Issue 2 Apr - Jun 2016 …GEAR UP! - Air Line Pilots ... 2016 Gear Up final.pdf · of all three QRH products further supporting the imperative nature of the situation. ... 330. The

Issue 2 Apr - Jun 2016

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In this quarter of …Gear Up! you will notice several articles on fires and fleet specific procedures. It is our intent to supplement the efforts of the Chairman, Safety and DG Committees in bringing attention to Lithium batteries fires by providing an applicable review of handling fires on your airplane. The goal of the Training Committee with …Gear Up! is to give you work-related topics to get you thinking, talking, and sharing information not readily understood or frequently used. We’ve added a table of contents that is hot linked to the articles for ease of navigating. Also included are ‘back to top’ markers at the end of each article. I am trying to shore up a dedicated editor for this publication to establish longevity and improve on what we’ve started. The last issue generated the biggest wave of positive feedback of any of the committee’s communication pieces, so, it behooves us to keep it going. Lastly, we are in the works to get this added to the Content Locker under References for something to read at cruise. Keep an eye out for that. As always, your feedback is appreciated and needed.

Fly Smart,

Matt Morley

In This Issue: Page 2: In-Flight Smoke, Fumes, and Fire Cocepts for FedEx Boeing 757 and 767 Crewmembers Page 7: “Maddog Pilots: Let’s Clear The Air on CARGO FIRE LWR (FWD/AFT) Level 3 Alerts” Page 10: Airbus and Cargo Fire Procedures Page 12: B-777 and Fire Cargo Main Deck Page 17: Lessons We Can Learn from UPS 1354 Page 22: A Comparison of Approach Types: APV v. NPAPage 30: Sweeper Flight—For all life’s twists andturns Page 33: High Altitude Upsets and Prevention/Recovery Training

…GEAR UP!A Training Committee Publication


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In-Flight Smoke, Fumes, and Fire Concepts for FedEx Boeing 757 and 767 Crewmembers By: Mike Elsenrath

For decades, the global aviation industry has stressed the criticality of aggressively responding to the threats posed by in-flight fires. Generations of professional pilots have spent countless hours in simulator training scenarios designed to elicit an expeditious response to the presence of smoke, fumes, or fire (Dong, Han & Li, 2014; FAA, 2014; RAS, 2013). Such efforts are commendable and arguably influential in the successful recovery of multiple aircraft experiencing in-flight fire situations (ALPA, 2015; NTSB, 1998, 2011). Still, despite the efforts of regulators and operators to combat the hazards of in-flight fires, recent tragedies such as UPS Flight 6 and Asiana Flight 991 suggest the potential for in-flight fires remains a relevant threat (GCAA, 2010; NTSB, 2016). This is a particularly salient observation considering the growing presence of undeclared lithium battery shipments (ALPA, 2015, 2016). While technological advancements to combat in-flight fires

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and mitigate risks posed by lithium batteries continue to evolve (FedEx, 2016; Smith, 2013), perhaps the best predictor of success related to surviving an in-flight fire remains the proximal decisions made by the flight crew immediately following the first indication of smoke, fumes, or fire.

Time is of the Essence Arguing in support of prompt action when dealing with an in-flight fire is rarely met with resistance from the professional aviation community. However, what is less certain is exactly how much time is available from the moment at which a fire is detected to the point at which the probability of a successful recovery substantially diminishes. As found in Table 1, review of past in-flight fire events provides insight into the need for aggressive and immediate flight crew response.

Table 1 Time from Fire Indication to the Point of Becoming Non-Survivable Date Location Aircraft Type Time to Become Non-Survivable

07.11.73 PARIS, FRANCE B-707 7 Minutes

11.03.79 JEDDAH, SAUDIA ARABIA B-707 17 Minutes

06.02.83 CINCINNATI, USA DC-9 19 Minutes

11.28.87 MAURITIUS, INDIAN OCEAN B-747 19 Minutes

09.02.98 NOVA SCOTIA, CANADA MD-11 16 Minutes

Note. Adapted from “Advisory Circular 120-82A. In-Flight Fires,” by the Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, Appendix 3.

While the sample provided lacks recency, the 2011 Asiana Flight 991 accident provides a contemporary example of an in-flight fire event and reveals the Boeing 747-400F had less than 20 minutes from the first fire indication until the aircraft was unrecoverable (RAS, 2013). In response to the continued potential for in-flight fire events, the FAA (2014) advises that flight crews “may have as few as 15–20 minutes to get an aircraft on the ground if the crew allows a hidden fire to progress without any intervention” (p. 8). While the context of the FAA’s comment pertains to small in-flight fires as witnessed in the Swissair Flight 111


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accident (TSBC, 2003), the logic is applicable to any indication of an in-flight fire, regardless of size.

It is important to realize the logic afforded by the FAA is also championed by the manufacturing community. Given the time critical nature of successfully responding to in-flight fire situations, Boeing redesigning their smoke, fire, and fumes Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedures for a majority of their product line (McKenzie, 2009). The redesigned Boeing QRH procedures place an emphasis on the need to expedite the diversion of the aircraft to the nearest suitable airport during in-flight fire scenarios. Evidence of these changes is found in the FedEx Boeing 757, Boeing 767 LDS, and Boeing 767 CFD QRH procedures for smoke, fire, or fumes. Referring to each QRH procedure reveals that after the phase one item is complete, the crew should consider diverting as their next priority (FedEx, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). This concept is repeated with frequency in subsequent steps of all three QRH products further supporting the imperative nature of the situation.

The redesigned QRH logic utilized by Boeing also aligns perfectly with guidance supplied by the FAA for in-flight fires. The FAA directs that after oxygen masks are donned, the flight crew should “plan for an immediate descent and landing at the nearest suitable airport” (FAA, 2014, p. 10). Further emphasizing the severity of onboard fires, the FAA (2014) highlights the following:

Technical evaluations and actual experience indicate that flightcrew [sic] members should immediately follow company-approved emergency procedures, notify ATC, and begin planning for an emergency landing as soon as possible. Delaying descent by only a couple of minutes may make the difference between a successful landing and evacuation and complete loss of the aircraft [emphasis added]. (p.10)

This chilling assertion not only stresses the severity of in-flight fires but also supports the need for decisive action on behalf of the flight crew to divert to the nearest suitable airport. Based on the evidence provided here, FedEx Boeing 757 and 767 crewmembers should be prepared to divert their aircraft to the nearest suitable airport and land at the first indication of smoke, fire, or fumes as directed by approved QRH guidance. While accomplishing a diversion in a time-compressed and task-saturated environment is certainly a challenging endeavor, the FedEx B-757/767 Pilot Handbook (PHB) (FedEx, 2013a) in combination with knowledge garnered from the 1996 in-flight cargo fire aboard FedEx Flight 1406 (NTSB, 1998) serves to provide a functional flight profile grounded in approved procedure and operational experience.

FedEx 757 and 767 In-Flight Fire Flight Profile and Considerations Section 7.3.7 of the FedEx B-757/767 PHB provides flight profile information “designed to bring the airplane down smoothly to a safe altitude, in the minimum time, with the least possible passenger discomfort” (FedEx, 2013a, p. 489). While the context of the published profile targets rapid descents due to pressurization issues, the profile provides excellent guidance for the initial stages of a rapid descent regardless of the reason for execution. Specifically, utilization of flight level change, full speedbrakes, and a target speed of


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MMO/VMO will expedite the aircraft’s descent toward the nearest suitable airport. The profile published in the PHB (2013a) effectively ends at the minimum safe altitude or 10,000 feet, whichever value is higher. Unfortunately, the lack of PHB guidance for operations below 10,000 feet leaves much to be desired given the time critical nature of in-flight fires. It is expected future FedEx Boeing 757 and 767 QRH products will contain enhanced profile information for flight crew use when dealing with in-flight fires that amplifies current PHB guidance. Until such time, reviewing the actions of the flight crew on FedEx Flight 1406 affords insight into operational techniques deployed during an actual in-flight fire event.

On September 5, 1996, FedEx Flight 1406 experienced an in-flight cargo fire at flight level 330. The elapsed time from the first indication of smoke, fire, or fumes to the aircraft’s successful diversion to Stewart International Airport was just over 19 minutes (NTSB, 1998). Review of the NTSB accident report suggests the DC-10 flight crew followed a similar profile to that directed by the B-757/767 PHB. However, when approaching 10,000 feet the captain instructed the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, to “keep the speed up man, don’t slow to two-fifty. . . we’re in an emergency situation here” (NTSB, 1998, p. 8). While it is pure conjecture to suggest the successful outcome of the event would have been different had the crew slowed to 250 knots at 10,000 feet, it is evident the decision to deviate from the speed limit was not only prudent but satisfied the FAA’s (2014) recommendation to expedite the diversion to the nearest suitable airport during in-flight fire events.

While the scope of this article targets diverting to the nearest suitable airport when faced with in-flight fire scenarios, it is prudent to consider situations where a suitable airport may be unavailable. Section 8.9.5 of the FedEx B-757/767 Pilot Handbook Supplement discusses this potential:

A cabin or airframe fire which becomes uncontrollable may necessitate ditching the aircraft while control and consciousness can be retained. This should be considered as a last recourse. If required, descend at an appropriate rate/speed in preparation for the ditching. Notify all concerned as to your intentions, being sure to include the planned position of the ditching. (FedEx, 2013b, p. 394)

If faced with such a situation, procedural guidance for ditching is contained in all three FedEx Boeing 757/767 QRH products and provides detailed information pertaining to desired aircraft configuration and energy management.

Considering the severity associated with ditching, it is important to be aware the airports displayed on FedEx Boeing 757 and 767 navigation displays (ND) and contained within associated flight management computer (FMC) databases may not represent all available suitable airports in the vicinity of the aircraft. Due to airline operational reasons, it is possible additional airports exist beyond those displayed on the ND or retrieved from the FMC. If displayed or retrieved airport information is deemed unsuitable to the flight crew, ensure the local controlling agency is contacted to ascertain the potential of other viable options. Communication with Global Operations Control will also assist in this process although this is an admittedly difficult task given the time constraints of in-flight fire events.


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Training Opportunities for FedEx 757 and 767 Crewmembers FedEx Boeing 757 and 767 crewmembers receive exposure to various in-flight fire scenarios during initial training as well as during the recently released recurrent training CMT event. In both curricula, flight instructors will discuss procedures and useful techniques designed to expedite the diversion to the nearest suitable airport. Both initial and recurrent training curricula incorporate in-flight cargo fire scenarios originating in the upper flight levels and designed to develop a baseline mental model for utilization in the actual aircraft if needed. Instructors will time the scenario from the moment of the first fire indication until the point at which the crew evacuates the aircraft to assist with refining and improving procedural compliance and general tactics. Crewmembers requesting a verbal refresher of procedures and tactics for in-flight fires are encouraged to contact the Boeing 757 and 767 Flight Training Department or any affiliated instructor. Crewmembers desiring to practice in-flight fire profiles in the simulator during non-ITU or CQ periods should refer to Section 11.P.18.b of the 2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement which allows for proficiency enhancement in the simulator up to two times per year.

Professional Vigilance is Key It is likely in-flight smoke, fire, or fumes will remain perpetual threats to flight safety for the foreseeable future. Recent events such as the UPS Flight 6 accident, where over 80,000 lithium ion batteries were complicit in the fire and subsequent crash, underscore the severity of in-flight smoke, fire, or fumes in contemporary all-cargo operations (ALPA, 2015, 2016; GCAA, 2010). While academic exposure and simulator training certainly provide welcome opportunities to hone procedural and human factors skills for such events, ultimately, it is incumbent upon the individual crewmember to ensure technical aptitude is maintained. Given the criticality of time when dealing with in-flight fire events, lack of requisite knowledge or skill can prove extremely costly. In that regard, ensuring vigilance is maintained pertaining to the response to in-flight fires is not only a professional expectation but an essential component of survival.

References

ALPA. (2015). Improving Aviation Safety: Safe Air Transport of Lithium Batteries. ALPA White Paper. Retrieved from http://www.alpa.org/~/media/ALPA/Files/pdfs/news-events/white-papers/lithium-batteries.pdf?la=en

ALPA. (2016). Myths/Facts Lithium Battery Shipments. Retrieved from https://www.alpa.org/~/media/ALPA/Files/pdfs/advocacy/fact-sheet-lithium-batteries.pdf

Dong, J., Han, B., & Li, X. (2014). The Study of Transport Category Aircraft Fire Safety Airworthiness Design. Procedia Engineering, 80, 44-48. doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2014.09.058

FAA. (2014). Advisory Circular 120-82A. In-Flight Fires. Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-80A.pdf.

FedEx. (2013a). Pilot Handbook B-757/767 (Third ed.). Memphis, TN. FedEx. (2013b). Pilot Handbook Supplement B-757/767: FedEx Express. FedEx. (2014a). B-757 Quick Reference Handbook (Sixth ed.). Memphis, TN. FedEx. (2014b). B-767 Quick Reference Handbook (Second ed.). Memphis, TN. FedEx. (2015). B-767 LDS Quick Reference Handbook (First ed.). Memphis, TN.


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FedEx (Producer). (2016). FedEx's Fire Supression System. Retrieved from http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/DGP%2024%20Working%20Papers/FedExFireSuppressionSystemPresentation.pdf

GCAA. (2010). Aircraft Accident Investigation Sector. Final Air Accident Investigation Report. Uncontained Cargo Fire Leading to Loss of Control Inflight and Uncontrolled Descent Into Terrain. Retrieved from United Arab Emirates: https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/40/2010-2010%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Boeing%20747-44AF%20-%20N571UP%20-%20Report%2013%202010.pdf

McKenzie, W. A. (2009). Flight Crew Response to In-Flight, Smoke, Fire, or Fumes. Aero Quarterly, (QTR_01.09). Retrieved from http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_01_09/pdfs/AERO_Q109_article03.pdf

NTSB. (1998). National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. In-Flight Fire/Emergency Landing. Federal Express Flight 1406. Douglas DC-10-10, N68055. Newburgh, New York. September 5, 1996. Washington, D.C.: National Transportation Safety Board Retrieved from https://app.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/AAR9803.pdf.

NTSB. (2011). National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation. Washington, D.C.: National Transportation Safety Board Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A-11-079-081.pdf.

NTSB. (2016). National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation. Washington, D.C.: National Transportation Safety Board Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A-16-001-002.pdf.

RAS. (2013). Smoke, Fire and Fumes in Transport Category Aircraft. Past History, Current Risk and Recommended Mitigations. Retrieved from London, England: http://flightsafety.org/files/RAESSFF.pdf

Smith, S. (2013). UPS Begins Using Fire-Resistant Cargo Containers. Ground Support Worldwide, 21(7), 26. TSBC. (2003). Aviation Investigation Report. In-Flight Fire Leading to Collision with Water. Swissair Transport Limited.

McDonnell Douglas MD-11 HB-IWF. Peggy's Cove Nova Scotia 5nm SW. 2 September 1998. Retrieved from Gatineau, Quebec: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/a98h0003.pdf

“Maddog Pilots: Let’s Clear The Air on CARGO FIRE LWR (FWD/AFT) Level 3 Alerts” By: David Mikkola

“Flashing Discharge Switch - Push.” We all know the phase one and can verbalize it with ease. However, writing from experience, when a quiet, dark night in smooth air at cruise altitude is interrupted by flashing red warning lights, an aural tone, and a red boxed CARGO FIRE LWR FWD (or AFT) alert on the EAD, our minds will initially be clouded with many thoughts. Unfortunately, the flashing discharge switch we reach for while reciting the phase one resides on a cargo fire panel that is counter-intuitive in its design. We all agree that a cargo fire is one of our biggest threats. A periodic review of the cargo fire panel and lower cargo fire QRH procedures will minimize confusion and prevent critical errors should you ever get these indications.

In those first few seconds of brain-stem-only thinking “Is this really happening?”, the first thing that can confuse us is that the “flashing discharge switch” does not contain the letters DISCH. See the panel below. Remember, the flashing letters you will see are FWD1, FWD2, AFT1, or AFT2. There are four agent discharge switches as labeled in white at the top of the panel. Push only the one that is flashing.

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When we push the flashing discharge switch, by design, nothing observable happens. Because of this, we are likely going to have the urge to keep pushing buttons. Let's not do it! Let's sit on our hands. Wind the clock. Get out the QRH. As pilots, we expect immediate feedback. Action. Reaction. Normally when we push a switch a light illuminates or extinguishes. We push another switch and a valve on a synoptic page changes color. However, the cargo fire agent discharge switches are a different animal. When we push a flashing discharge switch, there is no instant feedback. The associated bottle (1 or 2) will indeed be discharged into the associated lower cargo bay (forward or aft). However, the switch is designed to keep flashing until the agent is fully discharged. Only then will the agent LOW light illuminate steadily in the lower half of the switch. Normally this is 28 seconds for bottle one and 15 seconds for bottle two. The QRH allows for one full minute for this to occur. eplaceWatching that switch continue to flash will feel like an eternity in a real life scenario. Be patient. Use that time to determine the nearest suitable airport, coordinate with ATC, and open the QRH.

A common error observed in the training department is that this lack of immediate feedback lures crews into pushing other switches that are not flashing. This sometimes results in errantly using the second bottle prematurely and therefore reducing the designed suppression time of three hours. (We will get 90 minutes per bottle if the second bottle is manually discharged after the first 90 minutes has elapsed). Another common error is sending the fire suppression agent to the wrong compartment. To prevent these missteps, we must remember to press only the flashing discharge light when conducting the phase one and to stay in the same column (FWD or AFT) if the QRH or captain directs a discharge of the second bottle into the same compartment.


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Ok, we have that down. Press only the flashing switch. Sit on our hands. Comply with the QRH. Same column. Now what are all these other lights and switches on the cargo fire panel? The test switch is self explanatory, so we won't discuss that. What about these flow switches? The QRH will direct you to press the associated flow switches on the cargo fire panel. Keep in mind that MD-10-10 will not have these switches. Some MD-10-30's do have the FWD FLOW switch only. The red HEAT and SMOKE lights are informational only. They let us know which sensor or sensors are causing the fire warning. Our entire fleet has SMOKE detectors. All MD-11's and some MD-10's have HEAT detectors in the lower cargo bays.

There is one more important item for this discussion. There has been a recent change to the QRH level 3 CARGO FIRE LWR___ checklist. A WARNING has been added and procedures changed to prevent a false indication on the ground during loading from resulting in halon being discharged by the crew into a compartment where ramp personnel may be harmed. Please take the time to review the most up to date version of your QRH for the changes to the steps in the checklist. Only the new warning is included here.

After reading this, you may have decided that it is a good time to re-familiarize yourself with the cargo fire panel in the airplane next time you are on a long leg. A company provided Ipad application called Cockpit Companion can be found in the FedEx App Catalog and is very useful for this type of review. The icon looks like this:

By the way, my experience with a CARGO FIRE LWR indication resulted in the the level 3 alert remaining active for approximately 20 minutes from FL310 until short final. We were 120nm from the nearest suitable airport. Emergency responders determined that there was no fire. It was inconclusive what caused the indications.

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Airbus and Cargo Fire Procedures By Warren Cox

Bull riders and cargo pilots are consumed with “how long” they can hang on. While the bull rider is obsessed with an eight second ride, the cargo pilot is in a race with time to land before the fire wins. Section 7, Fire and Smoke, details fires in the bellies (Cargo Compt Smoke 7-1-0-14) and the main deck (Main Deck Cargo Smoke 7-1-0-17). Let’s take a look at two different ECAM procedures. First will be a cargo compt smoke, and the second a main deck cargo smoke.

The Cargo Compt Smoke ECAM states:

LAND ASAP AGENT 1………………………………………………………………………...DISCH LDG ELEVATION………………..………………………………..………...10,000 FT ● One hour later or for approach, whichever is earlier:

AGENT 2………………………………………………………...………DISCHPROC CARGO COMPT SMOKE

If a descent for landing is underway, it is recommended to discharge AGENT 2 immediately. AGENT 1 discharges its full contents immediately while AGENT 2 will discharge slowly to extend your fire-fighting time. For A300-600s with a standby generator and A310-300s, the second bottle (AGENT 2) has a metering device to maintain sufficient agent concentration up to 260 minutes from the time of first bottle discharge. For other Airbus versions, the second bottle (AGENT 2) has no metering device. Fire-suppression capability is 90 minutes from time of first bottle discharge. Remember, AGENT 1 must be discharged before AGENT 2. Expect the smoke warning light to remain on after agent discharge because the smokedetectors are sensitive to the extinguishing agent as well. Notice that oxygen masks are not required by ECAM. If smoke entered the cockpit, use your oxygen mask as directed by the QRH and Phase 1’s.


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For Main Deck Cargo Smoke the ECAM states:

LAND ASAP OXYGEN MASK……………………………………………………………………ON SEAT BELT/NO SMOKING………………………..…………………………..…..ON COURIER OXYGEN …………………..…………………………………MAN OVRD PROC MAIN DECK CARGO SMOKE

For this scenario, the ECAM has directed us to wear our oxygen masks. This makes everything more difficult. Our field of vision is reduced, communication between the pilots is now through the intercom, and even talking on the radio can be problematic. In this procedure, the plane uses airflow control to help fight the fire. When we get the smoke warning, airflow on the main deck automatically shuts off by closing:

● Both main deck isolation valves.● BULK cargo trim air valve.● HOT AIR SUPPLY valve.● BULK cargo isolation valve.● PACK VALVE 2 (if both packs operating).

A cold air bypass valve also opens to vent excess conditioned air overboard.

How long do you have to get the plane on the ground? There is no way to know how long you have—no two events are identical. History of cargo fires, and cargo fire research, suggests a maximum of 15 minutes. We probably have less time than we used to think. Lithium battery fires produce a tremendous amount of smoke and heat. A lithium battery fire can offer as little as 6 minutes time to get the airplane on the ground. If landing immediately is not an option (over the ocean etc.), the QRH directs us to cruise at 20,000 feet. The purpose of cruising at 20,000 feet is to deprive the fire of oxygen. While a descent may not be helpful when attempting to fight a lithium battery fire, the Airbus smoke and fire warnings on the flight deck cannot indicate fire type or severity.

How do we know what the closest airports are? Many of us fly with the airport tile selected, which would display airports in view on our ND. We can pull up the closest airport in the FMS by selecting REF—3L “Closest Airports.” This will give us bearing and distance to the closest airports in the FMS database, which is limited by our small database. ATC can be very helpful in this situation, along with providing the weather conditions for decision making. Remember, the nearest airport may be behind you.

Should we leave our duty station to go investigate? That will be up to the crew to determine. The FOM in 9.21 tells us that crewmembers should not leave their duty station to investigate unknown or suspected hazardous odors/fumes. If a crewmember elects to investigate or leave the flight deck to discharge fire extinguishers connected to dangerous goods containers, the crewmember must wear positive-flow oxygen equipment with eye protection. The preferred equipment is the walk-around bottle, with the


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regulator set to positive flow. If the PBE is used, crewmembers are reminded that once the PBE is activated, it cannot be turned off or reactivated. The PBE provides approximately 15 minutes of oxygen.

Items to consider once descending.

When you start your descent, it would be a good idea to use EGPWS for indication of terrain below. Your normal 3:1 descent ratio is out the window: something closer to 2:1 would be more appropriate. For simple 2:1 math, if this all occurs while cruising at FL320, and your new destination is approximately sea level, you’d need 64nm to lose 32,000 feet. Also, don’t forget the deceleration segment as described below. This example would indicate a descent should be started about 76nm from the airport. Autopilot use is recommended. The banana can also help plan your descent. If you really need to expedite your descent, above 20,000 feet, descending at Mmo/Vmo with the gear retracted provides the highest rate of descent. Landing gear may be extended below 20,000 feet once at Vlo/Vle 270 knots to increase rate of descent. Slowing to 250 knots at 10,000 feet is likely unnecessary because you are trying to land ASAP. Aim to be at 3,000 AGL and 340k by 12 miles from the end of the runway, if terrain permits. At 3,000 AGL, leave the speed brakes out to help slow. Configure the gear and flaps at their maximum allowable speeds. When simulated, slowing from 340kts to 170kts using speedbrakes, gear, and configuring on speed takes approximately 9 miles. If you maintained 340kts to 12 miles, the math from above will place you on GS and 170kts 3 miles from touchdown. Most pilots in simulator training slow too early and require additional power. For landing, consider use of auto brakes and potentially perform an auto landing. The pilot monitor should have the evacuation checklist ready to go: it is located on the back cover of the QRH. When stopping the plane consider the direction of the wind and the fact that fire trucks will need to maneuver around the plane. If you are able to run the evacuation checklist, one technique that works well is for the F/O to read the action and give the answer, while the captain moves the switches. Obviously abandon the QRH if your life becomes endangered. The primary escape route would be through the R1 and L1 doors. If that it is not an option, use the cockpit windows, protect your hands if possible. Have a predetermined meeting point for all passengers and crew, so we can account for everyone once on the ground.

B-777 and Fire Cargo Main Deck By Kirk Williams

So far the flight has been uneventful. Ticking off the required actions on the LRN checklist, we are two hours through our four-hour stint while the relief crew rests. Only two more hours and

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nap time! We made note of our southerly route. With ETOPS alternates like PMDY, PHNL, and PADK, we are indeed south during our transit of the expanse of the Pacific Ocean.

Then things start to happen that we prayed would never happen on our watch. First, out of the corner of our eye we see the fire-suppression discharge light illuminate. This is not good—we know from our training this means that the FSS has detected a fire and has attempted to suppress it. Next, our worst nightmare, a FIRE CARGO MAIN DECK EICAS alert with the associated bells and whistles. Time to recall the relief crew from the crew rest . . . but how are we going to communicate the urgency, traditional two digs of the crew rest chime? Sure wish we had briefed how we will handle an urgent recall to the flight deck.

The relief crew sleepily returns to the cockpit unsure why the early wake up call, but it doesn’t take long before the obvious severity of the issue consumes them as well. We need to prioritize actions now and, first and foremost, who is going to fly. The captain assigns PF duties to the F/O and directs him to proceed direct to the nearest airport, which happens to be one of our ETOPS alternates. Good news, if there is any, the weather at our divert airport is good.

All four of us are now donning O2 masks and beginning to comply with the contingency procedures of the LRN. No tracks or airways to worry about with this southerly route, so direct as fast as we can go is the new order of the day.

We select checklist, and the ECL populates the FIRE CARGO MAIN DECK checklist.

➢ Oxygen masks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON/100%OK, everyone is at a duty station and has donned their O2 mask

➢ Establish crew and supernumerary communications.Wow, how would we communicate with folks in the crew rest or supernumerary? Is it P/A or flight interphone or cabin interphone? Sure wish I would have had some folks go to the back of the airplane before this to try it out so I knew what was the correct selection.

➢ SUPRNMRY OXYGEN/MASK ALERT switch . . . . . . . . . . Push to ON and hold for 1second. OK, found that switch, but when I push it, what happens? � Lavatory and crew rest oxygen mask drop. � Activates aural and visual alerts in the supernumerary area and crew rest. � Supernumerary area and crew rest lights illuminate at full brightness. Supernumerary (SUPRNMRY) Oxygen ON light Illuminated (amber) —Supernumerary oxygen system is operating.

➢ MAIN DK ALERT switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Push


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OK, where is that switch, I know it must be on the overhead somewhere . . . Nope it’s on the COM panel that we use all the time to chime the crew rest. But when I push it what happens?

The main deck alert system activates an aural warning and flashes the cargo area sidewall lights for several seconds to alert crewmembers in the main deck cargo compartment to return to the cabin. The system activates automatically upon main cargo deck smoke detection or cabin depressurization, or manually by pushing the MAIN DK ALERT switch on the flight deck call panel. The switch light illuminates to indicate system activation and extinguishes to indicate reset.

➢ MAIN DECK CARGO FIRE ARM switch. . . .Confirm . . . . . . . . .ARMEDWait, this is a “confirm” switch so what happens when I push it?

� Turns off both recirculation fans. � Turns off the lavatory/galley vent fans. � Turns off cargo heat in respective compartment. � Turns off electrical power outlets in respective compartment. � Commands pack to supply air to flight deck and supernumerary areas only. � Turns off the Nitrogen Generation System.

➢ CARGO FIRE DEPR/DISCH switch . . . . . Push and hold for 1 secondOK, push and hold for one second and then what . . . CARGO FIRE Depressurization/Discharge (DEPR/DISCH) Switch Push With the MAIN DECK—ARMED - Initiates airplane depressurization to a cabin altitude of approximately 23,000 feet with the airplane altitude at 25,000 feet.

➢ Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.Ouch, our nearest suitable airport is almost 1,300 miles away. . . what did they say? Typically, 18–20 minutes is the magic number to land in an uncontrolled fire scenario.

➢ If the fire situation becomes uncontrollable, consider an immediate landing.Well this seems obvious, but that implies ditching may be a better option. If things become very dire it would be better to land controlled in the water than to not be able to control the airplane.

In mid-2015 Boeing introduced a freighter-specific fire profile that is designed to make the most out of a bad situation. ➢ Distances in the following steps assume airport elevation at sea level and no wind.Adjust distances for actual conditions.

➢ Choose one:


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� The distance to the nearest suitable airport is 60nm or less: Not our day so we have to answer “no” to this one. . ..

� The distance to the nearest suitable airport is more than 60 nm: Yes, that is our predicament. . .

➢ Expedite a climb or descentto 25,000 feet when conditions and terrain allow.

➢ Plan to stay at 25,000 feetuntil approximately 60 nm from the runway. OK, the F/O starts a MMO/VMO descent with speedbrakes extended, but I wonder why we stop at 25,000 feet?

Boeing studies suggest that 25,000 feet is the highest altitude we can operate on 100 percent oxygen without any adverse physiological effects, it also provides for our highest true airspeed, and the reduced oxygen partial pressure hopefully keeps the fire suppressed until a descent is required.

➢ At approximately 60 nm from the runway, start an expedited, uninterrupted descent tothe lowest safe altitude or 3,000 feet AFE, whichever is higher.

Note: Use of the autopilot, autothrottle, and FLCH mode is recommended to protect airspeed and altitude and reduce crew workload for the expedited descent. Use of V/S mode is not recommended.

MMO/VMO and speedbrakes to 3,000 feet. Thankfully, we put the 60-mile and 30-mile rings in the FIX pages, so we have SA on the NAV display.

➢ Arriving at 3,000 feet at 15 nm from the runway set the MCP speed to approach speedand immediately extend the speedbrakes (prevents autothrottle advancement and provides shortest time to configure). Upon reaching flaps up speed, extend flaps and landing gear on schedule. Plan a normal approach and landing.


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Note: Use of the autopilot and autothrottle with the APP mode is the recommended technique for the approach and landing. Use of the V/S mode is not recommended.

So today it all worked out, and we land successfully; now we need to make an evacuation decision. Do we need to use the slides to leave the airplane or is it safe to await emergency responders for assistance? It is imperative that we continuously evaluate the situation and the possible options to determine if evacuation is the best choice. There is no need to expose ourselves to the additional risk of a slide evacuation if the airplane is not on fire.

What other considerations are there if the fire is not suppressed?

• Will you go into the main deck and fight the fire? There is not much written aboutaccessing a Class E compartment, but one consideration would be that opening the access doors could compromise the airtight integrity of the occupied space.

• If things get very dire, think UPS 6, is ditching in controlled flight a better option thantrying to get to an airport? The Miracle on the Hudson demonstrated that landing on the water can be survivable.

• Ditching, what sort of preparations? Take the contents of the cooler food and water.Add additional equipment, axe, fire ex bottles as space permits.

• Is there an ELT in the slide? No, be sure to take the portable one with you.

• How do you find out where ships are? Call San Francisco ARINC and advise them ofyour position. They can contact the Coast Guard and find ships in the area so that a ditching attempt can occur in proximity to a rescuing vessel. A Cirrus aircraft was forced to ditch 250 miles off the coast of Maui. The whole evolution was video taped by a Coast Guard C-130:

http://youtu.be/9gCMdeU22Dk

http://www.flyingmag.com/technique/accidents/cirrus-sr22-pilot-releases-selfie-video-ditching

• Will you land at a closed airport? If you land at a closed airport there may be no ARFFFcapabilities at the airport. All ETOPS alternates are guaranteed to have at least Category 3 ARFFF and when we go over 207 minutes they have category 7 ARFFF.

• Satcom. . . who ya gonna call? One call to GOCC and then perhaps the ATSU that iscontrolling the flight. The numbers are in the directory.

In addition to completing the ditching checklist, there are a few other considerations.


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Turn on the 406mhz ELT on the overhead. This permits a satellite-broadcasted position for tracking to your ditching location. During the descent, don’t forget to squawk 7700 and send a CPDLC emergency report. This has the added effect of selecting ADS to EMERG ON.

Lessons We Can Learn from UPS 1354 By Todd Carpenter

On the morning of August 14, 2013 an A300-622R operating as UPS 1354 crashed on approach to RWY 18 at KBHM. The airplane was destroyed, and sadly, both crewmembers lost their lives.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently released its final report on the accident, which can be found here: UPS 1354 Accident Report.

The Probable Cause statement as well as a few of the findings from that report are listed below.

Probable Cause The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft’s altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain.

Pertinent Findings for our Discussion

ϖ The captain, as pilot flying, should have called for the first officer’s verificationof the flight plan in the flight management computer (FMC), and the first officer, as pilot monitoring, should have verified the flight plan in the FMC; their conversation regarding nonpertinent operational issues distracted them from

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recognizing that the FMC was not resequenced, even though several salient cues were available.

ϖ The captain’s change to a vertical speed approach after failing to capture theprofile glidepath was not in accordance with UPS procedures and guidance and decreased the time available for the first officer to perform her duties.

ϖ The flight crew did not monitor the descent rate and continued to fly theairplane with a vertical descent rate of 1,500 feet per minute below 1,000 feet above ground level, which was contrary to standard operating procedures, resulting in an unstabilized approach that should have necessitated a go-around.

ϖ The flight crew did not sufficiently monitor the airplane’s altitude during theapproach and subsequently allowed the airplane to descend below the minimum altitude without having the runway environment in sight.

ϖ The first officer’s failure to make the “approaching minimums” and “minimums”altitude callouts during the approach likely resulted from the time compression resulting from the excessive descent rate, her momentary distraction from her pilot monitoring duties by looking out the window when her primary responsibility was to monitor the instruments and her fatigue.

ϖ Although it was the first officer’s responsibility to announce the callouts as theairplane descended, the captain was also responsible for managing the approach in its final stages using a divided visual scan that would not leave him solely dependent on the first officer’s callouts to stop the descent at the minimum descent altitude.

ϖ The captain’s belief that they were high on the approach and his distractionfrom his pilot flying duties by looking out the window likely contributed to his failure to adequately monitor the approach.

ϖ For the captain, fatigue due to circadian factors may have been present at thetime of the accident.

ϖ The first officer poorly managed her off-duty time by not acquiring sufficientsleep, and she did not call in fatigued. She was fatigued due to acute sleep loss and circadian factors, which, when combined with the time compression and the change in approach modes, likely resulted in the multiple errors she made during the flight.

ϖ By not rebriefing or abandoning the approach when the airplane did notcapture the profile glidepath after passing the final approach fix, the flight


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crewmembers placed themselves in an unsafe situation because they had different expectations of how the approach would be flown.

ϖ The continuous descent final approach technique provides a safer alternative to “dive and drive” during nonprecision approaches.

ϖ Due to the importance of pertinent remarks, such as variable cloud ceilings, to the flight crew’s understanding of weather conditions, it is critical that flight dispatch papers, the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system, and automatic terminal information service contain pertinent remarks for weather observations because such remarks provide flight crews a means to understand changing weather conditions. Had the flight crew been provided with the pertinent remarks in this accident, they may have been aware of the possibility of changing visibility and ceilings upon their arrival at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport.

Moving forward, as the world’s largest operator of the A300/A310, what lessons can we learn from this accident? Fatigue This one is near and dear to every FedEx pilot’s heart, so let’s address it first. During the hearings surrounding the investigation, there was extensive discussion about fatigue. From the findings, you can see that the NTSB acknowledged the issue and spent considerable time exploring the history of the crewmembers activities leading up to the accident flight. There was plenty of concern with each individual’s travels in the days preceding the accident. Also, personal electronic device (cellphone, tablets and computer) history was used to help determine sleep cycles. It is truly a brave new world. The board was concerned that not every effort was made by the crewmembers to get adequate rest. They did acknowledge that flying on the backside of the clock can be problematic. The board also determined that the “cargo cutout” did not apply leading up to the accident. Their trip pairing, to that point, fell within the section 119 rest rules. When it comes down to it though, if you feel that you are too fatigued to fly a trip, for whatever reason, then you should use the framework that we have been afforded by the FOM and CBA guidance:

FOM 2.05 FATIGUE CBA Sec. 12.A.9 Fatigue Expectation Bias The dispatch paperwork included a BHM forecast for their ETA of VRB03KT P6SM 4BKN. Enroute, the crew obtained ACARS weather that showed the ASOS observation and METARs with ceilings broken to overcast at 800 to 1,000 feet. The METAR remarks indicating variable ceilings of 600 to 1,300 feet were not provided due to specifications by UPS to its weather service provider. The pilots then received


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ATIS information Papa, which was current at the time of the accident, and was prepared based on the 0353 METAR observation that indicated ceilings had improved to 10BKN. Again, the ATIS did not include the METAR remarks for variable ceiling. Based on the last weather received by the crew, it is likely they fully expected to break out of the clouds nearly 400 feet above minimums for the LOC 18 approach they chose to fly. It is reasonable to believe they did not fully anticipate that they may not break out and that a missed approach was likely.

This is the danger of an expectation bias. From that report, you can then imagine that, since they hadn’t broken out, they didn’t believe they were anywhere near minimums.

The good news for us is that our ACARS products at FedEx will provide the RMKS. The bad news is that ATIS might not. Be prepared for a missed approach and be careful when presented conflicting information.

Unbriefed Changes

While many of us may have heard that they didn’t clean up the approach, hopefully our understanding of the events that led to this tragedy doesn’t stop there. Yes, they made a procedural error by not cleaning up the FMS but that shouldn’t have resulted in an accident. Instead, this accident, like so many others, has its roots in the way that the error was mishandled. When the PF recognized that the aircraft wasn’t descending, he elected to start the aircraft down, going from a briefed VNAV approach, to a “dive and drive” mode. Furthermore, this change was not announced to the PM.

During the NTSB hearing, Dr. Tom Chidester, a research psychologist, observed:

When something changes, as it did here, it's a challenge, particularly for the pilot monitoring. It can become unclear as to what we're going to do next; I knew what I was going to do before and now we've got something that's got to change. I think I would hope to see the pilot flying in that case to very clearly verbalize what the intentions are and what I need the pilot monitoring to do in this particular case.

That is likely to produce a moment of confusion and a moment of reorientation, and that's why I think you hear Captain Parker (UPS A300 Fleet Training Manager) talking about the desire to see them just instead abandon an approach.

When asked whether it is easy for a crew to abandon an approach, Dr. Chidester went on to say:

There are several ways to look at this. If you look at the research that Judith Orasanu has done out at NASA, it would suggest to you that people are


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reluctant to abandon a plan as a plan that's going wrong and that sometimes you do see a perseverance in a course of action that you would like to see interrupted. I think if you look at how approaches are planned, very often we should be thinking of the intention to fly an approach to a missed approach, and the missed approach should be part of the maneuver. However, there are risks associated with an unplanned missed approach as well. Those can go wrong as well. So I would hope that if we are seeing people plan an approach having in mind the missed approach, that alleviates some of the perseverance issue and some of the threats associated with that missed approach.

If we imagine ourselves in the above situation, electing to abandon the approach and asking for a turn back out might be a slight blow to our ego, but it buys us some time to sort out the issues and discover why the VNAV didn’t work. Instead, by starting down, more confusion was introduced into an already confusing situation, and you can almost imagine the PM looking at the FMS, still trying to figure out why P.DES never captured. These distractions led to missed callouts, including the most critical “approaching minimums” and “minimums” calls.

We may take some solace in the fact that FedEx no longer allows us to do “dive and drive” approaches and instead, as a response to this accident, now directs us to use the constant descent angle (CDA) procedure for non-VNAV non-precision approaches. However, if we’ve taken the PM out of the loop with these unbriefed, last-minute changes, how much help can we reasonably expect with recommended altitudes and DME?

Who Is Monitoring the Monitor? One thing to keep in mind from the above discussion is that the PF is, by definition, flying and monitoring the airplane. The PM is monitoring the airplane, as well has keeping an eye on the PF. However, the PM is really the last line of defense, and no one is monitoring the PM. Silence from the neighboring seat is often incorrectly interpreted as de facto approval of the current flight parameters. But, if the PM is instead distracted, either by competing duties, fatigue, confusion or just by a lack of attention, then an important safeguard has been lost. The worst part of that situation is that the crew may not even realize there has been a breakdown.

It therefore becomes critical that crews communicate and that the PM lets the PF know when they are getting behind, distracted, or have other duties that will interrupt the PM’s monitoring duties. “I’m going to be heads down,” “I need to make a radio call to company,” “I’m confused,” or “I’ll get the landing data” are all good calls that let the PF know that SA in the cockpit could be degraded. This issue of PM duties highlights the fact that the PF, in addition to flying, also needs to monitor the PM. I know it seems circular, but as far back as 1979, NASA found that the crews that performed the best during a workload study used effective communication to ensure both crewmembers were actively engaged with each other and the flight.


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Finally, this aircraft was on an unstable approach that the crew elected to attempt to save and continue to a landing. Situational awareness had been degraded to the point that they didn’t know why the automation wasn’t doing what they wanted. They lost track of their vertical position in relation to the approach and continued with an excessive descent rate until it was too late. An early recognition of an unstable approach and subsequent go around would’ve prevented this accident. If we discount this accident as simply being the result of not cleaning up the FMS, then we miss an opportunity to examine ourselves and we may set ourselves up to repeat history.

Stay safe.

A Comparison of Approach Types: APV v. NPA By Matt Morley

I am often asked to explain the differences between DDA and MDA and to discern when not to add the 50 feet to the minimums block. The topic is a bit complicated and requires you to understand the type of approach you are flying, the FOM, and what the minimums block is telling you.

DDA or MDA? FOM 60 (6.53 DETERMINING MDA, DDA, DA, DH OR AH) has added clarification and says:

All aircraft except MD11/MD-10—Non-ILS DA/DDA Minimums:

•Domestic and International : For LNAV/VNAV approach minima, a published DA may be used. For all other approaches, a DDA shall be used for all published DA (H)/MDA (H).

•Domestic VNAV Exceptions : For those approaches that have the ball note "Only authorized operators may use VNAV DA(H) in lieu of MDA(H)" and LOC (GS out) MDA(H) on ILS approaches with the glideslope out of service, VNAV may be used to treat an MDA as a DA (no need to add 50 feet to create a DDA).

Three Times Not to Add 50 Feet

1. RNAV approach to the LNAV/VNAV minimums.

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2. ILS Glide Slope Out of Service to the LOC minimums (Domestic Only).


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3. VOR or LOC approaches with the ball note that reads: "Only authorized

operators may use VNAV DA(H) in lieu of MDA(H)." (Domestic Only).


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Back to the Basics Getting back to the basics from time to time is called for and necessary. Such is the case in discerning the differences in the instrument approaches FedEx pilots are authorized to conduct. Let’s review the differences between non-precision approaches (NPA) and approaches with vertical guidance (APV). We will begin by looking at the definitions of these two approaches.

Definitions From the AIM Non-precision approach procedure: A standard instrument approach procedure in which no electronic glideslope is provided (e.g., VOR, TACAN, NDB, LOC, ASR, LDA, or SDF approaches).

Approach with vertical guidance (APV): A term used to describe RNAV approach procedures that provide lateral and vertical guidance but do not meet the requirements to be considered a precision approach.

Definitions From ICAO Annex 6 Part 1

Non-precision approach and landing operations. An instrument approach and landing that utilizes lateral guidance but does not utilize vertical guidance.

Approach and landing operations with vertical guidance: An instrument approach and landing that utilizes lateral and vertical guidance but does not meet the requirements established for precision approach and landing operations.


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Refer to the FOM 6.29 for a list of approach types under the NPA and APV categories.

Each of these approach types have defining characteristics in the header title (VOR 23 v. RNAV (GPS) 23) and, more importantly, in their minimums. The NPA will post minimums as an MDA while the APV will reflect LNAV/VNAV minimums as a DA(H). Let’s look at those definitions from the AIM.

Minimum descent altitude: The lowest altitude, expressed in feet above mean sea level, to which descent is authorized on final approach or during circle-to-land maneuvering in execution of a standard instrument approach procedure where no electronic glideslope is provided. (See NONPRECISION APPROACH PROCEDURE.)

Decision altitude (DA): A specified altitude (mean sea level (MSL)) on an instrument approach procedure (ILS, GLS, vertically guided RNAV) at which the pilot must decide whether to continue the approach or initiate an immediate missed approach if the pilot does not see the required visual references.

FedEx pilots and airplanes are authorized to fly to the DA(H) published minimums and, as the definition implies, must make a decision to continue or initiate a missed approach at that altitude.

Two Approach Types Publish DA(H): Precision and APV APV approaches are designed to provide vertical guidance to a decision altitude (DA). Where designed to a DA the loss of height during the initial stage of a missed approach is taken into account (ICAO AC 008A-APV)

The MDA(H) found on NPAs has some restrictions that may mandate a 50-foot additive known as a DDA(H) or derived decision altitude. MDA(H) do not account for a loss of altitude during the initial stage of a missed approach. A computed DDA accounts for this loss of altitude.

Internationally, all NPAs require a DDA to be computed and referenced.

This leaves the question of RNAV (GPS) approaches. Those approaches are a type of APV approaches and post two types of minimums:

1. LNAV/VNAV to a DA(H). No additive is required.

Internationally no additive is required when flying to LNAV/VNAVminimums, as they are a DA(H), and any altitude loss in the initialstage of a missed approach is accounted for (ICAO AC 008A-APV).


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These approaches may require the baro minimums to be adjusted for temperature extremes as noted on the approach plate. In this case a DDA is required.

2. LNAV to a MDA(H). As it is an MDA(H), a DDA must be computed ifno ball note exists.

EU-OPS 1 member states are transitioning non-precision approach charts to a CDFA standard. In this transition, MDA(H) are being depicted as a DA(H). This stands as the one time FedEx is not authorized to fly to a DA(H) and must consider them a MDA(H) and compute a DDA. Following are examples of LOC (GS out), VOR, and LNAV minimums that are labeled as DA(H) but must be treated as an MDA(H) and add a 50-foot DDA.


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FAQs:

Does FedEx have to add 50 feet to the minimums of an RNAV (GPS) approach?

A: Not to the LNAV/VNAV DA(H) but yes to the LNAV MDA(H)

What type approach is an RNAV (GPS)?

A: It is an APV approach.

What type approach is a LOC or VOR approach?

A: It is a non-precision approach and displays a MDA(H).

Is there ever a time FedEx does not have to compute a DDA for the MDA(H)?

A: Yes two times: For ILS GS OTS to LOC MDA(H) and for those approaches with the ball note. It must be flown in VNAV mode else a DDA is required.

What if I have to fly the approach using V/S is a DDA required?

A: Yes. Always compute a DDA when flying in V/S mode.

What is the difference between non-precision and non-ILS?

A: Non-ILS is FedEx for non-precision.

Does FedEx have to compute a DDA for APV approaches flown to a DA(H)?

A: No. APV approaches are designed to provide vertical guidance to a decision altitude (DA). Where designed to a DA, the loss of height during the initial stage of a missed approach is taken into account.


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Does FedEx have to compute a DDA for APV approaches internationally flown to DA(H)?

A: It depends. If it is to LNAV/VNAV DA(H), then no. If it is to LNAV DA(H) or MDA(H), then yes.

Why can FedEx fly to LNAV/VNAV DA(H) minimums without computing a DDA?

A: FedEx can fly to all DA(H) published minimums for APV and precision approaches without computing a DDA both domestically or internationally. APV approaches are designed to provide vertical guidance to a decision altitude (DA). Where designed to a DA, the loss of height during the initial stage of a missed approach is taken into account.

Are there APV approaches designed that do not provide vertical guidance?

A: Yes, and those minimums are to LNAV MDA(H).

What is the difference between LNAV/VNAV and LNAV minimums?

A: LNAV/VNAV provides both lateral and vertical guidance to a DA. As such, it allows for a reduced obstacle clearance and accounts for the loss of height during the initial stage of a missed approach. LNAV provides only lateral guidance and requires a greater obstacle clearance until the pilot takes over visually to continue descent and assume obstacle avoidance visually. A loss of altitude is not accounted for in the initial stages of the missed approach. The computed DDA accounts for this altitude loss.

Sweeper Flight—For all life’s twists and turnsBy Matt Morley

GOC directed diverts—known as sweeps—generate a high cockpit workload. Rarely, are you notified of the sweep intention prior to push back, which would allow us time to prepare for the flight at 0 knots. How the cockpit is managed and tasks are prioritized has a lot to do with the pace and situational awareness of the crew during a sweep.

It is important to also remind ourselves why we have sweeper flights and their

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importance to “The World On Time.” Sweeper flights and their routing protect our system from interruption that may occur due to maintenance, weather, or cargo overages. None of us cherish the idea of recovering freight, but we play a very key role in delivering freight on time and keeping all of us profitable in a very competitive market. Having said that, there are certain steps that can be taken prior to departure to minimize the workload.

Identifying Sweeper flights

Know that you are on a sweeper flight. The bidpack publishes the sweeper designated flights and their departure cities.

Additionally, a quick call to the dispatcher can confirm the flight’s sweeper status and cities covered in the sweep.

Talking to your dispatcher

Probe your dispatcher for threats at these various cities to bring you and dispatcher up to speed on the airfield status and obstacles to safe operation. Are there restrictive NOTAMS that would affect your operation? Changing the conversation of “we will worry about that if it happens” to “if this happens, what risks will affect our operations this evening?” UPS 1354 reminded us how dangerous landing out of the KBHM LOC 18 really is. I’d like to know that runway 6/24 is closed prior to being swept into an airfield with similarly difficult situations.

Preparing for the sweep

On that note, the advice of “trust but verify” is wise guidance. Determine what cities your flight is covering from the dispatcher, have the conversation with them, and print the weather and NOTAMS for those cities in advance. If you are the tech savy type,


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you can also store them electronically. To do so, search for key words like “CLSD” or “OTS.” Using the FIND function to search the NOTAMS in this fashion will highlight all the closures and equipment that is out of service. It is a quick and easy way to screen the sweeper cities for high risks.

Preload your EFB or iPad with the sweep city Jepp charts for quicker access. Consider pulling up ATIS for those cities as you fly near them to improve your SA and be better prepared.

Should you receive the ACARS sweep notification, take your time to prepare, review, and brief in the comfort and calm at cruise before announcing the reroute to your sweeper city. Obviously, if it is an hour away then not an issue, but if you are out of Milwaukee and overhead O’Hare when you are notified to sweep to KORD it is foolish to immediately announce that to ATC. Fly 60nm south and get your cockpit and crew in order before making the call to ATC.

Chapter 9.14 Diversion

Chapter 9 is way down the road from Chapter 6 and most of us get off the train at Chapter 6. However, a bit over a year ago, diversion guidance was added to Chapter 9 of the FOM.

Take a moment and read the guidance material from this section and you will find the four-step guidance for a diversion with a definition of suitable. You will also have reference information to 5.37 Reroute, 6.69 Divert Procedures at Non-FedEx Ramps, and 4.21 Weight & Balance for contingency operations.

Take control of your designated sweeper flight:

� Know that your flight is a sweeper flight. � Contact the dispatcher and have a conversation on airfield risks and

expectations for the sweep. � Print off/download NOTAMS and weather for the sweeper cities and load your

iPad/EFB with sweeper cities. � Consider ATIS updates for the sweep cities as well as alternates and your

destination.

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High Altitude Upsets and Prevention/Recovery Training By Matt Morley

All Part 121 air carriers, including those who train under an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), are required to conduct UPRT beginning March 12, 2019. This article will give you a sampling of information found in a pilot guide called Airplane Upset Recovery. This guide is the product of a team formed by airplane manufacturers, airlines, pilot associations, flight training organizations, and government and regulatory agencies.

Airplane Upsets Definition: The four conditions that generally describe an airplane upset that are unintentional:

� Pitch attitude more than 25 degrees nose up. � Pitch attitude more than 10 degrees nose down. � Bank angle more than 45 degrees. � Flight within these parameters at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.

Why this topic? Loss of control is the leading cause for aircraft accidents in the aviation industry. Understanding the aerodynamic principles that lead to an upset and how to apply those principles to safely recover is essential to survival, should this rare occurrence present itself.

Key Takeaways From This Article The following are intended takeaways from this article:

1) Loss of control is the leading cause for aircraft accidents.¬ Environmental causes represent the majority of upsets that progress

into an accident.


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¬ Distraction is the leading cause for pilot induced upsets.

2) Protect maneuver margin¬ Cruise at or below Optimum Altitude. ¬ Never slow below L/Dmax

3) If an upset is encountered always reduce the AOA before countering roll.¬ An unloaded airplane will prevent a stall and/or accelerate the recovery

in an upset.

4) Know the high altitude stall characteristics that define a full stall for yourairplane.

¬ Heavy Buffett (It may be up to +/- 1.5 g and very similar to turbulence so if in weather this can be a challenge to recognize)

¬ Uncontrollable descent (once stall fully develops)

5) Reducing the AOA may require a large pitch change during a high altitude stall¬ It takes longer to recover at high altitude ¬ It is possible the airplane will be well out of trim ¬ The recovery rate to avoid a secondary and prevent an over g is similar

as the takeoff rotation rate.

Continue Reading for the full article.

Leading Cause for Upsets and Loss of Control Environmental upset is the top reason for an airplane upset and loss of control. In fact, from 1996 to 2002, environmental factors represented 126 loss-of-control incidents with no loss of life (72–Wake Turbulence and 54–Severe Weather). Similarly, during that same time period, the top losses of control accidents with loss of life were the result of stalls, flight control malfunction, disorientation, and a contaminated wing. In many cases, environmental factors induced the upset condition and would otherwise have been an incident if not for the incorrect recovery procedures. For example, high altitude wake turbulence is encountered and generated an airplane upset. The crew reacted incorrectly to the upset and resulted in a high-speed dive to a stall and accident.

High Altitude Aerodynamics, Upsets, and Loss of Control


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Deliberate attention given to a small but important set of aerodynamic principles will go a long way in preventing a loss of control in high altitude flight. Load Factor: High school physics taught us Newton’s second law of F=ma. Our concern with high altitude load factor is understanding the relationship acceleration has on it—specifically the vertical acceleration. Acceleration can be along any of the three axes where longitudinal is traditionally “going faster,” lateral is felt in a sideslip, and vertical is g forces. The higher the altitude, the greater the speed (TAS) is. At these higher speeds, the associated pitch rates can easily yield an excessive amount of g’s (vertical acceleration). In a Marine’s world, that translates into knowing that at high altitude the airplane is real pitchy and sensitive. Light control inputs are required to avoid over g-ing the airplane. This is much less true in the 777 where the fly-by-wire is commanding a g-rate and that command is the same for all flight regimes. We spend very little time hand-flying the airplane above FL250, and as such our muscle memory is not properly calibrated. So, should the airplane have a violent wake turbulence encounter at cruise and inadvertently disconnect the autopilot then timely and cautious inputs are required. The simulator is limited in its ability to prepare us for both the pitchy feel and the varying g-loads experienced in a sudden high altitude upset. Inadvertently entering a stall is possible. Stalls: An airplane stalls when its critical AOA has been reached. An airplane can stall at many different speeds and reacts to the stall differently depending on wing type. There is the potential that heavy buffet may precede stall warnings for high altitude stalls. During simulator training, you know that you are practicing stalls. You pre-brief the procedures, techniques, and expectations. You’re ready for it. Post-stall interviews from upset recoveries have revealed that pilots do not feel the stick shaker or hear the aural stall warnings during the stall event. Therefore, it is critical we can identify when the airplane is in a full stall. Defining stall characteristics varies among wing types. For swept wings typical of our airplanes full stalls will be defined by heavy buffet and an uncontrollable descent. What will likely be missing is the stereotypical wing drop and/or nose drop defined by smaller general aviation airplanes. The high altitude stall modeling is not available to simulator manufacturers. As such, the associated high altitude simulations may be an incorrect replication of the actual stall characteristics of your airplane. High altitude stalls are very different from low altitude stalls where excess thrust may allow the crew to “power” out of the stall. At higher altitudes, it is quite likely there will be very little excess thrust, and its effectiveness in aiding stall recovery is negligent. Therefore, reducing the AOA with a large pitch change may be required for a substantial amount of time and result in a large loss of altitude. Furthermore, we limit our trim for simulator stall setups but in reality the autopilot may have places the airplane in a very large out of trim condition. Similarly, we will not intentionally fly ourselves into a stall and as such it is likely we will continue to trim until stall indications are encountered. The airplane may not behave as expected with forward yoke pressure or behave very slowly until the nose up trim can be taken out.


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“At high altitudes the upper air currents such as the jet-stream become significant. Velocities in the jet-stream can be very high and can present a beneficial tailwind or a troublesome headwind. Windshear at the boundaries of the jet-stream can cause severe turbulence and unexpected changes in airspeed or Mach number. This windshear, or other local disturbances, can cause substantial and immediate airspeed decreases in cruise, as well as climb situations. If the airplane is performance limited due to high altitude and subsequently encounters an area of decreasing velocity due to wind shear, in severe cases the back side of the power curve may be encountered. The pilot will have to either increase thrust or decrease angle of attack to allow the airspeed to build back to normal climb/cruise speeds. This may require trading altitude for airspeed to accelerate out of the backside of the power curve region if additional thrust is not available.” Airplane Upset Recovery

The FedEx stall recovery emphasizes the importance of reducing the AOA. Gone are the days where we are concerned about +/-100 feet in the recovery and for a good reason. The goal is to recover from the stall and not crash. What may be missing in your training is how much of a pitch change is required to break the high altitude full stall (vice a low altitude stall), how much altitude is used to fly out of the stall, how gentle the recovery rate must be to avoid a secondary stall (3o/sec will avoid over g-ing and a secondary stall), and how little thrust will aid in that recovery. Buffet Limited Max Altitude: Flying at the optimum altitude provides 1.3g protection and operations at a speed sufficiently above L/D Max and well below Mmo. Optimum altitude is inversely proportional to aircraft weight and temperature. As weight is reduced due to fuel burn, a higher optimum altitude is available. Likewise, should there be a significant temperature change, the optimum altitude will change in a direct proportion to the change. Cruising at optimum altitude provides adequate g protection and airspeed stability. Protecting maneuver margin by cruising at or below optimum altitude is a primary upset prevention strategy. As the airplane climbs above the optimum altitude, the margin between low speed and high speed buffet narrows. The indicated airspeed for low speed buffet increases with altitude while the high speed buffet decreases with altitude. There is little room between an overspeed and a stall at max altitude. While we don’t want to overspeed the airplane, it is a much larger risk flying at the lower end of the speed range. Most jet airplanes are thrust limited at these higher altitudes and narrow speed ranges. As we slow below L/Dmax, the drag on the airplane increases to a point where we run out of excess thrust and are incapable of powering out of the slow speed range. The main risk factor is the high altitude stall. Whereas on the high speed end, we can reduce thrust and add drag with speed brakes as necessary. Attention to the temperature and, more importantly, to airspeed (particularly in turns) is required to ensure an adequate speed/maneuver margin is maintained. Consider


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using a reduced bank during high altitude turns if your airplane doesn’t automatically restrict it. Additional topics covered in the Airplane Upset Recovery manual pertinent to aerodynamics are energy management, icing, and effects of weight and balance. Let’s turn our attention to environmental and pilot-induced upsets. A small amount of prevention by maintaining a healthy maneuver margin goes a very long way in avoiding a loss of control during an upset event. Should an upset event occur, an immediate reduction of AOA will save your life and prevent aggravating the upset condition into a loss of control.

Environmental Induced Upset Four of the top five upset causes are the result of environmental conditions (wake turbulence, windshear, severe weather, and aircraft icing). We have little control of environmental conditions, so we train awareness and avoidance as preventive measures. Preventive measures are not full proof though. So, let’s look at two high altitude environmental conditions that could create an upset. Wake Turbulence: Reduced vertical separation was the creation of an ever busy and crowded airspace system. Unlike other types of severe turbulence, this one is particularly difficult to forecast and induces an immediate unusual attitude. Crossing traffic, opposite direction traffic, or following in trail traffic too closely can yield a wake turbulence encounter. Adequate maneuver margins usually allow for a controllable situation; however, your response to the upset can easily yield an overspeed or a stall. Accurately assessing the energy state in a timely fashion is very difficult while also overcoming startle. Untrained pilots will respond first by countering the roll which may aggravate the condition. Some pilots may naturally respond with rudder—both the FAA and airplane manufacturers do not recommend rudder use. After verifying the pitch and bank angles the first action should always be to reduce the AOA by unloading, then rolling wings level, and put the airplane in a positive energy state (trade altitude for airspeed if necessary). Should you find the airplane in a high speed dive, exercise extreme caution in your recovery to avoid both an over g and a g induced stall. A pitch recovery rate equal to the takeoff rotation rate will provide g and stall protection (approximately 3o / sec). Mountain Wave: Fortunately, this is fairly predictable. ATC is usually quite aware of mountain wave in their sector and crews are quick to offer pilot reports. Maneuver margin is key to upset prevention. Create greater margin by slowing to turbulent penetration airspeeds but not below L/Dmax. Airspeeds below L/Dmax put you on the back of the power curve where due to induced drag you may not have the thrust at higher altitudes to accelerate or to prevent further deceleration encountered by the mountain wave. Use autopilot altitude modes per your PHB. Here is guidance from the Airplane Upset Recovery manual in predicting mountain wave:


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“Severe turbulence can be expected in mountainous areas where wind components exceeding 50 kn are perpendicular to and near the ridge level; in and near developing and mature thunderstorms; occasionally, in other towering cumuliform clouds; within 50 to 100 mi on the cold side of the center of the jet stream; in troughs aloft; and in lows aloft where vertical windshears exceed 10 kn per 1000 ft and horizontal windshears exceed 40 kn per 150 nm.”

Pilot-Induced Upset

Not all upsets are the result of environmental factors. At times, subtle deviations from level flight yield large, out-of-control departures from controlled flight. There are many examples, but here are a few scenarios that have

resulted in pilot-induced upsets or stalls. High altitude holding without engaging the bank limiter resulted in a thrust deficient entry into holding. As the autopilot commanded 25o of bank, the throttles advanced but could not provide sufficient thrust to abate the deceleration. The autopilot trim continued to trim nose up until the aircraft entered high altitude low speed buffet and full stall. In the recovery, the crew had to overcome the out of trim condition while reducing the AOA. A significant amount of altitude was lost and an excessive g force was placed on the airplane in the recovery. There is another scenario where an airplane departed heavier than planned. The initial cruise altitude was within the performance capabilities of the airplane and near the optimum altitude. . . but well below the filed coast out altitude. The oceanic clearance issued a climb and the crew knew it would be at the max altitude due to thrust. Shortly after reaching cruise altitude, they could not maintain airspeed and attempted to coordinate a lower crossing altitude. Before a clearance could be issued, the airplane slowed to the point of stall. Lastly, a crew reverted to a vertical speed climb to comply with ATC instructions to expedite their climb. The crew was distracted with other duties and eventually inattention and never exited the vertical speed climb. As the climb continued, the airplane honored the vertical speed command and decelerated below L/DMax to a point that the deceleration now on the ‘back side of the curve’ increased at a subtle but ever increasing rate until the airplane stalled.


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Distractions are the main cause for pilot-induced upsets. The distractions are often rooted in human factor deficiencies. Those can range from poor communication in announcing mode changes to the autopilot, inattention to flying and monitoring the airplane, or blatant noncompliance with company SOP.

Human Factors and High Altitude Upsets The pilot monitoring needs to be active in his skills. Announcing and confirming the condition out loud can be beneficial to waking up the pilot flying. Coaching or encouraging the PF actions are examples of an active PM. Some may recall the C5 stall in Diego Garcia where the PM was very instrumental in the recovery. She coached the PF with statements like:“get the nose over, get the nose over…you’ve got altitude to work with…” It is crucial and expected that the PF take an active role in the prevention of upsets. Should an upset occur and progress into a stall it is even more crucial the PF shift into a strong support role. The three step process is our SOP for involvement in an upset or stall condition. Those steps can be found in the FOM and are:

1. Identify the condition: “Watch your speed, we are getting slow.” “Stall, we are ina stall.”

2. Command the correction: “Power, increase power.” “Get the nose over.”3. Intervene

https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/AP_UpsetRecovery_Book.pdf

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