Issue 1 413 7 April 20 - U.S. Department of Defense

Issue 1413 17 April 2020

// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1413 //

| airuniversity.af.edu/CSDS // 2

FeatureReport

“RenewedGreatPowerCompetition:ImplicationsforDefense—IssuesforCongress”.PublishedbyCongressionalResearchService;UpdatedApril7,2020https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838

Manyobservershaveconcludedthatthepost-ColdWareraofinternationalrelations—whichbeganintheearly1990sandissometimesreferredtoastheunipolarmoment(withtheUnitedStatesastheunipolarpower)—begantofadein2006-2008,andthatby2014,theinternationalenvironmenthadshiftedtoafundamentallydifferentsituationofrenewedgreatpowercompetitionwithChinaandRussiaandchallengesbythesetwocountriesandotherstoelementsoftheU.S.-ledinternationalorderthathasoperatedsinceWorldWarII.

TheshifttorenewedgreatpowercompetitionwasacknowledgedalongsideotherconsiderationsintheObamaAdministration’sJune2015NationalMilitaryStrategy,andwasplacedatthecenteroftheTrumpAdministration’sDecember2017NationalSecurityStrategy(NSS)andJanuary2018NationalDefenseStrategy(NDS).TheDecember2017NSSandJanuary2018NDSformallyreorientedU.S.nationalsecuritystrategyandU.S.defensestrategytowardanexplicitprimaryfocusongreatpowercompetitionwithChinaandRussia.DepartmentofDefense(DOD)officialshavesubsequentlyidentifiedcounteringChina’smilitarycapabilitiesasDOD’stoppriority.

TheshifttorenewedgreatpowercompetitionhasprofoundlychangedtheconversationaboutU.S.defenseissues.

Issue No. 1320


twitter.com/USAF_CSDS | airuniversity.af.edu/CSDS // 3

22 June 2018 twitter.com/USAF _CSDS

TABLEOFCONTENTSNUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE • AirForceWantstoAddMoreLong-RangeBomberstoitsInventory(NationalDefense)TheAirForcehasbeenlookingtoimproveitsfleetbypurchasingtheupcomingB-21RaiderandmodernizingtheBoeingB-52Stratofortress.

• GoldfeinonHowUSAFIsGeneratingAirpowerinthe‘NewAbnormal’(AirForceMagazine)Thosecriticalmissionsincludenucleardeterrenceandrelatedsupport.

• ThornberryWants$6billionThisYeartoLaunchCounter-ChinaFund(DefenseNews)Rep.MacThornberry,R-Texas,iscallingforthecreationofanIndo-PacificDeterrenceInitiative(IPDI),witha$6.09billioninvestinfiscalyear2021.

• PersistentRegionalDronesCouldDeterChina,Russia:CSBA(BreakingDefense)Implementinganewstrategy,whichCSBAcalls“deterrencebydetection,”wouldcostabout$1.4billionannually,thestudysays.

US COUNTER-WMD • ATAKintheField:ForgingaTacticalEdge(DVIDS/DTRA)WarfighterscannowuseATAKtoguidethemselvestosafetywhenconfrontedwithareleaseofchemicalandbiologicalagentsandradiologicalandnuclearthreats(CBRN).

• PatriotMissileDefenseSystemsNowActiveinIraq,SayUSOfficials(AP)ThemilitaryhasbeengraduallymovingthedefensivesystemsintoIraqoverthelastfewmonthstoprovidemoreprotectionfortroopsthathaveseenaseriesofrocketandmissileattacks.

• Hypersonics:5MoreArmy-NavyFlightTestsBy2023(BreakingDefense)Alltheglidebodiestestedsofarhavebeenbuilt,oneatatime,attheEnergyDepartment’sSandiaNationalLaboratories,whichinventedthedesign.

US ARMS CONTROL • AmericansSeeSpreadofDiseaseasTopInternationalThreat,AlongWithTerrorism,NuclearWeapons,Cyberattacks(PewResearch)Atleastseven-in-tenAmericansalsonameterrorism,thespreadofnuclearweaponsandcyberattacksfromothercountriesasmajorthreatstotheU.S.

• HowLasersCanHelpwithNuclearNonproliferationMonitoring(PacificNorthwestNationalLaboratory)Thenatureofnuclearchemistry—particularlyoxidation,thewayuraniuminteractswithoxygenduringanuclearexplosion—islargelyunknown,leavinggapsinourabilitytoaccuratelyidentifynuclearactivities.

• TrumpNamesArmsControlEnvoyasTreaty'sExpirationLooms(TheHill)TheappointmentcomesastheUnitedStates’sagreementwithRussia,knownastheNewSTARTTreaty,expiresinlessthanayear.



COMMENTARY • TowardaNewTheoryofPowerProjection(WarontheRocks)“TheU.S.efforttosupportthedeterrenceofamajorwarhasplayedanimportantroleinsustainingpeacesince1945andcancontinuetodoso—butitistimeforamajorshiftinhowtheUnitedStatesplanstofulfillthiscriticalmilitarymission.”

• Norway’sAlliesShareTheirViewsontheCountry’sNewDefensePlan(DefenseNews)“ThecollapseoftheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForcesTreatyin2019bringsanincreasedthreatfrommedium-rangeballisticmissiles,requiringNorwegianandallieddefenseplannerstoadjusttonewthreatstothehomelandandregion.”

• ExpectaSurgeinNorthKoreanMissileTests,andofGreaterRange(DefenseNews)“ThereiszeroreasonweshouldassumeNorthKoreahaslimiteditsresearchanddevelopmentactivitiestoitsshort-rangesystems.”

NUCLEARWEAPONSNational Defense (Arlington, Va.)

AirForceWantstoAddMoreLong-RangeBomberstoitsInventory

ByConnieLee

April9,2020

TheAirForcewants“justnorth”of220long-rangebombersinitsinventoryby2040,aserviceofficialsaidApril9.

Previously,theservicesaiditwanted175aircraftinthecurrentfleet,but“thatwasaprogrammaticallyderivedapproach,”Gen.TimothyRay,headofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand,toldreportersduringacallwithreporters.

“Therearemultiplewaystogettothatparticularpath,”hesaid."Forwhereweare,wethinkthelonger-rangecapabilitieswithlonger-rangecruisemissilesiswherewewanttogo."

TheAirForcehasbeenlookingtoimproveitsfleetbypurchasingtheupcomingB-21RaiderandmodernizingtheBoeingB-52Stratofortress.

Toreach220,theservicewillcontinuefocusingonaddingcapacitytotheB-52andsustainingtheB-1Lancer.However,theAirForceisstillexamininghowmanyB-21sandB-52swillmakeupthefinalnumber,henoted.OfficialshavesaidoverthecourseofthedevelopmentprogramthattheAirForceintendstobuild100B-21s.



“Ihavetosettheconditionsoverthenextcoupleofyearsandevenmyreplacementwillhavetoworkthrough…theconsiderablechoretosetthoseconditions,”hesaid.“Ibelievewe’reprobablyfourorfive[years]awayfrombeingabletopopwhatthatplanwilllooklikespecifically.”

TheB-1bombermayalsobeusedtoadvancetheservice’shypersonicweaponsefforts,henoted.

RaytoldAirForceMagazinethismonththatofficialsmayusetheplatformtocarrythefutureAirlaunchedRapidResponseWeapon.Earlierthisyear,theservicechosetomoveforwardwithARRWinsteadofthehypersonicconventionalstrikeweapon.

“Iseethereanopportunitytotakeonthathypersonicmissionfasterforusinsidethebomberfleet,”hesaid.

Meanwhile,theschedulefortheB-21Raiderisstillupintheair.RandallWalden,directorandprogramexecutiveofficerfortheAirForce’sRapidCapabilitiesOffice,saidlastyeartheserviceisnotlikelytoachieveitsoriginalgoalofreachingfirstflightin2021.RaydeclinedtocommentonwhetherornotCOVID-19challengescouldbringschedulechangesanddelays.

“AnythingItellyoutodaymaynotbeavalidpointtwoweeksfromnow,”hesaid.“We’regoingtogothrougharguablythetoughestseveralweeksinournation’shistorysincethesecondWorldWar.""We’reflyingalittleless,butwe’reflyingwhatweneed,”headded.

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/4/9/air-force-increases-need-for-morelongrange-bombers

Returntotop Air Force Magazine (Arlington, Va.)

GoldfeinonHowUSAFIsGeneratingAirpowerinthe‘NewAbnormal’

ByBrianW.Everstine

April15,2020

TheimpactofthenewcoronavirusoutbreakhasbeenmixedforUSAFflyingunits,withmanyclosetothefightmaintainingahighoperationstempo,whiletrainingathometakesamajorhitthatcouldhavelastingimpactstoreadiness.However,theservicehasfacedsimilarcutbacksbeforeandwillbepreparedtobounceback,ChiefofStaffGen.DavidGoldfeintoldAirForceMagazineinanApril15interview.

ThespreadofCOVID-19forcedaresetacrosstheAirForce,beginningwithareportfromallmajorcommandstoserviceleadershiponwhattasksaremissionessentialandothersthatcanbecurtailed.

“Thefirstthingwedidwasweidentifiedthekeymissionsthatweknowwewillgetnoreliefon,norshouldweexpect reliefwhen it comes todefending thehomelandanddoing thoseother criticalmissions,”Goldfeinsaid.

Thosecriticalmissionsinclude:

• Nucleardeterrenceandrelatedsupport

• Ongoingcombatoperations,includingsustainedintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance

• Continuedcyberoperations



• StandinguptheSpaceForce“Soweidentifiedthemissionsthatweknowwehavetocontinueandthentheaskwas:OK,howdoyoubuildthebreadthanddepthtobeabletosustainoperationsevenifthere’sanoutbreak?”hesaid.“We’veadjustedoperationsinthenuclearmissilefields,we’veadjustedoperationsinourcommandandcontrolheadquarters,we’vemadeadjustmentsinhowwemaintainspaceoperations.…We’reoperatinginwhatwecallthenewabnormal,operatingwiththevirus.”

Fornuclearoperations,missileershavedramaticallychangedtheiralertprocedures.Typically,anuclearcrewwouldgoonabouteightalertspermonthforabouttwotothreedayseachtime.Butthattimelinehasbeenincreasedsomissileersarenowinthefieldfor14daysormore.

“We’recontinuingtoadjustouroperations,sothatwe’readheringto[CentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention]protocolsatthesametime,”hesaid.“Andoperationscontinueunabated.”

Airmobilityisanothermissionthatmustcontinue,withanoperationspacethathasincreasedamidthecoronavirusoutbreak.Crewsflyingthesemissionsessentiallyremainina“bubble,”flyingamissioninacleancockpit,movingtotheirroomswithnocontactwithothers,andthenreturningtotheplane.

“Soglobalmobilitycontinuesunabated,”hesaid.“AndIexpect,actually,thedemandsignalforglobalmobilitytogoupintheweeksahead.Itwillnotgodown.”

Thepaceofflightsishighatforwardlocations,suchasBagramAirfield,whereAirmencontinuetosupportthecombatmissionthereinAfghanistan,oratKunsanAirBase,SouthKorea,where“fighttonight”forcescannothavedegradation.However,otherbasesandcommandsthatdon’thaveasmuchofanurgentoperationalneed,likeAirEducationandTrainingCommand,haveseentheirflyinghourscutbackbyapproximatelyhalf.

Theservicealsoiscloselywatchingtheimpactoftheoutbreakonitsdepots.

“Ourcivilianworkforceinthedepotsarejustmagicians,”Goldfeinsaid.“Theykeep58-year-oldairplanesflying.Imean,it’sjustmagicwhattheydo,buttheyalsotendtobeanolderpopulation,sothereforeatgreaterrisk.”

AirForceMaterielCommandisadjustingdepotoperationstolimitthepotentialfutureimpactonaircraftavailabilityandthestatusofaircraftmodification,whichinturnhasfutureimpactsontheflyinghourprogram,Goldfeinsaid.

Onasmallerscale,theservicehasseensimilarissuesbefore.Forexample,maintenance-relatedstanddownswiththeB-1Bfleetinrecentyearsimpactedtheservice’sabilitytokeeppilotscurrentandmaintainoverallreadiness.

“Thoughwe’venotbeen throughaglobalpandemicbefore,wehavebeen through timeswherewe’vehadtogroundfleetsforsomeperiodoftimebecauseofamaintenanceaction,andthenhavetoreconstitutethatfleet,”hesaid.“Andso,weactuallyhavesomegoodtemplatesandweknowhowtodothis.”

Theservicealsosawmajorimpactstoitsflyingoperationswhensequestrationwasimplementedin2013.Thosebroad,across-the-boardcutsarestillhavingimpactsonUSAFreadinesstoday,Goldfeinsaid.However,therecoveryhasproducedsomelessonslearned“intermsofhowweeventuallygotbackuponthestep,”headded.

“ButIwouldsaythattherearemorecurrentexamples…ofmaintenancegroundingsandwhathaveyouthatwe’vebeenthrough,wherewe’vehadtoreconstituteandrebuildreadiness,andso thatmusclememoryisnottoofarback,”Goldfeinsaid.



TheAirForceonApril13madeamajorpublicshowofitsreadinessinthePacific.FourB-52s,alongwithKC-135s,anRQ-4GlobalHawk,andU.S.Navyaircraftconductedan“elephantwalk”atAndersenAirForceBase,Guam,toshowUSAFcanlaunchtheheavybombersandsupportaircraftonshortnotice.StepslikethisareimportantforAmericans,andtheworld,“toknowthatitsAirForceisupandoperating,andthiswouldbeadangeroustimetoevenconsidertakinguson,”Goldfeinsaid.“Wecangenerateairplanes.Wecangenerateairpower.Wecangeneratespacepower.”

TheexercisegaveAirmenachancetoworkinahigh-pressuresituationamidthepandemic.DespitesocialdistancingrulesandCDCguidelines,airtrafficcontrollers,pilots,maintainers,weaponsloaders,etc.,hadtogetthoseairplanesready.

“There’s1,000fingerprintsonanaircraftthatgetsairborne,andsoeveryoneofthoseoperationshasgottobemodifiedandadjusted,”Goldfeinsaid.“Andso,welearn,andwedoanelephantwalk.HowdoyoudoairtrafficcontrolinaCOVIDenvironment?HowdoyoubuildweaponsinaCOVIDenvironment?Howdoyourefuelaircraft,andoperateafueltruck?Theseareallthingsthatwe’remodifyingrealtime,andsoit’sagreatexercisetoensurethatwecancontinuetoproduceairpowerdespitetheCOVIDchallenges.”

https://www.airforcemag.com/goldfein-talks-about-how-usaf-is-generating-airpower-in-the-newabnormal/

Returntotop Defense News (Washington, D.C.)

ThornberryWants$6billionThisYeartoLaunchCounter-ChinaFund

ByAaronMehta

April15,2020

WASHINGTON— The top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee will release aproposalThursdaytoformallycreateanewfundtocounterChineseactionsinthePacific,DefenseNewshaslearned.

Rep.MacThornberry,R-Texas,iscallingforthecreationofanIndo-PacificDeterrenceInitiative(IPDI),witha$6.09billioninvestinfiscalyear2021.ThefundwouldbebasedontheEuropeanDeterrenceInitiative,aspecialDoDfundforprojectsfocusedondeterringRussiathatwassetupinthewakeoftheannexationofCrimea.

“TheIndo-PacifichasbeencalledourhighestprioritytheaterandIbelievethatistrue.Itistimetoputourmoneywhereourmouthis,"ThornberrytoldDefenseNews."Thiseffortconsolidatesandfundsthepolicies,infrastructure,andplatformsneededtoreassureouralliesandpartnerswhilewedeterChina.Italsoservesasabenchmarkagainstwhichwecanjudgeoureffortsintheregion.Wemaynotbeabletogetthisalldonethisyear,butitisvitalthatwemakeastart.”

Forseveralyears,membersofCongresshavequestionedifsomeformofEDIisneededinthepacific.ActionwastakenintheFY2020NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,withlanguageinSection1253requiringINDOPACOMtodeliverbymid-MarchofthisyearareportdetailingwhatthecombatantcommandneedstofulfilltheNationalDefenseStrategyandmaintainanedgeoverChina.ThehopeamongsupporterswasthatthelistwouldprovidethecoreofaPDIrequirement.

AsDefenseNewsreportedApril2,INDOPACOMheadAdm.PhilDavidsoncamebacktotheHillwitha$20billionwishlistcoveringFY21-FY26,with$1.6billionrequestedspecificallyforFY21.



Thornberry’srequestforFY21isobviouslysignificantlyhigherthanDavidson’saskforthesamefiscalyear,butaCongressionalstafferaddedthatThornberry,whoisretiringcomeJanuary,isrealisticthatthewhole$6billionrequestisunlikelytosurvivethecomingbudgetfights.Thegoal,thestaffersaid,istogetsomethingthroughthatcreatestheIDPIaccount,inhopesitcangrowmovingforward.

Onthatfront,Thornberryislikelytofindatleastsomebipartisansupport.InaMarch24lettertoDavidson,Rep.AdamSmith,thechairmanoftheHouseArmedServicesCommittee,statedthatheintends“toidentifyfundingforanIndo-PacificReassuranceInitiativeintheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2021.”(TheEDIwasinitiallybrandedtheEuropeanReassuranceInitiativeundertheObamaadministration.)

WhiletheSection2153reporthelpedinformThornberry’srequest,thestaffersaidthatworkwasalreadyunderwayonthecongressman’sproposalbythetimethereportarrived.However,thereport’sinfluencecanbeseeninhowtheThornberryplanbreaksdownintofivecategoriesalsosimilartothoselaidoutbyDavidson,aswellasinanumberofcrossoverrequests.

Increasedpresenceandjointforcelethality($1billion):TheThornberryproposalwouldauthorizefundingfora“permanentandpersistentland-basedintegratedairandmissiledefensesystemandassociatedweaponsdeliverysystemonGuam,”whichDavidsondescribedintheSection1253reportashishighestpriority,onethatwouldcost$1.67billionoverthesixyearperiod.(TheThornberryproposalsummaryviewedbyDefenseNewsdoesnotcontainbreakdownsforindividualbudgetitems.)

Inaddition,theThornberryproposalwouldfundahomelanddefenseradarinHawaii,anotherkeyDavidsonrequest;increasefundingforintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancecapabilityintheregion;maintainrotationalforcesintheregion,includingarotationalbomberpresence;investmoreinunderseaswarfarecapability,anddeveloplong-rangeprecision“developlong-rangeprecisionfiressystemswithaplantoposturethesystemsthroughouttheIndo-Pacificregion.”

Prepositioningandlogistics($1.5billion):InhisSection1253report,Davidsonwrotethatnewprepositioningstrategiesareneeded,as“Itisnotstrategicallyprudent,noroperationallyviabletophysicallyconcentrateonlarge,close-inbasesthatarehighlyvulnerabletoapotentialadversary’sstrikecapability…Forward-based,rotationaljointforcesarethemostcrediblewaytodemonstrateU.S.commitmentandresolvetopotentialadversaries,whilesimultaneouslyassuringalliesandpartners.”

Alongthoselines,theThornberryproposalwouldauthorizefundingfor“contingencyregionalbasedclustersprepositioningkits;shipprepositioningandsurgecapacity;munitionsstocksandstorage;amovementcoordinationcentertofacilitateairandshiptransport;andprepositionedforces.”

Improvedinfrastructure($2.1billion):Thornberrywantsthispotofmoneyformilitaryconstructionandtheacquisitionoflandalongwithfundingtosupportthe“planninganddesignofemergentposturerequirementsfortheIndo-Pacifictheater.”

Includedinthispotofmoneyis$10millionforstrategicconstructionplanninganddesignassessmentsforplacesthattheU.S.currentlydoesnothaveafootprintin,butlikelywillneedtoconsiderinvestinginforthefuture.

Strengthenalliesandpartners($350million):Thornberrywantstoincreaseoverallcapacityandcapabilitiesofalliesandpartnersintheregion,includinganewprogramto“modernizecommunicationsarchitectureandsystemswithalliesandpartners;”increasingmultilateral



partnershipsbuiltaroundcounter-terrorismefforts;increasetheuseoftheNationalGuardStatePartnershipProgramwithcountriesintheregion;helpfundsecuritycooperationefforts,includingtheIndo-PacificMaritimeSecurityInitiative;andfundthePacificPartnershipprogram,an“annualmultilateralhumanitarianandcivicassistanceanddisasterreliefpreparednessmissionconductedintheIndo-Pacificregion.”

Trainingandexercises($1billion):ThisfundingwouldincreasejointtrainingandexercisebetweenINDOPACOManditsalliesandpartnersoverall,includingthefundingofbothjointdivisionlevelandservice-leveltrainingandexerciseprograms.

Notably,itwouldalsorequireDoDtocreateaplanfortheintegrationof“allmajortestandtrainingrangesintheIndo-PacificCommandareaofoperationstosupportfuturejointtrainingandexercisesandtestoperationalcapabilitiesandweaponssystemstoincludespaceandcyberactivities.”ThattestrangeintegrationwasalsoafeatureofDavidson’srequest.

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/04/16/thornberry-wants-6-billion-this-year-tolaunch-counter-china-fund/

Returntotop

Breaking Defense (Washington, D.C.)

PersistentRegionalDronesCouldDeterChina,Russia:CSBA

ByTheresaHitchens

April15,2020

WASHINGTON:AcoherentUSandalliedstrategytoincreasetheuseofdronesinregionalhotspotscouldserveasastrongdeterrenttogray-zoneaggressionbyRussiaandChina,saysanewstudybytheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments(CSBA).Implementinganewstrategy,whichCSBAcalls“deterrencebydetection,”wouldcostabout$1.4billionannually,thestudysays.

ThestudyarguesthatUSarmedforcesarepoorlyconfiguredtohandlepotentialregionalaggressionbyRussiainWesternEuropeandbyChinainEastAsia,wherebothcountriesare“developingtheabilitytolaunchaggressionrapidlyagainststatesontheirperipheryunderthecoverofincreasinglycapablereconnaissance-strikenetworks.”

Currently,theCSBAstudyfinds,“Withonlylimitedwarning,BeijingorMoscowcouldexploittheir

time-distanceadvantagetoseizealliedterritorybeforetheUnitedStatesanditsalliescould

respond,therebycreatingafaitaccomplithatwouldbedifficulttoreverseafterthefact.”

However,DoDdoeshaveenoughcapabilitybyusinglong-endurance,non-stealthyunmannedaerialsystems(UAS),todeployapersistent“eyeinthesky”capabilitythatcouldreducethelikelihoodofeithernationpullingoffsuchastealthycoup.Thestudy,called“DeterrencebyDetection:AKeyRoleforUnmannedSystemsinGreatPowerCompetition,”arguesthatallisneededisforthePentagontodevelop“newconceptsofoperationsandorganizationstoemploythosecapabilitieseffectively.”

Thestudyliststhefollowingsystemsasrelevanttosuchanewstrategy:AirForceMQ-9ReapersandRQ-4GlobalHawks,NavyMQ-4CTritons,andArmyMQ-1CGrayEagles.

SuchanewemploymentconceptforUASwouldbeenhancedbyfindingwaystoallowalliedandpartnernationstoparticipatecoalitionoperationsthatcouldoffsetUScosts,thestudyfinds.



“Real-timesituationalawarenessiscriticaltocounteringthetwinchallengesofsub-conventionalgrayzoneaggressionandaconventionalfaitaccompligambitpromptlyandeffectively,”thestudyexplains.“UASconductingISRmissionscouldprovideincreasedwarningofapendingChineseorRussianattack,therebyhelpingtoensurethatforwardposturedforcesarepreparedtoresponddecisively.Byincreasingwarningtime,UASwouldhelpmitigatetheUnitedStates’time-distancedisadvantage,therebyallowingtheUnitedStatesanditsalliestomasssufficientcombatpowertopreventafaitaccompli.”

ItidentifiesthreepriorityareasintheAsia-PacificandthreeinEuropethatCSBAsaysarebestsuitedforlong-enduranceunmannedaerialreconnaissance:theTaiwanStrait,SouthChinaSeaandEastChinaSeaintheAsia-Pacific,andtheBaltics,BlackSea,andeasternMediterraneanSeainEurope.

CSBAanalysisshowsthatimplementing“deterrencebydetection”inthosepriorityareaswould“require46airframesintheWesternPacificandanother46inEurope,oratotalof92aircraft.”

“TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandpartnerscouldmeettheinventoryrequirementbyshiftingexistingaircraftfromothertheatersandmissionstotheWesternPacificandEuropeandbyassigningsomeoftheaircrafttheUnitedStatesisalreadyprocuringtonewmissions,”itexplains.

Theauthors—CSBAPresidentThomasMahnken,ResearchFellowTravisSharp,andSeniorAnalystGraceKim—estimateannualoperatingcostsforthose92droneswouldtotalabout$1.4billionperyear,basedonCongressionalBudgetOfficefigures.

“Sincetheaircraftwouldcomefromtheexistinginventory,notfromnewpurchases,theoperatingcostrepresentsmoneyDoDwouldhavespentanywaytokeeptheaircraftflying(assumingitkeptthemflying).Forthisreason,implementing‘deterrencebydetection’shouldnotrequireanyspendingincreases,”thestudyexplains.

Thestudyfindsthatthestrategywouldtieuponly“14percentoftheAirForce’sMQ-9Reapers,38percentoftheNavy’sMQ-4CTritons,53percentoftheAirForce’sRQ-4GlobalHawks,and6percentoftheArmy’sMQ-1CGrayEagles.”

“Indeed,avirtueoftheconceptisthatitemployscapabilitiesthattheUnitedStatesalreadypossessesbutthathavebeenunderutilizedinthecontextofgreat-powercompetitionbecausetheirvalueinthatcontexthasnotbeenappreciated,”thestudyconcludes.“ContributionsfromalliedcountrieswouldreducetheburdenontheU.S.militaryandfreeupUASforothermissionswhileenhancingalliedcapabilities.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/persistent-regional-drones-could-deter-china-russia-csba/

Returntotop

USCOUNTER-WMDDVIDS (Atlanta, Ga.)

ATAKintheField:ForgingaTacticalEdge

ByDefenseThreatReductionAgency'sChemicalandBiologicalTechnologiesDepartmentApril

15,2020



Throughcollaborationandinnovation,theDefenseThreatReductionAgencyhasintegrateditspowerful,hazard-awareness-and-responsetoolsintotheAndroidTacticalAssaultKit(ortheAndroidTeamAwarenessKit,ATAK).ATAKisadigitalapplicationavailabletowarfightersthroughouttheDoD.BuiltontheAndroidoperatingsystem,ATAKofferswarfightersgeospatialmappingforsituationalawarenessduringcombat—onanend-userdevicesuchasasmartphoneoratablet.U.S.forcesuseATAKtoself-identifytheirlocations,andtheirenemy’slocation,tovisuallycommunicatetheirmovementstofriendlyforcesinthearea.Thesoftwarehassuccessfullyaidedinsearch-and-rescueandnaturaldisasterresponses,suchascoordinatingthereliefeffortsfollowingHurricaneFlorence.WarfighterscannowuseATAKtoguidethemselvestosafetywhenconfrontedwithareleaseofchemicalandbiologicalagentsandradiologicalandnuclearthreats(CBRN).

Warfightersrelyondigitalmapsandotherdatatoguidetheirmission.However,amissionrequiresadditionaldatawhenwarfightersareconfrontedwithareleaseofCBRN.Warfightersneedtoknowtheweatherconditionsinrealtime(e.g.,windspeedanddirection,stability,precipitation)tounderstandthepotentialforagentdispersalandspread.Theyalsoneedtoknowthetypeofagentreleased,monitortheirpersonalvitalstoassesstheirexposuretotheagent,andfindaroutetosafety.DTRAhasdigitaltoolstohelpwarfightersdefendagainstCBRN,buttheywereoftenhousedasstand-aloneapplicationsandnotembeddedinplatformsregularlyemployedbywarfightersoutsideoftheCBRNcommunity.

ATAKcanconnecttosensorsonmanyplatforms(e.g.,satellites,drones,smartwatches)andhasmanypluginsthatwarfighterscandownloadtocustomizetheiroperatingenvironment,dependingontheirroleormission.ATAK’ssoftwarearchitectureallowsplug-instoshareinformationwithotherplug-insorapplicationsontheend-user’sdevice.WithDTRA’scontribution,ATAKnowincludesthesethreeCBRNplug-ins:1)CBRNEffects,2)CBRN,and3)FilterTimes.

Thefirstplug-in,CBRNEffects,addstwocapabilitiestoATAK:real-timehazardpredictionandvehiclenavigationforCBRNevents.Theplug-inoptimizesDTRA’sHazardPredictionandAssessmentCapabilitytorunonanend-userdeviceindisconnected(withoutaninternetconnection)environments.Whentheplug-inisconnectedtotheinternet,itincorporatesDTRA’sMeteorologicalDataServertoprovidewarfighterswithreal-timeweather—fromdomestictoglobal,dependingonthemission—tocharacterizethedispersalandspreadofchemicalandbiologicalwarfareagentsfollowingarelease.TheCBRNEffectsplug-inalsomakesuseofanexistingATAKplug-in,theVehicleNavigationSystem(VNS).WithVNS,theCBRNEffectsplug-inofferswarfightersacomplexroutingtoolthataccountsforcontaminationandexposure,inadditiontotraveltime,andadvisesthewarfighterontheoptimalpathstotakeforsafety.

Toaddthesecondplug-in,CBRN,DTRAcollaboratedwiththeU.S.ArmyCombaCapabilitiesDevelopmentCommandChemicalBiologicalCenter(CCDCCBC)toimplementtheU.S.Army’sIntegratedSensorArchitecture(ISA)intoATAK.U.S.Army’sISAisusedacrosstheDoD,soDTRAandCCDCCBCbuiltuponISAtoincludesensorstocaptureCBRNevents.ISAseamlesslyintegratesdifferentsensortechnologiestogivewarfightersthedatatheyseek.Forexample,ATAKprovidesasingleinterfaceforviewingandcontrollingdifferentCBRN-sensingtechnologies,whetherthatisawearablesmartwatchthatmeasuresawarfighter’svitals(e.g.,heartrate)oradevicemountedonadronetodetectchemicalwarfareagents.

Thethirdplug-in,FilterTimes,addresseswhatwarfightershavelongaskedfor:real-timeguidanceonhowlongtheyshouldwearmasksandassumeamission-orientedprotectivepostureafteraCBRNrelease.ATAKoffersthisguidancethroughtheFilterTimesplug-in,whichinstructsthe



warfighterwhentostayneartheground,whentoseekimmediatehelp,andwhentoavoidcontamination.

WarfighterspositivelyevaluatedtheFilterTimesandotherCBRNplug-insatthe2019ChemicalandBiologicalOperationalAnalysis(CBOA)event,wherewarfightersevaluatedseveraltechnologyprototypesfortheirutilityinchemicalandbiologicaldefense.WarfightersreportedthattheCBRNcapabilitiesinATAKareusefulandeasytousewithminimaltraining.

Overall,theU.S.armedforcesandtheirinteragencyandcoalitionpartnersvalueATAKandthecommonoperatingpictureitprovides.DTRAcontinuestodevelopCBRN-specificplug-incapabilitiestosupportwarfightersonthebattlefield.

POC:ChristopherKiley,Ph.D;[email protected]

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/367459/atak-field-forging-tactical-edgeReturn

totop

Defense News (Washington, D.C.)

PatriotMissileDefenseSystemsNowActiveinIraq,SayUSOfficials

ByLolitaC.Baldor,TheAssociatedPress

April13,2020

WASHINGTON—NewairdefensesystemsarenowprotectingAmericanandalliedforcesatmilitarybasesinIraqwheretroopshavebeenattackedbyIranian-backedinsurgentsinrecentmonths,accordingtoU.S.officials.

Patriotmissilelaunchersandtwoothershort-rangesystemsarenowinplaceatal-AsadAirBase,whereIrancarriedoutamassiveballisticmissileattackagainstU.S.andcoalitiontroopsinJanuary,andatthemilitarybaseinIrbil,saidofficials,whospokeonconditionofanonymitytodiscusssensitiveweaponsmovement.Ashort-rangerocketdefensesystemwasinstalledatCampTaji.

ThemilitaryhasbeengraduallymovingthedefensivesystemsintoIraqoverthelastfewmonthstoprovidemoreprotectionfortroopsthathaveseenaseriesofrocketandmissileattacks.

SoonafterIranlaunchedamassiveballisticmissileassaultagainsttroopsatal-AsadinJanuary,questionswereraisedaboutthelackofairdefensesystemsatthebases.ButithastakentimetoovercometensionsandnegotiatewithIraqileaders,andtoalsolocatedefensesystemsthatcouldbeshiftedintoIraq.Priortothemissileattacks,U.S.militaryleadersdidnotbelievethesystemswereneededthere,morethaninotherlocationsaroundtheworldwheresuchstrikesaremorefrequent.

Thesystemsarenowoperational,astopU.S.officialswarnthatthreatsfromIranianproxygroupscontinue.

Gen.MarkMilley,chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffsaidThursdaythatbecauseofthatthreat,hundredsofsoldiersfromthe1stBrigade,82ndAirborneDivision,remaininIraq.

HesaidonlyonebattalionwasallowedtoreturntoFortBragg,N.C.,“inpartbecausethesituationwiththeShiamilitiagroupsandIranhasnot100percentsettleddown.”Headdedthat“theywillcontinuetheirmissionuntilsuchtimethatwethinkthethreathassubsided.”



SeveralrocketshitnearthesiteofanAmericanoilfieldservicecompanyinsouthernIraqthisweek.ItwasthefirstsuchattackinrecentmonthstotargetU.S.energyinterests.Americanshadalreadyleftthelocation.

PresidentDonaldTrumpearlylastweeksaidhisadministrationhasreceivedintelligencethatIranisplanningastrike.Heprovidednodetails,buthewarnedIraninatweetthatifU.S.troopsareattackedbyIranoritsproxies,"Iranwillpayaveryheavyprice,indeed!”

Otherofficialsinrecentweekssaidtherehadbeenanincreaseinintelligencepointingtoapossiblelargeattack.Buttheysaidthisweekthatthethreatappearstohavetaperedoff,ascountriesgrapplewiththerapidlyspreadingcoronavirus.

Still,militaryleadershavearguedthatU.S.andcoalitiontroopsneededtheextraprotectionbecausethreatsfromtheIranianproxiescontinueandit'sunclearhowmuchcontrolTehranmayhaveoverthem,particularlynowasthevirushitsIranhard.

InearlyJanuary,theU.S.launchedanairstrikeinBaghdadthatkilledIran’smostpowerfulmilitaryofficer,Gen.QassemSoleimani,andAbuMahdial-Muhandis,aleaderoftheIran-backedmilitiasinIraq.KataibHezbollah,oneofthosemilitias,hasbeenresponsibleforanumberofattacksonU.S.,Iraqiandcoalitionforces.

TheSoleimanikillingtriggeredtheIranballisticmissileattack,whichresultedintraumaticbraininjuriestomorethan100Americantroops.

Iraqileaders,however,wereangryovertheal-Muhandiskilling,andprotestsaroundthecountyhadbeencallingforthewithdrawalofU.S.troops.ThoseconditionsmadenegotiationsoverthePatriotsystemsverysensitive.

Inaddition,Gen.FrankMcKenzie,thetopU.S.commanderfortheMiddleEast,toldreportersthatmovingPatriotsandothersystemstoIraqwastrickybecauseitmeanthewouldhavetotakethesystemsfromanotherlocationwheretheywerealsoneeded.OfficialshavenotsaidwherethesystemsinIraqweretakenfrom.

Italsohastakentimetomovethelargesystems,piecebypiece,intoIraq,assemblethemandandlinkthemtogether.

ThePatriotbatteries,whicharedesignedtoprotectagainstmissilesareatal-AsadandIribil.Inaddition,theso-calledArmyC-RAMsystemisbeingusedandisabletotakeoutrocketsandmortars.AndthemoresophisticatedAvengerairdefensesystemcancounterlow-flyingmissilesandaircraft,includingdronesandhelicopters.

TrumpwithdrewfromtheIrannucleardealin2018andhassteadilyreimposedU.S.sanctionsonIranthathadbeeneasedorliftedunderthetermsofthedeal.Latelastmonth,theadministrationslappedsanctionson20IranianpeopleandcompaniesforsupportingShiamilitiaresponsibleforattacksonU.S.forces.

Currently,therearemorethan6,000U.S.troopsinIraq.Whilesomeforceshavebeenwithdrawnoverthepastfewmonths,othershaveflowedintosetupandoperatethenewairdefensesystems.

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/04/13/patriot-missile-defense-systems-now-activein-iraq-say-us-officials/

ReturntotopBreaking Defense (Washington, D.C.)



Hypersonics:5MoreArmy-NavyFlightTestsBy2023By

SydneyJ.FreedbergJr.

April15,2020

WASHINGTON:“Weneedtoacceleratethepaceoftesting,”theArmy’sthree-stardirectorofhypersonicssays.“FourthquarterFY23iswhentheArmybuilds[thisweapon];thattimeiscomingreallyfast.[And]we’relucky,becausewhenwewokeuponthe27thofDecemberandtheRussianspubliclydeclaredthattheyhadfieldedasimilarcapability,thatreallyputusonapathtoaccelerate.”

Lastyear,Lt.Gen.NeilThurgoodtookovertheArmy’sreorganizedandrenamedRapidCapabilitiesandCriticalTechnologiesOffice(RCCTO),whichisnowresponsibleforbothoffensivehypersonicmissilesandmissiledefenselasers.Whatkindofaccelerationishetalkingabout?

TheweaponthatevolvedintotheCommonHypersonicGlideBody–so-calledbecauseitwillgoonbothArmyland-launchedmissilesandNavysubmarine-launchedones–hashadjustfourflighttestsinnineyears.Thefirst,successfulflightwasin2011.Ittookthreeyearstogettothesecondtest,in2014,whichproducednousefuldatabecausetheboosterrocketfailedandtheglidebodyneverdetached.Thesecondsuccessfultesttookanotherthreeyears,to2017;thethirdtest,lastmonth,anotherthreeyears.

Butlookingforward,“ournextflighttestwillbeinthirdquarter’21.Thenwehaveadditionalflighttestsinfirstquarter’22,”Thurgoodtoldme.“Wehavefivemoreflighttests–atleastfivemoreflighttests–beforewebuildinfourthquarter’23.”

Testswillnotonlycomeclosertogether.They’llalsobecomemoredemanding.

“Weareworkingtomakeitmoreaccurateandsurviveinamorestressfulenvironment,”saidThurgood’sdeputyforhypersonics,RobertStrider.“Witheverytestthatwedo,we’reincreasingthetestenvelopetomakesurethatitwillworkasdesigned.”

Thatinitialtestin2011–usingalargerandlessrefinedversionoftheglidebody–wassimplyaboutprovingthedesigncouldsurvivetheflightprofile:extremeaccelerationfromthebooster,theheatofairfrictionasitrippedthroughtheatmosphere,thevacuumofnearspace,andreentrycomingdown.Thefailed2014test,andthe2017testthatreplacedit,begantoexploreaccuracy,lethality,andotherperformancecharacteristics.Thefuturetestsfocusonfine-tuningthedesigntoperformpreciselyastheArmyandNavymissionsrequire.

“Aswehoneinfurtherandfurtheronrefiningouroperationaloutcomes,the[test]objectivesbecomemorenarrowintheirscope,”Thurgoodtoldme.“Weknowoverthenextfivetestsexactlytheoutcomesweneedtotestto.”

Inparalleltotheflighttestprogram,theArmyisalsotryingtobuildanindustrialbasefromscratch.Alltheglidebodiestestedsofarhavebeenbuilt,oneatatime,attheEnergyDepartment’sSandiaNationalLaboratories,whichinventedthedesign.That’snotaviablemodelformassproduction.

“Theglidebodytechnologyissolelyownedbythegovernment,”Thurgoodtoldme.“They’recurrentlyproduced–‘made’isprobablyabetterword.It’snotreallyaproductionline–they’rereallyhandmadebythegreatfolksoutatSandia.[But]obviouslyhowthegreatPhDsatSandiamakeathingmaynotbehowwecommerciallymakeathing.”

SotheArmyhascontractedaerospacefirmDynetics–whosesubcontractorsincludemajorplayerslikeLockheedMartin,Raytheon,andGeneralAtomics–tostartaprivate-sectormanufacturingline.ThecompanieshaveteamsatSandialearninghowtobuildthedesignfirst-handfromitsinventors.



Overtime,Dynetics&co.willtakethelead.Firstthey’llbuildaglidebodyatSandiaunderthelabscientists’supervision.Then,aboutayearfromnow,DyneticswillstartproductionattheirHuntsville,Ala.factory.

DyneticsconceptfortheirCommonHypersonicGlideBody(C-HGB)

CantheArmyanditscontractorssticktothistightscheduleamidstthedisruptionsofCOVID-19?“Rightnow,Ithinkit’sexactlyontrackwhereitneedstobe,”Thurgoodtoldme.“Eveninthis(COVID-19)crisiswehavenow,ourindustrypartnersarerespondingreallywell.”Byworkingfromhomewherepossible,andbreakinguplargegroupsofworkersintosmalloneswherehands-onlaborisrequired,theprogramhassofarkeptgoingdespitethepandemic.

TheotherpotentialdisruptionistheAirForce’swithdrawalfromtheCommonHypersonicGlideBodyprogramtofocusonother,morecompacthypersonicweaponsthatfitbetteronanaircraft.Evenwhentheywereinvolved,Thurgoodtoldme,theiruniquerequirementsrequiredsomemodificationstotheglidebodybeforetheycoulduseit.Lookingforward,hesaid,there’salsoapossibilitytheAirForcemightstepbackin.

WiththeAirForcenolongerpayingashareoftheoverhead,“it’llchangeourcostnumbersalittlebit,”Thurgoodacknowledged.ButitalsofreesupR&DresourcesfortheArmyandNavy.

TheAirForcecontinuestoparticipateintheall-serviceboardofdirectorsgoverningtheCommonHypersonicsGlideBodyproject,hesaid.

Thecurrentmembership:

Thurgood,directoroftheRapidCapabilities&CriticalTechnologiesOffice(RCCTO),USArmy

ViceAdm.JohnnyWolfe,directorofStrategicSystemsPrograms(SSP),USNavy

Lt.Gen.DukeRichardson,militarydeputytotheassistantAirForcesecretaryforacquisition,technology,andlogistics

ViceAdm.JonHill,directoroftheMissileDefenseAgency(MDA)

MikeWhite,AssistantDirectorforHypersonicsfortheUndersecretaryofDefense,Research&Engineering

KevinFahey,AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition

FormorefromourinterviewwithLt.Gen.Thurgood,readtheeditedtranscriptbelow:

Q:Howdoesthedivisionoflaboramongtheserviceswork?

ArmyLt.Gen.NeilThurgood

A:It’sareallygreatrelationshipwehavewithAdmiralWolfeinthepartnershipwehavewiththeNavy.WehaveaMemorandumOfAgreement:theNavyownsthedesignresponsibilitiesforalltheservices,theArmyownstheproductionresponsibilitiesfortheglidebodiesforalltheservices.

TheAirForcehasalwaysbeenanimportantpartnerinthisprogram,buttheyweremostlyareceiverofthetechnologies.NowtheAirForcehasterminatedtheirHCSW[HypersonicConventionalStrikeWeapon]program,whichsharedthesamecommonhypersonicglidebody.

Someoftheinvestmentstheyhadintheirprogram,we’veagreedasaglidebodyboardofdirectorstoredistributesomeofthatintotheArmyandNavy,becausetheyhadresourcesthatwecannowleverage,likesoftwareintegrationlabsandhardwareintegrationlabs.



They’restillmembersoftheboard.Theystillcometoourmeetingsasapartner.We’restillhappytohavethem,andtherestillmaybeanopportunityinthefutureforthatpieceoftheAirForcetechnologytoberegenerated.We’rekeepingthemintheloopaswegoforward.

Q:Howareyouworkingwithindustry?

A:Wedon’thaveabigsingleprimejustdoingeverythingforus.There’saboutsixcompaniesthatarethekeyplayersinthis,withalargenumberofsubs.We’veformedapartnershipcalledtheIndustrialBoardofDirectorsinordertobetransparentandengagewithourindustrypartners.

Wehaveaquarterlymeeting.Weshareourliterature.Weshareourcostdata.Wesharescheduledataacrossallthesecompaniestotallytransparently.

WehavesignedacontractwithacompanycalledDyneticstobecomethecommercialproduceroftheglidebodies,butit’sonethingtohavethetechnicaldatapackageonhowtobuildathing:It’sanotherthingactuallytobuildit.ifyou’reanythinglikeme,thefirsttimeyoubuiltababycrib,youhadacoupleofboltsleftover.There’salearningcurvethat’sassociatedwiththatandwewantthemtolearnthatfromexperts,whichisSandia.

Dyneticsandtheirsubcontractors,includingLockheed,Raytheon,andGeneralAtomics,they’realloutatSandiainteams.Wejustfinishedoursecondclass,actually.Theyhavebeenhelpingbuildtheglidebodiesthatwe’reusing.

They’llactuallybuildtheirfirstglidebodyoutatSandia.Thenthey’lltransitiontoHuntsville.

Q:HowareboththegovernmentandindustrysidescopingwithCOVID-19?

A:Astragicasitis,we’vebeenabletokeepourselvesontrackandminimizetheimpact.

We’remaximizingourteleworkinthegovernmentandwithourindustrypartnersasmuchaswecan.Wehaven’tchangedanyofourbattlerhythmmeetings,ourreviewprocesses.Wedon’tdoitinpersonanymore.WedoitonVTCandouronlinetools.

Ifyou’reasoftwareengineer,youcanactuallydothatworkinanalternateworklocation.Youdon’tactually have to be at your office. Samewith some engineeringwork. They’re really being quitecreativeandinnovativeinhowthey’rekeepingthemselvesontrack.

Ourindustrypartners,someofthisistouchlabor,meaningthey’vegottobendmetalandtheygottoputboltsinthings.They’vebeenabletomakesmallergroupsanddifferentshifts.Youcanhavesmallergroupscomeinatvariabletimesthroughoutthedayratherthanasingleshiftwheneverybody’sthereatonetimeintheday.

Q:Howhastheprogramprogressedthroughflighttests,andwhat’stheplangoingforward?

A:2011wasreallythefirsthypersonicflighttest;thatwasdonebythegreatS&TcommunityinconjunctionwithSandia,whoownsthedesign.Itwasreallytoseeifthematerials,thetechnologywehadwouldsurvivetheenvironmentweneededtosurvive.

Thatwasfollowedbyanothersuccessfultestin2017withsomerefinementstotheglidebody.Andthen this testwe just had lastweekhad someadditional refinements.Nowwe’re reallymakingtweakstotheinsidesoftheglidebodyandhowweexecutethemissions.

Iwon’tgiveanyspecificnumbers,buttheoriginalglidebodywasalittlebitbiggerwhenweweretestingin2011.Nowtheglidebodyisthesizethatwe’regoingtobuild.Therearenuancesofthechangesinthematerialtechnologies,certainlythetechnologiesthatareontheinside,thatyou’renotgoingtobeabletotellbylookingatit



Ifyoulookatthe2011test,itwasreallytoseeifthematerials,thetechnologywehadwouldsurvivetheenvironmentweneededto.Onceyouprovedthatin2011,thenin2014youwouldstartenvelopeexpansion,youstartaccuracyexpansion,lethalityexpansion.

Nowunfortunately,asyoumentioned,the2014test,theboosterwasfouledontakeoffandtheglidebodyneveractuallyseparatedfromthebooster.Inthe2017test,wehadtoreplansomeofthethingsin’14thatdidn’tworkout.

Ournextflighttestwillbeinthirdquarter’21.Thenwehaveadditionalflighttestsinfirstquarter’22.OSD[theOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense]hastheleadtomakesurethatourtestinfrastructurecansupportwhatweneed.There’salotofworkgoingonwhattherangecomplexesneedtoadjustto.

Asweaccelerateourtests,we’llactuallybeabletotrainthefutureworkforceatafasterpacethanwehave.Theyoungengineersareinopsallthetime.

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-5-more-army-navy-flight-tests-by-2023/

Returntotop

USARMSCONTROLPew Research (Washington, D.C.)

AmericansSeeSpreadofDiseaseasTopInternationalThreat,AlongWithTerrorism,NuclearWeapons,Cyberattacks

ByJacobPoushterandMoiraFagan

April13,2020

Americanscontinuetoseemanyinternationalissues–includingterrorism,thespreadofnuclearweaponsandcyberattacks–asmajorthreatstothewell-beingofthenation.ButastheCOVID-19pandemicsweepstheglobe,thegreatestthreatnamedbyAmericansinaMarch3-29PewResearchCentersurveyisthespreadofinfectiousdiseases.

NearlyallU.S.adults(98%)saythisisatleastaminorthreat,withroughlyeight-in-ten(79%)namingoutbreaksofdiseaseasamajorthreattothecountry.Thisis27percentagepointshigherthanthelevelofconcernaboutinfectiousdiseaseinthemidstofWestAfrica’sEbolaoutbreakin2014.

ButinfectiousdiseaseisnottheonlyissuewhereAmericansseeagrowingthreat.ConcernsaboutChinaandtheconditionoftheglobaleconomyhavealsobeenontherise.Thesurvey,conductedatatimeofsurgingCOVID-19casesintheUnitedStates,foundthatworriesaboutboththethreatofinfectiousdiseasesandtheconditionoftheglobaleconomyroseafterPresidentDonaldTrumpdeclaredanationalemergencyonMarch13.

OverwhelmingmajoritiesofAmericanssaycooperationwithothercountriesisimportantwhendealingwitheachoftheinternationalissuestested,andthisisespeciallytrueofthespreadofinfectiousdiseases.Onthisissue,86%sayitisveryimportanttocooperatewithothercountries,and97%sayitisatleastsomewhatimportanttocooperate.

ThenewstrainofcoronavirusisthoughttohaveoriginatedinWuhan,China.ThepastyearhasseentensionsbetweenBeijingandWashingtononanumberoftopics,includingthecurrentpandemic,



tradeandeconomicissues.Roughlysix-in-tenAmericans(62%)nameChina’spowerandinfluenceasamajorthreat,afigurethathasincreasedsharplyinrecentyears.Bycomparison,in2017,41%saidChinawasamajorthreattotheU.S.

AndastheeconomicfalloutfromtheCOVID-19crisisbecomesclearer,Americansincreasinglyseetheconditionoftheglobaleconomyasathreat.Since2017,concernsaboutthestateoftheworldeconomyhaverisen18percentagepoints,from37%sayingitwasamajorthreatin2017to55%whosaysotoday.

AmajorityofAmericansalsoseeglobalclimatechangeandRussia’spowerandinfluenceasmajorthreats,althoughstarkpartisandividescharacterizeeachoftheseissues.

Ingeneral,DemocratsandDemocratic-leaningindependentstendtobemoreconcernedthanRepublicansandRepublican-leaningindependentsabouteachthreattestedonthesurvey.Butthisisespeciallytrueonthethreatofclimatechange,wherethereisa57percentagepointdifferencebetweenthesharesofDemocrats(88%)andRepublicans(31%)callingclimatechangeamajorthreat.Partisandifferencesofthisnatureareseenonotherissuestested,includingRussia’spowerandinfluence(Democratsare22pointsmorelikelytosaythisisamajorthreat),globalpoverty(19points)andtheconditionoftheglobaleconomy(17points).

Republicans,however,aremoreconcernedaboutthelargenumbersofpeoplemovingormigratingfromonecountrytoanotherandterrorismthanareDemocrats.

DemocratsandRepublicansareequallyconcernedaboutthethreatofdisease,andthiswaslargelytruein2014and2016aswell.

RoughlyhalfofAmericansorfewerareveryconcernedaboutglobalpoverty,migrationandlongstandingconflictsbetweencountriesorethnicgroups.Still,majoritiesnametheseasatleastminorthreats.

TheseareamongthemajorfindingsofaPewResearchCentersurveyof1,000U.S.adultsconductedbytelephonefromMarch3-29,2020.ThesurveytookplaceasCOVID-19spreadacrossAsianandEuropeancountries,andthenacrosstheU.S.Duringthefieldworkperiod,PresidentTrumpdeclaredamajornationalemergencyandtheeconomyenduredmajorshocks,includingplummetingstockprices;theclosureofmanyretail,travelandfoodsectors;andamajordropinthepriceofoil.

ConcernaboutdiseasethreathighamongallAmericans,butespeciallythosewithlesseducationandlowerincomes

WithmostAmericansworriedaboutthespreadofinfectiousdisease,differencesamongdemographicgroupsarerelativelynarrow.Still,somegroupsregisterparticularlyhighlevelsofconcern.

Forexample,Americanswithlessthanacollegedegreeare9percentagepointsmorelikelytobeconcernedaboutthethreatofinfectiousdiseasethanthosewhohaveacollegedegreeormoreeducation.Similarly,thosewhohaveincomesoflessthan$50,000peryearare10pointsmoreconcernedaboutthethreatposedbyinfectiousdiseasesthanthosewithhigherincomes.

WorriesaboutthespreadofdiseaseintensifiedthroughMarch

AstheCOVID-19outbreakdevelopedacrossthecountry,concernsaboutthethreatposedbythespreadofinfectiousdiseasesgrewrapidlyaswell.

AmongrespondentswhotookthesurveyfromMarch3-12,beforethedeclarationofanationalemergencyandthesuspensionofmostprofessionalandcollegiatesportsseasons,73%saidthe



spreadofinfectiousdiseaseswasamajorthreat.ButoncethedeclarationwasmadeonMarch13,ascasesofthenovelcoronavirusincreasedacrosstheU.S.,morebecameconcernedabouttheissue.AmongthosesurveyedbetweenMarch13-29,84%namedspreadingdiseaseasamajorthreat.

Concernsabouttheconditionoftheglobaleconomyandglobalpovertyalsosawincreasesduringthefieldperiod.AbouthalfwaythroughthedramaticslideinstockmarketpricesfromMarch3-12,48%ofAmericanssawtheconditionoftheglobaleconomyasamajorthreat.ButbetweenMarch13-29,asbusinessesbegantocloseduetothecrisisandItalywentintolockdown,majorconcernabouttheglobaleconomyroseto60%.

Infectiousdisease,terrorism,nuclearweaponsandcyberattacksaretopconcerns

Americansaremostlikelytoconsiderthespreadofinfectiousdiseasesasamajorthreattothenation.However,majoritiesrateeightoutofthe11threatstestedonthesurveyasmajorthreats.

Atleastseven-in-tenAmericansalsonameterrorism,thespreadofnuclearweaponsandcyberattacksfromothercountriesasmajorthreatstotheU.S.

Onlyaboutfour-in-tenAmericanssaythatlargenumbersofpeoplemovingfromonecountytoanotherorlong-standingconflictsbetweencountriesorethnicgroupsposemajorthreatstothecountry.

Nearlyone-in-five(19%)saythemovementofpeopleisnotathreat,thelargestshareacrossallthreatsincludedinthesurvey.

OlderAmericansmorelikelytoseemajorthreats,exceptincaseofclimatechange

Acrossmostoftheinternationalissuestestedinthesurvey,olderAmericansexpressgreaterconcernthanthoseinyoungeragegroups.

Thedifferenceislargestontheissueofmigration:Halfofthoseages50andoldersaythelargenumbersofpeoplemovingfromonecountrytoanotherisamajorthreat,comparedwith22%ofthoseages18to29.LargegapsarealsoseenbetweenolderandyoungerAmericansonthethreatsposedbycyberattacks,Russia,terrorism,nuclearproliferation,Chinaandlong-standinginternationalandethnicconflicts.

Thereverseistrueontheissueofglobalclimatechange:YoungerAmericansaremorelikelytosaythisisamajorthreatcomparedwiththeiroldercounterparts.Aboutseven-in-ten(71%)18-to29year-oldssayclimatechangeisamajorthreat,comparedwith54%ofAmericans50andolder.

Morenowsayclimatechangeisamajorthreat

ThebeliefthatclimatechangeisamajorthreathasincreasedsteadilyintheUnitedStatesoverthepastsevenyears.Six-in-tenAmericansseeclimatechangeasamajorthreattothecountrytoday,upfromalowof40%whosaidthesamein2013.

Viewsofclimatechangehavebeenconsistentlypartisanoverthepastdecade.Now,DemocratsandDemocratic-leaningindependentsaremorethantwiceaslikelytosayclimatechangeisamajorthreatthanRepublicansandRepublican-leaningindependents(88%vs.31%).TheshareofDemocratswhobelieveclimatechangeisathreathasrisenfrom61%in2009,whileRepublicanviewsonthisissuehaveremainedrelativelysteady.

DemocratsarealsomorelikelythanRepublicanstosayRussia’spowerandinfluenceposesamajorthreat.Nearlyseven-in-tenDemocratsandDemocratic-leaningindependents(68%)saidthisofRussia,comparedwith46%oftheirRepublicancounterparts,adifferenceof22percentagepoints.



ThispartisandifferencehasbeenconsistentlywidesinceTrump’selection;beforethat,partisanviewsofRussiawerelesspronouncedandmostlymovedintandem.

Americansgenerallyfavorinternationalcooperationtocounterthreats,butpartisandividespersist

Americansoverwhelminglysaythatcooperationwithothercountriesisimportantwhendealingwithmajorinternationalthreats.Thisisespeciallytrueonthepreeminentinternationalissueofearly2020,thespreadofinfectiousdiseases.Here,86%sayitisveryimportanttocooperatewithothercountrieswhendealingwithdiseaseoutbreaks,andfully97%sayitisatleastsomewhatimportanttocooperate.

Indeed,anoverwhelmingmajorityofAmericansthinkcooperationwithothercountriesisimportantfordealingwithallthemajorinternationalissuespolled.Butthereisvariationonwhetherpeoplesaycooperationisveryimportant.Forexample,eight-in-tenAmericanssaycooperationonterrorismandthespreadofnuclearweaponsisveryimportant,comparedwithonly55%and52%,respectively,whodosoontheissuesofmigrationandlong-standingconflictsbetweencountries.

However,Americansaremorelikelytosaythesemajorissuesrequirecooperationthantheyaretosaytheyseethemasthreats.Whencomparingwhethertheseissuesareseenasmajorthreatsandwhethercooperationtodealwiththemisveryimportant,Americanstendtobemorelikelytosaytheyrequirecooperation.Forexample,55%ofAmericansseecooperationwithothercountriesasveryimportantfordealingwithmigration,butonly42%ofAmericansseemigrationasamajorthreat.

Therearealsopartisandifferencesonwhethercooperationisimportantindealingwithinternationalthreats.Oneachissue,DemocratsaremorelikelythanRepublicanstosaythatcooperationwithothercountriesisveryimportant.Thedifferencesareespeciallylarge(over20percentagepoints)onglobalclimatechange,globalpoverty,theconditionoftheglobaleconomyandconflictsbetweenothernations.

Onthespreadofinfectiousdiseases,DemocratsarealsomorelikelythanRepublicanstosaycooperationisveryimportant,althoughpartisandifferencesarenotasstarkasonclimatechange.Roughlynine-in-tenDemocrats(92%)saycooperationwithothercountriesisveryimportantfordealingwiththespreadofdisease,comparedwith79%ofRepublicans.

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/13/americans-see-spread-of-disease-as-topinternational-threat-along-with-terrorism-nuclear-weapons-cyberattacks/ReturntotopPacific Northwest National Laboratory (Richland, Wash.)

HowLasersCanHelpwithNuclearNonproliferationMonitoring

ByRebekahOrton

April10,2020

Mountains.Shippingcontainers.ThesurfaceofMars.

Therearetimeswhenit’scomplicatedorimpossibletobringasampleintoalaboratorytotestitscomposition.

Thisisespeciallytruewhenitcomestodetectingexplosionscontainingnuclearmaterial.Detectionthatcanbedonequicklyoronsiteminimizeshumanexposureduringhazardouscollectionsorlaboratoryanalysis.



However,thenatureofnuclearchemistry—particularlyoxidation,thewayuraniuminteractswithoxygenduringanuclearexplosion—islargelyunknown,leavinggapsinourabilitytoaccuratelyidentifynuclearactivities.AteamofresearchersledbyPNNLphysicistSivanandanS.Harilalisworkingtoexpandoururaniumchemistryunderstandingusingasurprisingtool:lasers.

Themethod,detailedinarecentpaperintheJournalofAnalyticalAtomicSpectrometry,showshowmeasuringthelightproducedinplasmasmadefromalasercanbeusedtounderstanduraniumoxidationinnuclearfireballs.Thiscapabilitygivesnever-before-seeninsightintouraniumgasphaseoxidationduringnuclearexplosions.Theseinsightsfurtherprogresstowardareliable,noncontactmethodforremotedetectionofuraniumelementsandisotopes,withimplicationsfornonproliferationsafeguards,explosionmonitoringandtreatyverification.

Nonproliferationplasmas

Apulsing,fast-aslighteninglaserblastsintoasolidmaterialandexcitestheatomssotheyvaporizeintoatiny,brightlycoloredplumeofplasma.Thereactionwhentheatomsjumpintothissuperhotplasmaplumeemitslightwhichresearcherscancaptureandstudyusingopticalspectroscopy.

Plasmasmadefromdifferentelementsatdifferenttemperaturesemitdifferentwavelengthsoflight,eachofwhichproduceadistinctcolor.Thus,thecolorofplasmainacandle’sflameisdifferentthantheplasmamadeinaneonsign,orthemicroscopicplasmaplumeHarilalandhisteamgeneratetostudyuranium.

Thedistinctcolorsoflightemittedbyaplasmaarethesamenomatterhowmuchofamaterialisturned intoaplasma.Harilal’suranium laserproducedplasma(LPP) ismade fromsucha smallamountofnuclearmaterialthatthemethodcanbeconsiderednon-destructive.Evenso,thelightmeasurementsresearchersgetfromLPPissimilartothereactionsinthefireballproducedduringanuclearexplosion.

“It’saquestionofscale,”saysHarilal.“Thelaserscreatethesamefireballchemistrythathappensinanuclearexplosion,sowecanstudythechemistryandhowitreactstodifferentenvironmentalconditions.It’ssmall,butthelightisgood.Wecancollectitwithnoproblem.”

SeeingthelightinLPP

Althoughlightfromplasmasiseasytocollect,thedifferenceinthewavelengthsoflightthatspecificmoleculesemitismoredifficulttodecipher.Anduraniumissoreactivewithoxygenintheexplosionfireballthatitcreatesmanydifferenturaniumoxidecombinations.Thesemolecularcombinationscanbeanywherefromoneuraniumatompairedwithasingleoxygenatom,tomultipleuraniumatomsbondedtoasmanyaseightoxygenatoms.

Multipleuraniumspeciesimmediatelycomplicatehowspectroscopydecipherssimplelightcollection.Theseuraniumspeciesemitlightinasuchatightcolorspectrumwithsuchsmalldifferencesinwavelengthsthateachwavelengthisonlybeginningtobematchedwithitsrespectiveuraniumoxidetransition.

Theresearcherszoomedinonthetightspectrumofwavelengthsusingnarrow-bandfilterstheteamhadpreviouslydeveloped.Thesenarrow-bandfiltersworkbyisolatingthelightemittedatspecificwavelengthssothatonlythewavelengthsassociatedspecificspeciesarecollectedandanalyzed.

Onefiltermeasuredonlyatomicuranium,andanothermeasureduraniumoxideintheplasmaduringthelaserpulses.Theteamthenmeasuredthelightemittedfromtheplasmaastheyincreasedoxygenintheenvironment,watchingtoseehowthechemistrychangedinthepresenceofmoreoxygen.



Usingpreciselytimedsnapshotsoftheplasma(calledfast-gatedimaging),HarilalandhisteamdirectlyobservedhowuraniummonoxideanduraniumatomsmovedthroughtheLPPovertimeandbylocation.Thisletthemseehowandwherethespecieswereformedandhowtheypersistedastheplasmaplumeexpandedanddissipated.

Thelocationofuraniumanduraniumoxideduringthefirst5to50millionthsofasecondofalaserproducedplasma’slifecycle.Thegrayrectangularboxesrepresentthetargetposition.

Theteamfoundthaturaniumoxidesareformedfurtherfromthetarget,wherelowertemperaturesfavormolecularrecombination.Uraniumoxidesalsoformatlatertimesinthelifetimeoftheplasma.Whenmoreoxygenispresent,theplasmasdon’tlastaslong.

Understandingtheevolutionofuraniumatomstouraniummonoxidetohigheroxidesiscriticalforpredictivemodelingofexplosionevents.Precise,experimentallyvalidatedmodelsmeanmoreeffectivenuclearnonproliferationmonitoringandbetteroverallunderstandingofuraniumchemistry.

Inadditiontohelpingresearchersbetterunderstanduraniumplasmachemistry,thelaser-basedtechniquesusedinthisworkarealsounderdevelopmentforin-field,remotenonproliferationmonitoringaswell.Sincelaserablationcoupledwithopticalemissionspectroscopymeasureslightemittedfromaplasma,datacollectioncanbedonefromasafe,standoffdistancethatrequiresnosamplehandling.Thistechniquehasimplicationsfornuclearforensicandsafeguardsmonitoring.

ThisresearchwasperformedaspartoftheDepartmentofEnergy’sNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration.TeammembersincludedElizabethKautz,BruceBernacki,andSivanandanS.HarilalofPacificNorthwestNationalLaboratoryandPatrickSkrodzki,MilosBurger,andIgorJovanovicoftheUniversityofMichigan,withMarkPhillipsfromtheJamesC.WyantCollegeofOpticalSciencesattheUniversityofArizonaTucson,andsupportfromOpticslahinAlbuquerque,New Mexico. https://www.pnnl.gov/news-media/how-lasers-can-help-nuclear-nonproliferation-monitoring

ReturntotopThe Hill (Washington, D.C.)

TrumpNamesArmsControlEnvoyasTreaty'sExpirationLooms

ByRebeccaKheel

April10,2020

PresidentTrumphasofficiallynamedMarshallBillingsleaashisspecialenvoyforarmscontrol,aroleexpectedtospearheadeffortstoreachanuclearagreementwithRussiaandChina.

TheWhiteHouseannouncedBillingslea’sappointmentinanewsreleaseFriday,roughlyamonthafterreportssurfacedthatBillingsleawaschosen.

TheappointmentcomesastheUnitedStates’sagreementwithRussia,knownastheNewSTARTTreaty,expiresinlessthanayear.

Theagreement,whichwasnegotiatedbytheObamaadministration,capsthenumberofdeployednuclearwarheadstheUnitedStatesandRussiacanhaveat1,550apiece.Therearealsolimitsondeployingweapons,suchasintercontinentalballisticmissiles,thatcoulddeliverthewarheads.Andthetreatylaysoutaverificationregimethatincludes18on-siteinspectionsperyear.



TheagreementexpiresFeb.5,2021,butthereisanoptiontoextenditanotherfiveyearsafterthat.

ArmscontroladvocateshaveurgedTrumpto immediatelyextendtheagreement,arguing thatlettingitlapsewouldmeannolegalconstraintontheworld’stwolargestnucleararsenalsforthefirsttimeinfivedecades.

ButtheTrumpadministrationhassaiditwantstoexpandthescopeoftheagreement,includingadding China and new Russian weapons systems. Russia has offered to extend the treatyimmediatelywithnopre-conditions,whileChinahasrepeatedlyrejectedjoiningtalks.

BillingsleaiscurrentlytheassistantTreasurysecretaryforterroristfinancing.

AStateDepartmentstatementontheappointmentdescribedBillingsleaashaving"deepexpertiseinarmscontrolandbroadexperienceinforeignpolicyandnationalsecurity,havingheldseniorpositionsintheprivatesector,NATO,theDepartmentofDefenseandonthestaffoftheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonForeignRelations."

"PresidentTrumphaschargedthisadministrationwithbeginninganewchapterbyseekinganeweraofarmscontrolthatmovesbeyondthebilateraltreatiesofthepast,"thestatementsaid."TheappointmentofMarshallBillingsleareaffirmsthecommitmenttothatmission."

HewaspreviouslynominatedtobeundersecretaryofStateforciviliansecurity,democracyandhumanrightsin2018,buthisconfirmationstalledasDemocratsandadvocatesraisedquestionsabouthisroleintheGeorgeW.Bushadministrationinterrogationprogramnowwidelyviewedastorture.

BillingsleaoversawconditionsofdetaineesatGuantanamoBayin2002and2003.A2008SenatereportsaidheadvocatedinterrogationtechniquesCongresslateroutlawedastorture.

Inhisconfirmationhearingforthehumanrightsrole,Billingsleasaidhewould“advocateforandrespect”Congress’s2015decisiontobantorture.

SenateForeignRelationsCommitteerankingmemberSen.BobMenendez(D-N.J.)blastedBillingslea’sappointmentasarmscontrolenvoy.

“Mr.BillinsgleahasatroubledhistorywiththeSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,”MenendezsaidinastatementFriday.“FollowinghisunsuccessfulnominationfortheStateDepartment’stophumanrightspost,seriousquestionsremainconcerningwhetherhewasforthrightandtruthfulwhentestifyingbeforethecommitteeabouthisroleinthedetaineetorturescandalduringtheBushadministration.”

MenendezalsohighlightedthatjobstraditionallytaskedwithleadingarmscontrolnegotiationsthatrequireSenateconfirmation—includingundersecretaryofStateforarmscontrolandinternationalsecurityandassistantsecretaryofStateforarmsControl,verificationandcompliance—havebeenvacantformonths.

“Thisterribledecisionisemblematicbothofthisadministration’swillingnesstosidesteptheSenate’sconstitutionally-mandatedroleofnomineeadviceandconsent,andthehaphazard,carelesswaytheadministrationtreatsnucleardiplomacy,”Menendezsaid.

“Thisisnotwhoshouldbeputinchargeofournucleardiplomacy,”headded.“Iftheadministrationistrulyseriousaboutpursuinganeffectivearmscontrolagenda,itshouldreversecourseandnominatequalifiedindividualsforthecriticalunfilledseniorarmscontrolpositionsattheStateDepartmentassoonaspossible.”



https://thehill.com/policy/defense/492295-trump-names-arms-control-envoy-as-treatysexpiration-looms

Returntotop

COMMENTARYWar on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.)

TowardaNewTheoryofPowerProjection

ByMichaelJ.Mazarr

April15,2020

NowthatthepandemiccrisisishammeringAmerica’sfinances,U.S.strategyrisksveeringevenfurtherintopermanentinsolvency.Evenbeforethecrisis,themilitarydemandsofanintenseglobalcompetitionwithChina,Russia,andsecondarycompetitorslikeIranandNorthKoreawerebecomingfinanciallyuntenable.Now,thecostsofthecurrentcrisis—inboththeshortandlongterm—arelikelytoleadtofurthercutsfromthedefensebudgetandmaycallintoquestionthesustainabilityofmajorU.S.commitments.TheUnitedStatesislikelytosoonbeengagedinapainfulexercise:undertakingatrulyfundamentalprioritization,identifyingdefensecapabilitiesandcommitmentsthatcanbeabandoned,orpursuedinmoreefficientways,withoutunduerisk.Oneitemthatneedstobeonthatlistofprioritiesisexpeditionarypowerprojection.

Long-distancepowerprojection—theabilitytotransportoverwhelmingair,sea,andlandpowertofar-offplaceslikeTaiwan,Korea,ortheBalticsandwindecisivelyinmajorcombat—exercisesapredominantinfluenceonU.S.defensepolicy.Itgeneratesthemostdemandingrequirementsformilitarycapacityandcapabilities,determinesmanysystemstheservicesbuy,andshapestheconceptstheservicesdevelop.ItisnoexaggerationtosaythattheU.S.militaryoftodayislargelybuilttoprojectpowerinthisway.

Yet,evenbeforethecurrentcrisis,severalpowerfultrendscalledforafundamentalreassessmentofthewayinwhichtheUnitedStatesprojectspower.Theconventionalmethodcouldbetermed“expeditionarypowerprojection”—thestrategyofstationingthebulkofthejointforceintheUnitedStatesanddeployingthemtodistantlocalestodecisivelydefeataggression.Thisapproachisrapidlybecomingobsolete.Pickingupthousandsoftonsofmassandcarryingittoalocationontheothersideoftheworldwhereanopponenthasdecisiveoperationaladvantagesprovedsuccessfulagainstsecond-tierpowerslikeIraq;itwillnotbeeffectiveagainsteithernear-peermilitarieslikeRussiaandChinaorevenanuclear-armedNorthKorea.Butthatapproachisonlyonewayofsolvingtheproblemoflong-distancedeterrenceanddefense,anditistimefortheUnitedStatestoseekotherwaysofdoingso.Thisessaybrieflyoutlinesseveralpowerfulandinterconnectedflawsinexpeditionarypowerprojectionandthenarticulatesprinciplesofapossiblealternativeconcept.

We’llLoseWhenWeGetThere

Themostwell-knownandwidelydiscussedoperationalflawinexpeditionarypowerprojectionistheso-called“anti-access/areadenialproblem”—theideathatRussianandChineseanti-accessandareadenialcapabilitiescanblunttheeffectsofU.S.militaryoperations.DozensofstudieshavearguedthatU.S.forceswillbehard-pressedtooperateeffectivelyanywhereneartheforwardedgeofthebattleandwillsustainsignificantlossesintheattempttogetthere.Meanwhile,NorthKoreahasitsownversionofanti-accessandareadenialcapabilities—anincreasinglysophisticated



missileforceandnucleardeterrent.ThissituationispartlyafunctionofnewprecisionstrikeandsensingtechnologiesbeingdeployedbyU.S.competitorsbutalsoofbasicphysics:Potentialadversarieswillbefightingveryclosetohomeandhavedecisivegeographicadvantagesinanyofthesecontingencies.

Tobesure,America’sviewoftheanti-access/areadenialproblemmaybedisconnectedfromtheactualstrategyofU.S.rivals.Someanalyseshavequestionedhoweffectivesomeofthesedenialcapabilitieswouldbeinpractice.Thereareatleastpartialremediestotheanti-access/areadenialchallengeintermsofposture,concepts,andcapabilities.Iftheanti-access/areadenialproblemposesthesolebarriertoU.S.expeditionarypowerprojectionambitions,theUnitedStatesjustmightbeabletosurmountit.Butitdoesnot.

WeDon’tHavetheLifttoGetThere

AsecondchallengeisthattheUnitedStatesdoesnothavenearlyenoughstrategiclifttotransportlandforces—andthesustainmentfoundationforairunits—tofar-offfightsinatimelymanner.Airliftcannothaulenoughweightwhileandmostmajorsealiftshipsareinareservestatusandgenerallyold,shortofspareparts,andpotentiallyunreliable.Withoutmajorrecapitalizationinvestments,sealiftcapacitywillsharplydeclineafter2020.AdevastatinganalysiscontendedthattheU.S.sealiftfleetcouldbea“singlepointoffailure”forpowerprojectionmissions.

Intheory,theUnitedStatescouldbuyitselfoutofthisshortcoming.But,givenincreasingfiscalconstraints,massivenewinvestmentsinstrategicliftseemunlikely.TheUnitedStateswillneedmonths,therefore,tobuildupnecessaryforcesinanythreatenedtheater—andpotentialadversaries,whohavecloselystudiedU.S.operationsintheGulfandIraqWars,nowaimtoachievetheirlocalobjectivesasquicklyaspossible.Liftshortfallsalonemeanthatanexpeditionaryapproachtopowerprojection,whichassumesalongperiodofamassingforcesintheregion,isnolongeracrediblewayofthreateningresponsestomanycasesofmajoraggression.

ForcesinTransitWillBeStymiedorWrecked

Unitsintransittoadistantwarwillalsofaceanincreasinglydevastatinggauntletofattacks,fueledinpartbytheemergingrevolutioninunmannedandswarmingsystems,pervasivesensing,andartificialintelligence.Thefullmaturationoftheprecision-weaponsrevolution—alongsidetheemergenceofrelatedtechnologiessuchasautonomyandartificialintelligence—iscreatinganunprecedentedlylethalbattlefieldenvironment.Thesetrendsapplytomovementacrossoceansandevenairways:AsJamesLaceyrecentlyarguedinWarontheRocks,“Theoceans,neverahospitableenvironment,areincreasinglydeadly,tothepointwherethesurvivabilityofindependentlyoperatingnavaltaskforcesareinquestion.”

InafutureregionalconflictasU.S.forcessteamorflytowardabattle,anadversarycouldemploysemi-autonomousunmannedaircraft,dronesubmersibles,smallvessels,andsmartminestohammertheairandseaconvoys.Attacksubmarinescoulddecimatethemwithtorpedoesandcruisemissileswhilebombersshootlong-rangefire-and-forgetweaponsfromhundredsofmilesaway.Cloudsofswarming,tinyunmannedaerialsystemscouldemergefromsurfacedsubmarinesorpassingaircraftanddescendontransportshipsandtheirescorts—oreveninterceptslowmovingtransportaircraft.CyberoperationswillscrambletheinformationsystemsandcontrolsofU.S.vesselsandcreatelogisticalchaosinports.Anaggressorcouldusedirectattacksonspaceassetsandcyberoperationstodisruptcommunicationsandnavigation,includingGPSguidance.Forcesthatmakeittotheirdestinationwillthenfacecripplinglogisticsshortfallsanddisruptiveattackswithintheaters.Meanwhile,aggressorswillsurelythreatenalliesandpartners



witheconomic,cyber,ormilitaryattackstoensurethattheydenyU.S.forcesaccesstocriticalbases,stagingfacilities,andevenairspace.

Intheperpetualcontestbetweenoffenseanddefense,theUnitedStateswilldevelopanswerstosomeoftheserisks.Directedenergyweapons,forexample,arebeinginvestigatedasapossibleanswertodroneswarms.But,theemergingeraofmassedstrikeswillinescapablyboostanaggressor’sabilitytodegradeU.S.forcesintransit.

MeddlingintheU.S.HomelandWillDisruptMobilization

Thoseflawsinpowerprojectionarejoinedbyanewerchallengeassociatedwithemerginginformationtoolsandtechnologiesthathavethepotentialtostymiethedomesticfoundationforprojectingpower—adangerpartlyembodiedbywhatanewRANDreportcalls“virtualsocietalwarfare.”Asadvancedsocietiesbecomeincreasinglydependentoninformationnetworks,algorithmicdecision-makingandasuper-integrated“InternetofThings,”andastheabilitytomanipulatetruthbecomesmoreprevalentandpowerful,thepotentialforanoutsideactortocreatemischiefwillbeverygreat.Anaggressorcouldgeneratewidespreadconfusionandchaosinwaysthatwouldbeespeciallyproblematicforstrategiesofexpeditionarypowerprojection,includingtargetingmobilizationandlogisticssystemsintheUnitedStates.

Suchacampaignmightbeginwithanefforttopreventpowerprojectionfromhappeninginthefirstplace.Oversocialmediaandvia“deepfake”videoandaudio,aggressorswillseektomuddythefactsatissueandweakenthebasisforaresponse.Theresultingambiguitycouldcreateawindowofuncertainty—fromafewdaystoaweekormore—inwhichtheUnitedStatesandothersmighthesitatetorespond.SuchhesitationisespeciallyproblematicregardingexpeditionaryformsofpowerprojectionthatdemandthattheUnitedStatesstartandsustainforceflowinatimelymanner.

IftheUnitedStatesgoesaheadwithplanstodeployforces,theaggressorcouldthenundertakemorehostileformsofdisruption.TheaggressorcouldlaunchransomwareattacksonU.S.municipalitiesliketheattackthatrecentlycausedNewOrleanstodeclareastateofemergency,dislocatingthedeliveryofpublicservices.Itcouldusesocialmediatoolstofomentprotestsandoppositiontothewar.

IfthoseeffortsfailedtodeteraU.S.presidentfrombeginningforceflow,escalatingattackscouldfocusmorepreciselyonU.S.mobilizationandlogisticscapabilities,includingthedisruptionofmilitaryunitsastheyleaveagarrisonorbase.Someoftheseattackswouldfocusontraditionalcriticalinfrastructuretargetssuchasenergyandtelecommunicationsnetworks.However,inaneweraofmorepersonalizedandgeneralizedvirtualsocietalwarfare,anaggressorcouldbecomemoreprecise,emptyingthebankaccountsofservicemembersandtheirfamilies,issuingfakewarrantsforthearrestoftheirchildren,bringinghavoctothe“InternetofThings”intheirhomes,andbroadcastingverbalwarningsfromtheirAlexaorSirispeakers.

Wecannotknowinadvancejusthowcripplingthesevirtualattackswouldbe.Societiesandmilitariesareresilient.Eventoday,inthemidstofthepandemic,theUnitedStatesmilitarycould—withsignificantrisk—undertakelarge-scalepowerprojectionmissions.But,evenpartlyeffectivehomeland-disruptingcampaignsposechallengesforexpeditionarymodelsofpowerprojection:Thetime,domesticlogisticaleffort,andpoliticalwillneededtogatherforcesanddeploythemthousandsofmilesallprovidetimeforanaggressortoweakenthenationalconsensusbehindsucharesponseaswellasthephysicalprocessesneededtoaccomplishit.

Infact,theriskofsuchattacksextendsbeyondthedirectadversaryinanyfutureconflict.Multiple



U.S.rivalscouldgangupinacrisisorwartoimposeevengreaterlevelsofdisruption.InawarwithChina,forexample,Russia,Iran,NorthKorea,andothers—evenindividualsornon-governmentalnetworks—mightseeagoldenopportunitytounleashcyberandinformationwarriorstoimpedetheU.S.responseanddealadecisiveblowtotheU.S.reputationformilitaryprimacy.Theprimaryaggressorcouldalsoemploysuchactorsassurrogates.AfutureU.S.efforttodispatchaclassicexpeditionarypowerprojectioneffortcouldtriggerawholerangeofdisruptiveattacks.

TowardaNewApproach

Thesethreatstoexpeditionarypowerprojectionarenotnew.Infact,U.S.militaryservicesandotherpartsoftheU.S.governmentareworkingonwaystomitigatethem.Yet,giventheunavoidablegeographicasymmetryandcurrenttrendsinprecisionweaponry,unmannedsystems,andinformationnetworks,itseemsincreasinglydangeroustoassumethattheUnitedStatescancrediblythreatentoprojectexpeditionarypowerovertrans-oceanicdistancestothedoorstepofothermajorpowersand“win”extended,large-scaleconflictsatanacceptablecost.ThequestionofwhatpromisestheUnitedStatescontinuestomakeinthemostdemandingpowerprojectioncasesisbeyondthescopeofthisessay.But,ifitdoesintendtocontinueservingasabackstopdeterrenttomajoraggressioninfar-offcontingencies,itwillneedanewapproach.Suchanalternativecouldhavethreeprimaryelements:forward-deployedorlong-distancestrikecapabilitiestodegradeinvadingforces;conceptsforcreatingtheprospectofaprolongedresistanceeveniftheaggressionachievessomegoals;andwaysofimposingcostsonanaggressoracrossmultipledomainsbeyondmilitaryoperations.

AninitialstepwouldbetothreatencrediblelocalmilitaryeffectswithouttransportinglargeU.S.forcestothebattlearea.Thisstepcouldincludehelpingpotentialtargetsofaggressionmakethemselveslessvulnerableinpartbytakingadvantageofthesamesortsofemergingtechnologiesthatthreatenexpeditionarymodelsofpowerprojection.TheUnitedStatescouldhelppartnersandalliesdevelopautonomousswarmingsystems,smartmines,andcheap,anti-armorandanti-shipmissilestodisruptandweardownaninvasionforce.T.X.HammeshasmadeacompellingargumentforthevalueofsuchtechnologiesinthehandsofU.S.alliesandpartners.TheUnitedStatescouldalsoconducttrain-and-advisemissionstohelpbuildeffectivereserveforcescapableofoperatingthesesystems.Additionally,itcouldaidalliesandpartnersindevelopingpowerfulcybercapabilitiestodisruptthehomelandofanaggressoranditsownpowerprojectionactivities—includingthesortofcomprehensivevirtualsocietalwarfareattacksdiscussedabove.

Intermsofitsownmilitaryroleintheinitialfight,theUnitedStatescouldfocusonwaystoimposecostsonaninitialattackwithoutrelyingonthelong-distancedeploymentofmajorcombatelements.Thispathwouldnotpresumeanabilitytoforward-deployasignificantnumberofadditionalheavycombatunits—whichisbothpoliticallyinfeasibleandstrategicallyprovocativeinmostcases—butwould,instead,markanefforttouseinnovativeapproachestodispersedfirepowertoachievedeterrenteffects.Thesinewsofsucharevisedapproachareemerginginembryonicforminarangeofwidely-discussedconceptsthatenvisionresilientnetworksofsomewhatself-organizingnodesofmostlyforward-deployedfightingpowertobringfirepowertobearonaggressiveforces.Suchanetworkcouldbesupportedbyselecttypesoflong-rangestrikesystems,includingcyber,space,long-rangebombersandmissiles,andlimited,stealthymaritimeandairassets.

Insupportofthisemergingvisionofdistributedfirepower,amodifiedU.S.approachtopowerprojectionwouldinvestinlargernumbersofvariousprecisionweaponscapableofpenetratingcontestedairspace.Itwouldacceleratetheresearchanddeploymentofswarmingandunmannedsystemsthatdonotrelyonairfieldsforoperation.InamaritimetheaterlikethePacific,itwould



focusinpartonstealthyandsubmersibleplatformsonregularlocalpatrol.ItwouldexperimentwithmultiplenewforcedesignssimilartobutwellbeyondwhattheArmyisbeginningtodowithitsMulti-DomainTaskForces.

Havinglaidthegroundworktobeabletoimposecostsonaggressionwithoutlarge-scaleforcemovement,theUnitedStateswouldthenworkwithalliesandpartnersonthesecondelementofarevisedapproach:ensuringthatanyresistancewouldbeprolonged,confrontinganaggressorwiththepotentialofanextendedfight.TheUnitedStatescouldhelppartnernationsbuildthecapabilitiesforlong-termresistance,includingwell-equippedreservestrainedforinsurgency;largemagazinesofcheap,simplerocketsandmissilesaswellashidden3Dprintingfacilitiestochurnmoreout;stealthyundergroundreservoirscapableofreleasingswarmsofattackingdronesontime-delayedschedules;andcyberunitsbasedaroundtheworldthatarecapableoflaunchingcripplingattackseveniftheirhomelandwasoverrun.TheUnitedStatescouldalsopre-set,andthendirectlysupport,apotentcivilresistancetocomplementamilitaryinsurgency.

WhentheSovietUnioninvadedAfghanistanin1979,theUnitedStatesdeclaredtheattackillegitimateandsoughttoreverseit—inpartwitheconomicandpoliticalpenaltiesbutwithoutanymilitary“powerprojection”beyondaidtotheAfghanresistance.Theanalogyisnotexact,butanewapproachcouldsearchforsuperchargedversionsofaverysimilarstrategy—onethatthreatensanaggressorwithalonganddebilitatingcampaignratherthanaquickandpainlessfaitaccompli.

Finally,thethirdcomponentofarevisedstrategyforpowerprojectionwouldinvolveacomprehensiveglobalcampaigntoharassanaggressor’sworld-wideinterests.Thisthirdcomponent—across-domain,holistic,non-kinetic,or“unrestricted”approachtopowerprojection—wouldnotinvolveU.S.attacksonaggressormilitaryforcesfarfromtheareaofaggression,butwouldemploynon-military,oftennon-kineticmeanstoimposeeconomic,political,andsocialcosts.Theaggressorstate’scompanieswouldseetheiractivitiesembargoedordisruptedwithelectronicorregulatorymeans;movementsprotestingorlaunchingpoliticalharassmentoftheaggressor’slocalactivitiescouldbefundedandempowered.Moreambitiously,theUnitedStatescouldthreatenformsofeconomicstrangulation,employingelementsofwhatT.X.Hammeshascalled“offshorecontrol”andMikePietruchahastermeda“strategicinterdictionstrategy”—takingadvantageofanaggressor’sdependenceonimportantexportsofmaterials,energy,andsupplychainstointerdictitsmaritimeshippingandpotentiallyothersourcesoftrade.Suchlarge-scaleinterdictioneffortswouldhavetobeplannedinadvance,includingagreementsfromothernationstoplayrolesintheeffort,butneitherthethreatsnortheagreementswouldneedtobemadepublic.

Suchacampaignwouldalsoincorporateamultilateralefforttowrecktheaggressor’sgeopoliticallegitimacyandinfluence.ThiseffortcouldcompriseeverythingfromU.N.resolutionstoexpellingambassadorstoacoordinatedmultilateralcampaigntoencouragenationstoclampdownonitspoliticalandculturalinfluencetoolstoglobalbansonbroadcastingbytheattacker’sstatemedia.Onitsown,suchreputationalpunishmentcannotbeexpectedtodetermilitaryaction.Yet,RussiaandespeciallyChinacaredeeplyaboutbeingacceptedaslegitimategreatpowers,andtheprospectofafarmorefundamentalexpulsionfromtheworldcommunitywouldnotbetreatedlightly.

Takentogether,thesethreecomponentswouldadduptoanewconceptofprojectingpowerand,byextension,achievingdeterrenceindistantlocations.Itsobjectivewouldbetodemonstratetoapotentialattackerthatlarge-scaleaggressionwouldberuinouslycostlytotheirsocietyaswellasindirectlythreateningtothestabilityoftheirregime.Thisperspectivewouldhaveclearimplicationsfordefensepolicyandinvestment—forexample,encouragingapartialshiftinthebalancebetweenemphasisonheavy,contiguousU.S.-basedjointforcesandmoredispersed,forward-based,cutting-edgetechnologiesandunittypesaswellasfundstosupportalliedand



partneracquisitionofcapabilitiescentraltothisapproach.TheU.S.MarineCorps’newforcedesignguidanceprovidesagoodexampleofthescaleofrethinkingthatwillberequired.

Theeraofexpeditionarypowerprojectiondominanceisgone,atleastasassumedbythetraditionalmodel.Pretendingotherwisewillcontinuetowasteresources,skewtheinvestmentsandconceptsoftheservices,and,ifwardoesoccur,riskearlydefeatand/orcatastrophicescalation.TheU.S.efforttosupportthedeterrenceofamajorwarhasplayedanimportantroleinsustainingpeacesince1945andcancontinuetodoso—butitistimeforamajorshiftinhowtheUnitedStatesplanstofulfillthiscriticalmilitarymission.

MichaelJ.Mazarrisaseniorpoliticalscientistatthenonprofit,nonpartisanRANDCorporation.Theviewsexpressedherearehisown.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/toward-a-new-theory-of-power-projection/Return

totop


Norway’sAlliesShareTheirViewsontheCountry’sNewDefensePlan

ByStephenJ.FlanaganandJamesBlack

April16,2020

Ascountriesaroundtheworldgrapplewiththeunfoldingcoronaviruspandemic,thewiderbusinessofgovernmentcontinues.Norway’sMinistryofDefencewillshortlypublishitsnextLongTermPlan,whichwillthenbedebatedbyparliament.

TheplanoutlineshowtheArmedForces,intandemwithotherelementsofgovernmentandsociety,canbestaddressthethreatstoNorwayfromhostilestates,terrorists,andfragileandfailingstates.Theplanalsoexamineshowtobolsternationalresiliencetodealwithotherrisksincludinghybridwarfare,climatechangeandpandemics.

AnewRandreport,commissionedbytheMoDtoinformitsstrategyandpolicydevelopment,offersperspectivesfromitsclosestalliesontheemergingsecuritychallengesandstrategicoptionsfacingNorway.WefoundbroadalignmentofNorwegianandalliedassessmentsacrossDenmark,France,Germany,theU.K.,theU.S.andNATOinstitutions,butsomeenduringdifferencesinemphasisandpriorities.

OtheralliesrecognizeNorwayaspunchingaboveitsweightandplayingacriticalroleinthedefenseoftheNorthAtlanticandHighNorth.Atthesametime,ourresearchconcludesthereisnotimeforcomplacency.

Norway’skeyalliesagreethatthemostsignificantthreatintheHighNorthisnotacrisisdirectedagainstNorwayitself.Themoreplausibledangeris“horizontalescalation”—acrisiselsewhereinEuroperapidlygrowingintoawiderconflictthatthreatensNorwegianwaters,airspaceandterritory.

Russiacontinuestodemonstratehostileintent,anditsmilitarycapabilitiesthreatentheabilityofNorwayanditsalliestooperatemilitaryforces,securecriticalinfrastructureandprotectcivilianpopulations.ThecollapseoftheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForcesTreatyin2019bringsanincreasedthreatfrommedium-rangeballisticmissiles,requiringNorwegianandallieddefenseplannerstoadjusttonewthreatstothehomelandandregion.ImprovementsintheRussianNorthernFleet,includingsurfacevesselsandsubmarinesarmedwithmoderncruisemissiles,also



poseanincreasedthreattoNATOoperationsintheNorwegianSea,tounderseainternetcablesandtosealinesofcommunicationessentialtoreinforcingNorwayfromNorthAmericaorEuropeintheeventofanyconflict.

Thereisalsostrongconsensusontheenduringthreatsposedbyterrorism,nonstateactorsandchallengessuchasclimatechangeintheArctic.

WhileallalliesrecognizetheneedtoconsiderthestrategicimplicationsofarisingChina,theUnitedStatesseesChinaasamoredirectandimminentsecuritythreat.AlliesalsowelcomeNorway’scontributionstomissionsonNATO’seasternandsouthernflanks.

AlliesperceiveNorwayashavinganimpressivemixofhigh-endcapabilitiesforacountryofitssizeandamaturetotaldefenseconcept—itsstrategyforengagingallelementsofsocietyinnationaldefense.Thesecapabilitiesandcommitments,coupledwithawell-respectedapproachtostrategydevelopment,haveallowedNorwaytohavesignificantinfluenceonstrategicthinkingwithinNATO.

StrengthendeterrenceinNorway:Expandsurveillanceandreconnaissancecapabilities;increasethemilitarypostureinnorthernNorway;enhancetheprotectionofbasesandforcesagainstairandmissilethreats;maximizetheF-35fighterjet’spotentialtoaidjointoperations;andprepareforoperationsincontestedcyber,spaceandelectromagneticenvironments.

Expandcapacitytoreceivealliedreinforcements:BuildonlessonsfromthejointTridentJuncture2018exercise,whichalliesviewedasanimportantmilestonebutnotafullstresstest;pursueincreasinglychallengingtrainingscenarios;ensuresufficientpre-positionedstocksofconsumablesandequipment;upgradeandexpandinfrastructurealongwithconceptsfordispersingforcestopreventattack;anddeepencooperationtoenhancemilitarymobilityandinteroperability.

Exploreconceptstoholdpotentialadversariesatrisk:Inviteallieswithmoreadvancedreconnaissanceanddeep-attacksystemstodeploythemtoNorwayperiodically;developlongerrangeweaponsforNorwegianforces;exploretheutilityoflow-cost,unmannedassets;collaboratewithkeyalliesonconceptstodenyadversariesaccesstotheseaandtobetterprojectforcesontothelittoral;andrefineparallelstrategiccommunicationstocontrolescalation.

Enhancenationalandsocietalresilience:TestandrefineNorway’swhole-of-governmentapproachandthemechanismsforcivilsupporttothemilitary;contributetoNATO’sstrategyforaddressinghybridthreats,suchasdisinformation,economicpressureandcyberattacks;andexplorefurthermeasurestoenhancecollectivepreparednessandwilltofight.

SolidifyNorwegiancontributionstoNATOandpartners:ContinuecontributionstoNATOoperationsbeyondthenorth;helptoaddressvariationsindefenseexpenditureacrossallNATOnationsandrebalancetrans-Atlanticburden-sharing;promotedeeperNATOcooperationwithSwedenandFinland;anduseinnovationandindustrytoenableinfluencewithinNATO.

OthercountriescanlearnfromhowNorwaychoosestotackletheseemergingchallenges,andtheycanbenefitfromitslessonslearned,particularlywithrespecttothetotaldefenseconcept.Pursuitofsomeoftheseoptions,alongwiththeNorwegiangovernment’songoingeffortstoseekalliedviews,couldhelpenhancedeterrenceinthenorthandoverallNATOdefense.

StephenJ.FlanaganisaseniorpoliticalscientistatthethinktankRand.JamesBlackisasenioranalystinthedefense,securityandinfrastructureprogramatRandEurope.

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-onenhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/

Returntotop




ExpectaSurgeinNorthKoreanMissileTests,andofGreaterRange

BySheaCotton

April10,2020

NorthKoreaissignalingthiswillbeitsbusiestyearofmissiletestingyet.InMarch,theregimeconductedninetests,themostinasinglemonthrecordedinourdatabase.

RecallthatonApril21,2018,KimJongUndeclaredNorthKoreawouldceaseintercontinentalballisticmissileandnucleartestsinthelead-uptoasummitwithU.S.PresidentDonaldTrump.However,Kim’sstatedreasonforthepause—morepragmaticthandiplomatic—asserteditwasbecauseNorthKoreahad“completeditsmission”foritsnuclearandmissileprogram.

Asdiplomatictalksstalled,NorthKoreaslowlybegantounwinditspledge,andinMay2019,overayearafterinitiallypledgingtohalttests,itresumedlaunchingmissiles.Finally,onJan.1,2020,Kimstatedhenolongerfelt“unilaterallybound”byNorthKorea’smoratoriumonlong-rangemissileandnucleartests.

Theserenewedtestshadafewdifferentcharacteristics:Theyweresmaller,ofshorterrange,solidfueledandnew.Theirnoveltyisespeciallyimportant:Remember,Kim’sstatedreasonforthetestingfreezewasbecausehefeltconfidentenoughinthesystemshehadalreadytestedsoastomakefuturetestsofthemsuperfluous.

ThatthemissilestestedsinceMay2019havebeenentirelynewisnotacoincidenceandisperfectlyinlinewithKim’sstatedlogicfortheinitialfreeze.SeveralofNorthKorea’snewmissilesweresonew,infact,theyhadneverbeenseenbyanalystsintheopen-sourcesphere.Theregimeneededtotestthenewersystemstoverifythattheyworked.Evenmoresurprising,thetestsappearedtohavebeenlargelysuccessful.

Asofwriting,NorthKoreahasconductedatleast35missiletests,onlyoneofwhichappearstohavefailedinflight,sinceresumingtestsinMay2019.EveniftherewereafewmorefailedflightteststhatNorthKoreahadsuccessfullycoveredup,thisisaremarkablefeat.Itdemonstratesthat,whileNorthKoreaspentoverayearnotcarryingoutmissiletests,itcontinuedmissiledevelopment.

ThereiszeroreasonweshouldassumeNorthKoreahaslimiteditsresearchanddevelopmentactivitiestoitsshort-rangesystems.Giventhatthesetestshaveallbeenofsolid-fuelmissiles,andthatNorthKoreahasalreadysuccessfullytestedandfieldedlonger-range,solid-fuelsystemsbeforeitsself-imposedtestingfreeze,theregimeislikelyworkingtoexpanditssolid-fuelmissilecapabilitiestoachieveanintermediate-rangecapability,andpotentiallyintercontinentalrange.

Currently,NorthKorea’sintermediate-rangeballisticmissilesandICBMsareallliquid-fueledsystems,whicharefragileandcanonlybefueledrightbeforeflight,costingprecioustimeinapotentialconflict.IfNorthKoreaisworkingtoexpanditssolid-fuelcapabilitiesintolonger-rangesystems,itislikelytheregimewouldwanttotestthoseweaponsaswell.

Thereareafewstatementsfromtheregimecorroboratingthis.Mostnotably,followingtheMarch21test,NorthKoreaexplicitlystatedthat“thetacticalandstrategicweaponssystemsinthedevelopmentstagewillmakedecisivecontributions”toNorthKorea’sstrategicplanandreworkeddefensestrategy.ThesesystemswillneedtobetestedinorderforNorthKoreatobeconfidentinthem.



ThemostinterestingthingaboutNorthKorea'sMarch21testofashort-rangeballisticmissileisthatthestatementteasesfurther"tacticalandstrategicweaponssystemsinthedevelopmentstages."

Finally,wearemovingintowhatishistoricallythemostactivetestingwindowforNorthKorea.Individualtestsmightnotbepossibletopredict,butonthewhole,NorthKorea’stestingactivitiesfollowasomewhatregularpattern,withtestsbeginninginlateFebruaryorearlyMarchandthenproceedingthroughmid-Septemberbeforedroppingofffortheyear.

There’sbeenspeculationthatNorthKorea’sMarch2020testswereanattempttodemonstratetheregimeisunaffectedbythenewcoronaviruspandemicravagingtherestoftheworld.Whilethatcouldhaveplayedapartinit,andwhilewecannotknowforsure,Ibelievewewouldhaveseenasimilarnumberofmissileslaunchedevenwithoutthepandemic.

ThisleavesU.S.policyandthechancesfordiplomacywithadismaloutlook.Aswithtwoyearsago,whenNorthKoreawaspreparingtomeetthepresidentforasummit,NorthKoreawillnotvoluntarilygiveupitsnuclearweaponsormissilesystems.ThebestthatnegotiationscanprobablyhopetogainistorestartandlockinNorthKorea’smissileandnuclear-testingmoratoriuminexchangeforsomesanctionsrelief.

Mycolleagueshavewrittenindepthaboutwhatthespecificsofthatmightlooklike.WhilehardlytheU.S.’mostpreferredoutcome,itwouldatleastensuretheregimewouldbelimitedinfurtheringitsabilitytostriketheU.S.Potentially,intime,NorthKorea’scurrentcapabilitymayevendecayifitisunabletocarryouttestsverifyingitssystemsfunctionasexpected.Ifnot,thenwemayonceagainlookbacktonowinayear’stimeasanothermissedchancetoslowNorthKorea’smissiledevelopment.

SheaCottonisaresearchassociateattheJamesMartinCenterforNonproliferationStudiesattheMiddleburyInstituteofInternationalStudies.HecreatedandmanagestheNorthKoreaMissileTestDatabaseoftheNuclearThreatInitiative,aswellastheGlobalIncidentsandTraffickingDatabase.

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/10/expect-a-surge-in-northkorean-missile-tests-and-of-greater-range/

Returntotop

ABOUTTHEUSAFCSDSTheUSAFCounterproliferationCenter(CPC)wasestablishedin1998atthedirectionoftheChiefofStaffoftheAirForce.LocatedatMaxwellAFB,thisCentercapitalizesontheresidentexpertiseofAirUniversity—whileextendingitsreachfarbeyond—andinfluencesawideaudienceofleadersandpolicymakers.AmemorandumofagreementbetweentheAirStaff’sDirectorforNuclearand



Counterproliferation(thenAF/XON)andAirWarCollegecommandantestablishedtheinitialpersonnelandresponsibilitiesoftheCenter.ThisincludedintegratingcounterproliferationawarenessintothecurriculumandongoingresearchattheAirUniversity;establishinganinformationrepositorytopromoteresearchoncounterproliferationandnonproliferationissues;anddirectingresearchonthevarioustopicsassociatedwithcounterproliferationandnonproliferation.

In2008,theSecretaryofDefense'sTaskForceonNuclearWeaponsManagementrecommended"AirForcepersonnelconnectedtothenuclearmissionberequiredtotakeaprofessionalmilitaryeducation(PME)courseonnational,defense,andAirForceconceptsfordeterrenceanddefense."ThisledtotheadditionofthreeteachingpositionstotheCPCin2011toenhancenuclearPMEefforts.Atthesametime,theAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter,incoordinationwiththeAF/A10andAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand,establishedaseriesofcoursesatKirtlandAFBtoprovideprofessionalcontinuingeducation(PCE)throughthecareersofthoseAirForcepersonnelworkinginorsupportingthenuclearenterprise.ThismissionwastransferredtotheCPCin2012,broadeningitsmandatetoprovidingeducationandresearchonnotjustcounteringWMDbutalsonuclearoperationsissues.InApril2016,thenuclearPCEcoursesweretransferredfromtheAirWarCollegetotheU.S.AirForceInstituteforTechnology.

InFebruary2014,theCenter’snamewaschangedtotheCenterforUnconventionalWeaponsStudies(CUWS)toreflectitsbroadcoverageofunconventionalweaponsissues,bothoffensiveanddefensive,acrossthesixjointoperatingconcepts(deterrenceoperations,cooperativesecurity,majorcombatoperations,irregularwarfare,stabilityoperations,andhomelandsecurity).Theterm“unconventionalweapons,”currentlydefinedasnuclear,biological,andchemicalweapons,alsoincludestheimproviseduseofchemical,biological,andradiologicalhazards.InMay2018,thenamechangedagaintotheCenterforStrategicDeterrenceStudies(CSDS)inrecognitionofseniorAirForceinterestinfocusingonthisvitalnationalsecuritytopic.

TheCenter’smilitaryinsigniadisplaysthesymbolsofnuclear,biological,andchemicalhazards.Thearrowsabovethehazardsrepresentthefouraspectsofcounterproliferation—counterforce,activedefense,passivedefense,andconsequencemanagement.TheLatininscription"ArmisBellaVenenisGeri"standsfor"weaponsofwarinvolvingpoisons."

DISCLAIMER:Opinions,conclusions,andrecommendationsexpressedorimpliedwithinaresolelythoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheAirUniversity,theUnitedStatesAirForce,theDepartmentofDefense,oranyotherUSgovernmentagency.

Documents

Issue 1 413 7 April 20 - U.S. Department of Defense