THE ALLIED ADVANCE IN THE PACIFIC

ISLAND-HOPPING TOWARDS JAPAN, 1942-44

AUG., 1942- FEB., 1943:◦ U.S. ASSAULTS / RETAKES GUADALCANAL

NOV.,1942- JAN.,1943: ◦ ALLIED CAMPAIGN / CONQUEST OF NEW GUINEA

APRIL, 1943 – JUNE, 1944:◦ OPERATION CARTWHEEL

NOV., 1943: BATTLE OF TARAWA JUNE,1944:

◦ THE BATTLE OF SAIPAN ◦ BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA◦ “THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT”

IMPORTANT DATES

ADMIRAL CHESTER H. NIMITZ GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY THE SOLOMON ISLANDS GUADALCANAL “THE TOKYO EXPRESS” NEW GUINEA “ISLAND –HOPPING” OPERATION CARTWHEEL TARAWA “THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT”

IMPORTANT TERMS / PEOPLE

JUNE, 1942: BATTLE OF MIDWAY:◦ IJN IS DEALT 1ST MAJOR LOSS OF WWII◦ U.S. NAVY ACHIEVES 1ST MAJOR VICTORY IN PACIFIC◦ JAPANESE ADVANCE IN PACIFIC IS STOPPED

PROBLEM:◦ JAPANESE EMPIRE IS STILL AT IT’S GREATEST EXTENT◦ JAPAN STILL CONTROLS MOST MAJOR ISLANDS IN PACIFIC◦ AUSTRALIA IS STILL THREATENED BY JAPANESE◦ JAPAN HAS EXTENSIVE NETWORK OF FORTIFIED ISLAND

CHAINS THAT MUST BE TAKEN WHY?

NO INVASION OF JAPAN IS POSSIBLE UNTIL ISLANDS ARE TAKEN ISLANDS CAN BE USED AS NAVAL AND AIR BASES

RESULT? ALLIES MUST FORM PLAN TO…◦ ASSAULT / SEIZE JAPANESE-CONTROLLED ISLANDS◦ ASSAULT & POSSIBLY INVADE JAPAN

PACIFIC SITUATION, SUMMER, 1942

PROBLEM: ◦ WHAT WAS THE BEST WAY TO DEFEAT JAPAN?◦ WHAT ROUTE SHOULD THE ALLIES TAKE TO ADVANCE

TOWARDS JAPAN? NORTHERN ROUTE VIA N. PACIFIC ISLANDS? SOUTHERN ROUTE THROUGH LARGER S.PACIFIC ISLANDS?

◦ DECISION: THE SOUTHERN ROUTE◦ WHY?

MORE ISLANDS THERE ISLANDS WERE CLOSER TO EACH OTHER MANY S. PACIFIC ISLANDS WERE LARGER SO…ISLANDS COULD BE BETTER USED FOR NAVAL / AIR BASES SOUTHERN ROUTE WAS CLOSER TO AUSTRALIA

SO WHAT?◦ AUSTRALIA WAS ALLIED W/ U.S.◦ AUSSIE MILITARY WAS VITAL TO VICTORY◦ MANY U.S. TROOPS WERE BEING TRAINED/SUPPLIED THERE

PLANNING THE ADVANCE

U.S. / ALLIED PLAN TAKES SHAPE:◦ ALLIED FORCES WILL ADVANCE TOWARD JAPAN ON

TWO PARALLEL ROUTES◦ SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC ROUTE:

SOLOMON ISLANDS – NEW GUINEA – PHILIPPINES◦ CENTRAL PACIFIC ROUTE:

GILBERT ISLANDS – MARSHALL ISLANDS – MARIANA ISLANDS

WHAT FORCES WILL BE USED?:◦ S.W. PACIFIC ROUTE: U.S. ARMY, USMC, USN, AUST.◦ C. PACIFIC ROUTE: USN, USMC

WHO’S IN COMMAND?:◦ S.W. PACIFIC: DOUGLAS MacARTHUR◦ C. PACIFIC: CHESTER NIMITZ

PLANNING THE ADVANCE (cont’d.)

ALLIED OFFENSIVE BEGINS THERE: WHY?◦ GUADALCANAL IS @ SOUTHERN END OF JAPANESE EMPIRE◦ ISLAND HAS AIRFIELD ALLIES NEED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS◦ ISLAND CONTROLS SEA LANES TO AUSTRALIA

BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE IT’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE◦ SO…ALLIES WANT IT / JAPANESE WANT TO KEEP IT

USMC GIVEN INITIAL TASK OF TAKING ISLAND (U.S.ARMY INVOLVED LATER ON)

AUG. ’42-FEB.,’43: VICIOUS FIGHTING ON ISLAND◦ JAPANESE DESPERATE TO HOLD ISLAND◦ THE “TOKYO EXPRESS” REINFORCES JAPANESE◦ U.S. NAVY DISRUPTS “TOKYO EXPRESS”

OTHER PROBLEMS:◦ TROPICAL CLIMATE◦ TROPICAL DISEASE (EX. MALARIA)◦ JUNGLE TERRAIN MAKES MOVEMENT DIFFICULT

FINAL RESULT: ◦ JAPANESE CAN’T MAINTAIN TROOPS / SUPPLIES◦ CASUALTIES GROW (EX. 22,000 KIA/MIA)◦ JAPANESE WITHDRAW FROM ISLAND / U.S. CONTROLS ISLAND

GUADALCANAL

IJA INFANTRYMAN (L)AND IJA OFFICER (R)

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH, HENDERSON AIRFIELD, GUADALCANAL

BATTLE MAP,“BLOODY RIDGE”,GUADALCANAL, SEPT., 1942

U.S. MARINES ON “BLOODY RIDGE”

JAPANESE KIA ON “BLOODY RIDGE”

JAPANESE KIA, BLOODY RIDGE, GUADALCANAL, 1942

NEW GUINEA: WHY IMPORTANT?◦ LOCATION

CLOSE TO AUSTRALIA LOCATED ON IMPORTANT SEA ROUTES TO JAPAN WAS USED AS A BASE FOR SUPPORTING SMALLER ISLAND GARRISONS

◦ JAPANESE OCCUPIED NORTHERN HALF OF ISLAND HAD FAILED TO OCCUPY SOUTHERN HALF WHY? JUNGLE & MOUNTAIN TERRAIN MADE MOVEMENT DIFFICULT

◦ 1942-43: U.S. / AUSSIES DECIDE TO PUSH JAPANESE OFF ISLAND◦ PROBLEM?

TERRAIN – OWEN STANLEY MTS. ARE DIFFICULT TO PASS JUNGLE TERRAIN CLIMATE DISEASE

◦ SOLUTION? MacARTHUR DECIDES ON SIMPLE PLAN: “OPERATION CARTWHEEL”

BYPASS JAPANESE STRONGHOLDS USE ARMY & NAVY TO CUT OFF JAPANESE SUPPLIES STARVE JAPANESE ONLY ATTACK AREAS THAT ARE VITAL TO ALLIED MOVEMENT

◦ RESULT? JAPANESE SUFFER MASSIVE LOSSES – 150,000 KIA / MIA ALLIES SEIZE NEW GUINEA

NEW GUINEA

NEW GUINEA

THE KOKODA TRAIL,NEW GUINEA, 1942

AUSSIES ON THE KOKODA TRAIL, NEW GUINEA, 1942

“STAIRCASE” CONSTRUCTION,KOKODA TRAIL, NEW GUINEA,1942-1943

AUSSIES ASCENDING THE KOKODA TRIAL, 1942

AUSSIES TAKING REST, KOKODA TRAIL, 1943

AUSSIES ON THE KOKODA TRAIL, 1943

AUSSIES IN NEW GUINEA, 1943

NEW GUINEA U.S. OPERATIONS1942-43

AUSSIES WITH CAPTURED JAPANESE EQUIPMENT, NEW GUINEA, 1943

AUSSIE INFANTRY, NEW GUINEA, 1943

AUSTRALIAN ANTI-JAPANESEPROPAGANDA , 1942

U.S. ARMY INFANTRY ON PATROL,NEW GUINEA, 1943

WHEN? NOVEMBER , 1943 WHERE? TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS, CENTRAL PACIFIC WHAT? JAPANESE-HELD ATOLL W/ AIRFIELD WHY?

◦ TARAWA WAS THE EASTERNMOST USEABLE AIRSTRIP INSIDE JAPANESE-HELD TERRITORY

◦ CAPTURE WAS VITAL TO ADVANCE TOWARDS JAPAN ATOLL WAS DEFENDED BY IJN NAVAL INFANTRY W/OUT FLEET

SUPPORT USMC & USN ARE ORDERED TO SEIZE TARAWA & BEGIN USING

AIRSTRIP IJN FORCE: 5000 (approx.) IJN INFANTRY W/ WELL-

CONSTRUCTED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS U.S. FORCE:

◦ USMC 2nd MARINE DIVISION (& ELEMENTS OF USA 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION)◦ USN – TASK FORCE 30◦ TOTAL: APPROX. 35,000 MEN

TARAWA

BETIO ISLAND, TARAW ATOLL

JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, TARAWA, NOVEMBER, 1943

2nd DIVISION MARINES LAND ON TARAWA

PRESENT-ARMS,U.S. MARINES,BETIO, TARAWA,CURRENT-DAY

PROBLEMS:◦ JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ARE STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED◦ NAVAL GUNFIRE IS LESS EFFECTIVE THAN HOPED FOR◦ AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT ARE CAUGHT ON CORAL REEF◦ MARINES ARE FORCED TO WADE ASHORE◦ CASUALITES ARE VERY HIGH

FINAL CASUALTIES:◦ IJN: 4900 KIA, APPROX. 200 SURVIVORS◦ USMC: 3000, APPROX., 900-1000 KIA

SO WHAT?◦ USN & USMC HAVE TO RE-EVALUATE THEIR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

TACTICS EX.:

HOW CAN NAVAL ARTILLERY BE MADE MORE EFFICIENT DURING THE NEXT ASSAULT?

WHAT ARE THE BEST TACTICS / METHODS TO USE AGAINST JAPANESE POSITIONS?

◦ USN & USMC BEGIN NEW TRAINING METHODS FOR MARINES & NAVAL CREWS

TARAWA (cont’d.)

THE U.S. ADVANCE FROM HAWAII TO THE PHILIPPINES

WHEN? JUNE 19-20, 1944 WHERE? THE PHILIPPINE SEA (east of the Philippine Islands) WHO?

◦ IJN – ADM. JISABURO OZAWA◦ USN – ADM. RAYMOND SPRUANCE

FORCES:◦ IJN:

5 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 5 BATTLESHIPS 750 PLANES

◦ USN: 7 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 7 BATTLESHIPS 956 PLANES

WHY?◦ U.S. FORCES ARE “ISLAND-HOPPING” WESTWARD TOWARD PHILIPPINES &

JAPAN◦ IJN BELIEVES IT HAS TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE TO SLOW U.S.

PROGRESS◦ U.S. 5TH FLEET, MOVING TOWARDS JAPAN, SEEMS LIKE A GOOD TARGET

THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

JUNE 17: IJN TARGETS U.S. 5TH FLEET FOR ATTACK JUNE 18th:

◦ U.S. 5TH FLEET DISCOVERS IJN TO WEST OF U.S. POSITION

◦ SPRUANCE IS CAUTIOUS NOT TO PURSUE IJN W/OUT PROPER INTELLIEGENCE

JUNE 19TH: BATTLE BEGINS BATTLE TRAITS:

◦ MOSTLY AERIAL RAIDS ON ENEMY FLEETS◦ U.S. HAS ADVANTAGES:

MORE CARRIERS (7) MORE EXPERIENCED PILOTS BETTER RADAR CAPABILITY FOR PLANES BETTER PLANES

THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA (cont’d.)

U.S. NAVY, GRUMMAN F-6-F “HELLCAT” FIGHTER

GRUMMAN F6F SINGLE-SEAT FIGHTER

MITSUBISHI “ZERO” FIGHTER

U.S.N. F6Fs ON COMBAT AIR PATROL, 1944

JAPANESE TORPEDO PLANE HIT BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

JUNE 19th: ◦ IJN LAUNCHES 4 AERIAL ASSAULTS ON U.S. 5TH FLEET◦ IJN PLANES ARE REPEATEDLY INTERCEPTED BY U.S

PLANES◦ IJN AIR LOSSES ARE HEAVY◦ AIR BATTLE IS KNOWN AS “THE MARIANAS TURKEY

SHOOT”◦ U.S. FLEET LOSSES ARE LIGHT

JAPANESE AIR LOSSES – WHY SO HEAVY?◦ U.S. PILOTS ARE NOW MORE EXPERIENCED◦ U.S. PLANES ARE NOW AS GOOD (and often better)

THAN THE JAPANESE ZERO FIGHTER◦ MOST / BEST JAPANESE PILOTS WERE KILLED EARLIER IN

WAR◦ SO…JAPANESE PILOTS ARE LESS EXPERIENCED

THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA (cont’d.)

JUNE 20TH: U.S. COUNTERATTACKS U.S. FLEET DOESN’T DISCOVER IJN UNTIL LATE

AFTERNOON / EALRY EVENING PROBLEM?

◦ IF U.S. LAUNCHES LATE-DAY ATTACK, PLANES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN UNTIL AFTER DARK

◦ RESULT…U.S. PLANES MAY BE LOST DUE TO DARKNESS

U.S. ATTACKS @ 6:00pm (approx. time) 550 U.S. PLANES ATTACK IJN IJN SHIP LOSSES ARE HEAVY U.S. PLANES SUFFER LOSSES ON RETURN TRIP

DUE TO DARKNESS & FUEL DEPLETION

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA (cont’d.)

HEAVY IJN LOSSES:◦ 3 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SUNK◦ 2 OIL TANKERS SUNK◦ 6 SHIPS HEAVILY DAMAGED◦ 600 PLANES (approx. #) DESTROYED (INJ & LAND-BASED PLANES)◦ PILOT LOSSES ARE IRREPLACEABLE

U.S. LOSSES:◦ 123 PLANES DESTROYED◦ SOME DAMAGE TO U.S. SHIPS

EFFECT?◦ U.S. “ISLAND-HOPPING” CONTINUES ◦ U.S. IS NOW PREPARED TO INVADE PHILIPPINES◦ IJN AIRCREWS ARE DECIMATED◦ IJN NOW MUST RELY ON BATTLESHIPS TO STOP U.S. NAVAL

ADVANCE

FINAL RESULTS