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Is there a Non-psychological Intentionality?. Metaphysics of Mind Workshop Kyung Hee University, May 30-31 2012 Itay Shani, KHU. Part I: Context. What’s the issue?. A boundary debate : Is intentionality the mark of the mental ? Or is it the mark of the dispositional ? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Metaphysics of Mind Workshop Kyung Hee University, May 30-31 2012
Itay Shani, KHU
Part I: Context
What’s the issue?A boundary debate:Is intentionality the mark of the mental? Or is it the
mark of the dispositional?
Since Brentano (1874), intentionality has been conceived as a unique feature (if not the unique feature) of mental life. It has often been claimed that it is that which separates the mental from the physical.
However, a small minority of philosophers specializing in disposition research (in particular Place 1996, and Molnar 2003) have challenged this dogma ⇒ They argue that intentionality has a much broader scope: it is characteristic of all dispositional properties (powers, potencies). ⇒ does not separate M-P
Why it is an issue? It is customary to characterize intentionality in terms of
certain formal criteria such as:1) Directionality (or aboutness)2) Inexistence* 3) Non-truth-functionality4) Referential opacity 5) Indeterminacy*These (and possibly others) are interpreted as
adequacy criteria, which (almost) every intentional state must manifest.
Advocates of the thesis of dispositional intentionality (ID) argue that all of these criteria are equally met by simple physicochemical dispositions (e.g., acidity, viscosity, etc.).
On the significance of ID1) Significance for disposition research: ID is seen by some as vital for constructing a non-
counterfactual account of the connection between dispositions and their manifestations.
2) Broader metaphysical significance:If intentionality is ubiquitous in the physical world
then:
A) It does not distinguish the mental from the physical.
B) It significantly alters our world-image.
Questions to bear in mindWhile we engage in the debate concerning ID, we
would do well to pay heed to the following questions:
1) Degree of similarity: To what degree is it true to say that dispositions satisfy the criteria for intentionality?
2) Metaphysical significance: What metaphysical implications are embedded in the degree of similarity (or lack thereof) we identify between IM and ID?
Part two: The parallelism between IM and ID
Directedness and inexistenceDirectedness:IM: Mental states are directed towards their intentional
objects. ID: Dispositions are directed towards their manifestations.
Inexistence:IM: Mental states are directed at their intentional objects
regardless of whether such objects exist in actuality.
ID: Dispositions are directed towards their manifestations regardless of whether such potential
manifestations actualize.
Non-truth functionalityIM : (Ascriptions of) propositional attitudes are
NTFS1. ‘The weatherman predicts that the drought
will break’ does not entail:S2. ‘The drought will break’
ID. Ascriptions of dispositions are NTFS3. ‘The cloud seeding apparatus has the capacity
to bring it about that the drought will break’ does not entail:
S2. ‘The drought will break’
Referential opacity IM: Ascriptions of PA’s are referentially opaque:
S4. ‘Doolittle believes that all Pelicans are feathered’1 does not entail:S5. ‘Doolittle believes that all Pelicans have intertarsal
joints’2 (although 1&2 are coextensive).
ID. Ascriptions of dispositions are referentially opaque:S6. ‘Acid has the power to turn this litmus paper red’3 Does not entail:S7. ‘Acid has the power to turn this litmus paper the color
of Post Office Pillar boxes’.4
(although the color of POPB’s is red)
Anscombe’s indeterminacy (optional)*IM: We can think of an object (say a man) without
thinking of some of its attributes (say its precise height).
ID: A disposition (e.g., of a certain substance to dissolve in an aqua regia solution) leaves indeterminate some of the conditions of its manifestation (e.g., the precise location of the dissolution event).
Caveat: ‘Underdetermination’ seems a more appropriate term – both thoughts and dispositions specify certain conditions while leaving others unspecified.
Part III: Critical investigation of the parallelism between IM and ID
A preliminary caveatEach of the criteria for intentionality just
mentioned ought to be addressed with the following concerns:
Formal: How robust is the similarity between IM and ID?
Genetic: Can the observed similarity be traced to a common cause or origin?
<Analogy/Homology>
More on intentionalityOur evaluation of the parallelism should also take into
consideration the following criteria for IM:
Normativity: IM is fundamentally normative. It involves the possibility of representational error and error detection.
Aspectual shape: IM is aspect-relative. Mental states represent their intentional objects under specific aspects, or modes (of presentation).
Intrinsicality: There is an indispensible sense of ‘content’ in which mental states are endowed with intrinsically meaningful intentional content ⇒ content which is not thrust upon them from without.
Dispositional directednessID directedness: Dispositions are (a) projective, or
outward-oriented (OO), (b) with respect to particular kinds of effects relative to particular types of dispositional partners. (Martin and Heil, 1999).
Such projectivity is (the idea goes) a primitive form
of aboutness (“of-ness, or for-ness”)
Skepticism: Projectivity attests to the intrinsic connectedness of D’s to M’s; it indicates that they are internally related.
But, is the Projectivity of powers really of the same
kind as the Projectivity of mental states?
Mental directednessThere is no consensus on what constitutes MD. Yet, I
share Place’s (1996) sympathy for the “cybernetic” model (Anderson and Rosenberg 2008; Shani 2011).
Feedback loop: Intentional tracking (say, of a moving
prey) consists of repetitive coordination of: (a) information inflow (b) internal states indicating possible future outcomes, and (c) behavioral outflow.
Outcome: (1) Focused action; (2) the directedness of
thought is inherited from the role it plays in directing focused action.
If so: IM directedness is non-linear and cyclical in a manner
unparalleled by ID. ⇒ (but wait…)*
Revisiting NTF What lies behind the NTF of intentional and
dispositional ascriptions?
ID: “X has the power to effect Y” does not entail Y because possibility does not imply actuality.
IM: “X believes/predicts, etc. that P” does not entail P because beliefs/predictions, etc. can be frustrated.
ID – NTF: Modality IM – NTF: Normativity is N the missing
criterion?
Revisiting referential opacity IM: Ref. Op. is due to the aspect-relativity of mental
representations. Doolittle represents pelicans qua feathered creatures, but not
qua creatures with intertarsal joints.
ID: Ref. Op. is due to… the aspect-relativity of dispositions. The failure of substitutivity between ‘red’ and ‘the color of
POPB’ is because powers are aspect-relative.A substance X (e.g. vinegar), qua being P (an acid), has the
power to transform a substance Y (a litmus paper), qua being Q (having a certain color), in a certain way R (shift to the red).
But not in another way S (even if S & R are correlated
contingently)
Revisiting Anscombe’s indeterminacy* (optional)Anscombe’s indeterminacy, too, is a consequence
of aspect-relativity:IM: X is represented under certain aspects (A1…
Ak) but not under (Ak+1… An) → the latter remain unspecified, hence underdetermined.
ID: X (gold) has the power to dissolve in Y (aqua regia) qua being P (having a certain molecular structure), but not qua being Q (the time being T1) → the latter is accidental, hence underdetermined.
Part IV: Proto-intentionality?
Where do we stand?Logically, our options are:1) To accept ID and admit intentionality as the mark of the
dispositional.2) To reject ID altogether.3) To opt for a third way, for example, to argue that dispositions
are proto-intentional.
Affirming ID: (a) The 5 criteria are definitive of intentionality; (b) and they are sufficiently met.
Denying ID: The similarity to IM is superficial. When we dig deeper, we find crucial features -- e.g., normativity and loop-like directedness -- which separate IM from ID.
Proto-intentionality: Yes, there are differences, but the similarity and continuity is, nevertheless, ontologically deep.
Why proto-intentionality?Powers exemplify: Projectivity, internal relatedness, modality
(potentiality), aspect-relativity, and intrinsicality. all are crucially operative in IM. Could this be an irrelevant
accident? Or is it rather that such features are ontological scaffolds which
enable the eventual emergence of full-blown (psycho-social) intentionality?
Notice: The point is not that IM is a composite-aggregate of ID’s. Rather, it is that ID is (a) continuous with, and (b) necessary for, IM. (Pace Bird 2007)
Could we expect IM to be possible in, say, a world (atomistic, or
Humean) lacking projectivity, internal relatedness, aspect-relativity, etc.?
But there is more than that…First, even when IM seems to differ significantly
from ID, there are still intriguing connections, for example:
ID – NTF: Modality IM – NTF: Normativity
But notice: Ought → Can→ IsOnly a world of potentialities (of can-do) could be
a world of (emergent) normativities (ought-to-do)
Content, affordances, and dispositionsThe connection between IM and ID is even more
intimate, at least on the following picture:
(Narrow) Intentional content is specified as anticipatory indications of interaction potentialities ⇒ i.e., of affordances.
Affordances are potentialities of the environment
for the agent ⇒ A function of the match-up between external and internal potencies.
(e.g., the surface of a pond affords walking-on for
little insects but not for normal humans)
Enter normativity The organization of living creatures is such that its
stability and growth depends on recurrent regeneration and maintenance.
Asymmetry: Some processes on which the system can
exert a degree of control contribute to stability and growth while others are destabilizing.
Normativity: Emerges from this asymmetry ⇒ Some
processes must be maintained; others counteracted. Representations: Contribute to successful action by
indicating how external potencies reciprocate with internal potencies in light of the imperative to satisfy certain functional norms.
Meta-dispositions?If so, representations play a role in inhibiting the
manifestation of some powers while enabling, or instigating, the manifestation of others.
Meta-dispositions: Thus, perhaps intentional
properties can be viewed as meta-dispositions (cf. Ellis 2002) – dispositions to transform dispositions.
On this picture:IM: Meta-dispositions; holistic agency; full-blown
intentionality
ID: Dispositions; atomistic potency; proto-intentionalityThe differences are real, but the framework
continuous…