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Is Jordan Doomed? YesAuthor(s): Rita E. HauserSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1994), pp. 178-179Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045904 .
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Letters to the Editor
sion that the key lesson from Chile is that "the withering away of the state" is
the necessary condition for economic
progress. I go further than he does with
respect to foreign aid. I believe along with Lord Peter Bauer and others that
foreign aid has almost invariably been
harmful to the country receiving it pre
cisely because it tends to retard or pre vent "the withering away of the state."
MILTON FRIEDMAN
Senior Research Fellow, the Hoover Insti
tution on War, Revolution, and Peace
IS JORDAN DOOMED? YES
To the Editor:
Lawrence Tal ("Is Jordan Doomed?"
September/October 1993) presents a
sober and clear analysis of the risks fac
ing Jordan should the PLO-Israeli accords eventuate in a Palestinian state.
Most observers, including Israel's cur
rent leaders, contemplate that very
prospect as the likely outcome of the
recent decisions, despite public rhetoric
to the contrary. A mini-Palestine, demil
itarized and economically integrated
with, if not dependent upon, Israel will
likely emerge and seek to confederate
with Jordan, uniting Palestinians on
both banks of the Jordan River. That the prospect of confederation is
less than appealing to Jordan's Hashem
ites has received little serious attention
outside Jordan. Tal renders a real service
by posing the question of whether such a
development would doom Jordan as we
know it. While he consistently argues that a confederation of Palestine and Jor dan will come about, with the Palestinian
component clearly the stronger, Tal pulls his punch with a sanguine conclusion
that somehow or other the Jordanian state will remain intact.
It is difficult to share this conclusion.
The likely prospect following confedera tion is a democratic, mainly secular gov ernment in which the Hashemite crown
would reign rather than rule. Palestini
ans' economic acumen, aided by billions
of dollars in international assistance and
direct Israeli involvement, will assure
their place as the dominant demographic
group. The most startling statistic Tal
cites is that, even today, Jordan's per
capita GNP is lower than that of either the
West Bank or Gaza. Moreover, substan
tial expatriate Palestinian capital and
entrepreneurship will be deployed to
assist Palestinian projects. As Tal notes, a
diversion of Palestinian funds from
Amman to West Bank financial institu
tions would send Jordan's economy into
severe crisis.
Nor does it seem likely that King Hussein can slow the forces of democra
tization in Jordan, as he now seems to
acknowledge in going ahead with sched
uled parliamentary elections. When the
Palestinian dimension emerges more
clearly after final status is reached, politi cal parties attuned to a Palestinian
agenda will likely assert themselves and
eventually dominate the Jordanian politi cal process, especially after King Hussein
passes from the scene. Jordanian nation
alism is strongly tied to the person of
King Hussein.
A democratic confederation, with full
Hashemite participation, should be
encouraged. The merger of Palestine and
Jordan offers the chance for a secular,
economically prosperous entity to flour
ish, defying the long-held view that
[178] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume y3 No. 1
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Letters to the Editor
democracy cannot take root in the Arab
world. That prospect is important for
Arabs, and it is also the surest guarantee of peaceful relations with Israel.
RITA E. HAUSER
President, The H?user Foundation
INFLUENTIAL ARABISTS?
To the Editor:
William Quandt in his review of my book, TheArabists (November/Decem ber 1993), accuses me of "ignoring their
[the Arabists'] successes." Pages 207-229 of my book are
solely devoted to docu
menting the rescue of 12,000 Ethiopian
Jews carried out by two Arabic-speaking
Foreign Service officers. Pages 267 and
301 document the Arabist role in freeing an American from an Iraqi prison, sur
viving an embassy siege in Kuwait, and
carrying out the 1988 re-flagging opera tion in the Gulf "without a hitch." Page 137 covers how, without making conces
sions, Arabists preserved relations with
Saudi Arabia. Page 160 and a caption
plate mention the successful evacuation
of Americans carried out by Arabist
Talcott Seelye. Pages 232-233 cover the
Arabist role in uncovering Saudi missiles
capable of reaching Israel. This is in addition to the feats of heroism by
Arabist missionaries in the nineteenth
century that I document.
Quandt says I quote "approvingly" a
negative statement about Arabists by Francis Fukuyama. On page seven of the
book, immediately after the Fukuyama
quotation, I quote Nicholas Veliotis, who
"sharply disagrees" with Fukuyama.
Quandt says that my "prototypical
figure of the early Arabist, Loy Hender
son, was not an Arabist at all." Indeed,
on page 98 I write that Henderson "did not speak Arabic and spent only two of
his ninety-three years living in the Arab
world." My point, made absolutely clear
in the book, was that because of both his
harsh anti-Israel views and his loyalty to
the Foreign Service, Henderson, despite his not being an Arabist, ironically became a prototype.
Quandt says I "have made no effort to
interview [Ambassador April] Glaspie." From June 1991 through November 19921 made repeated attempts to convince
Glaspie to meet with me for a lengthy profile of her version of events, as well as
her diplomatic life prior to Iraq. These
attempts were made in three phone con
versations with Glaspie, in letters, faxes
and a request through the public affairs
office of the State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in autumn 1992.
Nevertheless, Glaspie did provide me with some direct information, such as
details about her honor awards and her
challenge to Saddam Hussein to remove
his sidearm in her presence. This mater
ial is in the book. ROBERT D. KAPLAN
William B. Quandt replies: I accept that Mr. Kaplan tried to
interview Ambassador Glaspie, although there was no way of knowing this from
his book. Still, I think he is too willing to
accept the thesis that Glaspie bears much
of the blame for our policy toward Iraq on the eve of the invasion of Kuwait. I
would look more carefully at policymak
ers in the White House. Indeed, my major difference with Kaplan is that he sees the "Arabists" as very influential in
the past 30 years, whereas I do not.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS January/February 1994 [179]
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