Upload
ashley-jordan
View
214
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
IRWIN
CHAPTER 16
Recognizing IndividualContributions with Pay
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
• Equity Theory - chapter 15• Reinforcement Theory• Expectancy Theory - chapter 11• Agency Theory
– principals as owners– agents as managers
• Equity Theory - chapter 15• Reinforcement Theory• Expectancy Theory - chapter 11• Agency Theory
– principals as owners– agents as managers
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
How Does Pay Influence Individuals?How Does Pay Influence Individuals?
1 Perquisites2 Attitudes toward risk3 Decision-making horizons
1 Perquisites2 Attitudes toward risk3 Decision-making horizons
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Types of Agency CostsTypes of Agency Costs
• Risk Aversion• Outcome Uncertainty• Job Programmability• Measurable Job Outcome• Ability to Pay• Tradition
• Risk Aversion• Outcome Uncertainty• Job Programmability• Measurable Job Outcome• Ability to Pay• Tradition
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Factors in the Choice of a Compensation Package
Factors in the Choice of a Compensation Package
EXPECTANCY THEORYEXPECTANCY THEORY
EFFORT PERFORMANCE
expectancy? instrumentality?
valence
• Tries to identify individual performance differences• Supervisor provides most performance information • Pay is linked to performance appraisal results• Feedback is infrequent• Feedback is mostly one way - supervisor to subordinate
• Tries to identify individual performance differences• Supervisor provides most performance information • Pay is linked to performance appraisal results• Feedback is infrequent• Feedback is mostly one way - supervisor to subordinate
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Merit Pay Programs:Characteristics
Merit Pay Programs:Characteristics
• Individual performance differences are due largely to SYSTEM• Discourages teamwork • System is not fair• Too much reliance on supervisor for rating
– procedural issue• Pay increaes are not representative of performance
– distributive issue• Contributes to entitlement mentality
• Individual performance differences are due largely to SYSTEM• Discourages teamwork • System is not fair• Too much reliance on supervisor for rating
– procedural issue• Pay increaes are not representative of performance
– distributive issue• Contributes to entitlement mentality
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Merit Pay Programs:Criticisms
Merit Pay Programs:Criticisms
1 Most jobs have no physical output2 Many administrative problems3 Individuals focus only on the incentive4 Does not fit with team approach5 Does not reward obtaining multiple skills6 Rewards output at the expense of quality or service
1 Most jobs have no physical output2 Many administrative problems3 Individuals focus only on the incentive4 Does not fit with team approach5 Does not reward obtaining multiple skills6 Rewards output at the expense of quality or service
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Individual IncentivesIndividual Incentives
Used rarely for the following reasons:
Advantages� Encourages employees to think like OWNERS� Payments are not part of base pay
Disadvantages� Many plans defer actual payments� Few plans pay out during business downturns
Advantages� Encourages employees to think like OWNERS� Payments are not part of base pay
Disadvantages� Many plans defer actual payments� Few plans pay out during business downturns
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Profit SharingProfit Sharing
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
GainsharingGainsharing
• Encourages pursuit of broader(team) goals• Measures performance that is controllable by employee• Distributes payouts frequently• Conditions for success include:
– management commitment– commitment to continuous improvement and change– willingness to accept employee input– high level of cooperation and information sharing– agreement on productivity standards– employment security
• Encourages pursuit of broader(team) goals• Measures performance that is controllable by employee• Distributes payouts frequently• Conditions for success include:
– management commitment– commitment to continuous improvement and change– willingness to accept employee input– high level of cooperation and information sharing– agreement on productivity standards– employment security
Individual Pay Programs: Design FeaturesIndividual Pay Programs: Design Features
Source: Adapted from E.E. Lawler III, “Pay for Performance: A Strategic Analysis,” in Compensation and Benefits,ed. L. R. Gomez-Mejia (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1989).
Programs
Merit Pay
Incentive Pay
Profit Sharing
Ownership
Gainsharing
Skill-based
Payment Method
Performance Measures
Frequencyof Payout Coverage
- Change in base- Bonus
- Bonus
- Equity changes- Bonus
- Change in base
- Annually
- Weekly
- Semiannual or annual- Sale of stock - Monthly / quarterly- when skill is acquired
- Boss’ appraisal- Output, productivity- Profit
- Stock value
- Production costs- Skill acquisition
- All
- Direct labor- All
- All
- Production /service unit- All
Individual Pay Programs: ConsequencesIndividual Pay Programs: Consequences
Source: Adapted from E.E. Lawler III, “Pay for Performance: A Strategic Analysis,” in Compensation and Benefits,ed. L. R. Gomez-Mejia (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1989).
Programs
Merit Pay
Incentive Pay
Profit Sharing
Ownership
Gainsharing
Skill-based
Performance Motivation CultureAttraction Costs
- Little - Clear connection- Little - Little - somein small units- Learning
- High performers- High performers- All - All - Retain employees- those who want to learn
- Intra-group competition- Individual competition- Knowledge of business- Sense of ownership- Cooperation - Learning
- Good system of appraisal- maintenance costs high- Ability to pay- Costs not to variable- Costs are variable- can be high
Individual Pay Programs: ContingenciesIndividual Pay Programs: Contingencies
Source: Adapted from E.E. Lawler III, “Pay for Performance: A Strategic Analysis,” in Compensation and Benefits,ed. L. R. Gomez-Mejia (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1989).
Programs
Merit Pay
Incentive Pay
Profit Sharing
Ownership
Gainsharing
Skill-based
Organization Structure
ManagementStyle Type of Work
- Independent jobs- Measurable jobs / units- Autonomous units- Any company - Most companies
- Most companies
- Control
- Participation desirable- Participation - Participation - Participation - Participation
- Individual, easy to measure- Individual appraisal- All types
- All types - All types - Professional
Sales
Product Life Cycle andOperation Strategies
Product Life Cycle andOperation Strategies
Prospectors Defenders
©a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997a Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Inc., company, 1997
IRWIN
Matching Pay Strategy to Operating StrategyMatching Pay Strategy to Operating Strategy
Pay Strategy Dimension
Business Unit Strategy
Defenders Prospectors
Risk Sharing (variable pay)
Time Orientation
Pay level (short run)
Pay level (long run)
Benefits Level
Where Pay Decision Made
Pay Unit of Analysis
Low
Short-term
Above market
Above market
Above market
Centralized
Job
High
Long-term
Below market
Above market
Below market
Decentralized
Skills
Source: Adapted from L.R. Gomez-Mejia and D. B. Balkin, Compensation, Organizational Strategy,and Firm Performance (Cincinnati:South-Western), Appendix 4b.