George H.W. Bushadministration for criticizing the right-wingLikud Party for expanding illegal Israelisettlements in the occupied West Bank.13

1993 When George H.W. Bush isdefeated by Bill Clinton, Dick Cheney joinsthe American Enterprise Institute wherehe is increasingly influenced by neoconAEI members, including Richard Perle.14

May 1993 -- Laurie Mylroie, an Iraq

policy advisor for the Clinton-for-presidentcampaign, no longer in favor with theadministration, meets with FBI agents toexplain her theory that Iraq was behindthe February 1993 World Trade Centerbombing. Afterwards they do not returnher calls.15

November 1993 --Ahmad Chalabipromotes a plan he calls The End Gamefor overthrowing Saddam Hussein,envisioning a revolt by INC-led Shiites in

southern Iraq and Kurds in the north thatwould inspire a military uprising and leadto the installation of an INC-dominatedregime friendly to the U.S. and Israel.Chalabi uses some of his substantial CIAfunding to start building an armedmilitia.16

1994 A CIA case officer accompaniedby Ahmad Chalabi visits a forgery shoprun by the INC in Kurdistan, where peoplescan Iraqi intelligence documents intocomputers to create disinformation.17

1994 --Republican electoral gains inCongress lead to increasingneoconservative influence on Middle Eastpolicy debates.18

October 29, 1994 President Clintonsigns a Memorandum of Amplificationreplacing Bushs 1991 finding authorizing


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covert action to overthrow SaddamHussein.19

March 5, 1995 --An attempt by AhmadChalabi and the CIA to execute what isessentially Chalabis End Game plan fails

dismally. Over State Departmentobjections NSC official Martin Indyk hadauthorized a clandestine CIA operationunder which Chalabis militia in alliancewith tribal leaders won over by bribeswould provoke urban disturbances in Iraqand sabotage government facilities.Shiite groups were to attack in the southand the Iraqi army was to then join theuprising. The scheme was discovered bySaddam Husseins government butChalabi refused to abort the operation; itfailed, no Iraqi military officers rebelled,

many INC members were executed. TheCIA and DIA turned against Chalabi asineffectual but the Defense Departmentcontinued funding the INC. Chalabiretreated to London and reliedincreasingly on neoconservative punditsand the U.S. Congress for support.20

August 8, 1995 Saddam Husseinsson-in-law, Gen. Hussein Kamel, defects.He tells U.N. inspectors they have beenhighly effective in Iraq and that all

chemical, biological, missile, and nuclearrelated weapons have been destroyed.After this high-level defection the Iraqigovernment gives huge volumes ofdocumentation on its former weaponsprograms to the U.N.21

1996-- Chalabi and a dedicatedsupporter, Francis Brooke, set up shop inGeorgetown to lobby for the INC. Theystudy the methods of the African NationalCongress and various pro-Israel groups inorder to refine their technique.22

July 1996 Future Bush administrationofficials Douglas Feith and David Wurmser(later an advisor to Dick Cheney) areamong the authors of an advisory paperfor newly elected right-wing primeminister Binyamin Netanyahu that calls foran Israeli clean break with the Oslopeace process and for the assertion that

Israel has the right to expropriate theoccupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Theyalso advise Israel to privatize its economy,to indirectly undermine Syria byoverthrowing Iraqi president SaddamHussein, and to work with the king of

Jordan to restore a monarchy to Iraq.(Britain installed generally amenablemonarchs in both Jordan and Iraq afterWorld War I; Ahmad Chalabis family waspart of a wealthy elite during that era,which was ended by a 1958 revolution.)23

Spring-Summer 1996-- A CIAundercover operation attempting toorganize an officers coup against SaddamHussein is discovered and routed by Iraq.Meanwhile, one faction among highlydivided Iraqi Kurds invites forces loyal to

Saddam Hussein into Kurdistan to crushits rivals; the Iraqi military captures andkills hundreds of Ahmad Chalabissupporters and many others flee to theU.S.24

September 27, 1996 Paul Wolfowitzattributes Iraqs crushing of the recentCIA coup attempt to Clintonadministration ineptitude and writes thatSaddam Hussein still has a loaded gun --and its pointed at us.25

June 1997 Ahmad Chalabi tells theJewish Institute for National SecurityAffairs that overthrowing Saddam Husseinand replacing him with a regime at peacewith its neighbors would be easy if theU.S. supported an INC-led insurgency.Later he tells theJerusalem Postthat hewould facilitate export of Iraqi oil toIsrael.26

October 1997-- The InternationalAtomic Energy Agency issues a definitive

report declaring Iraq to be free of nuclearweapons; its main author later says it was"highly unlikely" that Iraq could conceal anuclear weapons program from moderndetection systems. [Doc. 1]27

November12, 1997 David Wurmserpublishes an article in the Wall StreetJournal calling for a revolution in Iraq


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through an internationally supportedinsurgency like the Iraqi NationalCongress, led by Ahmad Chalabi. Hesupplies a counter-narrative for the failed1995 coup attempt asserting that INCtroops invaded government-controlled

territory in Iraq with impunity, absorbingthousands of defecting Iraqi soldiers alongthe way....But the United States neverrecognized the INC as the provisionalgovernment of Iraq.The United Statesabandoned the INC at the pinnacle of itssuccess.... He writes that Washingtonhas no choice but to abandon CIA-organized coup attempts and to resurrectthe INC.28

November 18, 1997-- Paul Wolfowitzand Zalmay Khalilzad in the Washington

Postcall for the U.S. to overthrowSaddam Hussein and to control thedisposition of Iraqs oil.29

January 26,1998-- Theneoconservative Project for the NewAmerican Century publishes an open letterto Bill Clinton signed by Donald Rumsfeld,Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, RichardPerle, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, andElliott Abrams, among others, advisingthat U.S. military action to oust Saddam

Hussein from power is the onlyacceptable strategy for Iraq.30

February 19, 1998 The Committee forPeace and Security in the Gulf publishesan open letter to Clinton, signed byStephen Solarz, Richard Perle, DonaldRumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith,David Wurmser, Douglas Feith, RichardArmitage, Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, andBernard Lewis declaring that Iraq still haschemical and biological weapons and nointention of giving them up and that the

U.S. must use military force to overthrowSaddam Hussein.31

Spring 1998-- In a letter to the editor ofForeign Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz andStephen Solarz write that the UnitedStates should be prepared to commitground forces to protect a sanctuary in

southern Iraq where opposition groupscould mobilize.32

March 19, 1998-- Ahmad Chalabi andKing Hussein of Jordan, each a presentand/or former CIA asset, meet in

Washington and agree that SaddamHussein has to go. Hussein presents theirjoint letter to Bill Clinton the next day atthe White House but it is rejected.According to David Wurmser, Husseinenvisions a Hashemite concept -- afederated Iraqi entity with regionalautonomy tied to a Jordanian-Iraqiconfederation.33

March20, 1998 Douglas Feith writes intheJerusalem Postthat the U.S. shouldrecognize the INC as Iraqs provisional

government and give it some of $800million in Iraqi government assets frozenin the U.S., along with virtually all theapproximately three million barrels of oilthat Iraq could produce daily. He saysthat Saddam Hussein and other top Iraqiofficials should be indicted as warcriminals, and the U.S. should have astrategy ready to replace Iraqsgovernment with the INC.34

April1998-- Senate majority leader

Trent Lott (R-Miss.) summons a bipartisangroup of senators to a closed-door briefingby retired general Wayne Downing on hisIraq Liberation Strategy. Downing andformer CIA officer and Iran-Contra figureDuane "Dewey" Clarridge have becomeconsultants for the INC, and Downingsstrategy is a variation of Chalabis EndGame plan, calling for INC troops backedby former U.S. Special Forces to inciteIraqi military defections. The U.S. wouldrecognize the INC as Iraqs provisionalgovernment, give it Iraqs U.N. seat;

create INC-controlled "liberated zones"freed of sanctions, give the INC frozenIraqi assets under U.S. control, launch airattacks, and have equipmentprepositioned in the region in case U.S.ground forces were activated.35

October 31,1998 Under pressure fromneoconservatives and Congress, and over


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Secretary of State Colin Powell off whenhe tries to discuss a new sanctionsstrategy. To Paul ONeill it appears thatIraq is seen as useful as a demonstrationmodel of Americas new, unilateralresolve overthrowing Saddam Hussein

would dissuade other actors from tryingto stand up to U.S. power. Wolfowitzlobbies for arming the Iraqi opposition andfor giving it direct U.S. military support.45

February 3,2001-- A high-level NSCofficial writes a top secret documentdirecting NSC staff to cooperate withCheneys newly formed Energy Task Forceas it considers melding two areas ofpolicy: operational policies towards roguestates, (such as Iraq), and the captureof new and existing oil and gas fields.

The Defense Intelligence Agency works onmapping Iraqs oil fields and explorationareas and listing companies that mightexploit them. A document entitledForeign Suitors for Iraqi OilfieldContracts has an attachment showingareas of Iraq earmarked for productionsharing.46

February 5,2001 At a principalscommittee meeting chaired byCondoleezza Rice the heads of agencies

discuss Iraq options and are instructed tofocus on increasing intelligence collectionon Iraqs suspected weapons of massdestruction programs. Another meetingon the topic is held on February 7.47

February 16, 2001-- The U.S. and theU.K. bomb anti-aircraft facilities nearBaghdad without informing Congress inadvance. An observer tells McClatchythatthe administration is making it clear thatthey are going to do something to get ridof Saddam Hussein; Bush meanwhile has

told speechwriter David Frum that he isdetermined to oust Saddam from power.48

February 27,2001-- Asked at hisSenate confirmation hearing whether hesupports a U.S. ground invasion of Iraq,Wolfowitz says No one has proposedthat. He says that the Bushadministration is reviewing the focus of

regime change efforts, including how bestto work with the Iraqi National Congressand other opposition groups.49

April2001-- The report of the Cheneytask force on American energy needs

predicts that use of foreign oil will rise by50 percent over the next few decades andsays the main U.S. goal should be toprotect free oil markets. SaddamHussein is the main obstacle to U.S.interests, because Iraq adjusts productionlevels in its strategic interest.Iraqremains a destabilizing influence to U.S.allies in the Middle East, as well as toregional and global order, and to the flowof oil to international markets from theMiddle East. The report calls for anti-Iraqpolicies, including a possible need for

military intervention.50

April2001-- The NSC deputiescommittee meets for its first discussion ofterrorism policy since Bush took office.When Richard Clarke briefs the group onOsama bin Laden and the Taliban,Wolfowitz tries to change the subject toIraq. Clarke is incredulous that Wolfowitzis reviving the totally discredited LaurieMylroie theory that Iraq was behind the1993 truck bomb at the World Trade

Center, a theory that had beeninvestigated for years and found to betotally untrue.51

Around April2001-- After the U.S.learns that Iraq is seeking to buy 60,000aluminum tubes (advertisements are onthe internet), CIA analyst Joe Turner, nota nuclear weapons specialist, becomesconvinced that since they are made froma high-strength alloy they can only beused in uranium enrichment centrifuges tomanufacture nuclear weapons. The CIA

embraces this view and it is passed on toBush in a highly classified PresidentsDaily Brief (PDB). An April 10 follow-upreport is circulated among top nationalsecurity officials and Turners analysis isimmediately challenged by nuclearweapons experts.52


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April11, 2001-- The first report on thealuminum tubes issued by a team ofscientists led by the chief of the Oak RidgeNational Laboratorys advancedTechnology Division on April 11, 2001notes that their diameter is half that used

for a gas centrifuge tested by Iraq in1990, among other discrepancies. TheOak Ridge team concludes that the tubesare probably not intended for use in acentrifuge.53

April 26,2001-- McClatchyreports thatU.S. officials assert that Bush authorizedFebruary air strikes on Iraq because heand Rice did not understand that theywould be perceived internationally asprovocative. Civilian officials were notinformed; the attack was seen as

signaling a more confrontational Iraqpolicy, and highlighted the presidentslack of experience in national securityaffairs and the drawbacks of amanagement style that leaves details tosubordinates; there was an incoherentand disjointed planning process for theraid, with planning and execution beinghandled almost solely by the Pentagon.54

May2001-- Bush gives Cheneyresponsibility for protecting the country

from weapons of mass destruction.Within Cheneys office Libby takes chargeof the issue; Bush nicknames him GermBoy.55

May 9,2001-- The Energy Departmentreports in a Daily Intelligence Highlight,published on a website used by the WhiteHouse and the intelligence community,that intercepted aluminum tubes are verysimilar to ones Iraq has used to buildconventional rocket launchers.56

June2001-- The U.S. gets access tointercepted aluminum tubes destined forIraq. After the CIAs Joe Turner,admitting that their dimensions are notright for most gas centrifuges, says theymatch those used for a centrifugedesigned by a German scientist in the1950s, the aforementioned scientist tellshim they are not even close.57

June2001-- Wolfowitz tries to get theCIA to explore the Mylroie theory thatIraq was behind the 1993 WTC bombing --proven baseless during the 1990s by CIAand DIA investigators. (The 9/11Commission concludes, We have found

no credible evidence to support herspeculations.)58

Early Summer 2001-- A careerPentagon planning official tries to evaluatethe Wolfowitz/Feith position that the INCcould play a major role in a coup to oustSaddam Hussein, and that Ahmad Chalabiwould then be welcomed as a hero byIraqis, by examining its premises: that is,what could go wrong, what if the INCcouldnt execute a coup, what if Chalabiwere not so popular? However, he learns

that the Pentagon leadership wants tofocus not on what could go wrong but onwhat would go right.59

June 1,2001-- The principals meet toreview Iraq policy options but do notreach a decision and ask the full NSC tofind a way to increase pressure on Iraq.60

June 5,2001-- During his nominationhearing to be Defense Department policyunder secretary, Douglas Feith says that

the U.S. has a strong interest infacilitating as best we can the liberation ofIraq. Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA.) sayswith no particular strategy for winningand no particular exit strategy, youranswer disturbs me greatly, noting he isspeaking as a Vietnam veteran.61

June22, 2001-- The deputies meet todiscuss Iraq and decide to include lethaltraining for the opposition among initialmeasures adopted for a new Iraq policy.62

Summer 2001-- Rocco Martino, aformer member of the Italian nationalpolice (SISMI) and current paid informant,assembles a dossier of informationincluding a letter purportedly from Nigerspresident approving the sale of 500 tonsof uranium to Iraq. In reality the packageconsists of old material from SISMI files


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and forged documents manufactured frompapers stolen from Nigers embassy.63

Summer 2001-Summer 2002 JoeTurner and the CIA produce at least ninereports, given to Bush and other high-

level officials, saying that Iraqs purchaseof aluminum tubes proved that it hadrestarted its nuclear weapons program.Energy and INR analysts, assuming thatthe claim that the tubes were forcentrifuges had long been discredited, donot see the reports.64

July13, 2001-- The deputies committeediscusses Iraq and Wolfowitz says thatweakening Saddam Hussein could serveU.S. goals in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Concerning regime

change, Wolfowitz proposes morecoordination between the U.S. and Iraqiopposition groups, and U.S. recognition ofa provisional government. He suggestscreating a second autonomous zone in thesouth that, along with the northernenclave, would be deemed Free Iraq.The U.S. would give it frozen Iraqi assetsand it would be expanded to expropriateIraqs oil fields. Powell thinks the ideathat U.S. seizure of the south would leadto Iraqi capitulation is ludicrous.

Rumsfeld says he wants Bushs opinionand asks Rice to schedule a principalscommittee meeting leading to an NSCdiscussion with the president.65

August 1,2001-- The deputies give atop secret paper on Iraq to the principalsentitled A Liberation Strategy, focusingon CIA and other U.S. support for Iraqiopposition groups; possible direct U.S.military action has also been discussed.Wolfowitz has pushed strenuously for hisenclave strategy which he says would

easily succeed but Powell, viewing theexpectation that Iraqis would embrace aU.S.-supported opposition as one of themost absurd, strategically unsoundproposals he had ever heard, tells BushThis is not as easy as it is beingpresented . Dont let anybody push youinto it. Bush says, its good contingencyplanning.66

August 4,2001 With CIA awarenessthat were ramping up on Iraq, itsDirectorate of Operations-IraqCounterproliferation Division has beenrenamed the Joint Task Force on Iraq, andTenet makes it clear that he wants the

chief of the Iraqi Operations Group(charged with running covert actions) tobe a hard-core, tough son-of-a-bitch.Saul, son of a Cuban veteran of the Bayof Pigs fiasco, is selected as IOG chief. Heevaluates U.S. plans and concludes that acoup would fail; instead, a full-scalemilitary invasion of Iraq with CIA supportwould be necessary. (In April 2002officials from the IOG tell a Romeconference of CIA case officers that Iraqwas on the Bush agenda when he waselected, and that 9/11 only delayed

action. They imply that 9/11 was adistraction from Iraq; Bush was alreadycommitted to a change of leadership inIraq -- meaning war.)67

Summer 2001-- During a visit to theIAEA in Vienna the CIAs Joe Turnertendentiously insists that Iraq is trying toenrich uranium.68

August 17, 2001-- A classified EnergyDepartment report states, again, that

rocket production rather than uraniumenrichment is the more likely end-usefor Iraqs aluminum tubes. The INRissues several later reports agreeing withthis assessment.69

Mid-August 2001 According toincoming CIA Europe chief TylerDrumheller after his first meetings withthe Directorate of Operations leadership,The scuttlebutt in the agency back thenwas that the Bush people were out tosettle the score for the Gulf War, which

ended with Saddam still in place . But itwas less Freudian and more banal thanthat .they truly believed there was nosolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[through negotiations] and that if theycould just knock out the dictatorship inIraq and put in a favorable government,Iraq would become a bastion ofdemocracy and a base for the United


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States in the Middle East; a view thatseemed to find a willing ear in thepresident.70

September 4,2001 The principalsmeet to discuss al-Qaeda but Rumsfeld, in

Richard Clarkes opinion, looksdistracted and echoes the Wolfowitzline that there were other terroristconcerns, like Iraq and whatever we didon this al Qaeda business, we had to dealwith the other sources of terrorism.71

September11, 2001-- Al-Qaedaattacks the World Trade Center and thePentagon. Its leader Osama bin Ladenlater says he struck in retaliation forAmerican and Israeli injustice towards thePalestinians and Lebanese, and for Israels

destruction of office towers in Beirutduring its 1982 invasion of Lebanon.72

September11, 2001-- As radio reportsdescribe the attacks and the evacuation ofthe White House, CIA Iraq covertoperations chief Saul and his aides areon their way to the Old Executive OfficeBuilding to brief senior NSC staffers.73

September11, 2001-- Bush wondersimmediately after the attacks whetherSaddam Husseins regime might have

had a hand in it because of the actsapparent sophistication and Iraqs supportfor Palestinian militants.74

September11, 2001-- Bushspeechwriter David Frum, at the AmericanEnterprise Institute after being evacuatedfrom the White House, calls Richard Perleat his home in the south of France; Perlesays, Whatever else the president says,he must make clear that hes holdingresponsible not just terrorists but whoeverharbors those terrorists.75

September11, 2001-- Rice tells Britishambassador Christopher Meyer that theBush administration is looking to seewhether Iraq was connected to theattacks.76

September11, 2001-- At the NationalMilitary Command Center at 2:40 p.m.

Rumsfeld directs incoming JCS chairmanRichard Myers to look for evidencejustifying attacking Iraq as well as Osamabin Laden, and instructs Pentagon lawyerJim (William) Haynes to ask Wolfowitz forinformation about links between Saddam

Hussein and Osama bin Laden.77

September11, 2001-- In an eveningspeech Bush says We will make nodistinction between the terrorists whocommitted these acts and those whoharbor them.78

September12, 2001 When nationalsecurity staff meet at the White HouseRumsfeld raises the topic of Iraq, andRichard Clarke realizes that Rumsfeld andWolfowitz were going to try to take

advantage of this national tragedy topromote their agenda about Iraq. Hehad heard before the attacks that thePentagon expected an invasion of Iraq in2002, and DODs focus was alreadybeginning to shift from al Qaeda,although CIA was explicit now that alQaeda was guilty of the attacks.Wolfowitz, however, thinks there was astate sponsor; Rumsfeld calls for gettingIraqit has better targets thanAfghanistan, and Bush says the U.S.

should change the Iraqi government. Inthe evening, according to Clarke, Bushtakes a few people aside and asks them tosee if Saddam Hussein was connected inany way. After Clarke says that al-Qaedawas responsible and that we have lookedseveral times and not found any real inksto Iraq, Bush seems irritated and hisdemeanor is very intimidating.79

September12, 2001-- At White Housedirection Tenet instructs the CIA IraqOperations Group to plan a covert

operation against Iraq. (The plan,codenamed Anabasis, involves CIAparamilitary operatives, a secret Nevadatraining site, recruitment of Iraqicollaborators, disinformation, economicdisruption, sabotage, assassination, andprovocation to initiate war; it is budgetedat around $400 million over two years.Ultimately Central Command chief Tommy


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Franks does not authorize an Anabasisprovocation because he does not want itto interfere with his own war plan.)80

Soon after 9/11 Attacks Senior JointStaff operations officer Gregory Newbold

encounters Douglas Feith soon after theattacks in an environmentof extremetension and says they are working hardon Afghanistan; Feith tells him theyshould be working on Iraq.81

September13, 2001-- At an NSCmeeting to discuss responding to 9/11Bush asks Tenet whether the CIA islooking into possible Iraqi involvement;Rumsfeld says attacking Iraq could inflictthe kind of costly damage that couldcause terrorist-supporting regimes around

the world to rethink their policies. And wecould locate Iraqs assets, includingweapons of mass destruction. Bushdirects Rumsfeld and Shelton to give hima plan and cost estimate for attackingIraq.82

September13, 2001-- Rumsfeld sendsa memo to Third Army headquarters;having divined the administrationsintentions toward Iraq contingencyplanning for war is already underway.

The planners are given 72 hours tosketch a plan to seize and hold Iraqssouthern oilfields.83

September13, 2001 At Bushsdirection, Richard Clarke launches aspecial project to look again for a linkbetween Osama bin Laden and Iraq; allagencies and departments agree thatthere is no cooperation between the two.A memorandum reporting this is sent toBush, but there is no indication that itreaches him.84

September13, 2001-- A JewishInstitute for National Security Affairs pressrelease calls for all necessary assistanceto the Iraqi National Congress includingdirect U.S. military support in order toexecute regime change in Baghdad, andfor revocation of a Presidential Order thatbans assassinations.85

September14, 2001-- In a phoneconversation Bush tells British PrimeMinister Tony Blair that he thinks theremight be evidence that there was someconnection between Saddam Hussein andOsama bin Laden and al-Qaida.86

September15, 2001-- The StateDepartments inspector general issues anaudit delineating the Iraqi NationalCongresss misuse of funds allocatedunder the Iraqi Liberation Act.87

September15, 2001-- Bush meets withhigh-level administration officials at CampDavid to discuss a response to 9/11.Wolfowitz says that Iraq could be aneasier target than Afghanistan, that thereis a 10 to 50 percent chance it was

involved in the 9/11 attacks, and that theU.S. will have to go after it at some pointif the war on terrorism [is] to be takenseriously. Later, Powell says Wolfowitzdid not justify his claim that Baghdad wasbehind the attacks -- he saw a way ofusing this event as a way to deal with theIraq problem. Rumsfeld indicates that hethinks this might be a good time to attackIraq, since there will be a large buildup offorces in the region and Afghanistan lacksgood targets. Late in the day Bush says

the military options he has seen for Iraqare not that imaginative, and Wolfowitz,with Cheney and Libby standing by, tellshim that the U.S. could seize Basra andIraqs southern oil fields and set up anenclave for opposition groups. When themeeting resumes, Cheney says Iraq needsto be part of the discussion eventually butis now a distraction: If we go afterSaddam Hussein, we lose our rightfulplace as good guy. Bush polls the groupand most agree that the U.S. should focusfirst on al-Qaeda. Bush says I believe

Iraq was involved, but Im not going tostrike them now. I dont have theevidence at this point.

At the end of the meeting Hugh Sheltonsays that attacking Iraq would hinder U.S.coalition-building efforts, and that there isno reason to think that Baghdad waslinked to 9/11. Bush calls Rice and says


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the U.S. will focus at present onAfghanistan -- were putting Iraq off. Buteventually well have to return to thatquestion, and he wants war plans to bedeveloped.88

September 16, 2001-- Cheney is askedwhether the U.S. would hesitate to attackSaddam Hussein if he were harboringterrorists and if there were any evidencelinking Iraq to 9/11. He says no.89

September 17, 2001 At an NSCmeeting that includes discussion of whatmight follow an Afghanistan campaign,Bush confirms his decision thatcontingency plans should be drawn up todeal with Iraq, including a plan to seizeIraqs oilfields. According to senior

administration officials he signs a 2 page top secret directive that, along witha plan for war with Afghanistan, directsthe Pentagon to begin planning militaryoptions for an invasion of Iraq.90

September 18, 2001-- Bush signs ajoint Congressional resolution authorizinguse of all necessary and appropriateforce against whomever he determinesplanned, authorized, committed or aidedthe 9/11 attacks.91

September 18, 2001 Richard Clarkesoffice sends a memo to Rice reporting theresults of a survey of intelligenceinformation prepared at Bushs directionon any Iraqi involvement in the 9/11attacks. It cites the ideological chasmbetween Iraqs leadership and al-Qaedaand concludes that only weak anecdotalevidence links the two. Rices chief aideon Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, acceptsthe memos conclusions. Clarke later tells60 Minutesthat the NSC sent back the

first draft of the memo because it did notreport a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda.92

September 18, 2001-- Envelopescontaining anthrax powder begin to arriveat Senate and media offices.93

After the September11 Attacks--After the attacks, Bush asks Cheney toassess Americas vulnerability to chemical,biological, and nuclear weapons, andaccording to White House press secretaryAri Fleischer, Cheney becomes the

strongest advocate of the possibility of [abiological] attack and [the] need toprepare for it, including traveling with afull biohazard protective suit. Cheney alsobegins scheduling seminars on Islam andthe Middle East, meeting with experts todiscuss how might a postwar Iraq takeshape and what are the prospects fordemocracy in the region. Those hechooses to consult include conservativeacademics Bernard Lewis and Wolfowitzsformer Johns Hopkins colleague, FouadAjami.94

September 19, 2001-- Ahmad Chalabiand Bernard Lewis speak before theDefense Policy Board, an advisorycommittee for the defense secretarychaired by Richard Perle. Wolfowitz andformer House speaker Newt Gingrichattend. Lewis says that to avoidappearing weak the U.S. must respond tothe 9/11 attacks with a show of force. Hesays the U.S. should support democraticreformers in the Middle East, such as my

friend here, Dr. Chalabi. Chalabi tells thegroup that Iraq has WMD, and proposesthat the U.S. skip Afghanistan and insteadattack Iraq immediately. He says thatwith help from U.S. airpower and SpecialForces advisers, insurgents under hiscommand could quickly prevail; therewould be no postwar resistance and a newgovernment could be quickly set up. Theoutcome would turn Iraq into a good,stable, modern, pro-Western free marketcountry. At the end of the meetingRumsfeld says that defeating the Taliban

will not be enough and that more needs tobe done to show that attacking the U.S.has serious consequences.95

Around September 19, 2001

Immediately after the Defense PolicyBoard meets, board member and formerClinton administration CIA director JamesWoolsey travels with a team of Justice and


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Defense Department officials on agovernment plane to Britain to look forevidence that Iraq was behind both theSeptember 11 attacks and the 1993 WorldTrade Center bombing; the trip wasauthorized by the Pentagon with support

from Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith.Like Wolfowitz, Woolsey believes in theMylroie theory that Iraq masterminded the1993 attack. His law firm represents andlobbies for the Iraqi National Congress.96

September 19, 2001-- Bush tells Tenet,I want to know about links betweenSaddam and al Qaeda.The Vice Presidentknows some things that might be helpful.Cheney says one of his staffers picked upa report that 9/11 hijacker MohammedAtta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer

in Prague five months before 9/11. Tenetis surprised; back at headquarters he tellsDirectorate of Operations head Jim Pavitt,Its a direct request from Cheney andBush.Lets get right on it.97

September20, 2001-- A memo writtenby Feith in consultation with Rumsfeldsays The president has stressed that weare not defining our fight narrowly and arenot focused only on those directlyresponsible for the September 11 attacks

. That is one of the reasons why I stillfavor an early focus on Iraq as well.98

September20, 2001 Tony Blair meetswith Bush and asks about Iraq; Bush saysit is not the immediate problem thoughsome in his administration disagree. Bushaddresses an evening joint session ofCongress, saying, Our enemy is a radicalnetwork of terrorists, and everygovernment that supports them.Everynation, in every region, now has adecision to make: either you are with us,

or you are with the terrorists. (Severaldays later Blair tells some MPs that heurged Bush to show restraint.Subsequently British ambassadorChristopher Meyer says that Bush wasunder intense Pentagon pressure to attackIraq, but decided after Blairs intercessionto leave Iraq for another day. Later stillMeyer reports that Bush asked Blair to

support overthrowing Saddam Hussein;Blair advised against getting distractedfrom the Taliban and al-Qaeda and Bushagreed, saying But when we have dealtwith Afghanistan, we must come back toIraq.)99

September20, 2001-- In a letter toBush the Project for the New AmericanCentury says that the U.S. must captureor kill Osama bin Laden, attackAfghanistan, target Hezbollah, considerstriking Iran and Syria, fully support Israelin its fight against terrorism, end allassistance to the Palestinian Authority,and greatly increase military spending.And it should provide full military andfinancial support to the Iraqi opposition inorder to overthrow Saddam Hussein,

whether or not evidence links him to 9/11.Signers include William Kristol, Perle,Solarz, and a number of otherconservative and neoconservativepundits.100

September21, 2001-- A PresidentsDaily Brief on Iraq prepared by the CIA atBushs behest says the intelligencecommunity has no evidence of an Iraq linkto 9/11 or of any significant collaborativeties with al-Qaeda. It says that the few

credible reports of Iraq/al-Qaeda contactsinvolve attempts by Iraq to monitor thegroup. Bush, Cheney, Rice, StephenHadley, Rumsfeld, Powell, undersecretaries at the State and DefenseDepartments, and other senioradministration officials receive the paper.Tenet tells Bush that the CIAs Czechoffice is skeptical of the report, promotedby Cheney, that hijacker Mohammed Attamet in Prague with Iraqi intelligence Itjust doesnt add up. Credit card andphone records show that at the time Atta

was in northern Virginia -- a few milesfrom CIA headquarters. (Several yearslater the Senate Intelligence Committeeinvestigates the misuse of intelligenceinformation prior to the Iraq invasion.The administration does not disclose theexistence of this clearly relevant brief untilthe summer of 2004 -- and still refuses toturn it over.)101


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September22, 2001-- McClatchyreports that U.S. officials and terrorismexperts say there is little evidenceSaddam Husseins regime played a role in9/11. Regarding reports of 1996 and2000 meetings between Iraqis and bin

Laden or hijacker Mohammed Atta, itnotes that aside from a hostilerelationship with the U.S., Iraq and al-Qaeda have little in common. It reportsthat a Congressional Research ServiceIraq expert says that he has never seenany evidence that Iraq is heavily involvedin al-Qaida. Nevertheless, it notes,Wolfowitz and Perle are lobbying fortargeting Iraq, over the opposition ofPowell, who hopes to preserveinternational support for U.S. anti-terrorism policy.102

September23, 2001-- CondoleezzaRice says on CNN that any attack on Iraqwould not occur until stage two of U.S.military actions.103

September 26,2001-- The SundayTelegraphreports mounting criticism ofColin Powell by prominent conservativehawks, including William Kristol, whowrote in the Washington PostthatVirtually every major political figure has

gone out of his way to support thepresident. Except for his secretary ofstate104

September 26,2001-- Reflectingdomestic antiwar opinion, former senatorThomas Eagleton says of the use offorce resolution just passed by Congress,it names no country. It names no region.It authorizes the use of appropriate forceas if he (the president alone) determineshow to excise terrorism from the world.Recalling that John F. Kennedy saw the

Vietnam War as a way to achieveunlimited gains for limited expenditureand as a proving ground for the theory oflimited warfare; that he failed to carefullydefine American objectives, aside frompreserving freedom in South Vietnam;that he did not realistically estimate thecost or the U.S.s lack of intelligenceinformation and language skills; that in

attacking Vietnam he attacked a countrythat had already driven out a Westernoccupier; Eagleton concludes withSantayanas saying, Those who cannotremember the past are condemned torepeat it.105

September 29,2001-- Rumsfeld asksGen. Myers to begin preparing Iraq waroptions with two objectives: finding anddestroying WMD, and regime change. Forthe second goal Rumsfeld requests a plantaking one or two months and 250,000troops.106

September 30,2001-- An Iraqi nuclearphysicist who recently defected tells theSunday Telegraphthat Saddam Husseinhas ordered his scientists to work

exclusively on expanding his chemicaland biological weapons arsenal, and thatsome 3,000 of them have been workingflat out on secret programs to developand deploy lethal toxins during the pastsix months. He says Iraqi engineers areworking on expanding the range ofpilotless aircraft that could be used forbiological warfare to reach Israel, Iran,Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. (All of thisinformation is false.)107

October2001-- By October the U.S.Third Army is planning an operation code-named Vigilant Guardianan invasionplan not to occupy all of Iraq but toestablish an enclave and seize its southernoil fields. The plan is expected to beready as early as January or February2002. Supposedly, its focus is preparationfor a preemptive strike should Iraq moveagainst Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Ratherthan the armed Iraqi opposition of theChalabi/Downing plan, the Army estimatesthat 75,000-100,000 U.S. armed forces

would be involved.108

October2001 Since Rumsfeld andother neocons in the Defense Departmentdiscount CIA analysis on Iraq, the DODpolicy office sets up an alternativeintelligence unit. Former AEI affiliateDavid Wurmser, who since 9/11 has beenworking on a giant spider web of a chart


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supposedly demonstrating links amongterrorists, state supporters, and terroristacts, is given a security clearance andaccess to an intelligence communitywebsite and raw data files. Wurmserupdates members of Cheneys foreign

policy team who are closely tied toChalabi, who in turn provides them with astream of reports from alleged Iraqidefectors about secret Iraqi WMDstockpiles.109

October 4,2001-- Letters containinganthrax are discovered at several Senateand media offices and Washingtonofficials are scared out of their wits.Early reports seem to indicate, wrongly,that the anthrax was weaponized.Laurie Mylroie announces that Saddam

Hussein is behind the mailings; Bushcounterterrorism advisor Gen. WayneDowning excitedly phones Wolfowitz andFeith with the news; according to a WhiteHouse aide: I had the feeling they werehigh-fiving each other.110

October 7,2001-- The U.S. war withAfghanistan begins.

October 8,2001-- Ambassador JohnNegroponte writes to the U.N. Security

Council that We may find that our self-defense requires further actions withrespect to other organizations and otherstates. European diplomats say that ifIraq is targeted the U.S. will alienateArabs and Muslims and rupture the anti-terrorism coalition.111

October10, 2001-- Iraqi ForeignMinister Naji Sabri says that Iraq seesNegropontes letter to the UNSC as adirect threat.112

October14, 2001-- The Observer(London) reports that U.S. intelligencesources, involved with both the CIA andthe Defense Department say that anthraxspores used in recent attacks wereairborne and were carefully milled, whichis a giveaway that a state sponsor wasinvolved; that they were a strain that inthe 1950s was distributed to countries

that included Iraq; and that al-Qaedaoperatives have said that anthrax wasobtained in the Czech Republic.113 (Allinformation implying an Iraqi link to theanthrax attacks is false.)

October14, 2001 Frontline interviewsIraqi exile Sabah Khodada al-Lami whosays he worked at a Salman Pak, Iraqcamp where people were trained to attackAmerican targets and to hijack airplanes.(As Frontline later notes, no laterinformation backed Khodadas claims andthe U.S. concluded that the camp wasused for Iraqi counterterrorism training inanti-hijacking techniques. The CIA andU.S. military intelligence had been awaresince the 1980s that Iraq had an anti-hijacking program, based on U.S.-Iraq

intelligence cooperation during the erawhen the two governments were quasiallies against Iran.)114

October15, 2001-- According to AriFleischer, In mid-October, I told thepress that no determinations had beenmade [linking U.S. anthrax attacks to Iraqor 9/11 or al-Qaeda.] Privately, I hadbeen told that none of the anthraxappeared to be sourced to knownstockpiles from a foreign government, but

I wasnt going to say that publicly in casethe information changed.115

October15, 2001-- Italy's militaryintelligence service (SISMI) gives the CIAa report about an alleged Iraq-Nigeruranium deal. Without any apparentconfirmable evidence SISMI suggests thatan Iraqi diplomat who visited Niger in1999 was seeking yellowcake, ore thatcould be processed into weapons-gradeuranium. (The visit was reported in thepress at the time and the U.S.

ambassador and British intelligence filedroutine reports, with no mention ofuranium or of anything remarkable aboutthe visit.)

The intelligence community dismisses theSISMI report as amateurish andunsubstantiated. However, it is quicklystovepiped to receptive administration


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officials including Cheney, who asks aboutit at one of his daily CIA briefings. Theagency tells him that the report is vagueand that in any case Iraq already haduranium ore, obtained in the early 1980s,which had been secured by the IAEA.

Dissatisfied, Cheney tells the CIA to revisitthe issue.116

October 16, 2001-- When Tenet andDrumheller visit London British officialsseek confirmation that as they understandit there is no evidence of an Iraq-9/11link, and according to Drumheller, Iheard Tenet say numerous times untilsome weeks before the war began thatthere was no link to Iraq and we had tofocus on terrorism, and I was confident,as I told my counterpart, that Tenet had

the presidents ear.117

October 17, 2001-- The Pentagonawards the Rendon Group a $16 millioncontract to run propaganda operationswith Iraq as one of its targets. Theevents of 11 September 2001 changedeverything, not least of which was theadministrations outlook concerningstrategic influence, according to an Armyreport; Faced with direct evidence thatmany people around the world actively

hated the United States, Bush begantaking action to more effectively explainU.S. policy overseas.118

October 17,2001-- The New YorkTimesreports that the Czech interiorminister has confirmed that Iraqiintelligence met with hijacker MohammedAtta in April 2001; that Iraqi exile SabahKhodada al-Lami reported that SalmanPak was a terrorist training camp (notingthat Mr. Khodadas identity might neverhave been known, were it not for the Iraqi

National Congress), and that Iraqsambassador to Turkey Farouk Hijazi, aformer head of Iraqi intelligence, met withOsama bin Laden in 1998 to offer him andal-Qaeda a safe haven in Iraq (also basedon information provided by Mr. ChalabisIraqi National Congress.) On the otherhand, Turkish intelligence officials saidthis week that they had no information

that Mr. Hijazi had traveled to Afghanistanor anywhere else to meet with Mr. binLaden. (None of the information in theTimesreport was confirmed by laterevidence except for the attribution of thereporting to the INC.)119

October 19, 2001-- Homeland securitydirector Tom Ridge says that the FBI hasdetermined that the mail-attack anthraxwas not weaponized; earlier informationattributed to Senate sources waswrong.120

LateOctober2001-- At a dinner atCheneys residence, with the Afghan warseemingly going well for the U.S.,academic Bernard Lewis criticizes theGeorge H.W. Bush administrations failure

to overthrow Saddam Hussein during the1991 Gulf War.121

October22, 2001-- Anthrax is found ona device used to open letters at a SecretService facility. Bush, his wife, most ofhis staff, and executive office mail-handling workers begin taking theantibiotic Cipro as a precaution.122

October22, 2001 James Woolsey tellsreporters that he does not have evidence

beyond a reasonable doubt that Iraq wasinvolved with U.S. anthrax scares or wasbehind the 9/11 attacks....Butsuspicions...are enough for him to goon.123

October 26,2001-- ABC News reportsthat anthrax sent to a senators office hascharacteristics that make it a trademarkof Saddam Husseins biological weaponsprogram. It had checked with AriFleischer beforehand, who passed oninformation from the NSC that there was

no information linking Iraq to the attacks.ABC reports the story anyway, citingthree well-placed but separate sources.ABC backs off the story on October 31.124

November 8,2001-- Rumsfeld asksFeith to evaluate possible actions toneutralize an Iraqi WMD or terroristthreat. Feith drafts a paper whose options


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include the Chalabi/Downing plan: usingIraqi opposition groups to seekcollaborators to rebel against thegovernment, build up enclaves in thenorth and south, and support the IraqiNational Congress.125

November14, 2001-- In a speechgiven as the Taliban are seemingly beingrouted in Afghanistan, Perle evokes theclaim of Iraqi exile Khidhir Hamza (whoseactivities are promoted by the INC) thatafter Israels 1981 bombing of an Iraqinuclear reactor Saddam Hussein orderedfuture nuclear facilities to be dispersed atfour hundred sites across the nation.Perle asks, "Do we wait for Saddam andhope for the best or do we take somepreemptive action?"126

November 17, 2001-- An NSC meetingdiscusses a phase two of the war onterrorism, and Bush directs the DefenseDepartment to be ready to deal with Iraqif Baghdad acted against U.S. interests,with plans to include possibly occupyingIraqi oil fields. Wolfowitz writes toRumsfeld saying that if there were even a10 percent chance that Saddam Husseinwas involved with the 9/11 attacks thentaking action against it should have first

priority, adding that the odds are far morethan 10 percent and citing as evidence thebaseless Mylroie theory that Iraq wasbehind the 1993 World Trade Centerbombing.127

November 18, 2001-- After the Talibanare routed from Kabul, administrationofficials say they hope that this outcomewill warn other regimes sponsoringterrorists. They cite Iraq, Syria, and Iran.Rice says, We didnt need September 11to tell us that Saddam Hussein is a very

dangerous man. There could only be onereason that he has not wanted U.N.inspectors in Iraq, and thats so he canbuild weapons of mass destruction.128

November21, 2001-- Bush tells Ricethat he plans to get Rumsfeld to work onIraq; he then asks Rumsfeld what kind ofa war plan he has. Rumsfeld says he

doesnt think the plan is current orrepresentative of his or Central Commandhead Tommy Franks thinking. Bush tellshim to start war planning but keep itsecret. Rumsfeld has the Joint Staff drafta top secret message to Franks requesting

an initial commanders estimate in abouta week.129

AroundNovember 21, 2001-- AtRumsfelds request JCS director ofoperations Gregory Newbold briefsRumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Myers, Pace, andDOD counsel William Haynes on thecurrent Iraq war plan, which calls for adeployment taking some seven monthsand around 500,000 troops. Rumsfeldrejects the force level and timing.130

November21, 2001-- Newbold calls hisCentral Command counterpart, GeneRenuart, who is working on Afghanistanoperations, to warn him that a request isimminent from Rumsfeld for acommanders estimate on Iraq; Renuartpasses on the news to Franks that aformal request is coming.131

November 27,2001-- Rumsfeld flies toTampa to meet alone with Tommy Franks,tells him to challenge everything in the

existing contingency plan for war with Iraq(Oplan 1003), and to produce an initialrough concept. He brings talking pointsdrafted with Wolfowitz and Feith thatlargely correspond to the Chalabi/Downingplan: finding a rationalization to start awar with Iraq (Saddam Hussein movesagainst the Kurds; U.S. discoversconnection to 9/11 or anthrax attacks;dispute over WMD inspections start nowthinking about inspection demands);recognition of a provisional government(Unlike in Afghanistan, important to have

ideas in advance about who would ruleafterwards); giving said provisionalgovernment revenues from liberated oilfields; the concept of a running start:Start military forces before all requiredfor worst case larger forces flow inbehind; and war crimes indictments forousted officials. The paper also calls foran Influence campaign to prepare the


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way for war. (An item on radical ideashas been redacted on national securitygrounds.)132

November 27,2001-- After theirmeeting, Rumsfeld and Franks hold a

press conference. Neither mentions Iraqnor are they questioned about it.According to Bob Woodward, Rumsfeld isin a buoyant mood because things aregoing so well in Afghanistan.133

November 29,2001 Having been toldby Wolfowitz earlier in November that hethought that the Pentagon was incapableof developing strategy to deal withsomething as complex as 9/11, and thenasked to create a group to report to Bushand other high-level officials, AEI

president Christopher DeMuth hasrecruited a dozen people, includingacademics Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajamiand journalist Fareed Zakaria. They meetin secret, along with Rumsfelds long-standing adviser Steve Herbits. DeMuthssummary memo after the meetingpredicts a two-generation battle withradical Islamism, identifies Egypt, SaudiArabia, and Iran as problematic, and saysSaddam Hussein is vulnerable -- Weagreed that Saddam would have to leave

the scene before the problem would beaddressed. This would transform theregion. Copies are hand-delivered to theadministration: Cheney is pleased and thereport has a strong impact on Bush,causing him to focus on the malignancyof the Middle East; Rice finds it verypersuasive. Rumsfeld later says heremembers the general plan but not thedetails. Herbits says the group concludedWere facing a two-generation war. Andstart with Iraq.134

November 30,2001-- Rumsfeld doesnot answer when asked if he agrees withRichard Perles recent statement that nowis the time to get rid of Saddam Husseinregardless of whether or not there is anyIraq-9/11 link except to say that Perledoes not speak for Bush. Rumsfeld saysthat when weapons inspectors were inIraq We couldnt find beans. And its

there. And we know its there. And it wasdefectors who came out and told us whereit was that helped us to find it . he hasbiological activity going on in mobile vans.Theyre moving around. It is almostimpossible to find what theyre doing. We

know with certain knowledge that SaddamHussein has chemical and biologicalweapons.135

Late2001-- What looks like a quick andeasy Afghanistan victory for the U.S.encourages Iraq war advocates to rampup their support for the Chalabi/Downingplan, which would provide Special Forcesassistance to an Iraqi opposition-baseduprising. The Joint Chiefs are skepticaland reportedly direct their staff to comeup with a counterproposal -- the

uniformed military have been especiallydismissive of Chalabis ideas. A formerhigh-level Defense Department officialsays, We looked at all these plans andalways came to the conclusion that theexternal opposition did not have thearmed ability to deal with Saddams policestate.136

December2001-- INR staff providePowell a major new review on Iraqiweapons of mass destruction. It verifies

earlier IAEA findings and says there is nopersuasive evidence that an Iraqi nuclearprogram is being reconstituted.137

December2001-- By this time Czechofficials who had earlier supported reportsthat hijacker Mohammed Atta met withIraqi intelligence in Prague before 9/11have backed away from the claim. Duringthe month Czech president Vaclav Havelsays there is only "a 70 percent" chancethat the allegation is true. (In 2002, hetells U.S. officials that the meetings did

not occur but keeps the matter quiet so asnot to embarrass the White House.)138

December 1,2001-- As part of asteady drumbeat of bellicose commentstoward Iraq during the week, Armitagesays on December 1 that Bush is on, thusfar, a roll in Afghanistan and has beenencouraged to pressure Baghdad to


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readmit U.N. weapons inspectors: I don'tthink there is any question that an Iraqwith weapons of mass destruction is athreat to its neighbors and ultimatelyourselves, and so we will do what we needto do to obviate that threat. Meanwhile,

Arab commentators say that invading Iraqwould be understood in the region as aWestern assault on Muslim countries.139

December 1,2001-- Rumsfeld sends atop secret planning order to Franksthrough the JCS chairman directing him tocome up with a commanders estimateleading to a new Iraq war plan. Itinstructs Franks to indicate how he woulduse the military to overthrow SaddamHussein, eliminate any threat of the use ofWMD, and stop Iraqs suspected support

of terrorism. Franks is told to report inperson in three days.140

December 2, 2001-- Asked whetherIraq continues to pursue weapons of massdestruction, Powell says, We have noreason to believe that they have not.Asked about hijacker Attas alleged Praguemeetings with Iraqi intelligence, he says,Certainly these meetings took place butthere is no evidence to link them to 9/11.James Woolsey disagrees with Powells

declaration that no smoking gun links Iraqwith 9/11: I think they may have had ahand in it. Woolsey says that multipleeyewitnesses say that Iraq providedtraining in hijacking with knives at SalmanPak; that he thinks there is somecircumstantial evidence indicating thatIraq was behind anthrax attacks in theU.S., because only Iraq and the Sovietsdeveloped anthrax of the type used, and itis highly implausible that an Americanwas responsible. He thinks an anthrax-9/11 connection is the most logical link

between al Qaeda and Iraq biologicalweapons programs, since we know alQaeda and Iraqi intelligence had a lot ofties. (The claims about Salman Pakemanate from Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami, produced for the press by the IraqiNational Congress. Al-Lami also says thetraining camp was contaminated by

anthrax.141 All of this information isfalse.)

December 2, 2001-- Powell says thatBush has made no decision about Iraq.142

December 4,2001-- In secret, Franksand his operations director Gene Renuartformally present the Iraq war plan for thefirst time. Franks says to date he hasonly been able to tinker with Oplan 1003but has trimmed force levels by 100,000to 400,000 troops, to be deployed over sixmonths; Rumsfeld thinks the troop level istoo high; and wants to know how quicklysufficient force could be deployed.143

December 9,2001 When Cheney isasked about the alleged Prague meetings

and Woolseys claim that Iraq trainedhijackers at Salman Pak, in light ofCheneys September 16, 2001 statementindicating that was no evidence linkingIraq to 9/11, Cheney says the Praguereport is now pretty well confirmed. Hisinterviewer says What we do know is thatIraqi is harboring terrorists . Why not goin and get them? Cheney changes thesubject to Saddam Husseins aggressivepursuit of weapons of mass destruction144

December12, 2001-- Franks andRenuart return to the Pentagon with asecond iteration of the Iraq commandersestimate. Rumsfeld wants to know howmuch of a military buildup in the regioncould be kept secret and if there areaspects that wouldnt cost much.145

December 17, 2001-- Former Iraqiengineer and exile Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, who has said that Iraq secretlyburied tons of biological, chemical and

nuclear weapons in wells, villas, and ahospital fails a polygraph test and the CIAconcludes that his entire story is a lie. Al-Haideri had been coached for days by theIraqi National Congress prior to the test.Ahmad Chalabi then calls freelancer PaulMoran, who has worked for the INC andfor the Rendon Group; and Judith Miller ofthe New York Times; she flies to Thailand


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and interviews al-Haideri. Later she saysshe didnt know of the failed test andgovernment experts said his informationwas reliable.146

December 19, 2001-- Franks returns to

the Pentagon with a third iteration of theIraq war plan, having reduced the initialinvasion force to 145,000 troops deployedover 90 days, to be reinforced to a forcelevel of around 275,000. War would take45 days while another 90 days would benecessary to destroy Iraqs government.Rumsfeld wants a smaller and fasterinvasion and tells Franks that Bush wantsto see him at his Texas ranch.147

December20, 2001-- Judith Millersstory on al-Haideris false accounts

appears on the front page of the New YorkTimes; Moran interviews al-Haideri onAustralian television. The story is pickedup by the White House and repeated bythe media around the world.148

LateDecember2001-- As he works onBushs January State of the Union speech,David Frum concludes that Iraq isanalogous to a World War II axis power;thus Bush will soon identify Iraq, Iran, andNorth Korea as an axis of evil.149

December 28,2001-- Bush, Cheney,Rice, Powell, and Tenet meet with Franksand Renuart, and Franks presents abriefing classified top secret/Polo Step(compartmentalized military planning.) Itincludes plans for a potential preemptivestrike and seizure of Iraqs southern oilfields by Special Forces. Rumsfeld is waryabout a 275,000-strong force level, andsays We are still working through thenumber. Bush tells Rumsfeld that theyneed to get started; Franks says if so then

the U.S. needs to start building up itsforces in the region. Rumsfeld and Bushagree to increase the number of troops inKuwait and Franks also wants to transferin some equipment already pre-positionedin the region. At a news conference afterthe briefing Bush and Franks do notmention Iraq and are not asked aboutit.150

Late2001-- Feiths office dispatches twoof its officials, Wolfowitz colleague AbramShulsky and former Newt Gingrich aide BillBruner to Tampa, Central Commandheadquarters. Some there view them asFeith spies.151

January 1,2002-- Saul meets withRumsfeld to outline a covert action plan tooverthrow the Iraqi government. OnJanuary 3, Saul, Tenet, and others fromthe CIA tell Cheney and Libby that a coupwill not succeed in ousting SaddamHussein; only a U.S. invasion with CIAsupport could achieve the desired result;later they tell Bush the same. Bushproceeds with U.N. diplomacy whilesecretly continuing preparations for war.In February, the CIA Directorate of

Operations begins having weekly meetingson Iraq.152

January 9,2002-- The Washington Postasks Rumsfeld about reports that hesuggested after 9/11 that theadministration needed to deal with Iraq aswell as al-Qaeda. Rumsfeld says he hasno recollection of this exchange (fourmonths earlier), or of Bushs views on thematter.153

January 27,2002-- Franks and Renuartpresent a fourth iteration of their Iraq warplan to Rumsfeld; Franks echoes the CIAconclusion that covert action cannotdepose Saddam Hussein and says that theIraqi opposition is incapable ofoverthrowing the regime; U.S. militaryinvolvement is necessary.154

January 30,2002 In his State of theUnion speech Bush identifies Iraq, Iran,and North Korea as an axis of evil andsays that Iraq is hostile towards the U.S.

and supports terrorism. Later WhiteHouse spokesmen say that this does notmean that U.S. military action isimminent.155

February 1, 2002-- Franks comes to thePentagon with his fifth iteration of the Iraqcommanders estimate, and tells Rumsfeldthat the plan can now be executed as a


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unilateral invasion. Rumsfeld still thinks itwould take too long and says hed likeFranks to compress deployment from 60to 30 days, which would require initiatingmilitary action with far fewer troops.156

February 16, 2002-- Bush signs a topsecret NSC directive calling for regimechange in Iraq. It directs the CIA to assistthe U.S. military in overthrowing SaddamHussein through support for oppositiongroups, sabotage, and disinformation anddeception operations. The plan isbudgeted at $200 million a year for twoyears, later cut to $189 million for the firstyear. Four days later, a CIA survey teamsecretly enters northern Iraq to preparefor the entry of CIA paramilitary teams.157

February 19, 2002-- Senate intelligencecommittee chairman Bob Graham (D-Fla.)visits Central Command to be briefed onthe Afghanistan war. Command chiefTommy Franks tells him privately thatcrucial materiel is being diverted toprepare for an Iraq invasion.158

February 28,2002-- Franks conveystwo large books of Iraq targets toRumsfelds office.159

March23, 2002-- The JCS begins amilitary exercise called ProminentHammer to test Oplan 1003s feasibility.According to the New York Times, theexercise indicates that an Iraq war wouldplace severe strains on personnel andcause deep shortages of certain criticalweapons.160

April2002 A team of covert SpecialForces enter Iraqi Kurdistan from Turkeyin what is clearly a precursor to war, nota substitute, and brief Cheney upon their

return.161

April2002-- Franks visits the Pentagonand for the first time shows the JCS adetailed war plan, calling for 200,000 to250,000 troops and a two-front land war,with U.S. troops invading from Kuwait andTurkey.162

Summer 2002-- JCS chairman Myersissues detailed war plans to U.S.combatant commanders and sets up aspecial Iraq planning cell within the JointStaff.163

August 29,2002-- Bush approves anIraq war plan, two weeks before going tothe Security Council to ask for a resolutionendorsing the use of force.164

December2002-- Senior Feith deputyWilliam Luti, who has been trying tocreate an armed Iraqi opposition force toassist a U.S. invasion, with support fromWolfowitz and Stephen Hadley, meetswith opposition groups in London. Lutiseffort gets few recruits, even afterWolfowitz tries to fly in Iraqi exiles from

Iran. Opposition groups submit 6,000names of potential recruits; 622 arevetted by the U.S.; 500 are invited to joina force; 95 show up in Hungary fortraining; 73 complete the four-weektraining program. The operation isbudgeted at $63.5 million.165

2003-- U.S. establishment of a post-invasion provisional government in Iraq isstrongly supported by Wolfowitz but notby the State Department because it would

give too much power to exiles with norecent experience of life in Iraq. Rumsfeldsees a provisional government as anobstacle to complete freedom of action forthe U.S. military. The White Housedecides against immediately installing agovernment.166

January 2003-- By January 2003Franks war plan, Oplan 1003 Victor, isessentially complete, calling for a rapiddrive to overthrow Iraqs government andthen reduction of the U.S. troop presence

as soon as possible. It predicts that largeareas will not have to be occupied byforeign troops. Meanwhile, several CIAanalyses warn of possible Ba'athistopposition, destruction of criticalinfrastructure, and the likelihood of armedopposition if the U.S. is perceived to beattempting to retain control of Iraq.167


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February2003 A poll shows that 72percent of Americans believe it is likelythat Saddam Hussein was personallyinvolved in the September 11th attacks.168

April 6,2003-- After the invasion of

Iraq, the Pentagon flies Chalabi and someof his men to Kuwait and then transportsthem to Baghdad, where they are driventhrough the city in a widely ignoredparade. In a television interview Chalabisays a strategic alliance between Iraqand the United States is a good thing forboth. Later Chalabi is named by the U.S.to the unelected 25-member IraqiGoverning Council.169

Around December2003-- David Frumand Richard Perle write that it is not truethat the president denied a link betweenSaddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks(Bush said on September 17 that there isno evidence of any involvement.)Rather, they say, theres no proof, butthere are clues and hints tying Iraqiintelligence to the hijackers that werediscovered by a small team ofindependent analysts inside the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense [who] foundclues that had eluded the [intelligence]agencies. (In June 2004 the 9/11

Commission concluded that there was noevidence connecting Iraq to either al-Qaeda or the September 11 attacks.)170

May20, 2004 Ahmad ChalabisBaghdad home is raided at gunpoint byIraqi police supported by American troops,and his offices are searched. The raid wasauthorized by the White House, as wasthe Defense Departments recent decisionto eliminate its stipend to the INC of$342,000 per month. Chalabis Pentagonallies were not notified in advance though

some knew it was under consideration.Chalabi and/or other INC members arealleged to have been involved with theft,embezzlement, and kidnapping; several ofChalabis top aides have already fled thecountry.171

December15, 2005-- In Iraqs firstelections for its Council of

Representatives, Ahmad Chalabi wins lessthan half of one percent of the vote.172

June 2006-- A poll of American soldiersin Iraq shows that 90 percent believe thatSaddam Hussein was involved with the

9/11 attacks.173

September 2006-- A national CNN pollshows that 43 percent of Americans stillbelieve that Saddam Hussein was involvedwith the 9/11 attacks.174

January 14, 2010 -- Iraqs independentelectoral commission disqualifies 499candidates from running in March 2010parliamentary elections, after receiving alist from the Accountability and JusticeCommission headed by Ahmad Chalabiand one of his allies. The commission,with unclear legal authority, secretlyvetted candidates for Baathist ties. (In2003 Chalabi had been appointed by U.S.occupation authorities to head a De-Baathification Commission that operatedduring the era of the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority. Its actions evicted tens ofthousands of civil servants from theirjobs.)175

February 19, 2010-- The Justice

Department, FBI, and U.S. Postal Serviceannounce the formal conclusion of theirinvestigation into the 2001 anthraxattacks. As had been previously reported,the Amerithrax investigation found thatthe late Dr. Bruce Ivins [a biologist at theU.S. Armys Fort Detrick biodefense lab]acted alone in planning and executing theattack.176

1W. Patrick Lang, Drinking the Kool-Aid, MiddleEast Policy Council JournalXI, no. 2 (summer 2004).

2John Dizard, How Ahmed Chalabi Conned theNeocons, Salon, May 4, 2004;http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/204/05/04/chalabi; Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 2004.

3W. Patrick Lang, op. cit.

4Globe and Mail (Canada), August 22, 1992;Financial Post (Toronto, Canada), May 10, 1997.


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5WP, June 23, 1991; WP, December 9, 1990; NYT,December 10, 1990.

6St. Petersburg Times (Florida), January 8, 1992;WP, January 12, 1992; John R. MacArthur, SecondFront: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War(Berkeley, CA: University of CA Press, 1992).

7James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans (New York:Penguin Books, 2004), 187.

8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fisk#The_Great

_War_for_Civilisation; Bob Woodward, State ofDenial (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 77;http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/192908_cheney29.html.

9UNICEF. Undeclared War, December 10, 1999;http://www.unicef.org/sowc00/sowc00_18_35.pdf

10Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, SaddamHussein: An American Obsession (London: Verso,2002), 31.

11Franklin Foer, Flacks Americana, New Republic,May 20, 2002; James Bamford, The Man Who Soldthe War, Rolling Stone, November 17, 2005;Richard Sale, Clintons Secret Wars: The Evolution ofa Commander in Chief (New York St. Martins Press,2009), 184-185.

12Observer, February 23, 2003; George Packer, TheAssassins Gate (New York: Farrar, Straus andGiroux, 2005), 13.

13Washington Times, March 4, 1992;JerusalemPost, March 9, 1992.

14Jacob Weisberg, The Bush Tragedy (New York:Random House, 2008), 168-169.

15Laurie Mylroie, Bush vs. The Beltway (New York:ReganBooks, 2003),fn. 231.

16Seymour Hersh, The Iraq Hawks; Can Their WarPlan Work? New Yorker, December 24, 2001; W.Patrick Lang, op. cit.; Jane Mayer, A Reporter atLarge: The Manipulator, New Yorker, June 7, 2004;Richard Sale, op. cit., 196-198; 215-221.

17Jane Mayer, op. cit.

18Richard Sale, op. cit., 273.

19Ibid., 182.

20Seymour Hersh, op. cit.; Robert Baer, See No Evil(New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), 174-205; W.Patrick Lang, op. cit.; Jane Mayer, op. cit.; JamesBamford, The Man Who Sold the War, op. cit.;Richard Sale, op. cit., 196-198; 215-221.

21Seymour Hersh, Annals of National Security:Selective Intelligence, New Yorker,May 12, 2003;Richard Sale, op. cit., 251-253.

22Jane Mayer, op. cit.

23Institute for Advanced Strategic and PoliticalStudies Study Group on a New Israeli Strategytoward 2000, A Clean Break: A New Strategy forSecuring the Realm, July 1996; Guardian (London),September 24, 2002.

24Jane Mayer, op. cit.; Michael Isikoff and DavidCorn, Hubris (New York: Crown Publishing Group,2006), 153-154, 211-212; Richard Sale, op. cit.,196-198; 215-221.

25Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1996; RowanScarborough, Rumsfelds War: The Untold Story of

Americas Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington:Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004), 36.

26Ahmad Chalabi, Creating a Post-Saddam Iraq,Speech Presented at JINSA Spring Board Meeting,June 2, 1997; Jane Mayer, op. cit.

27United Nations Security Council, Note by theSecretary-General, S/1997/779, October 8, 1997;Seymour Hersh, The Stovepipe; How Conflictsbetween the Bush Administration and theIntelligence Community Marred the Reporting onIraq's Weapons, New Yorker, October 27, 2003.

28David Wurmser, Iraq Needs a Revolution,AEIOnline, November 12, 1997;http://www.aei.org/print?pub=issue&pubId=8284&authors=David Wurmser; David Wurmser, Tyrannys

Ally (Washington: AEI Press, 1998), xi, xvii.

29WP, November 9, 1997.

30Washington Times, January 27, 1998.

31Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf OpenLetter to President Bill Clinton, February 19, 1998.

32Stephen J. Solarz and Paul Wolfowitz, Letter tothe Editor, Foreign Affairs78, no. 2, March/April1999.

33WP, February 18, 1977; David Wurmser, TyrannysAlly, op cit., 80, 87.

34Jerusalem Post, March 20, 1998.

35WP, October 20, 1998; W. Patrick Lang, op. cit.

36Guardian, October 21, 1998; United PressInternational, December 29, 2000; W. Patrick Lang,op. cit.; James Risen, State of War: The SecretHistory of the CIA and the Bush Administration (NewYork: Free Press, 2006), 74; Michael R. Gordon andBernard E. Trainor, Cobra II(New York: PantheonBooks, 2006), 12.

37Rowan Scarborough, op. cit., 37-40; W. PatrickLang, op. cit.

38David Wurmser, Tyrannys Ally, op. cit., 120;Scotland on Sunday, February 16, 2003.


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39Project for the New American Century,

Rebuilding Americas Defenses: Strategies, Forces,and Resources for a New Century, September 2000.

40U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on ArmedServices. U.S. Policy toward Iraq, November 28,2000; W. Patrick Lang, op. cit.; Michael R. Gordonand Bernard E. Trainor, op. cit., 27.

41Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2004), 9.

42David Frum, The Right Man (Westminster, MD:Random House Adult Trade Publishing Group, 2003),170-171.

43United Press International, December 29, 2000.

44Richard A. Clarke,Against All Enemies (New York:Free Press, 2004), 264; Ron Suskind, The Price ofLoyalty (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 70-75.

45Ron Suskind, op. cit., 82-86, 96.

46Jane Mayer, Contract Sport, New Yorker,February 16, 2004 (A source who worked at the NSCat the time doubts that there were links between theTask Force and the overthrow of Saddam); RonSuskind, op. cit., 96-97.

47Woodward, Bob, Plan of Attack,op. cit., 13;George Tenet,At the Center of the Storm (NewYork: HarperCollins, 2007), 303.

48McClatchy Washington Bureau, February 17, 2001;February 18, 2001; Jacob Weisberg, op. cit., 184.

49United States. Congress. Senate. Armed ServicesCommittee. Nominations before the Senate ArmedServices Committee, First Session, 107thCongress.January 11-December 4, 2001: 221-223, 226-227,238-244, 283.

50Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (New York:Verso, 2003), 208.

51Richard A. Clarke, op. cit., 231-232.

52NYT, October 3, 2004; Michael Isikoff and DavidCorn, op. cit., 37-39.

53Michael Isikoff and David Corn, op. cit., 37-39.

54McClatchy Washington Bureau, April 26, 2001 (theclaims were denied by a White House

spokeswoman).

55Jacob Weisberg, op. cit., 189.

56NYT, October 3, 2004; Michael Isikoff and DavidCorn, op. cit., 37-39.

57Michael Isikoff and David Corn, op. cit., 39.

589/11 Commission Report. July 22, 2004: 559.

59Seymour Hersh, The Stovepipe; How Conflictsbetween the Bush Administration and theIntelligence Community Marred the Reporting onIraq's Weapons, op. cit.

60Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, op. cit., 20;Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, op. cit.,14.

61United States. Congress. Senate. Armed ServicesCommittee. Nominations before the Senate ArmedServices Committee, First Session, 107thCongress.January 11-December 4, 2001: 599.

62Douglas Feith, War and Decision (New York:HarperCollins, 2008), 206.

63Peter Eisner and Knut Royce, The Italian Letter(New York: Rodale, 2007), xv.


65Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell(New York: Random House, 2006), 345; DouglasFeith, War and Decision,op. cit., 206-211; fn. 589.

66Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack,op. cit., 21-22.

67Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack,op. cit., 68-69, 71;Michael Isikoff and David Corn, op. cit., 12-13;James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of theCIA and the Bush Administration, op. cit., 77.


69Ibid., 40-41.

70Tyler Drumheller, On the Brink (New York: Carroll& Graf Publishers, 2006), 25-26.

71Richard A. Clarke, op. cit., 237-238.

72Sunday Telegraph (Sydney), October 31, 2004.

73Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, op. cit., 71-72.

749/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004: 334.

75George Packer, op. cit., 40.

76Guardian, November 26, 2009.

77CBS News. Plans for Iraq Attack Began on 9/11,September 4, 2002,http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/sempt

ember11/main520830.shtml; based on notes byStephen Cambone; 9/11 Commission Report, op.cit., 559.

78WP, January 27, 2002; Jacob Weisberg, op. cit.,188.

79Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2002), 60; Richard A. Clarke, op. cit., 30-32 (In interviews with the 9/11 commission Bushsaid that Clarke mischaracterized this exchange;


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he did not wander around the Situation Room, butacknowledged that he might well have asked Clarkeabout Iraq at some point. Clarkes deputy, RogerCressey, recalled the exchange though not the

intimidating tone conveyed by Clarkes account);9/11 Commission Report, op. cit., 334, 559; VincentBugliosi, The Prosecution of George W. Bush forMurder (Cambridge, MA: Vanguard Press, 2008),117; Cullen Murphy and Todd S. Purdum, Farewellto All That: An Oral History of the Bush WhiteHouse, Vanity Fair, February 2009.

80Michael Isikoff and David Corn, op. cit., 6-9, 153-154, 211-212.

81Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, op. cit.,15 (Feith denied making the comment.) Tenetseems to relate the same account, saying that the

conversation between Feith and a senior militaryofficial occurred as they shared a ride on an AirForce tanker returning from England to the U.S. SeeGeorge Tenet,At the Center of the Storm, op. cit.,

306.82Douglas Feith, War and Decision, op. cit., 13-15.

83Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, op. cit.,19-20; Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules (NewYork: PublicAffairs, 2009), 291-292.

84Richard A. Clarke, op. cit., 33.

85Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs PressRelease, This Goes beyond Bin Laden, September13, 2001.

86Guardian, November 30, 2009.

87http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/7508.pdf

88Bob Woodward, Bush at War, op. cit., 83-85, 99(Rumsfeld told Woodward that he did not recallWolfowitzs remarks); 9/11 Commission Report, op.cit., 335, 360, 559; Bob Woodward, Plan of Attackop. cit., 26; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E.Trainor, op. cit., 16-17; Stephen F. Hayes, Cheney:The Untold Story of Americas Most Powerful andControversial Vice President (New York:HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 351-352; BradleyGraham, op. cit., 290-291.

89Interview with Dick Cheney, Meet the Press,

September 16, 2001.90WP, January 12, 2003; Michael R. Gordon andBernard E. Trainor, op. cit., 17.

91Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of UnitedStates Armed Forces against Those Responsible forthe Recent Attacks Launched against the UnitedStates, S.J. Res. 23, 107thCong. (2001), Signed byGeorge Bush September 18, 2001.

92Jane Mayer, A Reporter at Large: TheManipulator, op. cit.; 9/11 Commission Report, op.cit., 334, 559 (Rice and Hadley denied that theyasked to have the memo redone for this reason.)

93Douglas Feith, War and Decision, op. cit., 218.

94Michael Elliott and James Carney, et al., FirstStop, Iraq, Time, March 31, 2003; Jacob Weisberg,op. cit., 190.

95Seymour Hersh, The Iraq Hawks; Can Their WarPlan Work?, op. cit.; NYT, October 12, 2001; BryanBurrough, et al., The Path to War, Vanity Fair, May2004; Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall,and Catastrophic Legacy (New York: Scribner, 2007),150-151; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,op. cit., 18-19.

96McClatchy,October 11, 2001; NYT, December 1,2001.

97Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 23.

989/11 Commission Report, op. cit., 560, fn. 75;Bradley Graham, op. cit., 293.

99Independent (London), September 25, 2001;Blair Persuaded Bush: Taleban before Iraq, BBCNews, April 3, 2003; Observer, April 4, 2004; 9/11Commission Report, op. cit., 336, 360.

100Project for the New American Century Letter toGeorge W. Bush, September 20, 2001.

101Murray Waas, Key Bush Intelligence BriefingKept from Hill Panel, National Journal, November22, 2005, 1-2; Ron Suskind, The One PercentDoctrine, op. cit., 23.

102McClatchy Washington Bureau, September 22,2001.

103Dallas Morning News, September 25, 2001.

104Daily Telegraph (London), September 26, 2001.

105Kansas City Star, September 26, 2001.

106Douglas Feith, War and Decision, op. cit., 218.

107Sunday Telegraph, September 30, 2001.

108Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, op.

cit., 19-20; Bradley Graham, op. cit., 291-292.

109Seymour Hersh, Annals of National Security:Selective Intelligence, op. cit.; Bryan Burrough, etal., op. cit.; Barton Gellman,Angler (New York: ThePenguin Press, 2008), 224-225.

110Michael Elliott and James Carney, et al., op. cit.;Michael Isikoff and David Corn, op. cit., 81.

111Philadelphia Inquirer, October 9, 2001.


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112WP, October 10, 2001.

113Observer, October 14, 2001.

114Frontline, October 14, 2001,http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews; NYT, October 27, 2001.

115Ari Fleischer, Taking Heat: The President, ThePress, and My Years in the White House (New York:William Morrow, 2005), 198.

116Seymour Hersh, The Stovepipe; How Conflictsbetween the Bush Administration and theIntelligence Community Marred the Reporting onIraq's Weapons, op. cit.; Peter Eisner and KnutRoyce, The Italian Letter, op. cit., xv, xvi.

117Tyler Drumheller, On the Brink, op. cit., 53.

118McClatchy Washington Bureau, October 19, 2001;James Bamford, The Man Who Sold the War, op.cit.

119NYT, October 27, 2001; Seymour M. Hersh,Annals of National Security: Selective Intelligence,op. cit.; McClatchy, March. 15, 2004.

120USA Today,October 19, 2001.

121USA Today, September 11, 2002.

122Jacob Weisberg, op. cit., 191.

123Ottawa Citizen, October 24, 2001.

124Ari Fleischer, op. cit., 201-204.

125Douglas Feith, War and Decision, op. cit., 218-

221; fn. 591.

126Seymour Hersh, The Stovepipe; How Conflictsbetween the Bush Administration and theIntelligence Community Marred the Reporting onIraq's Weapons, op. cit.; Jane Mayer, A Reporter atLarge: The Manipulator, op. cit.

1279/11 Commission Report, op. cit., 335-336, 559.

128Dallas Morning News, November 19, 2001.

129Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, op. cit., 1-5, 30,35.

130Andrew Cockburn, op. cit., 151-152.

131Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, op. cit., 7-8.

132U.S. Department of Defense Note from DonaldRumsfeld, November 27, 2001; Bob Woodward, Planof Attack, op. cit., 36-37; Michael R. Gordon andBernard E. Trainor, op. cit., 21-22.

133DOD News Briefing Secretary Rumsfeld andGen. Franks, November 27, 2001; Bob Woodward,Plan of Attack, op. cit., 36-37.

134Bob Woodward, State of Denial, op. cit., 84-85.

135U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary RumsfeldInterview with CNN Novak and Hunt, NewsTranscript, November 30, 2001.

136Seymour Hersh, The Iraq Hawks; Can Their WarPlan Work? op. cit.

137Seymour Hersh, The Stovepipe; How Conflictsbetween the Bush Administration and theIntelligence Community Marred the Reporting onIraq's Weapons, op. cit.

138WP, March 15, 2002; NYT, October 21, 2002.

139New York Times, December 1, 2001.

140Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, op. cit., 38.

141Powell Discusses Mideast, Afghanistan: MitchellAddresses Possibility of Middle East Peace; Hatch,Lieberman on Latest Terrorism, CNN Late Edition

with Wolf Blitzer, December 2, 2001; Jane Mayer, AReporter

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