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BijdragenInternational Journal for Philosophy and Theology

ISSN: 0006-2278 (Print) 1783-1377 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpt19

THE CHILDLESS MARRIAGE:

Prof. JOSEPH A. SELLING

To cite this article: Prof. JOSEPH A. SELLING (1981) THE CHILDLESS MARRIAGE:, Bijdragen,42:2, 158-173, DOI: 10.1080/00062278.1981.10597210

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00062278.1981.10597210

Published online: 02 Jan 2013.

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Bijdragen 42 (1981) 158-173

THE CHILDLESS MARRIAGE:

A MORAL OBSERVATION

JOSEPH A. SELLING

A great deal has been written during the last couple of decades about marriage, the theology of marriage and the approach to some very important pastoral problems in that area. However, one pertinent subject has received relatively little attention. The question of the childless marriage has always been part of theological tradition, though only one aspect of this situation has been thought worthy of moral consideration. The involuntarily childless marriage resulting from infertility has always posed a problem for defining the requirements for contracting a canonically valid union. Could a couple who married late in life, or a couple who knew beforehand that one or both of the partners were sterile, enter into a valid marriage even though the end of procreation was impossible to realize? The answer to this question was invariably given in the affirmative by orthodox theologians, if for no other reason than the difficult problem of establishing the validity of the marriage of Mary and Joseph, the question of the virginal marriage. It might even be said that the necessary consideration of the involuntarily childless marriage through history has formed a constant critique against absolutizing the so-called primary end of marriage, procreation, as the sine qua non for marital validity. What is more, the Church has often gone out of her way to valorize such a relationship and to reassure the faithful that this was no less a marriage than one blessed with children. Gaudium et spes drew this special attention to the problem in number 50. But what about the other aspect of this situation? Throughout history the marriage which remained childless was generally looked upon as an anomally, assumed to be the result of involuntary circumstances, and its occurrence as a free choice was not so much condemned as considered unthinkable. Until about fifty ·years ago the question of the voluntarily childless marriage was a relatively simple one. The marital intention to exclude procreation was con­sidered equivalent to the intention to use contraception for the duration of the couple's life together, a fact which merited condemnation for its own sake, at least in the minds of some. If total abstinence was the chosen means the issue was entirely different and one spoke of a virginal marriage rather than one which was childless, thus avoiding the core of the matter. However, with the improvement of the· technique of periodic continence it became possible to exclude procreation without using 'artificial' contraception and the option of carrying on regular sexual relations in marriage without ever realizing the 'end' of procreation became a real one, even for Catholics.

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The evolution of the Church's teaching on periodic continence has raised some serious questions with respect to the meaning and status of procreation within the conjugal unit. Unfortunately, up until very recently the official teaching of the Church has offered little insight into the fundamental issues involved, preferring instead to deal with the question of factors which might mitigate the couple's 'duty to procreate'. The result has been not only an obvious begging of the question (whence the duty?) but an implicit contradiction between pastoral and juridical decisions. Let us begin with the fact of a definite intention to exclude procreation from a marital relationship. Is this morally justifiable? According to papal teaching, especially that of Pius XII in his famous 'Address to the Midwives' (29 Oct. 1951), the answer is yes. Expounding on what is an implicit doctrine of his predecessor, Pius XI in the encyclical Casti connubii ( 1930), Pius XII recognized that the presence of some 'serious indications' may lead to the decision of the couple not to procreate "even for a considerable period of time, even for the duration of the marriage". The nature of these indications were described as 'medical, eugenic, economic or social' and although they were originally conceived as reasons to acquit the duty to procreate, it is a small semantic bridge to think of these as indications for the avoidance of procreation: the justification of the contra-procreative intention. However, there is one rather large assumption behind this teaching which severely limits its applicability, namely that the couple taking this decision is already married. For according to Canon Law, or at least its interpretations, the express intention to exclude procreation from marriage, especially when this exclusion is made a condition of the marital agreement itself, is an invalidating factor (cf. CIC 1013 §1, 1086 §2, 1092 §2).1t is very simple to illustrate a case where these judgments are not in accord. Taking the eugenic indication as a justifiable reason for excluding procreation, advances in genetic screening have made it possible to diagnose potential parents of severely handicapped offspring. If this knowledge is available to a person, would it not be reasonable for them to make it a condition of any future marriage that procreation would have to be completely excluded? One would think that any person with whom they entered marriage would have to agree to this decision if marital harmony was ever hoped to be achieved. In the eyes of the law such a couple could not contract a valid marriage. If the knowledge of genetic defect only becomes known and the excluding decision taken after the marriage has taken place, the marriage is. valid; if the knowledge is had beforehand and the decision is taken before the marriage, that marriage is invalid. While this rather strict application of the law appears harsh, it puts the canonist in a very difficult position. A common answer given to this situation is that the person(s) involved should be assumed to be acting in good faith and left undisturbed. The reason given is that the eugenic indication is an involuntary factor, imposed upon the couple despite their good intentions, and certainly not equivalent to the anti-procreative attitude which the law means to signal as

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invalidating. But does not this solution cause more problems than it seems to answer? For one, it calls into question the ability to legislate in this, or any other, area of moral intention. But more important, it only recognizes the role of involuntary factors and leaves completely aside the question of the voluntary decision to remain childless. The reluctance to face this question squarely is understandable for its implications for the doctrine of the ends of marriage, even if only for canonical validity, are tremendous. We might phrase the question in the following way: In order to enter into a valid marriage, or to live in a state of moral goodness once a marriage has been entered into, is it really necessary that a couple have any desire, inclination or intention to procreate? Or, to draw the minimal bottom line, is it really necessary for a couple to 'remain open to procreation' as a possibility in order to legally and morally achieve the meaning of marriage? Before we attempt a moral evaluation of these issues, let us pause to reconsider the meaning of Pius XII' s 'serious indications'. We must admit that, as applied, these factors are broader than they first appear. While the medical and eugenic indications seem rather clear, the economic and social categories remain open to speculation that eventually leads beyond the narrow range of involuntary, imposed factors. Consider the following cases: - the couple who are psychologically unfit for parenthood, either medically

diagnosed and recommended or as a matter of personal conviction by the couple themselves without being simply rationalization

- the couple approaching marriage at a late age when childbearing may be ill advised or even dangerous, or simply a matter of choosing not to raise children when they are approaching retirement themselves

- the couple who are concerned about overpopulation or the pressures of overcrowding and who therefore decide not to have any children themselves; this case can be strengthened if the couple decided to use their marital community to the benefit of the already existing population by, for instance, adopting and raising 'unwanted children'

- the couple who are engaged in demanding and especially socially beneficial careers as in the marriage of two doctors; this case can naturally be widely interpreted and should include all forms of social work and missionary activity, perhaps even work in and for the Church may lead to the decision to forsake the possibility of procreation, especially when it involves hardship conditions

- the couple who are engaged in less directly beneficial activity in society, such as the creative arts, who find fulfillment in their mutual full-time dedication to their art form and perhaps even travel widely, making the creation of a 'home environment' very unlikely.

The point of this progressive consideration is that the further one moves away from concrete, circumstantial impositions, the harder it is to justify the exclusion of procreation as less than voluntary. We will eventually have to face the decision which does not state "if circumstances were only different ... "

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because the very circumstances themselves are a matter of free choice. In such a case, would it still be meaningful to appeal to the teaching about serious indications? The tendency to reply in the negative here should not be taken as an exclusion of the broad interpretation of Pius XII's four categories. Rather, it should be interpreted as a symptom of the inadequacy of the teaching itself, namely that the very concept of 'serious indications' is almost entirely juridical, is based upon the unproven assumption that procreation is a duty, and preconditions the question itself to be entirely negativistic. To illustrate, consider the example of the couple marrying late in life. Theoretically, a pre-menopausal woman is still capable of bearing children. While male fertility lasts for a longer period of time, the couple must also deal with the psychological and social problems of a 40 to 50 year age gap between themselves and their potential children. Even though it is possible to find medical contraindications for this couple to procreate, is it really necessary to frame their decision in such negative terms: avoid procreation in order to avoid a health hazard or a debilitation of educational possibilities? The former teaching would seem to assume this, but it appears no longer necessary. According to the teaching of Gaudium et spes, this entire question can be dealt with under the category of responsible parenthood. According to that doctrine, in deciding whether or not to procreate, a couple "will thoughtfully take into account both their own welfare and that·of their children ... they will reckon with both the material and spiritual conditions of the times as well as their state in life ... (and) consult the interests of the family group, of temporal society, and of the Church herself". (GS, 50) The Council teaching, which supersedes that of Pius XII, clearly takes a very different position with respect to the meaning of procreation within marriage. Having abandoned the categories of end or purpose, children are looked upon as "the ultimate crown" (GS, 48) and "the supreme gift of marriage" (GS, 50). This goes far beyond the notion that procreation itself is a mere duty and recasts the entire understanding in terms of values. Procreation is a value, albeit a value to be balanced with other values potentially to be realized with respect to the particular life of the individual couple. Exercising responsible parenthood demands that a couple recognize, acknowl­edge and deal with procreation as a value. Whether or not that value is chosen to be realized remains a matter of conscience and not a pre-condition for legal validity. The assumption here, of course, is that the concrete decision not to procreate (here and now or forever) does not constitute the same thing as "turning against procreation as a value (a good)". One may still valorize procreation, children, the family, etc. without necessarily participating in the personal realization of these values. One need not personally intend or even be desirous of procreation in order to enter into and meaningfully live out a genuine and valid christian marriage. This is obvious when we consider a relationship between partners which is biologically sterile. Furthermore, one must be aware of this understanding when hearing and interpreting the pre-marital or

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ceremonial inquiry as to whether a couple will "freely accept and care for any children with which God may wish to bless them". The meaning of this phrase must theologically be explained according to the doctrire of responsible parenthood: a married couple must (not) procreate responsibly, must accept their own situation and a possible pregnancy without disregard, and must act according to the givens of their own circumstances which may in fact demand the temporary or permanent avoidance of having children. It appears, therefore, at least from a doctrinal point of view, that the decision of the individual couple vis-a-vis procreation is a personal one to be made with respect to balancing the value of procreation with other values potentially realizable within the marital relationship. But this very perspective obviously creates some significant problems, not the least of which is the value of procreation itself in the context of the marital relationship. Therefore, one more digression appears necessary, namely the attitude one might have toward potentially realizable values, even and especially those which might be realizable only remotely. Considering the fact that a number of values may be remotely realizable within our lives, is it necessary to turn our attention toward their fulfillment, or from the more negative point of view, is the non-realization of every (remotely) potential value to be looked upon as a sacrifice? Now it may be true that in our daily lives we sacrifice all kinds of values which may be 'remotely realizable'. I might be able to make myself better informed or wellread, I might devote more time to my physical health by exercising, I might even be able to directly contribute more to the common good by becoming more involved in local politics. But often I neglect or even specifically choose not to do some of these things because I have chosen to do other things. In other words, all these values come into a constant interplay with other values and every person who is attempting to be morally responsible must weigh, balance and compare values according to his or her own set of priorities. The athlete will probably rank physical exercise over reading classical literature while the professor of literature will make the opposite choice. The question is, when I fail to realize a possible value do I always have to speak of sacrificing that value and thus imply a disvalue (e.g. deterioration of physical health or literary ignorance) which involves the presence of some kind of evil? The answer to this question is: not necessarily. Sacrificing a possibly realizable value absolutely, as in complete neglect of my physical health, would certainly constitute a disvalue and hence an evil. It would be wrong to do this unless one had a very serious reason. One thinks of TB patients in the past who were restricted from all physical activity or some unfortunate women who must spend the majority of a pregnancy in bed if they hope to carry to term. However, in the vast majority of cases where one's priorities dictate the choice of one value over another, the 'untaken choice' is not so much a sacrifice as the result of a prudent, proportionate decision. What is striking in this context is that most of us who are consciously aware of making these decisions or even simply making them' spontaneously' are simultaneously aware that we can never totally neglect

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the unrealized value. The professor usually knows that he should get at least some exercise and the athlete knows that illitaracy is not a human ideal. That is, the prudent person is always aware that life is a continuous process of balancing priorities and that the non-realization of a value here and now means neither that such a value ceases to call for attention nor that its neglect can go on indefinitely without good reason. Before applying these thoughts to the good of procreation, it is necessary to

make one more observation. Namely, it must be said that not all values are equal. Some values are more important than others, regardless of their relative position in an individual's -orcouple's- set of priorities. We are speaking here of 'institutional values', those goods which are enshrined in and protected by personal and communal structures because they make life in society possible in the first place. One such institutional value is honesty. Without honesty, the revelation of truth and sur pression of falsehood and misunderstanding, human social life would be impossible. Such values always enjoy the benefit of the doubt and their 'sacrifice' always needs a specific justification. That is, any sacrifice of an institutional value - honesty, family cohesion, political stability, the sacredness of life, etc.- always constitutes a disvalue and thus some form of evil in that it threatens man's necessarily social existence. Without a justification, the presence of a proportionate reason that matches the seriousness of what is being accomplished with the seriousness.ofwhat is being 'let go', the sacrifice of an institutional value represents a greater degree of harm than what might be said to characterize our daily, prudent decisions about doing this thing or the other. We cannot arbitrarily sacrifice any value, but institutional values enjoy a special place and their sacrifice demands a special kind of consideration. There is always need for the presence of a proportionate reason to justify their loss, and even when we have a 'serious reason', the sacrifice of an institutional value leaves behind a residue of knowing that there has been harm done. Using the example of honesty, we can sense our special affection for this value, precisely because it is institutional, when we find out that our political leaders may have deliberately mislead us. Even when there has been a proportionately justifying reason, such as national security or political stability, we still feel hurt in having been 'lied to' and the harm done to the institution of truth in human relationships is evident in a skepticism toward the credibility of those whom we have found to be (justifiably) less than honest. Finally, it is most clear how the sacrifice of an institutional value can be proportionately justified when that value comes into conflict with another institutional value. We think imme­diately not only of national security but patient-doctor and client-lawyer relationships: the institutional value of professional secrecy.

Now to return to our question about the sacrifice of the value of procreation. The preceding diversion may imply that we would want immediately to classify procreation as an institutional value, and certainly it is inherently connected with the institution (value) of marriage itself. But I would rather refer to it as a value with an 'institutional character', that is to say that

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procreation is not something that is necessary for social life but something which is necessary for the continuance of social life. As future oriented beings we should dearly see the institutional relevance of procreation, but being realistic we must experience a slight hesitation in assigning•it full institutional status. This is very dearly present in traditional thinking which made the (legal) distinction between the general and specific type of obligation. Whereas full institutional values are the object of specific obligation, everyone must strive toward honesty as much as (proportionately) possible, procreation is only generally imposed upon the human race and its degree of obligation is relative to its need to be realized. In the sparsely populated, primeval world, the obligation fell upon all heterosexual union to be productive ('increase and multiply'), but in an overpopulated situation it is inconsistent to speak of an 'obligation' to procreate. Nevertheless, procreation as a value does exhibit an institutional character. It has become part of our human social life and will continue to be so as long as mankind believes in a future. To say a bit more, it is further endowed with a speCial significance insofar as it 'normally' comes about through the regular exercise of adult, heterosexual union; something must usually be done to prevent its coming to fruition. The pertinent question is, need we lqok for, or even be concerned about, reasons to justify the sacrifice of this value? In order to contract a valid marriage, or to live in a state of moral goodness in marriage, is it necessary that a couple desire, intend, or simply 'remain open to' procreation? The answer to that question appears dear, at least to me. Neither the desire nor the intention to procreate appears to be a necessary condition for the establishment of a valid and morally good marital relationship, although serious attention to this potentiality is called for if one is to act responsibly. But the category of 'remaining open to' procreation constitutes a qualification. This is so precisely because this phrase signifies that, except in the case of sterility where consideration of procreation is not even pertinent, to dose oneself off from procreation one must take a positive decision and literally do something, even doing something like abstaining from sexual intercourse. In other words, one must actually exclude the good of procreation, one must sacrifice the value. We have observed that the sacrifice of any potential value constitutes a loss which cannot be allowed to prevail arbitrarily. There must always be an at least spontaneous reference to one's priorities. But we have observed further that the value of procreation exhibits an institutional character: its sacrifice has more than personal and individual relevance for it is a good in service to the whole human community. Therefore, it would appear reasonable to state that any decision and subsequent action aimed at eliminating the value of procreation, temporarily or permanently, from an otherwise potentially fertile marital relationship demands the existence of a proportionate, justifying reason. What is more important is that we understand the existence of this proportionate reason to be continuous, i.e., coextensive with the period of time

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during which the value is being sacrificed. Without the proportionate reason, the sacrifice of the value becomes a negation, and the morally right decision becomes a morally wrong one. Now we must deal with the contemporary question of the status of the value of procreation in itself, or more precisely, the value of procreation with respect to and in relation with other values which play an important role in the determination of marital priorities. A rather clear, but not always obvious reason why the value of procreation has lately been called into question by many contemporary married couples is because of the changing structures of marriage and the family themselves. We must consult the givens of contemporary marriage. The first thing to be considered is that there has been a restructuring of priorities within marriage such that having children is not always the first - primary - end which is sought. This phenomenon is both positive and negative in nature and deserves our conscious attention. The positive aspects of restructuring the (mostly young) married couple's priorities are twofold. First, in accordance with the recognition that the ends of marriage should no longer be spoken of as primary and secondary, we have witnessed a healthy and theologically sound valuation of the conjugal relationship itself. Most marriage counselors, I believe, would recommend that a couple just married should get to know each other before they take the decision to have children. This has many benefits ranging from a deepening of the relationship itself and the creation of a healthy climate into which children are introduced (or the recognition that the proper climate is not being- or cannot be- achieved and perhaps the marriage itself was a mistake) to the long range preparation of the whole marital life, building a relation which will not have to suffer so severely when children are no longer present- the couple who learn on the departure of their last child that, at the age of 45 or 55, they are living with a virtual stranger. The second positive aspect is a serious consideration of one of the meanings of marriage being the procreation and education of children. In a world more demanding and challenging for both parents and children, it is more than an advantage to do whatever is possible to provide a full education for children- it is a moral responsibility. Of course, by education one does not mean merely schooling, although in our complex culture this is certainly part of it. Rather, in contrast to a time not so long ago, children are remaining as wards of their parents for longer periods of time. Fewer and fewer children have left home and become self-supporting before they end their teenage years these days than ever before. This implies that the home and resources to be made available for raising children should be adequately provided for. At the same time, we must realize that we live in an age when financial and career security are becoming harder to achieve and, as a practical thought, that there are those not fortunate enough to live in a system of social welfare who face a real financial burden because of the cost of the medical care necessary for having children (from prenatal care through adulthood).

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This having been said about the positive aspects of restructuring priorities and allowing that procreation alone is not a primary value in marriage, there is obviously still a danger. Namely, how far is one to go in demoting the value of procreation before it becomes a non-entity? Practically, where is the line to be drawn between pursuing a conjugal relationship and providing for family resources and the constant putting off of having a family at all? Is there not a difference between postponing a family until the couple has completed their career preparation (e.g. completing a college education or vocational training) and postponement until the second car has been paid for or the land for the vacation home has been purchased? At what point along the line do we simply loose a value by arbitrarily putting off its realization, or do we have any right at all to insist that some values need to be realized? Secondly, the contemporary, realistic expectations of marriage usually include the idea of a relatively small family, perhaps two to four children. In contrast to a time when the norm was a much larger.number of children, it is evident that the segment of one's life which will constitute childbearing years will be much shorter, perhaps five to ten years as opposed to twenty or so. Thus it makes more logical sense for the couple to assign a place for those childbearing years within the scope of their entire life together. Rather than begin procreating within a year or two after marriage, they may decide that they will begin their family at a certain age, say at 25 or 30. Again, the sacrifice of the value of procreation in the very early years of marriage can be understood as proportionate to the other values realized; creating a family environment; broadening the couple's own experience and education; accomplishing goals which might be very difficult with the presence of children, especially today the further education and career training of women (the wife) who have a right to establish themselves in society on the best possible terms. A third given of contemporary marriage is the growing recognition that not all persons are equally fit to·be parents. There is some truth in the sarcasm that one must pass a test before they receive a license to drive a car but no competency tests are necessary to get a marriage license and one doesn't even need a license to become a parent. We hope that we will never experience the science-fiction civilization where procreation demands outright permission from the state, but it appears that the best way that will be prevented is if a greater portion of persons begin acting responsibly. The cold, hard fact is that if someone simply does not like children, hates to be around them, or worse even feels no compunction against beating them or treating them cruely, it is inadequate to say that such a person should examine their personality or motives. It is necessary to say that this personality type should not take on the role of a parent. However, what we mean to signal here is not such a drastic situation of literally being against children but the conviction that one, or a couple, genuinely feels that they have neither the patience nor simply the interest that it takes to raise a family. In their own mind they may not feel that they are sacrificing the value of procreation, but it is in precisely this type of

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situation that it is really meaningful to speak of the sacrifice, here literally 'letting-go' of that value.

Now if we take all these givens seriously, we can easily see how procreation as a value is related to other values in contemporary married life. A broad category of reasons for merely postponing the advent of a family can be understood as truly proportionate, especially when cast in this light of being a value choice, the question of priorities. Voluntary childlessness, therefore, in terms of the postponement of procreation, presents little problem other than determining whether one's (the couple's) reasons are proportionate. Nevertheless, to this must be added the demand that the couple's motives and consequent structuring of priorities must be continuously reevaluated. What may be a proportionate reason at one time, such as postponing a family until the couple can afford to have children and have a minimal expectation of being able to care for and educate them adequately, may cease to be truly proportionate at some later time. Unlike positive decisions to achieve a given value, the decision to sacrifice a value temporarily must be based upon an openness to reconsider what has been sacrificed. Perhaps this is the most meaningful way of expressing the concept of being 'open to procreation'. Unlike the relatively simple understanding of the exercise of responsible parenthood described above, the decision to voluntarily exclude procreation from the whole of a potentially fertile marital relationship is a much more radical situation calling for careful thought. We will divide its treatment into two categories: the pre-marital and post-marital decision. The first category, the pre-marital decision to remain childless is the type of problematic set forth in the beginning of this essay. From a moral point of view our concerns are very similar to those offered with respect to the temporary decision, namely, are the reasons present for the value sacrifice truly proportionate ones? The only difference here is that the permanent sacrifice, which amounts to a complete exclusion, demands some very serious reasons because of the institutional character of the value of procreation in its service to the common good. It is not hard to envision such circumstances if we correctly interpret the former categories of 'serious indications'. Whatever can justifiably lead to the marital decision to permanently forego raising a family can and should apply to the pre-marital agreement between man and woman. The only stipulations appear to be that the reasons are truly proportionate (including those not imposed such as the social factors and the reasons based upon choice), that they are understood and agreed upon by both parties (otherwise one would be speaking of fraud or coercion), and that they remain open to reevaluation if and when that becomes possible. With respect to the juridical problem of establishing the validity of such a marriage, I see no reason to deny such a possibility and feel that such a situation should be better envisioned in Canon Law itself. It is largely irrelevant whether a couple reach this decision pre- or post-maritally, it is only important whether the decision reached can be morally justified because of the (moral) necessity to

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account for the voluntary sacrifice of (any, but especially institutional) values. This does not infer that I consider the law itself to be in error. On the contrary, my understanding of the meaning of this juridical stipulation is that an unproportionate, groundless decision to exclude procreation from marriage would necessarily call into question the very ability of such a couple to reach the marital decision itself. In other words, I believe that we should question the moral maturity of one (or a couple) who would permanently exclude procreation from their marriage for no good (proportionate) reason, or worse, without any reflection at all on what is at stake here. If this is what is meant to be signaled by the law in this case, this moralist would have to agree. The second category or post-marital decision to remain permanently childless presents problems for the moralist and the canonist which are much more subtle. There are two types of cases I would like to deal with here, those decisions which are mutual and those which are unilateral. The first, mutual, decision to permanently avoid o"r exclude procreation presents little difficulty so long as the reasons upon which it is based are continuously proportionate. But what if there are no proportionate reasons? Suppose the creation of a family has been permanently excluded for shallow or, what are lately termed egoistic, reasons? Perhaps there are no reasons at all and it is simply a matter of the value of procreation slipping gradually out of sight through non­advertance. For such a situation we might feel regret and even to be tempted to rectify the attitudes of those in question by reawakening an appreciation for the value(s) involved. But how is this to be done? At first sight, one might feel the temptation to say that a couple who see no value in procreation at all should refrain from having children. All things considered, not the least of which is the plight of the unwanted child, this appears the most pragmatic. But is this not going only half-way and reducing our call to moral striving to the acceptance of lesser evils? An alternative approach would seem to call for more than moralistic name-calling (such persons are 'selfish') or naive law-giving (forbidding the surest means to avoid conception) which is ·not only pointless but usually counterproductive (consider the number of abortions). The alternative could be a concentrated effort to give procreation- the family- a central, structural place in the life of the community. This, of course, cannot be done until the accessory issues of family life are taken on as well: the role of women in the family, society, and the Church herself; the symbolic institutionalization of non-procreative classes signified by disciplinary celibacy; and the role of the family in community liturgical practices which sometimes remove children for the sake of convenience. The other type of post-marital decision to remain permanently childless which merits more attention than it has received is the unilateral imposition, when one spouse imposes their (unproportionate) decision upon the other and makes the creation of a family impossible for no good reason. The position of Canon Law on this issue is less than satisfying. One may only raise the question

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of marital validity vis-a-vis procreation when the intention to exclude children was a permanent, pre-marital, expressed condition of the marriage itself. It that condition was vague, or not expressed, the felt need to 'protect the bond' makes the question impossible. However, especially in light of what were considered the givens of contemporary marriage, would it not make more sense to realize that a clear picture of procreative intention is extremely difficult to discern in the period before marriage? From a moral point of view we should question the meaningfulness of a relationship in which a couple is unable to come to an agreement over such a fundamental issue as whether to create a family. When one partner refuses, with no ostensibly proportionate reason, to consider raising a family, especially when that refusal has been made irrevocable as when one partner undergoes a sterilization procedure without the consent of their spouse, it would seem pertinent to question whether a true marriage exists. The distinctions between the moral and juridical decisions with respect to the marital relationship to which attention has been called in this essay underscore the difficulty of dealing with the reality of the decision to marry from only one point of view. Obviously one's attitude toward procreation plays a major role in that decision, but the nature of that attitude often cannot be understood for some time. To go a step further, it is inadequate to consider the attitude toward procreation simply as a 'yes or no' decision, as if one's (a couple's) 'openness to procreation' could be judged by whether or not they actually have children or attempt to hinder that possibility. Within the lived situation of the marital relationship this question is too infrequently raised at the most appropriate time. In fact, it is probably not relevant until either a specific, mutual decision is taken (not) to raise a family or the couple has knowingly decided whether or not ever to engage in non-fertility-controlled marital coitus, a point which, in view of the givens of contemporary marriage in Western (industrially) developed culture, usually does not occur until some time after the partners have been living together as a couple. When that decision is reached, whether in the affirmative or negative, it may be meaningful to ask whether a couple has truly entered into a marital covenant, has adequately dealt with the problematic of being 'open to procreation', or, to put it in more meaningful terms, is exercising responsible parenthood. The actual, material content of that decision, whether a couple (proportionately, justifiably) decide to raise a family or (proportionately, justifi"!b!y) decide to remain childless, is largely irrelevant. · Finally, we wish to signal an often neglected aspect and logical consequence of applying the doctrine of responsible parenthood. In elaborating that doctrine two seemingly incompatible but absolutely inseparable things need to be said. First, the doctrine of responsible parenthood rests upon the affirmation and. the insistance of recognizing procreation as a good and a value. That means, positively, that whenever procreation is an at least remote possibility it must be dealt with seriously and that any decision to render it impossible constitutes

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the sacrifice of a value and demands the presence of a proportionate reason. It is precisely in this call for a non-rationalized judgment, specifically made and continuously reevaluated, that the value of procreation will not so much be reinstated as reaffirmed in its importance. If in fact a couple lacks a sense of proportion, this can be taught by showing how various values may be compared and dealt with. It is not overcome by absolutizing only one value -procreation - to the detriment of other values, such as the good of the marital relationship, commu11ity service, greater education or the recognition of woman as an equal partner in marriage and an equal person in society. Practically, this call for judging the proportionality of reasons for sacrificing procreation which is held to be a value may put some couples in a difficult, and morally fruitful, position. To be honest, they will have to deal personally with their own situation and might possibly have to face up to an embarassing self-exposure of their own priorities. If we consider the case of the couple who simply felt children to be a burden or interference in their life, all we would ask is that this couple examine their motives and face up to the facts of their own priorities. If they consider themselves to be unfit for parenthood, say because they lack patience or dedication, rather than condemn such a self-judgment we may be able to (generally, impersonally) support that argument and allow the couple to face their conscience and live with the facts of the situation, determining themselves whether they find it a satisfactory one. Nevertheless, the entire impact of phrasing the question of voluntary childlessness in this way depends upon the ability of making the second statement with respect to responsible parenthood. Namely, that when there is a proportionate reason for sacrificing the value of procreation, it becomes a moral responsibility to do so. The strength of the moral obligation to avoid procreation is precisely proportionate to the existing reasons. Thus, a temporary postponement in raising a family for reasons of completing one's career preparation may call for a moderate effort in holding off procreation, the failure of which may be inconvenient but not disastrous. The presence of serious reasons, such as a severe financial burden, even substantial deprivation, for an alrea<;ly existing family may call for a more serious obligation and much more reassurance that procreation will not take place. The extreme indications that any procreation whatsoever should be avoided, such as for reasons of health, should be accompanied by a severe obligation to act in a morally responsible way. Unfortunately, the present position of the Church with respect to methods of birth control has made it impossible for her to take this stand clearly, forcefully, and consistently. The irony is that, according to the line of reasoning offefed here, the ability to think clearly about controlling conception, and even recommending in certain cases that the value of procreation be permanently sacrificed, along with realistic means for accom­plishing this if the credibility of a serious obligation is to be maintained, is a precondition for an intelligible approach to reaffirming the value of procreation in the first place.

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By way of conclusion, we hope that it is evident to the reader that the opinions offered here are theologically compatible with the traditional doctrine of the ends of marriage. It must be recognized that that doctrine in no way insists upon the concrete realization of all the possible ends, especially that of procreation. Actually having children is not a precondition for the establish­ment of a valid marriage, while being 'open to procreation' does seem to play an important part in defining a valid marital intention. The point is that this openness is not always identical with the specific decision whether or not to procreate. For this reason, it appears linguistically and logically more agreeable to substitute the term 'responsible parenthood' for 'openness to procreation'. For not only is this notion more compatible with understanding the meaning of marital decisions, but it avoids the almost inevitable connection which is made between 'openness' and the mere integrity of sexual intercourse. As Pius XII realized, that openness is motivational and not biological, an insight which has become submerged in the controversy over contraception. The voluntarily childless marriage is de facto no more valid or invalid than a marriage in which the value of procreation has been realized. However, because of the institutional character of the value of procreation, the former possibility appears to ask for some process of justification and moral evaluation. This should not be taken to mean that the decision of a couple to produce a family should be evaluated any less seriously. Responsible parent­hood demands that any decision made with respect to procreation - and therefore any decision to engage in sexual intercourse in which procreation is even remotely possible- be the result of serious reflection and a proportionate consideration of all the factors involved. However, the specific decision to avoid or exclude procreation carries with it a certain burden of proof that this decision is a morally right one. This conclusion certainly does not mean to imply that the voluntary choice to remain childless in marriage is presumed wrong until proven right. On the contrary, christian charity demands that we give the benefit of the doubt to the moral agent as acting in good faith. Witness, for example, the attitude of Canon Law with respect to presuming good faith in the initiation of the marriage contract itself. Rather, it seeks to state for this non-procreative decision an aspect which has virtually been lost in its opposite, namely that the decision tO procreate is presumed right until proven wrong. While that attitude may have substance on the level of general statements - procreation represents the achievement. of a good - it is presumptuous to apply it carte blanche to every individual instance of a married couple having children. No such judgment can be made without consulting the motives and circumstances of the individual marital decision. Thus, to underline the fact that there is at least a moral question involved in the issue we have discussed, we prefer to speak of the childless marriage rather than the 'child-free' marriage. The latter gives the impression of dealing with a

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value-free decision, while the former connotes that there is an unrealized value at stake here. If indeed the value of procreation is unrealizable, the only further discussion might entail whether and how this situation could be alleviated (e.g. artificial insemination). But if procreation is an at least remote possibility, and steps are taken to insure, temporarily or permanently, that it will not be realized, we should be aware that a potential value is at stake and that one's attitude toward that value is important not merely in terms of this concrete d~cision but for the meaning of one's entire moral orientation. Furthermore, when dealing with the temporary avoidance (e.g. postponement) of procrea­tion, one should realize that the evaluative process is also temporary, that it should remain open to review and not be allowed to become permanent simply through default. A final word on the consideration of some kind of (non-moral) evil being present in the decision for a voluntarily childless marriage, an evil springing from the concrete intention to sacrifice a possible value, seems in order. To reiterate, such a decision taken by virtue of the existence of a proportionate reason, the presence of other potential values considered more pressing or urgent in one's priorities or the presence of potential disvalues outweighing the good accomplished, can be a morally right and good one. The attendant presence of some kind of evil here in no way affects the morality of one's decision, nor is this evil connected with a method chosen to avoid the procreation although some forms of birth control do have consequentially 'evil' effects such as injuring one's health or possibly threatening the marital relationship (e.g. by prolonged abstinence). The purpose for which this consideration of 'evil' should be added is to heighten our moral sensitivity to the fact that a value once (justifiably) sacrificed should not be rejected as not demanding our attention. To exercise responsible parenthood, or to put it into the less advantageous way of being 'open to procreation', involves the consideration and affirmation of all the values connected with that project, not their necessary realization. The voluntarily childless marriage can be a concrete realization of the exercise of responsible parenthood. Nevertheless, this mode of realization is - proportionately - more difficult to comprehend than the case in which a really potential value has not been sacrificed.

Summary

As the phenomenon of the voluntarily childless marriage becomes more common and socially accepted, its moral-theological assessment becomes more crucial if the Church hopes to provide guidance and guidelines fer dealing with this cultural reality. On the one hand, the childless marriage itself has traditionally been upheld as a valid and meaningful conjugal relationship, while on the other, the iegal status (validity) of the voluntary pre-marital decision to remain childless can no longer be regarded as applicable in all cases. In response to this somewhat ambiguous situation the present article attempts to form a moral evaluation of voluntary childlessness on the basis of a personalist ethic grounded on Vatican II's teaching on responsible

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parenthood. This assessment is confronted with the current pastoral and catechetical problem of simultaneously affirming the value of procreation and sanctioning some temporary and even permanent decisions to avoid having children as morally justifiable. The central moral argument is that procreation, as a value with an institutional character (aimed at the common good), is a good which can sometimes be sacrificed because of the presence of a proportionate reason: the presence of other (conflicting) values or the threat of disvalues connected with procreation itself. When a proportionate reason is present, the avoidance of procreation may be not only a right decision but a moral obligation, even though that sacrifice of a good entails the occurrence of some non-moral evil. Without the continuing presence of a reason which is objectively proportionate, the decision to sacrifice the value of procreation cannot be assumed to be morally right. In the sphere of pastoral application, it is observed that the only credible means for protecting and re-affirming the value of procreation itself depends upon a willingness to allow for the avoidance of procreation, to comprehend that sacrifice as sometimes morally obligatory, and to accept efficient methods of regulating conception as morally justifiable.

Joseph A. Selling, born in 1945, prof. Kath. Univ. Leuven, moraltheology; public.: The Reaction to 'Humanae vitae', a study in Special and Fundamental Theology, Louvain 1977, Ann Arbor Univ., Microfilms 1980. Address: Koning Albertlaan 154, B-3200 Kessel-la, Belgie.