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“It was sort of a mad scientists experiment” Das Interview mit dem Historiker Tsuyoshi Hasegawa zu den Atombombenabwürfen über Horishima und Nagasaki. Seine Kernaussagen: Die Sowjets haben Japan betrogen. Wollten unbedingt noch in den Krieg eintreten, gaben aber vor, den Nautralitätspakt mit Tokio einzuhalten. Eintritt der Sowjets in den Krieg war für die Kapitulation Japans entscheidender als die Bomben. USA haben Bestandsgarantie für das Kaiserhaus aus der Kapitulationsaufforderung als Zugeständnis gestrichen und so womöglich das Kriegsende hinausgezögert, um noch die Bomben zu werfen. Weitere Bombenabwürfe wären möglich gewesen. Die USA sahen sich nach Pearl Harbor moralisch auf der sicheren Seite. Der Einsatz der Atombomben ist sozusagen der Vorläufer der Ende der 90er-Jahre entworfenen "Shock-and-Awe"-Militärdoktrin der USA. Hasegawas sieht eine Mitverwantwortung der japanischen Regierung, weil diese nicht früher kapituliert hat, sondern auf Vermittlung Moskaus hoffte. Er hält den Einsatz der Atombomben für ein Kriegsverbrechen.

Klaus Scherer: When I ask, “what made the Second World War end in the Pacific?” everyone would say, as I did, “it was the atomic bomb”. Is that accurate? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: No, I totally disagree with that, because if you really take a look at the process in which the Japanese government made the decision to surrender, the atomic bomb was not really the most crucial event, because the first bomb was dropped on August 6th, the second bomb, Nagasaki, the one that you’re interested in, was dropped on August 9th. In between there is the Soviet entry [into the war]. And my theory is that the Soviet entry has a more decisive impact on the Japanese decision. This was not the time where newsgathering was as quick as today. Did they actually have a chance to find out what kind of damage there was, to make up their minds to a decision, and then come up with a real answer to the Potsdam Protocol? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Well, you have to go back a little bit, because I think July 26th the Potsdam Proclamation was issued, and the Japanese government did not accept it, but did not reject it. [Potsdam Conference, held from 17 July to 2 August 1945 by the victorious Allied Powers - United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union - in order to codify the post war order as well as the terms of the Japanese surrender. Ed.] The reason is that the Japanese government was trying to terminate the war through the mediation of Moscow. And so the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and of course that created a crisis, and immediately they knew that that was the atomic bomb. By the end of the day, all the news came, but the Soviet answer was pending, so they continued to rely on Soviet mediation. And when the Soviets entered the war, the last hope was dashed. And then the second bomb was dropped and the second bomb had a very very little effect on the Japanese's decision.

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Why not? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Well, because the premiss on which the Americans decided to drop the bomb (…) is based on their assumption that the damage to civilians would inflict a tremendous impact, inflict tremendous damage that was inacceptable to the Japanese government, right? But, you see, each government has a priority. Damage to civilians is not really first priority. The first priority for Japanese policy makers at least, was the preservation of the so-called “kokutai”. “Kokutai” is a very special term, but “kokutai” is basically the emperor system. And so that is the very issue that concerned the Japanese policy makers, that’s the why the Potsdam Proclamation for instance was made silent on the field of the emperor. And so they said, “oh, it’s not clear,” and so they still continued to negotiate with the Soviet government. And so even after the atomic bomb of Hiroshima was dropped, still they were hanging on to the preservation of the “kokutai”, right? The damage, the civilian casualty, was not the most important thing that they were concerned about. You said there were actually two races going on? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Yes. The United States just wanted to end the war before the Soviets got in. Who’s going to come to the goal first, right? And the Soviet Union wanted to get in before the Japanese government decides to surrender. So those are two very intense reasons. But even that didn’t work out, if you take the American view? To end the war with the bombing? And before the Russians entered the war. Stalin first thought he had lost, but actually he grabbed the chance to get in earlier. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Yeah, Truman and Byrnes [James Byrnes, Secretary of State, Ed.] thought that the atomic bomb would do the job, and it turned out that it did not work out that well. The Soviet Union just managed to join the war in the nick of time. And so that was a very decisive factor, I think. Has there been an effort, by Truman [Harry S. Truman, US President] and Byrnes and the people in Los Alamos, or Stimson [Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Ed.], to justify the bombings? Like, “it’s only military targets”, “it’s only 60,000 people”, and, “it’s only to end the war, it’s only to save lives actually”, afterwards, to justify what they have done? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: When Truman received the first news of the successful detonation of a atomic bomb in Los Alamos [Test vom 16. Juli in der Wüste, die Red.], he wrote in a diary, in real time: “I’ve got big news: The atomic bomb was successful. And it has an enormous destructive capacity, it is so enormous, so powerful, that a steel tower, 60 feet long, melted.” And immediately after this: “But we are going to use this against a military target. We are a civilized nation, we are not going to use it against women, children.” I mean, can you imagine, a powerful weapon, dropped in the middle of a city, you are not going to affect women or children? And so already there is the process of denial started, even by Truman. So does that mean that they actually never gave Japan a real chance to surrender in time to avoid the bombing? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: If you really analyze the Potsdam Proclamation, there are a couple of very very funny things. In the first place, the United States already knew the Japanese government approached Moscow and they are on the verge of surrender decision, right? And so the second thing is that when the Potsdam Proclamation was given to Truman by Stimson, and Stimson drafted that, there were two things in the draft. That is first, the Soviet entry into the war was predicted, and

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that means that the Potsdam Proclamation would have Stalin’s signature. Second thing is that it included a provision. We had the United States promise to the Japanese that if they accept surrender, and they create a democratic government, and they were no threat to world peace, then the Japanese people would have a chance to preserve their monarchy and the current dynasty. When the proclamation was issued, those two provisions were eliminated. And you have to ask yourself, “why?” Truman wrote in a memoir and said, “the decision to drop the bomb was very very heavy, I just wanted to avoid it”. Well, if he wanted to avoid it, why didn’t he invite Stalin to sign the proclamation, when he knew the Japanese government relied on Moscow? And secondly, they knew that the Japanese government desperately wanted to know the fate of their emperor and their emperor system. Why didn’t they promise the Japanese government that there was a possibility there? And those two alternatives were consciously avoided. And so that’s why I think I would argue that the Potsdam Proclamation, when it was issued, they had already decided that they were going to drop them, unless the Japanese government just gave up. (…) But there was no chance that they would accept it, because there was no promise [to keep] the Emperor, and so on. And so, if that is so, then why did they issue it. They issued, so that, in my opinion, this is an alibi so that they can justify the drop of the bomb. What role did Stalin play? He fooled the Japanese, right? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: He fooled the Japanese. Japan and the Soviet Union had a neutrality pact; the neutrality pact was concluded in April 1941 that was to last five years . But one of the provisions is: unless one party notifies the other, one year before it’s over, full term, then the neutrality pact will be automatically renewed. And so April 1945, the Soviet government notified the Japanese government that, “we are not going to renew it.” And then the Japanese ambassador asked Molotov [Wjatscheslaw Michailowitsch Molotow, Ed.], the foreign commissar, “so that means you broke the neutrality pact right away?” and Molotov said, “no, the neutrality pact is still in force until April 1946". And on the clock of neutrality, the Soviet government was frantically sending the troops from Europe to the Far East, particularly after the German defeat. Later on, when Stalin had a conversation with Truman, he says, “we have to lull the Japanese to sleep.” Of course from Stalin’s point of view, it is necessary to delay the Japanese surrender so that the Soviet Union could participate. And Truman also wanted to delay, so that the United States could drop the bomb. Stalin knew that there was a bomb to be developed by the Americans. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: That’s right, Stalin knew. Of course the Manhattan Project was completely secret, confidential, kept from the Soviet Union, but Stalin had a spy, Klaus Fuchs among others. They were feeding information to Stalin. And they knew that the first atomic experiment would take place and so when Truman approached Stalin during the recess of the Potsdam Conference and said, “we have some important information to tell you, we have succeeded in possessing a weapon of enormous destructive capacity,” without saying “atomic bomb”, and everybody was watching Stalin’s reaction, Stalin, very nonchalantly, turned to Truman and said, “I hope that you make good use of it”. And everybody thought, “good, Stalin did not catch it,” but Stalin knew exactly and he went back to the official residence, "we just talked about this and we are not going to be fooled". But what he did not expect was that the United States was so quick to use the bomb. I think that’s something he did not expect. And so that when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, you know that Stalin came back to Moscow after the Potsdam Conference on August 5th and he immediately resumed his very frantic activities preparing for the war against Japan. And August 6th, if you take a look at Stalin’s logbook, there’s

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no appointment. (…) But I think that the absence of appointments shows the extent of shock. And then, August 6th, the 7th, the Japanese ambassador approached the Soviet foreign ministry and said, “what about our request for mediation?”and he [Stalin] immediately says, “the game is not up yet”. And he immediately left to action, he ordered the military to launch an attack 48 hours before the appointed time. And he also immediately told Molotov to summon Sato, the ambassador that (he) come to the foreign ministry, and Molotov said, “sit down, we have important news to tell you,” and he proceeded to read the declaration of war. And so the Soviets managed to join the war in the nick of time, totally fooled the Japanese, and then, in a way, therefore, Truman’s expectation that Japan would surrender with the shock of the atomic bomb was betrayed. Let me come back to Truman. He said twice, when he declared that Hiroshima was bombed and Nagasaki was bombed, in his press statement, that this was “because of Pearl Harbor.” Twice. Is that to justify? Did he really believe that? I mean, one bomb would have been enough to take revenge for the attacks of Pearl Harbor, but still he used that argument for the second bomb as well. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: You have to understand here the history of the atomic bomb, the Manhattan Project. The Manhattan Project, under the director [Leslie] Groves, the military director, under him there is a committee called the “Target Committee”. And early on, some time in April, before sometime in May, they made a list, and also they discussed how to use the bomb. They came to a conclusion that the bomb will be used against civilians in the cities. And you know the term “shock-and-awe-strategy”, this is the predecessor of that strategy: “It is very important to shock the Japanese government and the Japanese people.” And that’s the purpose. And on order to shock, there is not a military target, it’s the civilians: “We’re going to just bomb and kill as many civilians, as many people as possible, and one bomb is not enough, you have to have a second bomb, so we can convince the Japanese that we have more.”

Hintergundinformationen zu der politischen Entscheidung der USA, die Atombomne abzuwerfen The Atomic Bomb (6 an d 9 August 1945), pbs.org Target Committee Four Days in May: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus In fact more would’ve come, I think that the first bomb was used in New Mexico [Test 16th July 1945, first atomic explosion in history, Ed.], the second bomb was used in Hiroshima, the third bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and the fourth bomb was supposed to be available some time in September. And so, successively, by November 1st, the US military was planning to have the Operation Olympic, the invasion, and then several bombs would’ve been ready to be dropped. And so this is the history of the Manhattan Project so the first bomb and the second bomb will be used consecutively, to maximize the shock. And so the question is: what was the role of the president? The president, and then the others, was not involved in all of that because, in a very strange way, it’s a sort of contradiction on the atomic bomb. Previous to the atomic bomb, there’s a strategic bombing, conventional incendiary bombs, and therefore incendiary bombs were targeted particularly against civilians. And therefore killing civilians for the military purpose was already accepted and therefore a very important moral threshold was already crossed. And therefore killing with one bomb or with 300 airplanes, it did not cross the mind of Truman. So this was left on a decision of the commanders, the strategic air command.

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So he only later said that there wouldn’t be a third or fourth bomb dropped without his agreement and he then said that he doesn’t want to go on killing women and children. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: That’s right, this is a very interesting point because I think that sometime, something happened to Truman. Truman was convinced that it was ok justified dropping the bombs, the Hiroshima bomb was justified. And then on August 9th, when the United States used the Nagasaki bomb, he made a statement to the effect of “we use the bomb so that we use the bomb against the enemy that beat, that captured, that attacked Pearl Harbor, and treated very brutally the Prisoners of War, in violation of the international law. And so that we do not regret using it against those (…) because the only language that they understand is the use of the bomb.” But on that day that he received the information, I think this is the first time he was confronted with the result of the Hiroshima bomb. More than 100,000 people just got bombed, killed immediately. And that really, for the first time, he was confronted with this, and he said in a cabinet meeting that, “this is an awful bomb, and from now on, we are not going to authorize the use of the bomb unless I give the permission.” (…) The decision, the timing is very important because when the second bomb was dropped on Hiroshima [Prof. Hasegawa means Nagasaki, Ed.] he had not received the first report of Hiroshima, that came after the Nagasaki bomb was dropped. And therefore it dawned on him what a terrible weapon it is. I think the use of the bomb really bordered his conscience throughout his life. It is very interesting because before he left office, lots of people are working on his presidency, and one of the men tried to justify the drop of the Hiroshima bomb. Truman wrote a letter to him, saying, “the use of the bomb was more terrible than the use of chemical and biological weapons.” The implications of this is very important because the usage of chemical and biological weapons is prohibited by the Geneva convention. And so that means, at least towards the end of his presidency, he was convinced that the use of the atomic bomb was actually against the international law. And so that’s a very interesting point. The victims, they had the greatness to add that they feel actually like the victims of two nations: the Americans, that dropped the bomb, but also their own government here that didn’t make it to stop the war in time. Is that accurate? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: I think that’s very accurate. When you talk about Japanese memories of the war, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they sort of blame the United States government that dropped the bomb. But you see if the Japanese government had accepted surrender before Hiroshima, particularly after Hiroshima, there would not have been a second bomb. And I think the Japanese government’s delay of surrender, I think, is very important. I think the Nagasaki people who suffered, are quite justified to blame the Japanese government. And how much of it was the excitement of those who built the bomb, and Truman excited to have it, to use it also as an experiment in real theater to see what that bomb would have as an effect? Both bombs? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Well, I think this is again very interesting psychology of those people who developed the bomb to the cost of about 2 billion US dollars, at that time that’s an enormous expense. And so of course they want to use the bomb to see the effects, I think this is sort of a mad scientist experiment, they were doing something frontier. I don’t think you can really deny that.

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And the other thing is that. What if those politicians spent two billion dollars and did not use it? And the American public for instance, those who were killed in action, (would) say, “my gosh, you dropped [Prof. Hasegawa means: built, Ed.] a bomb and did not use it!” You said when you were interviewed, if the Americans should apologize, you said, “yes and no.” No, because the political frame here would be dangerous because of whitewashing of the war crimes the Japanese did before. If that situation changed and the Japanese politics would grow up, let’s say, would you then say, “yes, there should be an apology?” Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Yeah, I think so, and then also for the sake of Americans as well, because this is something they did. And unless they really get into that, the reason why they used the atomic bomb, then I think, in my opinion, it is connected with, say the war against terrorism, terror. If the just war can justify the unjust method of fighting the war, then it is okay to use the atomic bomb; it is okay to use torture. And so unless they go back to that original decision and really reflect on what the Americans did, this is, in my opinion, I think this is a war crime. If it’s chemical warfare, it’s a violation of the international law, then/and the atomic bomb is even worse than chemical warfare. And also don’t forget that it is not only the number of people who were killed but also the radiation effects. People are still suffering from radiation. And so I think that for Americans to reflect on this and then really think about, this is a matter of American conscience. Why do you think it is so unknown that actually the Russians entering the war was more decisive than the atomic bombs? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: I think this really touched the nerves of Americans, because most Americans know that the atomic bomb was a terrible weapon. And they want to justify it, “because that was the last alternative, there’s no alternative but to use the bomb”, therefore it can be justified. What about the Japanese side, still here people would say, “it was the bomb that ended the war”? Because it was easier to live with, that there was such a magic weapon and there was no way to win the war anymore? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: You know, another very interesting thing about the Japanese memory of the war is that it’s a very important turning point in Japanese history, but the process in which this government decided to terminate the war was not really closely scrutinized and closely studied. You know the reason why? The reason is because it will touch on a very very sensitive subject of Japanese history, that’s the role of the emperor. And this is still a taboo issue. And therefore Japanese historians don’t touch it. Informationen zu Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: http://www.history.ucsb.edu/people/person.php?account_id=35