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Is democracy with Chinese characteristicspossible? A theoretical and practicalreflection of crisis in the Chinese party-state regime and post-revolutionary socialisthegemonic politicsCho Hee-YeonPublished online: 24 Mar 2014.
To cite this article: Cho Hee-Yeon (2014) Is democracy with Chinese characteristics possible? A theoreticaland practical reflection of crisis in the Chinese party-state regime and post-revolutionary socialist hegemonicpolitics, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 15:1, 128-142, DOI: 10.1080/14649373.2014.875979
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Is democracy with Chinese characteristics possible? A theoretical andpractical reflection of crisis in the Chinese party-state regime andpost-revolutionary socialist hegemonic politics
CHO Hee-Yeon
ABSTRACT This article discusses political challenges to the current party-state regime in China andthe direction of its new political reform, on the one hand, and tries to theorize a post-revolutionary“socialist hegemonic politics” after the revolution, based on reinterpretation of Marxist politicaltheory and Western democracy theory, on the other hand. It understands that there is a deepercrisis of Chinese politics, rather than simply providing an empirical analysis. In so doing, thisarticle both reflects existing Marxist political theory and the concept of democracy while reconstruct-ing both of them, interacting with the current Chinese political reality. Currently, the Chinese party-state regime is facing a compressed form of crisis due to rapid economic growth; that is, a kind of“success crisis.” The crisis is expressed in such phenomena as the breakdown of “identification ofthe party-state with society,” assumed since the revolution, the victimization of the working classand peasants, which have been regarded as the main driving force of the Chinese revolution, the emer-gence of demands for political and social plurality coming from a new wealthy class, and an outpouringof various resistances. If these phenomena were to converge, it could result in the “statization of crisis,”which means that all kinds of opposition would join together against the state. However, there are nopolitical mechanisms to incorporate and mitigate grassroots opposition, through top-down reform ofthe party-state regime. Thus, I argue that democracy with Chinese characteristics should be imaginedas the realization of a kind of socialist hegemonic politics. To understand this, we have to overcome bothover-universalistic and over-particularistic perspectives on democracy. The Chinese regime’s maininnovation in socialist market reform has been to separate capitalism and the market, appropriatingthe latter in the name of making it more viable. Therefore, it should divide bourgeois democracy andits democratic elements, combining them with the Chinese political system in the name of enrichingit, expanding endogenous democratic elements.
KEYWORDS: China, democracy with Chinese characters, socialist market economy, socialism,hegemony, East Asia
1. How to see the current contradictorycomplexity
There are three countries with the same his-torical background of state socialism: China,Russia, and North Korea. However, thesethree countries are following totally differenttrajectories of change. As is well known,Russia’s road led to the breakdown of itsregime in 1991. China has adopted the differ-ent road of so-called “market socialism” up tonow, which has seemed to derail it from its
own tradition of state socialism. NorthKorea’s road shows a kind of “family poli-tics” in the form of “the third generation,”1
implementing a closed economic system ofstate planning. This essay focuses on theChinese case, and discusses the prospectsand tasks for its political and economic devel-opment. While China has successfully main-tained its political system using marketsocialism, it is confronted with totally differ-ent problems and contradictions from those
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 2014Vol. 15, No. 1, 128–142, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2014.875979
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under state socialism. As a result, discussionsabout democratic political reforms havebecome more common. Some intellectualsreject democracy, considering it to be awestern model. Some leftists even rejectdemocracy as spread by US imperialism.Instead of these extremes, this article seeksan alternative to the crisis of China’s party-state regime under “democracy withChinese characteristics.” This article tries todiscuss a new, alternative direction for thecurrent Chinese political regime to innovatein response to the current political situation.
1.1 Regime of “complex non-correspondence”
I call China’s current social formation as a“complex non-correspondence.” Based onthe existing Marxist social formationtheory, the base and superstructure have a“structural correspondence.” However, theChinese social structure shows thatelements of different characteristics exist atvarious levels and do not correspond toeach other. The worst case of non-corre-spondence is seen in the two contradictorysituations coexisting in China: (1) the expan-sion of the market economy after DengXiao-Ping’s opening and (the creation ofan) economic basis with new structuralcharacteristics based on the marketeconomy, and (2) the state ruling discoursethat promotes socialist ideology and asocialist party-state regime.2
Thus, while some scholars focus onexpansion of the market economy and theprocess of its domination on the wholesociety, and define it as a “de-socialist” capi-talistic market economy, others focus on theCommunist Party’s control and monopolyof state power on the market and still defineit as a socialist regime, and different fromcapitalism. I argue that current China’scomplex non-correspondence itself isoutside this framework; instead, it is unique.
1.2 “Crisis of success” by reform andopening
How has this complex non-correspondencearisen? Japan has achieved economic
development since the 1960s, followed bySouth Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Like-wise, after 30 years of reform and opening,and subsequent rapid development, Chinahas reached a level of “G2” with the US. Asa result, East Asia is now called a “generatorof the world economy.” However, since thisgreat transformation was made successfullyand in a short period of time,3 I argue thatnew paradoxes and problems have alsooccurred in a short time. I would like todescribe this as a “crisis of success.”
First among the factors is a breakdownof “the identification of the party-state withthe society” (Zheng 2004), which had beenassumed since the Revolution.
As is well known, the revolutionaryparty, representing the majority of workersand farmers, came to power through theChinese Revolution. As a result, a regimewas created characterized by “party controlof the state” and “state control of society.”This regime deliberately de-linked from themarket economy. However, after reform andopening, the regime deliberately re-linkedand pushed for reform towards a “socialistmarket economy.”
The process of re-linking and revolutioninvolved great internal structural reform.The central and local government’s powerand economic control passed to the privatesector, expanding its free economic activity.In doing so, great divisions of economicstatus appeared; a newly created class ofbusiness people and an emerging middleclass became beneficiaries of CommunistParty-led reform and opening, whilefarmers and workers, the party-stateregime’s traditional base, were marginalized.This meant the dissolution of the unity ofparty-state and society. The country hadexperienced a Cultural Revolution with agoal of absolute egalitarianism (So andChiu 1995, 270). However, it became veryunequal, compared not only with developedcountries but also with developing countries,with a Gini coefficient of 0.47.
Second, the situation has become worsesince the emergence of the new statewelfare regime. It was intended to supportthe lives of farmers and workers, who faced
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severe hardship under the market economy.After the Revolution, a special form ofwelfare regime was established, based onthe unit system. Under orders from thecentral party-state, each individual workunit existed as a specific entity and operatedunder a collective egalitarian order, whereeach of them could fulfil their basic needsin livelihood (even if their satisfaction wasnot high). Workers and farmers structuredtheir lives by adapting to this system.However, after the reform and opening, thisformer regime rapidly dissolved while thenew regime has only emerged slowly. Infact, the national health care system hadbeen considered one of the best achieve-ments of the Chinese Revolution, but eventhis has notably regressed. Anotherexample is the household registrationsystem. The household registration systemwas created as part of a new socialist collec-tive state management after the Revolution;however, it has contributed to the creationof “second-class workers,” i.e. super-exploited rural labour forced to acceptlower salaries.
Third, reform and opening since the late1970s is not simply economic change, but ithas come to include the need for a new politi-cal and social pluralism. I argue that this isa kind of “crisis coming from success inachieving economic growth.” The newneeds have been created by successful pro-gress of the development, which in turn hascreated economically prosperous upper andmiddle classes. While the need for pluralismdoes not threaten the system, it conceives anew “tension with the system” (H. Y. Cho2006, 73).
Ironically, it is the younger generationswho have benefited from economic prosper-ity, along with the middle and upper classes,who benefited from the reform and opening,and who are most actively calling for theseneeds. The younger generation, in particular,demanded pluralism through reform of theparty-state system, triggering the pro-democracy movements of 1989.
Fourth, the above-mentioned factors arenot only structural trends but also areexpressed as various resistances. Currently,
it is reported that more than 90,000 cases ofcollective resistance take place every year inChina. This resistance is visible not onlyamong workers and farmers but alsoamong the middle class. However, diversecrisis phenomena cannot develop into anoverall resistance against the party-statesystem; they can only exist as dispersedelements. Moreover, the attitude of thesegroups resisting the party-state system isnot hostile to the government. Liberalfactors within the resistance are developingbut not dominant. I believe, however, thatthese potential resistance factors are inter-related, which will lead to a “crisis of thestate.”
2. Alternative to democracy withChinese characteristics and socialisthegemonic politics
Based on this premise, I would like to discusssome theoretical bases of democracy withChinese characteristics. The combination ofsocialism and democracy, including humanrights, freedom, autonomy, and pluralism,is also an important topic within Marxism.However, as the former existing socialismfailed to combine these two, socialismbecame seen as antithetical to these values,and this is what conservatives-liberals criti-cize. How to realize this combinationremains a global, unanswered question.
2.1 Socialist hegemonic politics –combination of socialism and democracy
The following is a typical quote to show thegeneral view of socialism towards so-called“bourgeois democracy”: “A democraticrepublic is the best possible political shellfor capitalism, and, therefore, once capitalhas gained possession of this very bestshell… it establishes its power so securely,so firmly” (Lenin 1970, 15–16). The idea ofcalling democracy a “political shell for capit-alism” prevents socialists from intensivelyconfronting democracy. I am developing aso-called “leftist democratic theory” in thename of “radical democracy.”4
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A new approach to confronting democ-racy is needed within traditional socialism.I approach it from a socialist hegemonic pol-itical perspective.
2.1.1 Post-revolutionary politics. “Socialisthegemonic politics” relates to the revolutionof “socialist political theory” based on tra-ditional Marxist theory. First, Marxist andsocialist theory only describes the state andpolitics before a successful revolution, notafterwards. In certain respects, socialist pol-itical theory after the revolution could notmove even one step beyond the dictatorshipof the proletariat. This trend has beenreinforced by economic reductionismwithin Marxism. In this regards, it wasAntonio Gramsci (1971) who provided anopportunity to rediscover new perspectiveson the state and politics. My argument isbased on an effort to expand Gramsci’s per-spective critically. In this article, I use “hege-mony” as the main concept. When we sayhegemony, it is generally considered as pre-dominance, but I use the word hegemonyas “leadership based on consent” wherepeople voluntarily express consent to theruling regime.
2.1.2 Recognizing discordance between thecontradiction in reality and the presuppositionof non-contradiction in theory itself. Second,the complex reality after the Revolutionequated socialist and communist ideology,and there were not enough efforts tocapture that complexity within socialisttheory. After the Revolution, the systemwas seen and justified as non-contradictory.Under Stalin, this premise was mystifiedthrough the premise of the infallible Party.Considering a contradictory society to be“non-contradictory” hindered the recog-nition of the party-state’s errors and a reflec-tion on problems of the party beingabsolutized. As a result, socialist elitesfailed to correct many “errors” in reality,which have been regarded as peripheralones in their non-contradictory society).
2.1.3 Accepting political resistance as a part ofreality and making it non-hostile. Third, the
core of “socialist hegemony politics” is torecognize the space of resistance, turning itfrom hostile to non-hostile. Rather thanoppressing it, let it be expressed. In his con-tradictory theory, Mao distinguishedbetween hostile and non-hostile contradic-tion. It is a very important insight. I agreethat there would be a change in the“quality of hostility” due to revolution; thatis, the existing capitalistic class contradictioncould be dramatically erased or weakened,but thereafter, as long as there were no mech-anisms to mitigate and transform hostility,non-hostile contradiction after the revolutioncould transform itself into hostilecontradiction.
In China, if potential or current resist-ance to the system’s contradictions is notincorporated into the socialist system’s self-reform and comes to be interconnected,these resistances will in turn create thecounter-hegemony carried by the liberals.When the potential crisis coming fromdiverse resistance is incorporated not by theliberal democratic counter-hegemony butby top-down reform of the current Chineseparty-state system, resulting in making thepotentially hostile resistance non-hostile, Ican say that a kind of socialist hegemonicpolitics is working.
2.2 Democracy with Chinese characteristics
I believe that it is possible to have a newapproach to democracy with Chinese charac-teristics based on a “socialist hegemony poli-tics” perspective.
2.2.1 Beyond over-universalistic and over-particularistic views. To consider democracywith Chinese characteristics, it is necessaryto go beyond over-universalistic and over-particularistic views. The former seeswestern democracy as an “absolute”system and thinks democracy in Chinarequires the “application” of western democ-racy. This view can be found in variousforms, from colonial to modernization the-ories. In contrast, the over-particularisticview acknowledges democracy as awestern, Americanized concept and rejects
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it as either a residue of western imperialismor acceptance of western hegemony. I amcritical of both views. The first ignores thatall democracies are different in format andfundamental essence; democracy has differ-ent meanings based on its relationship to asociety’s state and economy. At the sametime, the over-particularistic view ignoresthat socialism’s goal is to achieve people’s(direct) democracy by overcoming bourgeoisdemocracy. Moreover, the over-particularis-tic view ignores the progressive meaning ofdemocracy, which lies in the relationshipbetween the ruling power and the people.
2.2.2 Democracy as a sovereign right of thepeople to power. Here, we face the question:what is democracy? Democracy aims atself-rule of the people regardless of whetherit is socialist, direct or bourgeois. Idealdemocracy means people decide their ownissues through equal participation. It meanspeople’s self-determination, and eventuallytheir sovereignty, over political and econ-omic power.
The over-particularistic view on democ-racy absolutizes western capitalistic democ-racy, but I see western democracy asseparating the ruler and the governed toprevent the former’s corruption and authori-tarian ruling. It institutionalizes variousmechanisms to narrow the resulting gap. Inthis regard, socialist revolution or anti-foreign radical revolution goes beyondalternatives that are based on this separation.It aims to achieve radical democracy to unifythe ruler and governed. Absolute egalitarian-ism, expressed during the Cultural Revolu-tion, aimed for absolute integration ofpower, ruler, state and society with the grass-roots people. This cannot be achieved in acapitalistic democracy.
However, with various anti-foreignradical systems like Muammar al-Qaddafi’sregime in Libya or socialist systems afterthe revolution, a revolutionary group con-trols state power and a single revolutionaryforce or its factions dominate the whole ofsociety semi-permanently under the presup-position that such a revolutionary group isidentified with the people themselves.
Conversely, it opens a possibility that oneruling revolutionary force can wield absolutepower under the presupposition that there isno distinction between ruler and ruledpeople. This is different from bourgeoisdemocracy where ruler and governedpeople are separated and the former iselected by the latter. In this way, in thepost-revolutionary socialist system, ideologytransforms into reality, and thereforepeople’s sovereign power is denied in sucha reality.
2.2.3 Routine institutionalized process toconfirm the people’s sovereign power. Democ-racy with Chinese characteristics means ima-gining a new frame to revolutionize thiscontradiction in socialist politics. In bour-geois democracy, it is a regular election –whose democratic impact socialists criticizeas fictional – that confirms the people’ssovereign power. Yet by participating in elec-tions, the people are incorporated into, anddo not oppose, a system governed by theirelected representatives. This is why manyproblems of bourgeois democracy do notdevelop into anti-systematic revolutions.
Therefore, I argue that it is necessary tohave a Chinese way of restructuring the jus-tification of existing power to counter thechanges in the relationship between rulersand governed people. Not simply relyingon the historical legitimacy of power, acertain “civilised” way should be developedthat does not question the justification ofobtaining power. This can be called democ-racy with Chinese characteristics.
3. Issues of democracy with Chinesecharacteristics
Based on the theoretical discussion describedabove, I will now discuss issues of democ-racy with Chinese characteristics that areraised within socialist hegemony politics.
Institutional sources to form democracywith Chinese characteristics can be foundwithin the Chinese political tradition.Murphy (2000) sees the Minbon idea,meaning that the ruled people are the baseof the state, which existed in Confucianism,
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as an example of democratic ideology. Sincethe modern period, several democraticsystems have been tried and are stillworking, including democracy within tribalcommunities or in the operating processesof local governments and councils. Moder-nizing these existing democratic systems –i.e. rediscovering and modernizing the“socialist democracy” that already existedwithin China – can be one of the ways toimplement democracy with Chinese charac-teristics. Additionally, it can be based onvarious elements of western “bourgeoisdemocracy.”
3.1 Institutionalizing new democraticpolitical space
Earlier, I mentioned an ideological trans-formation to create non-hostile resistance. Acore principle of bourgeois democracy isthat the government guarantees differentopinions, ensuring fundamental rights suchas freedom of expression and assembly.Within socialist theory, however, there is nospace to express oppositional ideas againstproletariat power; such ideas can easily bedefined as reactionary or as a residue of thebourgeoisie. This lack of epistemologicalspace makes the communist system oppresspolitical actions and ideas while aiming for“integration of party-state and society.”State power achieved by “violent revolution”becomes a means of control by violentlyoppressing resistance. More and more, thestate adopts an oppressive identity tocounter reactionaries rather than a “hegemo-nic identity.”
To overcome this dilemma, I think it isnecessary to institutionalize new democraticpolitical spaces to express and accept differ-ences and gaps that have been created fromthe separation of class and economic inter-ests, the separation of political attitudes andthe problems of “integration of party-stateand society.” This means guaranteeing aspace to express opinions that are againstproletariat power, with some limitations.The purpose is not to oppose the positivedemands, such as freedom, raised by liberalsin China but to incorporate those positive
factors into the Chinese party-state system.This new democratic political space can bepart of “civil society” (Baik 2000).
If this space is allowed, I believe that itcan be a route to represent the interests ofworkers and farmers and counter the upperclass’s interests that the system promotes. Aneed for democracy means a need forpopular participation. By correcting the“inequality of representation,” which doesnot benefit farmers andworkers, it is possiblefor democracy to be combined with socialistcharacteristics, representing the interests ofmarginalized groups such as workers andfarmers. Then, as Wang Hui described(Wang 2003, 30–31), progressive factors intwo different issues5 arising from the 1989Tiananmen movement would be able to beexpressed as resistance to the marketeconomy, created by neoliberalism after thereform and opening. This can be a source ofpower from below to publicly monitor thelatter.
3.2 New democratic political space as aspace for hegemonic competition
A new democratic space is not stable but a“competitive space,” open to hegemonicinfluence. Democratic space – even thoughlimited – may lead to a “nationalization ofcrisis” or, conversely, lead to “re-hegemoni-zation” beyond the “crack of hegemony”(Cho 2010, 341). In the former case, like theSoviets, it is possible for a radical reformergroup to achieve hegemony. In contrast,top-down reform can also fortify the hege-mony of the communist party system.
Given that a new democratic space is acompetitive space for hegemony, a steptoward re-hegemonization through the reno-vation of the party-state system, it is necess-ary for there to be a change in both theparty-state elite and opposition groups’mindsets.
In the case of the party-state elite, theymust recognize that a public democratic pol-itical space, in which people express theirdemands and resistance to the system, isnot a challenge threatening the reproductionof the regime but a precipitating factor to
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encourage its reform. It is further necessaryto recognize that resistance is not seditionbut the representation of the internal contra-dictions of an incomplete current socialistsystem in people’s critical thinking.
To allow regular resistance means allow-ing a certain amount of space for ideologicalplurality within the relationship between theparty-state and people. Today, “one officialinterpretation” for Maoism forms one of theideological foundations of the Party, butthis should be transformed to allow variousgroups to produce different interpretations.A number of these can satisfy the demandsfor political and social plurality.
3.2.1 Praxis of non-governmental left. Inimaging a new democratic political space,recognizing that it is a space for hegemoniccompetition, the “non-governmental left,”which exists outside of the party-stateregime should apply bottom-up leftistpraxis to various issues.
The so-called “new social movements”have emerged to promote various issuessuch as human rights, the environment,women’s rights, anti-corruption, civil liber-ties and, needless to say, labor rights.Critics of the Chinese party-state regimestrongly pursue a praxis of western liberaldemocracy; however, as mentioned earlier,this is not really characterized by anti-com-munism or western liberalism. The authoris of the opinion that, given that the newdemocratic space allows hegemonic compe-tition, these efforts at leftist praxis canenrich socialist hegemonic politics withindemocracy with Chinese characteristics –rather than moving towards western liberaldemocracy.6
The non-governmental left in capitalistsociety resists the ruling party and state.However, in China, it faces a fundamental“dilemma,” because the party-state is histori-cally justified by a radical nationalist orsocialist revolution, and to this day officiallyadheres to socialist discourse. The Chinesenon-governmental left, aware of thisdilemma and developing its reform move-ment to criticize the problem of the “party-state regime” with a tone of cleaving to
socialist pursuit on one hand, must engagein hegemonic competition with non-govern-mental groups in society. Leftist activistgroups outside of the party-state regimecan be called the “democratic left” (Cho2011b).
3.3 Changing how the state operates toaccept new democratic space, as a part of “newsocialist governance”
The challenge is to link a new democraticspace to the renovation of the party-stateregime. The democratic process shouldextend people’s participation in two ways:first, through democratic election of theirrepresentatives based on people’s free judg-ment, and second, through the democraticdecisions of elected representatives and thedemocratic, accountable and transparentoperation of authoritative agencies, includ-ing people’s monitoring of their representa-tives and state bodies.
3.3.1 Democratic elections. First, the corechallenge of the democratic process is toenlarge the extent of “democratic elections”to confirm the people’s sovereignty at mul-tiple levels. Various mechanisms alreadyexist within China for democratic elections.In the autonomous unit, or cun, equivalentto the village, direct election experimentsare being carried out. People’s congressesand local elections existed as an early, signifi-cant democratic mechanism of the Chineseregime (Cho 2006). The central governmentpractices so-called “inner sectarian politics”within the communist party. Although offi-cially prohibited, there exist inner opiniongroups and a certain degree of competitionamong them. It differs from the NorthKorean “third-generation hereditary” or“family oligarchy,” also called people’sdemocracy, under Qaddafi in Libya. Now, itis necessary to extend and confirm people’ssovereignty regularly beyond the inner, sec-tarian political democracy.
3.3.2 Limited multi-party system?. Regardingdemocratic elections, we ultimately face theissue of a multi-party system. This core
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element of western bourgeois democracyallows it to change the political party inpower regularly through elections.
After the Chinese revolution, there wasin essence a short-term multi-party system.However, this was converted to a one-partysystem, granting the Communist Party thestatus of the only ruling party according tothe people’s free will. The multi-partysystem existed in form alone. The Chineseparty-state regime has historically main-tained a relatively broad hegemony in com-parison with other socialist states (Lee2011). In other words, there has been a rela-tively smaller gap between the “party’swill” and the “people’s will.” Given this, a“limited multi-party system” – not a “fullmulti-party system” – is imaginable. It willcertainly require more theoretical discussionabout why the heart of socialist politicaltheory is the theory of proletarian dictator-ship, equivalent to a one-party system.
I can imagine a “limited multi-partysystem” to allow formation of a politicalparty that accepts the socialist values orMaoism enshrined in the Chinese Consti-tution. These values must be settled as alegacy of “traditionalized domination” inWeber’s meaning. If the hegemonic geogra-phy is maintained and Maoism is continu-ously shared as a constitutional value, alimited multi-party system that accepts theconstitutional value itself – considered as aconstituent part of western bourgeoisdemocracy – could appear as the realizationof a new constitutionalism.
3.3.3 Democratic operation and monitoring ofpower. The second question is how toreform the Chinese regime to create demo-cratic decision-making by elected representa-tives, democratic operations, and people’sroutine monitoring of these. They are thechallenges generally called the rule of law,vertical and horizontal accountability, trans-parency, anti-corruption, etc., in bourgeoisdemocracy.
If a certain “institutionalization of oppo-sition” is fulfilled, various demands raisedfrom the new democratic political spacecould be “legitimized,” organized not as a
hostile relation with the state system butas a part of a party-state system. Thus,people’s critical opinions would be reflectedin the daily operating process of the system,contributing to the transparency andaccountability of authority. It would createa kind of new “socialist governance” withChinese characteristics. Governance heredoes not mean that people simply criticizepower but that they participate in routinepower-operating processes themselves. Inlight of this, governance reform mustdevelop broader mechanisms to encouragepeople’s participation.
The most significant challenge for thedemocratic operation and oversight ofpower is how to fight corruption. Thisrequires the buildup of a strong precautionand monitoring system with Chinese charac-teristics. So-called developed countriespromote various development projects indeveloping countries, where the politicalauthority to decide upon these projects hasnewly emerged. In the process, state bureau-crats have the authority to make decisions onthe distribution and ownership of develop-ment projects. As these projects are newlydesigned, the decision process is usuallynot clearly stipulated by law. The decisionusually comes along with great economicprivileges being granted to certain individ-uals, which results in the trade-off of privi-leges and bribes between developmentproject drivers and state bureaucrats.
In light of this, it is important for theparty-state system to create an “initial,”strong anti-corruption framework. Thiscould make a big difference in corruptionlevels among societies led by the similar‘developmental state’. Even though the his-torical complexity and current structure ofChina differ from those of a city-state, Singa-pore can be a good model. As is well known,Singapore Prime Minister Li Kuan-yewpursued a strong anti-corruption policyfrom the beginning of his takeover, making“anti-corruption” a “trademark” of thePeople’s Action Party (PAP). This initialframe was successfully set up, which madean obvious difference to other developedcountries in terms of corruption. From an
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outsider’s perspective, the Singaporeansystem can definitely be called “authoritar-ianism” or “soft authoritarianism.”However one of the reasons why its “softauthoritarianism” is maintained with suchbroad consent is that people, to someextent, share a definition of democracy,albeit in some parts through the manipu-lation of public opinion.
3.4 Public character or socialization ofmarket economy – market economy anddemocracy
Democracy with Chinese characteristicsshould not be approached only as politics.The nature and the extent of conflict in“new democratic politics” are fundamentallydecided by the conflict surrounding econ-omic and class interests. In light of this,reform of the market economy must bestrongly advocated, in order tomitigate econ-omic conflict itself within democratic insti-tutions. There are many different levels ofmarketization within western economies,ranging from extremely neoliberal marketeconomies, such as the UK or the USA, to asocial democratic or corporatist marketeconomy, such as the Scandinavian countries.In the Asian development system, a countrylike Singapore has a high rate of publichousing provision, while in South Korea,housing and land are major targets of specu-lation, operating as significant mechanismsof capital accumulation and housing owner-ship mainly shows class differences. Thesocialization of the market economy varies,depending on policy and political measures.
3.4.1 The importance of establishing the initialframework for the public character of themarket. The former state welfare system isbeing dismantled but a new one is not yetcompletely formed; in a way, this is creatinga backward market economy. An essentialdifference between capitalism and socialismis whether fundamental needs such as edu-cation, housing, welfare for the elderly andpublic health care are provided as publicgoods or purchased through the market. Inthe current stage of the socialist market
economy, it is important to create a frame-work for public ownership in these funda-mental areas. This should not be identifiedas a “post-development issue.” Ironically, inthe case of South Korea, relatively progress-ive institutions such as the greenbelt,medical insurance, the education equaliza-tion system – in which middle and highschool students are allocated equally to thelocal school nearby and therefore eachstudent is given the same chance for edu-cation – and others were established by thedevelopmental dictatorship. After classeshave become clearly differentiated, classesact as checks upon each other’s interests,and it becomes more difficult to establishthe public character of a market economy.The author is of the opinion that class inter-est-based actions are fulfilled upon certaingiven conditions or terrain. In the US, BillGates and Warren Buffett were opposed tothe elimination of succession tax, consideringit desirable for the market economy, whereaschaebol, conglomerates in Korea, lobbied toeliminate it. In light of this, the initial frame-work is very important.
3.4.2 Emergence of “other” capitalists for“social-economic commensalism”. The publiccharacter of the market economy meansthat societal and economic coexistence withChinese characteristics are carried out andachieved through the market. As mentionedabove, in 2002 the Chinese Communist Partyrecognized the differentiation of classes afterreform and opening, and formalized thetheory of three representatives. As commu-nist hegemonic praxis, this meant that thenewly emerged class was linked to theparty after reform and opening. However,unless coexistence was ensured by socialand economic material conditions, thisexposed the “internal contradictions” of theCommunist Party.
In other words, under the Chinese party-state system, the “distance between the capi-talist class (private corporate enterprises)and the working class,” should be muchless than under a capitalist system, makingthe coexistence of different classes in oneparty not a contradiction. Unlike a capitalist
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class that has an “anti-communist identity,” a“capitalist class with communist identity”should be able to accept a certain degree ofsocial and economic coexistence, and theChinese party-state system should createthis terrain, strengthening public ownershipand creating hegemony on a different basisfrom western democracy.
3.4.3 Rapid formation of institutions to conjoincontradictory demands – dual contradictorydemands on land ownership. As noticed, landin China is characterized by public owner-ship. In rural areas, community ownershipor collective ownership exists based on thetradition of people’s enterprises, whereasstate ownership exists in the city. Underthis basic form of ownership, “land userights” have been privatized. However,private corporate and upper classes (includ-ing foreign investors), which have accumu-lated great wealth based on privatized“land use rights,” are demanding full priva-tization of land. This means legitimizing“illegal exploitation of public assets,” whichis a form of “primitive accumulation.” Itwill allow these classes to pass down theirwealth to their descendants. They havebeen accumulating their wealth with thesupport of the “developmental state,”which is the party-state. Currently, they arenot provided with the private ownership,but are demanding a full private ownershipby way of including radical privatization inthe public agenda. For example, the so-called demand for democracy and freedomincludes “constitutional reform” whichaims to establish private property rights –for instance the 2008 Constitution, whichincludes demands for private land rights.
The bigger issue is that ordinary peasantswho used to oppose private enterprise nowdemand land privatization and opposepublic land ownership, even though thebusiness class wants privatization topromote its class interests. The peasants tryto supplement their living costs or insufficientassets by using or selling privatized land.7
People in the cities are restricted in reno-vating their houses whereas big buildingseasily get licenses for making extensions.
The former complain that their houses canbe destroyed by large-scale development. Inconclusion, the demands of the lower classpeople in response to the destructive resultsof reform and opening, are getting increas-ingly identified with those of the upperclass benefiting from them. Such a changein the attitude of the lower class may be anatural response to their new reality that“public ownership is now nobody’s owner-ship.” The meaning of public ownershiphas been already diminished – this is howthe deconstruction of the “unificationbetween party-state and society” is reflectedin peasants’ mindsets. This is the realelement in crisis.
If these two contradictory demands con-verge, it is possible that the demands of thebusiness class for land privatization wouldachieve hegemony, and the Chinese party-state system would not be able to control it.It would parallel anti-communist liberalismachieving hegemony in civil society. Publicownership in a market economy must bepursued so that these two interests will notassociate.
The Chinese market economy is anassociation of socialist basic institutionswith a market economy, and its “socialistelements” can be found in common owner-ship, labor-based distribution, and economicmanagement institutions associated with aneconomic management system combinedwith planning and the market. Given thatlabor-based distribution here has alreadybeen nullified and economic managementhas been gradually narrowed to macro man-agement of the market economy, the fate ofcommon ownership depends on the fate ofthe socialist market economy.
3.4.4 For a progressive virtuous cycle.Demands for democracy raised in Chinacontain contradictory elements. On onehand, there exists a healthy resistance to neo-liberalism, the market and capital, privateenterprises, various privileges, unreasonableprofits, and the accumulation of wealth. Onthe other hand, there exists a demand formore radical privatization by various socialgroups that have gained vested rights since
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the reform and opening. For this author, thechallenge is how to make a political structurethat promotes a “reformative socialist virtu-ous cycle.” This would provide positivemotivation for a possible renovation of theparty-state system, allowing the party-stateto incarnate socialization and the publiccharacter of the market economy. Further-more, it would mean that the people’sradical demands for democracy would notbe associated with, but rather separatedfrom, vested demands, preventing the capi-talist class from pursuing full privatizationin the name of democracy. To fight against“capitalism in the name of democracy,” theradicalism of democracy should be extended,the public character of the market, economyand capitalism should be strengthened, anda back-scratching alliance between the gov-ernment and business should be blocked.“People’s power,” as a core of democracyand force for equality, should not be seen asa threat to the party-state system, but as amotivation for socialization and “publiciza-tion” of the market economy. In light ofthis, respecting reform and opening whilenoting its destructive results, a reform-oriented socialist alliance pursuing this kindof “socialization of the market economy” isnecessary (Lin 2006).
4. Two roads in front of China, threeroads in front of the East Asian states
In my view, there are three ideal-typicalmodels of social formation competing inEast Asia, We can divide these types by thecharacter of their political and economicregimes.
The political regime can be divided intoliberal and illiberal types (Park 2005, 214).This difference cannot be regarded as anessentialist one. In addition, the real form ofliberal and illiberal regimes can varygreatly. In addition, there are socialist andcapitalist economic regimes, as generallyaccepted. There is a lot of variation withinthe latter in terms of social character of themarket, from American neo-liberal type asvery least to Scandinavian one as high insuch a character, which is called the “social
market economy.” The social character ofthe market economy8 is related to the quali-tative character of democracy, which wasmentioned before.
Given these explanations, we cancharacterize Singapore, South Korea andChina. First, Singapore is an ideal-typicalcombination of political illiberalism andsocial communitarianism, with an EastAsian-type of social market. Second, SouthKorea combines political liberalism and anextreme form of neoliberal marketeconomy. However, in response to the con-tradiction of “market failure” in its neoliberaleconomy, there exist strong, militant socialmovements. Unlike these two, China hadan illiberal political regime, with radicalanti-market planning economy, after its revo-lution. However, in response to the extremecontradictions of “state failure,” it decidedto adopt a new market economy strategy,and is experiencing transitional conflict andchange as a result. What kinds of changewill these three cases experience in thefuture? Of course, there will be diverse trajec-tories. If we imagine an ideal type of pro-gressive change, three models mightemerge which combine political liberalismand a social economy. The first is a type of“democratized Singaporean model,” whichmeans that Singapore keeps its socio-econ-omic communitarian and social market char-acter, while overcoming its politicalilliberalism and soft authoritarianism. Thesecond is a type of “socialized SouthKorean model,” which means that thesocial character of the market economybecomes increasingly strengthened with thehelp of a successful bottom-up struggle,while maintaining political liberalism. Thedebate over the welfare state, currently inprogress, is an expression of this kind ofstruggle over strengthening the social char-acter of the market. In addition to these, a“re-socialized and democratized Chinesemodel” can be positioned. However, thereare two alternatives competing in China:one is a neoliberal economic regime, com-bined with political liberalism, and theother is a socialist democratic alternative.The former means that top-down reform
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fails and arrives at a bottleneck, in which thepeople feel that all reform possibilities areexhausted under the current communistregime, and as a result, political liberalswith a neoliberal economic orientation gainthe initiative. This reminds us of the emer-gence of Boris Yeltsin’s government. Thislatter road implies that the current socialistregime tries to strengthen the social characterof the market economy. It could reinventdemocracy but with a Chinese character byappropriating rational elements of Westernpolitical liberalism and democracy into itsown regime, and overcoming the currentcrisis. In that case, a new model that com-bines political liberalism and a socialmarket economy will emerge.
Here I have to emphasize that thesethree types are qualitatively different.Although they share a combination of politi-cal liberalism and social market economy,there are basic differences in the class charac-ter of the ruling bloc and historical character-istics of the power elite.
The Singaporean type emerged post-Second World War, in which radicalanti-imperialist nationalism and pro-socialistsentiments were very strong. The SouthKorean type emerged while the pro-Ameri-can and anti-communist regime was demo-cratized and socialized through a bottom-up struggle. In contrast to these two types,the Chinese model emerged in the historicaltradition of revolution and state socialism.
Finally, I have to indicate that the realiz-ation of these types is not a deterministicprocess. It is open to hegemonic competitionin which structures and strategic behaviorsinteract with each other. In this sense, thecurrent Chinese socialist market economyregime contains the two possibilities ofcrisis and chance.
Finally, the limitations of this articleshould be noted. Here, this author has dis-cussed new socialist hegemonic politicsfrom the viewpoint of “top-down” reform.This is the so-called “passive revolution” inthe Gramscian sense. Gramsci imagined aform of counter-hegemony to create abottom-up “active revolution” in responseto the passive revolution of the dominant
forces. This article, on the contrary, suggestsa kind of passive revolution in which thecurrent Chinese party-state elites enforcetop-down reform to incorporate thebottom-up resistance in order to enrich itshegemony. In addition, the author criticizespassive revolution in a capitalist democracy,while at the same time, encouraging a newkind of passive revolution in analyzing theparty-state system. This clearly poses aninternal dilemma. However, there is still a“qualitative difference” between theChinese system, which was born from aradical nationalistic revolution and socialistrevolution, and a capitalist system to be over-come by leftists. The collapse of Soviet social-ism fundamentally changed the globalpolitical-economic map, leading to the emer-gence of the “realistic monster” of globalneoliberalism and the emergence of the“intelligent monster” like Fukuyama’s “endof history” thesis. In contrast, the directionof the Chinese system can fundamentallychange the global “political map.” Therefore,actively reinterpreting and enlarging thelegacy of the weakening but remainingsocialism, “modernizing” the Chinesesystem, is a significant challenge to global lef-tists. This is why the author imagines themodernization of the Chinese system with“internal contradictions.”
Acknowledgement
This article is revised and rewritten from anarticle that was originally published inTaiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies,Vol. 87 (June 2012).
Notes
1. The government leadership was succeededthrough the family line, from Kim Il-Sung, to hisson, Kim Jung-Il, and now to his grandson, KimJung-Eun.
2. For example, while commemorating 30 years ofreform and opening, the Communist Party ofChina mentioned what is “allowed” and “not-allowed” in a socialist society, through the “sixwhy” propaganda. The six whys are: (1) why weshould maintain Marxist ideological leadershipand should not have diverse leadership; (2) why
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we should maintain Chinese socialism and shouldnot follow capitalism; (3) why we should maintaina basic economy system that is based on publiceconomy where collective ownership is developedand should not implement privatization and“pure” collective ownership; (4) why we shouldmaintain the National People’s Congress andshould not implement separation of the threepowers such as administrative, legislative andjudicial ones, (5) why we should maintain themulti-party cooperative system and political nego-tiation system of the Community Party of Chinaand should not follow a western multipartysystem; and (6) why we should maintain reformand opening without agitation and should notreturn to the past (quoted in Baek 2009).
3. There are various views and perspectives on the“socialist” character of complex non-correspon-dence, among not only liberal scholars but alsoleft-wing scholars. For example, Market Socialism:the Debate among Socialists (1998) contains four per-spectives on a socialist market economy. Schweick-art (2002) sees the Chinese model as one that willeventually form an exact or close model of“market socialism,” in which public support, thesharing of interests, and social justice can be inte-grated into management and business activity.James Lawler argues that Marx was a marketsocialist. In contrast, Hillel Ticktin pointed outthat market socialism itself is problematic, ratherthan the “result” of the market socialism is so.Bertell Ollman (1998) criticizes the market itselfas being mystified by both capitalism and marketsocialism. It is interesting that some people whosupport orthodox Marxism see reforms andopening as a deviation from socialist principles.In relation to this, the recent views of Arrighi(2007) are noteworthy. Arrighi says the Chinesesocialist market economy has its own characteristicas a “market-based non-capitalistic developmentmodel”which is different from a western capitalis-tic market development model. I agree withArrighi in the sense that the Chinese model is inde-pendent. However, I also believe that he idealizesthe latter; thus his framework does not acknowl-edge the seriousness of the Chinese economy crisis.
4. In this regard, I argue, “Marx worried that democ-racy would become a political shell for capitalism.However, Marxists abandoned democracy underthe reason that they ‘overcame’ capitalistic exploita-tion…By radically expandingMarx’s concern, resistunrealistic representative democracy in the name ofdemocracy! In the name of democracy, resist capital-ism! In the name of democracy, resist against allforms of social discrimination!” (Cho 2011a, 66).
5. According to Wang Hui (2003, 58), there were twodifferent “resistances” found in the 1989 Tianan-men movement. One was a movement for social
self-protection, to resist market growth andinequality. As a resistance movement, it reflectedcriticisms against the Leviathan state. It can becalled a “left” resistance against the interestgroups that emerged after reform, against the capi-talist class that colonized state power. In contrast,“right” characteristics also existed during the1989 Tiananmen movement, which called for awider opening of the market and economicliberalization.
6. At this point, we have to pay attention to the viewof one Chinese scholar Qian (2007). Criticizing thesituation that the party-state suppresses it, he notesthat such a non-governmental left should beallowed to be newly activated. In his view, theyear 1957 was a turning point, in which theparty-state regime was consolidated, and the con-struction of socialism was scaled down to amatter of maintaining the party-state regime.The revolution was stiffened and distorted. In theprocess, the suppression and removal of theleftist tradition (particularly democratic socialism)began, but the tradition ceased to exist with theBeijing democratic movement as the last one. Inthat year 1957, the people were estranged fromthe party-state; after that, a struggle emergedbetween the latter’s socialism and the population’sdemocratic socialism. The author’s view is largelysimilar to the view of the NewLeft, which criticizesthe neoliberal direction of reform after China’sopening. However, the new situation that theNew Left is gradually being recognized as a“statist left” (some even critically say that the“New Left defend party-state regime by usingleftist vocabulary”) comes up with the expansionof the critical opinion against the party-stateregime and in the absence of a new strategicresponse of the party to it. At this point, theauthor keeps a certain distance with the NewLeftist standpoint, highlighting new democraticspace and the originality of the non-governmentalleft in it; in other words, the New Left should thinkmore radically of “bottom-up democracy” beyond“consultative democracy” or “inner democracy inthe party.” Unlike New Leftist thinking, weshould not think of reform of the Chinese regimemerely within the framework of the party-stateregime.
7. Liu (2011) gives the example of 40,000 peasants inHeilong River, Fujin city of Dongnan-gang, whoattempted land privatization in December 2007,criticizing the “Communist Party depriving pea-sants of their rights” (Liu 2011, 84). He quotesHayek, who said that “not politics but ideologychanges the world.” By criticizing “extreme”market liberalists like Hayek who promote capital-ist democracy, and also trying to extend publicland rights against land privatization, the author
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also opposes such views of those like Liu Shaobo.However, since the “Bamboo Curtain” has beenunveiled, and the market economy has beenaccepted, it is not sustainable to stop this “rightwing” claim by “suppression” or “hegemonicstrategy.” The situation will further deteriorateunless public ownership is restructured tosupport peasants’ interests.
8. The so-called social communitarianism of EastAsia (Chua 2004) is related to this social characterof the market in the economic aspect.
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Special terms
cun 村
Heilong River 黑龍江
Fujin city 富錦
Dongnan-gang 東南崗
Author’s biography
CHO Hee-Yeon (曺喜昖) is Professor at the Schoolof Social Science and NGO Graduate School at Sung-konghoe University in Seoul. Outside campus, he hasworked as the representative of several diverse aca-demic and practical organizations such as Associationof Critical Sociological Association of Korea,
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Association of Social Movements and Politics Study,and Democracy and Social Movements Institute. Cur-rently, he works as Co-representative of the NationalAssociation of Professors for a Democratic Society [民主化를 爲한 全國敎授協議會]. He is a foundingmember of People’s Solidarity for ParticipatoryDemocracy [參與連帶]. He has written many booksincluding Class and Poverty [계급과빈곤]; Social Move-ment and Organizations in South Korea [한국의
사회운동과조직]; The State, Democracy and the Political
Change in South Korea [한국의 국가, 민주주의,정치변동]; Park Chung-Hee and Developmental Dictator-ship [박정희와개발독재시대];Mobilized Modernization[동원된 근대화]. His book, Mobilized Modernization,was translated into the Japanese, and entitled “朴正
熙動員された近代化 韓国、開発動員体制の二重性.”
Contact address:Division of Social Science, Sungkon-ghoe University. 1 Hang-dong, Kuro-gu, Seoul 152–716, S. Korea
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