J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-interventionists

�

J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-interventionists

FBI Political Surveillance and the Rise of the Domestic Security State, 1939–1945

Douglas M. Charles

TheOhiOSTaTeUniverSiTyPreSS • COlUmbUS

Copyr�ght©2007byTheOh�oStateUn�vers�ty.allr�ghtsreserved.

l�braryofCongressCatalog�ng-�n-Publ�cat�onData

Charles,Douglasm.J.edgarhooverandtheant�-�ntervent�on�sts:Fbipol�t�calsurve�llanceandther�seofthedomest�csecur�tystate,1939–1945/Douglasm.Charles.p.cm.includesb�bl�ograph�calreferencesand�ndex.iSbn-13:978-0-8142-1061-1(cloth:alk.paper)iSbn-10:0-8142-1061-9(cloth:alk.paper)iSbn-13:978-0-8142-9140-5(cd-rom)iSbn-10:0-8142-9140-6(cd-rom)1.hoover,J.edgar(Johnedgar),1895–1972.2.roosevelt,Frankl�nD.(Frankl�nDelano),1882–1945.3.Un�tedStates.Federalbureauofinvest�gat�on—h�story.4.WorldWar,1939–1945—Un�tedStates.5.intell�genceserv�ce—Un�tedStates—h�story—20thcentury.6.internalsecur�ty—Un�tedStates—h�story—20thcen-tury.7.D�ssenters—Governmentpol�cy—Un�tedStates—h�story—20thcentury.8.neutral�ty—Un�tedStates—h�story—20thcentury.9.Un�tedStates—h�story—1933–1945.10.Un�tedStates—Fore�gnrelat�ons—1933–1945—Publ�cop�n�on.i.T�tle.hv8144.F43C432007940.53'160973—dc222006102680Coverdes�gnbyJannaThompson-ChordasTypeset�nadobem�n�onProTypesett�ngbyJul�etW�ll�amsPr�ntedbyThomson-Shore

Thepaperused �n th�spubl�cat�onmeets them�n�mumrequ�rementsof theamer�cannat�onalStandard for informat�onSc�ences—PermanenceofPaper forPr�ntedl�brarymater�als.anSiZ39.48-1992.

987654321

Formyparents,JeannetteandDan�elCharles

acknowledgments �xintroduct�on 1

Chapter1 background 17

Chapter2 beg�nn�ngs War, Phony War, and Election 1939–40 39

Chapter3 intens�f�cat�on The Lend-Lease Debate, America First, and Its Allies December 1940 to Summer 1941 59

Chapter4 Focus From Great Debate Stalemate to Wartime Probe Mid-1941 to Summer 1942 87

Chapter5 retr�but�on The FBI and the Victory Program Leak 4 December 1941 to Mid-1942 114

Chapter6 blossom�ngoftheDomest�cSecur�tyState November 1941 to March 1942 140

Conclus�on 172

b�bl�ography 179index 193

Contents

ix

it�s,�ndeed,ajoytothankthosewhoseadv�ceandsupportmadework-�ngonth�sbookapleasurableexper�ence.Throughoutmyeducat�on,andas th�sprojectdeveloped, i’vebenef�ted fromsuperbadv�s�ngbeg�nn�ngw�throbertSzymcakandJohnPaulross�(Pennsylvan�aStateUn�vers�ty),athanTheohar�s(marquetteUn�vers�ty),andf�nallyrhodr�Jeffreys-Jonesand Dav�d Stafford (Un�vers�ty of ed�nburgh). i owe them all an �nest�-mabledebtofgrat�tudeforthe�rthoughtfuld�rect�on,encouragement,andass�stance.myresearchcouldneverhavebeencompletedw�thoutgener-ousf�nanc�alass�stancefromthebr�t�shOverseasresearchStudentawardScheme,ed�nburghUn�vers�ty,amer�canFr�endsofed�nburghUn�vers�ty,the roosevelt Study Center (holland), Pr�nceton Un�vers�ty l�brary, theherberthooverPres�dent�all�brary,andtheamer�canher�tageCenteroftheUn�vers�tyofWyom�ng.i’vealsobenef�tedfromtheselflessf�nan-c�al help and encouragement of my parents (Jeannette and Dan�el), mygrandparentswhohelpedtosparkmy�nterest�nh�story(Paul�ne&lavernbl�nn, anne & Dan Charles), and my great aunts (Jeannette and l�l).F�nally,iwanttothankSandyCrooms,eugeneO’Connor,andothersonthestaffofTheOh�oStateUn�vers�tyPresswhohelpedth�sprojectalongandmadetheprocessanenjoyableone.

D.m.C.er�e,Pennsylvan�aFebruary2007

ACknowledgments

between1939and1945,aswarravagedeuropeandas�a,J.edgarhoover’sFederal bureau of invest�gat�on (Fbi) mon�tored the pol�t�cal d�ssent ofPres�dent Frankl�n D. roosevelt’s celebrated ant�-�ntervent�on�st fore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs.Th�ssurve�llanceoccurredasamer�canspopularlyperce�vedathreatfromanaz�“F�fthColumn,”wh�chwas�nflamedbysensat�onalstor�esofGermanesp�onage,lead�ngmanyotherw�serat�onalc�t�zensandgovernment off�c�als to suspect the mot�ves of leg�t�mate ant�-�nterven-t�on�st fore�gn pol�cy cr�t�cs. more �mportantly, the b�tter fore�gn pol�cydebateoveramer�can�nvolvement�nwarprovedtobeanopportun�tyforthebureaucrathooverwho,asaconservat�ve,d�dnotf�tthemoldoftheleft-of-centerrooseveltadm�n�strat�on.hoover, therefore,sk�llfullyusedtheopportun�tyto�ngrat�ateh�mselfw�ththerooseveltadm�n�strat�onbycater�ngtothepres�dent’spol�t�calandpol�cy�nterests—�nprov�d�ngh�mdeta�ledpol�t�cal�ntell�genceonfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs—todemonstrateh�sworthtotheadm�n�strat�on,reta�nh�stenureasFbid�rector,andsecure�ncreasedauthor�tyandautonomyforh�sbureau.amongthosecr�t�cshetargetedwereCharlesl�ndbergh, theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,notablesenatorsandcongressmen,elementsoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stpress,andother lead�ng f�gures �n theant�-�ntervent�on�stmovement.Throughout,rooseveltvaluedthesereportsandmadenocompla�ntsaboutthe�mpro-pr�etyorc�v�ll�bert�esv�olat�onsofJ.edgarhoover’sact�ons. it was dur�ng th�s per�od, moreover, when hoover’s Fbi f�rst used�ts resources �n an expans�ve way to mon�tor, prov�de �ntell�gence, andd�scred�tanadm�n�strat�on’spol�t�caloppos�t�on.butwh�letheFbiexten-s�vely mon�tored adm�n�strat�on oppos�t�on as �t never had prev�ously,comparedtotheColdWarera—wherehooveroperatedautonomously—theextentof theFbi’sact�v�tywasmoredef�ned.Whereas,by1957, the

IntroduCtIon

1

� Introduction

ColdWarFbihadabandonedprosecut�ons �n favorofsecretand�llegalprograms (the COinTelPrOS) to d�srupt and conta�n �ts targets, theFbidur�ngthe1939–45per�odcons�gned�tselftothecollect�onandd�s-sem�nat�onofpol�t�cal �ntell�genceandworkedtos�lenceadm�n�strat�oncr�t�csbydevelop�nglegalcases—ut�l�z�ngtheSm�thact,Fore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact,consp�racystatutes,and(dur�ngwart�me)theesp�onageact1—orby�n�t�at�nggrandjuryproceed�ngsthat,wh�lenom�nallysecret,m�ghthaved�scred�tedoppos�t�oneffortsbycast�ngdoubtonthe�rleg�t�-macy.Th�sact�v�tysuggeststhattheFbi’srole�nthelaternat�onalsecur�tystate, executed wh�le amer�ca advocated an act�v�st fore�gn pol�cy anddeferred to execut�ve author�ty, l�es �n the prewar fore�gn pol�cy debate(theso-calledGreatDebate)whereah�ddenagendalaybeh�nd�nterven-t�on�stpol�cyandwherepatternsofFbibehav�orm�rrorthoseoftheColdWarandnat�onalsecur�tystateper�od. Further h�ghl�ght�ng the development of the Fbi as a nat�onal secu-r�tyapparatus,dat�ngfrom1940�testabl�shedaformalrelat�onsh�pw�thbr�t�sh �ntell�gence.l�kehooverandroosevelt, thebr�t�shhadavested�nterest �n the pol�t�cal act�v�t�es of the ant�-�ntervent�on�sts. Whereashoover sought to develop legal cases aga�nst them, collect derogatory�ntell�gence,andprov�detheWh�tehousew�thpol�t�cal�ntell�gencethatalludedto�tscr�t�cs’subvers�veness,br�t�sh�ntell�gencesoughttohastenamer�canentry�ntothewarbyd�srupt�ngandd�scred�t�ngthesefore�gnpol�cy cr�t�cs. The relat�onsh�p between the Fbi and br�t�sh �ntell�gence,wh�ch had ex�sted on an ad hoc bas�s dat�ng from the F�rst World War,wasmadepermanentfrom1940andcont�nuedtogrow,extend�ng�ntotheColdWaryears.Wh�letheexactscopeandnatureofthetwoorgan�zat�ons’relat�onsh�pcannotbeascerta�nedfullyow�ngtoclass�f�cat�onrestr�ct�onson relevant documents, nevertheless �t �s clear that the two ma�nta�nedclose t�es. The closeness, or�g�ns, and development of the relat�onsh�p,moreover, demonstrates that the Fbi’s �nternat�onal role �n the laternat�onalsecur�tystate—wheretheFbicooperated�nt�matelyw�thall�edfore�gn�ntell�genceagenc�es—had�tsor�g�nsdur�ngtheGreatDebateof1940–41. Thathooverwasl�m�tedtotheabovetact�csdur�ngtheGreatDebatecan be understood �f we recogn�ze that he d�d not yet have the level of

1. The Sm�th act of 28 June 1940 proh�b�ted any �nd�v�dual or organ�zat�on fromadvocat�ng thev�olentoverthrowof theUn�tedStatesgovernmentormembersh�pw�thagroupadvocat�ngsuchanact�on.The1940Fore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact(amendedfromthe1938vers�on)requ�redallfore�gn-controlledgroupstoreg�sterw�ththeJust�ceDepart-ment.

3Introduction

autonomy that he would dur�ng the Cold War, though he d�d have agreater level of autonomy than at any prev�ous t�me. W�thout completeassurance that �ntrus�ve programs would never be d�scovered, and unt�lh�spos�t�onasFbid�rectorwasf�rmlyrootedw�th�deolog�calall�es�ntheWh�tehouseorCongress—someth�nghooverd�dnotdevelopunt�l theCold War—hoover refused to employ such methods, remember�ng theeffects wrought on the bureau of invest�gat�on from d�scovery of other�llegal tact�cs employed dur�ng the 1919–20 red Scare. These concernswere reflected �n hoover’s repeated efforts to counter any cr�t�c�sm thatFbiagentswere�nvolved�n�llegalact�v�tyandh�spubl�cden�alsthattheFbicollectednoncr�m�nal�nformat�ondur�ngtheGreatDebate.Thefactof the matter, however, �s that Fbi agents had �ndeed employed �llegalsurve�llance tact�cs and act�vely sought noncr�m�nal �ntell�gence on theant�-�ntervent�on�stsforbureaucrat�candpol�t�calpurposes.

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Further character�z�ng th�s per�od, the Fbi d�rector demonstrated thathe was, above all, a pragmat�c bureaucrat. beg�nn�ng w�th the Cool�dgeadm�n�strat�on�n1924,hoovermadeh�mselfvaluabletoeachsucceed�ngadm�n�strat�onbyprov�d�ng�nformat�onhethoughteachwouldf�nduse-ful.hooverwassuccessful�nasmuchasheheldontoh�sh�ghpos�t�on�ngovernmentlongerthananycomparablef�gure�namer�canh�story—hewasFbid�rectorfrom1924unt�lh�sdeath�n1972,nearlyf�ftyyears.Th�spragmat�sm�ss�gn�f�cantwhenoneexam�nesthebureau�nthecontextofthenewDealera.Generallyregardedasawatershed�nthedevelopmentof the welfare state, the new Deal reflected the precept of “b�g govern-ment” staffed by left-of-center pol�t�c�ans seek�ng proact�ve leadersh�p�nWash�ngton.Wh�leonthesurface�tseemsthepol�t�calv�ewsofnewDealersand J.edgarhooverwouldbeatodds, theFbid�rector thr�veddur�ngtherooseveltadm�n�strat�on.hesucceeded�ncult�vat�ngacloserelat�onsh�p w�th roosevelt by us�ng h�s pragmat�sm to man�pulate therelat�onsh�p between the pres�dent and the Fbi. hoover became a val-uedsourceof �nformat�ononroosevelt’spol�t�calenem�esanduseful �noccas�onal attempts to underm�ne them. For roosevelt’s part, h�s longpersonal�nterest�nsecret�ntell�gence,�npart,expla�nsh�srecept�venesstohoover’spol�t�cal�ntell�gencereports.2

2. On roosevelt’s fasc�nat�on w�th �ntell�gence see Dav�d Stafford, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets(london:l�ttle,brown,andCo.,1999),3–12.

4 Introduction

hoover’spragmat�smdur�ng th�sper�od,however,mustalsobeana-lyzedw�th�ntheframeworkofthecorrelat�onbetween�nternat�onalcr�s�sand growth of power. hoover’s ab�l�ty to �ncrease Fbi author�ty has, forthemostpart,beenassoc�atedw�thsomeconcom�tant�nternat�onalcr�s�s.more bas�cally, the charged atmosphere created by var�ous �nternat�onalcr�sesresulted�nfearsofdomest�cunrest,whetherdur�ngtheF�rstWorldWar,redScare,GreatDepress�on,SecondWorldWar,ColdWar,orWaron Terror�sm. in each per�od, the Fbi’s power and author�ty �ncreased,ford�fferentreasons,todealw�thaperce�veddomest�cthreat.Dur�ngtheGreatDebateof1940–41, fore�gnpol�cy �ssuesprov�dedthe �mpetus forextens�veFbimon�tor�ngofWh�tehousefore�gnpol�cycr�t�cswhowerepopularlyregardedassubvers�ve.3Th�sall tookplace �nthecontextofacharged�nternat�onals�tuat�onthatperm�ttedhoovertocatertoPres�dentroosevelt’s domest�c pol�t�cal concerns about overcom�ng h�s ant�-�nter-vent�on�stoppos�t�on.Throughouttheper�od,hoovergarnered�ncreasedauthor�tyandautonomyforh�sFbi.Fromth�sbas�s,theColdWarFbiwasabletoevolve�ntoanevenmore�ntrus�venational secur�tyapparatus.

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Contemporar�esandh�stor�anshavepopularlydubbedroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy cr�t�cs dur�ng th�s per�od “�solat�on�sts.” The term “ant�-�nterven-t�on�st,”however,w�llbeemployedthroughoutth�sstudy.Theword“�so-lat�on�st” �s too narrow a descr�ptor to be appl�ed to roosevelt’s fore�gnpol�cycr�t�cswhod�dnotadvocate�solat�onfromfore�gnaffa�rsbutun�-lateral�sm �n amer�can fore�gn relat�ons. moreover, ant�-�ntervent�on�ststhemselves never used the word “�solat�on�st,” preferr�ng �nstead “ant�-�ntervent�on�st”or“non�ntervent�on�st.”itwasroosevelt’s�ntervent�on�stall�eswhopropagated—successfully—thederogatoryand�naccurateterm“�solat�on�st.” Wh�leFrankl�nroosevelt’sant�-�ntervent�on�stfore�gnpol�cyoppos�-t�on �ncluded elements from both ends of the pol�t�cal spectrum—fromthemostlyconservat�veamer�caF�rstComm�tteetotheleft�stamer�canleagueforPeaceandDemocracy—th�sstudyfocusesonh�smostlycon-servat�veandprom�nentcr�t�cswhowereassoc�atedw�thamer�caF�rst.(it also does not address those amer�cans who were caught up �n Fbi

3. Onthe�ntervent�on�stpercept�onofant�-�ntervent�on�stsassubvers�vesseemarkl�ncolnChadw�n,The Hawks of World War II(Chapelh�ll:Un�vers�tyofnorthCarol�naPress,1968).

5Introduction

surve�llanceact�v�t�eseventhoughtheywerenotant�-�ntervent�on�sts,asother h�stor�ans have already documented.) Some nonconservat�ves are�ncludedbutonly�nasmuchastheyopposedthecentral�zat�onofpower�nthepres�dencyandall�edthemselvesw�thamer�caF�rst.ant�-�nterven-t�on�stsfromotherpo�ntsonthepol�t�calspectrumareexcludedpr�mar�lyforthreereasons.F�rst,thoseassoc�atedw�ththeamer�caF�rstComm�tteewere best organ�zed and posed the most s�gn�f�cant pol�t�cal threat toadm�n�strat�onfore�gnpol�cy.Second,afterthenaz��nvas�onoftheSov�etUn�on �n June 1941, amer�can left�sts and Commun�sts wholeheartedlyjo�ned the �ntervent�on�st cause; thereafter amer�ca F�rst rema�ned theonly ser�ous threat to adm�n�strat�on pol�t�cal �nterests.4 Th�rd, hooverwasaferventant�-Commun�stw�thconservat�vepol�t�calandsoc�alcre-dent�als,andh�sw�ll�ngnesstomon�torthoseofs�m�larpol�t�cal�lkfortheleft-of-centerrooseveltadm�n�strat�onrevealsh�sbureaucrat�castuteness.everthemasterbureaucrat,hooverreal�zedh�spos�t�on�ntherooseveltadm�n�strat�onwastenuousandsoughttopreserveandexpand�tbycater-�ng to theWh�tehouse’spol�t�calandpol�cy �nterestsv�s-à-v�s theant�-�ntervent�on�sts. ashooverwasofthepol�t�calr�ght5—l�kemanyant�-�ntervent�on�sts,part�cularlythoseassoc�atedw�ththeamer�caF�rstComm�ttee—theques-t�onar�seswhetherhecons�deredh�mselfan�ntervent�on�st.Wh�lehed�dnotpubl�clyadvocateamer�can�ntervent�on�nthewar,there�ssomeev�-dencedemonstrat�ngh�s�ntervent�on�stcredent�als.butmore�mportantthanwhetherhooverwasan�ntervent�on�stwash�spragmat�ccharacter,amanwhoworkedtoeffectroosevelt’spol�t�cal�nterests.hoover,more-over, would l�kely have regarded ant�-�ntervent�on�sts as “subvers�ves”or“un-amer�can” �npartbecauseof thepopularassoc�at�onsmanyhadmade between ant�-�ntervent�on�sts and rad�cal or fasc�st elements. Th�sfollowedapopularoutlookdat�ngfromthe1930s,andextend�ng�ntotheearlyColdWar,that �dent�f�edStal�n�smandnaz�smasessent�allys�m�-lar total�tar�an reg�mes. hoover may have held such v�ews and, coupledw�thpopularpercept�onsofant�-�ntervent�on�stsasw�tt�ngorunw�tt�ng

4. Thewart�meall�ancebetweentheUn�tedStatesandtheSov�etUn�ond�dnotend�nanywayFbisurve�llanceofdomest�ccommun�standleft�stact�v�ty.OntheFbi’scont�nuedefforts�nth�sareaseeathanTheohar�s,Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelli-gence But Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years(Ch�cago:ivanr.Dee,2002),34–78. 5. hooverwasconservat�vebothpol�t�cally(thoughheneverjo�nedapol�t�calparty)andsoc�ally.hewasastrongant�-Commun�standhadthesupportofalargeconservat�veconst�tuencywho,bytheColdWarper�od,soughttod�smantlethetrapp�ngsofroosevelt’snewDeal.hewasalsoarac�st,sex�st,and�ntolerantofhomosexual�ty.

� Introduction

naz�dupes,hemayhaveregardedsomefellowconservat�vesasdomest�cthreats.h�sderogatorypol�t�calreportstotheWh�tehouseonlyservedtobolsterth�spercept�on.6

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Th�s book makes use of prev�ously class�f�ed Fbi f�les. Only �n the lastfew years have the Fbi f�les of Charles l�ndbergh, the amer�ca F�rstComm�ttee,andotherprom�nentant�-�ntervent�on�sts,forexample,beenava�lableforresearch.asaresult,prev�ousd�scoursesaboutthebureau’spol�t�cal surve�llance dur�ng th�s per�od have been tentat�ve and �ncom-plete. h�stor�ans of ant�-�ntervent�on�sm, furthermore, have e�ther beenonlytangent�ally�nterested�nFbiact�v�tyorhavebeenunawareof�ntr�-cateFbiprograms,f�l�ngprocedures,andvestedFbi�nterests.h�stor�ansoftheFbi,wh�lenotunawareofotherper�ods,havebeend�sproport�on-ately�nterested�ntheagency’sredScaredays(1919–20)or�tsColdWaract�v�t�es. much has been m�ssed through these overs�ghts, part�cularlynew �nformat�on that reveals the true extent of Fbi surve�llance act�v-�tyfrom1939to1945andtheor�g�nsof theFbi’s �nt�mate �nternat�onal�ntell�gencerelat�onsh�ps.asaresult,Fbipol�t�calsurve�llancedur�ngth�s�mportantper�odhasneverrece�vedthefulltreatment�tdeserves. Fbif�lesarethes�nglemost�mportantsourceof�nformat�onforth�sstudy.allbureauf�lescreateds�nce1924havebeenreta�nedbytheFbiandarenotdepos�ted�nthenat�onalarch�vesexceptfortheJ.edgarhooverOff�c�al and Conf�dent�al f�le �n 2005. For over seventy years, Fbi f�leshaverema�nedthepreserveofFbioff�c�alswhohaveopenedthemtoonlya selectnumberof “fr�endly” journal�sts.7Onlywhenamendmentsweremade�n1974totheFreedomofinformat�onact(FOia)d�dresearchershaveaccesstothese�mportantdocuments,butw�thaccesscomesrestr�c-t�on. exempt�ons to the FOia �nclude class�f�ed mater�al, pr�vacy-r�ghtsrelated �nformat�on, and anyth�ng reveal�ng Fbi sources and methods.W�thFbiemployees’ subject�veuseof theblack felt t�ppen, researchersarepresentedw�thsomet�mesheav�lycensoreddocuments.inadd�t�on,�t

6. SeeThomasr.maddux,“redFasc�sm,brownbolshev�sm:Theamer�canimageofTotal�tar�an�sm�nthe1930s,”Historian40(november1977):85–103;lesK.adlerandThomasG.Paterson,“redFasc�sm:Themergerofnaz�GermanyandSov�etruss�a�ntheamer�can image of Total�tar�an�sm, 1930s–1950s,” American Historical Review 75 (apr�l1970):1046–64. 7. Seeforexample,KennethO’re�lly,“Fr�endlyJournal�sts’accesstoFbiF�les,”USA Today109(September1980):29–31.

�Introduction

�stherespons�b�l�tyoftherequestertopayprocess�ngcosts(attencentsperpageforf�lesthatcanbethousandsofpageslong),wh�chcanbecomevery expens�ve. moreover, Fbi understaff�ng and budgetary restr�ct�onshave created very long delays �n the process�ng of requests (�n 1996 thebureauaveragedf�ftyrequestsperday).it�snotuncommontowa�tyearsforas�ngleFOiarequesttobef�nal�zed.nevertheless,Fbirecordsareav�tal and �mportant, �f somet�mes frustrat�ng and tantal�z�ng, source of�nformat�on.8

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Th�sbookmakesh�stor�ograph�cal contr�but�ons �n threeareas: theh�s-tory of Fbi pol�t�cal surve�llance, the h�story of the ant�-�ntervent�on-�st/�ntervent�on�stfore�gnpol�cydebate,andtheh�storyofther�seoftheamer�cannat�onalsecur�tystate.mosth�stor�ansoftheFbihavefocusede�theron�tsabusesdur�ngtheredScareof1919–209or�tspol�t�cal�ntel-l�gence act�v�t�es dur�ng the Cold War era.10 Some Fbi h�stor�ans haveexam�nedtheFbi’spol�t�calsurve�llanceofroosevelt’sant�-�ntervent�on-�stfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs,butonlyasasmallpartoflargerstud�es.athanTheohar�s br�efly ment�oned the Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of ant�-�ntervent�on-�sts �n h�s broad study Spying on Americans (1978), �n h�s b�ography ofFbiD�rectorhoover,The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American

8. itl�terallytakesyearstow�naccesstoFbif�les.FOiarequestsaretakenonaf�rst-come,f�rst-servedbas�s.asofmarch1999(whenmyresearchwascarr�edout),theFbihadatotalof8,500requestspend�ng,wh�chrequ�redtherev�ew(andredact�on)ofanest�mated1.8m�ll�onpages.letter,Johnm.KelsoJr.,FbiFOiaSect�onCh�ef,toDouglasm.Charles,14may1999. 9. robertK.murray,Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920(m�nneapo-l�s:Un�vers�tyofm�nnesotaPress,1955);W�ll�amPrestonJr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933,2nded.(Ch�cago:Un�vers�tyofCh�cagoPress,1994);Dav�dW�ll�ams,“‘W�thoutUnderstand�ng’:TheFbiandPol�t�calSurve�llance,1908–1941”(Ph.D.d�ss.,Un�vers�tyofnewhampsh�re,1981),2.SeealsoDav�dW�ll�ams,“Thebureauof invest�gat�onanditsCr�t�cs,1919–1921:TheOr�g�nsofFederalPol�t�calSurve�llance,” Journal of American History68(December1981):560–79. 10. athan Theohar�s, Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan(Ph�ladelph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1978);FrankJ.Donner,The Age of Sur-veillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System(newyork:Knopf,1980);KennethO’re�lly,Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Men-ace(Ph�ladelph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1983);Johnell�ff,The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations(Pr�nceton,nJ:Pr�ncetonUn�vers�tyPress,1979);Dav�dGarrow,The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From Memphis to “Solo”(newyork:norton,1981);W�ll�amKeller,The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State(Pr�nceton,nJ:Pr�ncetonUn�vers�tyPress,1989).

� Introduction

Inquisition (1988),and�nh�sThe FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History(2004).11l�kew�se,bothr�chardPowersandCurtGentry�nthe�rbooksment�onedbutonly�npass�ngthattheFbihadmon�toredroosevelt’scr�t�cs.12

Someh�stor�ansofant�-�ntervent�on�smandroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cyalsohaveonlysketch�lyexam�nedtheFbi’ssurve�llanceofant�-�nterven-t�on�sts. The�r �nterests have concentrated on the pol�t�cs of ant�-�nter-vent�on�sm, and wh�le recogn�z�ng Fbi pol�t�cal surve�llance perhapshave neglected �t through a lack of documentat�on. Wayne S. Cole hasstud�ed ant�-�ntervent�on�sts more than anyone else and �n h�s magnumopus,Roosevelt and the Isolationists(1983),onlybr�eflysurveyedtheFbi’ssurve�llance.13inh�sbookStorm on the Horizon(2000),JustusDoeneckebr�eflynotedtheFbi’sefforts.14robertDallek’sbroadsurveyofroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy,s�m�lartoCole’sandDoenecke’s,offeredonlyonepass�ngreferencetotheFbi.15

afewh�stor�ans,nevertheless,haveexam�nedtheFbi’spol�t�calsur-ve�llanceoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stsmored�rectlythanthesebroadstud-�es.r�chardW.Steele�nh�sart�cle“Frankl�nD.rooseveltandh�sFore�gnPol�cyCr�t�cs”(1979)attemptedfullercoverageofFbi�nvest�gat�ons�ntotheant�-�ntervent�on�sts,butwasl�m�tedbythe�naccess�b�l�ty(atthet�me)ofFbirecords.SteelefocusedonPres�dentrooseveltandarguedthathe�ntent�onallyd�rectedhoover,c�t�ngh�s1934and1936d�rect�ves,to�nves-t�gateh�sant�-�ntervent�on�stopponents�nanefforttodestroythem.asSteele’sargumentwasbasedononlyal�m�tednumberofFbidocuments,rooseveltpapers,andcongress�onalreports,heplacedtoomuchemphas�sonroosevelt’smach�nat�onsasd�st�nctfromJ.edgarhoover’sownpr�or�-t�es.Steeled�dnotw�delyexam�neFbimon�tor�ngofant�-�ntervent�on�sts

11. Theohar�s,Spying on Americans,158–59;athanTheohar�sandJohnCox,The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition(Ph�ladelph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1988), 149; athan Theohar�s, The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History(lawrence:Un�vers�tyPressofKansas,2004).. 12. r�chardG�dPowers,Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover(newyork:FreePress,1987);Powers,Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI (newyork:FreePress,2004);CurtGentry,J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets(newyork:norton,1991). 13. Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45 (l�ncoln: Un�vers�ty ofnebraskaPress,1983),484–87,530–33. 14. JustusD.Doenecke,Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941(lanham,mD:rowman&l�ttlef�eld,2000),276. 15. robertDallek,Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945(newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1979),289–90.

9Introduction

and, because h�s documentat�on was l�m�ted, he focused more on theWh�tehousethantheFbi.16

CharlesCrooghasanalyzedtheFbi’spol�t�calsurve�llanceofant�-�nter-vent�on�sts �n h�s art�cle “Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance and the isolat�on�st-intervent�on�stDebate,1939–1941”(1992).Croogarguedthatrooseveltandhooverfullyagreeduponthenat�onalsecur�tym�ss�onoftheFbiandthattheFbi’s�nvest�gat�onofant�-�ntervent�on�stswasl�m�ted.inmak�ngth�sargument,Croogstated thatFbi“resourceswerenevers�gn�f�cantlymob�l�zed aga�nst roosevelt’s law-ab�d�ng opponents.” yet Croog’s p�ecesuffered from one major weakness. l�ke Steele, Croog employed only al�m�ted base of ev�dence to support h�s conclus�ons: h�s footnotes showthatheusedonlyaport�onoftheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeFbif�le,con-gress�onalhear�ngs,andreports.Croogtherebyvastlyunderest�matedthetrueextentandnatureofFbipol�t�calsurve�llance.17

KennethO’re�llyexam�nedtheFbi’spol�t�calsurve�llanceofroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cyopponents�nthecontextoftheagency’snewDealexpan-s�on�nh�s“anewDealfortheFbi:Therooseveltadm�n�strat�on,Cr�meControl, and nat�onal Secur�ty” (1982). O’re�lly exam�ned Fbi �nst�tu-t�onal changesmadedur�ng thenewDeal �n theareasof cr�mecontroland nat�onal secur�ty. Wh�le he used a broader base of ev�dence thanprev�oush�stor�ans,whenanalyz�ngtheFbi’smon�tor�ngoffore�gnpol�cycr�t�cshenevertheless concluded, contrary toSteele, that “therooseveltadm�n�strat�on’spurposeswereessent�allybenevolent.”18

athanTheohar�sexam�nedanaspectoftheFbi’ssurve�llanceoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stpress�nh�sart�cle“TheFbi,therooseveltadm�n�strat�on,andthe‘Subvers�ve’Press”(1993).mak�ngmoreextens�veuseofFbif�les,Theohar�s analyzed the Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of prom�nent members of theant�-�ntervent�on�stpressandtherooseveltadm�n�strat�on’sdes�retosettlescores w�th them after the amer�can entry �nto the Second World War.Theohar�sconcludedthatacompleteunderstand�ngoftheep�sodecouldnotbeascerta�nedunt�lfurtherdocumentat�onwasdeclass�f�ed.19

16. r�chardW.Steele,“Frankl�nD.rooseveltandh�sFore�gnPol�cyCr�t�cs,”Political Science Quarterly 94 (Spr�ng1979):15–32. arthurSchles�nger Jr. commentedonSteele’sp�ece,argu�ngthathehadmadeoverstatements,andcla�medSteele’sart�clereadmorel�keaprosecutor�albr�efthanah�stor�calassessment.Seeh�s“aCommenton‘rooseveltandh�sFore�gnPol�cyCr�t�cs,’”Political Science Quarterly94(Spr�ng1979):33–35. 17. Charles F. Croog, “Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance and the isolat�on�st-intervent�on�stDebate,1939–1941,”Historian54(Spr�ng1992):441–58. 18. KennethO’re�lly,“anewDealfortheFbi:Therooseveltadm�n�strat�on,Cr�meControl,andnat�onalSecur�ty,”Journal of American History69(December1982):638–58. 19. athan Theohar�s, “The Fbi, the roosevelt adm�n�strat�on, and the ‘Subvers�ve’

10 Introduction

myownart�clesontheFbiandtheant�-�ntervent�on�sts,earlyresultsofmyresearch,exam�nedl�m�tedaspectsoftheFbi’spol�t�calsurve�llance.in“FbiPol�t�calSurve�llanceandtheCharlesl�ndberghinvest�gat�on,1939–1944”(1997),iarguedthattheFbi’s�nvest�gat�veeffortsaga�nstant�-�nter-vent�on�sts, �n part�cular Charles l�ndbergh, were greater than prev�oush�stor�anshadargued.Then,�n“inform�ngFDr:FbiPol�t�calSurve�llanceand the isolat�on�st-intervent�on�st Fore�gn Pol�cy Debate, 1939–1945”(2000),ifurtheredmyargumentbyexam�n�ngtheFbi’smon�tor�ngoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,l�ndbergh,andf�vew�retaptargets.iconcludedthatsecretFbipol�t�cal reports to theWh�tehousehelpedroosevelt toadvance h�s concept�on of the nat�on’s nat�onal secur�ty �nterests.20 and�n“Frankl�nD.roosevelt,J.edgarhoover,andFbiPol�t�calSurve�llance”(1999),iarguedforalayaud�encethat�twashooverandnotrooseveltwho �n�t�atedFbimon�tor�ngof ant�-�ntervent�on�sts, yetroosevelthadmadenocompla�nts.Theseearlyconclus�onswerel�m�tedandservedasabas�sonwh�chth�spresentstudywaslaunched.Someaspectsofmyearlyworkareexpandeduponhere�nandmorecloselyscrut�n�zed.21

Otherstud�esdealw�ththeFbiandpol�t�calsurve�llancedur�ngth�sper�od �n �nd�rect ways. roy Turnbaugh argued �n “The Fbi and harryelmer barnes” (1980) that the bureau targeted the ant�-�ntervent�on�stbarnes �n an effort to exact vengeance for cr�t�cal comments the notedh�stor�anhadmadeabouttheFbipr�ortotheGreatDebate.hed�dnotanalyze the Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of barnes as part of a larger effort aga�nstant�-�ntervent�on�sts.22 Franc�s macDonnell, �n h�s book Insidious Foes:

Press,”Journalism History19(Spr�ng1993):3–10. 20. WarrenK�mballwassol�c�tedtocommentonmyart�cleforh-D�plo,thed�plomat�ch�storyinternetd�scuss�onl�st.hepra�sedmypo�ntthattheor�g�nsof�llegalsurve�llancefortheWh�tehousedatebacktoFDrandnotn�xon.hecr�t�c�zedme,however,fornotadequately prov�ng my content�on that Fbi pol�t�cal reports perm�tted roosevelt to notworryabouth�sdomest�copponentsashehadkepttabsonthem.imayhaveoverstatedmycase,butiwasalsonotclear�nmyargument.ishouldhavestatedthatrooseveltgatheredsens�t�ve pol�t�cal �ntell�gence w�thout h�s cr�t�cs know�ng about �t, and th�s �nformat�on,�npart,allowedh�mto�mplementh�sconcept�onofthecountry’snat�onalsecur�tyneeds.WarrenF.K�mball,rev�ewofDouglasm.Charles, “inform�ngFDr”(19apr�l2000),h-D�plod�scuss�onl�st,http://www.h-net.msu.edu. 21. Douglas m. Charles and John ross�, “Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance and the Charlesl�ndbergh invest�gat�on, 1939–1944,” Historian 59 (Summer 1997): 831–47; Douglas m.Charles, “inform�ng FDr: Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance and the isolat�on�st-intervent�on�stFore�gnPol�cyDebate,1939–1945,”Diplomatic History24(Spr�ng2000):211–32;Charles,“Frankl�n D. roosevelt, J. edgar hoover, and Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance,” USA Today 128(September1999):74–76. 22. royTurnbaugh,“TheFbiandharryelmerbarnes:1936–1944,”Historian42(may1980):385–98.

11Introduction

The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (1995), analyzedthe Fbi’s act�v�ty dur�ng th�s per�od but only �nsofar as �t related to theperce�ved F�fth Column threat.23 barton bernste�n surveyed very br�eflyroosevelt’s�nterest�nFbireportsabouth�scr�t�cs,but�nthelargercontextoftheabuseofexecut�veauthor�tydat�ngfrom1940.24andJohnF.berensnoted roosevelt’s empowerment of the Fbi but overlooked �ts mon�tor-�ng of ant�-�ntervent�on�sts �n h�s broad and conc�se survey art�cle “TheFbi and C�v�l l�bert�es from Frankl�n roosevelt to J�mmy Carter—anh�stor�calOverv�ew”(1980).25

Th�sbookfurthermakesacontr�but�ontotheh�stor�ography,�ntermsof the Fbi at least, surround�ng the or�g�ns of the amer�can nat�onalsecur�tystate.ifthenat�onalsecur�tystate�sdef�nedasthecountryplac-�ng�tselfonapermanentwart�mefoot�ngg�venglobalthreatstonat�onalsecur�ty(nuclearweapons,ColdWar,terror�sm)andthelossofgeograph�csecur�ty (the atlant�c and Pac�f�c Oceans, the Pearl harbor attack, and9/11),thestepp�ngstonetothatwasfounddur�ngtheprewarsurve�llanceof,�npart,theant�-�ntervent�on�sts.moreover,thenat�onalsecur�tystatecanbeunderstood,wroteDan�elyerg�n,as“aun�f�edpatternofatt�tudes,pol�c�es,and�nst�tut�ons.”26Wh�letheatt�tudesandpol�c�esthatmadeupwhat we would cons�der the nat�onal secur�ty state developed pr�mar�lyw�ththeonsetoftheColdWarfrom1947(conta�nmentandabel�efthattosecuretheUn�tedStatesthecountrymustbeproact�ve�nternat�onally),the�nst�tut�ons—spec�f�callytheFbi—clearlybegantodevelopasystem-atic secur�ty consc�ousness �nvolv�ng �ntell�gence �nvest�gat�ons aga�nstbothrad�calsandleg�t�matefore�gnpol�cycr�t�csdur�ngtheper�odbeforetheamer�canentrance�ntotheSecondWorldWar.evenh�stor�anDav�dreynolds, �n h�s �mportant book From Munich to Pearl Harbor (2001),wh�lenotatallexam�n�ngtheFbi,doesconcludethatby“theendof1941manyfeaturesofwhatwouldemergeasthe ‘nat�onalsecur�tystate’werealready apparent �n embryo, albe�t appl�ed to a very d�fferent enemy.”27

23. Franc�smacDonnell,Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front(newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1995),157–83. 24. bartonJ.bernste�n,“TheroadtoWatergateandbeyond:TheGrowthandabuseofexecut�veauthor�tys�nce1940,”Law and Contemporary Problems40(Spr�ng1976):58–76. 25. John F. berens, “The Fbi and C�v�l l�bert�es from Frankl�n roosevelt to J�mmyCarter—anh�stor�calOverv�ew,”Michigan Academician13(1980):131–44. 26. Dan�elyerg�n,Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State(boston:houghton,m�ffl�n,1977),5. 27. Dav�dreynolds,From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second World War(Ch�cago:ivanr.Dee,2001),5.intermsoftheembryon�caspectsofthenat�onalsecur�tystate,reynolds�dent�f�esamer�ca’s“newglobalperspect�veon�nternat�onal

1� Introduction

Therefore, i have termed th�s per�od the domest�c secur�ty state—thepo�nt at wh�ch the Fbi developed �ts domest�c �ntell�gence apparatusand�nternat�onal�ntell�gencel�a�sontothedegreethat�toperatedsem�-autonomouslyandwasonasol�d foot�ng towardevolv�ng �nto the later,Cold War–era nat�onal secur�ty state once the country adopted �ts ColdWaratt�tudesandpol�c�es. Whereasdur�ngthenat�onalsecur�tystateeratheFbiwaspartof,andconcerned w�th, ensur�ng the nat�on’s secur�ty from commun�st subver-s�on that was bel�eved to be a global effort d�rected from moscow, dur-�ngthedomest�csecur�tystateper�odtheFbiwasmoreconcernedw�thpreserv�ngthenat�on’sdomest�csecur�tyfromperce�ved�nternalthreats.Thosethreatswere�dent�f�ed�nfasc�standcommun�st“subvers�ves,”butalso,s�gn�f�cantly,�nleg�t�matefore�gnpol�cycr�t�cswhoweresystemat�-callymon�toredunderadomest�csecur�tyrat�onale.eventheFbi’sownjargond�fferent�atedbetweentheGreatDebateper�odandtheColdWar:dur�ng the former they �nvest�gated threats to “domest�c secur�ty” wh�ledur�ngtheColdWarthatchangedto“nat�onalsecur�ty.”butthepatternofFbisurve�llanceand�ts just�f�cat�onrema�nedthesame,wh�ledur�ngtheColdWar thebureaudevelopedagreaterdegreeofautonomy,more�ntrus�ve�nvest�gat�vetechn�ques,and�llegald�srupt�onprograms. inh�sbookShattered Peace(1977),Dan�elyerg�ntracedtheor�g�nsofthenat�onalsecur�tystatebacktoWoodrowW�lsonandh�sconcept�onofamer�can �nternat�onal�sm. yerg�n argued that amer�can pol�cy makersconceptual�zedsecur�tyconcernsatth�st�me�nl�ghtofaperce�vedexpan-s�on�stand�deolog�calSov�etruss�a.28FrankJ.Donners�m�larly�dent�f�edthefederal�zat�onofdomest�c�ntell�gence�ntheF�rstWorldWareraandtheper�odoftheruss�anrevolut�on.itwasatth�st�me,heargued,thattheFbi�nvolved�tself�nlarge-scale�nvest�gat�onsofpr�mar�lyleft-w�ngd�s-senters,yethearguedthatthenat�onalsecur�tystate�sbestdemonstrateddur�ng the Cold War. and athan Theohar�s has exam�ned the nat�onalsecur�tystate�ntermsofmcCarthy�sm,dat�ng�tsor�g�nstotheColdWar,wh�ch,heargued,alongw�thPres�dentTruman’srhetor�candpoorleader-sh�p,perm�ttedsuchabusestobewrought.hefurtheredh�sargument�nSpying on Americans(1978)wherehearguedthat�twasdur�ngtheColdWarwhen theCongressdeferred to theexecut�ve �nmattersofnat�onalsecur�tyandtoleratedsecrecyasnecessarytoeffectsecur�typol�cy.29

relat�ons”w�thaconcom�tantexpans�onofU.S.secur�ty�ntermsofgeographyand“theasser-t�onofU.S.pr�nc�plesofl�beral,cap�tal�stdemocracy.” 28. yerg�n,Shattered Peace. 29. SeeDonner,The Age of Surveillance; athanTheohar�s,Seeds of Repression: Harry S.

13Introduction

Th�sstudyhopestocomplementtheworkofFbi,ant�-�ntervent�on�st,andnat�onal secur�tyh�stor�ansbyexam�n�ng theFbi’spol�t�cal surve�l-lance of roosevelt’s ant�-�ntervent�on�st fore�gn pol�cy cr�t�cs from 1939to1945.Fbipol�t�calsurve�llancedur�ngth�sper�odwasextens�ve,w�de-spread,andsoughttoberespons�vetoroosevelt’spol�t�cal�nterests.Theextentofthebureau’sefforts,moreover,closelym�rrorslaterColdWarpat-ternsofFbibehav�or.Th�s�ss�gn�f�cant�nasmuchasprev�oush�stor�anshave �dent�f�ed thenat�onalsecur�tystateasbe�ng �nextr�cably l�nkedtofearsofcommun�stsubvers�onandthespreadofbolshev�sm.Th�sstudy,andcontemporaryevents �nvolv�ng �nternat�onal terror�sm,demonstratethatthenat�onalsecur�tystateextendsbeyondnat�onaland�nternat�onalconcernsw�thcommun�sm,even�fcommun�smwasthepr�maryfocusofnat�onalsecur�tybureaucratsdur�ngtheColdWar.TheGreatDebate�llus-trateswellthatmostanyperce�vedthreatdur�ngacr�s�sper�od—whetherf�erce ant�-�ntervent�on�st oppos�t�on to fore�gn pol�cy or acts of terror-�sm—thateventuallyleadpol�cymakerstodeveloptheatt�tudes,pol�c�es,and�nst�tut�onsconsumedw�thsecur�tyconcernswouldmorph�ntothenat�onalsecur�tystate.

—■■■■■■■—

The terror�st attacks �n new york C�ty and Wash�ngton, D.C., on 11September2001andsubsequentgovernmentreact�onhavebroughtnews�gn�f�cancetoth�sstudy.inreact�ontotheseevents,�nanefforttosafe-guard the nat�on from further terror�st �nc�dents, the bush adm�n�stra-t�onsoughttosuspend�nvest�gat�verestr�ct�onsplacedontheFbi�nthe1970s.Follow�nghoover’sdeath�n1972,andrevelat�onsof�ntrus�veFbidomest�csurve�llanceact�v�t�es,Fbi�nvest�gat�onswereformallyrestr�ctedtopreventthebureaufrom�nvest�gat�ngpol�t�callyor�entedgroups.Some�nthebushadm�n�strat�on,however,bel�evedtheserestr�ct�ons�mpededFbicounterterror�smeffortsbyprevent�ngtheemploymentofundercoveragentstomon�tor,w�thoutprobablecause,rel�g�ousandpol�t�calgroups. Test�fy�ng before the Senate Jud�c�ary Comm�ttee, attorney GeneralJohnashcroftdefendedthebushadm�n�strat�on’sant�terror�smplan,wh�ch�ncludedabroadexpans�onofFbiw�retapp�ngand�nvest�gat�veauthor�ty.he den�ed that amer�can c�t�zens’ c�v�l l�bert�es would be restr�cted butadded:“Tothose[cr�t�cs]whoscarepeace-lov�ngpeoplew�thphantomsof

Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism(Ch�cago:Quadrangle,1970);Theohar�s,Spying on Americans, 3–12.

14 Introduction

lostl�berty,mymessage�sth�s:yourtact�csonlya�dterror�stsfortheyerodeournat�onalun�tyandd�m�n�shourresolve.”30

Wh�le the attorney general m�ght have cla�med �nd�v�dual l�bert�eswouldnotbev�olatedas�nthepast,thebushadm�n�strat�on’s“PaTriOTact”hascreatedthepotent�alfortheFbitoresumeapol�t�calsurve�llancerole.inthecurrentatmosphere,pastfearsofthe�nfluenceof“subvers�veact�v�t�es”onamer�cannat�onalsecur�tyhavebeenreplacedw�thconcernsoverterror�stact�v�t�es.W�th�ncreasedFbi�nvest�gat�veauthor�ty,andaconcom�tant �ncrease �n government secrecy (�.e., a t�ghten�ng of FOiastandards, restr�ct�ons on access to pres�dent�al records, secret meet�ngsw�thcorporateexecut�vestodevelopnat�onalpol�c�es,andthecreat�onofsecretnSaandCiasurve�llanceprograms),31arev�valoftheFbi’s�nter-est�ndomest�cpol�t�calsurve�llance�sposs�ble�fnotprobable.indeed,bynovember2003theCongresssoughttoexpands�gn�f�cantlyFbipowerstoexam�nef�nanc�alrecordsofvar�ousk�ndsw�thouta judge’sapproval.also�nthatmonth,theNew York TimesreportedthattheFbihadbeguntocollect“extens�ve�nformat�ononthetact�cs,tra�n�ngandorgan�zat�onof ant�-war [iraq War] demonstrators.” and by December the Fbi hadel�m�nated d�st�nct�ons between cr�m�nal and �ntell�gence �nvest�gat�onclass�f�cat�ons.32

by2005,moreover,afterthepres�dent�alelect�on,theeffortto�ncreasethe Fbi’s unchecked freedom �n conduct�ng �nvest�gat�ons grew. Dur�ngmay,Senaterepubl�cansandthebushadm�n�strat�onadvocatedexpand-�ngFbipowerstoperm�tagents“tosubpoenarecordsfrombus�nessesandother �nst�tut�onsw�thouta judge’s s�gn-off �f theydeclared themater�alwasneededaspartofafore�gn�ntell�gence�nvest�gat�on.”laterthatyear,

30. “ashcroftappearsbeforeSenatetoDefendTact�cs,”New York Times,6December2001;ne�la.lew�s,“ashcroftDefendsant�-terrorPlanandSaysCr�t�c�smmaya�dFoes,”New York Times, 7December2001. 31. DouglasJehl,“bushtoCreatenewUn�t �nFbiforintell�gence,”New York Times, 30 June 2005; “Cheat�ng h�story,” New York Times, 15 november 2001; “Cr�t�cs Say newrule l�m�ts access to records,” New York Times, 27 February 2002; Dana m�lbank andJust�nblum, “DocumentSaysO�lCh�efsmetw�thCheneyTaskForce,”Washington Post, 16november2005;Jamesr�sen,“bushletsUSSpyonCallersw�thoutCourts,”New York Times, 16 December 2005; Dana Pr�est, “Covert Cia Program W�thstands new Furor,”Washington Post,30December2005. 32. “ashcroftUrgesCaut�onw�thFOiarequests,”Washington Post,17October2001;ellennakash�ma,“bushv�ewofSecrecyisSt�rr�ngFrustrat�on,”Washington Post, 3march2002; athan Theohar�s to Douglas m. Charles, 6 november 2001; er�c l�chtblau, “Fbi’sreach�ntorecordsisSettoGrow,”New York Times,12november2003;er�cl�chtblau,“FbiScrut�n�zesant�warrall�es,”New York Times, 23november2003;Daneggen,“Fbiappl�esnewrulestoSurve�llance,”Washington Post, 13December2003.

15Introduction

the Washington Post reported that the Fbi had �nvest�gated “hundredsof potent�al v�olat�ons related to �ts use of secret operat�ons,” v�olat�onsthatwere“largelyh�ddenfrompubl�cv�ew.”morespec�f�cally,Fbiagentsconducted surve�llanceofU.S. res�dents foroverayear “w�thoutproperpaperworkorovers�ght.”aspartofth�seffort,Fbiagentsse�zede-ma�lsand bank records w�thout proper warrants and conducted at least one“unconsentedphys�calsearch.”inresponse,Fbioff�c�alscalledthev�ola-t�ons“adm�n�strat�veerrors.”33

in november of 2005, �t was further reported that Fbi agents werefrequentlyus�ngnat�onalsecur�tyletters“toscrut�n�zeU.S.res�dentsandv�s�tors who are not alleged to be terror�sts or sp�es.” nat�onal secur�tyletterswerean �nnovat�onof the1970s toass�stFbiagents �nesp�onageandterror�smcases,butthePaTriOTactandthebushadm�n�strat�on’sgu�del�neshaveextendedthe�ruse.accord�ngtotheWashington Post,Fbiagents�ssuemorethanth�rtythousandnat�onalsecur�tyletterseachyearandnoneofthemrequ�retheovers�ghtofajudgeandrece�venoexternalrev�ewafterward.34

by December of 2005, �t was also reported that someone �n the Fbialteredthedatesondocumentstocoveruptheemploymentofan�llegalw�retap, and one agent was blackballed from undercover �nvest�gat�onsafter he cr�t�c�zed Fbi v�olat�ons �nternally. later that month, �t wasfurther reported that Fbi agents work�ng �n counterterror�sm cases hadmon�tored a “vegan Commun�ty Project,” a Cathol�c Workers group,Greenpeace,andthean�maladvocacygroupPeoplefortheeth�calTreat-mentofan�mals.35

ev�dence advanced �n th�s book demonstrates that the roots of suchFbiact�v�tyaretobefounddur�ngtheant�-�ntervent�on�stfore�gnpol�cydebate when leg�t�mate adm�n�strat�on cr�t�cs were regarded as w�tt�ngorunw�tt�ngdupesoffasc�stsand�nvest�gatedunderadomest�csecur�tyclass�f�cat�on. it was dur�ng th�s cr�t�cal per�od (a t�me of �nternat�onalcr�s�s) that Fbi off�c�als acqu�red �ncreased �nvest�gat�ve author�ty andresortedtosens�t�ve�nvest�gat�vetechn�ques,l�kew�retapp�ng,andv�olated

33. er�cl�chtblau,“PlanWouldbroadenFbi’sTerrorrole,” New York Times, 19may2005;Daneggen,“FbiPapersind�cateintell�gencev�olat�ons,SecretSurve�llancelackedOvers�ght,”Washington Post, 24October2005. 34. “Patr�ot act Pr�mer,” Washington Post, 3 november 2005; barton Gelman, “TheFbi’sSecretScrut�ny,inhuntforTerror�sts,bureauexam�nesrecordsofOrd�naryamer�-cans,”Washington Post,6november2005. 35. er�cl�chtblau,“reportF�ndsCover-Up�nanFbiTerrorCase,”New York Times, 4December2005;l�chtblau,“FbiWatchedact�v�stGroups,newF�lesShow,”New York Times,20December2005.

1� Introduction

�nvest�gat�ve restr�ct�ons—all �n the name of combat�ng “subvers�veact�v�ty,”buttoooften,�nreal�ty,w�ththepr�meobject�veandendresultbe�ngthemon�tor�ngofdomest�cpol�t�calact�v�tywh�lev�olat�ngthec�v�ll�bert�esoffore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs.

Background

The or�g�ns of the Federal bureau of invest�gat�on date back to theProgress�veeraandtheadm�n�strat�onofthef�rstProgress�vepres�dent,Theodore roosevelt. after roosevelt’s ascendance to the pres�dency�n 1901, the Just�ce Department’s respons�b�l�t�es �ncreased dramat�-cally.bel�ev�ng�ntheProgress�ve�dealofanassert�veexecut�ve,rooseveltsought touse the federalgovernment toregulate theburgeon�ngcorpo-rateeconomy�nordertosave�t.hethereforere�nv�goratedtheShermanant�trust act of 1890 and d�rected the Just�ce Department to prosecutethosecorporat�onsheregardedas“badtrusts.”Follow�ngsu�t,departmentattorneyspursuedf�rstthenorthernSecur�t�esCompany—ag�antra�lroadmonopoly operated by James J. h�ll and J. P. morgan—before prosecut-�ngtheCh�cagomeatpackers,StandardO�l,andthesugarref�nersallfor�llegalrestra�ntoftrade.butthegovernmentsoonexper�encedd�ff�cult�es.itsproblemsstemmedfromthedepartmentattorneys’�ncreasedworkloadandthefactthattheJust�ceDepartmentd�dnothave�tsown�nvest�gat�veun�t—andcouldnoth�repr�vatedetect�vesbecauseofthe1892P�nkertonact bann�ng such act�v�ty—forc�ng �t to rely upon Secret Serv�ce agentswhowereprov�dedonloan.notsat�sf�edw�ththes�tuat�on,andreflect�ngProgress�ves’concernforeff�c�ency,rooseveltdec�ded�twast�metocre-atean�nvest�gat�veagency—thebureauofinvest�gat�on(bi)—w�th�ntheJust�ceDepartment.1

1. athanTheohar�s,“abr�efh�storyoftheFbi’sroleandPowers,”�nathanTheohar�setal.,The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide(Phoen�x,aZ:OryxPress,1999),3;Johnm�lton Cooper Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt(Cambr�dge,ma:belknapPress,1983),77;Johnmortonblum,The Republican Roosevelt,2nded.(Cambr�dge,ma:harvardUn�vers�tyPress,1977),74–75,85–87.

ChApter 1

1�

1� Chapter 1

Congresshes�tatedandhadconcernsaboutestabl�sh�nganother�nves-t�gat�ve agency. members of Congress were worr�ed pr�mar�ly becausetheJust�ceDepartmenthadusedSecretServ�ceagentsto�nvest�gate(andeventuallyconv�ct)acongressmanandsenatorfromOregonforconsp�r-acy todefraud theU.S.government �nan �ssue �nvolv�ngwestern lands.G�venthes�tuat�on,�nl�ghtofroosevelt’sdes�retocreatethebi,Congressheldhear�ngs�ntotheloan�ngofSecretServ�ceagents.membersbel�evedtheSecretServ�cehadoverstepped�tslegalauthor�tybyloan�ngagentstotheJust�ceDepartment,and �naneffort torat�onal�zeagent loan�ngtheass�stantch�efoftheSecretServ�ce,W�ll�ammoran,arguedthatTreasuryDepartmentfundswerenotspentwh�leJust�ceDepartmentfundswere.2Outraged over th�s l�beral �nterpretat�on of the Secret Serv�ce’s charter,andconcernedw�ththeposs�bleevolut�onofanamer�cansecretpol�ce,Congress amended �ts budgetary appropr�at�ons to ban the loan�ng ofSecret Serv�ce agents. in so do�ng, Congress had effect�vely renderedJust�ce Department �nvest�gat�ons �mpotent s�nce they had rel�ed exclu-s�velyupontheuseofSecretServ�ceagents.Congress,meanwh�le,dec�dednoth�ngregard�ngattorneyGeneralCharlesbonaparte’srequestforfundstoestabl�shthebi.3 Congress’s�nact�ond�dnotdaunttherooseveltadm�n�strat�on,howev-er.Dur�ngthesummerof1908,wh�leCongresswasadjourned,bonaparteusedroosevelt’sexecut�vemandatetoestabl�shthebureauofinvest�gat�onanyway(thebiwasrenamedtheFederalbureauofinvest�gat�on�n1935).an outraged Congress demanded answers, but through assurances thatthe bi agents were profess�onals and would not engage �n noncr�m�nal�nvest�gat�ons because of the attorney general’s personal overs�ght, �tacqu�esced.exam�nedd�fferently,Congresswasassuagedw�thbonaparte’sappealstotheProgress�ve�dealsofprofess�onal�sm,eff�c�ency,andrat�on-al�ty.S�gn�f�cantly,however,thebiwasnotchartedbyCongressandas�ts

2. Dav�d W�ll�ams, “‘W�thout Understand�ng’: The Fbi and Pol�t�cal Surve�llance,1908–1941”(Ph.D.d�ss.,Un�vers�tyofnewhampsh�re,1981),30–31.Foradeta�ledaccountofthelandfraudseer�chardG�dPowers,Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI(newyork:FreePress,2004),28–38;DonWh�tehead,The FBI Story: A Report to the People(newyork:randomhouse,1956),17–18;W�ll�ams,“‘W�thoutUnderstand�ng,’”32–34.TheCongress’sconcernwasalsorooted�nthe�rprev�ousdom�nance�nthefederalgovernmentthatdatedfrom1865andwh�chwasnowwan�ngw�thther�seofProgress�v�smand�tscharacter�st�cassert�veexecut�ve.Congresswasstruggl�ngw�ththenewly�nv�goratedpres�dency. 3. W�ll�ams,“‘W�thoutUnderstand�ng,’”34–37;athanTheohar�sandJohnCox,The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition(Ph�ladelph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1988),43.

19Background

respons�b�l�t�es�ncreased,theab�l�tyoftheattorneygeneraltomon�tor�tsact�v�t�esd�m�n�shed.4 Thegrowthofbirespons�b�l�t�es,andconcom�tantreduct�onofover-s�ght,occurredrap�dly.in1910,CongresspassedtheWh�teSlaveTraff�cact (the mann act) that outlawed the transportat�on of women acrossstate l�nesfor“�mmoral”purposes.Wh�lethe lawwas �ntendedtotargetprost�tut�onr�ngs,�twas�nterpretedtoperm�tthegovernmenttoregulateperce�ved �mmoral�tyamongthepubl�c.Then, �n1919,Congresspassedanotherlawthat�ncreasedthebi’slawenforcementrole.Whenautomob�lesalesskyrocketedafter1916,Congresspassedthemotorveh�cleTheftact(Dyeract)mak�ngthetransportat�onofstolenveh�clesacrossstatel�nesafederalcr�meandtherebyempower�ngthebito�nvest�gate.itwasth�slaw,forexample,thatbroughtthebureauand�tsresources�ntothehuntforJohnD�ll�ngerdur�ng1933.Thenat�onalcharacterofbothp�ecesofleg�sla-t�on,moreover,necess�tatedanexpans�onofthebiouts�deofWash�ngtontoensureeffect�ve�nvest�gat�ons,mak�ngthebureauatrulynat�onalpol�ceforce.The long-termeffectsofboth laws led tootherdevelopments: thebureaubegantoaccumulatederogatory�nformat�ononthepr�vatel�vesofc�t�zensbothcommonandprom�nent,�thelpedtonat�onal�zeandpopu-lar�zethebi,and�td�m�n�shedtheattorneygeneral’sovers�ght.5 W�th theadventof theF�rstWorldWar, thebureau’s respons�b�l�t�esmoved�ntotheareaofdomest�csecur�ty,�ncreas�ngevenmore�tsnat�onalpol�c�ngrole.mostpress�ngat th�s t�mewere fearsof fore�gn �nfluencesupon amer�can soc�ety. These nat�v�st concerns stemmed not from thewar but from the depressed amer�can economy �n 1914, and they wereonlyhe�ghtenedaftervar�ousGermanattemptsat sabotagewereuncov-ered. Pres�dent Woodrow W�lson d�d not allev�ate these nat�v�st fearswhenhes�ngledout“hyphenatedamer�cans”asthesourceofamer�ca’sdomest�ctroubleandhecalleduponCongresstoenactsed�t�onleg�slat�on.Wh�leCongressd�dnotactonW�lson’sw�shes, the toneofh�swart�mepreparednesscampa�gnneverthelessencouragedanatmospherewherebyperce�vedd�sloyaltywasharshlyrepressed.6

4. W�ll�ams, “‘W�thout Understand�ng,’” 38, 39–41, 44–47; Theohar�s and Cox, The Boss,43;lowenthal,The Federal Bureau of Investigation,10–11;JohnWh�teclayChambersii,The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920,2nded.(newyork:St.mart�n’s,1992),140. 5. Theohar�s,“abr�efh�storyoftheFbi’sroleandPowers,”6–7;r�chardG�dPowers,Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover(newyork:FreePress,1987),189;CurtGen-try,J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets(newyork:norton,1991),114–15;lowenthal,The Federal Bureau of Investigation,14–15;Cook,The FBI Nobody Knows,60. 6. Johnh�gham,Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925, 2nd

�0 Chapter 1

after several �nc�dents of successful and attempted sabotage wered�scoveredbetween1915and1917,Congressrespondedw�thtoughleg-�slat�on.Theesp�onageactof1917made�tacr�meto�nterferew�ththedraft,tofomentd�srupt�on�nthem�l�tary,ortostealgovernmentsecretsw�ththe�ntenttoa�dtheenemydur�ngwart�me.later,theSabotageandSed�t�onactsof1918—strongermeasuresyet—forbadepubl�coppos�t�ontothegovernmentandwareffort.Governmentoff�c�alsalsousedthe1918al�en Deportat�on act to deport nonc�t�zens who advocated the v�olentoverthrowoftheU.S.government.7

These var�ous laws �ncreased the Just�ce Department’s respons�b�l�-t�es �n the realmof �nternal secur�ty. in1918, therefore, thedepartmentformed the al�en enemy reg�strat�on Sect�on, known popularly as theal�en enemy bureau. Th�s agency focused on the act�v�t�es of Germansandotherfore�gnnat�onals,rad�cals,anarch�sts,afr�canamer�cans,andallmannerofperce�ved“subvers�ves.”itwas�nth�ssect�on,s�gn�f�cantly,that a young J. edgar hoover began h�s career and where he learned touse adm�n�strat�ve procedures to bypass legal restra�nts. hoover wouldlateremploywhathelearnedherewhenhetookthere�nsofthebureauofinvest�gat�on�n1924.8nat�v�stfearswerethenhe�ghtened�namer�ca

ed.(newbrunsw�ck,nJ:rutgersUn�vers�tyPress,1994),183–84;m�chaelJ.heale,Ameri-can Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–1970(balt�more:Johnshopk�nsUn�vers�tyPress,1990),10,14;Franc�smacDonnell,Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front(newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1995),11–15,23;W�l-l�ams,“‘W�thoutUnderstand�ng,’”80.SeealsoharrySche�ber,The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917–1921(ithaca,ny:CornellUn�vers�tyPress,1960).Kendr�ckCle-mentsarguesthatW�lsonmerelyfollowedpubl�cop�n�onwhensupport�ngrepress�vemea-sures�nWoodrow Wilson: World Statesman,rev.ed.(Ch�cago:ivanr.Dee,1999),176. 7. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,44–45;macDonnell,Insidious Foes,16–25. 8. Theohar�s and Cox, The Boss, 48; Powers, Secrecy and Power, 55; Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover,69–73;Joanm.Jensen,The Price of Vigilance(Ch�cago:randmcnally,1968),17–26,188–218;Cook,The FBI Nobody Knows,62–63,67.army�ntell�gencealsotookan�nterest�nmanyofthesesametargetsdur�ngtheF�rstWorldWarper�od.SeeroyTalbert,Negative Intel-ligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917–1941(Jackson:Un�vers�tyPressofm�ss�ss�pp�,1991);lowenthal,The Federal Bureau of Investigation,36–47;Theohar�s,“abr�efh�storyoftheFbi’sroleandPowers,”7.Paull.murphyarguesthatc�v�ll�bert�esf�rstappearedasan�ssue�npubl�cpol�cydat�ngfromWWi�nh�sWorld War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States(newyork:norton,1979);KennethO’re�lly,“Racial Matters”: The FBI’s Secret File on Black America, 1960–1972(newyork:FreePress,1989),9–17.Seealsomarkell�s,“‘Clos�ngranks’and‘Seek�nghonors’:W.e.b.Dubo�s�nWorldWari,”Journal of Amer-ican History79(June1992):96–124;markell�s,“J.edgarhooverandthe‘redSummer’of1919,”Journal of American Studies28(January1994):39–59;andell�s,Race, War, and Surveil-lance: African Americans and the United States Government during World War I(bloom�ngton:ind�anaUn�vers�tyPress,2001).Forageneralh�storyoftheracer�otsseeW�ll�amm.Tuttle,Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919(newyork:atheneum,1970).SeealsoTheodore

�1Background

when, �n 1917, the bolshev�ks se�zed power �n russ�a. Dur�ng the years�mmed�ately follow�ng theconclus�onof theF�rstWorldWar (1919and1920),concernthatas�m�larm�nor�tywasfoment�ngcommun�strevolu-t�on�namer�ca�ncreasedwhensh�pyardworkers(andthe�rsympath�z-ers)struck�nSeattle,Wash�ngton.afterward,thecountryexper�encedaser�esofstr�kesdur�ng1919thatseemedtoconf�rmcommun�st�nfluenceamong workers—a fear that management del�berately man�pulated tocrush the labor str�kes. The country then exper�enced a ser�es of ma�l-bombplotsandotherbomb�ngs(s�gn�f�cantlyattheres�denceofattorneyGenerala.m�tchellPalmer),wh�ch, �n l�ghtof thebolshev�krevolut�onandlaborunrest,promptedm�tchelltopurgethenat�onofrad�cal�nflu-ences.9

Whatfollowedwasanat�onalefforttorootoutrad�cal�smthatresulted�nmassv�olat�onsofmanypeople’sc�v�ll�bert�es.Palmercreatedarad�calbureau—later renamed the General intell�gence D�v�s�on—that washeadedbyJ.edgarhoover.TheproblemforPalmerandthebiwasthatto prosecute rad�cals under federal law, off�c�als had to e�ther prove therad�cals’membersh�p�nrad�calorgan�zat�onsorpersuadethemtoadm�tto membersh�p. F�nd�ng th�s goal �nsurmountable, government off�c�alsdec�ded�nsteadtodeporttherad�calsandtherebyel�m�natethe�nfluenceoffore�gn�deas.Todoth�s,thebientered�ntocooperat�onw�ththelaborDepartment’simm�grat�onbureau,whoseagents,byalter�ngregulat�onsto keep rad�cals from consult�ng lawyers, could coerce confess�ons andthereforemaketheml�ablefordeportat�on.itwasthesemeansthatunder-p�nned the so-calledPalmerra�ds, �nwh�chsome10,000 suspectswerearrestednat�onw�debutonly556weredeported.10

Kornwe�bel,Investigate Everything: Federal Efforts to Compel Black Loyalty during World War I(bloom�ngton:ind�anaUn�vers�tyPress,2002);Kornwe�bel,Seeing Red: Federal Campaigns against Black Militancy, 1919–1925(bloom�ngton:ind�anaUn�vers�tyPress,1998). 9. robertK.murray,Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920(m�nneapo-l�s:Un�vers�tyofm�nnesotaPress,1955),58–68.Seealsorobertl.Fr�edhe�m,The Seattle General Strike(Seattle:Un�vers�tyofWash�ngtonPress,1964);murray,Red Scare,69–71.athoroughb�ographyofattorneyGeneralPalmer�sStanleyCoben,A. Mitchell Palmer: Politi-cian (newyork:Columb�aUn�vers�tyPress,1963). 10. murray,Red Scare,193–94;Theohar�s,“abr�efh�storyoftheFbi’sroleandPow-ers,”8;W�ll�amPrestonJr.,Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933,2nded.(Ch�cago:Un�vers�tyofill�no�sPress,1994),208–12,216–17;lowenthal,The Federal Bureau of Investigation,184,199,211–17;Preston,Aliens and Dissenters,222–24.Seealsolou�s F. Post, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A Personal Narrative of an Historic Official Experience (newyork:DaCapoPress,1970);Dav�dW�ll�ams,“Thebureauof invest�gat�onanditsCr�t�cs,1919–1921:TheOr�g�nsofFederalPol�t�calSurve�llance,”Journal of American History68(December1981):563,567–79.

�� Chapter 1

The bi’s part�c�pat�on �n the Palmer ra�ds was just one example ofquest�onableact�v�ty thatplagued thebureauof theearly1920s.Dur�ngthe pres�dency of Warren G. hard�ng, an adm�n�strat�on notor�ous for�ts abuses, the Teapot Dome scandal marked the he�ght of such nefar�-ous act�v�ty. The scandal centered on o�l depos�ts located �n Wyom�ngandCal�forn�athatweresetas�deasnavalreservesbutplacedunderthecontrol of the inter�or Department and �ts secretary, albert b. Fall. Thesecretaryhadlosth�spersonalfortune�nabadmex�canm�n�ngventure,lead�ng h�m to s�gn contracts to perm�t two o�l compan�es to tap thegovernment’sreserves�nexchangefor$400,000�n“loans.”11

by1923,montanaSenatorsThomasWalshandburtonK.Wheeler—later a prom�nent ant�-�ntervent�on�st—exposed Fall’s corrupt�on and�n�t�ated a Senate �nvest�gat�on. but �n an attempt to quash �t, attorneyGeneralharryDaughertyandbiCh�efW�ll�amJ.burnsd�spatchedagentsto�nvest�gateWalshandWheelertouncoveranyth�ngw�thwh�chtod�s-cred�tthem.intheseefforts,biagents�nterceptedthe�rma�l,tappedthe�rtelephones,andbroke�ntothe�roff�ces.intheend,Daughertyandburnswereabletoconcoctan�nd�ctmentaga�nstWheelerforallegedm�suseofh�soff�cetoobta�ngasando�lleases.Thechargeswerebogusand,attr�al,Walsh—serv�ngasWheeler’sdefenseattorney—wasabletodemonstrateasmuch.When�twasallover,thebi’scr�meswereuncoveredandthepubl�cbecameoutragedatgovernmentabuses.12

hard�ng d�ed before any of th�s became publ�c, however, and h�ssuccessor—Calv�n Cool�dge—successfully d�stanced h�mself from thescandalsandappo�ntedareform�stattorneygeneral tocleanhouse.Thenewattorneygeneral,harlanF�skeStone,bel�evedmenofh�ghmoralandprofess�onal standards would br�ng order to the corrupted department.Follow�ngacab�netmeet�ng�nmay1924,Stoned�scussedh�splanw�thCommerceSecretaryherberthoover,whorecommendedJ.edgarhooveras a poss�ble replacement for the recently f�red burns. Desp�te hoover’spart�c�pat�on�nthePalmerra�ds,wh�chseemedtohavegoneunnot�ced,andw�threcommendat�onsfromsuchesteemedf�guresasthecommercesecretary,Stoneofferedhooverthejob.13

11. OntheTeapotDomescandalseeburlnoggle,Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920s(batonrouge:lou�s�anaStateUn�vers�tyPress,1962);andJ.leonardbates,Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana: Law and Public Affairs, from TR to FDR(Urbana:Un�vers�tyofill�no�sPress,1999),212–39. 12. Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover,118–21;Cook,The FBI Nobody Knows,129–33,133–35;burtonK.WheelerandPaulF.healy,Yankee from the West(GardenC�ty,ny:Doubleday,1962),213–45. 13. Wh�tehead,The FBI Story,66–67;Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,84;Cook,The FBI

�3Background

in�t�allywork�ngw�th�nthenew�nvest�gat�vegu�del�nesla�ddownbyStone,hooverpubl�clyd�sbandedthenow-controvers�alrad�calbureau,endedtheuseofw�retaps,and�nvest�gatedonlyv�olat�onsoffederalcr�m�-nalstatutes.Publ�clysupport�ngtheattorneygeneral’sgu�del�nes,hooverassuredamer�cansthatthebureauwouldnotcollectpol�t�cal�ntell�gence.Stone, bel�ev�ng that profess�onal�sm and h�gh moral standards wouldensure no abuses, trusted the new d�rector and, at every turn, hooversoughttodemonstrateh�sloyalty.14

irrespect�veofthegu�del�nesandhoover’sprom�sestoab�debythem,he and the bureau cont�nued to mon�tor “rad�cal” act�v�t�es, as hooverdef�ned them. Wh�le th�s mon�tor�ng d�d not reach prev�ous levels, �tnevertheless occurred. To gather th�s �ntell�gence w�thout be�ng d�scov-ered,hooverdev�sedspec�alprocedures toensureconf�dent�al�ty.These�ncluded the cl�pp�ng of press stor�es, comp�l�ng unsol�c�ted mater�al onrad�calact�v�t�es,us�ngeuphem�smstoconceal�ll�c�tsources(“conf�den-t�al source”), and work�ng closely w�th local pol�ce forces that regularlymon�toredrad�calsandthen“volunteered”the�rdatatobureauagents.15

hoover then dev�sed a spec�al procedure that would relay sens�t�ve�ntell�genceaboutthepersonalandpol�t�call�vesofprom�nentamer�cansnot�ntothebureau’scentralrecordssystembutd�rectlytoh�sdesk.Suchreports were labeled “personal and conf�dent�al” and perm�tted bureauagents tocont�nue tomon�torpol�t�calact�v�ty (�nvest�gat�ng theaClU,tradeun�on�stW�ll�amFoster,andotherleft�stgroups)wh�lepubl�clythebureaudemonstrated�tsadherencetothenewdepartmentgu�del�nes.16

Dur�ngthepres�dencyofherberthoover,thebureauofinvest�gat�onbegan to serv�ce, but only on an ad hoc bas�s, Wh�te house requestsfor pol�t�cal �ntell�gence.17 and by Pres�dent hoover’s last year �n off�ce,D�rectorhooverhelpedh�m�ndeal�ngw�ththebonusmarchers.Feel�ngdesperate dur�ng the Great Depress�on, thousands of unemployed F�rstWorldWarveteransmarchedonWash�ngton,D.C.,demand�ngpaymentof the�r prom�sed cash bonus of $1,000. Wh�le the payment was to be

Nobody Knows,136–38. 14. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,84–87. 15. ib�d.,93–94. 16. Th�sf�l�ngprocedure�sd�scussed�nathanTheohar�s,ed.,From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover(Ch�cago:ivanr.Dee,1991),2–4;Dav�dW�ll�ams,“‘TheyneverStoppedWatch�ng Us’: Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance, 1924–1936,” UCLA Historical Journal 2 (1981):7–14;Frank J.Donner,Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America(berkeley:Un�vers�tyofCal�forn�aPress,1990). 17. KennethO’re�lly,“herberthooverandtheFbi,”Annals of Iowa47(Summer1983):49–57.

�4 Chapter 1

d�spersedonly�n1945,g�ventheveterans’econom�cpl�ght,theybel�evedthe bonus should be pa�d �mmed�ately. They resolved, therefore, not toleavethecap�talunt�lthe�rdemandsweremet.18

Fearful of econom�c-or�ented protest, some government off�c�alsbel�evedthatcommun�stswererespons�bleforthebonusprotest.Jo�n�ngw�tharmyCh�efofStaffDouglasmacarthur,hooverconv�ncedthepres�-dentthatthemarchwasacommun�stplot.Trust�ng�nh�ssubord�nates,Pres�dent hoover ordered the army to d�sperse the veterans. Th�s onlyworked aga�nst the pres�dent dur�ng an elect�on year, however. he wasroundly cr�t�c�zed for the harsh treatment the veterans rece�ved, lead�ngthepres�denttoorderthebureautoprovecommun�stl�nks.bureauagentsattendedprotestrall�es,mon�toredbonusmarcheract�v�ty,and,w�ththehelp of local red squads, �nvest�gated veterans groups to determ�ne theextentofcommun�st�nf�ltrat�on.agentsd�scoverednone.19

Out of Progress�ve-era �deals of rat�onal and eff�c�ent government,the bureau of invest�gat�on was born dur�ng the Theodore rooseveltadm�n�strat�on. as �ts respons�b�l�t�es grew over t�me, the ab�l�ty of theattorneygeneraltooversee�tsact�v�t�esd�m�n�shed.Th�sledtoanabuseof power that only grew w�th �ncreased respons�b�l�t�es, wart�me neces-s�ty,andapostwarredScare.eventually,thoseabusesbecamepubl�candadm�n�strat�vereformswerecreatedtodealw�ththem.insteadofend�ngthebureau’sab�l�tytomon�torpol�t�calact�v�ty,thereformsonlylessenedthem.evenst�ll, thebureauofthe1920swassmallandnotas�gn�f�cant�nvest�gat�veforce,butth�swouldchangew�thther�seofanotherglobalemergencyandanotherpres�dentnamedroosevelt.

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When Frankl�n roosevelt acceded to the pres�dency �n 1933, J. edgarhoover,forthef�rstt�mes�ncetak�ngoverthebureau�n1924,waspartofapol�t�callyleft-of-centeradm�n�strat�on.Onem�ghtth�nkatf�rstglancethatrooseveltwouldhavenoroom�nh�sadm�n�strat�onforaconservat�vef�gurel�kehoover;yetdesp�tethe�rcontrast�ngpol�t�cal�dent�t�es,theFbid�rector developed an �nt�mate work�ng relat�onsh�p w�th the pres�dent.hooverthensawoverthenexttwelveyearsan�ncrementalexpans�onof

18. SeeDonaldJ.l�s�o,The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus Riot(Columb�a:Un�vers�tyofm�ssour�Press,1974). 19. W�ll�ams,“‘TheyneverStoppedWatch�ngUs,’”15;O’re�lly,“herberthooverandtheFbi,”57–58;l�s�o,The President and Protest,238–50;W�ll�ams,“‘TheyneverStoppedWatch�ngUs,’”15–16.

�5Background

Fbiauthor�ty.Th�sam�cablerelat�onsh�pwasnotev�dent,however,fromtheoutset,buthooverworkedhardtoservethepres�dentandh�sgoals,atleastastheFbid�rectorperce�vedthem.F�rst,byass�st�ngtheattorneygeneral w�th h�s Cr�me Control Program—by combat�ng the perce�vedr�se�ncr�medur�ngtheDepress�on—andthenbyprov�d�ngthepres�dentw�thpol�t�cal �ntell�genceonh�sfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs,hooverrosefromobsequ�ousbureaucrattonat�onalcelebr�ty.Overt�mehebecamepract�-cally�nd�spensabletothepres�dent,wh�leh�sbureauwastransformed�ntoamorepowerfulandgreatlyexpandedagency. becausehooverwasarepubl�canappo�ntee(oftheCool�dgeadm�n-�strat�on)ands�nceh�s jobwasnotprotectedby thec�v�l serv�ce, �twasl�kelythataDemocrat�cadm�n�strat�onwouldreplaceh�m.itwasw�delybel�eved,moreover,thatth�swould�ndeedhappen,buthoover—amasterbureaucrat—d�d not lack the ab�l�ty to preserve h�s job. he had advo-cates �n var�ous government posts who advocated h�s retent�on, such asSupremeCourtJust�ceharlanF�skeStoneandformerass�stantattorneyGeneralFranc�sGarvan.Thed�rector,furthermore,lobb�edconservat�veDemocratsandappo�ntedoveronehundredFbiagentsfromtheSouth—rooseveltrel�eduponsouthernDemocratsfornewDealsupport.20

irrespect�ve of these efforts, hoover’s pos�t�on was threatened whenroosevelt announced �n February 1933 h�s cho�ce to oversee the Just�ceDepartment:ThomasWalsh.hoovercouldhavefacednomorethreaten-�nganom�neethanWalsh.Thef�rebrandsenatorfrommontanahadled�nvest�gat�ons�ntothePalmerra�dsandTeapotDomescandal,andhewasalongt�mecr�t�coftheFbiandhoover.Compl�cat�ngmattersforhoover,on28FebruaryWalshannouncedh�s�ntent�ontoreorgan�zethedepart-ment through s�gn�f�cant personnel changes, and then hoover learnedthatnumerous�nd�v�dualshadlobb�edSenatorburtonWheelertoopposehoover’s reappo�ntment. hoover’s prospects for cont�nu�ng as bureaud�rectorseemedd�matbest.21

accord�ng to Wheeler’s account, hoover “got w�nd of th�s talk andcametoseeme”todenyany�nvolvement“�nthe[TeapotDomeera]repr�-salsaga�nstme.”itseemsclearthathooversoughttomendpol�t�calfences�nordertosaveh�sjob,but,�ron�callyenough,theeffortwasfleet�ng.On2march1933,wh�lehoneymoon�ng�nnorthCarol�na,attorneyGeneral–

20. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,111–12.Powers,Secrecy and Power,182. 21. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,112–13;Powers,Secrecy and Power,180.ThoughheoverlookstheFbi,onWalsh’sappo�ntmentseeJ.leonardbates,Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana: Law and Public Affairs, from TR to FDR (Urbana:Un�vers�tyofill�no�sPress,1999),325–31.

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des�gnateWalshd�edofamass�vecoronary.Wh�lethethreatthatWalshhad posed d�ss�pated, hoover nevertheless took steps to ensure that noquest�onswerera�sedoverthet�m�ngofh�sdeath.hooversentagentstoescortmrs.WalshbacktoWash�ngtonandmadesurethatathoroughanddocumentedmed�calexam�nat�onwasconductedonWalsh’srema�ns.22

roosevelt’snewcho�ceforattorneygeneralwasnotathreattohoover’stenure as bureau d�rector. homer Cumm�ngs, an av�d new Dealer, wasfarlessconcernedw�thhoover’spastthanWalshhadbeen.nevertheless,hoover cont�nued to lobby fr�ends and all�es—s�gn�f�cantly roosevelta�desedw�nWatsonandStephenearly—toensureh�scont�nuance�ngov-ernment.andwhenCumm�ngswassworn�nasattorneygeneral,hoovercont�nuedto�ngrat�ateh�mselfw�thh�ssuper�or.Thewayhooverd�dth�swasbysupport�ngtheact�v�stCumm�ngs’scr�me-controlprogram.23

Cr�mehadbecomeapopular�ssuedur�ngtheGreatDepress�on,at�mewhenmanyamer�cansperce�vedabreakdown�nlawandorder.Whether�t �nvolved celebr�ty k�dnapp�ngs, bank robber�es, or the adventures ofvar�ousgangsters,manypeoplebel�evedthatthecr�me�ssuehad�tsroots�nthe�nab�l�tyoflocalpol�ceforcestodealw�thsoph�st�cated(�.e.,�nter-state) and organ�zed cr�m�nals. new Dealers, l�ke Cumm�ngs, sought tousethepopular�tyofthe�ssueto�nvolvethefederalgovernment�nanareathatprev�ouslyhadbeentherespons�b�l�tyoflocalandstateauthor�t�es.To�naugurateh�scrusadeaga�nstcr�me,theattorneygeneralf�rst�ncreasedthebureauofinvest�gat�on’slegalauthor�ty.24

To expand the federal pol�ce force, Pres�dent roosevelt �ssued anexecut�veorder�nJune1933thatcomb�nedtheProh�b�t�onbureau(nowdefunct w�th the repeal of the e�ghteenth amendment), the bureau ofident�f�cat�on (already under hoover’s superv�s�on), and the bureau ofinvest�gat�on. The newly comb�ned organ�zat�on was then renamed theD�v�s�onofinvest�gat�onandbylatesummerhoovercontrolledallof�t.Theorgan�zat�onwouldseeonefurthernamechangewhen�nJuly1935�tbecame,permanently,theFederalbureauofinvest�gat�on—ades�gnat�onreflect�ng�tsmore�mportantrole�nthecountry.25

22. burton K. Wheeler and Paul F. healy, Yankee from the West (Garden C�ty, ny:DoubleDay,1962),243;Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,113. 23. FredJ.Cook,The FBI Nobody Knows (newyork:macm�llan,1964),150–51;Theo-har�sandCox,The Boss,114–16.OnCumm�ngsasattorneygeneralseer�chardW.Steele,Free Speech in the Good War(newyork:St.mart�n’sPress,1999),20,31–32. 24. W�ll�ame.leuchtenburg,Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940(newyork:harper&row,1963),334;Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,121. 25. Powers,Secrecy and Power,182–83.

��Background

beforeCumm�ngsdel�veredh�scr�meprogram—atotaloftwelveb�llsthat would dramat�cally alter the federal government’s role �n nat�onalpol�c�ng—he�n�t�atedapubl�c-relat�onscampa�gntogeneratemasssup-port and promote the newly expanded Fbi. For the f�rst two years oftheeffort,publ�cattent�onwas focusedonCumm�ngs’s ant�cr�meworkwh�le hoover went largely unnot�ced. among Cumm�ngs’s �nnovat�onswasanat�onal “Publ�cenem�es” l�st that tookadvantageof thepubl�c’sfasc�nat�onw�thgangsters.itwastheFbi’s�nteract�onw�ththesepopularcr�m�nals,moreover,thathelpedthepubl�c-relat�onseffortga�nrealtrac-t�on.26

Cumm�ngsusedvar�ous�nc�dents—theKansasC�tymassacre,thek�d-napp�ngofCharlesUrschel,andthepursu�tofCharles“Prettyboy”Floyd,lester “baby Face” nelson, alv�n “Old Creepy” Karp�s, Clyde barrow,and bonn�e Parker—to promote h�s program to w�n acceptance for anexpandedfederalrole�nlawenforcement.butonecase�npart�cular,thatofJohnD�ll�nger,d�dmorethananyothertoass�stCumm�ngs.27

Dur�ng the spr�ng and fall of 1933, career-cr�m�nal John D�ll�ngerrobbedtenbanksandcomm�ttedvar�ousm�sdemeanors.hewasarrestedtw�ceandbotht�mesescaped,but�twasthesecondescapethatbroughtthe Fbi �n on the case. Upon break�ng out of ja�l, D�ll�nger audac�ouslystole h�s ja�ler’s car and drove �t from ind�ana �nto ill�no�s and therebyv�olated the Dyer act of 1919. Cumm�ngs made pol�t�cal cap�tal of theevent,spec�f�callys�ngl�ngoutD�ll�ngerasareasonwhythefederalgovern-mentneeded�ncreasedpol�c�ngpowers.Theresultantpubl�c�tyD�ll�ngerofferedcreatedpubl�csupportforthecr�meb�ll.indeed,on6may1934,somebodypurport�ngtobeD�ll�ngerwrotecarmakerhenryFordtothankh�m“forbu�ld�ngtheFordv-8asfastandassturdyacarasyoud�d,other-w�se iwouldnothavegottenaway from thecoppers �n thatW�scons�n,m�nnesotacase.”28

26. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,122;Powers,Secrecy and Power,186. 27. Forah�storyoftheseeffortsseebryanburrough,Public Enemies: America’s Great-est Crime Wave and the Birth of the FBI, 1933–34(newyork:Pengu�nPress,2004).SeealsoCook,The FBI Nobody Knows,158–59,176,183,189–93;CurtGentry,J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets(newyork:norton,1991),167–200;DonWh�tehead,The FBI Story: A Report to the People(newyork:randomhouse,1956),83–103;andralphdeToledano,J. Edgar Hoover: The Man in His Time(newrochelle,ny:arl�ngtonhouse,1973),102–13. 28. letter,JohnD�ll�ngertohenryFord,6may1934,Fbi62–29777–1338.Fordma�ledthelettertoFbiD�rectorhoover,whoorderedlabtestsonthedocumenttodeterm�ne�ftheauthorwas�ndeedJohnD�ll�nger,but�nthe�refforts“[n]o�dent�f�cat�onswereeffected.”letter,DonaldS.leonardtohoover,21may1934,Fbi62–29777–1678;letter,hoovertoleonard,28may1934,Fbi62–29777–1678.

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Fewpol�t�c�ans�nth�satmospherecouldopposethefederal�zat�onofcr�mecontrol;the�rstates’r�ghtsargumentscarr�edl�ttlewe�ght�nsuchapol�t�caldynam�c.inthemeant�me,Cumm�ngsworkedbeh�ndthescenesto l�ne up conservat�ves and new Dealers w�th h�s proposals and, afterthepres�dentpubl�clyannouncedh�ssupport,thecr�me-b�llpackagewassenttothehouse.On19may1934,Congresspassedthef�rsts�xb�llsofCumm�ngs’sprogramand,by June, �tpassed threemore.Thereafter theFbiwasgrantedfullarrestpowers,wasperm�ttedtocarryf�rearms,had�ts jur�sd�ct�on expanded to �nclude apprehend�ng escaped felons whocrossedstatel�nes,and�tcouldautomat�callyenterk�dnapp�ngcasesaftera per�od of seven days. add�t�onally, �nterstate racketeer�ng (by phoneorma�l)becameafelonyandtheFbiwasauthor�zedto�nvest�gatebankrobber�es �f the bank was a member of the Federal reserve. These newlaws, and others, �n add�t�on to the publ�c�ty generated by Cumm�ngs’scr�me-control program, helped to make the Fbi a nat�onal pol�ce forceand,amongamer�cans,areveredgovernmentagency.29

hav�ngach�evedsuccessw�ththeant�cr�mecrusadeandtherebyhav-�ng�tspowersandjur�sd�ct�onexpanded,by1934–35theFbiwasreadyto assume new respons�b�l�t�es when fore�gn threats �ncreas�ngly drewtheattent�onofPres�dentroosevelt.W�thfasc�standm�l�taryaggress�onspread�ng �neurope,afr�ca, andas�a,rooseveltbecamemore sens�t�vetothedomest�cthreatthoseforcesm�ghtsow�ntheUn�tedStates.astheworldmovedclosertoglobalwar,andasroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy�ncreas-�nglyassumedamore�nternat�onal�stperspect�vebetween1934and1941,theFbi’sauthor�tyandpowers�ndomest�csecur�tycases�ncreased.Thebureau’sgrowthasadomest�c�ntell�genceagency,�nfact,canbechartedalongs�de amer�ca’s �ncreas�ng preoccupat�on w�th fore�gn pol�cy �ssuesdur�ngthe1930s.

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Frankl�n D. roosevelt by nature and exper�ence was an �nternat�onal-�st man. he was born �nto a wealthy, ar�stocrat�c fam�ly w�th whom heenjoyed summers �n europe. he began h�s formal educat�on at el�te�nst�tut�onssuchastheGrotonSchool,andthenharvardandColumb�a,wherehedebatedthel�vely�nternat�onal�ssuesofthelaten�neteenthandearly twent�eth centur�es. The future pres�dent’s upbr�ng�ng, travels, andeducat�on�nst�lled�nh�maser�ouscomm�tmentto�nternat�onal�sm.Th�s

29. O’re�lly,“anewDealfortheFbi,”643.

�9Background

comm�tmentwasreflected�nh�sserv�ceasPres�dentWoodrowW�lson’sass�stantsecretaryofthenavyfrom1913to1920,apos�t�onfromwh�chheadvocatedanexpans�onofamer�cannavalpower.Then,astheDemocrat�cv�ce-pres�dent�alcand�date�n1920,rooseveltchamp�onedpassageoftheversa�lles Treaty and amer�can membersh�p �n the league of nat�ons.h�scomm�tmentto�nternat�onal�smnotw�thstand�ng,rooseveltwasalsoamanofh�st�mewhoabhorredwar,bel�evedthatpeaceandprosper�tywere�nextr�cablyl�nked,andadvocatedafreehandforamer�ca�n�nter-nat�onalrelat�ons.30

yetbeyondh�s�nternat�onal�sttendenc�es,rooseveltwasalsoatalent-edandsavvypol�t�c�an.Understand�ngthecountry’sdes�retoturn�nwardfollow�ngtheonsetoftheGreatDepress�on,rooseveltdec�ded—forpol�t�-calreasons—notto�ssueanyk�ndofpubl�cstatementsonfore�gnpol�cy.later, as a pres�dent�al cand�date, he even went so far as to d�savow h�sprev�ous support foramer�canentry �nto theleagueofnat�onsandhemadeno�mportantfore�gnpol�cypronouncementsdur�ngh�scampa�gn.rooseveltknewthatg�venthesever�tyofthedomest�ceconomy,hewouldnever be elected pres�dent as an �nternat�onal�st; moreover, rooseveltbel�evedthatbeforeamer�cacouldaga�nlead�nworldaffa�rs�tf�rsthadtoeffectrel�efathome.inpart,becausehemadeno�ssueoffore�gnaffa�rs,rooseveltwon the supportof amajor�tyof later ant�-�ntervent�on�sts �n1932,suchasSenatorsburtonK.WheelerandGeraldnye.31

Uponassum�ng thepres�dency,roosevelt focusedalmostexclus�velyondomest�caffa�rswh�lerender�ngfore�gnrelat�onsofsecondary�mpor-tance. Th�s �s not surpr�s�ng �nasmuch as the devastat�ng �mpact of theGreat Depress�on �n amer�ca necess�tated the pres�dent’s pr�or�t�es. Thegrossnat�onalproducthaddroppedfrom$87b�ll�on�n1929to$41b�l-l�on by 1933, wh�le the jobless rate had exceeded 15 m�ll�on. Therefore,roosevelt the �nternat�onal�st acted as a nat�onal�st between 1932 and1934.32

roosevelt’s pr�or�t�es were, �ndeed, reflected �n how he handled for-e�gn pol�cy. h�s fore�gn pol�cy team espoused both �nternat�onal�st and

30. alan br�nkley, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Cambr�dge, ma: harvard Un�ver-s�tyPress,1998),1–16;robertDallek,Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945(newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1979),3–18;WayneS.Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–1945(l�ncoln:Un�vers�tyofnebraskaPress,1983),3–5. 31. Dallek,Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,18–20;Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 17–27. 32. GeraldD.nash,The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America, 1933–1945(newyork:St.mart�n’s,1979),7.

30 Chapter 1

nat�onal�stv�ewpo�nts,plac�ngthem�nconstantconfl�ct.h�ssecretaryofstate,Cordellhull,wasan�nternat�onal�stwhowasf�ercelyded�catedtorec�procaltradeagreements,buthewaschosenmoretosat�sfyDemocrat�cpol�t�cs than for h�s worldv�ew. On the other hand, roosevelt’s ass�stantsecretaryof state,raymondmoley,advocated“acons�derable �nsulat�onofournat�onaleconomyfromtherestoftheworld.”inshort,rooseveltcreatedan�ncons�stentfore�gnpol�cyapparatuswheremajorpol�cydec�-s�onswerecentral�zed�ntheWh�tehousesoastonotd�sturbh�sdomest�cpol�t�calagenda,wh�chwash�spr�or�ty.Suchanapproachwasapparent�n h�s handl�ng of both the 1933 london econom�c Conference, whereamer�canpol�cywasunclearand�neffectual,andtheWorldD�sarmamentConference�nGeneva,whererooseveltfa�ledtomakeanyser�ouseffortotherthanendors�ngthe�deaofd�sarmament.33

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by1938,w�thnomajornewDeal leg�slat�onbe�ng�ntroducedandw�throosevelt’sdomest�c�nfluencecurta�ledasaresultofthe“courtpack�ng”scheme,hebegantofocusmoreonworldaffa�rs.Theexpans�onofnaz�powerandthespreadof fasc�smandm�l�tar�smacross theglobedur�ngthem�d- to late1930s led someadm�n�strat�onoff�c�als tobecamecon-cernedoverther�seoffasc�stelementsw�th�ntheUn�tedStates.indeed,extremer�ght-w�ngers�namer�ca,l�kethevocalGermanamer�canbund,denounced roosevelt and the new Deal as commun�st�c. Wh�le on thesurface�tm�ghthaveappearedthereweret�esbetweennaz�Germanyandthesmallbuth�ghlyv�s�ble fasc�stgroups �n theUn�tedStates, �nreal�tythose l�nks were m�n�mal. nevertheless, there was a strong percept�onthatadomest�cfasc�stthreatex�sted.in1934and1935,forexample,sev-eralbookswerepubl�shedexam�n�ngthepopular�tyofamer�canfasc�sm,suchasCarmenha�der’sDo We Want Fascism?(1934),normanThomas’sThe Choice Before Us (1934), raymond Gram Sw�ng’s The Forerunners of American Fascism (1935), and S�ncla�r lew�s’s popular novel It Can’t Happen Here(1935).34

33. Dallek,Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,23–34;irw�nF.Gellman,Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles(balt�more:Johnshopk�nsUn�vers�tyPress,1995),20–38;moleyquoted�nCole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,52.OntheconferencesseeDallek,Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,51–70;Cole,Roos-evelt and the Isolationists,39–47,59,60–76;Gellman,Secret Affairs,38–42.OnGermanfore�gnpol�cydur�ngth�sper�odseeGerhardWe�nberg,The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Dip-lomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36(Ch�cago:Un�vers�tyofCh�cagoPress,1970). 34. Carmenha�der,Do We Want Fascism?(newyork:JohnDay,1934);normanThomas,

31Background

Concern led roosevelt to call a conference on 8 may 1934 w�th theattorney general, treasury secretary, labor secretary, and Fbi and SecretServ�cech�efs tod�scuss the s�tuat�on.Dur�ng theconference, thepres�-dentorderedtheFbitomon�toramer�cannaz�sandthe�rsympath�zersandtodeterm�netheextenttowh�chGermanyhad�nfluenceddomest�cgroups. Over the next two years the Wh�te house rece�ved regular Fbireportsonr�ght-w�ngelementsaswellasothersundryreportsonadm�n-�strat�oncr�t�cs.Th�swasthef�rst�nstanceofan�ncrease�nFbiauthor�ty�ndomest�csecur�tymattersdur�ngtherooseveltadm�n�strat�onthathadat �ts or�g�n a concern w�th the effects of fore�gn �nfluence on domest�caffa�rs,and�nt�meth�sauthor�tywouldonly�ncrease.35

in the meant�me, by 1934, Congress had assumed a prom�nent role�nfore�gnpol�cyandwasassert�ng�tself�nth�sareawh�lenotautomat�-callydeferr�ngtothech�efexecut�ve.itspr�maryconcernwashowtodealw�thanexpans�on�stGermanyandJapan�nrelat�ontoU.S.strateg�candeconom�c �nterests w�thout becom�ng entangled �n anyth�ng that m�ghtleadtowar,w�ththeF�rstWorldWarbe�ngthebestexample.Th�sreas-sert�on of congress�onal prerogat�ve �n fore�gn pol�cy stemmed from aw�despread postwar d�s�llus�onment over the purpose and effects of theF�rstWorldWar.h�ghl�ght�ngandcontr�but�ngtotheseconcernswasthepubl�cat�onofvar�ousbooksonthesubject,suchasharryelmerbarnes’sGenesis of the World War (1926) and helmuth engelbrecht and Frankhan�gen’sMerchants of Death(1934).Th�swasfollowedbytheformat�onofaSenatecomm�ttee,ledbynorthDakotaSenatorGeraldnye,tostudythe�nfluencemun�t�onsmanufacturersand�nternat�onalbankershad�nbr�ng�ngthecountrytowar.Wh�lethenyeComm�ttee(1934–36)foundnoev�dencethatspec�al�nterestshad�nfluencedamer�canpart�c�pat�on�n war, �t nevertheless popular�zed the �ssue and fed amer�can postward�s�llus�onment.36

The Choice Before Us(newyork:macm�llan,1934);raymondGramSw�ng,Forerunners of American Fascism (newyork: Jul�anmessner,1935);S�ncla�rlew�s,It Can’t Happen Here(GardenC�ty,ny:Doubleday,Doran,1935).Forthe�mpactofthesepopularworksonpub-l�cpercept�onsofdomest�cfasc�sm,seeFranc�smacDonnell,Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front(newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1995),29–32. 35. W�ll�ams, “‘They never Stopped Watch�ng Us,’” 21–22; Theohar�s and Cox, The Boss,148–49. 36. SeeDav�dm.Kennedy,Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945(newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1999),387–88;WayneS.Cole,Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations(m�nneapol�s:Un�vers�tyofm�nnesotaPress,1962), 60–81. On the �nfluence Dorothy Detzer had on the nye Comm�ttee see rhodr�Jeffreys-Jones, Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917–1994(newbrunsw�ck,nJ:rutgersUn�vers�tyPress,1995),65–83.

3� Chapter 1

a d�rect result of the �ntense d�s�llus�onment over the war wasCongress’spass�ngofleg�slat�ondes�gnedtopreventamer�canpart�c�pa-t�on�nanotherGreatWar.Thef�rstoftheselaws,overwh�chtheWh�tehouseandCongressdebatedtheamountofd�scret�on�twouldperm�tthepres�dent,concernedthesaleofarmstocountr�esatwar.Congress�onalant�-�ntervent�on�sts soughtamandatoryarmsembargowh�lerooseveltwantedad�scret�onaryone,lead�ngboths�destostalemate�nthesummerof1935.Onlyw�ththethreatofaf�l�busterd�dcongress�onalleadersagreetoacomprom�sewherebyanarmsembargowouldgo�ntoeffectw�ththepres�dent’s declarat�on of the ex�stence of host�l�t�es. Furthermore, theb�llexcludedbell�gerentsubmar�nesfromamer�canportsandperm�ttedamer�canstotravelonbell�gerentvesselsbutatthe�rownr�sk.roosevelt,sens�ngthecountry’smood,agreedtothemeasureands�gned�t�ntolawon31august1935,butwarnedthatthelaw’s“�nflex�bleprov�s�ons”m�ghtyetdragthecountry�ntowar.37

The prov�s�ons of the neutral�ty act were tested two months laterwhen,on3October1935,Fasc�stitaly�nvadedeth�op�a,thereby�n�t�at�ngthestartofglobal(�.e.,Japaneseandeuropean)fasc�stm�l�taryaggress�on.Twodayslaterrooseveltdeclaredtheex�stenceofwar,wh�ch,accord�ngtotheneutral�tyact,mandatedanarmsembargoonallbell�gerents.Theembargo,however,hadnegl�g�bleeffectsonitaly’sattackandsowaslargelysymbol�c. moreover, because afr�ca was outs�de of amer�ca’s nat�onal�nterests,thegovernmentwasnotpreparedtotakethestepsnecessary,�ntermsofacollect�ve�nternat�onalembargoasproposedbytheleagueofnat�ons,toaffectser�ouslyitaly’swareffort.atthet�me,amer�cancom-pan�esma�nta�neda$25,000monthlyexportaveragew�thitalythat,bythefollow�ng year, �ncreased to $583,000. nevertheless, ant�-�ntervent�on�stswerepleasedw�ththeneutral�tyactandpleasedthattheconfl�ct�nafr�capromotedfurtherdebateonhowto�mprovethemeasure.38

W�th the neutral�ty act to exp�re �n early 1936, Congress debatedwhether to extend the law’s prov�s�ons. ant�-�ntervent�on�sts looked totheitalo-eth�op�anWarasev�dencefor�ncreaseduseofembargoswh�lerooseveltandh�ssupporterssoughtgreaterexecut�velat�tude�ndeclar�ngneutral�ty.G�venthecountry’smood,thepres�dent’seffortswerefleet�ng,and�nFebruaryCongressextendedtheprov�s�onsofthe1935neutral�tyactandaddedabanon theextens�onof loans tocountr�esatwar.The

37. JustusD.DoeneckeandJohne.W�lz,From Isolation to War, 1931–1941,2nded.(arl�ngtonhe�ghts,il:harlanDav�dson,1991),56–57. 38. Jonas,Isolationism in America,172–75;lloydC.Gardner,Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy(mad�son:Un�vers�tyofW�scons�nPress,1964),93,94.

33Background

new prov�s�ons, �n real�ty, were redundant s�nce the 1934 Johnson actproh�b�tedtheextens�onofloanstocountr�esthathaddefaultedonthe�rGreatWardebts.but theycanbeunderstood �n the contextof theday:leg�slatorsusedtheonlyexampletheyhadathand—howtheUn�tedStatesbecame�nvolved�ntheGreatWar—�nordertoavo�dbecom�ngentangled�nanyth�ngs�m�lar.39

increased �nternat�onal tens�ons �n 1936 ra�sed even further �ssuesconcern�ng neutral�ty and domest�c secur�ty. in 1936 Spa�n fell �nto athree-yearc�v�lwar.r�ght-w�ngnat�onal�stforcesledbyGeneralFranc�scoFranco (a�ded by naz� Germany and Fasc�st italy) battled the so-calledloyal�sts who were f�ght�ng to preserve Spa�n’s republ�can government(supportedbyCommun�struss�a).yet�nth�ss�tuat�onPres�dentrooseveltrefusedtorecogn�zebell�gerency,mak�ngad�st�nct�onbetweenac�v�lwarandan�nternat�onalwar,andtherebypreventedtheneutral�tyactfromgo�ng�ntoeffect.but�naccordw�thothereuropeanpowers,rooseveltd�dagreetoamoralembargoonarmssh�pmentstoe�thers�de�ntheconfl�ct.irrespect�vely,some�deal�st�camer�cansonthepol�t�calleftsawthewaras �mportant toward stopp�ng the spread of fasc�sm and, by 1937, hadorgan�zedvolunteerun�ts toa�d theloyal�st forces.G�venexternal sup-portfromGermanyanditaly,theSpan�shloyal�steffortwasdoomedtofa�lure,butanothercontr�but�ontothesuccessofFranco’sforceswastheadventoftheF�fthColumn.inSeptember1936,Generalem�l�odemola,oneofFranco’sl�eutenants,announcedbyrad�othatfourm�l�tarycolumnshadadvancedonmadr�dwh�leaf�fthcolumnof�nsurgentsoperatedfromw�th�n the c�ty. Thereafter, many amer�cans �ncreas�ngly grew worr�edthatfore�gnagentsm�ghtattempttod�sruptandsoftenupamer�cansoc�-etyfromw�th�n.

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Worr�edaboutthedomest�cram�f�cat�onsofgrow�ngnaz�andcommun�st�nfluence,asdemonstratedw�thdomest�cfasc�stsandheadyamer�canleft-�stswhowereconcernedaboutthecourseoftheSpan�shC�v�lWar,on24august1936Pres�dentrooseveltcalledFbiD�rectorhoovertotheWh�tehouseforameet�ng.accord�ngtohoover,thepres�dent“wasdes�rousofd�scuss�ngthequest�onofsubvers�veact�v�t�es �n theUn�tedStates,par-t�cularlyFasc�smandCommun�sm.”roosevelt�nformedhooverthat“hehadbeencons�derablyconcerned”abouttheact�v�t�esofthesegroupsand

39. Kennedy,Freedom from Fear,397;Jonas,Isolationism in America,176–79.

34 Chapter 1

thathewantedtheFbid�rectortoprov�deh�mw�th“abroadp�ctureofthegeneralmovementand�tsact�v�t�esasmayaffecttheeconom�candpol�t�-call�feofthecountryasawhole.”hooverrelatedtorooseveltthattherewasnosuchava�lable�nformat�onfromanygovernmentagency,butthatthe Fbi’s 1916 appropr�at�ons statute “conta�ns a prov�s�on that �t m�ght�nvest�gateanymattersreferredto�tbytheDepartmentofState.”P�quedbyhoover’ssuggest�on,butfearfuloftheplanbe�ngleakedfromtheStateDepartment,rooseveltaskedhoovertomeetw�thh�mandSecretaryofStatehullthefollow�ngday.40

Ontheafternoonof25august,hoovermetw�throoseveltandhullat the Wh�te house. The pres�dent stated h�s concerns to hull, not�ngthat “�t was a matter wh�ch fell w�th�n the scope of fore�gn affa�rs overwh�chtheStateDepartmentwouldhavear�ght torequestan �nqu�rytobemade.”Comply�ngw�throosevelt’sw�shes,hullasked�fthepres�dentwantedtherequesttobeput�ntowr�t�ng,butrooseveltd�sagreed,stat�ngthathewanted“themattertobehandledqu�teconf�dent�ally.”Pres�dentroosevelt’s d�rect�ve stepp�ng up Fbi �ntell�gence act�v�ty, therefore,rema�nedanoralone.41

Whenhoover�mplementedroosevelt’sorder,however,he�nterpretedroosevelt’s words to �n�t�ate not a l�m�ted �nvest�gat�on but an exten-s�ve one. Fbi agents, thereafter, mon�tored the act�v�t�es of alleged F�fthColumn�sts,pro-naz�s,andcommun�stsandthenreportedth�s�nforma-t�ontotheWh�tehouse.Th�swasan�mportantwatershed�ntheh�storyoftheFbibecause�twasfromth�spo�ntonwardthattheFbifocusedmoreon“subvers�ve”act�v�t�esut�l�z�ng“�ntell�gence”�nvest�gat�onsratherthanthemorel�m�t�ngcr�m�nal�nvest�gat�ons.Pres�dentroosevelt,moreover,cametovaluethereportsthathoovervolunteeredtotheadm�n�strat�on,reportsdeta�l�ng theact�v�t�esofcommun�stsbutalsor�ght-w�ngers l�ketheGermanamer�canbund,theS�lverSh�rts,Geraldl.K.Sm�th,GeraldW�nrod,andW�ll�amDudleyPelley.42

40. Conf�dent�almemorandum,FbiD�rectorJ.edgarhoover,24august1936,Folder136,Off�c�alandConf�dent�alf�lesofJ.edgarhoover,FOiaread�ngroom,Fbiheadquar-ters,Wash�ngton,D.C.(hereafterc�tedashooverO&C). 41. Conf�dent�almemorandum,hoover,25august1936,Folder136,hooverO&C.SeealsoathanTheohar�s,“TheFbi’sStretch�ngofPres�dent�alD�rect�ves,1936–1953,”Political Science Quarterly91(W�nter1976–77):649–72. 42. leor�buffo,The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depres-sion to the Cold War(Ph�ladelph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1983),184–87.Onthes�gn�f�-canceofthe1936meet�ngandorderseeathanTheohar�s,The FBI and American Democ-racy: A Brief Critical History(lawrence:Un�vers�tyPressofKansas,2004),44–47.

35Background

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W�th�nternat�onaleventsbecom�ng�ncreas�nglyper�lous—Fasc�stitaly’sv�ctoryovereth�op�a,theS�no-JapaneseWar,h�tler’sreoccupat�onoftherh�neland, and the Span�sh C�v�l War—amer�can ant�-�ntervent�on�stssought to make permanent the prev�ously temporary neutral�ty leg�sla-t�on. as w�th the prev�ous neutral�ty acts, roosevelt sought d�scret�on�napply�ngthelaw’sprov�s�ons,butdomest�cpol�t�calevents,suchasthefa�ledJud�c�alreformb�llandtheeconom�crecess�onof1937,preventedthepres�dentfromassert�ngthe�nfluencethatm�ghthaveshapedtheleg-�slat�on.butroosevelt’s�nfluencewasnotent�relycurbed.WhatCongressenactedwhenmak�ngtheneutral�tyactpermanent�n1937wasthecash-and-carry prov�s�on whereby bell�gerents could buy nonm�l�tary goodsfromtheUn�tedStates�ftheypa�dforthemw�thhardcurrencyandtrans-portedthegoodsthemselves.Thelawonlydelayedthe�nev�table,however,as �t �nd�rectly encouraged the ax�s powers �nasmuch as they knew theUn�tedStateswouldnot�ntervened�rectly�neuropeanevents.43

Othereventsdur�ng1937and1938furtherdemonstratedthe�nfluenceant�-�ntervent�on�sts had �n determ�n�ng the shape of amer�can fore�gnpol�cy.inOctoberrooseveltdel�veredh�sso-calledquarant�nespeech�nwh�chhechoseh�swordscarefullybystat�ng:“War�sacontag�on,whether�tbedeclaredorundeclared.”reporterspressedthepres�dent toexpla�nwhathemeant,butherefused.Theresultwasthatthespeechseemedtopleaseboths�desofthefore�gnpol�cydebate�nasmuchas�ntervent�on�stsregarded�tascall�ngforanact�v�stfore�gnpol�cywh�leant�-�ntervent�on-�stssaw�tasrooseveltseek�ngtoavo�dwar.44

Then,�n1938,ind�anarepresentat�velou�sludlowproposedacon-st�tut�onal amendment that would have placed the country’s war-mak-�ng power d�rectly w�th the people v�a referendum. Wh�le the �n�t�at�veult�matelyfa�led,�tneverthelessdemonstratedthepopular�tyoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stsatth�spo�nt.meanwh�le,Fasc�staggress�oncont�nuedw�ththe annexat�on of austr�a �nto the greater German re�ch and then themun�chCr�s�s,whereroosevelt’sact�onsaga�nreflectedthestrengthoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stswhenheappealed toeuropeanpowers tonegot�atethefateoftheSudetenland.amer�canop�n�onstartedtochange,buteversohes�tat�ngly,afterGermanyacqu�redtheSudetenlandandasJapanese

43. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 400–1; Doenecke and W�lz, From Isolation to War,63–64;Jonas,Isolationism in America,198–99. 44. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 405–6; Doenecke and W�lz, From Isolation to War,69–70.

3� Chapter 1

aggress�on advanced �n Ch�na. Th�s led roosevelt to beg�n to bu�ld upamer�can defenses �n 1938 and to recall the amer�can ambassador toGermanyfollow�ngtheKr�stallnachtpersecut�onofJews.45

Domest�cally�n1938,amer�cansbecame�ncreas�nglyconcernedw�thapparentGermanattemptsat�nternalsubvers�on.inFebruary,Fbiagentsuncoveredanextens�veGermanesp�onager�ng�nnewyorkC�tythathadextended�tself�ntothearmedforcesanddefense�ndustr�es.Thespyr�ngwasunderm�ned,however,asaresultofoneof �ts �ncompetentGermanamer�can members, Guenther rumr�ch. a ne’er-do-well who hab�tuallyfound h�mself �n trouble, rumr�ch was enamored w�th F�rst World WarGerman esp�onage act�v�ty. after wr�t�ng to the Völkischer Beobachter—the naz� party’s newspaper—offer�ng to prov�de �ntell�gence about theamer�canarmy,rumr�chwasrecru�tedasaspy.inh�sesp�onageefforts,rumr�chonlymanagedtocollectrelat�vely�nnocuous�nformat�onsuchasvenereald�seaseratesamongamer�cansold�ers,but �twasaconnect�onhehadtoScotlandthatledtoh�scaptureandtheeventualexposureofthenewyorkspyr�ng.46

rumr�chma�nta�nedcontactw�thh�sGermanhandlersthroughcorre-spondence.hewas�nstructedtowr�teaf�fty-one-year-oldwomannamedJess�e Jordan �n Dundee, Scotland, who worked as a screen for German�ntell�gence.in1937,thebr�t�shSecur�tyServ�ce(mi-5)obta�nedawar-rantto�nterceptherma�l,wh�chledthemtoestabl�shher�dent�ty.aftertrac�ng the source of her correspondence to the Un�ted States, mi-5off�c�als alerted the Fbi and, �n due course, Fbi agents determ�ned thatrumr�chwasoneofJordan’scorrespondents.hewasplacedundersurve�l-lancebutonlyarrested�nFebruary1938afterheattemptedtoobta�nblankpassports from the State Department. Upon h�s arrest rumr�ch dec�dedtocooperatew�thh�scaptors, result�ng �n theexposureofh�sesp�onager�ng.Desp�te thefact that thespyr�ngwas, forall �ntentsandpurposes,rather�nept,thecaserece�vedfront-pageheadl�nes�ntheamer�canpressandhelped to foster thebel�ef thatF�fthColumn�stshadpermeated thecountry. The cooperat�on w�th br�t�sh �ntell�gence, moreover, helped tolayaf�rmbas�sonwh�chtheFbiwouldlaterdevelopan�nt�matework�ngrelat�onsh�p.47

45. Kennedy,Freedom from Fear,418–20. 46. SecretWorldWariiesp�onageSummary,nodate,Fbi65–37193–332,pp.25–34. 47. n�gelWest,MI-5: British Security Service Operations, 1909–1945(newyork:Ste�nandDay,1982),98–100;“leaderConfesses,”New York Times,27February1938;“SpyhuntPressedbyagentsonTra�lofTwomorehere,”New York Times,28February1938.

3�Background

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W�th both the �nternat�onal and domest�c s�tuat�on develop�ng asthey d�d �n 1938, the Fbi acqu�red yet more �nvest�gat�ve autonomy.interested �n the scope of the “so-called esp�onage s�tuat�on,” Pres�dentroosevelt d�rected attorney General Cumm�ngs �n October to surveythe government’s �nvest�gat�ve act�v�ty. When report�ng the Fbi’s workto Cumm�ngs, hoover made no attempt to h�de the fact that the Fbihad�nvest�gatedpol�t�calact�v�ty,and,�nfact,heurgedanexpans�onoftheFbi’s�nvest�gat�verole.hooverwarnedCumm�ngs,however,aga�nstseek�ngleg�slat�veauthor�tyforsuchanexpans�on,observ�ngthatalawm�ghtdrawcr�t�c�smfrompeoplewho,�nhoover’sv�ew,d�dnotunder-stand the counteresp�onage character of Fbi �nvest�gat�ons (after 1936).TheFbid�rectorpreferredto�nvest�gateunderthebureau’s1916appro-pr�at�onsstatute.48

Pres�dent roosevelt, apparently, was not d�sturbed by the pol�t�calnatureofsomeFbi�nvest�gat�ons.Th�s�snotaltogethersurpr�s�ngg�venh�s leadersh�p style whereby the char�smat�c ch�ef execut�ve bel�eved hecould control h�s subord�nates or play one off aga�nst another. G�venhoover’sdevelopmentofseparatef�l�ngproceduresandh�sresortto�lle-gal�nvest�gat�vemethods,heeffect�velynegatedthepres�dent’sab�l�tytoholdat�ghtre�nontheFbi’sact�v�t�es.atthesamet�me,however,hooverd�dnotyetfeelsecureenough�nh�spos�t�ontoasserttheFbi’s�nfluencetotheextentthathelaterwoulddur�ngtheColdWar.nevertheless,hooverwas able to �nvest�gate matters w�th and w�thout roosevelt’s knowledgewh�leemploy�ngextralegal�nvest�gat�vetechn�ques.49

hoovertookonemorestep�n1939toensuretheFbi’ssoleauthor�tytomon�tordomest�csubvers�veact�v�ty.Uponlearn�ngofaplantocoor-d�nate domest�c surve�llance through an �nterdepartmental comm�ttee,hoover moved to d�sable the proposal. he �mpressed upon the attorneygeneralthatsuchaplanwouldcause�nterdepartmentalchaos.rem�nd�ngattorneyGeneralFrankmurphy(Cumm�ngs’ssuccessor)ofthew�despreadc�v�ll�bert�esabusesdur�ngtheF�rstWorldWar,hooverarguedthatcen-tral�z�ngdomest�c�nvest�gat�onsw�th�ntheFbicouldavo�dthem�stakesofthepast.Th�scleverc�v�ll�bertar�anargumentworkedandresulted�nroosevelt’s secret order of 26 June 1939 plac�ng all domest�c �nvest�ga-t�ons under the Fbi, m�l�tary intell�gence D�v�s�on, and Off�ce of naval

48. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,152–53. 49. ib�d.,153.

3� Chapter 1

intell�gence. more �mportantly, all domest�c �nformat�on collected bytheseagenc�eswastobecoord�natedw�ththeFbi.Th�scoord�nat�onlaterextended publ�cly to local pol�ce un�ts �n September. hoover now hadalmost exclus�ve control over domest�c surve�llance, and h�s power and�nfluencewould�ncreaseastheSecondWorldWardeveloped.50

50. Theohar�sandCox,The Boss,154;Pressrelease,FbiD�rectorJ.edgarhoovertoalllawenforcementOff�c�als,6September1939,repr�nted�nathanTheohar�s,ed.,From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover(Ch�cago:ivanr.Dee,1991),184.OnattorneyGeneralmurphy’sconceptofc�v�ll�bert�esprotect�ons,seer�chardW.Steele,Free Speech in the Good War(newyork:St.mart�n’sPress,1999),21,24,26,38,48.

BeginningsWar, Phony War, and Election

1939–1940

W�tha�r,sea,andlandforcesmob�l�zedjustbeforedawnon1September1939,theGermanm�l�taryburstacrossthePol�shfront�eremploy�ngthetact�c of the blitzkrieg. Wh�le f�ght�ng bravely, the Pol�sh defense forceswereutterlyunpreparedfortheoverwhelm�ng�nvas�onandhadnochanceof successfully defend�ng the�r homeland. For Germany, however, them�l�tarycampa�gn—atleast—wasasuccessfulpartofadolfh�tler’s�ncre-mentalplantoun�teallGerman-speak�ngpeoples �ntoas�ngleGermanReich, wh�le d�smantl�ng the prov�s�ons of the versa�lles “diktat.” butafterayearofappeas�ngnaz�Germanyalltoavo�danothercostlywar�neurope,br�ta�nandFrancerefusedtoofferh�tleranyfurtherconcess�ons.inlondon,Pr�mem�n�sternev�lleChamberla�nthenannouncedbeforeParl�amentanult�matumforGermanytow�thdraw�tsforces�mmed�atelyor face the consequences. When Germany rebuffed the demand, bothbr�ta�nandFrance,adher�ngtothe�rmutualpledgetoass�stPoland�ntheeventofGermanaggress�on,declaredwaron3September. in the Un�ted States, Pres�dent Frankl�n roosevelt sought to movecaut�ously�fdel�berately.beforetheGerman�nvas�onofPoland,between1934 and 1939, roosevelt’s fore�gn pol�cy was restr�ct�on�st and focusedupon deal�ng w�th the threat of an expans�on�st Germany �n relat�on toU.S.strateg�candeconom�c�nterests.nowthatwarwaspresent,rooseveltwasforcedtodealw�thanexpans�on�standaggress�veGermanyasreal�ty.roosevelt’s fore�gnpol�cyat th�spo�ntchanged.Wh�leoff�c�allyneutral,the Un�ted States was �n real�ty clearly ant�-ax�s, s�gn�f�cantly no lon-ger restr�ct�on�st, and pred�sposed to favor an all�ed v�ctory. roosevelt,ut�l�z�ng h�s f�nely honed leadersh�p sk�lls and w�th a new percept�onof Germany as an aggressor, was able from th�s po�nt forward to shapeamer�can fore�gn pol�cy �ncrementally toward a�d short of war. in the

ChApter 2

39

wordsofh�stor�anWayneCole,rooseveltby1939becamethe“supremepol�t�calmaster”�ngu�d�ngamer�canfore�gnpol�cy.1 Thepres�dent,however,st�llfacedapowerfulandvocalant�-�nterven-t�on�st bloc. Some of them had sympathy for the Poles, such as OswaldGarr�sonv�llardandtheChicago Tribune,bothofwhomregardedh�tlerasanaggressor.Otherant�-�ntervent�on�stsexpressed l�ttle sympathy forthePolesbecause,ash�stor�anJustusDoeneckehasobserved,theybel�evedGermanyhadaleg�t�matecla�mtothefreec�tyofDanz�gandthePol�shCorr�dor.Prom�nentant�-�ntervent�on�stCongressmanham�ltonF�sh,forexample,bel�evedthePoles(andbyproxytheFrenchandbr�t�sh)fool�shfor not negot�at�ng w�th h�tler. F�sh wrote �n h�s memo�r that becauseDanz�gwasoverwhelm�nglypopulatedw�thGermansandhadvoted�napleb�sc�teforreun�f�cat�onw�thGermany,that“Pol�shcontrolofth�sc�tywasnot...an�ssueforwh�ch�twasworthplung�ngtheworld�ntowar.”F�sh further bel�eved—na�vely—that had the Poles negot�ated, Germanywouldhaves�gned“atreatyguarantee�ngthe�ndependenceand�ntegr�tyofPoland.”SenatorburtonK.Wheeler,alternat�vely,hadl�ttlesympathyforPolandbecausethatcountry,hesa�d,hadtheh�ghestlevelofJew�shpersecu-t�ons�neurope;wh�leh�stor�anharryelmerbarnesarguedthatamajor�tyofPolesdetestedthe�rowngovernmentanyway.Charlesl�ndbergh—l�keothers—wasatalossunderstand�ngwhybr�ta�nandFrancewouldwagewaroverPoland,butunl�kesomeofh�sotherant�-�ntervent�on�stbrethrenhebel�evedblamewasequallywe�ghtedtoboths�des.2

bytheeven�ngof3September,Pres�dentrooseveltdel�veredoneofh�snotablef�res�dechatstotheamer�canpubl�ctoprocla�mamer�canneu-tral�ty.inh�sspeech,however,thepres�dentrefusedtoaskamer�canstobeneutral�nthoughtaswellasact�on,suchasWoodrowW�lsonhadaskedsometwenty-f�veyearsearl�er.anddesp�teh�scallforneutral�ty,rooseveltwa�tedtwofulldaysbefore�nvok�ngtheneutral�tyact.bymov�ngslowly,hehadperm�ttedtheall�esprec�oust�metopurchasev�talwarmatér�el.roosevelt then called Congress �nto spec�al sess�on on 13 September tocons�der rev�s�on of the neutral�ty act—to abandon the embargo andperm�ttheuseofcash-and-carryform�l�tarygoods.3

1. Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45 (l�ncoln: Un�vers�ty ofnebraskaPress,1983),320. 2. JustusD.Doenecke,Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941(lanham:rowman&l�ttlef�eld,2000),9–10,14;ham�ltonF�sh,Memoir of an American Patriot (Wash�ngton,DC:regnery,1991),91;Charlesl�ndbergh,The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh(newyork:harcourtbraceJovanov�ch,1970),250. 3. Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,320–21.

40 Chapter �

41Beginnings: 1939–1940

Th�spromptedthefamedav�atorCharlesl�ndberghtorespondtothepres�dent,lead�ngh�mtobecomeoneofthemostpopularchallengerstoroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cyandapr�marytargetofFbioff�c�als.l�ndberghconf�ded to h�s journal after roosevelt’s rad�o talk that he w�shed he“trusted h�m more.” eventually, by 7 September, after wr�t�ng an art�cleoppos�ngamer�can�nvolvement,l�ndberghdec�dedhecouldnot“standbyandseeth�scountrypushed�ntowar�f�t�snotabsolutelyessent�altothefuturewelfareofthenat�on.”Theav�atordec�dedtotakeanact�vepart�npol�t�cs—wh�chhecla�medtod�sl�ke—“tostopthetrendwh�ch�snowgo�ngon�nth�scountry.”4

l�ndbergh was ass�sted �n h�s endeavor by W�ll�am Castle—formerundersecretaryofstate �n thehooveradm�n�strat�on—tohaveh�sv�ewsbroadcastnat�onallyontherad�o.Ontheeven�ngof15September,fromahotel�nWash�ngton,D.C.,l�ndberghdel�veredaspeechent�tled“amer�caandeuropeanWars.”headvocated�nsulat�ngtheUn�tedStatesfromwarandwarnedthat“by f�ght�ng fordemocracyabroadwemayendby los-�ng�tathome.”Thewarhadthepotent�al,heargued,todestroyWesternc�v�l�zat�on as �t was then known. Th�s speech thus marked the start ofl�ndbergh’sconcertedefforttounderm�neroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy,andfromth�spo�ntforward—w�thoutprompt�ngfromtheWh�tehouse—Fbioff�c�alswouldtakean�ncreas�ng�nterest�nthepopularav�ator’spol�t�cald�ssent.5

l�ndbergh cont�nued to advocate non�ntervent�on through furtherrad�obroadcasts.h�s secondonea�redon13October, t�tled“neutral�tyandWar,”andath�rd�n1940concern�ng“Thea�rDefenseofamer�ca”�nwh�chhearguedthata�rpowerwouldprotectthecountryfromattack.he also publ�shed var�ous art�cles �n Reader’s Digest, Atlantic Monthly,andCollier’s between1939andthespr�ngof1941that,wh�leprov�ngtobe controvers�al, sparked great publ�c �nterest. l�ndbergh’s newly foundpol�t�calact�v�sm—wh�chsopass�onatelyopposedtherooseveltadm�n�s-trat�on—almost�mmed�atelycaughttheattent�onofFbioff�c�als.6 The bureau’s �n�t�al �nvest�gat�on of l�ndbergh, dat�ng broadly fromSeptember1939toapr�l1941whenhejo�nedtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,

4. l�ndbergh,Wartime Journals,251–52. 5. ib�d.;Wartime Journals,253–56;WayneS.Cole,Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle against American Intervention in World War II (new york: harcourt brace Jovanov�ch,1974),70–72;“l�ndbergh’sappealforisolat�on,”New York Times,16September1939,9. 6. Charlesa.l�ndbergh,“av�at�on,Geography,andrace,”Reader’s Digest,november1939,64–67;l�ndbergh,“WhatSubst�tuteforWar?”Atlantic Monthly,march1940,305–7;l�ndbergh,“alettertoamer�cans,”Colliers, 29march1941,75–77.

4� Chapter �

cons�stedpr�mar�lyofthecollect�onofrelat�vely�nnocuous,publ�csourcemater�al. Fbi agents scoured the publ�c press for art�cles about and byl�ndberghand rev�ewedbooks thatment�onedh�m.bycl�pp�ng severalhundredpressstor�es,Fbiagentswereable,earlyon,toconstructadoss�erthatenabledthemto�dent�fyl�ndbergh’sassoc�atesasposs�ble�nvest�ga-t�ve targets. Search�ng all ava�lable publ�c avenues, Fbi agents perusedthe country’s ma�nstream and extrem�st presses for any and all data onl�ndbergh. and desp�te the fact that l�ndbergh’s publ�c statements andassoc�at�onswent,atth�spo�nt,nofurtherthanadvocat�ngneutral�ty,toFbioff�c�alsth�swasof�nterestbecauseh�s“numerousremarks...bearuponh�sfore�gnornat�onal�st�csympath�es.”7

Fbiagentsd�dnotrestr�ctthe�r�nteresttol�ndberghafter1September1939.Dur�ngthedebateoverrev�s�ngtheneutral�tyact,SenatorGeraldnye—whocutshortaspeak�ngtour�nthem�dwesttoplayalead�ngrole�n thecontroversy—sa�d thatbyus�ngcash-and-carry to trade �nmun�-t�ons,theUn�tedStatescouldbecomeeconom�callydependentuponthewar.healsoadvocatedreplac�ngroosevelt’scash-and-carryproposalw�thone that �mposed an absolute embargo on bell�gerents, argu�ng that thedef�c�t�ntradewouldbemadeup�nlat�namer�ca.nyewarned,more-over,that�fcash-and-carrywereadopted,rooseveltwouldonlythenaskto repeal the cash prov�s�on followed by the carry prov�s�on, ult�matelylead�ngthecountrytowar.Whentheactualvoteswerecast,nyeopposedroosevelt’scash-and-carryproposal.8 Fbiagentstookan�nterest�nnye�nOctober1939,justweeksbeforetheSenatevotedontheneutral�tyact.atthatt�me,theFbi’slosangelesf�eldoff�cerece�vedunsol�c�ted �nformat�onsuggest�ngthatnyewas“�nthe pay of the German government” and a spy. Th�s type of sensat�onalaccusat�on was leveled aga�nst var�ous prom�nent ant�-�ntervent�on�sts,and �t was one that stemmed purely from the�r publ�c oppos�t�on toroosevelt’s fore�gn pol�cy. in nye’s case, however, h�s unnamed accuserbel�eved the content of nye’s pol�t�cal speeches conf�rmed that he waspro-naz�and, �n theop�n�onofaSanFranc�scoch�ropractor,aGermanagent.irrespect�veoftheabsurd�tyofsuchacompla�nt,anFbiagentwasd�spatched to �nterv�ew the �nformant (not always a rout�ne procedure)andonlythend�dFbioff�c�alsdeemthechargebaseless.Wh�leFbiagents

7. bl�ndmemorandumreCharlesa.l�ndbergh,nodate,Fbi65–1149–152.Ontheuseofpubl�csourcemater�alto�dent�fytargets,seeFrankJ.Donner,The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System(newyork:Knopf,1980),129. 8. Doenecke,Storm on the Horizon,62,64;Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,327–28,329.

43Beginnings: 1939–1940

developednoth�ngw�thth�sf�rstaccusat�onaga�nstnye,later,asthe�nter-vent�on�st–ant�-�ntervent�on�st debate �ntens�f�ed, they would scrut�n�zeotherser�ouschargesra�sedaga�nsth�m.9

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W�ththeneutral�tyactrev�sed�ntheautumnof1939,andPolandf�nallycrushed w�th the Sov�et �nvas�on of that country �n m�d-September, thewar �n europe suddenly—and temporar�ly—became qu�et. h�tler hadhopedtheall�es,fac�ngthereal�tyofadefeatedPoland,wouldrecogn�zethat he had no des�gns on e�ther French or br�t�sh terr�tory and would,therefore,ceasehost�l�t�es.h�sw�shwasfanc�ful,�fatallser�ous.Forthe�rpart, the all�es saw no reason to seek reconc�l�at�on. They bel�eved theFrench border fort�f�cat�ons were adequate, and they thought the th�ckardennesForestwouldpreventtheGermanarmyfromenter�ngFrance.To the all�es, the only poss�b�l�ty for a German westward �nvas�on wasthroughthelowCountr�eswhere�twouldbecounteredbythecomb�nedbr�t�sh and French m�l�tar�es and the defense forces of those �nvadednat�ons.Theresultant�nact�v�tyoverthew�nterof1939–40wasdubbed,�nthewordsofant�-�ntervent�on�stSenatorW�ll�amborah,the“phonywar.” irrespect�veof �nternat�onalevents,Fbiagentscont�nuedtomon�torant�-�ntervent�on�st act�v�ty, pr�mar�ly by collect�ng var�ous newspapercl�pp�ngs. They were also �nterested �n correspondence amer�cans senttotheWh�tehouse,butpart�cularlythatconcern�ngCharlesl�ndbergh.Worr�ed c�t�zens wrote the�r government to express concern aboutl�ndbergh or to prov�de �nformat�on they bel�eved would �nterest gov-ernment off�c�als. no matter who �n the government rece�ved these let-ters,muchofthecorrespondence�nvar�ablyfound�tswaytotheFbi.asl�ndbergh’spol�t�calefforts�ncreased,so,too,d�dthebureau’scorrespon-dence f�le. reflect�ng l�ndbergh’s �ncreas�ng prom�nence �n the fore�gnpol�cy debate—where h�s pol�t�cal act�v�ty and past tours of Germanybetween1936and1938(wherehewasawardedamedal)werecalled�ntoquest�on—many amer�cans expressed concern over the av�ator’s loyaltyandpatr�ot�sm.Onec�t�zenwrote:“idon’tunderstandwhyyourdepart-ment doesn’t b�nd and gag that man Charles a. l�ndbergh.” anotherwarnedtheFbi:“[i]fhewas�nvest�gatedhewouldbefoundtobea5thcolumn�standperhapsoneoftheworld’sh�ghestpa�dsp�es.”10

9. letter,SaClosangelestohoover,10October1939,Fbi65–6030–1. 10. letter,(deleted)toFrankl�nD.roosevelt,22may1940,Fbi65–11449–2x;(deleted)to J.edgarhoover,4august1940,Fbi65–11449–6; letter,anonymous toFbi,6august

44 Chapter �

letterswr�tten�noppos�t�ontoPres�dentroosevelt’spol�cy,or�nsup-portofl�ndbergh,provedtohavegreaters�gn�f�cance,espec�ally�npro-pell�ng forward the Fbi’s already unauthor�zed—�f pass�ve—mon�tor�ngof theant�-�ntervent�on�sts.On9apr�l1940,however, the “phonywar” came to an end. Germany �nvaded Denmark, lead�ng to the subsequentconquests of norway, belg�um, holland, and France. in react�on, lead-�ng ant�-�ntervent�on�sts—l�ke l�ndbergh—spoke out aga�nst amer�can�nvolvement. Then, �n may 1940, at roosevelt’s request, Pres�dent�alSecretaryStephenearlyforwardedtohoover“anumberoftelegrams”thatwere“�noppos�t�ontonat�onaldefense.”TheWh�tehousehadrece�vedthe telegrams follow�ng roosevelt’s recent speech on nat�onal defenseand the threat to amer�ca by fore�gn a�r forces. early �nformed hooverthat “thePres�dent thoughtyoum�ght l�ke to look themovernoting the names and addresses of the senders.” The follow�ngmonth, fora secondt�me,earlyforwardedtohooverth�rty-s�xtelegramsrece�ved“express�ngapproval of Col. l�ndbergh’s [rad�o] address” that month on “Our Dr�ftTowardsWar.”11

insteadofmerely“not�ngthenamesandaddresses”ofthecorrespon-dents, hoover exceeded the pres�dent’s �nterest and ordered a search ofthe Fbi’s f�les for any �nformat�on on the wr�ters. Th�s �nformat�on wasthen comp�led and forwarded to the Wh�te house for �ts “conven�enceand reference.” Pres�dent roosevelt had not requested th�s �nformat�on.rather, on h�s own author�ty, hoover offered �t but roosevelt made nocompla�nts.h�slackofconcerncanbestbeunderstoodw�th�nthecontextoftwocommentsthepres�dentmade�nmaytoTreasurySecretaryhenrymorgenthauandSecretaryofWarSt�mson.accord�ngtomorgenthau,thepres�dent toldh�mover lunch: “if i shouldd�e tomorrow, iwantyou toknowth�s.iamabsolutelyconv�ncedthatl�ndbergh�sanaz�.”rooseveltalso wrote St�mson: “When i read l�ndbergh’s speech [of 20 may] i feltthat�tcouldnothavebeenbetterput�f�thadbeenwr�ttenbyGoebbelsh�mself. What a p�ty that th�s youngster has completely abandoned h�sbel�ef�nourformofgovernmentandhasacceptednaz�methodsbecauseapparentlytheyareeff�c�ent.”12

1940,Fbi65–11449–21;letter,(deleted)toattorneyGeneralrobertJackson,5august1940,Fbi65–11449–36. 11. memorandum,Frankl�nD.roosevelttoStephenearly,21may1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,Frankl�nD.rooseveltl�brary(FDrl),hydePark,newyork;memorandum,Stephenearly toJ.edgarhoover,21may1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;memorandum,early tohoover,17June1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;memorandum,17June1940,Off�c�alF�le92,Charlesl�ndbergh,FDrl.emphas�sadded�nquote. 12. Personal and conf�dent�al letter, J. edgar hoover to Stephen early, 26 June 1940,

45Beginnings: 1939–1940

hoover’s dec�s�on to br�ef the Wh�te house on �ts ant�-�ntervent�on-�st cr�t�cs marked a s�gn�f�cant development �n the hoover-rooseveltrelat�onsh�p, tr�gger�ng an ongo�ng and �ntens�f�ed surve�llance of theant�-�ntervent�on�st movement. Th�s was the f�rst t�me that hoover, ofh�sownaccord,prov�dedtheWh�tehousew�thpol�t�cal �ntell�genceonthepres�dent’sant�-�ntervent�on�stcr�t�cs.hooverexplo�tedtheopportu-n�tyofroosevelt’sforward�ngoftelegramstoreportbacktoh�mpol�t�cal�nformat�onhethoughtrooseveltwouldf�ndof�nterest.Theprov�d�ngof�ntell�genceonroosevelt’sant�-�ntervent�on�stcr�t�csonly�ncreasedasthedebate�ntens�f�ed. as l�ndbergh’s part�c�pat�on �n the so-called Great Debate escalatedover1940,so,too,d�dFbimon�tor�ngefforts.astheav�ator’scommentsbecame �ncreas�ngly more controvers�al, h�s popular�ty and �nfluenceamongthepubl�c�ncreased.inh�s1939art�cle“av�at�on,Geography,andrace,” the fl�er’scontent�ousandrac�st statements ledmany toconcludehe was pro-naz�. l�ndbergh had descr�bed the european war as one“w�th�nourownfam�lyofnat�ons,awarwh�chw�llreducethestrengthanddestroythetreasuresoftheWh�terace.”hefurtherwrotethatsurv�valdependedon“aWesternwallofraceandarmswh�chcanholdbacke�thera Gengh�s Khan or the �nf�ltrat�on of �nfer�or blood.” (years later, wellaftertheconclus�onofthewar,l�ndberghelaboratedonthesecomments,cla�m�nghewasnota rac�st.hed�dadm�t,however, tobel�ev�ng �n thesuper�or�tyofracesbaseduponach�evements�ncultureandtechnology.)S�ncel�ndberghbel�evedawaramongWesternnat�onswouldbead�sas-ter forc�v�l�zat�on �ngeneral,byallow�ngas�anelements(�.e.,russ�ans/commun�sts)todom�natethecont�nent,headvocatedanegot�atedpeace.not surpr�s�ngly, such �deas led many, �nclud�ng off�c�als �n the govern-ment,toregardthefl�erasanaz�sympath�zer.nomatterhowod�oush�sv�ews, l�ndbergh’s op�n�ons d�d not, however, const�tute grounds for anFbi�nvest�gat�on.13

l�ndbergh’sgoaldur�ng1940wastopromotethe�deathattheUn�tedStates should rema�n �solated from the european confl�ct and, �nstead,concentrateon�tsowndefenses.hecalledforacleardefensepol�cy,onethat,heargued,roosevelthadneverart�culated.bybu�ld�ngapowerfuland

Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;personalandconf�dent�alletter,J.edgarhoovertoStephenearly,2august1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;entryfor20may1940,henrymorgenthauPres�-dent�alD�ar�es,p.563,FDrl;letter,Frankl�nD.roosevelttohenrySt�mson,21may1940,henrySt�msonPapers(m�crof�lmed.,reel101),manuscr�ptsandarch�ves,yaleUn�vers�ty,newhaven,CT. 13. Cole,Charles A. Lindbergh,80–82.Forl�ndbergh’sant�-Sem�t�smseealsoa.Scottberg,Charles A. Lindbergh(newyork:Putnam,1998),361,385–86.

4� Chapter �

moderna�rforcew�thamer�cana�rbasesalongtheeasternandwesternapproaches to the Western hem�sphere, l�ndbergh cla�med the countrywouldbe�mpregnabletoenemyattack.“W�thaf�rmandclear-cutpol�cy,”he told amer�cans �n a nat�onal rad�o broadcast �n may 1940, “we canbu�ldana�rdefenseforamer�cathatw�llstandabovethesesh�ft�ngsandsof war.” h�s argument resonated w�th amer�cans �n general and ant�-�ntervent�on�sts�npart�cular.h�sgovernmentworkandmult�pletoursoffore�gna�rforces,furthermore,ledmanytoseeh�masanauthor�tyona�rpowerwhocouldeffect�velycounterroosevelt.14

Dat�ng from 1940, Fbi agents began to pursue leads suggest�ng thatl�ndbergh m�ght have been �nvolved w�th fasc�st organ�zat�ons. To Fbioff�c�als these alleged connect�ons assumed part�cular s�gn�f�cance afterCongress passed the Sm�th act of 1940 that author�zed prosecut�on ofthose who advocated the v�olent overthrow of the U.S. government. inFebruary1940,forexample,Fbiagentslearnedthatl�ndberghwasalleg-edlyassoc�atedw�ththefasc�stgroupthenewWorldmovement.TheFbi’s�nformercla�medthatth�sgrouphad“chosenColonell�ndberghasthe�rworldleaderbecauseofh�syouth,h�sprom�nenceandothercharacter�s-t�cs.”Theav�atorwasalsorumoredtobeconnectedw�thanorgan�zat�oncalled the James True assoc�ates—an ant�-Commun�st and ant�-Sem�t�cgroup—whose leaders reportedly “referred to l�ndbergh as the�r leaderandagoodmanforthepres�dency.”byaugust1940,anotherFbisourcereported that the German propagand�st Dr. Fr�eder�ch ernst auhagen,whohadbeenconv�ctedforfa�l�ngtoreg�sterw�ththeJust�ceDepartmentasanagentofa fore�gn-controlledorgan�zat�on,cla�medthatl�ndberghwas a member of the Steer�ng Comm�ttee of the amer�can Fellowsh�pForum. accord�ng to auhagen, the amer�can Fellowsh�p Forum was a“Germanpropagandaun�t”that“advocatedaFasc�stformofgovernmentandonewh�chwouldcooperatew�ththenaz�reg�me.”15

l�ndbergh was allegedly l�nked to other groups l�ke the nat�onalCopperheads,ledbyell�sJones(whowasconv�ctedforsed�t�on�n1942)androberthoble,who“supportedthepol�c�esandpr�nc�plesofCharlesa. l�ndbergh.” Fbi off�c�als also mon�tored Joseph mcW�ll�ams andGeraldl.K.Sm�th,whoregardedtheav�atorasapotent�alleaderofthe�r

14. Charlesa.l�ndbergh,“Thea�rDefenseofamer�ca”rad�oaddressof19may1940�nCongressional Record,20may1940,3034–35.Seealsol�ndbergh,“WhatSubst�tuteforWar?”307–8;“Textofl�ndberghaddress,‘aPleaforamer�canindependence,”New York Times,15October1940. 15. SummarymemorandumreCharlesa.l�ndbergh,byD.m�ltonladd,21august1942,pp.8–11,Fbi65–11449–154.

4�Beginnings: 1939–1940

followers. Desp�te l�ndbergh’s be�ng popularly assoc�ated w�th “numer-ous”subvers�veorgan�zat�ons,Fbioff�c�alsneverthelessadm�ttedthat“nochargecouldbemade thathehashadanyd�rect connect�onw�th theseorgan�zat�onsorgroups.”and, �ndeed,l�ndberghd�dnothaveanycon-nect�onstoanyoftheserad�calgroups,butthatd�dnotstopagentsfromcheck�ng.16

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Dur�ngJanuaryandFebruary1940,andbeforetheendofthe“phonywar,”Fbiagentsaga�nfocusedonSenatornye�ntermsofesp�onage.ThatnyefellunderFbiscrut�nyforasecondt�me�sprobablynotunusuals�nce�tco�nc�ded w�th h�s elevat�on, upon the death of Senator W�ll�am borah,to the powerful Senate Fore�gn relat�ons Comm�ttee, wh�ch made h�manevenmore�nfluent�alcr�t�c.inth�s�nstance,alawyerfrommoorhead,m�nnesota,namedJamesW�therow,wrotehooverontwoseparateocca-s�onsurg�ngh�mtoass�gnagentsto�nterv�ewtwomen.W�therowcla�medthat these two men—D. h. mcarthur and John andrews—worked fornyeandhad“very�nt�mateknowledge”ofGermanandJapanesenat�on-alswhohadv�s�tedthesenator.heevencla�medthatasecretaryfromtheGermanembassyhadspec�alaccess,atonepo�nt,tothesenator’sf�les.Tolendcredencetoh�scla�ms,W�therow�nformedhooverthatdur�ngtheF�rstWorldWarhehadworkedw�th“theamer�can�ntell�genceserv�ces,”help�ngthemtouncoverdomest�cGermanesp�onage.Then,cla�m�nghewas fam�l�ar w�th German clandest�ne techn�ques, W�therow re�teratedthattheGermanstyp�callyusedatarget’spol�t�caloppos�t�onaga�nsth�m.ToW�therow,then,th�sexpla�nedwhySenatornyehadbecomesovocalwh�lecha�r�ngthenyeComm�tteefrom1934to1936andwhyhecont�n-uedtospeakoutaga�nstadm�n�strat�onfore�gnpol�cy.17

Unl�ke the prev�ous esp�onage charge aga�nst nye, hoover took th�sone more ser�ously. The reason for th�s probably stems from the factthat W�therow was a lawyer and cla�med to have prev�ously engaged �n�ntell�gencework, therebymak�ngh�m �nhoover’s eyesamorecred�ble�nformant.hooverreferredW�therow’slettertotheJust�ceDepartmentford�rect�on.alexanderholtzoffrespondedtohooverthat“�t�sthedef�n�te

16. SummarymemorandumreCharlesa.l�ndbergh,byD.m�ltonladd,21august1942,pp.18–21,Fbi65–11449–154. 17. letter, James m. W�therow to hoover, 31 January 1940, Fbi 65–8799–2X; letter,W�therowtohoover,24February1940,Fbi65–8799–2X; letter,hoover toW�therow,14march1940,Fbi65–8799–2X.

4� Chapter �

op�n�onthatno�nvest�gat�onshouldbeconductedofSenatornyeonthebas�softhatletter.”holtzoff,however,d�dnotpreventanyprob�ngofnye’sact�v�t�es. because W�therow had ment�oned alleged German access tonye’sSenatef�les,holtzoffsuggested,andsen�orFbioff�c�alsagreed,thatacopyofW�therow’sletterbesenttotheStateDepartmentforanyact�ontheydeemedappropr�ate.18

irrespect�ve of the�r uncorroborated or fantast�c nature, hoovertyp�cally referredunsol�c�ted letters toh�s Just�ceDepartment super�ors.hoovere�thertrulybel�evedthelettersmer�tedact�on(almostalwaysthedepartmentorderedno�nvest�gat�on),orheknewtheywouldfeedalreadyheldsusp�c�onsofant�-�ntervent�on�stsandtherebydemonstrateh�suse-fulnesstothe�rends.moreover,hoovernever�n�t�atedanFbiprobeofacongressman w�thout adm�n�strat�on approval. if any unauthor�zed Fbi�nvest�gat�onbecamepubl�c,theonusfor�twouldbeonhooveralone. Th�s d�chotomy between unsol�c�ted allegat�ons and adm�n�stra-t�on requests for �nvest�gat�ons �s exempl�f�ed �n a Wh�te house requestof June 1940 to �nvest�gate a matter concern�ng nye and h�s assoc�ates.The request came the samemonth thatnyeunsuccessfullyopposed theappo�ntmentsofhenrySt�msonandFrankKnoxtothepres�dent’scab�net,aftertheburke-Wadsworthconscr�pt�onb�llwas�ntroduced,andatat�mewhennyepubl�clydemandedroosevelt’sres�gnat�on.On18June,Sm�thbrookhart—aret�redrepubl�cansenatorfromiowa—adv�sedearlythataWash�ngton,D.C.,pr�vatedetect�veandpol�t�caloperat�venamedhenryGrunewaldwas“�ncahoots”w�thSenatornye.Grunewaldallegedlyhaddel�veredtwocheckstotal�ngsome$8,000tonyethat theoutgo�ngsec-retary of war—and ant�-�ntervent�on�st—henry Woodr�ng had wr�tten.WhatsoconcernedtheWh�tehouseandFbioff�c�alswastheunsubstan-t�atedcla�mmadebyarmy�ntell�gencethatGrunewaldwas �nchargeofGerman�ntell�gence�nWash�ngton.19

because the Wh�te house had requested th�s �nvest�gat�on, hooverorderedthat �tbeg�ven“cont�nuousandpreferredattent�on.”Fbiagents�nterv�ewed Senator brookhart, nye’s former secretary D. h. mcarthur,and major Thomas C. mcDonald—brookhart’s fr�end who had cla�med

18. letter, James m. W�therow to hoover, 31 January 1940, Fbi 65–8799–2X; letter,W�therowtohoover,24February1940,Fbi65–8799–2X;memorandum,edwarda.Tammtohoover,18march1940,Fbi65–8799–2X. 19. memorandum, early to hoover, 18 June 1940, Off�c�al F�le 10-b, 146-a, FDrl;memorandum, mrs. John Frece to early, 18 June 1940, Off�c�al F�le 10-b, 146-a, FDrl;memorandum, C. m. busbee, miD, to act�ng Ch�ef of Staff, G-2, 25 June 1940, Fbi 87–2755–287.

49Beginnings: 1939–1940

Grunewald was a spy. because brookhart’s statement was hearsay, Fbiagents focused upon mcarthur and mcDonald. The former conf�rmedthat Grunewald had regularly v�s�ted nye’s off�ce “to p�ck up p�eces of�nformat�onwh�chhecouldcap�tal�zeon,”andthathehaddel�veredcashtonye.mcDonald,moreover,bel�evedthatGrunewald’ssecret�venature�nd�catedthathem�ghtbe�nvolved�nGermanesp�onage.Tounderscoreh�scla�m,mcDonaldsa�dhew�tnessedaconversat�onspoken�nGermanbetween Grunewald and Colonel edw�n emerson, whom mcDonaldcla�medwasaF�rstWorldWarGermanagent.Fbiagentsthensoughttoconf�rm these susp�c�ons and whether Grunewald had l�a�sed w�th nyeandWoodr�ngtotakeadvantageofthe�r�nfluence.20

Ofmore�nteresttoFbioff�c�als,however,wasthefactthatGrunewaldwasapol�t�caloperat�ve.Onaregularbas�sheprov�dedhooverw�th�ns�depol�t�cal�nformat�on.Th�srelat�onsh�pprovedtobeserend�p�tousforFbiagents’ probe of Grunewald because, �n June, Grunewald—unaware ofthe�nvest�gat�on—askedFbiagentstoexam�neh�stelephonetoascerta�n�f �t had been tapped. “bel�ev�ng th�s was a good opportun�ty to closelyscrut�n�ze Grunewald’s apartment,” Fbi off�c�als d�spatched agents thereon2July1940.TheFbiagentsreported,however,thattheyhadobservednoth�ng“wh�chwould�nd�catethathewaspro-Germanorant�-amer�can�nanymanner�nh�ssympath�es.”21

The Fbi’s �nvest�gat�ons of Grunewald, Woodr�ng, and nye had, �nthewordsofoneagent,“fa�ledtodevelopanysubstant�at�onofanyofthechargesmade.”nevertheless,hoovernotedthatthe�nformat�onFbiagents“developedrelat�ngnotonlytoSenatornyebuttomr.Woodr�ngandmr.Grunewald,hasbeenofanegat�venature.”TheFbid�rectorthenreportedth�s “negat�ve” �nformat�on about Grunewald, nye, and Woodr�ng notonlytoearly—whohadrequestedthe�nvest�gat�on—buttotheattorneygeneralandh�sass�stant,aswellasTreasurySecretaryhenrymorgenthau.Clearly, �t only re�nforced the�r negat�ve op�n�ons of roosevelt’s oppos�-t�on.22

20. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoearly,27June1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,146-a; aff�dav�t of D. h. mcarthur, 27 June 1940, Fbi 65–6165-?. Wh�le the documentnumber�sunreadable,�tcanbefound�nWayneS.Cole’spapersatthehhl.memorandum,hoover to early, 8 July 1940, Off�c�al F�le 10-b, 146-a, FDrl; memorandum, hoover toattorneygeneral,9July1940,Fbi65–6165–12;memorandum,hoovertomcGu�re,9July1940,Fbi65–6165–12. 21. memorandum,hoovertoearly,8July1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,146-a,FDrl. 22. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoearly,9July1940,w�thattachedmemo-randum,8July1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,146-a,FDrl;memorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,9July1940,Fbi65–6165–12(w�thattached8Julymemo);memorandum,hoover

50 Chapter �

Thes�gn�f�canceofth�sep�sode,however,l�es�nGrunewald.Fromthe�nvest�gat�on and Grunewald’s unsol�c�ted shar�ng of �nformat�on w�ththeFbi,hooverreal�zedthevalueofGrunewaldasasourceofpol�t�cal�ntell�gence.aconnectedWash�ngtonpol�t�caloperat�ve,Grunewaldhadconnect�ons to prom�nent personal�t�es l�ke Senator nye, former Wh�tehousea�deThomasCorcoran,andtheconservat�veandpol�t�callyact�vebus�nessman henry marsh. When Grunewald shared pol�t�cal �nforma-t�onw�ththeFbi,hooveraccepted�tw�thouthes�tat�on.andastheGreatDebate�ntens�f�ed�n1941,m�l�taryintell�genceD�v�s�on(miD)off�c�alsaga�nwarnedtheFbithatGrunewald“wasthepay-offmanforGermanagents�ntheUn�tedStates”andthathewasthe�rl�a�sontovar�ouspeaceand subvers�ve groups. S�gn�f�cantly, however, Fbi ass�stant D�rector D.m�ltonladddeterm�nedthatmiD“wasmerelyresurrect�ngold�nforma-t�on” already put to rest. yet, anx�ous to cap�tal�ze on Grunewald’s con-nect�ons, hoover nevertheless used th�s rehashed army �nformat�on asthebas�sforauthor�z�ngaw�retaponGrunewald’stelephone.Thew�retaprema�ned�nplacebetween4Juneand3September1941andy�eldedvalu-ablepol�t�cal�ntell�gence.23

W�retapp�ng was not a legal surve�llance method. S�nce passage �n1934 of the Federal Commun�cat�ons act, and unt�l the 1968 Omn�busCr�meControlandSafeStreetsactperm�ttedw�retapp�ngw�thawarrant,the �ntercept�onofw�reorrad�ocommun�cat�onsbyanyonewas �llegal.Th�s law was even upheld by two compan�on Supreme Court dec�s�ons,Nardone v. U.S. (1937and1939), andattorneyGeneralrobert Jackson,who �n march 1940, publ�cly announced that the Just�ce Departmentwouldnotsanct�onw�retapp�ng.hepo�ntedoutthattheFbiwasnotanOGPU—forerunneroftheSov�etnKvDandKGb.inmay1940,however,w�th the war cr�s�s mount�ng, Pres�dent roosevelt secretly author�zedthe use of w�retaps to avert “sabotage, assass�nat�ons, and ‘f�fth column’act�v�t�es”butonly�ncasesconcern�ng“nat�onaldefense”and“ofpersonssuspected of subvers�ve act�v�t�es aga�nst the Government of the Un�ted

tomcGu�re,9July1940,Fbi65–6165–12(w�thattached8Julymemo);letter,morgenthautohoover,17 July1940,andpersonalandconf�dent�al letterw�thattached8 Julymemo,hoovertomorgenthau,9July1940,henrymorgenthauD�ar�es,vol.283,pp.188–97,FDrl.Onnye’sreservat�onsabouttheSt�msonandKnoxappo�ntmentsseeDoenecke,Storm on the Horizon,103–4. 23. memorandum,laddtohoover,7February1945,Fbi87–2755–287.it�salso�nter-est�ngtonotethatGrunewaldwasaga�nw�retapped�n1945–46.DonotF�lememorandum,Spear to Foxworth, 17 may 1941, Fbi 62–116758; Do not F�le memorandum, T�mm toFoxworth,6June1941,Fbi62–116758;DonotF�lememorandum,F�tchtoFoxworth,25July1941,Fbi62–116758.

51Beginnings: 1939–1940

States,�nclud�ngsp�es.”rooseveltfurthermorewantedtol�m�tth�sact�v�tybykeep�ng�ttoa“m�n�mum”andl�m�ted“�nsofarasposs�bletoal�ens.”heauthor�zedtheattorneygeneraltorev�ewandapproveallproposedFbiw�retaps.24

attorney General Jackson, however, wanted hoover to ma�nta�n therecordofthesew�retaps.hooverd�dth�sbyma�nta�n�nga“memorandumbook” of attorney general–author�zed w�retaps �n h�s off�ce. by plac�ngth�s respons�b�l�ty w�th hoover, Jackson effect�vely d�m�n�shed h�s over-s�ghtrolebecauseheknewonlyofthosew�retapsthathooverreportedtoh�m.infact,Fbioff�c�alscould,andd�d,author�zew�retapsonthe�rownauthor�tyw�thout�nform�ngtheattorneygeneral.25

Theexactnumberofw�retapsauthor�zedbyFbioff�c�als�snotknown,butsomecanbedocumented.W�retaps thatwerenotauthor�zedby theattorney general were not recorded �n hoover’s memorandum book;�nstead theywererecordedonauthor�zat�oncards thatwerema�nta�ned�nthesecretoff�cef�lesofhoover’sl�eutenants.in1954,forreasonsthatareunknown,f�fteenw�retap-author�zat�oncardsfromthe1940sthathadbeenf�led�nFbiass�stantD�rectorladd’soff�ceweretransferredtothesecret f�le of ass�stant D�rector lou�s n�chols. even more cur�ous, theFbi ma�nta�ned as standard pol�cy that w�retap-author�zat�on cards bedestroyedeverys�xmonths,yetthesecardssomehowescapeddestruct�on.Whatever happened, the cards nevertheless document the fact that Fbioff�c�alshaddevelopedanot�ns�gn�f�cantlevelof�nvest�gat�veautonomyandd�demploy�llegalw�retapsonthe�rowndur�ngth�sper�od.26

ThroughtheGrunewaldw�retap,Fbiagentsdevelopedno�nformat�onsubstant�at�ngtheesp�onagechargeaga�nstthepr�vatedetect�ve.instead,they recorded cr�t�cal and pol�t�cally charged comments that var�ousprom�nent �nd�v�duals had made to Grunewald over the telephone. inSeptember1941,forexample,Grunewaldhadaconversat�onw�thformer

24. FederalCommun�cat�onsact,47U.S.C.605(1934);major�tyOp�n�on,U.S.SupremeCourtJust�ceOwenJ.roberts,Nardone v. United States,302U.S.397(20December1937);major�tyOp�n�on,U.S.SupremeCourtJust�ceFel�xFrankfurter,Nardone v. United States,308U.S.338(11December1939); “Just�ceDepartmentbansW�reTapp�ng; Jacksonactsonhooverrecommendat�on,”New York Times,18march1940;“FbiisnoOGPU,Jacksonasserts,”New York Times,31march1940,19;conf�dent�almemorandum,Frankl�nD.roos-evelttoattorneyGeneralrobertJackson,21may1940,Pres�dent’sSecretary’sF�le,Just�ceDepartment,FDrl. 25. athanTheohar�s,“FbiW�retapp�ng:aCaseStudyofbureaucrat�cautonomy,”Polit-ical Science Quarterly107(1992):106. 26. ib�d.; f�fteenw�retapauthor�zat�oncards,W�retapp�ngFolder,Off�c�alandConf�-dent�alF�leofFbiass�stantD�rectorlou�sn�chols,FbihQ,Wash�ngton,DC.

5� Chapter �

Wh�tehousea�deThomasCorcorandur�ngwh�chCorcoranreferredtonavy Secretary Knox as an “�ncompetent four-flusher,” and d�sm�ssednaval �ntell�gence off�cers as an “awfully snooty bunch.” Corcoran alsocommented to Grunewald that he bel�eved roosevelt only surroundedh�mself w�th “stuffed sh�rt” �nd�v�duals. Fbi agents also �ntercepted aconversat�on Grunewald had w�th Woodr�ng concern�ng h�s des�re toworkw�ththepr�c�ngcomm�ss�on.TheseexamplesdemonstratethattheGrunewald w�retap, �nstead of reveal�ng Grunewald’s alleged esp�onagecontacts,served�nsteadasaun�quesourceofpol�t�cal�ntell�gence,andonethatp�quedhoover’s �nterest.yetbeyondgather�ngpol�t�cal �ntell�gencefromtheGrunewaldw�retap,hooveralsorece�vedpol�t�cal �nformat�ond�rectly fromthemanh�mself.When the fore�gnpol�cydebatebetweenant�-�ntervent�on�stsandtherooseveltadm�n�strat�onbecamemorehos-t�le�n1941,theGrunewaldsourcewouldproveuseful�nhoover’sb�dto�ngrat�ateh�mselfw�ththeWh�tehouse.27

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FbiD�rectorhooverd�dnotonlyemploy�llegalw�retapswhencollect�ngsens�t�ve�nformat�onaboutant�-�ntervent�on�sts,healsousedspec�alf�l-�ngprocedurestoensurethatsens�t�veFbirecordswouldnotbed�sclosedpubl�cly. hoover’s “personal and conf�dent�al” letter system—d�scussed�nchapter1—wascerta�nlyused,butby1940hedev�sedfurthercreat�vef�l�ng methods. On 11 apr�l 1940, hoover �nst�tuted the “Do not F�le”procedure whereby spec�ally marked memoranda were not �ndexed andser�al�zed�ntheFbi’scentralrecordssystem.insteadtheywerema�nta�nedbyass�stantFbiD�rectorladd’sDomest�c intell�genceD�v�s�onperm�t-t�ngFbioff�c�alstoemploysens�t�ve�nvest�gat�vetechn�ques,suchas�lle-galbreak-�nsandw�retaps(notetheGrunewaldfootnotes),andtocreatewr�ttenrecordsaboutthemthatwouldbesecure.28

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Fbi off�c�als were �nterested �n the pol�t�cal act�v�t�es of var�ous ant�-�ntervent�on�sts, but part�cularly �nterested �n them �f the�r pol�t�cs�nvolved cr�t�c�sm of the Fbi. in th�s regard, Fbi off�c�als found Senator

27. Personalandconf�dent�almemorandum,(deleted)toTamm,3September1941,Fbi65–6165–42. 28. athanTheohar�s,The FBI and American Democracy(lawrence:Un�vers�tyPressofKansas,2004),108–9.

53Beginnings: 1939–1940

burtonWheelerofpart�cular�nterest.asalongcr�t�cofthebureau,dat�ngbacktotheTeapotDomeper�od,Fbioff�c�alscons�deredWheeler’sv�ewsof theFbisusp�c�ous. in termsof the fore�gnpol�cydebate,Fbioff�c�alsfocused on Wheeler’s publ�c statements made �n may of 1940 when hecr�t�c�zed the Fbi �n the Philadelphia Inquirer. in react�on to roosevelt’sproposal to transfer the imm�grat�on bureau to the Just�ce Departmentafterthe“phonywar,”SenatorWheelersa�dthe�deawasterr�blebecauseanother Just�ce Department agency—the Fbi—was staffed by “a lot ofcheaptwo-by-fourdetect�ves.”Then, �nJune,theFbi’sSeattlef�eldoff�cereported that an anonymous �nformant cla�med that Wheeler had aga�npubl�clycr�t�c�zedtheFbi.(inc�dentally,atthet�meWheelerwascr�t�c�z�ngtheSt�msonandKnoxappo�ntments.)The�nformantcla�medtohavetheab�l�tyto“shutWheelerup”and�nqu�redastothebureau’s�nterest�nth�s.Wh�lethe�dent�tyofthe�nformantwasneverestabl�shed,h�scallwascon-s�dered�mportantenoughtoreporttohoover.Wh�lehooveralwaystookapersonal�nterest�nh�scr�t�cs,thosewhocr�t�c�zedh�mwh�lealsocr�t�c�z-�ngthepol�cyoftherooseveltWh�tehouserece�vedspec�alattent�on.29

inSeptember1940,am�df�erceant�-�ntervent�on�stoppos�t�ontocon-scr�pt�onandthedestroyers-for-basesdeal,hooverrece�ved�nformat�onthatby1941evolved�ntoafar-reach�ng�nvest�gat�on�ntotheact�v�t�esofSenatorsWheelerandnyeandCongressmanham�ltonF�sh.Theep�sodega�nedl�fewhenthenewyorkf�eldoff�cereportedthatd�rectma�ladver-t�serhenryhoke—publ�sherofthe Reporter of Direct Mail Advertising—had accused var�ous senators and congressmen of �llegally d�str�but�ngfranked envelopes. (Congressmen have the r�ght to ma�l speeches andother �nformat�on to const�tuents postage-free.) These envelopes, wh�chconta�ned ant�-�ntervent�on�st l�terature, allegedly were sent to Germanamer�cans who subsequently ma�led them en masse to amer�cans �nan attempt to �nfluence popular op�n�on. hoke s�ngled out Farm-laborSenatorernestlundeenofm�nnesota,Democrat�cSenatorrushholtofWest v�rg�n�a, Senator nye, republ�can representat�ve J. Thorkelson ofmontana, and representat�ve F�sh for us�ng the�r frank �n th�s manner.hooverforwardedth�s�nformat�ontotheJust�ceDepartment’sneutral�tylawUn�t,andwh�leatth�st�me�tgeneratednoconcern,by1941�twouldevolve �nto a controversy that for the ant�-�ntervent�on�st congressmensuggested—byassoc�at�on—thattheyhadfore�gnl�nks.30

29. “Wheeler Denounces Fbi as ‘2-by-4’ Detect�ves,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 31 may1940,�nWheelerFbif�le,numberunreadable;memorandum,r.P.KramertoClegg,1June1940,Fbi62–55261–3;Doenecke,Storm on the Horizon,103,104. 30. Personal and conf�dent�al letter, SaC new york to hoover, 7 September 1940,

54 Chapter �

The follow�ng month, hoover rece�ved further �nformat�on aboutcongress�onalfranks,butth�st�me�ts�ngledoutSenatorWheeler.atthet�me,Wheelerwaspubl�clycr�t�c�z�ngtheconscr�pt�onb�ll—call�ng�tdan-gerous—andoppos�ngthedestroyers-for-basesdeal.Thematter�nvolvedtwodozenp�ecesofma�lbear�ngSenatorWheeler’s frankthathadbeendel�veredtoapostoff�ce �nmanchester,Connect�cut.Th�s frankedma�lreportedly conta�ned ant�-�ntervent�on�st l�terature addressed to personsofGermandescent,andatleastonefrankedenvelopewasaddressedtotheleaderofthelocalbundorgan�zat�on.hooverreportedth�s�nc�denttotheJust�ceDepartment“�nv�ewofthefactthatth�s�nformat�onwasoff�c�allyreportedtoarepresentat�veofth�sbureau.”TheFbid�dnothavejur�sd�c-t�onto�nvest�gateamatter�nvolv�ngtheU.S.ma�l,yethoover’sreport�ngof�t�llustratesh�s�nterest�nreport�ngtotheadm�n�strat�onanyderoga-tory�nformat�on,even�funsubstant�ated,aboutroosevelt’scr�t�cs.31

Thefrank�ng�ssuewasnottheonlyt�me�nformat�onsurfacedtosug-gestSenatorWheelermayhavehad fore�gn l�nks.hooveralsoobta�nedunsubstant�ated �nformat�on �n December 1940, wh�ch he shared w�ththeWh�tehouse,TreasuryDepartment,andStateDepartment, that thew�fe of a former German embassy counselor agreed to prepare a sum-maryof �nformat�ononadolfh�tlerandd�sarmament forWheelerandDemocrat�cSenatorm�llardTyd�ngs.The�nformat�onalso�nd�catedthatthewomancla�med tobe“work�ngw�thmrs.Wheeleron th�s ‘amer�caF�rst’ organ�zat�on.” (The amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee became a nat�onalorgan�zat�on �n December 1940.) Th�s �nformat�on, though uncorrobo-rated,suggestedtosen�oradm�n�strat�onoff�c�alsthatWheelerandotherant�-�ntervent�on�st cr�t�cs had t�es w�th naz� Germany. Such �nforma-t�on lentcredence topopularpercept�ons thatant�-�ntervent�on�stswere“subvers�ves”andundoubtedlybolsteredth�sv�ewamongoff�c�als�ntheWh�tehouse.byprov�d�ngsuchunsubstant�ated�nformat�on,hooverwasplaced�ngoodsteadw�ththeadm�n�strat�on.32

There �s ev�dence that the Wh�te house valued hoover’s pol�t�cal

Fbi65–6030–21;memorandum,hoovertolawrencem.C.Sm�th,Ch�ef,neutral�tylawUn�t,16October1940,Fbi65–6030–21;personalandconf�dent�alletter,SaCnewyorktohoover,15august1940,Fbi(number�lleg�ble,but�nnyeFbif�le). 31. memorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,18October1940,Fbi65–6030–3;per-sonalandconf�dent�almemorandum,hoovertoass�stanttotheattorneyGeneralmatthewF.mcGu�re,30October1940,Fbi146–7–3963;letter,SaCnewhaventohoover,10Octo-ber1940,Fbi65–6030–4. 32. bl�nd memorandum, 31 December 1940, Fbi 65–28688–115X1 attached to: per-sonal and conf�dent�al letters, hoover to edw�n m. Watson, Secretary to the Pres�dent,TreasurySecretary,andadolfa.berle,31December1940,Fbi65–28688–115X1.

55Beginnings: 1939–1940

�ntell�gencereports.On14June1940,Pres�dentrooseveltwroteashortnotetotheFbid�rectortothankh�m“forthemany�nterest�ngandvalu-ablereportsthatyouhavemadetomeregard�ngthelastfewmonths.”Thepres�dentthoughthooverhad“doneandaredo�ngawonderfuljob,andiwantyoutoknowofmygrat�f�cat�onandapprec�at�on.”hoover’sresponsetoroosevelt’sbr�efnote�llustratesh�srepeatedeffortsto�ngrat�ateh�mselfw�ththech�efexecut�ve.hooverexpounded:

Thepersonalnotewh�chyoud�rectedtomeonJune,14,1940,�soneofthemost�nsp�r�ngmessageswh�chihaveeverbeenpr�v�legedtorece�ve;and,�ndeed,ilookupon�tasratherasymbolofthepr�nc�plesforwh�chournat�onstands.WhenthePres�dentofourcountry,bear�ngthewe�ghtofuntoldburdens,takesthet�metosoexpressh�mselftooneofh�sbureauheads,there�s�mplanted�ntheheartsoftherec�p�entsarenewedstrengthandv�gortocarryonthe�rtasks.

innot�ngthevastcontrastbetweentheleaderofournat�onandthoseofotherlessfortunatenat�ons,ifeeldeeplythankfulthatwehaveatthehead of our Government one who possesses such sterl�ng, s�ncere, andaltogetherhumanqual�t�es.33

W�thsuchapprovalcom�ngfromtheWh�tehouse�n1940,�twasperhapsw�th l�ttle surpr�se that dur�ng the follow�ng year the Fbi’s surve�llanceefforts�ncreased.

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as�gn�f�cantdevelopment �n1940thatunderscores theevolut�onof thedomest�c secur�ty state, and the spec�al focus ant�-�ntervent�on�st cr�t�csrece�ved,wastheformat�onof�nt�matet�esbetweentheFbi,br�t�sh�ntel-l�gence,andCanada’sroyalCanad�anmountedPol�ce.ifcloset�esamongWesternnat�ons’�ntell�genceagenc�eswasahallmarkoftheColdWar–eranat�onalSecur�tyState,theor�g�nsofthoset�escerta�nlydemonstratethe

33. letter,roosevelttohoover,14June1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;letter,hoovertoroosevelt,18June1940,Pres�dent’sPersonalF�le4819,FDrl.hooveralsosentrooseveltas�m�larly�ngrat�at�ngletter�n1942whenthecountrywasatwarandafterthepres�dentwrotealetterthatwastobereadtothegraduatesofthenat�onalPol�ceacademy.hooverwascarefultopo�ntoutthathe“wouldberem�ss�nmydut�es�fid�dnottellyouthatthelastseveralyearsunderyouradm�n�strat�onhavebeensomeofthehapp�estyearsofmyl�fe....”letter,hoovertoroosevelt,25July1942,J.edgarhooverFolder,Off�c�alandConf�dent�alF�lesofJ.edgarhoover.

5� Chapter �

pr�macyofthedomest�csecur�tystateto�tsdevelopment.morenarrowly,boththeFbiandbr�t�sh�ntell�gence—�ntheformofthebr�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on(bSC)—hadaparallel�nterest�nmon�tor�ngand,�fposs�ble,d�scred�t�ngroosevelt’sant�-�ntervent�on�stcr�t�cs.FbiD�rectorhoover’s�nterest was pr�mar�ly bureaucrat�c—as a conservat�ve operat�ng �n therooseveltadm�n�strat�on—whereasthebSC’s�nterestwas�nbr�ng�ngtheUn�tedStates�ntotheeuropeanwarontheall�eds�de. Wh�le the Fbi-bSC relat�onsh�p formed only �n 1940, the Fbi’s rela-t�onsh�pw�thbr�t�sh�ntell�gence,�nfact,datesbacktotheeraoftheF�rstWorldWar.atthatt�methebureauofinvest�gat�onma�nta�nedal�a�sonw�thS�rW�ll�amW�seman,whoservedasbr�ta�n’s�ntell�gencerepresen-tat�ve �n amer�ca. after the war there appears to have been l�ttle or nocontactbetweenoff�c�alsoftheFbiandbr�t�sh�ntell�gence.nevertheless,dat�ngfrom1937theFbibegantoma�nta�nl�m�tedandunoff�c�alcontactstart�ngw�thbr�t�shPassportControlOff�cerCapta�nS�r JamesPaget—theusualcover forbr�t�sh �ntell�gence—andw�th thebr�t�shPurchas�ngComm�ss�on.by1939,furthermore,hooverreportedtotheWh�tehousethat the Fbi had enjoyed “for the past several years” an off�c�al l�a�sonw�th the royal Canad�an mounted Pol�ce “�n the f�elds of plant protec-t�on,esp�onageandsabotage,”wh�chy�eldedvaluable�nformat�onforthebureau. it was not unt�l 1940, however, that the Fbi would establ�sh anoff�c�al relat�onsh�p w�th br�t�sh �ntell�gence when W�ll�am Stephensonarr�ved�ntheUn�tedStatestoorgan�zethebSC.34

W�ll�amStephensonwasaCanad�anc�t�zenwhod�st�ngu�shedh�mselfdur�ngtheF�rstWorldWarnotonlyasap�lotbutasanamateurl�ghtwe�ghtbox�ngchamp�on.(itwouldbeh�sbox�ngconnect�onsthat,�ron�cally,pro-v�dedStephensonw�thawaytomeetFbiD�rectorhoover.)more�mpor-tantly, Stephenson became a h�ghly successful bus�nessman �n europedur�ngthe�nterwarper�od,wh�chmadeh�man�nvaluableassetnotonlytobr�t�sh�ntell�gence—becausehecouldprov�dethemw�th�nformat�on

34. Douglasm.Charles,“‘beforetheColonelarr�ved’:hoover,Donovan,rooseveltandthe Or�g�ns of amer�can Central �ntell�gence,” Intelligence and National Security 20 (June2005):226.hooverrelayedsome�ntell�gence,aboutthesecur�tyofGreenland,gleanedfromPagettoroosevelt:seepersonalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoWatson,23apr�l1940,Off�c�al F�le 10-b, FDrl. (Th�s �nformat�on, wh�ch roosevelt read personally, apparently�mpressedtheCanad�anpr�mem�n�ster,mackenz�eK�ng,�ntermsofthepres�dent’s�ntel-l�gence sources when roosevelt shared �t w�th h�m. See: personal and conf�dent�al letter,hoovertoWatson,14June1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl.)OntheFbi-rCmPconnect�onseepersonalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoWatson,2December1939;letter,S.T.Wood,Comm�ss�oner of the rCmP, to hoover, 21 november 1939; letter, Watson to hoover, 7December1939all�nOff�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl.

5�Beginnings: 1939–1940

aboutGermanmun�t�onsmanufactur�ng—buttoW�nstonChurch�ll,whousedStephensonasasourceof�nformat�ons�ncehewasoutoffavordur-�ng these “w�lderness years.” after Church�ll rose to the off�ce of pr�mem�n�ster�nmayof1940,becauseofh�s�nt�mateandh�gh-levelcontacts�ntheUn�tedStates,br�t�sh�ntell�gencerecru�tedStephensontobe�ts�ntel-l�gencerepresentat�vethere.35

beforeStephensoncouldsetupshop�ntheUn�tedStates,however,�twas �mperat�ve thathe f�rstmakecontactw�th J.edgarhooverand theFbi.Th�shewasabletodothroughamutualfr�end,thecelebratedboxerGeneTunney,whohaddefeatedJackDempseyfortheheavywe�ghtbox-�ng champ�onsh�p �n the 1920s. but hoover refused to effect a formaland�nt�matel�a�sonw�thafore�gn�ntell�genceorgan�zat�onthatwastooperateonamer�canso�lw�thouttheapprovalofthepres�dent.Furthercompl�cat�ngth�ngsforStephensonwasthefactthatass�stantSecretaryofStateadolfberle,headoftheinterdepartmentalintell�genceConference,opposed strongly any �nt�mate relat�onsh�p w�th br�t�sh �ntell�gence.becauseofth�sobstacle,Stephensonobta�nedroosevelt’sassentthroughamutualfr�endhehadw�ththepres�dent,thewealthynewyorkar�stocratv�ncent astor. Pres�dent roosevelt then endorsed a l�a�son between theFbiandbr�t�sh�ntell�gence,hop�ngthatthetwowouldworkverycloselytogether.36

reportedly, Stephenson then negot�ated the deta�ls of l�a�son w�thhoover,shar�ngw�thh�mbr�t�sh�nformat�onregard�ngtheforthcom�ngital�andeclarat�onofwarontheall�es�n1940wh�chhooverforwardedto the Wh�te house. Stephenson then traveled to london to coord�natew�th br�t�sh �ntell�gence author�t�es, and returned to new york C�ty on21 June 1940 to organ�ze what would be named, by hoover, the br�t�shSecur�ty Coord�nat�on. located on F�fth avenue w�th�n rockefellerCenter, Stephenson p�eced together the bSC by h�r�ng f�fteen secur�tyoff�cers and forty-f�ve support personnel wh�le ma�nta�n�ng close com-mun�cat�onsw�thhoover.Stephenson’sm�ss�on,however,was threefold:toprotectbr�t�shproperty �namer�ca (espec�allyafter the format�onof

35. Charles, “‘before the Colonel arr�ved,’” 226–27; anthony Cave brown, “C”: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill (newyork:macm�llan,1987),262. 36. ThomasTroy,Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA(newhaven,CT:yaleUn�vers�tyPress,1996),39;h.montgomeryhyde,Secret Intelligence Agent (newyork:St.mart�n’s,1982),82;Charles,“‘before theColonelarr�ved,’”227.Onamer�cananglophob�aseeJohne.moser,Twisting the Lion’s Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars(newyork:newyorkUn�vers�tyPress,1999).

5� Chapter �

lend-lease�n1941),tomon�torenemyact�v�ty,andtopromoteamer�can�ntervent�on�ntheeuropeanwar.37

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The Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of ant�-�ntervent�on�sts between September 1939andDecember1940cons�stedpr�mar�lyofpass�ve�ntell�gencegather�ng,forward�ngofcompla�ntsmadeaga�nst themto the Just�ceDepartment,andtak�ngact�ononadm�n�strat�on�nterest�nant�-�ntervent�on�stact�v-�ty.but�neach�nstancehoover’spr�marymot�vat�on�sclear.hewascare-fultodevelopany�nformat�onorsourcesof�nformat�onthatm�ghty�eldnot corroborat�on or ver�f�ed ev�dence of a cr�me but valuable pol�t�cal�nformat�on.W�thsuch�nformat�onathand,theconservat�veFbid�rectorcouldplacatethedes�resofthel�beralroosevelttoensureh�sbureaucrat�cpos�t�onand�ncreasethe�nfluenceandpoweroftheFbi.Whenthedebateoveramer�can �nvolvement �n theeuropeanwar �ncreaseddramat�callyby1941,at�mewhenant�-�ntervent�on�stsmovedbeyondadvocat�ngneu-tral�ty to d�rectly cr�t�c�z�ng roosevelt’s fore�gn pol�cy, Fbi �nvest�gat�veefforts�ncreaseds�gn�f�cantly.

37. Charles,“‘beforetheColonelarr�ved,’”228.Ontheital�an�nformat�onseepersonalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoWatson,31may1940,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl.memoran-dum,W�nthropCranetoadolfberle,29november1941,StateDepartmentCentralF�les,record Group 59, 800.01b11 reg�strat�on/1140, nat�onal arch�ves and records adm�n-�strat�on (nara); letter and l�st of bSC employees, Crane to Gordon, 12 February 1941,rG59,800.01b11reg�strat�on/1209,nara; letter,r.l.bannermantoClark,6February1941,rG59,841.01b11/191,nara;letter,berletoSumnerWelles,31march1941,rG59,841.20211/23,nara;British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940–45(london:St.erm�n’sPress,1998),xxv�–xxv���.

IntensificationThe Lend-Lease Debate, America First, and Its Allies

December 1940 to Summer 1941

The debate between �ntervent�on�sts and so-called �solat�on�sts changed�nlate1940andextend�ng�nto1941.Dur�ngthe1940elect�oncycle,thedebatecenteredontheneedtoensureneutral�tyandamer�candefense,although each s�de held d�fferent pos�t�ons. both s�des d�ffered, forexample,overconscr�pt�on,yetthecontrovers�almeasurewaspassed�ntolawwhenframedasgoodforamer�candefense.Thedestroyers-for-basesdeal,too,wasacontrovers�alproposal,butwhenpresentedasbenef�c�altoamer�cansecur�tytheamer�canpubl�clargelyaccepted�t.intheautumnof 1940, however, after the conclus�on of the battle of br�ta�n and afterGreatbr�ta�nhadexper�encedmass�vesh�pp�nglossesduetoGermanU-boats,br�t�shPr�mem�n�sterW�nstonChurch�ll�nformedrooseveltthatbr�t�shdollarreserveswereexhausted.nolonger,Church�llwarned,couldh�scountrypaycashtobuyamer�cansuppl�esasst�pulated�ntherev�sedneutral�tyactof1939,popularlyknownascash-and-carry.Compl�cat�ngthebr�t�shpos�t�onwasthe1934Johnsonactthatpreventedamer�cansfromextend�ngloanstocountr�esthathaddefaultedonthe�rF�rstWorldWardebt.1 inordertoensurebr�t�shaccesstoamer�cansuppl�es,wh�leavo�d�ngv�olat�ng the letter of the law as def�ned �n the neutral�ty and Johnsonacts, on 17 December 1940 Pres�dent roosevelt announced a new and�nnovat�ve pol�cy. To ensure cont�nued br�t�sh access to war matér�el,roosevelt proposed to “el�m�nate the dollar s�gn” from further orders.Thepres�dentcalledh�s �dea“lend-lease”and,tos�mpl�fythematterfor

1. SeeGarryJ.Cl�ffordandSamuelr.SpencerJr.,The First Peacetime Draft(lawrence:Un�vers�tyofKansasPress,1986);W�ll�aml.langerandeverettS.Gleason,The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940(newyork:harper,1952);manfredJonas,Isolationism in America, 1935–1941, 2nded.(Ch�cago:impr�ntPubl�cat�ons,1990).

ChApter 3

59

�0 Chapter 3

publ�c consumpt�on, employed the analogy of lend�ng a garden hose toone’sne�ghbortoext�ngu�shh�shousef�re.Justashehaddonew�thcon-scr�pt�onanddestroyers-for-bases,rooseveltarguedthattheproposalwas�nthe�nterestsofamer�candefensebecausethesecur�tyofGreatbr�ta�nd�rectly affected U.S. �nterests, part�cularly as �ts support would ensurethatamer�cawouldavo�danotherdevastat�ngwar.Then,�nJanuary1941,whendel�ver�ngh�sStateoftheUn�onaddress,rooseveltfurthercouchedlend-leaseasapol�cymovethatwas�ntendedtoensurethepreservat�onofthefourhumanfreedoms:freedomofspeechandexpress�on,freedomfromwant,freedomofworsh�p,andfreedomfromfear.2

ant�-�ntervent�on�sts mob�l�zed �n oppos�t�on to the pres�dent’s pro-posal.lend-lease,�npart�cular,becameafocalpo�ntforthosewhosoughtto avo�d amer�can �nvolvement �n war. no longer advocat�ng neutral�ty�neuropeanaffa�rs,astheyhadprev�ously,ant�-�ntervent�on�stschangedtact�cs tod�rectlycr�t�c�zeadm�n�strat�onpol�cy.S�gn�f�cantly, thestakesweretherebyra�sedbecausenowtheypo�ntedlychallengedthepres�dent’sleadersh�pandpol�cy,ra�s�ngthemselvestothelevelofaser�ouspol�t�calthreat.Concernovertheconsequencesofroosevelt’snewpol�cyproposal,moreover, prov�ded momentum for ant�-�ntervent�on�sts to organ�zenat�onallyandgaver�setotheemergenceoftheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeas the most s�gn�f�cant, and best-funded, ant�-�ntervent�on�st pressuregroup. Wh�letheamer�caF�rstComm�tteebecamenat�onallyprom�nentonlyby late1940, �tsor�g�nsdate fromearl�er thatyearwhenyaleUn�vers�tylawstudentr.DouglasStuartJr.formedthegroupasastudentorgan�za-t�on.Troubledby theeventsof early1940,he sought theback�ngofh�scolleagueswho�ncludedGeraldr.Ford(thefuturepres�dent)andPotterStewart(thefutureSupremeCourtjust�ce),amongothers.bytheautumnhe had persuaded a number of m�dwestern bus�nessmen and lead�ngrepubl�canconservat�ves tohelporgan�zeh�sgrouponanat�onal level,�n part, to oppose the �ntervent�on�st Comm�ttee to Defend amer�caby a�d�ng the all�es wh�ch was led by newspaperman W�ll�am allenWh�te.W�ththesegoals�nm�nd,theso-calledamer�caF�rstComm�tteeannounced �ts format�on �nSeptember1940andheadquartered �tself �nCh�cago.3

2. Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1939–1945 (l�ncoln: Un�vers�ty ofnebraskaPress,1983),411–13. 3. WayneS.Cole,America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940–1941 (mad�son:Un�vers�tyofW�scons�nPress,1953),10–13;JustusD.Doenecke,ed.,In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940–1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee(Stanford,Ca:hooverinst�tut�onPress,1990),7,87–88.

�1Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

Thecomm�ttee’spr�maryobject�vewas tounderm�nepubl�c supportfor Pres�dent roosevelt’s �ncreas�ngly �ntervent�on�st fore�gn pol�cy. Topromote th�s object�ve, Stuart enl�sted robert e. Wood—cha�rman ofSears, roebuck and Company—to serve as comm�ttee cha�rman. Overt�me,otherprom�nentpersonal�t�esjo�nedthecomm�tteeaswell,�nclud-�ngthew�feofSenatorburtonWheeler,al�cerooseveltlongworth,andCharlesl�ndbergh.notpac�f�st,thegrouphadfourpr�nc�pala�ms:

1. TheUn�tedStatesmustbu�ldan�mpregnabledefenseforamer�ca.2. nofore�gnpower,norgroupofpowers,cansuccessfullyattackaprepared

amer�ca.3. amer�can democracy can be preserved only by keep�ng out of the

europeanwar.4. “a�dshortofwar”weakensnat�onaldefenseathomeandthreatensto

�nvolveamer�ca�nwarabroad.4

after go�ng nat�onal, the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee expanded rap�dlyby open�ng chapters �n c�t�es and towns nat�onw�de. it also sponsoredant�-�ntervent�on�st speakers both at rall�es and on the rad�o, publ�shedant�-�ntervent�on�st l�terature, and suppl�ed �nformat�on to membersof Congress. as a result of such act�v�t�es the amer�ca F�rst Comm�tteebecamethemost�nfluent�alandbest-organ�zedant�-�ntervent�on�stpol�t�-calpressuregroup�nthecountry.When�td�sbanded�nDecember1941,thecomm�tteehad450localchaptersandroughly800,000members.5 Wh�le the comm�ttee declared �tself to be nonpart�san, �ts member-sh�p was composed mostly of those who were pol�t�cally conservat�ve.irrespect�veofth�smakeup,var�ousrad�calgroupsendorseds�m�larpol�t�-cal platforms and goals. These �ncluded naz�s, Commun�sts—unt�l theGerman�nvas�onoftheSov�etUn�on�nJune1941—andant�-Sem�tes.yetdesp�tetheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee’seffortstod�stance�tselffromthesepart�cularelements,manyamer�cansequatedtheserad�calsw�thamer�caF�rst.Theresult�ngnegat�vepopularpercept�on thenbecameoneof thecomm�ttee’s most s�gn�f�cant h�ndrances, and a bas�s on wh�ch the Fbiwouldfocus.6

4. Cole,America First,13–15;amer�caF�rsta�msasquoted�nWayneS.Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45(l�ncoln:Un�vers�tyofnebraskaPress,1983),381.emphas�s�nor�g�nal. 5. Justus D. Doenecke, The Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941 (malabar, Fl:Kr�egerPress,1997),9. 6. Doenecke,In Danger Undaunted,16–17.Forthecomm�ttee’sefforttod�stance�tselffrom“naz�s,bund�sts,Fasc�sts,S�lverSh�rts,Chr�st�anFront�sts,etcetera,”seeletterrobert

�� Chapter 3

Fbioff�c�alssharedthebel�efthattheaFC’smembersh�pe�therheldfasc�stsympath�esorweredupesofthenaz�sandtheyhelpedtosusta�nsuchv�ewsbysubm�tt�ngnegat�vereportsaboutthemtotheWh�tehouse.Theymostl�kelyheldth�sv�ew—perce�v�ngant�-�ntervent�on�stsas“sub-vers�ves” or “un-amer�can”—�n part because of the assoc�at�ons manyhadmadebetweenant�-�ntervent�on�stsandrad�cal/fasc�stelements.Th�sfollowedapopularoutlookdat�ngfromthe1930s,andextend�ng�ntotheearlyColdWar,that�dent�f�edStal�n�smandnaz�smasessent�ally�dent�-cal total�tar�an reg�mes. hoover and other Fbi off�c�als apparently heldsuchv�ewsand,coupledw�thpopularpercept�onsofant�-�ntervent�on�stsasw�tt�ngorunw�tt�ngnaz�dupes,mayhaveregardedsomefellowcon-servat�ves—fore�gnpol�cycr�t�csofroosevelt—asdomest�cthreats.7 asFbiagentsaccumulated�ncreas�ngamountsof �nformat�onaboutthe aFC’s alleged fasc�st lean�ngs—all of �t unsubstant�ated—Fbi off�-c�alse�therbel�eved theseallegat�onsor found �tpol�t�callyexped�ent toforward�ntell�gencetotheadm�n�strat�onthatsuggested�tscr�t�cswere,�ndeed, “subvers�ve.” in short, Fbi D�rector hoover played to Pres�dentroosevelt’spol�t�cal�nterests.butatthestartofthe�rprobe,atleast,�ntoamer�caF�rst,Fbiagentsfoundveryl�ttleev�dencetosuggestthegrouphad subvers�ve connect�ons. Throughout the ent�re course of the Fbi’s�nvest�gat�on,moreover,agentsgathered �nformat�onaccuratelyshow�ngthattheaFCsoughttoexcludeextremeelementsfrom�tsranks,butth�s�nformat�on was subord�nated to negat�ve �nformat�on, much of wh�chwassharedw�ththeadm�n�strat�on.asthefore�gnpol�cydebate�ntens�-f�ed,andas�ntervent�on�stgroupsandadvocates�ncreasedthe�r�nvect�vetoward ant�-�ntervent�on�sts, the Fbi’s accumulat�on of unsubstant�atedmater�al suggest�ng aFC fasc�st l�nks mult�pl�ed. Th�s chang�ng v�ew �sev�dent �n Fbi records. a 1942 summary report on the aFC concedesthatthegroup’sor�g�nswere“totallyrespectable”but,throught�me,�thadevolved�ntoahavenforfasc�sts.8

e.Woodtoedgarb.Stern,17June1941,roberte.WoodPapers,herberthooverPres�den-t�all�brary[hhl],Westbranch,ia.anexampleoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee’sconser-vat�vecharactercanbefound�n:letter,henryregnerytoroyCullen,19march1953,roberte.WoodPapers,hhl. 7. SeeThomasr.maddux,“redFasc�sm,brownbolshev�sm:Theamer�canimageofTotal�tar�an�sm�nthe1930s,”Historian40(november1977):85–103;lesK.adlerandThomasG.Paterson,“redFasc�sm:Themergerofnaz�GermanyandSov�etruss�a�ntheamer�can image of Total�tar�an�sm, 1930s–1950s,” American Historical Review 75 (apr�l1970):1046–64. 8. report,SaCWash�ngton,DC,toFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–384.

�3Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

Fbiagentsf�rsttooknot�ceoftheaFC’spol�t�calact�v�t�esandsusp�-c�ous connect�ons on 9 november 1940. On that date the b�rm�ngham,alabama, spec�al agent �n charge (SaC) reported to hoover that an�nformerhadalertedh�mtoarad�oprogram,sponsoredbyamer�caF�rst,a�red tod�scuss thewars�tuat�on.The �nformantbel�eved theprogram’scontent “�nd�cated to h�m that �t was a naz� �nsp�red program [that] hethought m�ght be part of German propaganda.” The b�rm�ngham SaCforwardedth�s�nformat�on“�ntheeventthebureaudes�restheCh�cagooff�cetomakean�nqu�ry.”nofurther�nvest�gat�onwasordered,butthereport�llustratesthatbecauseofpopularpercept�ons,evenearlyon,agentsfocusednotonclearandpresentthreatsbutonunsubstant�atedchargesof�ll�c�tconnect�ons.9 byDecember1940,Fbioff�c�alsbegantorece�veonarelat�velyl�m�tedbas�sfurther�ntell�genceonamer�caF�rst.Th�s�nformat�on,wh�chpre-dated the forthcom�ng voc�ferous lend-lease debate, accurately reflectedtheaFC’spol�t�calpos�t�on.On16December,forexample,Fbiass�stantD�rector lou�s n�chols—the head of the Fbi’s Cr�me records D�v�s�onand�nth�scapac�tyhoover’sformall�a�sontothemed�aandCongress—authored a rev�ew of news reports that �nd�cated that the amer�ca F�rstComm�tteewas“�nfavorofma�nta�n�ngastr�ctcashandcarrypol�cy,astr�ctpol�cyofneutral�ty,bu�ld�ngadequatedefensesandthattheywould not tolerate any Communists or Fascists�nthegroup.”10

Unsurpr�s�ngly,Fbiagentsatth�spo�nthadnotdevelopeds�gn�f�cantquant�t�es of �nformat�on on the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee. The reasonforthepauc�tyofthe�nformat�onl�es�nthefactthatthegrouphadonlyjust been formed and �t devoted �ts resources to organ�z�ng �tself wh�leoppos�ng the �ntervent�on�st Comm�ttee to Defend amer�ca by a�d�ngthe all�es. but when Pres�dent roosevelt announced �n December 1940h�s�ntent�ontocreateanewmethodtoextendass�stancetoGreatbr�ta�n,wh�chbecameh�slend-leasepol�cy,thebureau’s�nterest�nthecomm�tteemarkedlydeepened,ow�ngtothecomm�ttee’sv�gorousoppos�t�ontothepres�dent’s �n�t�at�ve.The f�rst summarymemorandumonamer�caF�rstwascreatedon29 January1941 forass�stant to theD�rectoredwarda.Tamm. Th�s summary outl�ned the comm�ttee’s membersh�p and notedpart�cularly�tspol�t�caloppos�t�ontoadm�n�strat�onpol�c�esrang�ngfromconscr�pt�on,a�dtobr�ta�n,and—most�mportantly—thelend-leaseb�ll.11

9. letter,e.P.Gu�nanetoJ.edgarhoover,9november1940,Fbi100–4712–1. 10. memorandum,lou�sn�cholstoClydeTolson,16December1940,Fbi100–4712–3.emphas�sadded. 11. memorandumreamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,J.b.O’learytoedwarda.Tamm,29

�4 Chapter 3

Fortheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeandotherant�-�ntervent�on�sts,thelend-leaseb�llbecameafocalpo�ntonwh�ch�twoulddevote�tsresources.Comm�tteecha�rmanroberte.Woodpubl�clyvowedthath�sorgan�za-t�on would oppose the pres�dent�al �n�t�at�ve “w�th all the v�gor �t canexert,” and he mob�l�zed comm�ttee resources nat�onw�de.12 reflect�ngtheacr�monysurround�ngthedebate,SenatorWheeler—allytotheaFCandthemostaggress�veant�-�ntervent�on�stsenator�n1941—referredtolend-leaseas“thenewDeal’str�pleafore�gnpol�cy—�tw�llplowundereveryfourthamer�canboy.”(Thepres�dentrespondedtoWheelersay�ngthat h�s remark was the “rottenest,” most “dastardly,” and “unpatr�ot�c”th�nghehadeverheard.)aftertheb�llwas�ntroduced�nCongress,Wood,former Undersecretary of State W�ll�am Castle, and lead�ng republ�canhanfordmacn�der—allprom�nentamer�caF�rstmembers—were�nv�tedbyCongressmanham�ltonF�shtotest�fybeforeCongress�noppos�t�ontothemeasure.Thecomm�ttee’s tact�cwastomob�l�zepubl�csent�menttopersuadecongressmentovote�tdown.accord�ngly,thecomm�tteespon-sored hundreds of meet�ngs, d�str�buted newsletters and pet�t�ons, andpa�dforpos�t�onpapers�nmajornewspapers,wh�chwerethenrepr�nted�n the Congressional Record, urg�ng oppos�t�on. by the end of February1941,atthehe�ghtofthelend-leasedebate,theamer�caF�rstComm�tteehadorgan�zedsome648“embryon�cchapters”acrossthenat�on.13

v�gorous ant�-�ntervent�on�st oppos�t�on notw�thstand�ng, the housevoted�nfavorofthelend-leaseb�llon8Februarybythecomfortablemar-g�nof260to165.Thedebatethensh�ftedtotheSenatewheretheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeredoubled�tsoppos�t�onefforts.TheSenatedebatelastedthroughmarchandwasoneof themostheated �namer�canh�story. inthe �nter�m,FbiD�rectorhoover,desp�te the fact that theWh�tehousewas rece�v�ng pol�t�cal updates from �ts congress�onal floor managers,prov�ded the adm�n�strat�on w�th advance pol�t�cal �ntell�gence on boththeSenatedebateand the �nfluenceamer�caF�rsthaddur�ng �t.On21February,hoover�nformedPres�dent�alSecretaryedw�nWatsonthathehad learned through a “str�ctly conf�dent�al source” that “the debate �n

January 1941, Fbi 100–4712–6. The bureau followed th�s memorandum up w�th a moredeta�led,yetst�lll�m�ted,descr�pt�onofamer�caF�rstand�tsleaders.Seememorandumreamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,7February1941,Fbi100–4712–10. 12. robertWoodquoted�nDoenecke,In Danger Undaunted,22. 13. Doenecke,In Danger Undaunted,23;amer�caF�rstComm�tteeWash�ngtonnewsletter #1, 31 January 1941, repr�nted �n Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted, 226–27. OnWheeler’sstatusasanant�-�ntervent�on�stseeWayneS.Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45(l�ncoln:Un�vers�tyofnebraskaPress,1983),458.

�5Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

the Senate on the lend-lease b�ll w�ll last for about two weeks longer.”elevensenators,hooveralsoreported,plannedtof�l�busterthemeasure�nanattempt tounderm�ne �tspassage.h�seffort tokeep thepres�dent�nformedonpol�t�calmatters�nvolv�ngprom�nentpol�cycr�t�csreflectedhoover’s larger �nterest �n promot�ng the �nterests of theadm�n�strat�onforthebettermentofh�sown,andtheFbi’s,pos�t�on.14

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When Charles l�ndbergh jo�ned w�th amer�ca F�rst �n oppos�t�on tolend-lease,Fbiagentsredoubledthe�refforts�nmon�tor�ngh�sact�v�t�es.herece�vedspec�alFbiattent�onatth�spo�ntbecausehehadassumedaprom�nentrole�nthedebate.l�ndberghwas�nv�tedtotest�fybeforethehouse Comm�ttee on Fore�gn affa�rs and the Senate Fore�gn relat�onsComm�ttee who were cons�der�ng the pres�dent’s b�ll. (The lend-leaseb�ll had been subm�tted to both houses of Congress s�multaneously.)l�ndbergh’s appearances at these hear�ngs were a popular draw. lend-lease, he argued, would weaken amer�can defenses by send�ng neededsuppl�estobr�ta�nwh�chwouldonlyleadtowarandcreate“cond�t�ons�nourowncountryasbadorworsethanthosewenowdes�retooverthrow�nnaz�Germany.”h�stest�monyandresultantlobby�ngeffortswerecloselyreportedbythepress,lead�ngevensomeant�-�ntervent�on�ststoregardh�sv�ewsastoocontrovers�al.15

Dur�ng thedebate,moreover,Charlesl�ndbergh sh�ftedh�spol�t�caltact�cstod�rectlycr�t�c�ze�nsworntest�monytheadm�n�strat�on’spol�cy.Then,�napr�l,theav�atorjo�nedtheamer�caF�rstComm�tteetoopposeroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy.reflect�ngthe�ntens�tyofsent�mentaboutthenat�on’sfore�gnpol�cycourse,Pres�dentrooseveltmadeacursoryremarkatapressconferenceequat�ngl�ndberghw�ththeC�v�lWarcopperheadClement valland�gham—a northerner w�th pro-southern sympath�eswho was cr�t�cal of Pres�dent abraham l�ncoln. an �nsulted l�ndberghthensenttorooseveltapubl�cletterannounc�ngh�sres�gnat�onfromthearmya�rCorpsreserve.inthem�dstofthesetens�ons,Fbimon�tor�ngofl�ndberghonly�ntens�f�ed.nowthatl�ndbergh,alreadythemostpopularant�-�ntervent�on�st, had jo�ned the most �nfluent�al and powerful ant�-

14. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,J.edgarhoovertoedw�nm.Watson,21February1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,Frankl�nD.rooseveltl�brary(FDrl),hydePark,ny. 15. asquoted�nCole,Charles A. Lindbergh,92–93.Thebestaccountofthelend-leaseact�sWarrenF.K�mball,The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939–1941(balt�more:Johnshopk�nsPress,1969).

�� Chapter 3

�ntervent�on�stpressuregroup—theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee—prov�d�ngrooseveltw�thpol�t�cal �ntell�genceorwork�ng tounderm�ne th�s cr�t�cbecame�ncreas�nglymore�mportanttoFbioff�c�als.16

Wh�lerooseveltm�ghthavecomparedl�ndberghtotheC�v�lWar–eracopperheads,othersl�kenedtheav�atortoabrahaml�ncoln.Fbioff�c�alstookan�nterest�nth�scompar�son�nrelat�ontothepres�dent’slend-leaseb�llandwhocomparedl�ndberghtol�ncoln:r�ght-w�ngextrem�sts l�keGeraldW�nrod.Fbiagentsabstractedastoryfromther�ght-w�ngKansasnewspaper Publicity that l�kened “Colonel Charles a. l�ndbergh, by h�scourageous standaga�nst1776 [the lend-leaseb�ll]mayprove tobe th�snat�on’smanonawh�tehorse.Justthe�nd�v�dualtor�deroughshod�ntothenat�on’scap�tol�n1944[anelect�onyear].”Seem�nglyconf�rm�ngthe�rv�ew of l�ndbergh as sympathet�c to these elements, Fbi off�c�als noted“thattodate,Col.l�ndberghhasnotobjectedtosuchuseofh�sname.”17

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Fbioff�c�alstookadvantageofeveryopportun�tytocollectpol�t�cal�ntel-l�genceontheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.inFebruary1941—althoughth�swas not reported to Fbi headquarters unt�l June—the head of the Fbi’sKansasC�ty,m�ssour�,f�eldoff�ceobta�nedperm�ss�onfromtheed�toroftheKansas City Startosearchthatnewspaper’sf�lesfor�nformat�onrelat-�ng to amer�ca F�rst. Th�s rev�ew uncovered the follow�ng controvers�alpol�t�cal comments made by lead�ng ant�-�ntervent�on�sts. Comm�tteeCha�rmanrobertWoodreportedlysa�d:“Democracy�snotgo�ngtoworkunless men stand up for the�r conv�ct�ons.” ant�-�ntervent�on�st John T.Flynn, a journal�st who wrote about f�nanc�al affa�rs and who “b�tterlyopposedtheadm�n�strat�ve[sic]pol�cy,”reportedlysa�d theadm�n�stra-t�onwasproact�velypush�ngthecountrytowardwar.F�nally,amemberofthelocalamer�caF�rstchapterreportedlysa�d:“naz�smandDemocracycould l�ve s�de by s�de” and sa�d noth�ng else “except �n cr�t�c�sm ofPres�dentroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy.”18

The bureau’s best opportun�ty to gather �ntell�gence on the amer�caF�rstComm�tteecame,however,dur�ngthef�rsthalfof1941fromnoneother than thecomm�ttee �tself. in Januaryand thenaga�n �nmarch, �n

16. ib�d. 17. bl�ndmemorandumreCol.Charlesl�ndbergh,2may1941,Fbi65–11449–64. 18. report,amer�caF�rstComm�ttee,bySaCKansasC�ty,m�ssour�,18June1941,Fbi100–4712–75.OnFlynnseeronaldradosh,Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism(newyork:S�monandSchuster,1975),197–273.

��Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

anefforttoassuagethepopularnot�onthat�twasasubvers�veorgan�za-t�on,theCh�cagochapter�nv�tedFbiagentstoexam�ne�tsf�les.Chesterbowles,anant�-�ntervent�on�stnewyorkadvert�s�ngexecut�ve,suggestedthateverylocalchapterrequestFbichecksofthe�rf�lesto“keep�tssk�rtscompletelycleansofarasant�-Sem�t�smandFasc�sm,e�therdomest�corfore�gn,areconcerned.”Wh�leperfectlyw�ll�ngtohaveFbiagentscollect�ntell�gence on the comm�ttee �n conf�dence, as �n the opportun�ty w�ththeKansas City Star,hooverhes�tatedtohaveFbiagentspubl�clyexam�nethe f�les of a pol�t�cal group that opposed the roosevelt adm�n�strat�on.accord�ngtoh�stor�anJustusDoenecke,however,theFbieventuallyd�dexam�netheCh�cagochapter’sf�les(�nJune)butrefusedtoperuseotherchapters’ records. Word then spread of the Ch�cago chapter’s requestwh�ch resulted �n at least one government agency—the Off�ce of Pr�cemanagement—ask�nghooverforacopyoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee’smembersh�pl�stso�tcouldcheckthenamesaga�nstthoseofnewappl�-cants.hoover,accord�ngtoFbidocuments,toldtheOPmoff�c�althath�sbureauhadnosuchl�sts.19

meanwh�le,on26and27February,hooverforwardedtotheadm�n-�strat�on d�fferent pol�t�cal �ntell�gence regard�ng John Wheeler, the sonof the prom�nent ant�-�ntervent�on�st senator and cha�rman of the losangeles branch of amer�ca F�rst. The Fbi d�rector reported that JohnWheeler’s w�fe—also a lead�ng member of amer�ca F�rst—sa�d �n refer-encetolend-lease:“theonlywaywecanbesafe�stoseethep�nsknocked

19. letter, Chester bowles to r. Douglas Stuart Jr., 28 november 1941 �n Doenecke,In Danger Undaunted, 107–8; Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941 (newyork:rowman&l�ttlef�eld,2000),276;Cole,America First, 117–18; letter, a. h. Johnson to hoover, 4 June 1942, Fbi 100–4712–411;memorandum,D.m.laddtohoover,27September1941,Fbi100–4712–179;memoran-dum,D.m.laddtoe.a.Tamm,17October1941,Fbi100–4712–202;memorandum,ClydeTolsontohoover,24September1941,Fbi100–4712–165;memorandum,lou�sn�cholstoTolson,1October1941,Fbi100–4712–175.itshouldbenotedthathoovermadeapract�ceofoff�c�allydeny�ngaccesstoFbif�lesandcreat�ngarecordsay�ngasmuch,wh�leatthesame t�me prov�d�ng these f�les to trusted rec�p�ents. by late 1942, w�th amer�ca alreadym�l�tar�ly�nvolved�ntheSecondWorldWar,Fbioff�c�alsweremorethanw�ll�ngtoshare�nformat�onw�thgovernmentagenc�es.inSeptemberaTreasuryDepartmentoff�c�al,Sam-uelKlaus,sol�c�tedanyFbirecordsconcern�ngtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.(Thereasonforh�s�nterest�sunknown,asthebureauhasredactedport�onsofthedocument.)inth�s�nstance,undertheordersofFbiass�stantD�rectorD.m�ltonladd,headofthebureau’sDomest�cintell�genceD�v�s�on,anFbireportwasg�ventoKlausthat“hadall�dent�fy�ngmarksl�nk�ng�tw�ththebureauobl�teratedtherefrom.”FromtheFbidocumentnumberc�ted�ntheFbimemorandum,however,weknowthatthe�nformat�onhadsometh�ngtodow�thamer�caF�rstComm�tteerecordswh�chFbioff�c�alshadsomehowsecured.memo-randum,J.K.mumfordtoD.m�ltonladd,16October1942,Fbi100–4712–472.

�� Chapter 3

out fromunderbr�ta�n.”SuchastatementsuggestedtoFbioff�c�als thatWheeler’sw�fehad“become�mbuedw�thpro-Germansent�mentsbecauseof her assoc�at�on w�th var�ous �nd�v�duals . . . [all of] whom are under�nvest�gat�on by th�s bureau.” beyond the statements and alleged sym-path�es of mrs. Wheeler, Fbi agents also noted that John Wheeler hadaccepteda$2,000checkforthelosangelesamer�caF�rstgroupfroman�nd�v�dualunderFbiscrut�ny.20

Thefollow�ngmonth,ut�l�z�ngabl�ndmemorandum,hooverreportedfurther pol�t�cal �ntell�gence to the Wh�te house concern�ng the losangeles branch of amer�ca F�rst. aga�n, he noted the act�v�t�es of theWheelers,butalsothoseoftherev�s�on�sth�stor�anharryelmerbarneswho had act�vely campa�gned �n the reg�on aga�nst lend-lease. Takentogether,thecontentofthetworeportsconf�rmthathoover’s�nterestwasto forward not �nformat�on concern�ng cr�m�nal act�v�t�es but pol�t�cal�ntell�gence toe�ther susta�norcreate the �mpress�on thatamer�caF�rstmembershadl�nkstoquest�onable—�neffectsubvers�ve—�nd�v�duals.atthesamet�methatFbiagentswerecollect�ngth�stypeofderogatorydata,other agents were collect�ng exculpatory �nformat�on that �nd�cated theamer�caF�rstComm�tteehadnosubvers�vel�nksorthat�tact�velysoughttod�stance�tselffromsuchelements—suchaslou�sn�chols’sDecember1940 memorandum to Tolson report�ng as much. nevertheless, hooverchose not to forward n�chols’s memorandum or any other exculpatorydatatotheWh�tehouse,whereashed�dtheother.21

Sat�sf�ed w�th hoover’s prov�d�ng of unsol�c�ted pol�t�cal �ntell�gencereports,bythestartofthelend-leasedebatePres�dentroosevelteventu-ally requested an Fbi �nvest�gat�on of the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee. inFebruary 1941, the pres�dent learned of an amer�ca F�rst c�rcular cap-t�oned:“areyouw�ll�ng tog�veupdemocracy?”Th�sdocumentcharac-ter�zedlend-leaseas“award�ctatorsh�pb�ll”thatwouldult�matelybestowupon the pres�dent “absolute power.” D�sturbed by th�s c�rcular, on 21February,rooseveltaskedStephenearlyto“f�ndoutfromsomeone—per-hapsFbi—who�spay�ngforth�s?”22

20. Personalandconf�dent�alletterandbl�ndmemorandum,J.edgarhoovertoedw�nWatson,26February1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;personalandconf�dent�al letterandmemorandum,hoovertoadolfa.berle,27February1941,Fbi100–4712–7X;personalandconf�dent�al letterandmemorandum,hoover tomatthewF.mcGu�re,27February1941,Fbi100–4712–7X;personalandconf�dent�almemorandum,J.edgarhoover toattorneyGeneral,27February1941,Fbi100–4712–14X. 21. bl�ndmemorandumreamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,3march1941,Fbi100–4712–17X. 22. amer�caF�rstComm�tteec�rcular,Fbi100–4712–18;memorandum,rooseveltto

�9Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

earlypassedroosevelt’srequestontohoover,whoorderedan�mme-d�ate reply.Thed�rectorordereda summarymemorandumonamer�caF�rst tobeprepared for theWh�tehouse,but �f thepres�dent’s “spec�f�cquest�on[was]notanswered,”totellh�m“�t�sbe�ngcheckedandhew�llbefurtheradv�sed.”by1march,hooverhadprov�dedtheWh�tehousew�thamemorandumthatsummar�zedtheaFC’sleadersh�pandnotedthatthegroup’sf�nanc�alsourcesstemmedsolelyfrom“volunteercontr�but�onsbythose�nterested�ntheorgan�zat�on.”23

roosevelt’srequestaskedhoovertouncoverwhowas“pay�ngforth�s[c�rcular].”hoover’sresponse,however,exceededthel�m�tsofroosevelt’sor�g�nal �nterest; and �nstead hoover launched a full-scale �nvest�gat�on�nto the fund�ng of not the comm�ttee’s ant�-lend-lease campa�gn but ofthe ent�re amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee. at th�s po�nt, because Fbi agentshaddevelopedonlyal�m�tedamountof�nformat�on�nth�sarea,hooverwasunw�ll�ngto�n�t�ateafurtherprobew�thoutsomek�ndoftac�tWh�tehouseapproval.assuch,theFbid�rectorwroteearlysuggest�ngacoursehewouldtake�nordertosat�sfythepres�dent:“if�t�sthepres�dent’sw�shthat a more exhaust�ve �nvest�gat�on be made relat�ve to the means bywh�chtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee�sbe�ngf�nanced,I hope you will not hesitate to call upon me to conduct such an �nvest�gat�on.” early passedon hoover’s response to the pres�dent, employ�ng hoover’s �nterpreta-t�on of roosevelt’s request—“source of funds and organ�zat�onal data ofthe amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee”—to descr�be the �nformat�on. rooseveltd�dnot�mmed�atelyrespondtohoover’ssuggest�on,butoversubsequentmonthshoovercont�nuedtovolunteer�nformat�onallud�ngtotheques-t�onablesourcesofamer�caF�rst’sfund�ng.24

Thelend-leasedebate,wh�chhadbreathedl�fe�ntotheant�-�nterven-t�on�st movement and �n part�cular the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee, wassettledwhen�nmarchtheSenateapprovedthemeasureandthepres�dents�gned �t �nto law. The end of the s�ngle most-debated �ssue dur�ng theGreat Debate d�d not, however, lead Fbi off�c�als to halt the�r surve�l-lance of adm�n�strat�on cr�t�cs. On the contrary, on 19 march, hoovervolunteeredto thepres�dentandtheattorneygeneralwhathedescr�bedas “the contemplated plans of the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee.” accord�ng

early,21February1941,Fbi100–4712–18. 23. handwr�ttennoteonrout�ngsl�p,hoovertoK.r.mcint�re,26February1941,Fbi100–4712–18; bl�nd summary memorandum re amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee, no date, Fbi100–4712–18;memorandum,earlytoroosevelt,4march1941,Off�c�alF�le4330,FDrl. 24. memorandum, early to roosevelt, 4 march 1941, Off�c�al F�le 4330, FDr; letter,hoovertoearly,1march1941,Fbi100–4712–18.emphas�sadded.

�0 Chapter 3

to hoover the comm�ttee planned “to have Senators, Congressmen, andvar�ous peace and patr�ot�c organ�zat�ons travel throughout the Un�tedStatestoreachallareasforthepurposeofoppos�nganyplansthePres�dentm�ghthave �nbr�ng�ng th�scountry �ntowar.”hoover further �nformedtheadm�n�strat�onthat“threeSenatorsandseveralCongressmen”wouldass�stamer�caF�rst �nthenorthernUn�tedStateswh�le“as�m�lartra�n-load”wouldcoverthesouth.ath�rdgroupwouldtravelcross-countrytohelpspreadthecomm�ttee’sant�-rooseveltmessage.insummar�z�ngtheplanforthepres�dent,hoovernotedthat�twastobeledbyamer�caF�rstComm�tteecha�rmanWoodandSenatorWheeler.25

The Fbi d�rector’s �nformat�on was accurate and, more s�gn�f�cantly,conf�rms h�s �nterest �n the comm�ttee’s pol�t�cal act�v�t�es �n relat�on tothepres�dent’sfore�gnpol�cy.Shortlyafterpassageofthelend-leaseact,desp�te amer�ca F�rst hav�ng suddenly found �tself �n “f�nanc�al stra�ts”asaresultof�tspubl�coppos�t�ontotheb�ll,SenatorWheelerandothers�ndeedtouredthecountrytoopposeroosevelt,asreportedbytheChicago Tribune�napr�l1941.Th�stourra�sedbothfundstocont�nuethe�rant�-�ntervent�on�stf�ghtandtospreadfurtherthecomm�ttee’smessage.26

Therooseveltadm�n�strat�onshowed�nterest—�fsomewhatbelatedly—�nhoover’sprov�d�ngof �nformat�ononamer�caF�rst’spost–lend-leasepol�t�calefforts.inSeptember,follow�ngthes�nk�ngoftheUSSGreerandroosevelt’ssubsequentshoot-on-s�ghtorderandextens�onoftheneutral-�tyzonetoiceland,attorneyGeneralFranc�sb�ddle—oneoftherec�p�entsof hoover’s report on amer�ca F�rst’s “contemplated plans”—requestedthat Fbi agents mon�tor an amer�ca F�rst rally �n los angeles at wh�chSenator Wheeler was to speak. b�ddle was �nterested �n the s�ze of thecrowdandhow �t reacted toWheeler’s speech.hooverreportedback tob�ddle—and roosevelt—that the crowd numbered between e�ght andeleventhousandandappeared“verysympathet�candfr�endlytowardtheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeandSenatorWheeler.”27

25. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoedw�nm.Watson,19march1941,Off�-c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;personalandconf�dent�almemorandum,hoovertob�ddle,19march1941,Fbi100–4712–20;bl�ndmemorandum,19march1941,Fbi100–4712–20. 26. letter, robert e. Wood to herbert hoover, 8 July 1941, robert e. Wood Papers,hhl;Chicago Daily Tribune(21apr�l1941).Foran�t�neraryofsomeofthetoursseeletter,roberte.Woodtor.DouglasStuart,16apr�l1941,androbertl.bl�sstoallChapters,14apr�l1941,amer�caF�rstComm�tteePapers,box57,hooverinst�tut�onarch�ves[hia],StanfordUn�vers�ty. 27. memorandum, ladd to hoover, 27 September 1941, Fbi 100–4712–170; report,SaClosangeles tohoover,3October1941,Fbi100–4712–158;memorandum,hoovertob�ddle,8October1941,Fbi100–4712–158;personalandconf�dent�alletter,hooverto

�1Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

by late august, hoover rece�ved another request for �nformat�on onamer�caF�rst,butnotfromtheWh�tehouse.Th�st�me,SenatorClaudePepper,aDemocratfromFlor�daandavoc�ferouscr�t�coftheant�-�nter-vent�on�sts, requested �nformat�on about the amer�ca F�rst Comm�tteefrom the attorney general. b�ddle forwarded the request to hoover.normallyunw�ll�ngtoprov�depol�t�cal�ntell�gencetocongressmenunlesstheycouldbetrustednottorevealtheFbiasthe�rsource,hooverhonoredth�srequest.(hehonored�tbecausetherequestcamev�ah�ssuper�or�ntheJust�ceDepartmentandnotd�rectlyfromPepper.)hooverforwardedan eleven-page bl�nd memorandum—a document w�th no letterhead or�nd�cat�on of the sender or rec�p�ent—on the amer�ca F�rst Comm�tteeto b�ddle, who subsequently prov�ded �t to Pepper. The document, des-�gnated secret, exam�ned the group’s or�g�ns and conta�ned b�ograph�calsketchesof�tsleadersandprom�nentmembers,andothersundrypol�t�cal�ntell�genceonroosevelt’sopponents.28

Thefollow�ngmonth,SecretaryofthenavyFrankKnox—afrequentcr�t�coftheant�-�ntervent�on�sts—contactedFbiass�stantD�rectorTammto obta�n �nformat�on about amer�ca F�rst. Knox’s concern stemmedfrom h�s bel�ef that the comm�ttee was try�ng “to frustrate the nat�onalDefense effort through man�pulat�on of trade un�ons �n br�ng�ng aboutlabor d�sputes.”29 Conv�nced that subvers�ve elements had contr�butedto labor troubles, Knox �dent�f�ed some of these �n the amer�ca F�rstComm�ttee.indeed,heconf�dedtoh�sd�aryon28may1941:“Oneofthef�rstth�ngsthePres�dentmustdo...�stotakepos�t�veact�onaga�nstthevar�ousformsofsubvers�veact�v�tywh�chare�nterfer�ngw�thand�nter-rupt�nganddelay�ngourdefensepreparat�ons.Unlessh�sf�newordsarefollowedby f�rmact�onthe lastcond�t�onw�llbeworse thanthe f�rst.”30On3September,Tammrespondedbyforward�ngtothenavysecretary“abl�nd memorandum conta�n�ng �nformat�on �n our f�les w�th respect to

Watson,13October1941,Fbi100–4712–158. 28. Conf�dent�almemorandum,b�ddletohoover,28august1941,Fbi100–4712–127;conf�dent�almemorandum,hoovertob�ddle,3September1941,Fbi100–4712–127;con-f�dent�alandsecretbl�ndsummarymemorandumreamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,29august1941,Fbi100–4712–127. 29. memorandum,ass�stantD�rectoredwarda.Tammtohoover,3September1941,Fbi100-4712-132. 30. entryfor28may1941,FrankKnoxD�ary,PapersofFrankKnox,box1,l�braryofCongress,Wash�ngton,DC.SeealsoFranc�smacDonnell,Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (newyork:OxfordUn�vers�tyPress,1995),80–81;JoanJensen,Army Surveillance in America (newhaven,CT:yaleUn�vers�tyPress,1991),217.

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Theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.”Th�sbl�ndmemorandumwass�m�lar �ncontenttothatforwardedtoSenatorPepper.31

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asthelend-leasedebateevolvedandraged�nWash�ngton,D.C.,theFbi’srelat�onsh�p w�th br�t�sh �ntell�gence grew closer. Dur�ng the w�nter of1940–41,twoFbirepresentat�ves—sen�orFbioff�c�alhughCleggandFbiagentlawrenceh�nce—traveledtolondontosurveythevar�ousbr�t�sh�ntell�genceapparatuses.TheFbimenweregrantedaccesstoh�gh-rank�ngbr�t�sh�ntell�genceoff�c�als�nboththebr�t�shdomest�cSecur�tyServ�ce,Secretintell�genceServ�ce(thebr�t�shfore�gn �ntell�genceorgan�zat�on),and theGovernmentCodeandCypherSchool (thebr�t�shcommun�ca-t�ons�ntell�genceorgan�zat�on).Theywerealsoabletoreportonthev�s�tofharryhopk�nswhomroosevelthadd�spatchedtolondontofosteracloser br�t�sh and amer�can relat�onsh�p before the enactment of lend-lease;hooverreportedtothepres�dentthathopk�nshadsucceededwell�nh�sm�ss�on.32

in march 1941, after the Fbi representat�ves’ return to the Un�tedStates,hooversentroosevelttwomemorandadeta�l�ngtheorgan�zat�onandmethodsofboththebr�t�shSecur�tyServ�ceandSecretintell�genceServ�ce,aswellastheprobablepostwarplansofthebr�t�sh.h�spurposewasundoubtedly toshowtheFbi’svalue �n the �ntell�gence f�eldaspartofalongefforttocult�vateforh�mselfafuturerole�nfore�gn�ntell�gence.Two month later, moreover, hoover sent roosevelt another report thatstemmedfromtheFbim�ss�ontolondon.Th�st�me,theFbid�rectorout-l�nedforthepres�dentthemeansofbr�t�shcensorsh�p.WhatFbioff�c�alslearnedfromthebr�t�shherebecamepart�cularly�mportantafterthePearlharborattack,whenhooveroutl�nedforthepres�dentthestepshetook�ntermsofwart�mecensorsh�p.Whathooverd�dwasbased,�npart,onwhath�sagentshadlearnedfromthebr�t�shandreveal—tous—thattheFbiobta�neds�gn�f�cant�nformat�onfrombr�t�shandCanad�ansources.moreover,asw�llbeseen,br�t�sh�ntell�genceworkedtod�scred�tthesame

31. memorandum,KramertoTamm,3September1941,Fbi100–4712–154;personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoKnox,3September1941,Fbi100–4712–154;conf�dent�alandsecretbl�ndsummarymemorandumreamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,29august1941,Fbi100–4712–154;letter,Knoxtohoover,8September1941,Fbi100–4712–135. 32. Douglasm.Charles,“‘beforetheColonelarr�ved’:hoover,Donovan,rooseveltandtheOr�g�nsofamer�canCentralintell�gence,1940–41,”Intelligence and National Security20(June2005):229–31.

�3Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

ant�-�ntervent�on�st�nd�v�dualsandorgan�zat�onsthatFbiagentstargeted.Whethertherewasanycollaborat�onbetweentheFbiandthebSC�nth�sregardrema�nsunknownbecausenorecordshavebeenreleased�ne�thertheUn�tedStatesortheUn�tedK�ngdom,butg�venthe�nt�matecontactsbetween the two groups (even �f tense) tantal�z�ng quest�ons are ra�sedaboutthenatureoftheGreatDebatethattodatecannotberesolved.33

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Three months after the conclus�on of the lend-lease debate, when argu-mentssh�ftedtotheuseofconvoysand“neutral�typatrols,”Fbiagents—st�llverymuch�nterested�ntheact�v�t�esofroosevelt’sprom�nentcr�t�cs—mon�toredanamer�caF�rstrally�nPh�ladelph�awherel�ndberghwasthepr�nc�palspeaker.Fbiagentswered�spatchedtotherallyand,accord�ngtothe�rownreport,“c�rculated�nthecrowdw�thoutreveal�ngthe�r�dent�-t�estoanyone.”Theagentsnotedwhospokeatthemeet�nganddescr�bedthedemeanorof thecrowdas“orderly, thoughenthus�ast�c.”Theagents’report�ncludedanewspapercl�pp�ngontherally,andconcluded“thattheamer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee was ga�n�ng �n strength and that undoubtedlythereweremorepeoplepresentfortheamer�caF�rstmeet�ngthantherewereforthe[F�orello]laGuard�aprotestmeet�ngthen�ghtbefore.”34

Fbioff�c�alswereso�nterested�nl�ndbergh’spol�t�calact�v�tyfollow-�nglend-leasethattheytookadvantageofnearlyanyopportun�tytogauge“h�ssent�ments�nconnect�onw�ththe�nternat�onalpol�cyoftheUn�tedStatesGovernment.”inOctober1941,atthestartofthedebateoverrev�-s�on of the neutral�ty act to arm merchant sh�ps, the head of the Fbi’sDetro�t f�eld off�ce, John bugas, obta�ned from an �nformer �n the FordmotorCompanyapr�vateletterl�ndberghhadwr�ttentohenryFordthatsuggestedh�s“sent�ments.”Thepartoftheletterthatmost�nterestedFbioff�c�alsread:

i amcont�nu�ng to takeanact�vepart �noppos�ng thepropagandaandag�tat�onforwar.Thecountry�sst�llopposedtoourentry,butiamnot

33. Charles, “‘before the Colonel arr�ved,’” 231–32; personal and conf�dent�al letterandmemorandum,3may1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;personalandconf�dent�alletter,9December1941,andmemorandumre:censorsh�p,8December1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl. 34. letterandenclosures,J.F.SearstoJ.edgarhoover,10June1941,Fbi65–11449–66.laGuard�aheadedtheOff�ceofC�v�l�anDefense,wh�chsoughttocreateamer�canun�tyandd�scred�tant�-�ntervent�on�sts.SeeCole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,12.

�4 Chapter 3

surehowlongthepeoplew�llbeabletow�thstandthem�s�nformat�onandpropagandathatf�llsourpress,ourrad�o,andourmot�on-p�cturetheaterseach day. it �s d�ff�cult to see how democracy can funct�on �ntell�gentlyorevensurv�vew�thoutanyaccuratesourceof�nformat�ontowh�chthepeoplecango,andfromwh�chtheycanbasethe�rdec�s�ons.

in august 1942 Fbi off�c�als �ncorporated th�s p�lfered letter as part ofan �nternal summary memorandum demonstrat�ng l�ndbergh’s pol�t�calsympath�es.35

anopportun�tytounderm�nel�ndberghd�rectly,however,presented�tselftoFbioff�c�alsf�vemonthsbefore—on26may1941—whenaTexasman, marv�n e. rutherford, volunteered �nformat�on to agents at thebureau’sDallas f�eldoff�ce.aneng�neerand�nventor,rutherfordheldavar�etyofpatentsonmechan�caldev�cesandoneofh�s�nvent�onswasatthecenterofh�scompla�nttotheFbi.in1939theeng�neerhaddes�gnedabulletproofself-seal�ngav�at�onfueltankandhadforwardedh�sdes�gnstoCharlesl�ndbergh,who,at thet�me,wascha�rof thea�rcorps’snewDev�ce Comm�ttee. hav�ng rece�ved no acknowledgment from the a�rcorpsabouth�splans—rutherfordhadsentthemv�areg�steredma�l—hereturnedtoCal�forn�atocont�nueh�sworkona�rcraftmechan�smsatthelockheedlaboratory.36

Wh�lework�ng �nCal�forn�a,rutherfordreadanewspaperart�cle �ntheLos Angeles Examinerwr�ttenbyGeneralhenryarnoldofthearmya�r Corps that descr�bed, �n deta�l, a bulletproof self-seal�ng av�at�onfuel tank thatwas foundw�th�nluftwaffea�rplanewreckage �nenglanddur�ng 1940. D�sturbed by the t�m�ng of h�s forward�ng of plans tol�ndbergh �n1939andth�ssubsequentd�scovery,rutherfordconcludedthatl�ndbergh—whoafterlend-leasewasroundlybe�ngcr�t�c�zedaspro-naz�—musthavesecretlypassedh�splanstonaz�Germany.hetoldFbiagentsthatthedes�gn,asla�dout�nthenewspaperart�cle,wasnearly�den-t�caltotheplanshehaddevelopedtwoyearsbefore.hefurtherreportedthatasof1941theUn�tedStateshadonly justbegunproduct�onof th�stypeofav�at�onfueltankandthathehadnotpatentedh�sdes�gnssoas

35. letter,JohnS.bugastoJ.edgarhoover,20October1941,Fbi65–11449–94;letter,Charlesa.l�ndberghtohenryFord,2august1941,Fbi65–11449–94;summarymemo-randumreCharlesa.l�ndbergh,byD.m�ltonladd,21august1942,p.17,Fbi65–11449–154. 36. letter,bernardh.Thomas,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,PatentandTrademarkOff�cetoauthor,5november1993;letter,a.P.K�tch�ntoJ.edgarhoover,27June1941,Fbi65–11449–74.

�5Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

topreventanyoneelse(�.e.,enemyagents)fromcopy�ngthem.rutherfordalso cla�med that un�dent�f�ed persons had unsuccessfully attempted tostealothertechnolog�cal�nformat�onfromh�shome.Theeng�neerfurtherfearedthath�shousewassubjectedto,whathecalled,a“shakedown”atthet�mehehadma�ledh�sdes�gnstol�ndbergh.37

When the SaC of the Dallas f�eld off�ce forwarded th�s �nformat�onto Fbi headquarters, hoover sought the Just�ce Department’s counsel.becauseth�s�nformat�onwasrece�vedfromanunsol�c�tedsource,hooverasked theass�stant to theattorneygeneral,matthewF.mcGu�re, “�fyouwouldadv�seth�sbureauwhatact�on, �fany,shouldbetaken.”mcGu�re�n turn sol�c�ted the response of the head of the department’s Cr�m�nalD�v�s�on,ass�stantattorneyGeneralWendellberge.bergerespondedthat“there �snoev�denceofav�olat�onofaFederalcr�m�nalstatute”andhe“suggestedthatnofurther�nvest�gat�onbemade�nth�smatter.”mcGu�rethereuponadv�sedhoover:“no�nvest�gat�onshould,therefore,bemade.”hoover,�nturn,formallyadv�sedh�sDallasSaCnotto�nvest�gate“�ntheprem�ses.”38

From a legal standpo�nt, the �ssue seemed closed. The Just�ceDepartment had determ�ned the ev�dence d�d not warrant an �nvest�ga-t�onand,�ndeed,theesp�onageactonlywent�ntoeffectafteradeclara-t�onofwar.Theconsp�racystatuteposs�blycouldhavebeenemployed,butJust�ceDepartmentattorneysfoundnoact�onableev�dence.Desp�teth�s,however,thematterd�dnotceasebe�ng�nvest�gated.WhereastheFbihadsuspended itsoff�c�alprobes�ncenoprosecut�onwasposs�blew�ththe�rev�dence,army�ntell�gencecont�nuedthe�nvest�gat�on.hoover,theastutebureaucrat that he was, �nformed the m�l�tary intell�gence D�v�s�on ofthematterandletthem�nvest�gate.inreturn,miDkepttheFbid�rectorappra�sed.hooverhadexplo�tedpres�dent�ald�rect�vesof1936and1939thatrequ�redtheFbitotakechargeof“esp�onage,sabotage,andv�olat�onsoftheneutral�tyregulat�ons”andtocoord�nate�ts�ntell�gencew�thmiD,navalintell�gence,andtheStateDepartment.Theendresultwasthattheprobe cont�nued s�nce the Fbi d�rector succeeded �n bypass�ng Just�ce

37. letter,a.P.K�tch�n to J.edgarhoover,27 June1941,Fbi65–11449–74.On thepopular�mageofl�ndberghasanaz�seechapter18,“isl�ndberghanaz�?”�nCole,Charles A. Lindbergh,142–53.Coleconcludedtheav�atorwasmanyth�ngsbutnotanaz�. 38. memorandum, J. edgar hoover to ass�stant to the attorney General matthew F.mcGu�re,18July1941,Fbi65–11449–74;memorandum,ass�stantattorneyGeneralWen-dellbergetomatthewF.mcGu�re,26July1941,(FOiaeddocument)WayneS.ColePapers,hhl;memorandum,matthewF.mcGu�retoJ.edgarhoover,29July1941,Fbi65–11449–80;letter,J.edgarhoovertoSaCDallas,20august1941,Fbi65–11449–80.

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Department’s restr�ct�ons, hop�ng, thereby, that miD could successfullydevelopthe�nformat�on.39

On31October,br�gad�erGeneralShermanm�les,headofarmy�ntel-l�gence,adv�sedhooverthatmiDoff�c�alshadconf�rmedthatrutherfordhadsenth�sav�at�onfueltankdes�gnstol�ndberghv�athea�rcorps’snewDev�ce Comm�ttee. W�th the ass�stance of post off�ce �nspectors, miDoff�c�alshadevenlocatedthe�nd�v�dualwhohadrece�vedthepackage.bynovember,theyconcludedthatl�ndberghhad“rece�vedtheplansbutthatnorecord�sconta�nedatthepresentt�me�ntheWarDepartmentf�les.”Further,a�rcorpsoff�c�alshad“wr�ttentol�ndberghrequest�ngtheplansoranexplanat�onastothed�spos�t�onofthem.”Wh�leFbidocumentsdonot�nd�catel�ndbergh’sresponse,the�nvest�gat�on—apparentlyproceed-�ngnowhere—wasclosed.Th�s�nc�dentnevertheless�llustratesthelengthstowh�chFbiD�rectorhooverwent,bypass�ngJust�ceDepartmentgu�de-l�nes,todevelop�ntell�gencethatcouldbeuseful�nd�scred�t�ngoneoftheadm�n�strat�on’smostprom�nentandsuccessfulcr�t�cs.ifFbiagentscouldhave developed a case aga�nst l�ndbergh he would have been shown tobeunpatr�ot�c,�fnottreasonous,andh�scred�b�l�tyasacr�t�cwouldhavebeenunderm�ned.as�tturnedout,th�snevermater�al�zed.40

Therutherfordcompla�ntwasnotun�quetotheFbi’sprobeofCharlesl�ndbergh.inFebruary1942,theFbi’sSanFranc�scooff�cereportedthat�mm�grat�on�nspectorm.bertrandCouchhadf�ledacompla�nts�m�lartorutherford’s.in1930,Couchcla�medthathehadsentl�ndberghplansfora“propellerlessplane”�nventedbyh�sfr�endJ�mall�s.Couchsenttheplanstol�ndbergh,whoatthet�mewasanadv�sertoTrans-Worlda�rl�ne,“foranexpress�onofop�n�onastopract�cal�tyandcommerc�alposs�b�l�-t�es.”inJanuary1942,the�mm�grat�on�nspectorreadanart�cle�ntheSan Francisco Examinerthatdescr�bedajeta�rcraft(�.e.,apropellerlessplane)used�nFasc�stitalyandhe,l�kerutherford,cametosuspectl�ndbergh’smot�ves. inth�s �nstance,however,w�ththeUn�tedStatesalreadyatwarandtheant�-�ntervent�on�stsallbutd�scred�ted,theFbitooknoact�on.41

beyond try�ng to develop �nformat�on to prosecute l�ndbergh, Fbi

39. Str�ctlyconf�dent�almemorandum,J.edgarhoovertoedwardTamm,10Septem-ber1936;pressrelease,J.edgarhoovertoalllawenforcementOff�c�als,6September1939,bothrepr�nted�nathanTheohar�s,ed.,From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover(Ch�cago:ivanr.Dee,1991),182–84. 40. Conf�dent�alletterw�thattachedmemorandum,br�gad�erGeneralShermanm�lestolt.Col.J.edgarhoover,31October1941,Fbi65–11449–99;memorandum,G.C.burtontoD.m�ltonladd,26november1941,Fbi65–11449–104.Onthearmy’srole�npol�t�calsurve�llanceseeJoanm.Jensen,Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980(newhaven,CT:yaleUn�vers�tyPress,1991). 41. letter,n.J.l.P�epertoJ.edgarhoover,14February1942,Fbi65–11449–129.

��Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

off�c�alsalsocollectedderogatory�ntell�genceabouth�m.Gather�ngsuch�nformat�onhadnoth�ngtodow�thav�olat�onoffederalstatutes.itsonlyposs�ble value was that �t could be d�ssem�nated to d�scred�t l�ndbergh.Fbi agents usually culled such �nformat�on from bureau �nformers andthen relayed �t to Fbi headquarters �n a secure manner, such as w�thhoover’s“personalandconf�dent�al”lettersystemwherebysens�t�vedatawas sent d�rectly to the Fbi d�rector’s off�ce and bypassed the bureau’scentralrecordssystem.Oneexampleofthecollect�onofsuchderogatory�ntell�genceoccurred�nJune1941whenW.G.ban�ster—theFbi’sspec�alagent�nchargeatbutte,montana—adv�sedhooverthatwh�lel�ndberghwasonabarnstorm�ngtour �nmontanadur�ng the1920shehad“l�ved�n the home of a prost�tute for a cons�derable t�me and assoc�ated w�ththeprost�tute’sp�mp.”ban�sternotedthataphotographex�sted“show�ngl�ndberghw�thth�swomanandherp�mp.”inadd�t�on,theSaCreported,l�ndberghhad“tr�edtomarrytwod�fferentg�rlswhowereemployed�nalaundry.”and,worseyet,theav�atorreportedlyst�llowedadebtofth�rty-e�ghtdollarstoabutteboard�nghouse.42

ban�sterwasalso“rel�ably�nformed”thatdur�ngProh�b�t�onl�ndbergh“should have been prosecuted on two d�fferent charges of bootlegg�ngwh�skeyfromCanadatob�ll�ngs,montana,bya�rplane.”Desp�tethedatedcharacter of th�s �nformat�on, ban�ster bel�eved �t could be useful. hewrotehoover:“Thesecharges,ofcourse,arenowoutlawedbytheStatuteofl�m�tat�ons,butibel�evethat �t �sst�llposs�bletoobta�nproofofthefact thathed�dbootlegwh�skey.”TheU.S.attorney�nb�ll�ngs,ban�sterbel�eved, “w�ll furn�sh �t, properly supported by aff�dav�ts, etc., to [pro-rooseveltnewspaperandrad�ogoss�pcolumn�st]WalterW�nchell.”43

Through another �nformant, Fbi off�c�als learned about the allegedstateofl�ndbergh’smentalhealth.Thedatawasgleanedfroman�nformerwhowasassoc�atedw�thl�ndbergh’sclosefr�endandcolleague(theyhadcoauthored a book together, The Culture of Organs [1938]), Dr. alex�sCarrel. The �nformer overheard part of a conversat�on between Carrel,whoopposedl�ndbergh’spol�t�cs,andapsycholog�stover“thetrendthatl�ndbergh’sm�ndwastak�ng.”Carrelreportedlysa�dthat“l�ndberghhatedthebr�t�shandnexttothemhehatedtheUn�tedStates.”The�nformerwasunabletoreportontherema�nderoftheconversat�on,butthe�nformat�ongatheredwasd�rectedstra�ghttohooverv�athe“personalandconf�den-t�al”system.44

42. Personalletter,W.G.ban�stertoJ.edgarhoover,3June1941,Fbi65–11449–71. 43. ib�d. 44. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,Fbiass�stantD�rectorFoxworthtoJ.edgarhoover,

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Why d�d Fbi agents collect and Fbi off�c�als ma�nta�n th�s type of�nformat�on? Clearly, none of the reported �nformat�on �nvolved anyallegedcr�m�nalact�v�tyonl�ndbergh’spart;eventhebootlegg�ngcharge,�ftrue,wasnotprosecutableduetothestatuteofl�m�tat�ons.Thedec�s�ontocollectandma�nta�nth�s�nformat�onhadadeterrentpurpose:tod�s-cred�tCharlesl�ndbergh’scharacter.S�nceh�stransatlant�cfl�ght�n1927,l�ndbergh had developed a reputat�on as a shy, clean-cut, all-amer�canboy.Suchpersonallyderogatorydatacould tarn�sh th�s �mage.andFbioff�c�als’ very �nterest �n the �nformat�on reflects the�r des�re to prov�detherooseveltadm�n�strat�onw�th�nformat�onthatcouldbeusedaga�nstnotcr�m�nalsbutpol�t�calopponents.extantFbirecordsdonot�nd�catewhetherhooversharedth�s�nformat�onw�ththeWh�tehouse.G�venthemet�culoussystemtheFbid�rectorhaddev�sedtod�str�butesens�t�vedata,andg�venroosevelt’s longpract�cenot toputanyth�ngcontrovers�alonpaper,�trema�nsposs�blethat�nfacthooverhadsharedth�s�nformat�on,butwemayneverknow.inanyevent,thatFbioff�c�alssought�trevealsmuchaboutthe�rmot�ves.

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Wh�le prov�d�ng pol�t�cal �ntell�gence to the Wh�te house dur�ng 1941,hoovercont�nuedtooffer—onaper�od�candunsol�c�tedbas�s—reportsthat�ncreas�nglyfocuseduponthef�nanc�alback�ngoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.eventhoughrooseveltd�dnotfollowuponhoover’s�n�t�alofferto�nvest�gatethecomm�ttee’sf�nances,hooverneverthelesscont�n-uedtopursueth�savenueof�nvest�gat�on.On10July,asant�-�ntervent�on-�stsrall�edtoopposea�dtoruss�a,hoover�nformedtheWh�tehousev�aspec�almessengerthatnewspaperpubl�shersJosephPattersonandrobertmcCorm�ck—of the conservat�ve New York Daily News and Chicago Tribune respect�vely—had contr�buted “a lot of money” to the amer�caF�rstComm�ttee.moreover,Pattersonwassa�dtohavewantedh�s“largesums”contr�but�onskeptsecret.hooveraddedthatthecomm�ttee,then,proact�velyfundedtheant�-�ntervent�on�stper�od�calUncensored,acopyofwh�chheprov�dedtheWh�tehouse.45

Twomonthslater,hooveraga�nofferedtheWh�tehouse�nformat�onrelat�vetotheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee’sf�nanc�alsources“tosupplementtheprev�ous�nformat�onconcern�ngth�sgroup...�naccordancew�thh�s

10February1942,Fbi65–11449–128. 45. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoWatson,10July1941,andbl�ndmemo-randum,10may1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl.

�9Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

[roosevelt’s]requestofFebruary21,1941.”Desp�tehoover’scharacter�za-t�onofthe�nformat�onaspartofroosevelt’sprev�ousrequest—wh�ch�twasnot—theWh�tehouseaccepted the �nformat�onw�thnocompla�ntandhooverprom�sedtokeepthepres�dent“currentlyadv�sed�nmattersofth�sk�nd.”Thepart�cularf�nanc�al�nformat�onhooverprov�ded�nd�-cated that a large, unnamed Jew�sh organ�zat�on operat�ng through theGuggenhe�mFoundat�onhadw�thdrawn�tssupportoftheamer�caF�rstComm�tteebecauseof �ts “ant�-roosevelt”pos�t�on, �tsefforts toembar-rassthepres�dent,and�tsespousalof“ant�-Jew�shpropaganda.”Fbiagentswere never able to substant�ate these allegat�ons, yet they d�d j�be w�thpopularnot�onsaboutthecharacteroftheamer�caF�rstComm�tteethatwerenotalwaysaccuratebutsuccessfullypropagatedbypro-all�ed,�nter-vent�on�stgroups.Further,th�stypeof�nformat�onalsohelpedtosusta�ntheb�asesabout thegroupheldbycerta�nsen�orWh�tehouseoff�c�als,nottheleastofwhomwasthepres�denth�mself.46

in the�rceaselessefforts touncover the f�nanc�al sourcesofamer�caF�rst, Fbi agents pursued all poss�ble leads. a new opportun�ty arose �nOctober when an Fbi �nformer prov�ded �nformat�on about amer�caF�rst’spart�c�pat�on�nW�scons�n’sf�rstcongress�onald�str�ct.Whatcaughttheattent�onofFbioff�c�alswasaW�scons�nstatelawthatrequ�red“allorgan�zat�onspart�c�pat�ng�npol�t�calcampa�gnstof�leadeta�ledexpenseaccount.”Thelocalamer�caF�rstchapterhadallegedlyv�olatedth�slaw,prompt�ngW�scons�nStateattorneyJohnmart�ntoorderthelocalchap-tertorelease�tselect�onrecords.The�nc�dent,moreover,gavehopetoFbioff�c�als that they would d�scover the f�nanc�al sources beh�nd amer�caF�rst.There�snoment�on�nFbirecords,however,astothed�spos�t�onofth�spart�culareffortotherthananotat�onthattheW�scons�nchapter“hasrefused tocomplyw�th th�s lawasof thepresentwr�t�ng.”nevertheless,the ep�sode further �llustrates the lengths to wh�ch hoover would go tosat�sfywhathebel�evedtobethepol�t�cal�nterestsoftherooseveltWh�tehouse. it also suggests that Fbi off�c�als were seek�ng any �nformat�onthatm�ghtserveasthebas�sonwh�chthebureaucouldbu�ldalegalcaseaga�nstamer�caF�rstbasedupontheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact.if�tcouldhavebeenproventhattheamer�caF�rstComm�tteehadrece�vedfundsfromafore�gngroup,thecomm�tteecouldhavebeenprosecutedasanunreg�steredagentofafore�gnpower.47

46. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoWatson,22September1941,andbl�ndmemorandum,22September1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl. 47. memorandum,D.a.Fl�nntomr.Kramer,13October1941,Fbi100–4712–203.

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another �nvest�gat�ve avenue Fbi agents focused upon w�th regard tothe amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee was �ts alleged l�nks to subvers�ve groups.if agents could ver�fy such �nformat�on �t could have been employed tod�scred�tamer�caF�rstortoprosecute�tsmembersasagentsofafore�gnpower.e�therway,Fbioff�c�alswouldhavesat�sf�edthepol�t�cal�nterestsof the pres�dent. iron�cally, though, the very act of hoover’s cont�nuallypass�ng on to the Wh�te house unsubstant�ated reports purport�ng thatthe amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee had quest�onable assoc�at�ons helped tosusta�nadm�n�strat�onbel�efsthatthegroupwas,�ndeed,subvers�ve.W�thgovernment off�c�als hold�ng such v�ews, �t �s no wonder that the GreatDebateof1939–41wassuchab�tterone. inpurs�ngth�sl�neof�nvest�gat�on,Fbiagentsfocusedspec�f�callyontheamer�caF�rstchapters�nWash�ngton,D.C.,Ch�cago,andnewyorkC�ty.Thesewerethethreelargestchaptersoftheorgan�zat�onandgener-ated for �nvest�gators a s�gn�f�cant amount of pol�t�cal �ntell�gence. Thepr�marymeansbywh�chagentsgatheredthe�r �nformat�onwasthroughthe use of �nformers. The rel�ance on �nformers �s s�gn�f�cant to thebureau’slarger�nvest�gat�veeffortbecause,�ngeneral,therel�ab�l�tyofthe�nformerswasquest�onableatbest.but �nFbioff�c�als’quest toprov�detheWh�tehousew�thderogatory�nformat�ononpol�cycr�t�cs,accuracywasnota toppr�or�ty.and, �ndeed, thequal�tyof theFbi’s �nformat�onontheamer�caF�rstComm�tteewasoftensuspect.mostoften,exceptforthe very f�rst reports agents f�led on the comm�ttee, Fbi off�c�als seem-�nglyacceptedthew�delyheldnot�onthatamer�caF�rstandotherant�-�ntervent�on�sts were fasc�st dupes. intervent�on�st groups—notably theF�ghtforFreedomComm�ttee—hadsuccessfullypromotedth�sv�ewand,clearly,thepercept�onworked�nfavoroftheFbi. The bureau’s �nformer �n the Wash�ngton, D.C., area reflected thepopular v�ew of the comm�ttee as a subvers�ve group. The un�dent�f�ed�nformercla�medhehadascerta�ned theval�d�tyof theaFC’squest�on-ableconnect�onsby l�st�ngbogusmembersh�psw�thpro-naz�andothersubvers�vegroupsonh�smembersh�pappl�cat�on.TheaFC’sreact�ontoh�sappl�cat�on,accord�ngtothe�nformant,wasmerelyasm�leandanod.Fromth�s,the�nformerconcludedthattheamer�caF�rstComm�tteewas“deeplypollutedbytheFasc�stcrowd.”inh�sv�ew,the“honest�solat�on-�sts” �n the comm�ttee were vastly outnumbered by “ant�-adm�n�stra-t�on bus�nessmen and �ndustr�al�sts w�th an overwhelm�ng follow�ng of

�1Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

appeasers,naz�s,Fasc�sts,andotherenem�esofthedemocrat�cwayofl�fe.”mored�rectly,hecla�medamer�caF�rstwasthenexusforafasc�strevolu-t�on�namer�caasnumeroussubvers�vegroupsandover130congressmenweree�ther“openlyorclandest�nelyw�ththeamer�caF�rstmovement.”48

notallFbisourcesreportedthatamer�caF�rstwasfasc�st.TheSaC�n Ch�cago, for example, reported that after the d�ssolut�on of the com-m�ttee, “�nvest�gat�on todatehas fa�led to reveal any �nd�cat�on that thestructureofamer�caF�rst,has�nanyway,beenusedbyfore�gn�nterestsor �nd�v�dualscooperat�ngw�th fore�gn �nterests.”Theagentalsoarguedthat “a few local Chapters . . . have reportedly made ava�lable l�sts andpledgedcooperat�ontocerta�nrad�calgroupsbutthesehavebeen�solated�nstances and �n the op�n�on of persons �nterv�ewed, represented only am�nutem�nor�tyofthetotalmembersh�p.”49

TheSaCof theFbi’snewyorkC�tyoff�ce tookad�fferentv�ew.hecharacter�zedtheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeasanaz�tool.hesummar�zedthetotal�tyofthe�nformat�oncollectedbythenewyorkoff�ceastend�ng“toprovesupportof,orconnect�onw�ththeamer�caF�rstComm�tteebysuchknownorallegedsubvers�veorgan�zat�onsastheGerman-amer�canbund, Chr�st�an Front, S�lver Sh�rts, Women Un�ted, mothers’ organ�-zat�ons, Chr�st�an mob�l�zers, amer�can Dest�ny Party” among manyother groups and extrem�st �nd�v�duals. not only d�d the amer�ca F�rstComm�tteenotma�nta�noff�c�al l�nksw�thanyof thesegroups,noneofthe �nformat�on �n the SaC’s report—such as newspaper and magaz�necl�pp�ngsfromextrem�stpubl�cat�ons—provedtheex�stenceofsubvers�veconnect�ons.h�sreport�ngreflectsonlyan�nterest�ndatathatsuggestedsubvers�ve l�nks, but �t also shows a fa�lure by Fbi agents to �nvest�gateproperly.50

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in �ts off�c�al h�story, br�t�sh Secur�ty Coord�nat�on cla�med that �t had�nvest�gatedandtakend�rectact�onaga�nsttheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.To re�terate, because no s�gn�f�cant documentat�on has been releasedregard�ng the bSC’s act�v�t�es or relat�onsh�p w�th the Fbi �n e�ther theUn�tedStatesorbr�ta�n,h�stor�anscannotconf�rmthescopeorverac�tyofth�scla�m.nevertheless,wehavethebSC’soff�c�alh�storyand,�fused

48. report,SaCWash�ngton,DCtoFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–384. 49. report,SaCCh�cagotoFbihQ,29may1942,Fbi100–4712–397. 50. report,SaCnewyorktoFbihQ,11July1942,Fbi100–4712–443.

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verycarefully,wecanatleastascerta�nal�kely�f�ncomplete�nd�cat�onofthebSC’sact�v�t�es. What�smostobv�ouslyreflected�nthebSCh�story—wh�chwaswr�t-tensecretly�n1945—arecontemporarypercept�onsoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee. Wh�le these percept�ons are largely counterfactual, they doconf�rmacerta�nlevelofhonesty�ntheh�story�tselfbecausethesev�ewsweresow�delyheldatthet�me.Forexample,thebSCh�storycla�msthatthe amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee had leg�t�mate or�g�ns but, over t�me, haddegenerated �nto “a pro-German assoc�at�on.” Th�s v�ew corresponds tohow Fbi off�c�als v�ewed amer�ca F�rst dur�ng the 1940s.51 The bSC’sassessment of amer�ca F�rst also �ncluded the cla�m that the group“appealed to pac�f�sts, haters of roosevelt, haters of Great br�ta�n ant�-Commun�sts,ant�-Sem�tes,adm�rersofGermany,amer�can�mper�al�sts,devoteesofb�gbus�ness,andthosewhohatedeurope.”Wh�letheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee�ndeedhadsomememberswhovar�ouslyf�tthesecr�te-r�a, �twasnotapac�f�storgan�zat�onandthegroupmadeser�ouseffortstoexcludeextremeelementsfrom�tsranks.yetthebSC’sop�n�onofthecomm�ttee’smakeupcorrespondsw�thcontemporary�ntervent�on�stop�n-�onofamer�caF�rst.52

Other aspects about the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee are �naccurate �ntheoff�c�albSCh�storybutreflectcontemporaryassumpt�onsabout theorgan�zat�on. accord�ng to the bSC, amer�ca F�rst had seven hundredchaptersandnearlyonem�ll�onmembers.morerecentscholarlyresearch�ntotheamer�caF�rstComm�tteerevealsthatthegrouphadfourhundredandf�ftychaptersandaboute�ghthundredthousandmembers.ThebSCh�story also cla�ms that dur�ng 1941 Charles l�ndbergh had emerged asthe comm�ttee’s leader. Wh�le l�ndbergh certa�nly was the group’s mostpopular and controvers�al speaker and member, he was not �ts leader.nevertheless,suchav�ewwasw�delybel�eved�nthe1940s.Otherv�ewsofamer�caF�rst�nthebSCh�story�ncludeabel�efthatthegrouphadbeen�nf�ltrated by German agents who turned the comm�ttee “more openlyant�-br�t�sh and pro-German.” as ev�dence, the h�story c�tes a speechl�ndberghhadg�venjustpr�ortothePearlharborattackwherehepo�nted

51. British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Ameri-cas, 1940–45(london:St.erm�n’sPress,1998),71–72.FortheFbi’sv�ewseereport,SaCWash�ngton,DC,toFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–384. 52. British Security Coordination, 72. For the contemporary �ntervent�on�st v�ew ofamer�caF�rstseec�rcular-letter,henryW.hobson,3november1941,box1,F�ghtforFree-dommanuscr�pts,Seeleymuddl�brary,Pr�ncetonUn�vers�ty,Pr�nceton,nJ.SeealsoCole,America First: The Battle against Intervention.

�3Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

outthreewar-ag�tat�nggroups:thebr�t�sh,theJews,andtheWh�tehouse.Theseexamplesaga�n�llustratecontemporaryv�ewpo�nts,manyofwh�chwerealsoheldbyFbioff�c�als,andweshouldnotd�sm�ssthemsoeas�lyasl�esandd�stort�onsperpetuatedbyoff�c�alh�story.53

bSCheadW�ll�amStephensonwassa�dtohave“perce�vedthepoten-t�al menace of the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee.” G�ven Stephenson’s andthe bSC’s unsurpr�s�ng v�ews of the group, he had allegedly “d�spatched[agents]toeachpartofthecountrytoattend�tsmeet�ngs,tokeeptrackof�tsnewmembersandtoponderuponnewandeffect�vewaysof�nst�gat�ngcounter-propaganda.”54There�snodocumentaryev�dencecurrentlyava�l-abletoconf�rmthatbSCagents,l�keFbiagents,wereusedtomon�tortheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,butthere�ssomereasontodoubt�t. it �s �nconce�vable that hoover—a bureaucrat always very protect�veofh�sFbi’s turfandalwaysconcernedaboutunwelcomeanddangerouspubl�cexposure—wouldperm�tafore�gn�ntell�genceagencytorunfreelyabout the country �nvest�gat�ng and attempt�ng to d�scred�t amer�canpol�t�calgroups.ifthebSC’sact�v�t�eshadbeend�scovered,�twouldhavereflectedbadlyupontheFbiandhoover,show�ngh�mtobe�nleaguew�ththebr�t�shandnot�ncontrolofamer�cansecur�ty.eventhebSCh�storyadm�tsthatFbioff�c�als“werenaturally�ncl�nedtoresentany�nterference�n the�r affa�rs by a fore�gn agency.” moreover, by the early summer of1942,accord�ngtothebSC’sownh�story,“allfore�gn�ntell�genceagenc�eswere proh�b�ted, inter alia, from employ�ng the�r own agents w�th�n theUn�tedStates.”55

Whatseemsfarmore l�kely �s thathooversharedthe �ntell�gencehegatheredaboutamer�caF�rstw�ththebSC,and,subsequently,whenwr�t-�ngthe�rorgan�zat�onalh�story,bSCoff�c�alsl�berallyemployedtheterm“agent”whendescr�b�ngtheworkbSCpersonnelallegedlyconducted.WeknowtheFbiandthebSCma�nta�nedaverycloserelat�onsh�p,thattheyexchanged �ntell�gence, and that they were apparently �nterested �n theverysametargets;wejustdonotknowtheexactnatureandscopeofth�s�ntell�genceshar�ngtodate. intermsofthebSCand�tscla�med“act�on”aga�nsttheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,�temployed(allegedly)threeavenuesofattack.F�rst,thebSCwouldexpose�nthepressamer�caF�rst’s“closet�esw�thGermanact�v�-t�es.”Second,thebSC“approached”var�ous�ntervent�on�stgroupstoplan

53. British Security Coordination,72–73;Doenecke,The Battle against Intervention, 9. 54. British Security Coordination,73. 55. ib�d.,351,xxx���.

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attacks,“throughthem,”ontheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.andth�rd,thebSCh�storycla�msw�thnoclar�tythat“effortsweremade”—bywhom�tdoesnotsay—“toprovethatthesoc�etywasconcernedw�th�llegal,trea-sonousact�v�t�es.”allthreeavenues,reportedly,weresuccessful.56

it �s conce�vable that the bSC may have had access to sympathet�cnewspapersorhavel�a�sedw�ththemthroughath�rdparty,butnod�rectev�denceconf�rmsth�s.ithasbeenestabl�shed,however,thatatleastone�ntervent�on�stgroup�ndeedhadaccesstobr�t�shoff�c�als,buttheextentofthebSC’seffortstodevelop�ncr�m�nat�ng�nformat�onaga�nsttheaFC�s unknown. The F�ght for Freedom Comm�ttee sought and ma�nta�nedarelat�onsh�pw�thbr�t�shoff�c�als.(ThebSCh�storycla�ms,unconv�nc-�ngly, that F�ght for Freedom was, �n real�ty, a br�t�sh front.) When theF�ght for Freedom Comm�ttee was formed �n 1940, one of �ts pr�nc�palmembers—Dr. henry van Dusen, a theology professor at the Un�onTheolog�cal Sem�nary and graduate of ed�nburgh Un�vers�ty—soughtl�a�sonw�th thebr�t�shembassy.W�th theass�stanceofaubreymorgan,abr�t�shinformat�onServ�ceoff�c�al �nnewyorkC�ty,vanDusencon-tactedbr�t�shambassadorlordloth�an.vanDusenandloth�anagreedthat F�ght for Freedom would work w�th the ass�stance of the br�t�shembassy.57

h�stor�anmarkl�ncolnChadw�nhasfoundthattheF�ghtforFreedomComm�ttee acted as a l�a�son between the br�t�sh embassy, br�t�shinformat�onServ�ce,andtheamer�can�ntervent�on�stpress.vanDusen’sclose cooperat�on w�th the br�t�sh embassy, �n help�ng �t to d�str�butebr�t�sh propaganda to the press, was a v�olat�on of the Fore�gn agentsreg�strat�onact.F�ghtforFreedom,bytheletterofthelaw,hadactedasanagentofafore�gnpower.Th�s�snot�ns�gn�f�cantbecauselauraingalls,asw�llbeshown,wassuccessfullyprosecutedunderth�slawforaccept�ngmoneyandpropagandafromtheGermanembassy.itwasunl�kely,how-ever,thatF�ghtforFreedomoff�c�alswouldhavebeenprosecutedasthe�r�nterestswere�nl�new�ththeadm�n�strat�on’sfore�gnpol�cygoals.58

S�nceF�ghtforFreedomservedasal�a�sonbetweenthebr�t�shinfor-mat�on Serv�ce and the �ntervent�on�st press, �t �s poss�ble that the bSCplayedsome�nd�rectrole.Thebr�t�shinformat�onServ�cewasheadquar-tered,l�kethebSC,�nrockefellerCenter,stronglysuggest�ngthatthetwoorgan�zat�onshad t�es. it �sat leastconce�vable that thebSCcooperated

56. British Security Coordination,73. 57. mark l�ncoln Chadw�n, The Hawks of World War II (Chapel h�ll: Un�vers�ty ofnorthCarol�naPress,1968),41–42. 58. Chadw�n,The Hawks of World War II,74,100,102,138–39,143.

�5Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941

w�th the �nformat�on serv�ce to forward pro-all�ed �nformat�on to the�ntervent�on�stpressand then took toomuchof thecred�t �n �tsoff�c�alh�story. inone�nc�dent,thebSCh�storycla�msthatbSCagentspersuadedF�ghtforFreedomtoattendaspeechSenatorGeraldnyedel�vered�nboston�nSeptember1941wherethegroupd�str�butedleafletsaccus�ngh�mofbe�nganaz�appeaser.ThebSCalsocred�ted�tselfforhav�ngF�ghtforFreedombuy advert�s�ng space �n a boston newspaper also label�ng nye a naz�appeaser,aswellaspersuad�nglocalrad�ostat�onstodenythesenatora�r-t�me.ThebSCpromptedF�ghtforFreedom,accord�ngtothebSCh�story,totargetCongressmanF�sh.F�shhaddel�veredaspeech�nm�lwaukeeanddur�ngh�sconclud�ngremarkssomebodyhandedh�manotestat�ng:“DerFuehrerthanksyouforyourloyalty.”newspaperphotographersreportedlycapturedthesceneandthenpubl�shed�t.Theseexamples,accord�ngtothebSCh�story,wererepresentat�veofthebSC’s“mored�rectact�on”aga�nsttheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeand�tsspeakers.59

ThebSCh�storyrecountsonefa�ledattemptat“d�rectact�on,”however.ata30October1941amer�caF�rstrallyatmad�sonSquareGarden,bSCagentsallegedlytargetedspeakerCharlesl�ndbergh.bSCagentssuppos-edlycreateddupl�catet�cketstof�lltheamer�caF�rstcrowdw�th�nterven-t�on�sts, part�cularly F�ght for Freedom members. Some �ntervent�on�stswere to arr�ve early and others later to d�srupt the seat�ng of leg�t�mateamer�caF�rstt�cketholders.UnfortunatelyforthebSC,attendanceattherally was low and the �lleg�t�mate attendees were seated �n vacant seats,thereby �ncreas�ng the rally’s already low attendance. h�stor�an m�cheleFlynn Stenehjem has d�scovered that John T. Flynn of the new yorkamer�ca F�rst chapter d�rected that the t�ckets for the rally be spec�allystamped.bystamp�ngthet�cketspr�ortothe�rd�str�but�on,accord�ngtoStenehjem,�lleg�t�matet�cketholderswereusheredtoanout-of-waysec-t�onofmad�sonSquareGarden.60

There �snover�f�ableev�dence toprove that thebSChadpersuadedord�rectedF�ghtforFreedom(orother�ntervent�on�stgroups)tod�sruptamer�caF�rstComm�tteerall�es.it�sposs�blethatthebSCsoughtto�nflu-ence th�s type of behav�or, but �t �s equally �f not more l�kely that thesegroupsemployedd�srupt�vetact�csw�thoutanyprompt�ngfromexternalforces. inh�sbookDesperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the

59. British Security Coordination,74. 60. ib�d.,74–75;m�cheleFlynnStenehjem,An American First: John T. Flynn and the America First Committee(newrochelle,ny:arl�ngtonhouse,1976),163–64.

�� Chapter 3

United States, 1939–44 (1998), Thomas mahl cla�ms that the F�ght forFreedomComm�tteewas, �nfact,a frontforthebSC.mahlprov�desnover�f�ableev�dencebeyondspeculat�ontosupporth�scontent�onsandtooeas�lyaccepts theoff�c�albSC l�ne, reflect�ng the longpers�stenceof themythology surround�ng the act�v�t�es of br�t�sh �ntell�gence �n amer�ca.F�ghtforFreedom�ndeedhadcontactsw�thbr�t�shrepresentat�ves,but�tdoesnotfollowthattheywereafrontorgan�zat�on.Unt�lver�f�abledocu-mentat�on�sava�lable,allthatcanbeconcluded�sthatthebSCplayedarole—thescopeasyetundef�ned—�nattempt�ng tod�srupt theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.61

61. SeeThomase.mahl,Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939–44(Wash�ngton,DC:brassey’s,1998).

FocusFrom Great Debate Stalemate to Wartime Probe

Mid-1941 to Summer 1942

Desp�te the �ntervent�on�sts hav�ng won the battle over lend-lease, theGreatDebatewas�nnowaysettled.betweenthesummerandlateautumnof1941,thetwofact�onsfoundthemselvesdeadlockedoverfurtherrev�-s�onof theneutral�tyact,whethertoarmamer�canmerchantsh�ps.inth�sheatedcl�mate,Fbioff�c�als�ncreas�nglyfocuseduponant�-�nterven-t�on�sts�nCongress—suchasSenatorsburtonWheeler,Geraldnye,andDav�dWalshandCongressmanham�ltonF�sh—andtheysteppedupthe�refforts tounearthderogatorydataon theamer�caF�rstComm�tteeandothers that m�ght be used e�ther to prosecute or d�scred�t them. Theseefforts extended �nto 1942 and, �n some cases, w�th the country at war,�ntens�f�ed.

—■■■■■■■—

by early 1941 Senator Wheeler aga�n surfaced �n connect�on w�th thefrank�ng �ssue, but th�s t�me w�th far-reach�ng pol�t�cal �mpl�cat�ons.The ser�ousness of the affa�r revolved around the fact that the Germangovernmenthad,�nfact,�n�t�atedapropagandascheme—albe�t�neffectu-al—�ntheUn�tedStates,ut�l�z�ngthecongress�onalfrank,�nanattemptto�ncreaseant�-�ntervent�on�stsent�ment.Wh�letheFbid�dnothavejur�s-d�ct�on�nmatters�nvolv�ngthefrank(�twasan�ssueforthepostoff�ce�nspectors),Fbiagentsneverthelesscollected�nformat�onandforwarded�ttotheJust�ceDepartment.TheFbi’s�nterestbeganw�thWheeler,sh�ftedtoSenatornye,and,more�mportant,cametofocusuponCongressmanham�ltonF�sh. Wh�lethefrank�ng�ssuehadbegun�n1940w�thSenatorWheeler—who was an aggress�ve ant�-�ntervent�on�st leg�slator—�t only became a

ChApter 4

��

�� Chapter 4

nat�onal�ssuedur�ng1941.inFebruaryofthatyear,thesenatordec�dedtod�scoverwhohadm�susedh�sfrank,wh�ch,�nev�tably,ledh�mtoFbiD�rectorhoover.Wheelertoldhooverthathehadd�scoveredtheabuseafterthepostoff�cereturnedam�saddressedfrankedlettertoh�sSenateoff�ce.Theletteror�g�natedfromanorgan�zat�oncall�ng�tselfamer�canDefenders. The senator told hoover that he was “extremely anx�ous toascerta�n whether someone �s us�ng my franked envelopes �llegally, andwhethersomeone�sus�ngmyname�nth�sconnect�on.”1

hooverforwardedWheeler’scompla�nttolawrenceSm�th,anoff�c�al�ntheJust�ceDepartment’sneutral�tylawsUn�t.Sm�thre�teratedtheFbi’slackofjur�sd�ct�oneven�f,henoted,thesenator’senvelopeshadbeensto-lenfromh�soff�ce.ifthathadhappened,Sm�thsa�d,theaffa�rwouldthenbe a matter for the Wash�ngton metropol�tan pol�ce. hoover forwardedthesedeta�lstoWheelerw�thnofollow-up�nvest�gat�on.nevertheless,�nsubsequentweeksthesenator’snameaga�nsurfaced�ntermsofthefrank-�ng�ssue.2

accord�ng to the Fbi’s spec�al agent �n charge �n el Paso, a localres�dentallegedlyhadrece�vedfromWheelera largepackageconta�n�ngunaddressed, franked envelopes. The SaC reported that each envelopeconta�nedapr�ntedspeechandletters�gnedbyWheelerthatdenouncedthelend-leaseb�llwh�lesuggest�ngrooseveltwasseek�ngd�ctator�alpow-ers.Whenreport�ng th�sevent to theFbi, theTexasres�dentdemandedan �nvest�gat�on because, �n h�s v�ew, the l�terature from Wheeler was“un-amer�can.”Desp�tebe�ngtoldtheFbihadnojur�sd�ct�on,theTexanthreatened towr�teSenatorCarolhatch (Democrat fromnewmex�co),whowasamemberofthejud�c�arycomm�ttee.W�thhatch’sname�nvoked,hooverreportedtheeventtotheJust�ceDepartment.Whathappenednext�sunclear,but, aga�n,SenatorWheelerwasassoc�atedw�thquest�onableact�v�ty�noff�c�alFbireportsthat,�nsum,reaff�rmednegat�veadm�n�s-trat�onv�ewsabouth�m.3

by the late spr�ng and early summer, as �ssues over convoys and a�dtoruss�awerehotlydebated,thefrank�ng�ssueevolvedfroman�solated

1. letter,Wheeler tohoover,4February1941,Fbi62–55261–6; letter,TheGermanFr�endSoc�etyofhoustontoSenatorburtonK.Wheeler,20January1941,Fbi62–55261–6. 2. memorandum, matthew F. mcGu�re, the ass�stant to the attorney general, to l.m. C. Sm�th, neutral�ty laws Un�t, 17 February 1941, Fbi 62–55261–9X; letter, hooverto burton K. Wheeler, 10 February 1941, Fbi 62–55261–6; letter, hoover to burton K.Wheeler,6march1941,Fbi62–55261–9X;letter,hoovertoSaChouston,6march1941,Fbi62–55261–11. 3. letter,SaCelPasotohoover,20march1941,Fbi62–55261–12;memorandum,hoovertomcGu�re,27march1941,Fbi62–55261–12.

�9Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

event to a sensat�onal nat�onal �ssue. Th�s developed after a d�rect-ma�ladvert�sernamedhenryhokewroteWheeleraccus�ngh�mofm�sus�ngh�sfrank.hokechargedthesenatorw�th“a�d�ngthenaz�planbyallow-�ngtheuseof[the]frank�ngpr�v�legeforthed�ssem�nat�onofd�srupt�vepropaganda.”Wheelerrespondedw�thaden�althathehaddoneanyth�ngwrongandquest�onedwhyhokehad�gnoredthe�ntervent�on�sts’s�m�laruseofthefrank.4

hokerebuttedWheeler’scomments�nasecondletter,andthenpub-l�shedapubl�c condemnat�onof the senatorandh�s allegedabuses �naJuly art�cle t�tled “War �n thema�ls.”When the �ntervent�on�stF�ght forFreedomComm�tteelearnedofhoke’scharges,theyalsoattackedWheelerwh�le ask�ng the postmaster general to l�m�t Congress’s frank�ng pr�v�-lege.5

The sensat�onal nature of the now publ�c charge aga�nst Wheelerprompted reporter bla�r moody, of the Detroit News, to telephone Fbiheadquarters to ascerta�n whether the Fbi had �nvest�gated the charge.Concernedw�ththepubl�cnatureofthecharge,espec�allys�ncethebureauhad no jur�sd�ct�on, Fbi assoc�ate D�rector Clyde Tolson reported tohoover“thaticouldverydef�n�telytellh�mthatnosuch�nvest�gat�on�sbe�ngmadebyth�sbureau.”Techn�cally,Tolson’scla�mwasaccurate�nas-muchastheFbiwascollect�ng�nformat�onaboutthefrank�ng�ssuewh�lenotoff�c�ally�nvest�gat�ng�t.6

Theeventbecamemoreacr�mon�ouswhen,on24July,SecretaryofWarhenrySt�msonlearnedthatseveralact�ve-dutysold�ershadrece�vedpost-cardsfromSenatorWheelerurg�ngthemtowr�tethepres�dentdemand-�ngheavo�dwar.Therevelat�oncameas theSenatedebatedwhether toextenddraftees’m�l�taryserv�ce.afterconsult�ngroosevelt,St�msonthenpubl�clyannouncedthatWheelerhadcome“verynearthel�neofsubver-s�ve act�v�t�es aga�nst the Un�ted States, �f not treason.” Wheeler repl�edthathehadmadenoattemptto�nfluencethesold�ersandexpla�nedthat

4. The Fbi obta�ned cop�es of the Wheeler/hoke correspondence from an unsol�c-�ted source �n P�ttsburgh, Pennsylvan�a. The Fbi has w�thheld th�s person’s name underprov�s�onsoftheFOia.letter,[deleted]tohoover,28July1941,Fbi62–55261–26;letter,Wheelertoa.h.becker,7July1941,Fbi62–55261–26;letter,henryhoketoWheeler,16July1941,Fbi62–55261–26. 5. henryhokenewsrelease,24July1941;henryhoke,“War�nthema�ls:anexpla-nat�on of the most G�gant�c D�rect ma�l Fraud �n the h�story of advert�s�ng”; all �n Fbi62–55261–26;markl�ncolnChadw�n,The Hawks of World War II(Chapelh�ll:Un�vers�tyofnorthCarol�naPress,1968),213. 6. memorandum,ass�stantD�rectorClydeTolsontohoover,10June1941,Fbi62–55261–21.

90 Chapter 4

onlythreepostcards,outofoveronem�ll�onthathadbeenma�ledthroughacommerc�all�st,werem�stakenlysenttothesold�ers.Uponreal�z�ngh�serror,St�mson—everthegentleman—publ�clyapolog�zedtoWheelerbutthecontroversyd�dnotend.7 inlateJuly1941,forexample,afterWheeler’sallegedpart�nthefrank-�ng controversy had been revealed, the Women’s roosevelt Democrat�cCluboflosangeleswrotehooveraccus�ng thesenatorofhav�ng takena$100,000br�bewhenheworkedasaU.S.D�str�ctattorney�nmontanaaftertheF�rstWorldWar.resurrect�ngthechargesdrummedupaga�nsth�m am�d the acr�mony of the 1920s Teapot Dome scandal, the groupcla�med that Wheeler had accepted the br�be �n return for d�sm�ss�ng awh�te slave traff�ck�ng charge. not content �n shar�ng the�r �nformat�ononlyw�ththeFbi,thewomen’sgroupalsosentatelegramtotheattorneygeneraldemand�ngaprosecut�onofWheelerbecauseh�s“propagandatooursold�ersfomentsadangerousand�mproperatt�tude�nourarmedforc-es, �mper�l�ngmorale.”irrespect�veofthedatedcharge,andthefactthatthematterhadbeenresolvedtwodecadesbefore,hooverforwardedthewomen’scompla�nt to theJust�ceDepartment ford�rect�on. inresponse,ass�stanttotheattorneyGeneralmatthewmcGu�rewrote:“inv�ewofthefactthatthe[br�bery]chargewouldbebarredbytheStatuteofl�m�tat�ons,no�nvest�gat�onofthemattershouldbeundertaken.”8

ThefocusonWheelerm�ghthaveended,butthefrank�ng-abuse�ssuesh�fted toSenatorGeraldnyeandCongressmanham�ltonF�sh.Dur�ngOctober,am�ddebateonneutral�tyrev�s�on,Fbiagentsrece�ved�nforma-t�onfromtwo�nformantsconcern�ngSenatornyeandthecongress�onalfrank.Thef�rst�nformant—pol�t�caloperat�vehenryGrunewald—report-ed Senator nye’s bel�ef that the m�suse of the frank was “w�despread”and “perfectly regular.” Grunewald also reported nye’s percept�on thatroosevelthada“determ�nat�on. . . toget�ntowar.”Duetothesens�t�v-�tyofGrunwaldasa source,Fbiass�stantD�rectoredwardTammcon-cludedthat“th�s�nfoshouldnotbetransm�ttedouts�de[ofthe]bureau,”conf�rm�ng�nd�rectlythatFbioff�c�alssoughtandd�ssem�natedpol�t�cal

7. St�msonasquoted�nWayneS.Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45(l�n-coln:Un�vers�tyofnebraskaPress,1983),470–71. 8. letter,em�lyDen�son,Pres�dentWomen’srooseveltDemocrat�cClubtohoover,28July1941,Fbi62–55261–25;telegram,Women’srooseveltDemocrat�cClubtoattorneygeneral,25July1941,Fbi62–55261–25;letter,hoovertoDen�son,2august1941,Fbi62–55261–25;memorandum,hoovertoass�stanttotheattorneyGeneralmatthewF.mcGu�re,2august1941,Fbi62–55261–25;memorandum,mcGu�retohoover,11august1941,Fbi62–55261–28.

91Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

�ntell�gence. (if released, the spec�f�c nature of the comment probablycouldhavebeentracedbacktoGrunewaldandthentotheFbi.)instead,Fbi off�c�als f�led �t �n hoover’s secret off�ce f�le us�ng the Do not F�leprocedure.9Thesecondun�dent�f�ed�nformantcla�mednyeregularlysentagreatdealoffrankedma�ltopeopleouts�deofh�sstate.inl�ghtofthedevelop�ng frank�ng-abuse story, hoover forwarded this �nformat�on totheJust�ceDepartment.10

T�meandaga�n,�ntervent�on�stsaccusedcerta�ncongressmenofm�s-us�ng the�r frank�ngpr�v�lege.Suchchargeswere stronglyden�edby theaccused, but German propagand�sts were, �n fact, beh�nd the brouhaha.On29July1941,theGermanchargéd’affa�res�nWash�ngtonreportedtotheGermanFore�gnm�n�strythat:

in recent months the mass d�spatch of postcards has proved to be par-t�cularlyeffect�veasapropagandaact�onwh�chcanbecarr�edoutveryqu�cklyand suddenlyandwh�ch �s tobed�rectedat as largeagroupofpersonsasposs�blewhodonothavemuch�ntellectualtra�n�ng.Thereforethroughtheagencyofthe[embassy]pressoff�certhema�l�ngofaboutadozencards,each�n100,000—�nwordsahundredthousand—toam�ll�oncop�eshasbeenorgan�zedandf�nanced.Theyconta�nedsarcast�cattackson roosevelt and the warmonger�ng members of h�s Cab�net, rem�nd-ersofh�s campa�gnprom�se tokeepamer�caoutofwar, a reference totheamer�canbloodsacr�f�ces �ntheWorldWar,anappealtoamer�canmothers,andtheyaskedrec�p�ents towr�teor telegraph �n th�s sense tothe�rrepresentat�ves�nCongressandtheWh�tehouse.asallofthepost-cardshadtheletterheadoftheamer�canCongressorofthemembersofCongressconcernedandconta�nedma�nlymater�alwh�chwastakenfrompurelyamer�cansourcesandalsoappeared �none formorother �n theoff�c�al“Congressional Record,”ourhandwasnot�nanywayrecogn�zable.alarmedbythesuccessofth�scampa�gnofpostcards,the�ntervent�on�stpress�salreadystart�ngtoattackthe�rbe�ngsentthroughCongress,butsofarw�thoutsuccess.11

9. DonotF�lememorandum,helenGandytohoover,8October1941,Off�c�alandConf�dent�alF�lesofJ.edgarhoover(hereafterhooverO&C),Folder80,henryGrunewald,FbihQ,Wash�ngton,DC. 10. memorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,13October1941,Fbi100–4712–207. 11. Telegram,chargéd’affa�resGermanembassyWash�ngtontoGermanFore�gnm�n-�stry, 29 July 1941, �n Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, ser�es D, vol. 13(london:hermajesty’sStat�onaryOff�ce,1964),234.

9� Chapter 4

The chargé d’affa�res further reported that Senator Wheeler had beentargeted and, he cla�med, the publ�c d�ff�cult�es between Wheeler andSt�msonreflectedthesuccessfulcult�vat�onof�nf�ght�ng.12

lead�ngtheGermanblackpropaganda13operat�onwasGeorgeSylvesterv�ereck,whowasborn�nGermanybutnatural�zedasanamer�canc�t�zen�n1901.nevertheless,hereta�nedstrongTeuton�csympath�es.Dur�ngtheF�rstWorldWar,forexample,hed�str�butedpro-Germanpropaganda�ntheUn�tedStates,andw�ththeadventoftheSecondWorldWarhereg-�steredh�mselfw�ththeStateDepartmentasapa�dagentoftheGermangovernment.v�ereckthenrece�vedf�nanc�alsupportforh�sact�v�t�esfromtheGermanl�braryofinformat�on—theGermangovernment’spropagan-daagency—andheed�tedth�sorgan�zat�on’sper�od�cal,Facts in Review.14

mov�ngfromnewyorkC�tytoWash�ngton�nearly1940,v�erecktookajobwr�t�ngspeechesfortheant�-�ntervent�on�stSenatorernestlundeen.after the senatord�ed �nanunt�melyplanecrash later thatyear,v�ereckfoundajob�ntheoff�ceofnewyorkrepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh.itwasfromth�spos�t�onthathewasabletoman�pulatethecongress�onalfrank.15

approach�ngGeorgeh�ll—aforty-f�ve-year-oldclerk�nF�sh’soff�ce—v�ereckaskedtouseF�sh’s franktod�str�buteoneoflundeen’sspeechesbecausethedeceasedsenator’sstaffwasunabletocopew�thvolum�nousrepr�nts.itwasfromth�s�n�t�alrecru�tmentofh�llthatv�ereckbegantoman�pulate F�sh’s off�ce to effect a w�de d�str�but�on—more so than anylone senator or congressman would have done—of ant�-�ntervent�on�stl�terature. To keep the operat�on secret, v�ereck used a th�rd party (anant�-�ntervent�on�stpubl�c�stnamedPrescottDennett)toma�nta�ncontactw�thh�ll.16

v�ereck gathered ant�-�ntervent�on�st l�terature and forwarded �t toDennett’soff�cewhere�nhesent�ttoGeorgeh�ll.h�llthenhadF�sh�nsertthe mater�al �nto the Congressional Record whereby h�ll would orderthousands of repr�nts and then send these back to Dennett �n frankedenvelopes.Dennettwasthenabletoma�lthel�teratureouttowhomeverhew�shed,andamongtheorgan�zat�onsthatunw�tt�nglyhelpedtod�str�butev�ereck’spropagandawastheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.17

12. ib�d.,234n2. 13. blackpropagandapurportstobefromonesourcebut�s,�nreal�ty,fromanother.inth�s�nstance,theGermansattemptedtousetheSenatetocoverthe�rownefforts. 14. m�chaelSayersandalberte.Kahn,Sabotage! The Secret War against America(newyork:harper&brothers,1942),168–73. 15. ib�d.,181–84. 16. ib�d.,186–87. 17. ib�d.,187–88;Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,472;“ma�lbagsl�nkedtono-

93Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

Wh�letheGermanpropagandaeffortwascerta�nlycreat�ve,�tseff�cacywas negl�g�ble. all v�ereck managed to accompl�sh was a w�der d�str�-but�on of ant�-�ntervent�on�st l�terature that, �n any event, d�d not leadamer�canstoreassessthe�rv�ewoftheall�es.bes�des,s�ncelate1940theamer�caF�rstComm�tteehadalreadybeenconduct�ngamuchlargerandwell-organ�zedeffort topreventamer�can �ntervent�on �n theeuropeanwar.Therevelat�onofa l�nkbetweenGermanpropagand�sts (not sp�es)and lead�ng ant�-�ntervent�on�sts, no matter �f the ant�-�ntervent�on�stswereunsuspect�ng,wasaboonto�ntervent�on�stpart�sansl�ketheF�ghtfor Freedom Comm�ttee. Such groups used the event to d�scred�t theant�-�ntervent�on�stsbyaccus�ng themofbe�ngnaz�dupes,and therebyconf�rmedtosomethe�rstatusassubvers�ves. in September 1941, a federal grand jury led by prosecutor W�ll�ammaloney began to cons�der ev�dence of German propaganda and “othersubvers�ve elements” �n the Un�ted States. S�multaneously, Washington PostreporterD�llardStokestookupthefrank�ngmatter.herevealedthel�nkbetweenDennett’sandF�sh’soff�cesaswellasthefactthatamer�caF�rst was tangent�ally �nvolved. The �ncreased publ�c�ty led the pol�ceto se�ze franked ma�l from amer�ca F�rst’s Wash�ngton chapter on 25September. Thereafter, the propaganda mach�ne created by v�ereck wasexposedpubl�cly.18

bothGeorgeh�llandGeorgev�ereckwerecalledtotest�fybeforethegrandjury,whereh�llperjuredh�mselfwhenanswer�ngaquest�onabouth�sconnect�ontov�ereck.inearly1942,h�llwassuccessfullyprosecutedfor perjury and rece�ved a ja�l sentence of between two and s�x years.v�ereck was conv�cted for v�olat�ng the Fore�gn agents reg�strat�on act�nasmuchashefa�ledtorevealthefullextentofh�sact�v�t�estothegovern-ment.Whenasked,CongressmanF�shrefusedtotest�fybeforethegrandjury, lead�ng theprosecutor to subpoenah�m.F�sh’shes�tancyproved tobeafurtherboontothe�ntervent�on�stswhopubl�clyquest�onedwhythecongressmanrefusedtocooperate,allud�ng�nthe�rremarksthathemusthavesometh�ngtoh�de.butwhenhef�nallyd�dtest�fy,F�shrevealednoth-�ngs�gn�f�cantexcepth�s�gnoranceofwhatwasgo�ngon�nh�scongres-s�onaloff�ce.atonepo�nt,however,h�sbehav�ormadeforgoodheadl�neswhenheshoutedattheprosecutorforsuggest�ngh�sv�ewsweres�m�larto

WarGroupsareinvest�gated,”New York Times,27September1941. 18. memorandum,ass�stantattorneyGeneralWendellbergetohoover,26may1942,FOiaeddocument,Just�ceDepartment�nWayneS.ColePapers,herberthooverPres�den-t�all�brary(hereafterhhl),Westbranch,ia;Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,471–72;Chadw�n,The Hawks of World War II,214–15.

94 Chapter 4

thoseofv�ereck’s.Wh�letheFbihadnojur�sd�ct�on,�td�dcloselymon�torthegrandjury�nvest�gat�on.TheJust�ceDepartment,moreover,requestedthat hoover prov�de prosecutor maloney �nformat�on about ham�ltonF�sh.19

Wh�le one m�ght assume—g�ven hoover’s cater�ng to roosevelt’spol�t�cal �nterests—thathewouldhavehapp�lyass�stedmaloney,theFbid�rectord�dnot.Thefactsarenotent�relyclear,buthooverhadpersonald�fferences w�th maloney that or�g�nated from a cr�t�cal comment theprosecutor had made about hoover not tak�ng a more proact�ve role �nthecase.(G�venh�sprov�d�ngofpol�t�cal�ntell�gencetoroosevelt,hooverwould never have �nvolved h�mself publ�cly �n such a case.) The Fbid�rectorresentedmaloney’scr�t�c�sm,wh�chnewsmenDrewPearsonandGeorgeallenrepeated�nanat�onw�debroadcast,and�twasth�sthatledh�mtorefusehelp�ngtheprosecutorevenaftermaloneytr�edtorepa�rthedamage.hoover’sonlyreplywasto“makecerta�nthatwedoeveryth�ngpropertothoroughlyhandleallaspectsofth�scasesoasnottog�veth�swhelpanyrealbas�sforhowl�ng.”20

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W�ll�amStephensonandthebSCwerealso�nterested�nthecongress�onalfrank�ngcontroversy.Theonlyaccess�blesourceof�nformat�on,however,about the bSC’s poss�ble �nvolvement �s �ts off�c�al h�story. S�nce noneof the book’s �nformat�on can be conf�rmed �t must be used w�th care.nevertheless,�t�sposs�blethatthebSCwas�nvolved,but�tmustbekept�nm�ndthat theoff�c�alh�storypurposefully—andforbureaucrat�crea-sons—pa�ntedaflatter�ngp�ctureofthebSC’sact�v�t�es.WhetherandhowtheFbil�a�sedw�ththebSC�snottouchedupon,butg�ventheFbiandthebSC’s relat�onsh�p theym�ghthavecommun�catedw�thoneanotheroverthematter.

19. Summarymemorandumrerepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi65–29514–33,pp.14,17–20;memorandum,ass�stantattorneyGeneralWendellbergetohoover,6June1942,Fbi65–29514–22;Chadw�n,The Hawks of World War II,215.Unfor-tunatelytheFbihasw�thheldlargeport�onsofthesummarymemorandumregard�ngF�shaswellasamemorandumsenttotheWh�tehouseregard�ngF�shonFOiapr�vacygrounds,result�ng�nan�ncompleteunderstand�ngofthe�r �nterest.“F�sha�dind�ctedasPerjurer;Frankedma�linvolved�nCounts,”New York Times,25October1941;“h�llGetsPr�sononPerjuryCharge,”New York Times,7February1942,19;“F�shShouts‘l�e’atv�ereckTr�al,”New York Times,21February1942,7. 20. Do not F�le memorandum, helen Gandy to hoover, 28 October 1941, hooverO&C;memorandum,Gandytohoover,28October1941,hooverO&C.

95Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

accord�ngtothebSCoff�c�alh�story,an“amer�canfr�end”ofbr�t�sh�ntell�gencehadrevealed the frank�ngabuse �nvolv�ngSenatorsWheelerandnyeandCongressmanF�sh.ThebSCdoesnotnameth�s“amer�canfr�end,”buttherelevantparagraphleavesnodoubtthatthepersonalludedtowashenryhoke:

Forth�scampa�gn[reveal�ngthecongress�onalfrank�ngabuse],thecoop-erat�onofanamer�canfr�endwasenl�sted.heworkedonh�sown,�nh�sownt�meandw�thh�sownmoney,wh�lebSCprov�dedh�mw�th�nforma-t�on,gu�danceandextrafunds.byprofess�onhewasa“d�rectma�ladver-t�s�ngspec�al�st.”h�scl�entscons�stedofthosecommerc�alcompan�eswhow�shedtobetoldaboutnewandbettermethodsofadvert�s�ngbyma�l.21

The bSC vers�on of the frank�ng controversy has �t that after hokedevelopedthefrank�ng�nformat�on,bSCagentsmorethoroughlyprobedthe �ssue. The agents supposedly had learned that a part�cular type ofletter-address�ng mach�ne was used and they d�scovered ma�l�ng l�stsor�g�nat�ng from the German l�brary of informat�on. The bSC h�storyfurther cla�ms that �t was bSC agents who had uncovered George h�llandGeorgeSylvesterv�ereckasthe �nd�v�dualshead�ngthepropagandacampa�gn.WhetherbSCagentsactuallyhadplayedalead�ngrole�nth�sep�soderema�nsunknown,buteven�ftheyhad�tappearsthatbSCeffortswerem�n�mal.hoke,�ndeed,had�nvest�gatedandpushedthe�ssue—par-t�cularlyw�thSenatorWheeler—andeven thebSCh�story freelyadm�tsthat hoke had worked “on h�s own” though w�th, perhaps, l�m�ted bSCass�stance. moreover, after hoke had publ�c�zed the frank�ng contro-versy,thefederalgrandjuryhadconvenedandWashington Post reporterStokesbegantowr�teh�sexposés.Then,afterth�s,theF�ghtforFreedomComm�tteebegantotakeupandpressthe�ssue. everyth�ngaboutthefrank�ngcontroversythebSCh�storycla�msas�tsown,moreover,canbefound�ntheworkofhoke,thegrandjury,andStokes.Th�ssuggeststhatthebSCh�storyhasexaggerated�tsrole.yetsuchanexaggerat�onshouldnotbecons�deredunusualg�venthatthebSCh�s-toryasawhole,�ndeed,pa�ntsarosyandsomet�mesm�slead�ngportra�tof�tsownwork�namer�ca,wh�chwasmoreforbureaucrat�creasons—tojust�fy�tsex�stence—ratherthantopreservetruth.

21. British Security Coordination, 75. The bSC h�story also notes that the “amer�canfr�end”wroteanopenlettertoWheeleraboutthefrank,wh�chhokehaddone.

9� Chapter 4

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inOctober1941,asthebr�t�shwerelos�ng�ncreas�ngnumbersofsh�ps�nthe�ntens�fy�ngwar�ntheatlant�c,Pres�dentrooseveltaskedCongresstorev�setheneutral�tyacttoallowboththearm�ngofamer�canmerchantsh�psand toperm�t those sh�ps todockatbr�t�shports.Thepres�dent’sgoal was to �ncrease the ab�l�ty of the Un�ted States to prov�de br�ta�nw�tha�d-short-of-war.ant�-�ntervent�on�sts,ash�stor�anWayneColehasnoted,dec�dedatth�spo�ntthattheycouldnotdefeatthepres�dent�napol�t�calbattlewherethe �ssuewasdef�ned�ntermsofa�d-short-of-war.instead,theyattemptedtopresent�tasoneofwarorpeace.Theamer�caF�rstComm�tteeurgedthepubl�c,andmembersofthehouseandSenate,to regard rev�s�on as a move that, �f passed, would result �n war and, �frejected,�npeace.Wh�letheeffortfa�led,thev�ctoryovertheant�-�nter-vent�on�stswasrazorth�nand,�npart,conf�rmedthecont�nu�ng�nfluenceoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee�nshap�ngpubl�cop�n�on. TheSenatevotedforrev�s�onbyamarg�nof50to37,andthehousebyavoteof212to194.St�ll,thedebateover�ntervent�onwasfarfromsettled.as roosevelt’s speech wr�ter robert Sherwood (and later ch�ef of theOff�ceofWarinformat�on)wroteconcern�ngtheset�mes,“[i]solat�on�stsent�ment became ever more str�dent �n express�on and aggress�ve �nact�on,androoseveltwasrelat�velypowerlesstocombat�t.hesa�devery-th�ng‘shortofwar’thatcouldbesa�d.hehadnomoretr�cksleft.Thehatfromwh�chhehadpulledsomanyrabb�tswasempty.”22

butPres�dentroosevelthad,�nfact,onelastrabb�t�nh�shat.Toendthestalematereflected�ntheneutral�tyactdebate,rooseveltoptedforacompan�onstrategy.On17november—thesamedayhes�gnedtherev�sedneutral�ty b�ll—the pres�dent d�rected h�s attorney general to beg�n “aGrandJury�nvest�gat�onofthemoneysourcesbeh�ndtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.”roosevelthopedthattheconven�ngofagrandjury,w�th�tsresultantpubl�c�ty,m�ghtservetod�scred�th�sant�-�ntervent�on�stcr�t�cs.heoptedforth�sstrategyoutofh�sfrustrat�onto“getanyact�onoutofCongress.”it�s�mportanttore�terate,however,thatthroughout1941,FbiD�rectorhooverhadforwardedtothepres�dentunsubstant�atedreportssuggest�ngthatamer�caF�rsthadquest�onablesourcesoffund�ng.many�ntervent�on�sts—both�nandoutofCongress—bel�evedthattheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee’sfundshador�g�natedfromfasc�stsources,but�nreal�ty

22. Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,446–53;robertSherwood,Roosevelt and Hop-kins: An Intimate History(newyork:harperandbrothers,1948),382–83.

9�Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

thecomm�tteetookcarefulstepstoavo�dtak�nganyquest�onablefund�ng.amer�caF�rstoff�c�als,forexample,refusedtoacceptdonat�onsoveronehundreddollarsunlessthesourcehadbeenvetted,andtheyrefused,once,toaccepta$4,000anonymousdonat�onunt�lthecontr�butor’s�dent�tywasver�f�ed.23

hoover �mmed�ately sought to support roosevelt’s proposed grandjury �nqu�ry. he f�rst forwarded to attorney General b�ddle a summarymemorandumofall�nformat�ontheFbihadconcern�ngtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.24 Fbi agents also pursued a new lead. Th�s lead or�g�nated�n a sensat�onal�st book �n press at harper and brothers Publ�shers thatcla�medtheGermangovernmenthadsecretlysubs�d�zedthecomm�ttee.25The book—or�g�nally—was to have focused only on amer�ca F�rst, butafterPearlharbor�texam�nedthebroadertop�coff�fthcolumnact�v�ty.Thebookwasm�chaelSayersandalberte.Kahn’sSabotage! The Secret War against America(1942).26

inthe�rbook,SayersandKahnrecounttheact�v�t�esofseveral �nd�-v�dualssupposedlyassoc�atedw�ththeamer�caF�rstComm�tteewhohadrece�vedmoney fromGermansources.Theauthorsspec�f�callydescr�behowFrankburch,aprom�nentOh�olawyerand,accord�ngtotheauthors,found�ngmemberoftheakronchapterofamer�caF�rst,rece�ved$10,000fromtheGermangovernmenttod�str�butepro-naz�l�terature.SayersandKahnalsosuggestthatnaz�Germanyhadfundedtheextrem�stpaperthe Herald,wh�choftenadvert�sedfortheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.27

23. memorandum, roosevelt to the attorney general, 17 november 1941, Pres�dent’sSecretary’sF�le:Just�ceDepartment,FDrl;Cole,America First,117,126. 24. memorandum,Tammtoladd,21november1941,Fbi100–4712–230;memoran-dum,hoover to theattorneygeneral, 22november1941,Fbi100–4712–210;memoran-dum, ladd to hoover, 4 December 1941, Fbi 100–4712–309; memorandum for attorneygeneralreamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,4December1941,Fbi100–4712–309. 25. memorandum,Tammtohoover,21november1941,Fbi100–4712–231. 26. SayersandKahn,Sabotage! The Secret War against America.FOiaredact�onsdonotrevealtheauthors’names,butotherev�denceprovesthatth�swasthebookthathad�nter-estedbureauoff�c�als.Thenamesoftheauthorsaredeleted�nFbidocuments,buttheydorevealthattheauthors’�nformat�onaboutthesourcesofamer�caF�rst’sfundswaslocatedattheoff�cesoftheHour,aconf�dent�alnewsletterthatdevoted�tselftoexpos�ngF�fthColumnact�v�t�es.albertKahn,oneofthebook’sauthors,wastheed�torofth�snewsletter.Desp�tetheredactednatureofthedocumentsacqu�redbymyownFOiarequest,thesenameswerepubl�clyreleased �nsomeof these �dent�caldocumentsreleased toh�stor�anWayneCole.letter, SaC new york to hoover, 25 apr�l 1942, Fbi 100–4712–344; letter, Foxworth tohoover,2may1942,Fbi100–4712–345;memorandum,Tammtohoover,21november1941, Fbi 100–4712–231. For Cole’s cop�es of these documents refer to h�s papers at theherberthooverPres�dent�all�brary�nWestbranch,ia. 27. SayersandKahn,Sabotage! 235–36.h�stor�anWayneColenoted thatburchwas

9� Chapter 4

For several months Fbi agents attempted to �nterv�ew Sayers andKahn’s ed�tor—russell Davenport—to w�n perm�ss�on to exam�ne the�rresearchf�le.Fbiagentstr�edt�meandaga�ntoarrangeth�s�nterv�ewbutwereplaguedbycont�nuedschedul�ngconfl�ctsanddelaysunt�lhooverpersonally stepped �n and arranged to meet w�th Davenport. hooverbel�eved that Sayers and Khan’s research f�le would be valuable for tworeasons:“f�rst,for�nformat�vepurposesonthebroadp�ctureofsubvers�veact�v�t�es, and second, from the prosecut�ve angle.” bureau and Just�ceDepartmentoff�c�als,meanwh�le,evaluatedtheev�denceava�labletothemconcern�ng th�s avenue of �nvest�gat�on. eventually, though, attorneyGeneralb�ddlemetw�thharperandbrotherslawyer,morr�sernst.ernst,whoma�nta�nedcloset�estotherooseveltadm�n�strat�onandthepres�-dent, relayed to hoover that Sayers and Khan’s ev�dence about amer�caF�rst hav�ng rece�ved fore�gn money was th�n, but, he stressed, “there �sagooddealofev�denceof�nterlock�ngmanagementwh�chm�ghtbethebas�s of reg�ster�ng under the [Fore�gn agents] reg�strat�on act.” ernstemphas�zed that �f �nvest�gators could prove amer�ca F�rst had rece�vedany fore�gn money, the organ�zat�on could be prosecuted for fa�l�ng toreg�sterundertheprov�s�onsofthelaw.28

morr�s ernst had a profess�onal �nterest �n d�scred�t�ng the amer�caF�rstComm�ttee.herevealedsomeofh�sthoughtsmonthsafterthe�n�t�a-t�onoftheSayersandKahnlead,butst�llw�th�nthet�meframethatFbioff�c�alswerecons�der�ngdevelop�ng �nformat�on forprosecut�on.On8apr�l1942,ernstwrotePres�dentrooseveltadv�s�ngh�mofad�scuss�onhehadw�thattorneyGeneralb�ddlesuggest�ng“aggress�veact�onaga�nstamer�canF�fthColumn�ststhroughthemed�umofTreasuryDepartmenttax returns of �nformat�on from amer�ca F�rst, Coughl�n, et al.” Thenon23may,ernst sent thepres�dentanextens�ve l�stofpeoplewhohad

neveranoff�cer�ntheakronchapterandthathed�dnotcontr�buteanymoneytotheorgan-�zat�on.SeeCole,America First,124;memorandum,hoovertob�ddle,23December1941,Fbi100–4712–263. 28. memorandum, Tamm to ladd, 21 november 1941, Fbi 100–4712–230; memo-randum,hoovertoTolsonandTamm,27november1941,Fbi100–4712–232;memoran-dum,hoovertoTolsonandTamm,21november1941,Fbi100–4712–220;memorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,22november1941,Fbi100–4712–221;memorandum,hooverto Tolson and Tamm, 24 november 1941, Fbi 100–4712–228; memorandum, hoover toTolsonandTamm,24november1941,Fbi100–4712–216;memorandum,hoovertoTolsonandTamm,22november1941,Fbi100–4712–217;memorandum,hoovertoTolsonandTamm,21november1941,Fbi100–4712–219.manyofthesedocumentsiobta�nedv�atheFOiaconta�nredact�ons.Toseeunredactedcop�esconsulttheWayneS.Coleresearchf�leatthehooverPres�dent�all�brary.

99Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

contr�butedmoneytotheamer�caF�rstComm�tteethathehadsecuredfrom“rel�able”sources.Whenernstlaterlearnedthatnoonefrome�therthe Just�ce or Treasury Departments was ser�ously pursu�ng the matter(by1942),heurgedroosevelttocont�nuetheproject.Desp�teernst’ssug-gest�ons for “aggress�ve act�on,” all along Fbi off�c�als were reluctant toundertakeh�splanow�ngto�tspubl�cnature.29

even before ernst vo�ced h�s concerns to roosevelt, ass�stant FbiD�rectorTammrecommendedon12December1941that theFbiavo�dbecom�ng�nvolved�nernst’splanbecause�t“obv�ously. . .[�s]aneffortto curta�l exposed and publ�c�zed facts relat�ng to organ�zat�ons such asamer�caF�rst—�nfactthat�sprobablytheorgan�zat�onthatwasspec�f�-cally�nh�sm�nd.”noth�ngevercameofernst’ssuggest�ons,butthey�llus-tratethelatentdes�reofsomeadm�n�strat�onall�estod�scred�tthe�roppo-nents�nthethenheatedpol�t�calatmosphere.h�ssuggest�onsalsorevealthehes�tancyofsen�orFbioff�c�alstobecome�nvolved�nanyact�onthatwouldpubl�clybev�ewedasquest�onableand,moreover,l�nkedtotheFbi.hooverpreferredtoworkbeh�ndthescenesand�nsecret.30

bureauoff�c�alsneverthelesswerekeenly�nterested�nthe�ntell�genceoffered�nthesoon-to-be-publ�shedbook.aftersomehes�tat�on,andst�llhav�ng fa�led to obta�n �nterv�ews w�th the book’s authors or the pres�-dentof thepubl�sh�ngcompany, Just�ceDepartmentoff�c�alsdec�ded toass�gn the case to the Cr�m�nal D�v�s�on.31 but the effort was too l�ttle,too late.Follow�ng the JapaneseattackonPearlharboron7December,the Just�ce Department temporar�ly suspended the case.32 The bureau’s�nvest�gat�onresumedw�ththestartofthenewyear,butFbiagentswerenotabletoexam�neSayersandKahn’smater�alunt�lapr�l1942.bythenthe ant�-�ntervent�on�sts had d�sbanded and Fbi off�c�als had developedser�ousquest�onsabouttherel�ab�l�tyofbothalbertKahn—ow�ngtoh�sallegedconnect�onsw�ththeCommun�stparty—andtheant�-Defamat�onleague,wh�chhadofferedtheuseof�tsf�les�nth�smatter,because�twas

29. letter,morr�sernsttoroosevelt,8apr�l1942,Pres�dent’sSecretary’sF�le—ernst,FDrl;letter,ernsttoroosevelt,23may1942,PSF—ernst,FDrl;letter,ernsttoroosevelt,10June1942,PSF—ernst,FDrl;memorandum,edwarda.Tammtohoover,12December1941,mart�nD�esFolder,hooverO&C. 30. ib�d. 31. memorandum,hoovertoass�stantattorneyGeneralberge,2December1941,Fbi100–4712–240; memorandum, Tamm to hoover, 2 December 1941, Fbi 100–4712–243;memorandum, Tamm to hoover, 2 December 1941, Fbi 100–4712–244; memorandum,Tammtoladd,4December1941,Fbi100–4712–245. 32. memorandum,lawrencem.C.Sm�th,Ch�ef,Spec�alDefenseUn�t,tohoover,23December1941,Fbi100–4712–264.

100 Chapter 4

aleft�stgroup.inanyevent,bureauoff�c�alseventuallydeemedthe�rlong-sought-after�nformat�on“tobelargelyworthless.”33

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The Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of the ant�-�ntervent�on�sts d�d not cease w�th theUn�tedStates’entrance�ntothewar.Desp�tethequest�onablenatureoftheassert�onsmadebySayersandKahn,andthed�ssolut�onoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,Fbioff�c�alsrema�nedfocusedonthecomm�tteebecauseof�ts1December1941announcementabouttak�ngpart�nthe1942con-gress�onalelect�ons.The�rplanwas tocampa�gn �nanattempt to sw�ngcontested elect�ons away from the pres�dent. indeed, on 13 February1942 hoover �nformed Pres�dent�al Secretary edw�n Watson about a 17December1941d�nnerpartyatwh�chCharlesl�ndberghwaspresent.inadd�t�on to descr�b�ng l�ndbergh’s remarks at the meet�ng (wh�ch wereobta�nedthroughan�llegalw�retap[seechapter6]),hooveradv�sedtheWh�tehousethatl�ndberghhad“�nd�cated. . .[that]theamer�caF�rstComm�tteecanaga�nbeapol�t�cal force; that theremaybea t�mesoonwhentheComm�tteecanadvocateanegot�atedpeace.”hooveralsopro-v�ded Watson w�th a twenty-one-page summary memorandum on the“structure,act�v�t�es,andconnect�onsoftheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeas�twasorgan�zedpr�orto�tsallegedlygo�ngoutofex�stencefollow�ngourentry�ntowar.”34

Fbiagentsthenlearnedfroman�nformerabouttheallegedpost–Pearlharborsecretact�v�t�esoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.On26February,Fbiassoc�ateD�rectorClydeTolsonreportedtohooverthat,wh�leata(d�fferent)d�nnerparty�nnewyork,l�ndberghhadallegedlyremarkedthat the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee had gone underground. The Fbi’ssourcecla�medthatl�ndberghbel�evedthat“th�swarhyster�aw�llwearoffandwew�llcomeback.”inresponsetoth�sdevelopment,hooveradv�sedTolson“togetto[the]bottomofth�s.”35

Then, on 16 march, hoover ordered sen�or Fbi off�c�als and SaCsnat�onw�detocont�nueto�nvest�gatethecomm�tteeandtoreportw�th�n

33. letter,Foxworthtohoover,2may1942,Fbi100–4712–345;letter,SaCnewyorktohoover,14may1942,Fbi100–4712–342;memorandum,FrankW.Crockertohoover,1may1942,Fbi100–4712–343;letter,P.e.Foxworthtohoover,2may1942,Fbi100–4712–345. 34. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoWatson,13February1942,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl. 35. memorandum, Clyde Tolson to hoover, 26 February 1942, Fbi 100–4712–302;memorandum,D.m.laddtohoover,5march1942,Fbi100–4712–302.

101Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

f�fteendays.Torat�onal�zecont�nuat�onoftheprobe,hooverc�tedl�nd-bergh’sremarkthatamer�caF�rsthadgoneundergroundandplannedtosurfacelater.accord�ngtotheFbid�rector,thecomm�tteekept�tselfact�vethrough frequent “house part�es . . . to keep al�ve [pol�t�cal] contacts.”hoover ordered Fbi f�eld off�ces to rev�ew the�r f�les and then �n�t�ate�nvest�gat�ons “for background �nformat�on,” but to be careful to makethem “�n a d�screet manner so as to cause no undue publ�c�ty.” hooverurgedagentstoemploy“conf�dent�al�nformants”aswellas“s�ncere�sola-t�on�sts,whoformerlywereact�ve�nth�sComm�tteeandwhonowreal�zethenecess�tyforanalloutnat�onaldefense.”hooverfurtheradv�sedthatagents“shouldbecarefulwhenapproach�ngComm�tteemembers,astheym�ghtbeassoc�atedw�ththeallegedundergroundsect�onoftheamer�caF�rst Comm�ttee.” The Fbi d�rector just�f�ed th�s �nvest�gat�on, l�ke oth-ers,ontheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact.Fbiagentswere“toascerta�nwhetherthestructuresetupbytheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee�snowbe�ngusedbyfore�gn�nterests,orby�nd�v�dualscooperat�ngw�thfore�gn�nter-ests,�nsuchamannerasto�nterferew�ththenat�onaldefenseeffort.”36

Spec�al agents �n charge at each Fbi off�ce �n�t�ated �nvest�gat�ons�n the�r geograph�c areas look�ng �nto the status of the amer�ca F�rstComm�ttee. Some of the larger f�eld off�ces, such as Ch�cago, even sub-m�tted reports on smaller c�t�es that fell under the�r jur�sd�ct�on. Fbiagentscloselyfollowedhoover’sd�rect�onsandused�nformerstogatherthe�r�ntell�gence,andtheychron�cledtheact�v�t�esoflocalamer�caF�rstchaptersdat�ngfromthe�ror�g�ns.noSaC,however,uncoveredanyth�ngto suggest that the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee had gone underground �nant�c�pat�on of reemerg�ng later to become �nvolved aga�n �n amer�canpol�t�cs. instead, each Fbi f�eld off�ce conf�rmed that all amer�ca F�rstComm�tteechaptershadd�sbanded.37

36. memorandum,hoovertosen�orFbioff�c�als,16march1942,Fbi100–4712–320;memorandum,hoovertoallSaCs,16march1942,Fbi100–4712–320;telegram,hoovertoallSaCs,11may1942,Fbi100–4712–349;telegram,hoovertoallSaCs,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–374;telegram,hoovertoSaCsDetro�t,m�am�,butte,Ph�ladelph�a,13June1942,Fbi100–4712–417. 37. report,SaCC�nc�nnat�toFbihQ,25apr�l1942,Fbi100–4712–337;report,SaChunt�ngton,WvtoFbihQ,27apr�l1942,Fbi100–4712–341;report,SaCPhoen�xtoFbihQ,28apr�l1942,Fbi100–4712–342;report,SaCSpr�ngf�eldtoFbihQ,8may1942,Fbi100–4712–346;report,SaCSanD�egotoFbihQ,9may1942,Fbi100–4712–354;report,SaCnorfolktoFbihQ,12may1942,Fbi100–4712–355;report,SaCSeattletoFbihQ,11 may 1942, Fbi 100–4712–357; report, SaC new york to Fbi hQ, 13 may 1942, Fbi100–4712–358;report,SaCKansasC�ty,mOtoFbihQ,15may1942,Fbi100–4712–362;report,SaCl�ttlerocktoFbihQ,18may1942,Fbi100–4712–363;report,SaCJackson,mStoFbihQ,18may1942,Fbi100–4712–364;report,SaCDallastoFbihQ,18may

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in late December 1941, hoover rece�ved yet another unsol�c�ted docu-mentthatportrayedSenatorWheelerasasubvers�ve.Thedocumentwasa legal br�ef prepared by lawyers �n the new york law f�rm of Ph�ll�ps,n�zer,benjam�n,andKr�m,and�taccusedthesenatorofhav�ngaccepted

1942,Fbi100–4712–365;report,SaCDenvertoFbihQ,18may1942,Fbi100–4712–367;report,SaCGrandrap�dstoFbihQ,16may1942,Fbi100–4712–368;report,SaCind�a-napol�s to Fbi hQ, 17 may 1942, Fbi 100–4712–369; report, SaC memph�s to Fbi hQ,22may1942,Fbi100–4712–371;report,SaCDesmo�nestoFbihQ,22may1942,Fbi100–4712–372;report,SaClou�sv�lletoFbihQ,20may1942,Fbi100–4712–373;report,SaCSanJuantoFbihQ,21may1942,Fbi100–4712–375;report,SaCnewhaventoFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–376;report,SaCOklahomaC�tytoFbihQ,25may1942,Fbi100–4712–377;report,SaCalbanytoFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–378;letter,SaCWash�ngton,DCtoFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–380;report,SaCSaltlakeC�tytoFbihQ,25may1942,Fbi100–4712–382;report,SaCWash�ngton,DCtoFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–384;report,SaCbalt�moretoFbihQ,27may1942,Fbi100–4712–385;report,SaChoustontoFbOhQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–386;report,SaClosangelestoFbihQ,27may1942,Fbi100–4712–387;report,SaCS�ouxFallstoFbihQ,27may1942,Fbi100–4712–388;report,SaCProv�dencetoFbihQ,27may1942,Fbi100–4712–389;report,SaCm�lwaukeetoFbihQ,27may1942,Fbi100–4712–391;report,SaCSananton�otoFbihQ,28may1942,Fbi100–4712–392;report,SaCCharlottetoFbihQ,27may1942,Fbi100–4712–393;report,SaCnewOrleanstoFbihQ,28may1942,Fbi100–4712–395;report,SaCJuneautoFbihQ,25may1942,Fbi100–4712–396;report,SaCCh�cagotoFbihQ,29may1942,Fbi100–4712–397;report,SaCSanFran-c�scotoFbihQ,26may1942,Fbi100–4712–398;reportSaCSt.lou�stoFbihQ,28may1942,Fbi100–4712–404;report,SaCnewarktoFbihQ,30may1942,Fbi100–4712–405;report,SaCelPaso toFbihQ,4 June1942,Fbi100–4712–467; report,SaCr�chmondtoFbihQ,2June1942,Fbi100–4712–408;report,SaCPh�ladelph�a toFbihQ,6June1942,Fbi100–4712–409;report,SaCbuffalotoFbihQ,2June1942,Fbi100–4712–410;report, SaC Omaha to Fbi hQ, 12 June 1942, Fbi 100–4712–419; report, SaC PortlandtoFbihQ,5June1942,Fbi100–4712–420;report,SaCbuttetoFbihQ,13June1942,Fbi100–4712–427;report,SaCKansasC�tytoFbihQ,22June1942,Fbi100–4712–428;report,SaCDetro�ttoFbihQ,22June1942,Fbi100–4712–429;report,SaCSanD�egotoFbihQ,25June1942,Fbi100–4712–432;report,SaCm�am�toFbihQ,23June1942,Fbi 100–4712–433; report, SaC m�lwaukee to Fbi hQ, 6 July 1942, Fbi 100–4712–440;report,SaCbalt�moretoFbihQ,8July1942,Fbi100–4712–442;report,SaCnewyorktoFbihQ,11July1942,Fbi100–4712–443;report,SaCP�ttsburghtoFbihQ,1September1942,Fbi100–4712–458;report,SaCSaltlakeC�tytoFbihQ,12September1942,Fbi100–4712–459;report,SaCDesmo�nes toFbihQ,Fbi100–4712–460;report,SaCSaltlakeC�ty toFbihQ,22September1942,Fbi100–4712–462;report,SaCDemo�nes toFbihQ,28September1942,Fbi100–4712–463; report,SaCb�rm�nghamtoFbihQ,1October1942,Fbi100–4712–465;report,SaCClevelandtoFbihQ,9October1942,Fbi100–4712–466; report, SaC San D�ego to Fbi hQ, 3 October 1942, Fbi 100–4712–467;report,SaCS�ouxFallstoFbihQ,15October1942,Fbi100–4712–470;report,SaCind�a-napol�stoFbihQ,14October1942,Fbi100–4712–471.

103Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

$25,000fromGermand�plomatstosupporth�soppos�t�ontoroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy.(iftrue,th�swouldmeanthatWheelerwas�nv�olat�onoftheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact.)Thebr�efalsoaccusedWheelerofv�olat�ng the 1917 esp�onage act for reveal�ng—the prev�ous July—thegovernment’splan tooccupy iceland.F�nally, thedocumentaccused thesenator,asweremanypeopleatth�st�me,of�llegallyus�ngh�scongress�on-al frank�ng pr�v�lege to effect a w�de d�str�but�on of ant�-�ntervent�on�stl�terature.hoovertookth�sunsol�c�tedlegalbr�efandforwarded�ttotheJust�ceDepartment.38

Wh�lethedocumentaryev�dence�smurky,�tappearsthatbyFebruary1942attorneyGeneralb�ddlehadatleastcons�deredthechargesasla�dout�nthelegalbr�ef,espec�allytheaccusat�onalleg�ngthatWheelerhadacceptedfore�gnfunds.b�ddlesol�c�tedhoover’sop�n�onastowhetherthedepartmentshould“makeafurther�nvest�gat�on.”There�sno�nd�cat�on�nWheeler’sFbif�leofhoover’sreply,buta28February1942memoran-dum from hoover to Wendell berge—head of the Just�ce Department’sCr�m�nal D�v�s�on—conf�rms that berge had asked hoover whether theFbi made an �nvest�gat�on. hoover repl�ed that the bureau had not, butthedepartment’s language �n thedocumentsuggests thatadm�n�strat�onoff�c�alshadregardedthechargesaga�nstWheeleras,atleast,v�ableandthattheycons�deredpursu�ngthem.39

Wh�le hoover forwarded unsol�c�ted pol�t�cal �ntell�gence reports tothe Wh�te house and Just�ce Department, �n at least one �nstance theadm�n�strat�on requested �nformat�on from the Fbi regard�ng SenatorWheeler. The Wh�te house’s �nterest centered on some off-the-recordremarks Wheeler had made to Milwaukee Journal reporter laurence C.eklund on 14 January 1942. Wheeler commented dur�ng h�s �nterv�ewthat the adm�n�strat�on was too recept�ve to br�t�sh �nfluence and thattheWh�tehousehadw�thheldfromthepubl�chowd�sastrousthePearlharborattackreallywas.Wheeler,furthermore,referredtonavySecretaryFrankKnoxasa“blathersk�te.”becausetheseremarkscamesosoonaftertheJapaneseattackonPearlharbor,thereporterfeltcompelledtosharethemw�ththeadm�n�strat�on.buteklundwasnottheWh�tehouse’sonlysourceaboutthesecomments.W�ll�amDonovan,d�rectoroftheOff�ceofCoord�nator of informat�on, and Frank Knox both alerted roosevelt to

38. memorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,30December1941,Fbi62–55261–35;memorandumofFacts,lawandexh�b�tsreSenatorburtonK.Wheeler,Fbi62–55261–35. 39. memorandum,attorneyGeneralFranc�sb�ddle tohoover,2February1942,Fbi62–55261–37;memorandum,hoovertoass�stantattorneyGeneralWendellberge,28Feb-ruary1942,Fbi62–55261–44.

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Wheeler’scomments.Knox,moreover,ed�tor�al�zedthatWheeler’swordsconst�tuted“themostshock�nglyreckless,treasonabletalkthatihaveeverseen.”40

Stephen early, roosevelt’s secretary, thereupon asked hoover on 26Januarytover�fytheaccuracyofeklund’sreport�ngandwhether�tcouldbecorroborated.earlynotedthat“wewouldl�keverymuchtoknow,”andheaskedthathooversendtotheWh�tehouseanFbi“report.”41acced�ngtotheWh�tehouserequest,hooverorderedFbiagentstover�fyeklund’saccount. m�lwaukee Fbi agents conducted several �nterv�ews and Fbiass�stant D�rector ladd reported to hoover that not only had eklund’saccountbeenver�f�ed,butWheelerhad“rambledonatgreat length�naveryb�ttermanneraga�nstthePres�dent,SecretaryKnox,andenglandtotheextentthateklundf�nallyhadtoterm�natethe�nterv�ewh�mself.”42

hoover forwarded th�s spec�f�c �nformat�on to early on 3 Februaryand added that “the Senator’s feel�ngs [about the pres�dent, Knox, andengland]wereapparentbyh�s fac�alexpress�onsaswellash�sremarks.”WhattheWh�tehoused�dw�thth�s�nformat�on�sunclear;wecancon-clude,however,thattheWh�tehousewas�nterestedenough�nWheeler’scommentstohaveFbiagentsver�fythe�raccuracy.hoover,�nh�sefforttokowtowtoroosevelt,wasmorethanw�ll�ngtocatertosuchrequests.43

The best way to make sense of the Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of SenatorburtonWheeler�stocompare�tw�thotherprom�nentant�-�ntervent�on-�sts. Whereas the Fbi’s probe of Charles l�ndbergh was extens�ve andthorough—ow�ng toh�spopular�tyandmanycontrovers�alpubl�c state-ments—the bureau’s �nvest�gat�on of Wheeler was c�rcumspect. Wh�leWheelerwasoneofthemostprom�nentant�-�ntervent�on�sts,hewasalsoaverypowerful and �nfluent�al senator.Th�s expla�ns, for example,why

40. letter, r�chard S. Dav�s, Milwaukee Journal, to roosevelt, 14 January 1942, Fbi62–55261–40; �nterv�ew memorandum of laurence eklund, no date, Fbi 62–55261–40;memorandum,W�ll�amJ.Donovantoroosevelt,22January1942,Fbi62–55261–40;mem-orandum,FrankKnoxtoroosevelt,23January1942,Fbi62–55261–40. 41. memorandum,Stephenearlytohoover,26January1942,Fbi62–55261–40. 42. letter,hoovertoSaCm�lwaukee,27January1942,Fbi62–55261–40;memoran-dum,D.m.laddtohoover,31January1942,Fbi62–55261–40. 43. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoearly,3February1942,Fbi62–55261–40;bl�ndmemorandumreburtonWheeler,3February1942,Fbi62–55261–40;personalandconf�dent�alletter,SaCm�lwaukeetohoover,31January1942,Fbi62–55261–40.Theheav�lyredacteddocuments �nclude:memorandum,lou�sb.n�chols toClydeTolson,12February1942,Fbi62–55261–42(alltextdeleted);Just�ceDepartment,Cr�m�nalD�v�s�ondocument, no date, Fbi 62–55261–44 (ent�re document w�thheld); memorandum, K. r.mcint�retomr.mumford,17October1942,Fbi62–55261–45(alltextdeleted);andfour-teenpagesofdocumentsw�thheld�nthe�rent�rety,Fbi62–55261–45.

105Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

hoover only thoroughly �nvest�gated h�s act�v�t�es w�th a Wh�te houserequest. Furtherexpla�n�ngtheFbi’srestra�nt�ntermsofWheelerwashoover’sh�storyw�ththesenator.intheaftermathofthePalmerra�dsandTeapotDomescandal,burtonWheelerandothersenatorsled�nvest�gat�onsthatexposed�llegalFbiandJust�ceDepartmentact�v�ty.assuch,Wheelerwaswellacqua�ntedw�thhoover’sact�v�t�esasheadoftheGeneralintell�genceD�v�s�onwhere, �n themass round-upofallegedrad�cals,manypeople’sc�v�l l�bert�es had been v�olated. Undoubtedly, th�s h�story affectedhoover’sprobe�ntoWheeler’sact�v�t�es,lead�ngh�mtonotauthor�zeanyFbi�nvest�gat�onw�thoutpr�orconsentfromtheadm�n�strat�on.bydo�ngth�s,�fFbiagents’workwasexposed,hooverwouldbe�nsulated.

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Wh�lehooverwouldonly �n�t�atea formal Fbi �nvest�gat�onthatdelved�nto an ant�-�ntervent�on�st congressman’s or senator’s pol�t�cal act�v�t�esw�th author�zat�on from the Wh�te house, he d�d not hes�tate to moveforwardw�thFbi �nvest�gat�onsof themforposs�blecr�m�nalact�v�ty.aperfectexample �s thatofant�-�ntervent�on�stSenatorDav�di.Walsh.aDemocratfrommassachusettsandcha�rmanoftheSenateComm�tteeonnaval affa�rs from 1937 to 1947, Walsh fought hard aga�nst roosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy.hetr�edtoconv�nceamer�cansthatthe�rcountrywouldbesafefromanyattack�f�tsa�randseaapproacheswereadequatelydefended.butbymayof1942Walshwasnamedasaposs�bleconsp�rator�nafraudcharge. On4may1942,rooseveltallyandattorneymorr�sernsttelephonednewyorkSaCFoxworthalleg�ngthatWalshwas�nvolved�nafraudulentschemetoawarda$16m�ll�onnavalcontracttooneofh�sfr�ends.ernstcla�medthatWalsh’sfr�endhadbeen�nd�cted�nanothermatterandwas,therefore, not el�g�ble to rece�ve the contract. instead, the contract wasawarded to a corporat�on supposedly under th�s man’s control. hooveradv�sed the attorney general of the charge on 13 may, whereupon heauthor�zedaprel�m�narycr�m�nal�nvest�gat�on.Fbiagentsdoggedlypur-suedthematterthatyear,generat�ngaflurryofreportsbetweentheFbiand attorney general, but noth�ng was developed to �nd�cate that Walshhadbeen�nvolved�nanycr�me.nevertheless,becausehehadacr�m�nalallegat�on hoover was able to pursue the matter v�gorously and therebygather derogatory �nformat�on about a prom�nent ant�-�ntervent�on�st

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senatorw�thoutfearofpubl�cexposure.ifexposed,hoovercouldr�ghtlycla�mtheFbiwasmerelyfollow�nguponacr�m�nalcompla�nt.moreover,duetothenatureoftheallegat�on,therecordsgeneratedabout�tweref�led�ntheFbi’scentralrecordssystem.44

What �s more tell�ng about th�s �nc�dent, however, �s what was notf�led �n the “off�c�al f�les” of the Fbi, but �n hoover’s secret off�ce f�le.S�gn�f�cantly,ernsthadalsot�ppedFbioff�c�alsoffon�nformat�on“con-cern�ngSenatorWalsh’sallegedconnect�onw�ththehouseofdegradat�onoperated [deleted, but by Gustave beekman] �n new york C�ty.”45 Th�s“house of degradat�on” was a “male brothel” frequented by sold�ers andsa�lorsseek�nghomosexualencounters.Thepro-rooseveltNew York Postbroke th�s story on 6 may cla�m�ng that Walsh had v�s�ted the brothel,add�ng that naz� agents rout�nely v�s�ted and quest�oned the brothel’spatronsaboutthe“com�ngsandgo�ngofthe�rsh�ps.”46Wh�tehouseoff�-c�alsknewaboutthestorybefore�tbroke,however,andhoover�nformedthemthath�sonly�nterestwastheesp�onages�deofthecase.inresponse,thepres�dent’ssecretary,marv�nmcintyre,applaudedhoover’scla�m.(inreal�ty,Fbioff�c�alswereobsess�vely�nterested�ntheact�v�t�esofgayandlesb�anamer�cans,dat�ngfrom1937whenFbiagentsbeganasystemat�ccollect�onof�nformat�onaboutgays.)hoover,moreover,prov�dedJust�ceDepartment off�c�al Oscar Cox w�th a complete Fbi report, whereuponheshared�tw�thSenatoralbenbarkley,theSenatemajor�tyleader,whorevealedtheFbi’s�nvest�gat�onontheflooroftheSenatetodemonstratethat Walsh had been cleared of any wrongdo�ng.47 ant�-�ntervent�on�stsenatorsthenpubl�clybackedWalsh,referr�ngtothehomosexualchargeasnoth�ngbutpartofa“d�abol�cal”campa�gntod�scred�teveryant�-�nter-vent�on�stsenator.becauseofthesens�t�v�tyofth�spart�cularderogatory�nformat�on, hoover d�d not f�le �t �n the bureau’s central records sys-tem—ashehadw�ththeothercompla�ntaga�nstWalsh—but�nh�ssecretoff�cef�les.48

44. memorandum, Foxworth to hoover, 4 may 1942, Fbi 62–68060–1; memoran-dum,hoovertob�ddle,13may1942,Fbi62–68060–1;memorandumre:SenatorDav�di.Walsh—allegedFraud,7December1942,Fbi62–68060–32. 45. memorandum,hoovertob�ddle,25may1942,Fbi62–68060–2. 46. Newsweek,1June1942,30. 47. bl�ndmemorandum,27June1942,Folder153,Dav�di.Walsh,hooverO&C. 48. “FbiClearsWalsh,barkleyasserts,”New York Times,21may1942,6;“Tobeyasksinqu�ry on Walsh Charge,” New York Times, 22 may 1942, 10; “The Case of ‘Senator X,’”Time,1June1942,50;“GustavbeekmanSentencedonmoralsCharge �nbrooklyn,”New York Times,6October1942,16.

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l�ndbergh, Wheeler, and Walsh were lead�ng opponents of roosevelt’sfore�gn pol�cy, but the most cr�t�c�zed congress�onal ant�-�ntervent�on�stwas representat�ve ham�lton F�sh. Dur�ng 1942, Fbi agents mon�toredF�sh’spol�t�calact�v�ty,tr�edtodevelopderogatory�nformat�onabouth�m,andforwardedpol�t�cal �ntell�gencetotheWh�tehousethatserv�ced�ts�nterests. F�sh, a republ�can who represented roosevelt’s home d�str�ct �nCongress,was�nmanywaysthepres�dent’snemes�s.l�keroosevelt,F�shcame from a d�st�ngu�shed patr�c�an fam�ly who l�ved �n the hudsonr�vervalley.F�sh’sgreat-grandfather—n�colasF�sh—wasacolonel�ntheWarforindependencewhohadall�edh�mselfpol�t�callyw�thalexanderham�lton.Thecongressmanwasalsothegrandsonofh�sfamousname-sake,whowasPres�dentUlyssesGrant’ssecretaryofstate.l�keroosevelt,F�sh attended harvard College where he also stud�ed law (rooseveltstud�ed law br�efly at Columb�a); F�sh graduated at the top of h�s class(rooseveltd�dnot).Dur�ngtheF�rstWorldWarF�shservedasthecom-panycommanderofanafr�canamer�canun�t,whereasrooseveltservedasPres�dentW�lson’sass�stant secretaryof thenavy.F�shwon theS�lverStarandFrenchCro�xdeGuerreforh�sserv�ce,wh�lerooseveltwentonto run—unsuccessfully—for the v�ce pres�dency �n 1920. Wh�le hav�ngmanycommonsoc�alandpol�t�cal tra�ts, �npol�t�csF�shtherepubl�canandroosevelttheDemocratwereatpolarends.49

in1919F�shwaselectedtoCongressand,partlyasaresultofh�sser-v�ce w�th an afr�can amer�can un�t, he garnered some support amongm�nor�t�es. W�th th�s const�tuency F�sh supported ant�lynch�ng leg�sla-t�onandhelped toerectmonuments toblack sold�ers,but th�swas theextentofh�sadvocacyform�nor�ty �ssues.inabroadersense,however,

49. Summarymemorandumrerepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi94–4–3997–33.OnF�sh’sbackgroundseeh�sshortandpol�t�c�zedmemo�rHamilton Fish: Memoir of an American Patriot(Wash�ngton,DC:regnery,1991),3–31.Stud�esonF�sharescant.Seer�chardKayhanks,“ham�ltonF�shandamer�canisolat�on�sm,1920–1944”(Ph.D.d�ss.,Un�vers�tyofCal�forn�aatr�vers�de,1971).Thepol�t�cal r�ftbetween thepres�dentandF�sh�sev�dencedbyroosevelt’s�nvocat�onofF�sh’snamedur�ngthe1940pres�dent�alcampa�gn.rooseveltstated,tothedel�ghtofacrowd�nnewyorkC�ty,that“Greatbr�ta�nwouldneverhaverece�vedanounceofhelpfromus�fthedec�s�onhadbeenleftto[Con-gressmenJoseph]mart�n,[bruce]bartonandF�sh.”achantof“mart�n,barton,andF�sh”soonbecameapopularandnegat�vepol�t�calslogan.Quoted�nDor�sKearnsGoodw�n,No Ordinary Time, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II(newyork:S�monandSchuster,1994),185.

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F�shsupportedallveteranswh�chledh�mtosupporttheamer�canleg�onwhen�twasestabl�shedfollow�ngtheF�rstWorldWar.butF�shwasbestknownforcha�r�ngacongress�onalcomm�ttee�nthe1930s,theso-calledF�sh Comm�ttee that had �nvest�gated commun�st propaganda �n theUn�ted States. a staunch ant�commun�st, F�sh opposed the rooseveltadm�n�strat�on’srecogn�t�onoftheSov�etUn�on.50

irrespect�ve of F�sh’s ant�commun�sm, Fbi off�c�als took an �nterest�n h�m after he began to oppose roosevelt’s fore�gn pol�cy, but part�cu-larly s�nce he was the rank�ng m�nor�ty member of the house Fore�gnaffa�rs Comm�ttee. When �t came to support�ng e�ther ant�commun�stsor Pres�dent roosevelt, hoover—the shrewd bureaucrat that he was—chose roosevelt. S�nce 1932, F�sh had opposed roosevelt and h�s newDeal because of “�ts soc�al�st nature” and the dangers F�sh perce�ved �nroosevelt’s�ncreas�nglycentral�zedpower—espec�ally�nfore�gnrelat�ons.asthecongressmanlaterwrote�nh�smemo�r:“roosevelt,ibel�eved,wasstart�ngusdowntheroadtosoc�al�smandd�ctatorsh�p.”51

anFbisummarymemorandumfromlate1942conf�rmsFbioff�c�als’�nterest�nF�sh’soppos�t�ontoroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy.Theagentwr�t-�ngthememonotedthatarev�ewofF�sh’scongress�onalvotes“reflectsh�s�solat�on�sttrendofthought.”Theagentalsotookspec�alnoteofthepos�-t�ons F�sh took �n oppos�t�on to the pres�dent: from m�l�tary appropr�a-t�ons�n1938toconscr�pt�ontolend-lease.noneofth�s�nformat�onhadanyth�ngtodow�thalawv�olat�onthatwouldjust�fyFbi�nterest.Ofpar-t�cularconcerntoFbioff�c�als,accord�ngtoth�smemorandum,wasF�sh’soppos�t�on to lend-lease, wh�ch marked the he�ght of the fore�gn pol�cydebate.TheFbiagentalsonotedF�sh’sconnect�onstotheComm�tteetoKeepamer�caOutofFore�gnWarsandtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,h�svar�ousant�-�ntervent�on�ststatements,andthath�snamewasment�onedby the German-language newspaper Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachterandotherrad�calpubl�cat�ons.Thememorandumstandsasev�dencethatFbi off�c�als took great �nterest �n ant�-�ntervent�on�st pol�t�cal act�v�ty,espec�ally where �t �ntersected w�th the pol�t�cal efforts and goals of therooseveltadm�n�strat�on.52

50. F�sh,Memoir of a Patriot,32–39;summarymemorandumrerepresentat�veham�l-tonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi94–4–3997–33,pp.3–6. 51. F�sh,Memoir of an American Patriot,56. 52. Summarymemorandumrerepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi94–4–3997–33.it�s�mportanttonotethatthesummarymemosurveysall�nformat�onma�n-ta�ned�nthe“off�c�al”f�lesoftheFbiandnotnecessar�lyall�nformat�onma�nta�nedonF�shwh�chcouldhavebeenma�nta�ned�noneofJ.edgarhoover’svar�oussecretoff�cef�les.

109Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

bymay1942—acongress�onalelect�onyearandat�mewhenfore�gnpol�cycr�t�csst�llconcernedtheadm�n�strat�on—theWh�tehouselearnedofsomet�t�llat�ngpol�t�calgoss�p�nvolv�ngF�shwh�chledthemtorequestanFbi �nvest�gat�on.roosevelt’sappo�ntmentssecretary,edw�nWatson,learnedfromnewyorkpol�t�calsourcesthatF�shhadallegedlyrece�vedandendorsedsusp�c�ouschecksamount�ngtoseveralhundredthousanddollars.Watsonthenforwardedth�s�nformat�ontohooverwhoorderedanFbi�nvest�gat�on.53

in the�r �nvest�gat�on,Fbiagents �nterv�ewedmrs.vanderb�ltWebb,headofthecomm�tteeoppos�ngF�sh’sreelect�on,aswellasherconf�dant,henry hoke—who had �n�t�ally publ�c�zed the congress�onal frank�ng-pr�v�legecontroversy.mrs.Webbcla�medthatF�shhadacceptedtwocheckstotal�ng$3,000fromaGermancav�arreta�lerbythenameofSturm.WhenFbi agents �nterv�ewed hoke, he cla�med that F�sh had accepted checks�n 1940 total�ng $2,500 from the romanoff Cav�ar Company and, more�mportant,thattheTreasuryDepartmenthadpossess�onofthechecks“�nconnect�onw�than�ncometaxv�olat�on.”54

When report�ng these developments to the Wh�te house, hoovernotedthatthebureau’s�nvest�gat�onwas“be�ngaffordedv�gorousatten-t�on.”inthemeant�me,hooverrelayedthatG.F.hansen-Sturm,thecav�arbus�nessman,hadd�scussedneutral�ty�ssuesw�thF�shandhadrequestedf�vethousandcop�esofaF�shspeechforabus�nessassoc�ate.G�venF�sh’srole �n thev�ereck-ledcongress�onal frank�ngscandal,hoover regardedth�s part�cular connect�on as susp�c�ous. he ordered an �nvest�gat�on todeterm�newhetherF�shhadv�olatedtheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact,and he adv�sed the Wh�te house that �f any �nformat�on was developedthatwould“�nterestthepres�dent”hewouldpass�talong.55

Wh�le hoover had Fbi agents look�ng �nto F�sh’s act�v�t�es, the con-gressmanlearnedofthechargesandtheFbi’squest�on�ngofWebb.F�shalsolearnedthat“someFbimanhadknowledgeof,orhadshownsomechecks”tooneofh�sconst�tuents,lead�ngh�mtotelephoneass�stantFbiD�rectorTamm.return�ngF�sh’sphonecall,Tammcla�medtheFbihad“no �nformat�on about any such checks �n the amounts or any s�m�lar

53. Conf�dent�almemorandumforedgarhoover,4may1942,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;letter,Frankl�na.Schr�vertoWatson,23apr�l1942,Off�c�alF�le300,FDrl;personalandconf�dent�al letter,hoover toSecretary to thePres�dentedw�nm.Watson,13may1942,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl. 54. ib�d. 55. Personal and conf�dent�al letter, hoover to Secretary to the Pres�dent edw�n m.Watson,13may1942,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl.

110 Chapter 4

amounts”andthattheFbiwas“conduct�ngnosuch�nvest�gat�on.”Tammsuggested to F�sh that people often confused other federal agenc�es andthe�r �nvest�gat�ons w�th the Fbi, and that he should check w�th thoseagenc�es.F�sh,nevertheless,expla�ned that“thecheckwasa forgery �f �tex�sted,and�twasputoutforpol�t�calpurposes.”56

Tamm m�ght have den�ed any Fbi �nvest�gat�on, but just one monthbeforeF�sh’sphonecallhooverhadprov�dedtheWh�tehousew�th�nfor-mat�on spec�f�cally about F�sh’s checks. G�ven the pol�t�cal nature (andthusthesens�t�v�ty)oftheFbi’s�nterest,�t�snowonderthatTammmadeblanketden�alstoF�sh,espec�allyas1942wasanelect�onyear.butF�sh’scla�mthatanFbiagenthadshowncheckstoaconst�tuentledTammandass�stantD�rectorladdtolook�ntothematter.inthe�nqu�rythealbanyf�eldoff�ceden�edanyknowledgeofthe�nc�dent,butbecauses�gn�f�cantport�ons of Tamm’s memorandum have been redacted we do not knowwhattheyd�scovered.inanyevent,the�nc�dentfurther�llustratestheFbi’scater�ngtoadm�n�strat�onpol�t�cal�nterestsandthe�rconcernw�thkeep-�ngtheseeffortssecret.57

—■■■■■■■—

interest�ngly,br�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�onalsonotedthematterofF�shaccept�ngchecks fromhansen-Sturm.accord�ng to thebr�t�shaccount,bSCagentsconducteda“stra�ghtforward�ntell�gencejob”to“d�scred�t”anumberof“part�cularpersonal�t�es,”�nclud�ngF�sh.ThebSCh�storyg�vesno deta�ls—wh�ch �s typ�cal—and only notes that cop�es of checks fromhansen-SturmtoF�sh“wereobta�ned.”Onem�ghtlog�callypresumethats�ncehenryhokewas�nvolved�nth�saffa�r—asw�ththefrank�ngpr�v�-lege controversy—and s�nce the bSC h�story cla�ms he had cooperatedw�ththemregard�ngthecongress�onal frank,thathemayhavebeenthepersontosharethechecksw�ththebSC.Wh�leth�sconclus�oncannotbeconf�rmedw�thoutaccesstoclosedbr�t�shandamer�canrecords,�tdoesf�tthebSCpatternofoperat�ons.58

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inaugust1942,Fbioff�c�alsaga�nfocusedonF�sh’srece�ptofmoneyfrom

56. memorandum,Tammtohoover,22June1942,Fbi94–4–3997–3. 57. memorandum,Tammtoladd,22June1942,Fbi65–29514–23;(second)memo-randum,Tammtoladd,2June1942,Fbi65–29514–23. 58. British Security Coordination,73–74,75.

111Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

quest�onablesources.Th�s t�me theFbi’s �nterest followedaWashington Poststorypubl�shedon6augustreport�ngthatF�shhadrece�ved$25,000from General rafael Truj�llo, the r�ght-w�ng m�l�tary d�ctator of theDom�n�can republ�c. accord�ng to the art�cle, F�sh had rece�ved th�smoney �n July 1939, but had only declared $22,000 on h�s �ncome taxreturn—seem�ngly comm�tt�ng �ncome tax evas�on �f not v�olat�ng theFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact.ThenewspaperfurtherreportedthatF�shhadrece�vedsomeofthemoneyd�rectly,andsomeof�tfromo�lstocks.59

afterthestorybroke,Fbiass�stantD�rectorladdbr�efedhooverthatthebureauhadno�nformat�onconcern�ngF�sh’spayment.hethenorderedanexped�tedand“completesurvey”ofallFbi�nformat�onaboutF�sh,butwhencompleted �tonlyconf�rmedtheFbi’s �gnorance.meanwh�le,F�shrespondedtothestorycall�ng�ta“pol�t�calsmearcampa�gn”andcla�medthat he had not accepted any “fee” from Truj�llo. instead, F�sh cla�medthathehad“merelyactedasanagentforthegeneral”�nhandl�ngano�l-speculat�ondealwh�ch,bylaw,d�dnotneedtobereportedonh�s1939taxreturn.F�shexpla�nedthathehadlostas�gn�f�cantport�onofthegeneral’smoney �no�l stocksandhadreturnedtherema�nder toh�m.hefurthercla�medthattheinternalrevenuebureauhadneveraskedh�maboutthetransact�on, as had been reported. Whatever the truth, the story dom�-natedF�sh’sreelect�oncampa�gnand�nterestedFbioff�c�als.60

What �nterested theFbimostwas the relat�onsh�pbetween thecon-gressman and Truj�llo. Com�ng so soon after the v�ereck-h�ll frank�ngcontroversyandpopularnot�onsthatant�-�ntervent�on�sts—�npart�cularham�ltonF�sh—werethemselvesfasc�stsordupesofthenaz�s,thefactthatF�shhadarelat�onsh�pw�thar�ght-w�ngfore�gnd�ctatorconcernedsome.in the�r probe, Fbi agents learned that F�sh had v�s�ted the Dom�n�canrepubl�c as part of a goodw�ll v�s�t �n march 1939, and that Truj�lloreturnedthefavortheprev�ousJuly(whenF�shhadallegedlyrece�vedh�sfee)byv�s�t�ngnewyorkC�ty.F�shthenmadefavorableremarksaboutthegeneralatabanquet,say�ngthathewas“proudtorepeatatth�st�metoaUn�tedStatesaud�ence,youw�llgodown�ntheh�storyofyourcountry

59. “Secret$25,000FeePa�dtoham�ltonF�shbyFore�gnPower;U.S.invest�gat�ng,”Washington Post,6august1942;summarymemorandumrerepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi94–4–3997–33,p.15. 60. memorandum,ladd tohoover,6august1942,Fbi65–29514-(�lleg�ble);memo-randum, ladd to hoover, 8 august 1942, Fbi 65–29514–25; summary memorandum rerepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi94–4–3997–33,p.16;“F�shDen�esheGotFeefromTruj�llo,”New York Times,7august1942,15.F�shwasreelectedthatyear,butwasf�nallydefeated�n1944.

11� Chapter 4

asabu�ldergreaterthanalltheSpan�shConqu�stadorestogether.”Thoughmade�n1939,by1942thecommenttookonanews�gn�f�cance�ntermsoftheFbi’ssusp�c�onsaboutF�sh.61

Fbi off�c�als took great �nterest �n the money Truj�llo had g�ven toF�sh,butthe�rspec�f�c�nterest,andwhattheylearned,�sunknowableduetoredact�ons�nFbidocuments.hooverorderedtheFbi’snewyorkf�eldoff�ce to report on Truj�llo’s v�s�t and F�sh’s meet�ng w�th h�m “�n orderthatanyfurther�nformat�on�nth�scasemaybe�mmed�atelybroughttotheattent�onoftheWh�tehouseoff�c�als.”Wh�lethedeta�lsofwhatFbiagents had learned and reported are murky, �t �s clear that hoover kepttheWh�tehouse �nformedas to thepol�t�calact�v�t�esof thepres�dent’snemes�s,F�sh.62

There�sno�nd�cat�onthattheWh�tehousehadsol�c�tedanyofth�spart�cular�nformat�onaboutF�sh,but�td�drece�ve�nformat�onaboutF�shandTruj�llofromUndersecretaryofStateSumnerWelles.Thesecretary�nformed roosevelt about the F�sh-Truj�llo affa�r before the Washington Postevenbrokethestory,reveal�ngthatthefederalgrandjury�nvest�gat-�ng the frank�ng case had d�scovered the payment �nformat�on. becauseTruj�llo’smoneyallegedlyor�g�natedfromaGermansource,federalpros-ecutormaloneyforwardedthe�nformat�ontoass�stantSecretaryofStateberle. Wh�le berle concluded there had been no transgress�on, Wellesneverthelessshared�tw�throosevelt,sat�sfy�ngthepres�dent’s�nterestandexpla�n�ngwhyhehadnotsoughtanFbiprobe.63

interest�ngly, �n 1951 F�sh learned that the Just�ce Department hadcons�deredh�mafasc�stdur�ngthe1930sand1940s.Concernedw�ththeseoldallegat�onsatthehe�ghtofmcCarthy�sm,F�sh,whocons�deredh�mselfa stalwart ant�commun�st, v�s�ted Fbi headquarters to request access toh�s Fbi f�le. an Fbi off�c�al adv�sed the former th�rteen-term congress-man thatFbi f�leswereconf�dent�al andnotopen toexternal rev�ew,atwh�chpo�ntF�shfeltcompelledtoexpla�nh�spastact�onstoseth�srecordstra�ght.accord�ngtoF�sh’s1951account,internalrevenue�nvest�gators

61. Summarymemorandumrerepresentat�veham�ltonF�sh,26September1942,Fbi94–4–3997–33,pp.16–17.itshouldbenotedthataspartofh�sGoodne�ghborPol�cyroos-eveltalsometw�thTruj�llo�n1939whenhev�s�tedtheUn�tedStates.Whencr�t�csbroughtupthefactthatTruj�llowasad�ctator,rooseveltreportedlysa�d:“hemaybeanS.O.b.,buthe�sourS.O.b.”Quoted�nThomasG.Patersonetal.,American Foreign Relations: A History,vol.2,4thed.(lex�ngton:D.C.heath,1995),188. 62. memorandum,laddtohoover,4September1942,Fbi65–29514–(�lleg�ble);mem-orandum,Tammtoladd,5September1942,Fbi65–29514–32. 63. letterandenclosure,UndersecretaryofStateSumnerWellestoroosevelt,27July1942,Pres�dent’sSecretary’sF�le,Conf�dent�alF�le,StateDepartment,FDrl.

113Focus: Mid-1941 to Summer 194�

had approached h�m for not report�ng the quest�onable checks on h�s�ncometaxreturn,butheconv�ncedthemthat the �nc�dentwasben�gn.nevertheless, F�sh bel�eved the internal revenue bureau’s �nterest wasnoth�ngbutarooseveltadm�n�strat�oneffortto“geth�m.”64

by the late summerof1942, theWh�tehouseasked theFbi to look�nto one last matter concern�ng F�sh. On 22 august, Colonel harmanbeukema—an �nstructor at West Po�nt—wrote Pres�dent�al SecretaryWatsonthatF�shpossessedaphotographofroosevelt’shydeParkl�braryshow�ng a br�t�sh flag d�splayed above an amer�can one. accord�ng tobeukema, F�sh bel�eved he could use the photo to “hang the pres�dent”pol�t�cally.Sens�t�vetoth�sreport,rooseveltd�rectedanotherofh�ssecre-tar�es,marv�nmcintyre,to“havetheF.b.i.look�ntoth�s.”hooverrepl�edthattheallegedphotowas�nreal�tyasketchand,accord�ngtoF�sh’scon-f�dants,thecongressmanbel�eved�tcouldbeused“�fhewantedtocausealotofdamagetoPres�dentroosevelt.”F�sh,hooverreported,haddec�dedaga�nst us�ng the sketch. as compared to F�sh’s other act�v�t�es th�s onepales �n s�gn�f�cance, but �t �s �llustrat�ve of how roosevelt often rel�edupontheFbitover�fypol�t�callysens�t�ve�nformat�onandhowtheFbi,atth�spo�nt,operatedasthe�ntell�gencearmoftheWh�tehouse.65

64. memorandum,l.l.laughl�ntoa.h.belmont,17February1951,Fbi65–29514–45. 65. letter,hermanbeukematoWatson,22august1942;memorandum,roosevelttomcintyre,3September1942;conf�dent�almemorandum,mcintyretohoover,4September1942;personalandconf�dent�almemorandum,hoovertomcintyre,9September1942;per-sonalandconf�dent�almemorandum,hoovertomcintyre,6november1942,all�nOff�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl.

RetributionThe FBI and the Victory Program Leak

4 December 1941 to Mid-1942

On 4 December 1941, the Chicago Tribune and �ts s�ster paper, theWashingtonTimes-Herald,publ�shedasensat�onalstorythatreverberated�n the already b�tter and deadlocked ant�-�ntervent�on�st/�ntervent�on�stfore�gnpol�cydebate.1JustthreedaysbeforetheJapaneseattackonPearlharbor, the twonewspapersexposeda top-secretWarDepartmentcon-t�ngencyplancommonlyreferredto�ngovernmentc�rclesasthev�ctoryProgram.Carr�edunderthebannerheadl�ne“F.D.r.’SWarPlanS!”thestoryseemedtoconf�rmthedarkestsusp�c�onoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stswhosawtheplanasev�denceofroosevelt’sdupl�c�tyandbe�ng�ntentonlead�ngtheUn�tedStates�ntotheeuropeanwar.intervent�on�sts,ontheother hand, v�ewed the revelat�on as tra�torous behav�or on the part ofroosevelt’scr�t�cs. The pol�t�cal consequences of th�s leak tr�ggered an �nvest�gat�on to�dent�fywhohadprov�dedthesecretm�l�taryplantotheChicago Tribune.asthecountry’sch�effederal lawenforcementagency,theFbiwasdele-gatedtherespons�b�l�ty,ratherthanthem�l�tary,fordeterm�n�ngwhohadleakedthedocument. in theensu�ng �nvest�gat�on,FbiD�rectorhooversparednoeffortand,�ndeed,theaffa�rreflectedh�spragmat�smwhereby�n return for placat�ng adm�n�strat�on des�res he ga�ned �ncreased favoramongadm�n�strat�onpersonnel.hel�kelypursuedthematterw�thsuchélanassomeh�gh-rank�ngmembersoftherooseveltadm�n�strat�onav�d-lysoughttoholdtheant�-�ntervent�on�stsrespons�blefortheleak.yetthe

1. robert mcCorm�ck’s Chicago Tribune was loosely connected, by fam�l�al t�es, topapers of s�m�lar pol�t�cal �lk. Joseph Patterson, h�s cous�n, founded the New York Daily Newsandh�sothercous�n,C�ssyPatterson,waspubl�sheroftheWashington Times Herald.Seer�chardnortonSm�th’sThe Colonel: The Life and Legend of Robert R. McCormick(newyork:houghtonm�ffl�n,1997).

ChApter 5

114

115Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

leakoftheplanwasnotthenat�onalsecur�tybreachthatsomeperce�ved;rather,asacont�ngencyplanonly, �tsrevelat�onservedtoembarrasstheadm�n�strat�onandg�vepol�t�cal f�re totheant�-�ntervent�on�sts.byser-v�c�ng adm�n�strat�on �nterests, hoover placed h�mself �n good stand�ngw�thlead�ngoff�c�als�ntheadm�n�strat�on. Theleakandsubsequent�nvest�gat�ond�dnothavelegs,however,asamajor�ssueforamer�cans.becausetheplanwasrevealedjustdaysbeforetheamer�canentrance�ntotheSecondWorldWar,�twasovershadowedqu�ckly �n thepubl�cm�ndand thepress.nevertheless, the �ssue st�rreddeeply held emot�ons on both s�des of the fore�gn pol�cy debate, evenextend�ng �nto 1942. The �nvest�gat�on, moreover, reached and �nvolvedmany prom�nent members of the ant�-�ntervent�on�st commun�ty to�ncludeoneU.S.representat�ve,twoU.S.senators,ahostofm�l�taryoff�-cers, Charles l�ndbergh, henry Ford, and reporters and staff from theChicago Tribune. Unt�l now, the Fbi’s �nvest�gat�on �n th�s ep�sode hasneverbeforebeenfullydocumented.2 Thepersonmostrespons�blefordevelop�ngthev�ctoryProgram,andthemanwhobecameapr�maryfocusofFbi�nvest�gators,wasarmymajoralbertC.Wedemeyer.abr�efsketchofWedemeyer’sb�ographysuggestswhy he became the focus of government �nvest�gators, why some of h�sbel�efs �nterested Fbi agents, and, f�nally, why he acted as he d�d �n theface of an Fbi �nvest�gat�on. a nat�ve nebraskan of German extract�on,Wedemeyerrece�vedaJesu�teducat�onsteeped�n�dealsofdutyandobl�-gat�on.Follow�ngh�sh�ghschoolgraduat�on,�n1916Wedemeyerwonanappo�ntment to the Un�ted States m�l�tary academy at West Po�nt fromSenator George W. norr�s. W�th the cr�s�s of the Great War of 1914–18andamer�ca’slateentrance�ntothatconfl�ct,Wedemeyerwasgraduatedearlyfromtheacademybutneverpart�c�pated�nanycombat.Then,�nthe�mmed�ate postwar years, as a newly m�nted jun�or off�cer, Wedemeyerstud�ed�nfantrytact�csandwasass�gneddutyasam�l�tary�nstructorandlaterassumedcommandofanart�lleryun�t.3

as an army off�cer, Wedemeyer served �n a var�ety of capac�t�esbetween 1923 and 1934. he spent three years �n the Ph�l�pp�nes as an

2. Theleakofthev�ctoryProgramhasbeenreferredtocountlesst�mes�nbooksandart�cles,buttherearetwobooksthatdescr�bethecreat�onoftheplan�tself(seebelow).Theonlyworksthatdescr�betheFbi’s�nvest�gat�onarealbertWedemeyer’smemo�r,wh�chonlyconcernsh�s�nvolvement,andasketchyandspeculat�veart�clebyThomasFlem�ng.Seenote71. 3. Charlese.K�rkpatr�ck,An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Vic-tory Plan of 1941(Wash�ngton,DC:Centerform�l�taryh�story,1990),6–7.

11� Chapter 5

�nfantry off�cer, and then became a staff off�cer. ass�gned staff duty �nWash�ngton,D.C.,Ch�na,andthePh�l�pp�nes(aga�n),Wedemeyerlearnedthef�nerdeta�lsofarmystaffwork.h�sworkthenwonh�m,�n1934,anappo�ntmenttotheCommandandGeneralStaffCollege�nleavenworth,Kansas,wherehegraduatedw�thhonors.Thecollege’scommandantwasso �mpressed w�th Wedemeyer’s work that he nom�nated h�m to studyeuropeanm�l�tarytact�cs�nGermanyattheKriegsakademie,theGermanStaffCollege.So,�n1936,WedemeyerdepartedforGermany.4 Dur�ngh�stwo-yearst�nt�nberl�n,Wedemeyerlearnedmuch�nthewayofwarmak�ngandwarpreparat�on.buth�str�p,wh�ledec�dedlyuse-ful�nexpand�ngh�sunderstand�ngofm�l�tarypreparedness,�nlateryearsled �nvest�gators to quest�on the off�cer’s loyalt�es am�d popular not�onsof naz� �ntr�gue among amer�ca F�rsters—wh�ch �ncluded Wedemeyer.add�ng to h�s later troubles, dur�ng h�s br�ef ass�gnment �n Germany,Wedemeyerwasaffordedspec�alpr�v�legesnotcommonlygrantedfore�gnv�s�tors. he part�c�pated �n German m�l�tary maneuvers and cult�vatedpersonalrelat�onsh�psw�thseveralh�gh-rank�ngmembersoftheGermanm�l�tary,�nclud�ngClausvonStauffenberg,majorFerd�nandJodl—broth-ertoh�tler’slaterarmych�efofstaff—andthearmych�efofstaff,ludw�gbeck.WedemeyerlearnedmuchaboutGermanpreparednessandstrategyfromh�sGermancontacts.h�s tourproved tobe sovaluable thatupon�tsconclus�onhesubm�ttedareport�n1938toGeneralGeorgemarshall,then ch�ef of the War Plans D�v�s�on. Undoubtedly �mpressed by th�sreport,marshall later elevatedWedemeyer to theWarPlansD�v�s�on �nmay1941,bywh�cht�memarshallhadr�sentoch�efofstaff.5 Wedemeyer’st�me�nGermanyalsocontr�butedtoh�slaterant�-�nter-vent�on�sm. Wr�t�ng �n 1958, Wedemeyer stated that dur�ng h�s stay �nGermanyhehad“d�scernedagreatdealoftruthaboutCommun�sta�ms,pract�ces,andmethodsunknownor �gnored �namer�caunt�l recently.”6he had also come to regard naz� Germany �n a pos�t�ve fash�on. “[m]ytwoyearsexper�encew�ththeGermanpeople�ngeneralandthem�l�tarypedagogy�npart�cular,”hewroteWalterTrohan,“hadcausedmetoren-der favorable reports concern�ng them.”7 Wedemeyer, moreover, saw �nnaz�Germanyabulwarkaga�nstCommun�struss�a.Toh�m“theGermansearch for Lebensraum d�d not menace the Western World to anyth�ng

4. ib�d.,7–9. 5. ib�d.,9–11. 6. albertC.Wedemerer,Wedemeyer Reports! 4. 7. letter,WedemeyertoWalterTrohan,27november1953,WedemeyerPapers,box139,hooverinst�tut�onarch�ves(hereafterhia),StanfordUn�vers�ty,Paloalto,Ca.

11�Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

l�ke the same degree as the worldw�de Commun�st consp�racy centered�nmoscow.”Wedemeyer’sv�ews,as such, sharedacommonthreadw�ththose of another ardent ant�-�ntervent�on�st, Charles l�ndbergh. bothWedemeyer and l�ndbergh had spent t�me �n naz� Germany between1936and1938,andbothwere�mpressedw�thwhattheyhadseen.both,moreover,wrotefavorablereportsonGermanprogress.Probablyw�thnosurpr�se,bothmensubsequentlybecametargetsofFbi�nvest�gat�onsdue,�npart,tosusp�c�onscastbythe�rt�mespent�nnaz�Germany.8

—■■■■■■■—

Follow�ng passage of the lend-lease act �n march 1941, the amer�cangovernment was faced w�th the task of arrang�ng procurement of war-related matér�el for Great br�ta�n. The War Department was delegatedrespons�b�l�ty fordeterm�n�ngtheprojectedneedsof lend-lease,butwasg�ven no spec�f�c d�rect�on from sen�or adm�n�strat�on off�c�als. WarDepartment personnel nevertheless began to develop var�ous plans tocopew�thlend-leaseneeds.F�nd�ng�td�ff�culttodevelopav�ableschemew�thoutadm�n�strat�ond�rect�on,UndersecretaryofWarrobertPattersonrequested from h�s super�or—Secretary of War St�mson—an est�mate oftheoverallneedsofaposs�blewart�meamer�can�ndustry.On18apr�lherequested“adec�s�onastotheult�matemun�t�onsproduct�onrequ�redbytheWarDepartmentsothatappropr�ateplanscanbestarted.”9

accord�ng to the off�c�al h�story of the v�ctory Program, SecretarySt�msonwholeheartedlyagreedw�ththeundersecretary’sdes�reformorespec�f�cd�rect�on.TheWarDepartmentcont�nuedtofumbleaboutdevel-op�ng a plan for wh�ch m�l�tary off�c�als had no nat�onal strateg�c goalsorest�mates.That �s,unt�l9 July1941,whenPres�dentroosevelt f�nallystepped�nandorderedh�ssecretar�esofwarandnavytoexplore“atoncethe overall product�on requ�rements requ�red to defeat our potent�alenem�es.” The off�c�al h�story suggests that Undersecretary Patterson’sexecut�veoff�cer,Generalburns,whowastheWarDepartment’sl�a�sontotheWh�tehouse,had�nfluencedlend-leasesuperv�sorharryhopk�nsto

8. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!10–12;WayneS.Cole,Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle against American Intervention in World War II(newyork:harcourtbraceJova-nov�ch,1974),33–37. 9. memorandum,UndersecretaryofWarrobertPattersontoSecretaryofWarhenrySt�mson,18apr�l1941,repr�nted�nmarkSk�nnerWatson,United States Army in World War II, the War Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations(Wash�ngton,DC:U.S.GovernmentPr�nt�ngOff�ce,1950),332.

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br�ngpressureupontheWh�tehouseford�rect�on.Whateverthemannerofevents,roosevelt’sd�rect�ve,afteraper�odofconfus�on,putthedepart-mentontrack.10

Soon thereafter, respons�b�l�ty for draw�ng up a global wart�me con-t�ngencyplandevolvedfromthesecretaryofwartoGeneralmarshalltoGeneralleonardGerowoftheWarPlansD�v�s�on—theun�trespons�blefor creat�ng m�l�tary plans—and f�nally to major albert C. Wedemeyer.as Wedemeyer later po�nted out, never before had amer�can m�l�taryauthor�t�esdev�sedsuchanall-encompass�ngplan.“itmeanttravel�ngonunchartedseasw�thoutacompasstowardafatalShangr�-la,”Wedemeyerwrote, “s�nce no nat�onal a�ms or strateg�c object�ves were g�ven us.”Desp�teth�s�mped�ment,Wedemeyercoord�natedw�thothergovernmentdepartments to acqu�re the �nformat�on he needed. Due to the project’ssens�t�v�ty,however,allworkwascarr�edout�nsecret.Thenavyconcur-rentlydrafted�tsownest�matesthatweresubsequentlyaddedtothelargerplanWarDepartmentoff�c�alshaddeveloped.11

Wedemeyerwasan�ron�ccho�cetodevelopacont�ngencyplandes�gn-ed“todefeatourpotent�alenem�es.”Wh�lebe�ngselectedtop�ecetogetherthev�ctoryProgram,albertWedemeyerwasalsoaconf�rmedadvocateofamer�can�solat�onfromfore�gnwar.Or, �nthev�ewof �ntervent�on-�sts,Wedemeyerwasan�solat�on�st.Fromh�sbroadread�ngonwarandnat�onal strateg�c plann�ng, Wedemeyer was conv�nced that amer�can�nvolvement �n a second worldw�de m�l�tary confl�ct would lead onlyto nat�onal devastat�on. yet, desp�te h�s underly�ng ant�-�ntervent�on�stpol�t�cal v�ews, Wedemeyer’s Jesu�t�cal and m�l�tary sense of duty kepth�mfocusedonh�sass�gnedtask.“itwasmyjob,”hewroteyearslater,“toant�c�patedevelopmentsandcont�nuouslymakeplanssothatmycountrywouldbepreparedforanycont�ngencywh�chfate,pol�t�c�ans,orpower-drunkleadersm�ghtprec�p�tate.”12

Work�ngw�thastaffofs�x,Wedemeyersetaboutdevelop�nganat�onalplanforwart�meproduct�onest�mates.butthemajorst�lllackedtwokeyp�ecesof�nformat�ontocreateacoherentplan:anat�onalwart�meobjec-t�veandam�l�tarystrategytoreal�zethatobject�ve.W�thoutsuchd�rect�onfromtheadm�n�strat�on,wh�chwasneverformallydec�dedupon�n1941,

10. letter, roosevelt to Secretar�es of War and navy, 9 July 1941, repr�nted �n �b�d.,338–39. 11. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!16–17;bl�ndmemorandum,publ�cat�on �nChi-cago Tribune and Washington Times-Herald of army and navy est�mate of Un�ted StatesOver-allProduct�onrequ�rements,5December1941,Fbi65–39945–23. 12. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!14.

119Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

Wedemeyercouldnotarr�veatanyusefulf�gures.Onh�sown,therefore,hedraftedanassessmentofnat�onalobject�vesandsubm�ttedth�sstate-ment to Secretary of War St�mson for approval. St�mson approved themajor’sstatementafterwh�chWedemeyerdev�sedaplanthatwasbasedontheassumpt�onthattheUn�tedStateswould“el�m�natetotal�tar�an�smfromeurope,”ally�tselfw�thGreatbr�ta�n,and“denytheJapaneseund�s-putedcontrolofthewesternPac�f�c.”13

Wedemeyer’sstaffworkedd�l�gentlyonthev�ctoryProgramthrough-out the summerof1941, and �na relat�vely shortper�odof t�me—fromJuly, when roosevelt requested a nat�onal est�mate, to September, whenthearmy’splanwassubm�tted—theycompletedthe�rtask.avastnumberofgovernmentresourceswereusedtocreateapol�t�co-m�l�taryplanofascaleneverbeforeseen�namer�canh�story.between20and25Septemberthe completed plan was d�str�buted to the h�ghest-rank�ng members ofthe War Department and later g�ven to the pres�dent. but Wedemeyer’ssenseofaccompl�shmentwasqu�cklydashedwhen,on4December1941,thefru�tsofh�stop-secret laborrece�vedbannerheadl�nes �ntwoofthenat�on’smostprom�nentant�-�ntervent�on�stnewspapers.14

—■■■■■■■—

Follow�ngtheChicago Tribune’sandWashington Times-Herald’spubl�shedaccount of the v�ctory Program, Wedemeyer’s l�fe became markedlyuncomfortable. he v�v�dly recalled that morn�ng when he arr�ved at h�soff�ce�nthemun�t�onsbu�ld�ng:

i sensed at once an atmosphere of exc�tement. Off�cers were m�ll�ngaroundandtherewasabuzzofconversat�onwh�chceasedabruptlyasmysecretary,�nv�s�bleag�tat�on,handedmeacopyoftheWash�ngtonTimes-Herald.Theroomwass�lentandalleyesweref�xeduponmeasireadthescream�ngbannerheadl�nes....icouldnothavebeenmoreappalledandastounded�fabombhadbeendroppedonWash�ngton.15

13. K�rkpatr�ck, An Unknown Future, 60–62; �nterv�ew w�th General Wedemeyer, 24apr�l1987,quoted�nK�rkpatr�ck,An Unknown Future,63. 14. bl�nd memorandum, publ�cat�on �n Chicago Tribune and Washington Times-Her-ald of army and navy est�mate of Un�ted States Over-all Product�on requ�rements, 5December1941,Fbi65–39945–23.Fordeta�ledh�stor�esofthecomp�lat�onofthev�ctoryProgram,seeK�rkpatr�ck,An Unknown Future,andWatson,United States Army in World War II. 15. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!15–16.

1�0 Chapter 5

The developer of the top-secret cont�ngency plan had cause to be wor-r�ed,forhewasrespons�ble,toalargedegree,for�tssecur�ty.Thenews-paper story, wr�tten by the Tribune’s Chesly manly, gave deta�ls of theplan, �nclud�ng�tsest�matesfora10,000,000-plus-mancomb�nedarmedforcecons�st�ngofa1,100,000-mannavy,a150,000-manmar�necorps,a6,745,000-man army, and a 2,050,000-man army a�r force. add�t�onally,the art�cle repr�nted �n �ts ent�rety Pres�dent roosevelt’s 9 July memo-randum author�z�ng the plan to h�s war secretar�es. Quot�ng extens�velyfromthev�ctoryProgram,theant�-�ntervent�on�stpaperconcludedthattheplanwasproofthatroosevelthadno�ntent�onofkeep�ngamer�canarmedforcesw�th�ntheWesternhem�sphere,ashehadprev�ouslyprom-�sed.Thestorybecamean�mmed�atepol�t�calsensat�on.16

ant�-�ntervent�on�sts dep�cted the revelat�on as a smok�ng gun. Tothem, the v�ctory Program was clear ev�dence that roosevelt had beenpurposefully maneuver�ng the country �nto war. moreover, ant�-�nter-vent�on�stsplannedtousetherevelat�ontothe�radvantage.ruthSarles,d�rector of the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee’s speakers bureau, advocatedd�str�but�ngtheplanacrossthecountry“�ntensofthousands.”Shehoped“thateveryspeakerwhogoesontheplatformforaF[amer�caF�rst]w�lldenounce �t �nr�ng�ng terms, thatallw�llhammer ‘noaeF’ [amer�canexped�t�onary Force].”17 One republ�can ant�-�ntervent�on�st congress-man, h. Carl anderson of m�nnesota, remarked to an amer�ca F�rstrepresentat�vethatthepubl�cat�on“v�nd�cateswhatwehavebeensay�ngr�ghtalong.abl�ndmancouldseethrough�tall.”republ�canDanreedofnewyorkpred�ctedthat“[w]henth�sstorygetsaroundtothepeople�tw�llstrengthenourcausegreatly.”18

intervent�on�sts,on theotherhand,v�ewed the leak �n str�k�nglyd�f-ferent terms.SenatorCarterGlassofv�rg�n�a,honorarycha�rmanof therab�dly �ntervent�on�st F�ght for Freedom Comm�ttee, commented that“the freedom of the press was never �ntended to extend to people whotreasonablymakepubl�carmyandnavysecretplans.”19“itwasascandalous

16. Washington Times-Herald,4December1941. 17. letter,ruthSarlestor.DouglasStuartJr.,6December1941,amer�caF�rstCom-m�tteePapers,box239,hia. 18. Generalreport,Fredburd�ck,4December1941,�nJustusD.Doenecke,ed.,In Dan-ger Undaunted:The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940–1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford,Ca:hooverinst�tut�onPress,1990),436–38.Th�scomp�lat�onofdocuments �sanextremelyuseful resource.Theamer�caF�rstComm�tteepapersarest�llwoefullyunorgan�zedand,thus,veryd�ff�culttoresearchw�thoutspend�ngan�nord�nateamountoft�mes�ft�ngthroughhundredsofvaguelymarkedboxesandfolders. 19. letter,SenatorCarterGlasstob�shophenryW.hobson,8December1941,F�ght

1�1Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

th�ngtohavehappen,”SecretaryofWarSt�msonnoted�nh�sd�ary,“andwastyp�calofthementalatt�tudeofthe�solat�on�stsatthatt�me.”20andwhereas the ant�-�ntervent�on�sts hoped to use the v�ctory Program tost�mulateoppos�t�ontoroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy,St�msonhadarelated,�foppos�ng,object�ve:“Theth�ngtodo�stomeetthematterheadonanduseth�soccurrence�fposs�bletoshakeouramer�canpeopleoutofthe�r�nfernalapathyand�gnoranceofwhatth�swarmeans.”21

The Wh�te house also del�berated over how to handle the s�tuat�on.Onthemorn�ngof4December,accord�ngtoSecretarySt�mson’saccount,w�thouthav�ngconsultedw�ththepres�dent,Wh�tehousePressSecretaryStevenearlyheldapressconference.earlystatedthatnoone�ntheWh�tehouse but the pres�dent had knowledge of the v�ctory Program. Whenasked�ftherewereanyconfl�ctsof�nterestforothernewspaperstorepr�ntthemanlystoryw�thoutv�olat�ngvoluntarycensorsh�prestr�ct�ons,earlyrepl�ed:“idon’tth�nkanyonewouldbecorrect�npr�nt�ng�tunlesstheygot�tfromagovernmentsource,unlesstheyattr�buted�ttothepaperthatbu�ltthestory.”headded,“icons�derthepress�soperat�ngasafreepressandtherespons�b�l�ty�nth�scase�smoreongovernmentthanthepress,�fthestory�strue.”Th�sawkwardresponsepromptedafurtherquest�onastowhethertheWh�tehousecons�deredthepubl�cat�onastreasonableor unpatr�ot�c. “your r�ght to pr�nt,” early repl�ed, “�s unchallenged andunquest�oned.”22

at the War Department that morn�ng, Secretary of War St�msonrecorded�nh�sd�arythatoff�c�alsthere,suchasass�stantSecretaryofWarJohnJ.mcCloy,had“verylongfaces.”Toh�m“noth�ngmoreunpatr�ot�cordamag�ngtoourplansfordefensecouldverywellbeconce�ved”thanthatdonebytheant�-�ntervent�on�stpress.Concernedaboutearly’scom-mentsath�spressconferenceearl�erthatmorn�ng,St�mson�mmed�atelyphonedroosevelt.Thesecretarycharacter�zedearly’scommentsasfeebleand, accord�ng to St�mson, roosevelt agreed w�th h�m. moreover, thewhole�ssueoftheleak,St�msoncla�med,causedthepres�denttobe“fulloff�ght.”apparentlysens�ngroosevelt’smood,St�msonsuggestedprosecut-�ng those �nvolved �n the leak under the esp�onage act. roosevelt “was

forFreedommanuscr�pts(hereafterFFF),box10,SeeleyG.muddl�brary,Pr�ncetonUn�-vers�ty. 20. entryfor24February1942,henrylew�sSt�msonD�ar�es,37:155(m�crof�lmed.,reel7),manuscr�ptsandarch�ves,yaleUn�vers�tyl�brary,newhaven,CT. 21. entryfor4December1941,St�msonD�ar�es,36:74(m�crof�lmed.,reel7). 22. notesofStephenearlypressconference�nconf�dent�alreport,Josepha.Genau,15January1942,Fbi65–399454–3.

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del�ghted to hear th�s” because he had prev�ously been adv�sed that nov�olat�onoftheacthadoccurred.inthemeant�me,thepres�dentd�rected“thatweshouldnotansweranyquest�onsabout�tatourpressconferencesandthatthef�rstact�ontakenshouldbethearrestofthoserespons�bleforthed�sclosure,�nclud�ng�fposs�blethemanagersofthenewspapers.”23

after further del�berat�on, St�mson concluded that the pres�dent’spol�cyofnotspeak�ngoutontheleakwaswrong.Thesecretarydraftedastatement,phonedthepres�dent,andread�ttoh�m.adv�s�ngthepres�dentthattheWarDepartmenthadascheduledpressconferencethatmorn�ngand he “d�dn’t want to duck such an �mportant matter,” St�mson askedroosevelttoallowh�mtomakeapubl�cstatement.rooseveltagreedandauthor�zedSt�mson’spressstatement.24

Thatday,rooseveltalsohadscheduledapressconference.Preferr�ngtoallowh�swarsecretarytocommentf�rst,St�msonfoundh�spressroom“jammedasneverbefore—peoplestand�ngupallaroundme.”25Thesec-retaryofferedreportersaforcefulandpos�t�vestatementfollowedbytwoquest�ons.heoutl�nedtheWarDepartment’srespons�b�l�t�es:

itdoesnotprecludethestudyofposs�bleeventual�t�es,oneofthepr�marydut�esandrespons�b�l�t�esof theWarDepartment. . . .Fa�lures tomakesuch stud�es would const�tute a ser�ous derel�ct�on on the part of therespons�blem�l�taryauthor�t�es.Theobjectofthestudyreferredtobythepresswastodeterm�neproduct�onrequ�rements....Wearenotprepar�ngtroopsnorhaveweaskedforfundsforana.e.F.

What would you th�nk of an amer�can General Staff wh�ch �n thepresent cond�t�onof theworldd�dnot �nvest�gateand studyeverycon-ce�vable typeof emergencywh�chmayconfront th�s country, andeveryposs�ble method of meet�ng that emergency? What do you th�nk of thepatr�ot�sm of a man or newspaper wh�ch would take those conf�dent�alstud�esandmakethempubl�ctotheenem�esofth�scountry?26

23. entryfor4December1941,St�msonD�ar�es,36:73–4(m�crof�lmed.,reel7).Ontherooseveltadm�n�strat�on’sandFbi’sconcernsw�ththe“�solat�on�st”press,seeathanTheo-har�s,“TheFbi,therooseveltadm�n�strat�on,andthe‘Subvers�ve’Press,”Journalism His-tory19(Spr�ng1993):3–10.Forananalys�sofroosevelt’suseofmassmed�atoadvanceh�sfore�gnpol�cyagenda,seer�chardW.Steele,“TheGreatDebate:roosevelt,themed�a,andtheCom�ngoftheWar,1940–1941,”Journal of American History71(June1984):69–92. 24. entryfor5December1941,St�msonD�ar�es,36:75(m�crof�lmed.,reel7). 25. ib�d. 26. StatementmadebySecretaryofWarSt�mson,5December1941,repr�nted�nWatson,United States Army in World War II,359.

1�3Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

atacab�netmeet�nglaterthatday,rooseveltexpla�nedtoh�sdepart-mentheadsh�sdec�s�ontoperm�tSt�mson’scomment.Wh�lemostofthecab�netsupportedthepres�dent’sdec�s�on,noteveryoneagreedfullyw�thwhatSt�msonhadsa�d.harold ickes, ardentopponentof theant�-�nter-vent�on�sts, found �t tobe“ent�rely toodefens�ve.”v�cePres�denthenryWallaceagreedw�thSt�msonbutobjectedtothequest�onsfollow�ngthesecretary’s statement. in any event, St�mson was not deterred. To h�m,the“extremelyweak”commentsofPressSecretaryearly,“wh�chv�rtuallycondonedthepubl�cat�onofthestatement[v�ctoryProgram]onthebas�sofFreedomofthePress,”just�f�edh�sact�on.27

much of the cab�net meet�ng was spent d�scuss�ng whether to pros-ecute those respons�ble for the v�ctory Program leak. ickes urged thepres�dent to go forward w�th prosecut�ons aga�nst the Chicago TribuneandWashington Times-Herald.Thequest�onoverwhethertheesp�onageactofferedanavenuetoexplo�twassettled, tothecab�net’ssat�sfact�on,when attorney General b�ddle defended such act�on. Then, follow�ngthemeet�ng,St�msonpressedroosevelt topursuechargesofconsp�racyaga�nstthose�nvolved.Thesecretary,moreover,demandedthatthecharg-es be broad and not narrowly focused because, he thought, “�t �s v�tally�mportanttomake...agreatStateprosecut�ontogetr�dofth�s�nfernald�sloyaltywh�chwenowhavework�ng�ntheamer�caF�rstand�nthesemcCorm�ckfam�lypapers.”rooseveltalsometpr�vatelyw�thb�ddle,whoconf�dent�allyadv�sedthepres�dentthathooverhadlearned“thatatleastonecopy[ofthev�ctoryProgram]hadbeenhandedtoaSenatorandthatWheelerwastalk�ngabout�nvest�gat�on.”Keenly�nterested�nth�s�nfor-mat�on,rooseveltprom�sednottosharethedeta�lsw�thanyothercab�netmembers. G�ven the charged atmosphere created w�th the leak, b�ddleprobablyfearedtheworst�funsubstant�ated�nformat�onwasleakedfromtheWh�tehouse.inanyevent,b�ddleauthor�zedtheFbito�nvest�gate.28

Fbi D�rector hoover, �n th�s pol�t�cally charged atmosphere, foundh�mselffrontandcenter�nan�ssuehecouldusetocatertothepol�t�caldes�resofcerta�npowerfuladm�n�strat�onoff�c�alswhosoughtretr�but�onaga�nstant�-�ntervent�on�stcr�t�cs.hebroughttobearthefullresourcesoftheFbi.On4December,hoover,accompan�edbyFbiass�stantD�rectoredward Tamm, met w�th Secretary of the navy Frank Knox and other

27. entryfor5December1941,St�msonD�ar�es,36:76(m�crof�lmed.,reel7). 28. entryfor5December1941,St�msonD�ar�es,36:76(m�crof�lmed.,reel7);haroldl.ickes,The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes(newyork:S�monandSchuster,1954),3:659;noteson5December1941Cab�netmeet�ng,1941Cab�netmeet�ngsfolder,Franc�sb�ddlePapers,Frankl�nD.rooseveltl�brary(hereafterFDrl),hydePark,ny.

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h�gh-rank�ngnavyDepartmentoff�c�als tod�scuss thev�ctoryProgramleak, thenavy’s contr�but�on to �t, andhow the reporthadbeend�str�b-uted.reveal�ngh�spr�or�tytofocusontheadm�n�strat�on’spol�cycr�t�cs,hooverfurther�nqu�redofthenavyoff�c�als“astowhetheranyd�ssens�onoroppos�t�onhadbeenexpressedtowardtheplans.”Otherthand�sagree-mentoverwhethertheplanwaspract�cal,theoff�cerscouldofferno�nfor-mat�onon�nternaloppos�t�ontotheplan�tself.navyoff�c�alsgavehooverareg�steredcopyofthev�ctoryProgramtoass�stFbi�nvest�gators.29

Us�ng th�s copy of the v�ctory Program, Fbi agents �mmed�atelycompared the actual cont�ngency plan w�th that publ�shed by the ant�-�ntervent�on�st press. in so do�ng, the Fbi’s �nvest�gators focused on theth�rty-f�vequotat�onsmadepubl�cfromthev�ctoryProgram.eachquota-t�onwas scrut�n�zed and any �ncons�stency between the two documentswasla�dout�nfulldeta�l.Wh�leFbioff�c�alsfoundnumerousm�norand�ns�gn�f�cant d�screpanc�es—such as a m�splaced comma or an om�ttedword—theyneverthelessconcludedthatthepress�ndeedhadhadaccesstothesecretv�ctoryProgram.30

Wh�letheFbibegan�tsprobe,GeneralGerow�nformedWedemeyerthatthepres�denthadorderedan�nvest�gat�on.Wedemeyerrepl�edthathehadnotleakedanydocuments,but,helaterwrote,“icouldnotbecerta�nthatihadneverneglectedtoexerc�seproperprecaut�ons.”Gerow,hav�ngworked w�th Wedemeyer (who by now had been promoted to colonel)andhav�ngknownh�mpersonally,expressedh�strust�ntheman.G�venWedemeyer’s known ant�-�ntervent�on�st pol�t�cal sympath�es, however,andthefactthathewasrespons�bleforp�ec�ngtogethertheplan,otherssuspected he was gu�lty. ass�stant Secretary of War John J. mcCloy, st�llnew�nh�spos�t�on,orderedWedemeyertoh�soff�cetod�scussthemat-ter. Wh�le Colonel Wedemeyer stood at attent�on, accord�ng to h�s ownaccount,mcCloysa�dtoh�m:“Wedemeyer,there�sbloodonthef�ngersofthepersonwho�srespons�bleforthereleaseofth�stopsecretwarplantothenewspapers.”31

Shortlyafterward,on9December,Wedemeyerwasv�s�tednotunex-pectedlybytwoFbioff�c�als,oneofwhomwasedwardTamm—hoover’s

29. memorandum (for f�le), author unknown, 4 December 1941, Fbi 65–39945–16.TheFbihasw�thheldseveralpagesofth�sdocumentand,thus,theauthorcannotbedeter-m�ned. 30. memorandum(forf�le),attorneyGeneralFranc�sb�ddle,6December1941,b�ddlePapers,FDrl;memorandumfortheD�rector,Deta�ledanalys�softhePres�dent’sWarPlanasQuoted�nnewspaperandComparedw�ththeOr�g�nal,J.a.C�mpermanandDuanel.Traynor,4December1941,Fbi65–39935–17. 31. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!21;letter,albertC.WedemeyertoWalterTro-han,27november1953,WedemeyerPapers,box139,hia.

1�5Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

th�rd �n command. Wedemeyer was understandably concerned. yearslater, �n1957,hedescr�bedtheeventand,wh�lethepassageoft�mehadundoubtedly colored h�s memory, he conveyed h�s last�ng b�tterness:“Whenedgarhoover[sic],Thams[sic,Tamm],GenauandotherFbimendescendeduponme�nmyoff�ce,atthatt�me�nthemun�t�onsbu�ld�ng,about December 1 [sic], 1941, i was confused, worr�ed, and a l�ttle b�tangry.”hedescr�bedthe�nc�dent:“[Fbiagents]descendeduponmel�kevulturesuponaprostrateantelope.”32

Desp�te h�s v�v�d descr�pt�on of the Fbi off�c�als’ v�s�t, Wedemeyerdescr�bedTammas“socourteousas tobed�sarm�ng.”TheFbiass�stantd�rectoraskedwhetherWedemeyerknewhowtheWarDepartment’ssecu-r�ty protocols had been breached, and how he had ensured the secur�tyofthesens�t�vedocumentsunderh�scare.Wedemeyercharacter�zedth�sf�rstmeet�ngw�thFbioff�c�alsascenter�ngonevaluat�ngh�s“s�ncer�tyandsenseofrespons�b�l�ty.”heconveyedh�sconcernthathemayhavebeencarelessatsomepo�nt,butotherw�seWedemeyercla�mednottohaveanysenseofgu�lt.33

atasubsequent�nterv�ew,FbiagentsaskedhowWedemeyerd�sposedofthef�nalcop�esofthev�ctoryProgram.atonepo�nt�nthe�nterv�ew,heconfused thedatesas towhenhegaveSecretarySt�msonh�scopyofthe plan. That he confused the dates was a red flag to Fbi agents. Theconfus�onwasnotsurpr�s�ng,however,s�ncetheplanwascompletedon10 September but not fully assembled (w�th the navy port�on) and d�s-tr�butedunt�l25September.Wedemeyer’sconfus�onrevealsno�mportant�ncons�stency.ToFbioff�c�als,whoregardedtheant�-�ntervent�on�stcolo-nelasapr�mesuspect,however,th�ssl�pwass�gn�f�cant.Suspect�ngthatthev�ctoryProgramhadbeenleakeddur�ngth�sSeptemberper�od,Fbiagentsconcluded:

ColonelWedemeyerwasvery�llateasedur�ngth�s�nterv�ewandseveralt�mesfellbackupontheoldadage,“icouldnotremember,”andseemedtobeth�nk�ngupexcusesforh�mselfandh�sact�ons....[a]s�twasnotunt�lthem�ddleofOctober,1941,thatColonel[r�chard]Scobeyrece�ved�nstruct�onstof�nallyassembleandproducetheent�redocument,ColonelWedemeyerbecomesrespons�bleforanyleakageuptothatdate.34

32. letter,albertC.Wedemeyer toburtonK.Wheeler,22august1957,WedemeyerPapers,box139,hia;letter,albertC.WedemeyertoCheslymanly,22august1957,Wede-meyerPapers,box139,hia.hooverd�dnotattend. 33. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!22–23. 34. report,byJosepha.Genau,15January1942,Fbi65–39945–3,pp.28–30.

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inanother�nterv�ewFbiagentJosephGenauquest�onedWedemeyerabout h�s t�me �n Germany. Genau asked Wedemeyer who �n Germanyhehadbefr�ended,part�cularlythose�nh�gh-rank�ngm�l�taryc�rcles.hethen asked whether the colonel had ma�nta�ned a correspondence w�thanyoftheseGermanfr�ends.Wedemeyerrepl�edthatwhenthewarbegan,h�sGermancorrespondencehaddw�ndled.TheFbiagentalso �nqu�redwhetherWedemeyerhadattendedanynaz�partymeet�ngsbetween1936and1938.Wedemeyeranswered�nthenegat�ve,conced�ng,however,thathadhebeeng�ventheopportun�tyhewouldhaveattendedoutof“cur�os-�ty”toobservef�rsthandthe“masspsychos�sandunusualspectacle.”35

agent Genau then turned h�s quest�on�ng to Wedemeyer’s contactsw�th the ant�-�ntervent�on�st movement. he asked: “Do you have anycontactsw�thapersonorpersonsw�th�ntheamer�caF�rstOrgan�zat�on[sic]?” “yes,” Wedemeyer responded, “i have several fr�ends connectedw�ththatorgan�zat�on:mrs.[robert]Taft,JohnT.Flynn,SenatorWheeler,and Colonel l�ndbergh. i haven’t seen them for some t�me because i’vebeen too busy.” When asked �f he sympath�zed w�th the efforts of theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,Wedemeyerresponded:“inmanyways,yes.”ToFbioff�c�alstheset�eswereas�gn�f�cant�nvest�gat�veleads�ncehoover’sFbi had an �nterest �n and h�story of prov�d�ng pol�t�cal �ntell�gence onsuchprom�nentpol�cycr�t�csand,�fl�nkedtothem,Wedemeyermustbesuspect.36

Th�sanswerpromptedfurtherquest�onsaboutWedemeyer’sconnec-t�ons w�th the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee. Genau was part�cularly �nter-ested �nWedemeyer’s connect�ons toCharlesl�ndbergh.respond�ng toaser�esofquest�ons,Wedemeyeradm�ttedtohav�ngf�rstmetl�ndbergh�n Germany dur�ng h�s tour there �n 1938 and then to hav�ng met w�thl�ndbergh“occas�onally”�ntheUn�tedStates.Genauwasalso�nterested�nWedemeyer’sstatementthat“irespecth�mandagreew�thmanyofh�s�deasconcern�ngourentrance�ntothewar.”Genauthereupon�nqu�redastowhenhehadmetw�thl�ndbergh�namer�ca,themostrecentmeet�ngonly hav�ng been, Wedemeyer sa�d, one month past. Wedemeyer addedfurtherthath�sv�s�tswerepurelysoc�alandtheyonlyd�scussednat�onaland�nternat�onalpol�t�cs.nevertheless,toFbioff�c�alsWedemeyer’sl�nkw�thl�ndbergh—themostpopularand�nfluent�alofroosevelt’scr�t�cs—onlyservedtocastfurthersusp�c�onsonthecolonel.37

35. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!32–33. 36. ib�d.,34–35. 37. Wedemeyer,Wedemeyer Reports!40–41.

1��Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

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On6December,adayafterhebr�efedtheattorneygeneralonthev�ctoryProgram�nvest�gat�onforthecab�netmeet�ng,hooversubm�ttedtob�ddleaprel�m�naryreport.hooveradv�sedthatbecauseoftheway�nwh�chWarDepartmentdocumentswerehandled,“�t�s�mposs�bletoaccuratelyandexactly” determ�ne who had leaked the v�ctory Program. Desp�te th�sconclus�on,hooverorderedagents tocont�nue tod�gdeeper to �dent�fytheperpetrator,andheproposedtwocoursesofact�onforb�ddle.F�rst,hooversuggestedconven�ngagrandjurybeforewh�ch,andunderoath,thesuspectswouldbe�nterrogated.Thedrawbacktoth�scourse,hooverreported,wasthat�tm�ghtshedsomeunfavorablel�ghtupontherooseveltadm�n�strat�on.hoover’ssecondrecommendat�on,andtheoneheperson-allyadvocatedduetothesens�t�v�tyof thematter,was“tode-emphas�zethe�nqu�rywh�ch�sbe�ngcarr�edonconcern�ngth�smatter,andtohave�tappearthatthe�nqu�ry�s�naqu�escentstatus.”Th�s,hoovercounseled,wouldenableFbiagentstolocatethe“off�cerorperson”whohadleakedtheplan.b�ddle,apparently,acceptedhoover’ssecondopt�on,butthef�rstwascons�deredatalaterdate.38

Though unable to spec�f�cally �dent�fy the leaker, hoover adv�sedb�ddlethat“thoroughlyrel�ableconf�dent�al�nformants”�nd�catedthatah�gh-rank�nggeneralstaffoff�ceroftheWarDepartmenthadleakedtheplan “to an �solat�on�st Senator.” as for who had leaked the document,hoovernotedthatsomemembersoftheWarDepartment“werenotatall�nsympathyw�ththeadm�n�strat�on’sapparentplansorpreparat�onsforwar.”moreover,theseoff�cers�nd�catedthe�r�nsubord�nat�onbyreferr�ngtothe�rsuper�orsas“boneheads”wh�lehold�ngl�ttlerespectforthe�rab�l�-t�es.another�nformant,whowas“closelyassoc�atedw�thcerta�naspectsof thepubl�cat�onof th�sstory,” �nformedFbiagents that theant�-�nter-vent�on�stpresshadhopedtheleakwouldsparkan“�nsurrect�on”�ntheWarDepartment thatwouldamount toascandal“ofgreaterproport�onthantheDreyfuscase.”39

“There was ample ev�dence to suggest my gu�lt,” albert WedemeyerwrotetonewspapermanWalterTrohan�n1953.40Onapr�mafac�elevel,

38. Personal and str�ctly conf�dent�al memorandum, hoover to b�ddle, 6 December1941,Fbi65–39945–19. 39. Str�ctlypersonalandconf�dent�albl�ndmemorandum,5December1941,Fbi65–39945–19. 40. letter, albert C. Wedemeyer to Walter Trohan, 27 november 1953, WedemeyerPapers,box139,hia.

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thatad�sgruntled“�solat�on�st”w�th�ntheWarDepartmenthadleakedthev�ctoryProgrampo�ntedd�rectlytoWedemeyer.butth�ssusp�c�oncouldnotbeproved,asoneFbiagentreported:

The facts and c�rcumstances surround�ng the preparat�on and handl�ngofth�sreport�ntheper�odbetweenthedatethepres�dentrequested�tonJuly9thandthet�me�twasactuallysubm�ttedtoh�monSeptember25th,andthecomparat�velyw�ded�str�but�onof35m�meographedcop�esofthereportsubsequentto�tsd�str�but�onbytheSecretaryoftheJo�ntPlann�ngboard, make �t �mposs�ble to establ�sh any ev�dence or man�festat�on ofgu�ltyconductonthepartofth�soff�cer[Wedemeyer]atth�st�me.41

Wedemeyer,nevertheless,rema�nedundersusp�c�on.F�rst,Wedemeyerrema�nedasuspectbecauseofthet�mehehadspentattheKriegsakademiebetween1936and1938.Wh�lenotsuff�c�enttocastdoubtonh�sloyaltytotheUn�tedStates,�nformat�onpurport�ngthathewas“mostpro-German�nh�sfeel�ngs,h�sutterances,andh�ssympath�es”alongw�thh�sconnec-t�ons to Charles l�ndbergh d�d, �n fact, lead Fbi off�c�als to suspect h�spol�t�calmot�ves.Th�swasapparentlyconf�rmedtoFbioff�c�alswhentheylearnedWedemeyerhadhotlydebatedw�thfellowoff�cersthe�ssueof“h�slackofsympathyw�ththeadm�n�strat�on’s�nternat�onalprogram.”agentslearned thatWedemeyerwas “opposed to thelend-leaseprogram”andthathewas“very �solat�on�st �nh�sstatementsandsympath�es.”beyondh�s clear pol�t�cal b�ases, Fbi off�c�als took note as well of Wedemeyer’saccesstothedepartment’splanstosendtroopstoicelandand�tsplantooccupy theazores,bothofwh�chhadbeensubject to leaks to theant�-�ntervent�on�stpress.42

ThentheFbi’sspec�alagent�ncharge�nDetro�t,Johnbugas,prov�dedfurther�ncr�m�nat�ngev�dencethatpo�nted,mostl�kely,toWedemeyer.asource�nDetro�thadoverheardaconversat�onbetweenl�ndbergh,henryFord—the automob�le magnate and fellow ant�-�ntervent�on�st—and h�sd�rectorofplantpersonnelandplantsecur�ty,harrybennett.l�ndberghallegedly sa�d that he had rece�ved “cons�derable �nformat�on” from anoff�cer �n the army. Th�s off�cer, whom l�ndbergh had v�s�ted wh�le �nWash�ngton, D.C., �n add�t�on to prov�d�ng l�ndbergh w�th m�l�tary-related �nformat�on, also shared the av�ator’s pol�t�cal sympath�es—l�keWedemeyer.43

41. Str�ctlypersonalandconf�dent�albl�ndmemorandum,5December1941,Fbi65–39945–19,p.4. 42. ib�d.,4–5. 43. memorandum,D.m�ltonladd toedwarda.Tamm,9December1941,Fbi62–

1�9Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

Fbiagentssubsequently�nterv�ewedbennett—whowasprobablythe�r�nformantg�venthefactthatagentshadah�storyofcontact�ngh�m—whoexpla�nedthatFordhadadmon�shedl�ndberghforspeak�ngonm�l�tarymatterss�ncehewasnotanexpert.l�ndberghthenexpla�nedtoFordthathe acqu�red h�s m�l�tary �nformat�on from h�gh-rank�ng army off�cers.bennettcouldnotrecallthenameofth�soff�cer,whotoFbioff�c�alswasl�kelybethe�rleaker,andhealsod�dnotrecalll�ndberghment�on�ngthev�ctoryProgram.44

S�nce bennett could not produce the name of l�ndbergh’s armycontact, Fbi ass�stant D�rector Tamm bel�eved that Ford could. So heorderedtheDetro�tSaCto�nterv�ewFordbuttodoso�nanonconfron-tat�onal way. Del�ghted w�th the progress be�ng made to ascerta�n whohad leakedthev�ctoryProgram,hoover �nstructedh�ssubord�nates to“pressth�s”and“letmeknow[the]result.”45meanwh�le,hooverbr�efedtheattorneygeneral,adv�s�ng that �fFordrevealedl�ndbergh’scontact,“my�dea�stohavetwoofourbestmenseel�ndberg[sic]andcalluponh�mtog�veusthe�nformat�onhehas”and,�fheshouldrefusetorevealh�s �nformat�on, totellh�mthatFordhadalready�dent�f�edtheoff�cer.hooverthenpostulatedthat“wecouldtheng�vecons�derat�on”tosub-poena�ng l�ndbergh to test�fy before a grand jury where he could beforced to“e�ther . . .putupor shutup.”b�ddleagreed,add�ng that theeffortm�ghtperm�tthepres�dentto“cleanoutsome‘brasshats’”fromtheWarDepartment.46

Spec�alagent�nChargebugas�nterv�ewedFord,yethed�dnotknowthe name of l�ndbergh’s War Department contact. hoover’s scheme tolocatetheleakfa�led,butth�sd�dnotdeterbugas,who�nterv�ewedbennettaga�n.bennettsa�dhewouldjustaskl�ndberghwhoh�scontactwas,butbugasadv�sedaga�nstsuchablatantconfrontat�on—probablyfear�ngthatl�ndberghwouldd�scovertheFbi’s�nterest—and,�nstead,bennett�dent�-f�edanotheroff�cerwhoml�ndberghknew,majorJamesh�ggs,whoprob-ablycould�dent�fyl�ndbergh’s“pr�nc�palcontact.”47

19253–304. 44. memorandumformr.Tamm,byD.m�ltonladd,9December1941,Fbi62–19253–304. 45. memorandum,edwarda.TammtoJ.edgarhoover,11December1941,Fbi62–19253–304. 46. memorandum, J. edgar hoover to Clyde Tolson, D. m�lton ladd, and edwardTamm,12December1941,Fbi65–11449–105.l�ndbergh’snamewascommonlym�sspelledbymanyamer�cans. 47. memorandum,edwarda.TammtoJ.edgarhoover,13December1941,Fbi65–11449–113;personalandconf�dent�alletter,JohnS.bugastoedwarda.Tamm,13Decem-ber1941,Fbi65–39945–14.

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On20December1941h�ggswasconfrontedbyFbiass�stantD�rectorTammandtwomiDoff�cers.h�ggs,anat�onalGuardoff�cerwhoworkedasapubl�crelat�onsexpert�nGeneralhenry“hap”arnold’soff�ce,den�edeverhav�ngseenthev�ctoryProgram,anassert�onTammfoundcur�ousbecause h�ggs’s job was to publ�c�ze the army a�r Corps, wh�ch meantthathehadtohaveaccess tom�l�taryest�mates.Themajoralsocla�medtoknowl�ndberghonlyformally,andnotsoc�ally,wh�chTammfoundtobe�ncons�stents�nceh�ggshadreferredtol�ndberghseveralt�mesbyh�sn�ckname,Sl�m.yet,�rrespect�veofthelengthy�nterv�ewand�ncons�sten-c�es�nh�ggs’sremarks,Tammfa�ledtoestabl�shanyleadsonthev�ctoryProgramleak.hed�df�ndh�ggs,however,tobeheav�ly�nvolved�nWarDepartmentpol�t�csand“sculduggery[sic].”48

Wh�le Fbi agents worked ass�duously to conf�rm Wedemeyer (orsomeone else) as the leaker, they also attempted to �dent�fy wh�ch ant�-�ntervent�on�stsenatorhadrece�vedtheplans.Fbiagentsfocusedontwosuspects: Senator burton K. Wheeler of montana and Senator Dav�d i.Walshofmassachusetts.Wheelerwas suspectalmost �mmed�atelyg�venh�sprom�nenceasanant�-�ntervent�on�st (andFbisubject)andbecause�twashewhohadpubl�c�zedthem�l�taryplantosendtroopstoiceland.49Walshbecameasuspect�nJanuary1942whenanunnamed�nformant—ad�saffectedformeremployeeoftheWashington Times-Herald—had�den-t�f�edh�mastherec�p�entofoneoftheth�rty-f�vem�meographedcop�esofthev�ctoryProgramandtheonewhoallegedlyhadprov�ded�ttotheChicago Tribune. The �nformant, who was reportedly “t�ckled to death”toass�sttheFbi,bel�evedthatWalshandCheslymanly,theauthorofthecontrovers�alTribuneart�cle,enjoyedacloserelat�onsh�p.50

interest�ngly,Fbioff�c�alsalmostgot�tr�ght�n�dent�fy�ngthesenatorwhowasg�ventheplan.They�n�t�allybel�evedthatWheelerwasthe�rmanbutlaterfocusedonWalshasthe�rpr�marysuspect,probablybecauseofh�s connect�on �n the contract fraud and homosexual cases. They were

48. memorandum,edwarda.TammtoJ.edgarhoover,27December1941,Fbi100–12691[?].Thecompletedocumentnumber�sunreadable;suff�ce�ttosaythememorandum�s�ncluded�nthef�leonthev�ctoryProgramleak:f�le65–39945.Transcr�ptofh�ggs�nter-v�ew�nreport,byJosepha.Genau,15January1941,Fbi65–39945–3,pp.35–48. 49. Conf�dent�alWarDepartmentmemorandum,Grenv�lleClarktoass�stantSecretaryofWarJohnJ.mcCloy,4December1941,Fbi65–39945–26;memorandum,ass�stantD�rec-torlou�sn�cholstoroberte.W�ck,25January1952,Fbi65–39945–62. 50. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,ass�stantD�rectorP.e.FoxworthtoJ.edgarhoover,20January1942,Fbi65–39945–35;memorandum,D.m�ltonladdtoedwarda.Tamm,21January1942,Fbi65–39945-[?];personalandconf�dent�al letter,S.K.mcKeetoJ.edgarhoover,22January1942,Fbi100–3709-[?].

131Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

wrong.SenatorWheelerhad,�nfact,beentherec�p�entoftheplanandhadprov�ded�ttoCheslymanly;Wheelerpubl�clyadm�ttedasmuch�n1962. Wheeler’srole�nthev�ctoryProgramleakbeganon8June1940,thedayafterhehaddel�veredanat�onallybroadcastspeech�nwh�chheurgedamer�canstorema�ncalm�nthefaceofevents�neurope.accord�ngtoWheeler’saccount,acapta�n�nthearmya�rCorpsthenv�s�tedh�m�nh�sSenateoff�ceandofferedtoprov�dethesenatorw�thoff�c�alm�l�taryf�g-ureswh�lewarn�ngthesenatorthattheamer�cana�rforceswerenomatchfornaz�Germany’s.Theoff�cer further stated thatanyonewhocla�medtothecontrarywasly�ng.Wheeler’srelat�onsh�pw�thth�sm�l�tarysourcebecome�nt�mateandlong-last�ng;thesenator,moreover,tookth�sman’snamew�thh�mtoh�sgrave.51

aboutayearandahalfaftermeet�ngth�soff�cer,he�nformedWheelerthatroosevelthadorderedthecreat�onofamasterplanforanamer�canexped�t�onaryforcetoeurope.Fasc�natedbyth�scla�m,�nSeptember1941Wheelerasked�fthecapta�ncouldprov�deh�mw�thacopy.heagreedtothe senator’s requestbutwasunable to securea copyunt�l 3December.That day, he del�vered the v�ctory Program “wrapped �n brown paper”toWheeler’shome.Wheeleraskedthecapta�nwhyheagreedtoleakth�splan,towh�chherepl�ed:“Congress�sabranchofgovernment.ith�nk�thadar�ghttoknowwhat’sreallygo�ngon�ntheexecut�vebranchwhen�tconcernshumanl�ves.”Wheelerkepttheplanovern�ghttostudy�t.52

“as i scanned �ts contents,” Wheeler subsequently wrote, “my bloodpressurerose.”Thesenatorbel�evedthatg�ventheway�nwh�chroosevelthadcouchedtheneutral�tyacts,lend-lease,andthedestroyers-for-basesdealasdefens�vemeasuresmeanttoensureamer�can�solat�onfromwar,reveal�ngthev�ctoryProgramwouldundercutthoseseem�nglyspec�ousarguments. Wheeler wanted to prove to amer�cans that �f the countrycont�nuedon�tspresentcourse thatwarwas �nev�table;andthev�ctoryProgram only underscored that prem�se. add�t�onally, Wheeler d�dnotbel�eve that reveal�ng th�s top-secretplanwasav�olat�onof the lawbecause �t was only a cont�ngency plan of product�on requ�rements and

51. burtonK.Wheelerw�thPaulF.healy,Yankee from the West(newyork:Doubleday,1962),21. 52. asquoted�nWheelerandhealy,Yankee from the West,32.Wheelersuspectedthatasen�oroff�cer�ntheWarDepartmenthadauthor�zedthev�ctoryProgram’sreleasetoh�m.accord�ngtonewspapermanWalterTrohan,Wheelerbel�evedthatarmya�rCorpsGen-eralhenryarnold—whowassympathet�ctotheant�-�ntervent�on�sts—wasatthecenteroftherelease.albertWedemeyer,however,stronglyd�sagreedw�thTrohan’sbel�ef.Seeletter,WalterTrohantoalbertWedemeyer,25november1953,andletter,albertWedemeyertoWalterTrohan,27november1953,WedemeyerPapers,box139,hia.

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notanoperat�onalwarplan.hesawno leg�t�matereasonnot to �nformthepubl�c.53

Wheelerdec�dedthatthebestwaytomakepubl�cthev�ctoryProgramwas to ensure �ts publ�cat�on �n a paper sympathet�c to the ant�-�nter-vent�on�stcause.hethereforedec�dedtoshare�tw�thCheslymanly,theChicago Tribune’sWash�ngtoncorrespondent,because“il�kedmanlyandknew h�s paper would g�ve the plan the k�nd of attent�on �t deserved.”When presented w�th the document that n�ght, accord�ng to Wheeler,manly was “startled and fasc�nated.” The two men scanned the v�ctoryProgramatWheeler’shouse“forseveralhours”dur�ngwh�cht�memanlytookcop�ousnotes.ThedocumentwasreturnedtotheWarDepartment�nthemorn�ng,andon4Decembertheplanwentpubl�c.54

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hav�ng fa�led �n the�r �n�t�al efforts to �dent�fy the leaker of the v�ctoryProgram and to f�rmly establ�sh wh�ch ant�-�ntervent�on�st senator hadrece�ved�t,Fbioff�c�als�ncreasedpressureonspec�f�c�nd�v�duals.inearly1942,FbiagentsandmiDoff�cersextens�vely �nterv�ewedtheauthoroftheTribuneart�cle,Cheslymanly.Theyhadhopedthe�rquest�on�ngwouldrevealh�ssourceaswellasfurtherdeta�lssurround�ngtheleak.TheFbiand miD �nterrogators cont�nually pressed manly to �dent�fy h�s sourceus�ng the class�c �nterrogat�on tact�c of constantly rephras�ng the samequest�ons. but manly, undaunted by h�s adversar�es, stuck to the sameanswer:“iamnotatl�bertytoansweranyquest�onthatgoestothesourceofmy�nformat�on.”FbiagentJosephGenau,thebureau’slead�nvest�gator,pressuredmanlybyask�ngh�m�fh�ssourcewas“abovepatr�ot�sm?”Thejournal�stden�edthematterhadanyth�ngtodow�thpatr�ot�sm.Chang�ngtact�cs,the�nterrogatorsaskedmanlywh�chnumberedcopyofthev�ctoryProgramhehadseen.Know�ngthatcop�esoftheplanwerechargedouttospec�f�c�nd�v�duals,manlyrefusedtoanswer.Fbiagentswerealsonotaboveemploy�nghyperbole�nthe�rquest�on�ng:

There�s. . .adeadlyearnestnesstogettothebottomofth�sandwearetry�ngtoclearyouandyourpaperofth�sesp�onage.it�sdef�n�tely,unt�lyouprovetothecontrary,aposs�blecaseofesp�onage.icantellyouth�s,that�f�tevergotouttothepubl�c—evenarumor—thattherewerecop�es

53. Wheelerandhealy,Yankee from the West,32–33. 54. asquoted�nWheelerandhealy,Yankee from the West,33.

133Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

of the document you had several week pr�or to Pearl harbor, they [thepubl�c]wouldteardownthatbu�ld�ng�nCh�cago,andyouknow�t.That’sjustthetypeofhyster�awedon’twant�nth�scase.55

Desp�tetheagent’ssuggest�onthattheonuswasonmanlytoproveh�sown�nnocence,heassuredtheagent thatnoesp�onagehadtakenplace.SecretaryofWarSt�msonwasbr�efedonthe�nterv�ewandwastoldthatmanlyhadobfuscateddur�ngquest�on�ng.St�msonthenconf�dedtoh�sd�ary,accuratelydeterm�n�ngonh�sownwhomanly’s l�kelysourcewas,that“�tlooksas�fmyoldfr�endWheelerwasprettyclosetotrouble.”56

inordertohandlesuchalarge�nvest�gat�on,Fbioff�c�alsrel�eduponm�l�tary �ntell�gence off�cers to �nterv�ew the publ�sher of the New York Daily News,JosephPatterson.Pattersonwasnotascaut�ous�nh�sanswersasmanlyhadbeenandsorevealedthat“[a]Senatorcalled[telephoned]mr.[arthur]henn�ng,manageroftheWash�ngtonOff�ceoftheCh�cagoTr�bune...andthroughth�smed�umhadmr.henn�ngth�sstory.”Unableto�dent�fythesenator,Patterson�nformed�nvest�gatorsthatmcCorm�ckhad stand�ng orders to f�nd any story that could be used to scoop theChicago Sun,ther�valnewspaperslatedtomake�tsdebuton4December1941.57

W�thth�slead,theFbiandmiD�nvest�gatorslocatedandquest�onedarthur henn�ng �n Wash�ngton, D.C. henn�ng refused to �dent�fy thesourceof the leak,but commentedabout scoop�ng theSun: “Th�s th�ngjusthappened.itwasaprov�dent�aloccurrence....irece�vedno�nstruc-t�ons from my super�ors.” henn�ng also adm�tted to hav�ng seen a copyof the v�ctory Program, but added that h�s source “had a legal r�ght tohavetheplan�nh�spossess�on.”Whenaskedwhetherth�ssourcewasonCap�tol h�ll, henn�ng re�terated: “These th�ngs may be d�sm�ssed fromyourm�nd.”58

Fbi�nvest�gatorsfoundhenn�ng’satt�tudeand�nformat�onofseem�ng�mportance.Follow�ng�t,Fbiagents�nterv�ewedmcCorm�ckandrece�vedfromh�maprom�setoaskhenn�ngtoass�stthebureauw�thoutv�olat�ngtheconf�dent�al�tyofnewspapersources.ThenFbiagentsre�nterv�ewedhenn�ng,prefac�ngthe�reffortw�thaquest�onastowhetherhenn�nghadspoken to mcCorm�ck. Though answer�ng �n the aff�rmat�ve, henn�ng

55. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,S.K.mcKeetoJ.edgarhoover,Fbi65–39945–1;statementofCheslymanly,23January1942,Fbi65–39945–1. 56. entryfor24February1942,St�msonD�ar�es,37:155(m�crof�lmed.,reel7). 57. report,byJosepha.Genau,15January1942,Fbi65–39945–3,pp.33–34. 58. report,byJosepha.Genau,15January1942,Fbi65–39945–3,pp.50–52.

134 Chapter 5

refusedtod�vulgeanyfurther�nformat�on,comment�ngonlythat“[t]he�nd�v�dualwhohad�tgot�tlegallyandproperly.imustprotectmysourceandw�llnotg�vemysourceaway�ficanposs�blyhelp�t.”59

yetaga�n,Fbiagents’effortsgotthemnowhere.Fbiass�stantD�rectorTammthenadv�sedhooverthatthebureaushoulddropthe“k�dgloves”and subpoena henn�ng, mcCorm�ck, and manly before a federal grandjurytoforcethemtoreveal the�rsource“orbec�tedforperjuryorm�s-conduct.”TheFbid�rectoragreed.“Wehaveourselveslargelytoblame,”hecommented,“becauseofunaggress�vehandl�ngof[th�s]casebyourownpeople.”Desp�tethefactthattheFbi’s�nvest�gat�vestrategywasdev�sedbyhoover,heneverthelessblamedFbiagents’workfor�tsfa�lure.60

hooverthenchangedh�sstrategy.Whenadv�s�ngtheattorneygeneralon27January1942,theFbid�rectornotedthathundredsofpeoplehadbeen�nterv�ewed,butbecausetherecordofWarDepartmentdocumenthandl�ngwas�mprec�se�twas“�mposs�ble”to�dent�fytheleaker.hooverpo�ntedoutthatatleast109peoplehadaccesstothev�ctoryProgram�nboththeWarand navy Departments, but because these people regularly shared docu-mentsw�thoutcharg�ngthemouttherealnumber“�sleg�on.”61

inrecap�tulat�ngthecaseforb�ddle,hooverd�sclosedthatapopularrumor suggested m�ssour� congressman Ph�l�p bennett had pa�d a WarDepartmentclerkfortheplan,butFbiagentscouldnotcorroborateth�s.regard�ngCharlesl�ndbergh,hoovernotedthat thebureau’s“extens�ve�nvest�gat�on” had fa�led to l�nk l�ndbergh through “personal fr�ends orcontacts” to the leak. F�nally, those War Department off�cers who were“ant�-br�t�sh,ant�-adm�n�strat�on,orotherw�seoutofsympathyw�ththeadm�n�strat�on’s �nternat�onal pol�c�es” had also not been l�nked to thev�ctoryProgramleak.62

becauseh�seffortshadfa�ledtouncoverthesourceoftheleak,hoover�nformedb�ddlethattheFbiwouldd�scont�nuefurther�nvest�gat�on.herecommended,�nstead,thattheadm�n�strat�oncons�dertheother,poten-t�allyembarrass�ng,�nvest�gat�vestrategyhooverhadoutl�ned�mmed�ate-lyaftertheleak:conven�ngofagrandjury.TheFbid�rectorthens�ngledouthenn�ngandmanlyasthetwomost�mportantw�tnessestosubpoena

59. ib�d.,pp.52–57. 60. memorandum, edward a. Tamm to J. edgar hoover, 14 January 1942, Fbi 65–39945–4. 61. Personalandconf�dent�almemorandum, J.edgarhoover toattorneygeneral,27January 1942, Fbi 65–39945–26; bl�nd memorandum, 27 January 1942, Fbi 65–39945–26X. 62. bl�ndmemorandum,27January1942,Fbi65–39945–26X,p.4.

135Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

wh�leargu�ngthatthe�rsourcewasundoubtedly“aCongress�onalone.”ifhenn�ngandmanlyrevealedwh�chsenatorhadobta�nedtheplan,hooverwrote,thenanattemptcouldbemade“tocompel”thesenator,beforethegrandjury,tonameh�sWarDepartmentsource.63

Wh�lehoovertoldb�ddlethattheFbiwouldstop�ts�nvest�gat�on,�nreal�ty�td�dnot.Fbiagentsfollowedupanyleadtheyd�scoveredafter27Januaryandcont�nuedto �nterv�ewnumerous �nd�v�duals. inthemean-t�me, the roosevelt adm�n�strat�on dragged �ts heels �n dec�d�ng how tod�sposeofthecasebecause�nthedaysjustafterPearlharbor,w�thnof�rmsuspectsathand,thereweremorepress�ng�ssuestoaddress—suchaswhattodow�thJapaneseamer�cansontheWestCoast. Wh�letheFbi’s�nvest�gat�onwas,forall�ntentsandpurposes,stalled,thematterwasst�lloneofconcernonCap�tolh�ll.On13February1942,afterad�scuss�onw�thSenatornye,Tammwarnedhooverthattherewasagreatdealofsusp�c�onamongsenatorsaboutwhat theFbiwasdo�ng.ant�-�ntervent�on�stsenators,moreover,bel�evedthattheFbiwasspec�f�-callytarget�ngthemasleaksuspects.Cheslymanlywasevenreportedtohave toldSenatorWheeler that �f theFbicont�nuedto targetant�-�nter-vent�on�stsenators,hewould“exposetheent�reth�ng.”howhooverandothersen�orFbioff�c�alsrespondedtoth�s�nformat�onrema�nsunknownbecauseofredact�ons�nFbidocuments,but�t�sclearthattheFbi’s�nves-t�gat�onneverwentpubl�candtheFbinever�dent�f�edthe leakerorh�ssenator�alcompan�on.64

Forthenexttwomonths(Februaryandmarch)Fbiagentscont�nuedtowr�teup�nvest�gat�vesummar�esandconduct�nterv�ews.Theyseem�nglyexploredeveryposs�bleavenueava�labletothemunt�ltheadm�n�strat�onmade a f�nal dec�s�on as to whether the grand jury would be employedaga�nst those �nvolved �n the leak. agents �nterv�ewed �n part�cular theth�rty-twom�l�taryandc�v�l�anemployees�ntheoff�ceofthesecretaryofwar, �nclud�ng henry St�mson’s personal secretary. none of the subjectscouldrevealanyuseful�nformat�onto�nterrogators.65

63. bl�ndmemorandum,27January1942,Fbi65–39945–26X,p.6.Th�swasnotthef�rstt�methathooversuggestedemploy�nggrandjur�esaga�nstroosevelt’sant�-�nterven-t�on�stfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs.headvocateduseofagrandjurywhen,forexample,Charlesl�ndberghseemedtobeaprom�s�nglead�nthecase. 64. memorandum, D. m�lton ladd to J. edgar hoover, 13 February 1942, Fbi 65–39945–32.Wheelerhaswr�ttenthathed�dnotbel�evetheFbihad�nvest�gatedh�srole�ntheleak.SenatorDav�dWalsh,however,toldthemontanasenatorthat“hewasta�ledforseveraldays.”SeeWheelerandhealy,Yankee from the West,36. 65. For these �nterv�ews see the 218-page conf�dent�al memorandum by Joseph a.Genau,24march1942,Fbi100–3709.

13� Chapter 5

by may, hav�ng rece�ved no d�rect�on from the Just�ce Department,hoover �nqu�red of b�ddle what the adm�n�strat�on’s dec�s�on was as totheleak�nvest�gat�on.herelayedthatallava�lable�nformat�onhadbeensubm�tted to the department’s cr�m�nal d�v�s�on, and asked �f the caseshouldbeclosedorleftopen.Theattorneygeneral,apparently,chosenottocont�nuetopursuethematterandhooveradv�sedh�ssubord�natesthatthe“f�lemaybeclosed.”66

Th�s d�d not, however, end the matter. by June the adm�n�strat�onbegan to recons�der prosecut�ng those �nvolved �n the v�ctory Programleak.Th�sdec�s�ond�dnotstemoutofsomesuddenrecons�derat�onoftheev�denceorhoover’sproposedtact�cs.instead,afterthebattleofm�dway�nJune1942,becausetheChicago Tribunehadpubl�shedastoryreveal�ngthestrengthofJapanesenavalforces�nthePac�f�candbecauseth�s�nfor-mat�on or�g�nated from government sources, the adm�n�strat�on soughtto�nd�cttheTribuneandtheart�cle’sauthor,StanleyJohnson,forpr�nt�ng“sed�t�ous”mater�al.Ult�mately,however,because thegovernmentcouldnotprove thatdamagehadbeendonew�thpubl�cat�onof the story, the�nd�ctmentnevermater�al�zed.but�twastheexc�tementgeneratedfromth�spart�cularstorythatrenewedthegovernment’scons�derat�onovertak-�ngact�on�nthev�ctoryProgramleak.67

W�thaprosecutor�alsp�r�tre�nv�goratedam�dthefast-mov�ngeventsof1942,ass�stantattorneyGeneralWendellbergerequestedanFbisum-maryofthecase.in�t,hooveroutl�nedtheev�denceandhow,�nh�sv�ew,theesp�onageactcouldbeusedaga�nstthose�nvolved�ntheleak.hooversuggestedprosecut�ngmanly,henn�ng,andthemanagementofboththeChicago TribuneandWashington Times-Heraldunderthreesect�onsofthelaw.Onesect�oncr�m�nal�zedthepossess�onofanoff�c�alnat�onaldefenseplanw�ththe�ntenttod�sclose�ttoanunauthor�zedperson.manlyandhenn�ngweresupposedlyl�ables�ncetheyhad,�nhoover’sv�ew,prov�dedthe v�ctory Program to the two newspapers; and the newspapers werel�able �nasmuch as they had made the v�ctory Program ava�lable to thegeneralpubl�c.asecondsect�oncr�m�nal�zedthecopy�ngofdefenseplans

66. Personalandconf�dent�almemorandum,J.edgarhoovertoattorneygeneral,2may1942,Fbi65–39945–41;letter,J.edgarhoovertoSpec�alagent�nCharge,Wash�ngton,DC,11may1942,Fbi65–39945–40. 67. memorandum, J. edgar hoover to W�ll�am D. m�tchell, 17 June 1942, Fbi 65–39945–42;memorandum,J.edgarhoovertoattorneygeneral,17June1942,Fbi65–39945–47;memorandum,WendellbergetoJ.edgarhoover,17June1942;memorandum,J.edgarhoovertoWendellberge,19June1942,Fbi65–39945–51;memorandum,J.edgarhoovertoWendellberge,31July1942,Fbi65–39945–55;athanTheohar�s,“TheFbi,therooseveltadm�n�strat�on,andthe‘Subvers�ve’Press,”Journalism History19(Spr�ng1993):8.

13�Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

w�ththe�ntenttousethe�nformat�ontothedetr�mentoftheUn�tedStatesortotheadvantageofafore�gnpower.hooverbel�evedtheleakcouldbeconstrued�nawaytoarguesuchapos�t�on.Theth�rdsect�onmade�lle-galtheacqu�s�t�onofadefenseplanwh�leknow�ng�twasaga�nstthelaw.hooverbel�evedthatthebestw�tnessesforprosecut�ngthecasewouldbeWedemeyerandf�fteenothers.68

Wh�lethe�rreasonwasleftunrecorded�nava�labledocuments,Just�ceDepartment attorneys dec�ded aga�nst pursu�ng the case. W�th the t�deofwarsh�ft�ngdramat�callybythem�ddleof1942,andw�thmoreurgentwar-related matters occupy�ng the Wh�te house, �nterest �n the caseseemedtohaved�ss�pated.nevertheless,Fbieffortstod�scoverthesourceoftheleakand,�fposs�ble,developev�denceaga�nstthemforprosecut�onwere prod�g�ous �f a fa�lure. more �mportant, however, was the reasonhoover so urgently pursued the matter: sen�or roosevelt adm�n�stra-t�onoff�c�alssoughtretr�but�onfortheembarrass�ngrevelat�onandtheywantedroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cyoppos�t�ontopay.

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One cla�m concern�ng bSC act�v�ty and the ant�-�ntervent�on�sts that �sbogus�nvolvedtheleakofthev�ctoryProgramtotheChicago TribuneandWashington Times-Herald.notment�oned�ntheoff�c�albSCh�story,theaccountofthebSC’srole�nthev�ctoryProgramleakappeared�nthejour-nal�stW�ll�amStevenson’ssensat�onalbookabout thebSChead,A Man Called Intrepid(1976).StevensonwrotethatSenatorWheelerwas,�ndeed,the person who had offered the v�ctory Program to the ant�-�nterven-t�on�stpress,bel�ev�ng�t tobethesmok�ng-gunev�dencethatroosevelt�ntendedtoleadamer�catowar.yet,Stevensonalsocla�med,thev�ctoryProgram was, �n real�ty, part of a ruse concocted by the bSC’s Pol�t�calWarfare D�v�s�on to prov�de naz� Germany w�th a “fantast�c coup.” Thev�ctory Program, accord�ng to Stevenson, was p�eced together “out ofmater�alalreadyknowntohavereachedtheenemy�ndr�bsanddrabs,and...somem�slead�ng�nformat�on.”69

68. memorandum,D,m�ltonladdtoJ.edgarhoover,15June1942,Fbi65–39945–43;memorandum re news art�cle �n Chicago Tribune and Washington Times-Herald, authorunknown,15June1942,Fbi65–39945–4[?];memorandum,l.l.TylertoD.m�ltonladd,17June1942,Fbi65–39945–50;bl�ndmemorandumrePert�nentart�cles�nChicago Tribune,17June1942,Fbi65–39945–50. 69. W�ll�am Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (new york: harcourtbraceJovanov�ch,1976),298.

13� Chapter 5

W�ththeUn�tedStatesonthevergeofwarw�thJapanandGermany(v�atheundeclaredwar�ntheatlant�c)�nlatenovember1941,bSCalleg-edly sl�pped the phony v�ctory Program to Wheeler through a youngm�l�tary off�cer. The bSC’s goal was to have Wheeler publ�c�ze the planandtherebygoadh�tler�ntodeclar�ngwarontheUn�tedStates.Thefakedv�ctory Program was to stand as ev�dence, once publ�shed �n the press,of roosevelt’s �ntent�on to wage war on naz� Germany. and, accord�ngtoStevenson,�twassuccessful�nprompt�ngh�tlertodeclarewarontheUn�tedStateson11December1941,fourdaysaftertheJapaneseattackonPearlharbor.70

Th�s account of the bSC’s role �n creat�ng and sl�pp�ng the v�ctoryProgramtotheunw�tt�ngWheelerwho,�nturn,had�tpubl�shed,therebylead�ngtheUn�tedStatestowarw�thGermany,�serroneous.asthepre-ced�ngFbi�nvest�gat�ondemonstrates,thev�ctoryProgramwasagenu�necont�ngencyplandrawnupunderWedemeyer’ssuperv�s�on.butthestory�s�llustrat�veofthepers�stenceofthemythologysurround�ngbr�t�sh�ntel-l�genceand�tsact�v�t�es�ntheUn�tedStates,amythologythat�sd�ff�culttorepressbecauseofcont�nued(s�xty-year-old)governmentrestr�ct�onofaccesstorecordsonboths�desoftheatlant�c. butsomecont�nuetopressthenot�onthatthev�ctoryProgramwas�ntendedto�nc�teh�tler�ntodeclar�ngwarontheUn�tedStates.ThomasFlem�ng,�nh�sbookThe New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War within World War II (2001), accepts that the v�ctory Program wasgenu�ne, yet he bel�eves that roosevelt �ntent�onally leaked the v�ctoryProgramtoWheeler.roosevelt,sens�ng�mm�nentwarw�thJapan,soughttogoadh�tler�ntodeclar�ngwartoach�evethereal�zat�onofh�seurope-f�rstpol�cyofwar.Conced�ngthat“there�snoabsoluteproof ”tosupporth�scla�m,Flem�ngneverthelessbel�evesthecharge“f�ts thedev�ouss�deofFrankl�nroosevelt’scomplexpersonal�ty.”Flem�ngoffersnover�f�ableev�dencewhatsoevertosupporth�scase.71

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The v�ctory Program leak and subsequent Fbi �nvest�gat�on, therefore,arebestunderstood�nthecontextofhoover’s longefforttocatertotherooseveltadm�n�strat�on’spol�t�cal�nterestsratherthanasaconsp�rator�al

70. Stevenson,A Man Called Intrepid,299–300. 71. ThomasFlem�ng,The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War within World War II(newyork:bas�cbooks,2001),1–48.SeealsoFlem�ng’sart�cle“Theb�gleak,”American Heritage38(December1987):65–71.

139Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194�

plantogoadnaz�GermanytodeclarewarontheUn�tedStatesorafabr�-cat�onofbr�t�sh�ntell�gencetobr�ngtheUn�tedStates�ntowar,orevenasanactoftreachery.Thev�ctoryProgramleakwasnotthenat�onalsecur�tybreachthatsomecla�med;�nstead,asacont�ngencyplanonly,�tsrevelat�onwasanembarrassmentthatfannedtheflamesofroosevelt’sant�-�nterven-t�on�stoppos�t�on.TheverynatureoftheFbi’s�nvest�gat�onconf�rmsasmuch,s�ncetheyfocusedon“�solat�on�sts”as targetsandregardedthe�rmot�ves as be�ng rooted not �n treason, but �n hav�ng no sympathy forroosevelt’s fore�gn pol�cy. Th�s �s character�st�c of the domest�c secur�tystate,andlaterColdWar,wherebyfore�gnpol�cycr�t�csweretargetedfor�nvest�gat�on and retr�but�on because they opposed off�c�al governmentpol�cyorheldrad�calbel�efs.andsuchmon�tor�ngd�dnotendw�thPearlharborandamer�ca’s�nvolvement�ntheSecondWorldWarbecausefor-e�gnpol�cycr�t�cscont�nuedtofallunderFbiscrut�ny.

Blossoming of the Domestic Security State

November 1941 to March 1942

bytheendof1941thedebatebetween�ntervent�on�stsandant�-�nterven-t�on�stshadsettled�ntostalemate.Wh�letherooseveltadm�n�strat�onhadwon passage of many measures to ass�st the beleaguered all�es, yet st�llavo�dd�rectpart�c�pat�on�nwar,�tcouldnotbreakthedeadlockbetweentwor�valandpass�onatefore�gnpol�cyadvocatesandthe�rpos�t�ons.Thev�ctoryProgram leakappeared tobeanevent theadm�n�strat�oncouldusetobreakthedeadlockandf�nallyd�scred�ttheant�-�ntervent�on�stsasconsp�ratorswho�llegallyga�nedaccesstosecretgovernmentrecordsandpubl�shed them,butFbiD�rectorhooverwasunable to f�nd the leaker.Forant�-�ntervent�on�sts,ontheotherhand,theleakonlyconf�rmedthe�rworstsusp�c�onsaboutrooseveltandtheyhopedtotr�umphw�th�t. Th�sstalemate,however,�nnowaydauntedtheobsequ�ousFbid�rec-tor. by the dawn of 1942 Fbi agents developed three cases that provedvaluable �n hoover’s effort to serv�ce Wh�te house pol�t�cal �nterestsandtopromotethev�ewof leg�t�matecr�t�csassubvers�ve,exempl�fy�ngthe evolut�on of the domest�c secur�ty state. each case reveals, �n part,hoover’sbureaucrat�cmot�vesv�s-à-v�stherooseveltadm�n�strat�onandh�s quest�onable �nvest�gat�ve tact�cs where agents cons�stently �gnoredc�t�zens’c�v�ll�bert�es.Fbiagents,�nthef�rstcase,developedafru�tful—�f�llegal—source of pol�t�cal �ntell�gence on ant�-�ntervent�on�st pol�t�calact�v�tyandsomeofth�s�nformat�onmade�tsway�ntoFbireportssharedw�th theWh�tehousewhere, �nat leastone �nstance, �twasused �nanattempttod�scred�tanadm�n�strat�onopponent.inthesecondcase,Fbioff�c�alssoughttodevelop�nformat�ontowarrantased�t�oncaseaga�nstoneprom�nent,outspoken,andotherw�seleg�t�materooseveltcr�t�c.and�ntheth�rd,Fbiagentsused�llegal techn�ques—w�thoutthe�rsuper�ors’

ChApter 6

140

141Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

perm�ss�on—anddeveloped�ntell�gencethatsawtheconv�ct�onofana�veandatyp�calant�-�ntervent�on�stwhosecasereflectedFbioff�c�als’cur�ousv�ewofleg�t�matefore�gnpol�cycr�t�csassubvers�ves.moreover,allthreeexamples�llustratethatthedomest�csecur�tystatewasst�llevolv�ngbythedawnof1942,dur�ngaper�odofcr�s�s,wh�letherooseveltadm�n�strat�one�theraverted�tsgazeorrema�ned�gnorantastoexactlywhattheFbiwasengaged�n. What�spart�cularlystr�k�ngaboutthethreeFbitargetstobeanalyzedhere,however, �s that the�rcasespreceded,andwereaclearsteptoward,themuchmorepubl�c�zedGreatSed�t�onTr�alwh�chservesasamarkerforthepeakofthedomest�csecur�tystate.Thetr�al�nvolvedth�rtyallegedfasc�stswho�nJanuary1944werechargedw�tha“plotto�nc�temut�ny�nthe armed forces, unseat the Government and set up a naz� reg�me.” inotherwords,theywerechargedw�thv�olat�ngtheSm�thact—advocat�ngthe v�olent overthrow of the U.S. government. among these th�rty werethenow�nfamousbut,atthet�me,relat�velyobscuref�guresoflawrenceDenn�s,GeraldW�nrod,W�ll�amDudleyPelley,el�zabethD�ll�ng,JosephmcW�ll�ams, and George Sylvester v�ereck.1 roosevelt had pressed h�sattorney general, Franc�s b�ddle, by 1944 to �nd�ct these r�ght-w�ng f�g-ures—whosatontheper�pheryofamer�canpol�t�cs—forsed�t�on.inh�s1975 book, Prophets on the Right, ronald radosh r�ghtly compared thetr�al of Denn�s and company to those tr�als aga�nst alleged commun�sts�nthe1950s.2Whatthetr�al�llustrated,however,wasthewell-establ�sheddomest�c secur�ty state—the forerunner to the later nat�onal secur�tystate—already �n operat�on �n 1944. What eluc�dates th�s so-called f�rstDenn�sCase,moreover,�sthatwh�chpreceded�t;namely,theFbi’s�nves-t�gat�ve efforts aga�nst the br�gham fam�ly of new york, the rev�s�on�sth�stor�an harry elmer barnes, and the av�ator laura ingalls. The Fbi’sefforts,fa�lures,andsuccesses�nthesethreecases�llustratethatevolut�on-aryprocesslead�ngtotheGreatSed�t�onTr�alwh�chcreatedthebas�sonwh�chthenat�onalSecur�tyStateformed.

—■■■■■■■—

Thef�rstofthesepart�cularFbitargetswasethelbr�ghamandherfam�ly

1. “U.S. ind�cts 30, alleg�ng naz� Plot to inc�te mut�ny and revolut�on,” New York Times,4January1944. 2. ronaldradosh,Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism(newyork:S�monandSchuster,1975),291.

14� Chapter �

ofnewyorkC�ty.TheFbi’s�nvest�gat�onofethel—avocalultraconserva-t�ve—andher fam�lyprovedtobeaw�ndfall forhoover’s �nterest �n thepol�t�calact�v�t�esoftheant�-�ntervent�on�stsand�nh�sefforttopresentthem as subvers�ve. The pr�nc�pal means by wh�ch Fbi agents collectedth�s pol�t�cal �ntell�gence was a w�retap of ethel’s telephone. Pol�t�cally,ethel and her daughter, barbara, �dent�f�ed w�th ant�-�ntervent�on�smandwere�nt�matelyassoc�atedw�ththeGreenw�chv�llagebranchoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee’snewyorkchapter.barbara, �nfact,servedasth�sbranch’scha�rperson. not fr�nge f�gures, the br�ghams were a prom�nent fam�ly, wh�chs�tuated them perfectly among other fore�gn pol�cy cr�t�cs whom Fbiagentsmon�tored.ethelwasalead�ngoperaandconcertsopranodur�ngthe 1920s and 1930s who performed �n london, berl�n, and new york.barbarawasan�mportantamer�caF�rstf�gure�ntheGreenw�chchapter,wh�leherbrother,Dan�el,wasafore�gncorrespondentfortheNew York Times,based�nSw�tzerland;the�rteenages�ster,Constance,wasanasp�r-�ng actress who performed on broadway. The Fbi’s mon�tor�ng of th�sprom�nentnewyorkfam�ly’spol�t�cscorrespondsto�tsbroaderpatternofmon�tor�ngroosevelt’sotherprom�nentfore�gnpol�cycr�t�csforpol�t�calpurposes.but,s�gn�f�cantly,s�ncethebr�ghamswerenotnat�onalf�gures,Fbiagentscouldmore�ntrus�velygather�ntell�gencefromthemw�thlessofachanceofexposure.3

The catalyst that brought the br�ghams to the attent�on of Fbi off�-c�als was not the�r pol�t�cs but a rumor about them relayed to the v�cepres�dent of the Un�ted States, henry Wallace, on 3 november 1941.Wallace’sunnamedconf�dantcla�medtohave �nformat�onrelat�ngtoanalleged assass�nat�on plot aga�nst Pres�dent roosevelt that was l�nked tothe amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee. Th�s person had been �ntroduced to thebr�ghams�nWash�ngton,D.C.,andsubsequentlyv�s�tedethelandbarbara�nnewyork,where,afteraneven�ngatthec�nema,ethelbecameenragedoveranewsreportthatroosevelthadplacedtheCoastGuardundernavyauthor�ty.S�nceethel’snephewwasaCoastGuardreserv�st,andwasnowseem�ngly�ndangerofsee�ngcombat�ntheatlant�c,sheexcla�medthatroosevelt“oughttobek�lledfortak�ngsuchact�on”andthat“hewouldbek�lledbeforelong.”Subsequently,the�nformantlearnedthatthebr�ghams

3. Seeethelbr�gham’sob�tuary�nNew York Times,28September1968,33.Onthenewyorkchapterofamer�caF�rstseem�cheleFlynnStenehjem,An American First: John T. Flynn and the America First Committee(newrochelle,ny:arl�ngtonhouse,1976).ForDan�el’sworksee,forexample,h�spageonestory:Dan�elbr�gham,“PopehaslongTalkw�thTaylor;movetoa�dJews�nFranceSeen,”New York Times,20September1942.

143Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

allegedlywereassoc�atedw�thanorgan�zat�ondubbedtheOneGunClubthatwassa�dtohavef�vehundredthousandmembersandplannedarevolt�ftheUn�tedStatesenteredthewar.4 Uponrece�ptofth�s�nformat�on,anFbioff�c�alplacedthebr�ghamson“loosesurve�llance”wh�chwasto“behandledveryd�screetly.”hooverthen not�f�ed the Secret Serv�ce, whose respons�b�l�ty �t was to protectthe pres�dent and �nvest�gate threats made to h�s l�fe. irrespect�ve ofthe Secret Serv�ce’s jur�sd�ct�on, on 4 november 1941 hoover obta�nedfrom attorney General b�ddle author�zat�on to w�retap the br�ghams’telephone. Th�s was an unlawful act�on. S�nce the enact�ng of the 1934FederalCommun�cat�onsact,theuseofw�retapsbyanyonewas�llegal.in1940,however,g�venthesenseofcr�s�safterthenaz��nvas�onofwesterneurope,roosevelthadsecretlyauthor�zed the l�m�teduseofw�retaps �nnat�onaldefensecasessolongastheattorneygeneralapprovedofthem.b�ddleaccededtohoover’srequestand,on10november1941,Fbiagents�nstalledaw�retap.5 Wh�lethew�retapwasFbioff�c�als’mostvaluablesourceof�nforma-t�onregard�ngthebr�ghams,�twasnotthe�ronlysource.Tobetterestab-l�sh “the �dent�ty and act�v�t�es of ” the fam�ly, Fbi agents contacted theCred�tbureauofGreaternewyork,theautomob�lereg�strat�onbureau,and the br�ghams’ ma�l carr�er. in so do�ng, agents learned that bothethelandbarbaraworkedforthelocalamer�caF�rstComm�tteechapter,wh�ch led them to �nclude that chapter under the�r umbrella of surve�l-lance.F�nally,on13november1941,agentsestabl�shedama�l cover—asurve�llancemethodofrecord�ngthenamesandaddressesofsendersandrec�p�entsofma�l—onthebr�ghamhousehold,but�tult�matelyprovedtobeunproduct�ve.6

4. Conf�dent�al report, SaC P. e. Foxworth, new york C�ty, 15 January 1942, Fbi100–50729–19; personal and conf�dent�al memorandum, hoover to attorney general, 3november1941,Fbi100–50729–1;memorandum,edwarda.TammtoD.m�ltonladd,3november1941,Fbi100–50729–2;memorandum,Tammtohoover,3november1941,Fbi100–50729–3. 5. memorandum,Kramertoladd,4november1941,Fbi100–50729–4;letter,hoovertoFrankW�lson,Ch�efofSecretServ�ce,4november1941,Fbi100–50729–4;letter,W�lsontohoover,5november1941,Fbi100–50729–5;memorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,4november1941,Fbi100–50729–4(there�sanotat�on�nbr�gham’sFbif�lethathoover’s4novembermemototheattorneygeneralauthor�z�ngthew�retaphadbeenremovedper-manentlytothenat�onalSecur�tyelectron�cSurve�llanceF�le�n1973);memorandum,laddtohoover,5January1942,Fbi100–50729–17. 6. Conf�dent�al report, SaC P. e. Foxworth, new york C�ty, 15 January 1942, Fbi100–50729–19.

144 Chapter �

after Secret Serv�ce agents �nterv�ewed ethel br�gham about herallegedassass�nat�onthreat,athreattheagentsfoundnottobe�nnocuous,hooveradv�sedb�ddlethat“theposs�b�l�tyofobta�n�ngadd�t�onal�nfor-mat�on,e�therthroughthetechn�calsurve�llance[w�retap]or[�nformant]�sextremelydoubtful.”hooverneverthelessadv�sedh�ssuper�orthatFbiagentswouldcont�nuetodevelop�nformat�on“asopportun�typresented.”Desp�te hoover’s doubt as to the eff�cacy of the w�retap, �t rema�ned �nplaceforanothermonth.it�snotclearwhetherb�ddlewasawarethatthew�retap was cont�nued, but hoover’s language seemed to suggest that �twouldnotbe.7

What �s clear, however, �s that �n the n�ne commun�cat�ons and onesummar�z�ngreportfromnewyorkSaCFoxworthtohooverconcern�ngthefru�tsofthebr�ghamw�retap,allthereported�nformat�onconcernednotcr�m�nalact�v�tybutthepol�t�calact�v�tyofthefam�lyandotherprom-�nentant�-�ntervent�on�sts.inh�sreportstohoover,SaCFoxworthneverexpl�c�tly ment�oned the w�retap. instead, as was common Fbi pract�ce,he employed the euphem�sm “from a conf�dent�al source that �s knowntothebureau”�nplaceof“w�retap”or“electron�csurve�llance.”byus�ngwordsubst�tut�ons,FoxworthwasabletoconcealtheFbi’suseofan�llegal�nvest�gat�vetool,even�fthepres�denthadsecretlyauthor�zed�tsl�m�teduse w�th the attorney general’s assent. if the Fbi report was somehowcomprom�sed,areadernotfam�l�arw�thFbiparlancewouldassumethedocumentreferrednottoaw�retapbutahumansourceof�nformat�on. Therealvalueofthebr�ghamw�retaptoFbioff�c�als�sev�dentw�ththe f�rst reportFoxworthsent tohoover. inapersonalandconf�dent�alletter8 tohooverdated18november1941,Foxworthnotedthatnofur-ther�nformat�onhadbeendevelopedregard�nganyassass�nat�onplotorother �llegal act�v�t�es, but he d�d report bount�ful pol�t�cal �ntell�gence.Th�s �ncludedthenewyorkamer�caF�rstchapter’sdec�s�onnotto jo�nthe r�ght-w�ng group Women Un�ted �n burn�ng roosevelt’s campa�gnpledges�nprotestbecauseofthenegat�vepubl�c�ty�twouldengender,andbr�gham’s d�scuss�on of the chapter’s plan to lobby congressmen to voteaga�nstrev�s�onoftheneutral�tyact(arm�ngofmerchantsh�ps).9

7. Personalandconf�dent�almemorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,15november1941,Fbi100–50729–7;memorandum,laddtohoover,5January1942,Fbi100–50729–17. 8. Fbi pol�cy requ�red letters to hoover marked “personal and conf�dent�al” to bed�rected�mmed�atelytoh�sdeskandnotd�rectly�ntothebureau’scentralrecordssystem.SeeathanTheohar�s,ed.,From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover (Ch�cago: ivanr.Dee,1991),2–4. 9. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,18november1941,Fbi100–

145Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

allsubsequentreportstohooverconta�nedfurtherandmorecompel-l�ngpol�t�cal �ntell�gence,suchasbr�gham’scommentthatamer�caF�rstm�ghtevolve�ntoapol�t�calparty(theamer�canparty),thatbr�ghamhadmadeanumberofant�-Sem�t�cremarks,thatshehadsa�d“das�stgut”onthetelephonewh�lespeak�ngtosomeonew�thaGermanaccent,andthattheaFCwasl�nkedtocongressmenwhowouldensurethattherewouldbe no vote on war. br�gham also cla�med to know a man who saw thepres�dentb�weeklyandsuggestedthathecouldbeusedtodel�vermessagestotheWh�tehouse.Otherreportsrelatedb�ngham’snegat�veop�n�onofroosevelt,herdes�reto“Whoop�tup”�froosevelt’ssonsweresenttowar,andher f�tful remarkafterPearlharbor: “Where �s thatOne-GunClubthat’sgo�ngtodosometh�ng?”10

Fbiagentswereevenabletouse�nformat�ongleanedfromthew�retap�nDecember1941tocult�vatean�nformant.The�nc�dentstemmedfroma heated pol�t�cal d�scuss�on ethel br�gham had w�th a houseguest whoapparently d�d not agree w�th her pol�t�cs. Fbi agents recorded ethel’s�ncend�ary comment over the telephone that “what’s bother�ng me now�swhatthatl�ttleb�tchw�lldotome,butiswearbyallthat�sholythat�fshedoestryanyth�ngiw�llcallupthew�vesofthemenshehasbeenhav-�ng�nherroom.”Foxworthmadearrangementsto�nterv�ewth�swoman(whose�dent�ty�sredacted�nFbidocuments)whothenbecameanFbi�nformer.Sheprov�dedFoxworthw�thalongl�stofthebr�ghams’fr�endsandacqua�ntances,al�stthathooverfoundvaluable.11

inlateDecember,Foxworthreportedtohooverthelast�nformat�ontobedevelopedfromthew�retapdur�ng1941.itconcernedtwoprom�nentamer�caF�rst f�gures:lauraingalls(tobed�scussedbelow)andCharlesl�ndbergh. barbara br�gham d�scussed w�th new york attorney em�lmoros�n�—whomFbioff�c�alsbel�eved tobe subvers�ve—ingalls’sarrestfornotreg�ster�ngasafore�gnagentandtheposs�b�l�tyofamer�caF�rst

50729–6. On Women Un�ted and other r�ght-w�ng women’s groups see Glen Jeansonne,Women of the Far Right: The Mothers Movement and World War II (Ch�cago:Un�vers�tyofCh�cagoPress,1996). 10. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,25november1941,Fbi100–50729–8;Fbiteletype,Foxworthtohoover,25november1941,Fbi100–50729–10;Spec�aldel�verya�r-ma�l letter,hoover toSaCnewyork,2December1941,Fbi100–50729–10;personalandconf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,3December1941,Fbi100–50729–9;personalandconf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,13December1941,Fbi100–50729–11;personalandconf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,16December1941,Fbi100–50729–14. 11. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,13December1941,Fbi100–50729–12.

14� Chapter �

ra�s�ng her $7,500 ba�l when barbara expressed concern over ingalls’sarrest be�ng “a slap” for the comm�ttee. br�gham also d�scussed, s�gn�f�-cantly,ad�nnerpartysheattendedw�thl�ndberghon17December1941hostedbythesecretaryoftheaFC’snewyorkchapter,edw�nS.Webster.in a telephone conversat�on, br�gham sa�d that l�ndbergh had referredto the Japaneseasa “yellowper�l” andhadurgedamer�caF�rst to rallybeh�ndthewareffortafterPearlharbor,yet“seemedd�scouragedasthegovthasnoplannordoes�tknowforwhat�t�sf�ght�ng.”12

Th�s part�cular pol�t�cal �ntell�gence concern�ng Charles l�ndbergh,gleaned �llegally from a w�retap, made �ts way to the Wh�te house andwas then used by inter�or Secretary harold ickes—one of l�ndbergh’sf�ercestcr�t�cs.(itshouldbenotedthatickeswouldnothaveknownthe�nformat�on had or�g�nated from an �llegal surve�llance method.) ickeskeptan�ndexedf�leofallofl�ndbergh’sspeechesandwr�t�ngsbecausehebel�evedh�mtobe“aruthlessandconsc�ousfasc�st,mot�vatedbyhatredforyou[roosevelt]personallyandacontemptfordemocracy�ngeneral.”13yetbeyondh�s�ndex,ickeshadaccesstoFbipol�t�cal�ntell�gencethatherece�vede�therd�rectlyfromhooverorfromroosevelt.inOctober1941,forexample,hooverprov�dedthe�nter�orsecretaryw�thabl�ndmemo-randumsummar�z�ngallFbi�nformat�ononGuyJunemann,anassoc�ateof Joseph mcW�ll�ams who, �n turn, had t�es to ham�lton F�sh and theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee. inanotherexample,dur�ng1943hooverhadusedthef�ngerpr�ntresourcesoftheFbitohelpickesdeterm�ne�famannamedabrahamJoneswassteal�ngch�ckeneggsfromh�sfarm.but�twasthel�ndbergh�nformat�onthatickeshadfoundtantal�z�ngand, �ndeed,used.14

inDecember1941,ickeswroteascath�ngbookaboutCharlesl�ndberghand made arrangements to publ�sh �t w�th vanguard Press. Tentat�velyt�tledThe Strange Case of Mr. Lindbergh or Charles A. Lindbergh: A Failure in Americanization, ickescla�med“totrace,factuallyandobject�vely,th�syoungman’sfatalcourse.”Probablybecausetheant�-�ntervent�on�stshad

12. Fbiteletype,Foxworthtohoover,19December1941,Fbi100–50729–13;Fbitele-type,Foxworthtohoover20December1941,Fbi100–50729–16. 13. letter,haroldickestoFrankl�nD.roosevelt,30December1941,Pres�dent’sSecre-tary’sF�le,Just�ceDepartment,FDrl.rooseveltagreed“wholeheartedly”w�thickes’sassess-mentofl�ndbergh.Seeletter,roosevelttoickes,30December1941,Pres�dent’sSecretary’sF�le,Just�ceDepartment,FDrl. 14. Personalandconf�dent�alletter,J.edgarhoovertoharoldickes,31October1941;andbl�ndmemorandumre:GuyJunemann,27October1941;andpersonalandconf�den-t�alletter,hoovertoickes,17October1943,all�nJust�ceDepartmentfolder,haroldickesPapers,box205,l�braryofCongress(hereafterlOC),Wash�ngton,DC.

14�Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

rall�edbeh�ndthewareffortfollow�ngtheJapaneseattackonPearlharbor,anddesp�tehav�ngwonacontract for thebook, �twasneverpubl�shed.needlesstosay,themanuscr�ptconf�rmsthatat leastonesen�oradm�n-�strat�on off�c�al used some Fbi pol�t�cal �ntell�gence (that was obta�ned�llegally)�nanefforttod�scred�troosevelt’scr�t�cs.15

The�nformat�onickesusedor�g�natedw�ththebr�ghamw�retapandappearedlate�nthemanuscr�pt.ickeswroteaboutthed�nnerpartyedw�nWebster hosted at wh�ch both br�gham and l�ndbergh were present.C�t�ngaNew York Mirrorstorythatrecountedtheevent,ickesnotedthatl�ndberghblamedGreatbr�ta�nfortheoutbreakofwarandarguedthatamer�ca F�rst should wa�t unt�l the Pearl harbor exc�tement d�ed downbefore attack�ng further roosevelt’s pol�c�es. ickes also cla�med to have“fromapr�vatesource”otherreveal�ng�nformat�on.hewrote:

The party was held �n the home of edw�n S. Webster, secretary of thenew york Chapter of the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee on December 17,and50peoplewerepresent.l�ndberghaddressedthegather�ng.hetoldthemthattherealdangerwasnoth�tlerbuttheyellowPer�l—Ch�naandJapan.hesa�dthat�fGermanyhadbeenperm�tted(byGreatbr�ta�n)toattackruss�abefore1939,h�tlercouldhavebeenthebulwarkaga�nsttheyellowracesand theruss�ans.hesa�d that thebr�t�shand the“fools �nWash�ngton”spo�ledth�splan.inconclus�onhe�nformedthegroupthatalthoughtheamer�caF�rstComm�tteecouldnotbeact�veatthemoment,�t should take prompt advantage of the �nev�table casualty l�sts to maketheamer�canpeoplereal�zethattheyhavebeenbetrayedbyGreatbr�ta�nand the roosevelt adm�n�strat�on. The[n], he sa�d, the amer�ca F�rstComm�ttee would re-enter the pol�t�cal f�eld and advocate a negot�atedpeace—favorabletoh�tler.16

Th�spassage�sstr�k�nglys�m�lar�nbothspec�f�c�nformat�onandlayouttoanFbireportthathooversenttoroosevelton13February1942.in�t,hooverdescr�bedthed�nnerpartyandl�ndbergh’scomments.hoover’ssourceof�nformat�on,s�gn�f�cantly,wasboththebr�ghamw�retapandareporthehadrece�vedfrommiD.17

15. haroldickes,“Charlesa.l�ndbergh:aFa�lure �namer�can�zat�on,”unpubl�shedbook manuscr�pt, p. 4, Charles a. l�ndbergh Folder, ickes Papers, lOC; correspondenceandbookcontractbetweenharoldickesandvanguardPress,December1941through1944,ickesPapers,lOC. 16. ickes,“Charlesa.l�ndbergh:aFa�lure�namer�can�zat�on,”207–9. 17. Conf�dent�alreportreethelbr�gham,P.e.Foxworth,15January1942,pp.30–31,63,

14� Chapter �

ickes, moreover, was not the sole rec�p�ent of th�s �nformat�on. inaugust1942,l�ndberghwassubpoenaedtotest�fyforthedefenseatthesed�t�ontr�alofW�ll�amDudleyPelley,leaderoftheS�lverSh�rts.Toass�stthe prosecutors �n the�r cross-exam�nat�on of l�ndbergh, Fbi off�c�alspreparedabl�ndmemorandumthat summar�zed �nformat�on �nbureauf�lesthatconf�rmedtheav�ator’s“fore�gnornat�onal�st�csympath�es.”Th�ssummary �ncludedthederogatory �ntell�gencegleaned �llegally fromthebr�ghamw�retap.yet,becausel�ndbergh’stest�monywasl�m�tedtotwelvem�nutesandbecauseheofferednoth�ng�mportanttothedefendant’scase,Just�ceDepartmentattorneysd�dnotusethe�nformat�on�ntheFbi’ssum-marytod�scred�th�stest�mony.18

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SaCFoxworth,of thenewyorkoff�ce,d�scont�nued thebr�ghamw�re-tapon30December1941,and thenprepareda summary reporton the�nvest�gat�on for hoover. in the e�ghty-n�ne-page document, labeled“inTernal SeCUriTy-G[ermany],” Foxworth summar�zed the n�nereports he had sent to hoover, wh�le cont�nu�ng to employ euphem�st�clanguage�nreferencetothe �llegalw�retap.alargesect�onofthereportwasreservedfor�nformat�ongatheredonprom�nentfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs,l�kel�ndbergh,buttheFbihasredactedmostof�t.Thesummaryreportstandsasev�dencethatFbioff�c�alsweremost�nterestednot�ncr�m�naldevelopmentsbut�npol�t�cal�ntell�gencefromthebr�ghamw�retap.19

after hav�ng rece�ved th�s report, hoover ordered Foxworth to fol-lowupseverallooseends.hestressedthatthe“poss�bleex�stence”oftheOneGunClub“advocat�ngrevolut�onbeexhaust�vely �nvest�gated.” it �s�mportanttonotethatall �nformat�onrelat�vetotheso-calledOneGunClubwasuncorroboratedandstemmedfromtheheatedconversat�onsofethelbr�gham.Th�sbe�ngthecase,hooverorderedthefollow-upto“be

Fbi100–50729–19;conf�dent�alletterandenclosures,br�gad�erGeneralraymonde.leetoJ.edgarhoover,15January1942,Fbi100–4712–270;memorandumandattachments,JohnJ.mcCloytohenrySt�mson,12January1942,henrySt�msonPapers(m�crof�lmed.,reel105),manuscr�ptsandarch�ves,yaleUn�vers�ty,newhaven,CT;personalandconf�dent�alletter, J.edgarhoover toedw�nm.Watson,13February1942,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl;memorandum,D.m�ltonladdtoJ.edgarhoover,13February1942,Fbi100–4712–334;memorandum,J.edgarhoovertoFranc�sb�ddle,13February1942,Fbi100–4712–284. 18. memorandum,K.T.(�lleg�ble)tomr.mumford,5august1942,Fbi65–11449–152;bl�nd and undated memorandum re Charles a. l�ndbergh (ca. 5 august 1942), Fbi 65–11449–152;Cole,Roosevelt and the Isolationists,534. 19. Conf�dent�alreport,FoxworthtoFbihQ,15January1942,Fbi100–50729–19.

149Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

handled �n a most d�screet manner.” a second follow-up that �nterestedhoover was �n ascerta�n�ng the �dent�ty of the person barbara br�ghamcla�medhadv�s�tedtheWh�tehouseb�weekly.regard�ngthesetwolooseends,hooverdemanded�mmed�ateact�onandregularreports.20

The �nformat�on culled from the br�gham w�retap was not l�m-�ted toFbioff�c�alsandamemorandumtoroosevelt regard�ngCharlesl�ndbergh’s d�nner-party chats. On 26 January 1942, hoover prov�dedthe Wh�te house w�th deta�led �nformat�on on the br�ghams. The Fbid�rector�nformedroosevelt’ssecretary,edw�nWatson,thatamemberofthebr�ghamfam�lyhadthreatenedthel�feofthepres�dentandhadthenreferred to theex�stenceofaOneGunClubas “ready to starta revolu-t�on”once theUn�tedStateswasatwar.by referenc�ng these two �tems,hoover f�rmlyestabl�shedthebonaf�desofh�s �nvest�gat�on,yethewasalso careful to make no ment�on that the �nformat�on had been uncor-roborated(OneGunClub)orhadbeend�sm�ssedmonthsbeforebytheSecret Serv�ce (assass�nat�on threat). not�ng barbara’s cla�m of know�ngapersonwhometrooseveltb�weekly,yethatedh�m“asmuchasdothebr�ghams,”hooverprov�dedWatsonw�tha l�stofnames,oneofwh�ch,he thought,m�ghtbe th�s contact. Someof thesenamesFbiagentshadacqu�redfromthebr�ghamhouseguest-turned-�nformer,asourcedevel-opedthroughthecourseofthe�llegalw�retap.hooveralsorelayedtotheWh�tehousesomepol�t�cal�ntell�gencethator�g�natedfromthew�retap,�nclud�ngethel’s comment thathernephew,aCoastGuardsman,hatedwear�ng h�s un�form and that the br�ghams were assoc�ated w�th therecentlyarrestedlauraingalls.hooverevenmadeanerroneouscla�mtotheWh�tehousethattheamer�caF�rstComm�tteewassomehowassoc�-atedw�ththeOneGunClub—anassert�onthatwasneverunearthed�nthebr�ghamw�retapor�nvest�gat�on,butwasmadebyhooverbecauseethelandbarbaraweresupposedlyl�nkedandtheyweremembersofthenewyorkbranchofamer�caF�rst.hoovermadenoment�onas totheor�g�nsofth�s �nformat�onotherthanthat �thador�g�nated“throughaconf�dent�alsource.”21

hooverd�dnotstoph�sagents’mon�tor�ngofthebr�ghamsw�thth�sreporttotheWh�tehouse.Thenewyorkoff�cecont�nuedtowatchthebr�ghams, ostens�bly to determ�ne the ex�stence of the One Gun Club

20. Conf�dent�alletter,hoovertoFoxworth,24January1942,Fbi100–50729–19. 21. Personalandconf�dent�alletterandattachedbl�ndmemorandum,hoovertoWat-son,26January1942,Off�c�alF�le10-b,Frankl�nD.rooseveltl�brary(FDrl),hydePark,ny;memorandumw�thattachedbl�ndmemorandum,hoovertoattorneygeneral,26Janu-ary1942,Fbi100–50729–20.

150 Chapter �

andaposs�bleplotaga�nstroosevelt,buts�ncethebr�ghamw�retaphadbeencanceledFbiagentswereforcedtorelyupon�nformersandphys�calsurve�llance.and,aga�n,thesesourcesrevealedtoFbioff�c�alsno�nfor-mat�onaboutaOneGunCluboranefar�ousplot,buttantal�z�ngpol�t�cal�ntell�gence. in one �nstance, wh�le attend�ng her daughter’s play “Thelandisbr�ght,”ethelbr�ghamwasallegedtohavemade“av�olentout-burst”aga�nstrooseveltandh�sfore�gnpol�cywh�chFbioff�c�alsdeemedtobe“un-amer�can.”Th�s�nformat�onso�nterestedFbiagentsthattheylocated and �nterv�ewed aud�ence and cast members to conf�rm thatbr�ghamwas“abo�sterousadvocateof�solat�on�smandstronglyopposedtothePres�dentandh�sFore�gnPol�cy.”22

Wh�leagents�nnewyorkrecordedethel’s�mpetuouspubl�cremarks,agents�nWash�ngtontr�edtoascerta�nhertravelhab�ts.Ga�n�ngaccesstobr�gham’spassportrecords,agentslearnedofhervar�ouseuropeantravels(part of her mus�cal career) as well as further personal data. Fbi agentsthenattemptedtofollowupalead�nPennsylvan�athatsuggestedbr�ghamhad“subvers�vetendenc�es,”butnoth�ngofanyvaluewasuncovered.23

becausetheywererely�ngon�nformersandphys�calsurve�llance,andbecausethesesourceshadunearthednovaluable�nformat�on,on4June1942 ass�stant Fbi D�rector D. m�lton ladd reauthor�zed the br�ghamw�retap.S�gn�f�cantly,ne�therladdnorhooversoughtapprovalfromtheattorneygeneralpr�ortorenew�ngthew�retap.insodo�ng,theyv�olatednotonlythe1934FederalCommun�cat�onsactbutroosevelt’s1940d�rec-t�vethattheattorneygeneralauthor�zeallw�retaps.Fbioff�c�alsrat�onal-�zed the�r act�on by bas�ng �t on “the or�g�nal author�ty granted by theattorneyGeneral.”attorneyGeneralb�ddle,however,hadauthor�zedtheor�g�nalw�retaponlywhenpresentedw�th �nformat�onaboutaposs�bleassass�nat�onplot.Thecont�nuanceofth�sw�retap,therefore,hadnoth�ngtodow�thathreatmadeaga�nstthepres�dent,suggest�ngthatFbioff�c�alsm�ghtnothavebeenconf�dentthatb�ddlewouldhaveconsented.indeed,b�ddlewrote�n1962thatasattorneygeneralhehadnotmade�ta“hab�t”toconsent tow�retapsbecausehev�ewed the�ruseasa “d�rtybus�ness.”ifso,andthere�snoreasontodoubtb�ddle’sword,theact�ontakenherebysen�orFbioff�c�alsdemonstratesthattheyhadga�nedanot�ns�gn�f�-cantlevelof�nvest�gat�veautonomyby1942becausetheycouldauthor�ze�llegalw�retapsw�thl�ttleornoovers�ght.Such�nvest�gat�vefreedom�sa

22. report,SaCnewyorktoFbihQ,2march1942,Fbi100–50729–23;conf�dent�alletter,Foxworthtohoover,18may1942,Fbi100–50729–25. 23. report,SaCWash�ngton,DCtoFbihQ,19may1942,Fbi100–50729–26;report,SaCPh�ladelph�atoFbihQ,20may1942,Fbi100–50729–27.

151Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

hallmarkoftheemergenceofthedomest�csecur�tystate,andreflectslaterands�m�larFbiact�v�tydur�ngtheColdWar.24

Whenreestabl�sh�ngthew�retapon24June,follow�ngFbiprocedure,�t was ass�gned a “symbol number”—the code-�dent�f�cat�on for w�retapor m�crophone surve�llance targets. (The Fbi has w�thheld the br�ghamsymbol number.) The symbol number was then �ncorporated �nto theSymbolnumberSens�t�veSourceindex(nowcalledthenat�onalSecur�tyelectron�cSurve�llanceCardF�le),acentral�zedf�nd�nga�dforFbibugsandw�retaps.byc�t�ngthesymbolnumber �nthe�rcorrespondenceandreports,Fbiagentswouldnotrevealthe�rsourcetobeasens�t�veone.inthe case of br�gham, Fbi agents c�ted the symbol number �n the�r cor-respondenceor,mostoften,referredtothew�retapas“conf�dent�al�nfor-mant[symbolnumber].”25

W�ththere�nst�tut�onofthebr�ghamw�retap,SaCFoxworthregarded�tsfru�tstobe“ofvalue.”26Onaweeklybas�shebr�efedhooveraboutthew�retap,wh�ch,yetaga�n,revealednocr�m�nalordomest�csecur�tythreatbut “add�t�onal ant�-roosevelt, ant�-Sem�t�c, and cont�nued �solat�on�statt�tude on the part of ethel and barbara br�gham.”27 and, aga�n, someofthe�nformat�onobta�nedfromth�s�llegalw�retapwassharedw�ththerooseveltWh�tehouse.inth�s�nstance,Fbiagents�nterceptedaconver-sat�onbetweenethelandanun�dent�f�ed�nd�v�dualsuggest�ngthatethelhadlearnedfroman“undergroundsource”thatbr�ta�nandGermanyweremeet�ngsecretly�nbelg�umandthatth�swouldresult�ntheUn�tedStates“hold�ng the bag.” These comments were wholly w�thout corroborat�on,andclearly shouldnothavebeenregardedas s�gn�f�cant,buton20 July1942 hoover forwarded the �nformat�on to the attorney general, harryhopk�ns,miD,andadolfberle.noneoftheserec�p�entswere�nformed

24. letterandaccompany�ngmemorandum,Foxworth tohoover,21may1942,Fbi100–50729–28; memorandum, J. K. mumford to ladd, 3 June 1942, Fbi 100–50729–30;memorandum,hoovertoFoxworth,9June1942,Fbi100–50729–31;memorandum,mum-fordtoladd,3 June1942,Fbi100–50729–30;Franc�sb�ddle,In Brief Authority (GardenC�ty,ny:Doubleday,1962),166,168. 25. memorandum,e.G.F�tchtoladd,6July1942,Fbi100–50729–35;athanTheoha-r�sandJohnCox,The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition(Ph�ladel-ph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1988),9–10. 26. Seepersonalandconf�dent�al letter,Foxworthtohoover,27June1942,Fbi100–50729–33;letter,Foxworthtohoover,7July1942,Fbi100–50729–34;letter,Foxworthtohoover, 14 July 1942, Fbi 100–50729–36; letter, Foxworth to hoover, 18 July 1942, Fbi100–50729–38. 27. letter,hoovertoFoxworth,12august1942,Fbi100–50729–42;report,SaCFox-worthtoFbihQ,14July1942,Fbi100–50729–37.

15� Chapter �

as to hoover’s source, but h�s shar�ng of th�s �nformat�on can best beunderstood as part of hoover’s effort to break �nto the f�eld of fore�gn�ntell�gence. S�nce at least 1940, hoover had v�ed w�th Colonel W�ll�amDonovan—headoftheOSSdur�ngtheSecondWorldWar—forarole�nfore�gn �ntell�genceandoperat�ons;and th�sb�tof �nformat�on,nomat-terhowabsurd,waspartofh�sefforttoproveh�mself�nth�sarea.italsoreflectshoover’suseof�nd�recttargetstogatherpol�t�cal(and�nth�scasefore�gn)�ntell�genceonlargertargets(e.g.,theamer�caF�rstComm�tteeandant�-�ntervent�on�stmovement).28

W�thweeklyapprovalsfromsen�orFbioff�c�als,thenewyorkoff�cema�nta�ned the br�gham w�retap unt�l 26 October 1942. Throughout1942, the w�retap y�elded no cr�m�nal or secur�ty �nformat�on and onlymorepol�t�cal�ntell�gence,muchof�tcaust�c.On17July,forexample,Fbiagentsoverheardethelstatethat“thePres�dent�sunabletostandonh�sownfeet, letalone th�nk,and thathe �sonly the frontmanfor the Jewswhoaredes�rousofgett�ngar�ngaroundtheworldandwanttosmashtheUn�tedStates.”On5augustshereportedlyreferredtorooseveltas“that�d�otatthehelmofth�scountry.”On16augustshereferredtoroosevelt’srefusaltout�l�zeCharlesl�ndbergh’sserv�cesaftertheUn�tedStateshadentered the war—�n apr�l 1941 l�ndbergh had res�gned h�s army a�rCorps comm�ss�on as a colonel—as “part of the crookedness . . . of thePres�dent.”Theseexamplesare representat�veof the typeof �nformat�onFbi agents developed dur�ng the course of th�s w�retap. most of �t wasv�tr�ol�c,emot�onal,andsomet�mesant�-Sem�t�cand�t�scompell�ngthatagents�nthe�rreportsweresofocusedonreport�ngth�spol�t�cal�ntell�-gence.Desp�tenoth�ngbe�ngdevelopedabouttheOneGunClub,hoovercont�nually approved the w�retap’s use because, as Foxworth repeatedlysa�d�nh�sw�retapcont�nuancerequests,�nformat�on“ofvalue”hadbeencollected.29

28. letter,SaCnewyorktoFbihQ,14July1942,Fbi100–50729–39;memorandum,laddtohoover,16July1942,Fbi100–50729–40;memorandum,hoovertoattorneygen-eral,20July1942;personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertohopk�ns,20July1942;personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoGeneralKroner,20July1942;personalandconf�dent�alletter,hoovertoberle,20July1942;all�nFbi100–50729–40. 29. Conf�dent�alletter,SaCFoxworthtohoover,4September1942,Fbi100–50729–47; conf�dent�al letter,SaCFoxworth tohoover,22September1942,Fbi100–50729–49;letter, SaC Foxworth to hoover, 2 October 1942, Fbi 100–50729–50; conf�dent�al letter,SaC Foxworth to hoover, 20 October 1942, Fbi 100–50729–51; conf�dent�al letter, SaCFoxworth tohoover,18October1942,Fbi100–50729–52; report,SaCFoxworth toFbihQ, 10 December 1942, Fbi 100–50729–54. it �s �nterest�ng to note that follow�ng thew�retap’s d�scont�nuance, reports regard�ng ethel br�gham were, �n add�t�on to labeled

153Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

by1943,Fbioff�c�als’v�ewofthebr�ghamshadchangeds�gn�f�cantly.bythatdate,roosevelt’sant�-�ntervent�on�stcr�t�cswereanon-�ssueandthe br�gham source for pol�t�cal �ntell�gence had dr�ed up. Fbi off�c�als’v�ewofthebr�ghams�n1943revealsasmuchandreflectsamoreobject�veanalys�sastothe�ract�v�t�es:

S�ncethelong�nvest�gat�onconductedw�thregardtomrs.ethelbr�ghamandherfam�lyhasnot�nd�catedthattheyareengaged�nanyun-amer�canact�v�t�es,ands�ncethe�rrab�dandv�c�ousstatementshavebeencons�d-eredharmlessbyunprejud�cedamer�canswhohavehadfrequentoppor-tun�tytojudgethebackgroundandcharacterofth�sfam�ly,thecollateralleadssetout�ntheabovereferencedreportarebe�ngd�sregardedandth�scase�sbe�ngclosed�nthenewyorkF�eldOff�ce.30

TheFbi’s �nvest�gat�onofethelbr�ghamandher fam�lyproves thatFbioff�c�alshad,�nfact,gatheredpol�t�cal�ntell�genceconcern�ngant�-�nter-vent�on�stsfroman�llegalw�retapandthensharedselectport�onsof�tw�ththeWh�tehouse.The�nvest�gat�onandw�retapmayhaveor�g�nated�naleg�t�mateprobeofathreatonthepres�dent’sl�feandrumorsastotheex�s-tenceofagroupadvocat�ngrevolt,butthatthreatwasnotser�ousandthegroup’s ex�stencewasunfounded.nevertheless,Fbioff�c�als successfullyusedtheseprem�sestoma�nta�nthe�rw�retap,wh�chproved,�nreal�ty,tobeavaluedsourceofpol�t�calsurve�llanceonprom�nentrooseveltcr�t�csl�ke the amer�ca F�rst Comm�ttee and Charles l�ndbergh. interest�ngly,�nOctober1941,hooverexpl�c�tlyden�edtoroberte.Wood,cha�rmanoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,thattheFbi“d�rectlyor�nd�rectlyatanyplace �ntheUn�tedStatestappedthew�res, �nterferedw�ththema�ls,orcheckedthemembersh�pl�stsoftheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.”Wh�leth�sstatementcamejustonemonthpr�ortothebr�ghamw�retap,therewereother w�retaps, and we now know that hoover’s general statement wasuntrue�nallrespectsandh�ss�ncer�tysuspect.31

“�nternalsecur�ty,”labeled“custod�aldetent�on.”Fbioff�c�alsapparentlyregardedbr�ghamassometypeofsecur�tyr�sk,plac�ngherontheFbi’semergencydetent�onl�st.Oncustod�aldetent�onseeathanTheohar�s,Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan(Ph�ladelph�a:TempleUn�vers�tyPress,1978),40–64. 30. report,SaCnewyorktoFbihQ,1July1943,Fbi100–50729–60. 31. letter,hoovertoWood,17October1941,box60,amer�caF�rstComm�tteePapers,hooverinst�tut�on,StanfordUn�vers�ty,Stanford,Ca.Forotherw�retaps,l�keGrunewald’s,seeDouglasm.Charles, “inform�ngFDr:FbiPol�t�calSurve�llanceand the isolat�on�st–intervent�on�st Fore�gn Pol�cy Debate, 1939–1945,” Diplomatic History 24 (Spr�ng 2000):219.

154 Chapter �

Thevalueofth�s�llegalw�retapasasourceofpol�t�cal�ntell�gence�sfurther demonstrated by Fbi off�c�als cont�nu�ng �t after Secret Serv�ceagentshadd�sm�ssedthebr�ghamassass�nat�onthreat,andfurtherunder-scored by the dec�s�on of sen�or Fbi off�c�als not to seek the attorneygeneral’sconsent toreestabl�shthew�retap �n1942.Th�swasav�olat�onofroosevelt’sw�retapd�rect�ve,av�olat�onof the law,anddemonstratesthatFbioff�c�alswereconcernedw�thlos�ngavaluablesourceshouldthec�v�l l�bertar�an b�ddle be br�efed. The w�retap �s also �llustrat�ve of thedomest�csecur�tystate�nasmuchashooverclearlyhadas�gn�f�cantlevelofautonomy�nauthor�z�ngandma�nta�n�ng�llegalw�retaps,and�tclearlyshowstheFbi’snewroleastheWh�tehouse�ntell�gencearm�nthatthepol�t�cal�ntell�gencehegeneratedhelpedtosusta�nadm�n�strat�onv�ewsof �ts cr�t�csas subvers�ve—hoover’serroneouscla�m thatamer�caF�rstwas l�nked to the One Gun Club, for �nstance, and that amer�ca F�rstmemberswantedthepres�dentdead.

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Fbi off�c�als lost �nterest �n the br�ghams after �t became clear that theant�-�ntervent�on�stswerenolongerathreattotherooseveltadm�n�stra-t�on’sfore�gnpol�cy.TheFbi’sself-descr�bed“extens�ve�nvest�gat�on”32ofl�ndberghalsolostmomentumoncetheGreatDebatepassed�ntoh�story,wh�ch �s yet another example of the operat�on of the domest�c secur�tystate—only real or perce�ved pol�t�cal threats rece�ve �nvest�gat�ve atten-t�on;whenthatpassesall�nterest�n“domest�csecur�ty”�ssuesends.TheFbi’slastdocumented�nterest�nl�ndbergh,�nnovember1942,�nvolvedthecuratoroftheyaleUn�vers�tyl�brary,who�nformedhooverthath�s�nst�tut�onhadacqu�red“alargecollect�onofma�l”addressedtol�ndberghfromavar�etyofamer�cansandoffered theFbiaccess to th�smater�al.(The yale Sterl�ng l�brary holds the st�ll-sealed l�ndbergh papers.) Fbioff�c�alswelcomedthe �nv�tat�on“�nv�ewoftheposs�b�l�tythat �tm�ghtbecons�deredadv�sable toexam�nel�ndbergh’sma�l �nconnect�onw�thanyofthecasesbe�ng�nvest�gatedbytheFbi.”hooverbr�efedh�sJust�ceDepartmentsuper�ors,butthere�sno�nd�cat�on�nextantFbif�lesastowhethertherecordswereexam�ned.33

instr�k�ngcontrasttoth�s,by1944,Fbioff�c�alshadalmostno�nterest�nl�ndbergh.Thatyear,F�rstladyeleanorrooseveltrece�vedaletterfrom

32. bl�ndmemorandum,27January1942,Fbi65–39945–26X,p.4. 33. letter,r.h.S�monstohoover,13november1942,Fbi65–11449–155;memoran-dum,hoovertoSm�th,16December1942,Fbi65–11449–155.

155Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

an amer�can who was “troubled about Charles l�ndbergh’s . . . where-abouts.”Pres�dentrooseveltbroughtthe lettertohoover’sattent�onandpersonallyaskedh�mhowh�sw�feshould“answer th�sone.” incontrasttohoover’sprev�ousresponsestorequestsfromthepres�dent(espec�allypersonal requests) where he would demand summary reports from h�ssubord�nates,checkFbif�lesfor�nformat�on,andd�spatchapersonalandconf�dent�almemorandumtothepres�dent,th�st�mehoovermerelysug-gestedthattheF�rstladysendaletterofacknowledgmentandapprec�a-t�on.it�snot�ns�gn�f�canttothefunct�on�ngandnatureofthedomest�csecur�tystatethatforlornprom�nentcr�t�cswere�gnoredbyFbioff�c�alsatth�spart�culart�mewh�lepeopleontherad�calfr�nge—l�kelawrenceDenn�sandcompany—weretargetedfor�nd�ctment.Prom�nentcr�t�csaregoodsourcesforpol�t�cal�ntell�gence;fr�ngef�gures,whose�nvest�gat�onsdonotdrawscrut�ny,areprosecuted.34

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another vocal roosevelt adm�n�strat�on cr�t�c who rece�ved spec�al Fbiattent�on after the declarat�on of war was the prom�nent rev�s�on�st h�s-tor�an,soc�olog�st,cr�m�nolog�st,andsoc�alcr�t�charryelmerbarnes.aColumb�aUn�vers�ty–educatedh�stor�an,barneswaswellknownforh�scollegetextbooksWorld Politics in Modern Civilization(1930),A History of Western Civilization(1937),andAn Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World (1937).h�sbest-knownwork,however,wash�srev�s�on-�sttractGenesis of the World War(1926)�nwh�chbarnesla�dblamefortheF�rstWorldWarnotonGermanybutonFranceandruss�a.intotal,barnespubl�shedoverth�rtybooksandhundredsofessays,sothatwhenhef�nallyjo�nedthechorusofant�-�ntervent�on�stsdur�ngthelate1930s,h�s scholarly reputat�on made h�m an art�culate and prom�nent cr�t�c ofroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy. but why d�d the pol�t�cally l�beral barnes—an early new Deal sup-porter—jo�nw�ththemostlyconservat�veant�-�ntervent�on�stmovement?The explanat�on for barnes’s defect�on �s rooted �n h�s F�rst World Warrev�s�on�sm,wh�chevolvedtounderp�nh�scr�t�c�smsofnewDeald�plo-macy,espec�ally�nh�sbel�efthat�ntervent�onwaspartofamer�can�mpe-r�al�sm.he, therefore,wasw�ll�ng to serveasa speaker for theamer�caF�rst Comm�ttee to oppose roosevelt’s �ncreas�ngly un-neutral fore�gn

34. memorandum,roosevelttohoover,3September1944,Fbi65–11449–158;letter,hoovertoedw�nm.Watson,6September1944,Fbi65–11449–158.

15� Chapter �

pol�cy.inadd�t�on,barnesservedasv�cecha�rmanoftheKeepOutofWarCongressanded�tedtheant�-�ntervent�on�stnewsletterUncensored. barnes’s pol�t�cal defect�on was not uncons�dered and not w�thoutpersonalandprofess�onalconsequences.bys�d�ngw�thconservat�veswhosawathreat�nroosevelt’scentral�zat�onofpower,barnesal�enatedh�mselffromh�spubl�shers.D.C.heath,forexample,wrotebarnes�n1941adv�s-�ngh�mthatbecauseofthe“somewhathyster�calt�mes,”theydec�ded“nottoundertakeyourbook,nomatterhowgood.”effect�velyblackballed,thel�beralbarnesbegantopubl�shw�thconservat�vepresses tocr�t�c�ze theamer�canentrance�ntotheSecondWorldWarandtheeventslead�nguptoPearlharbor.Theconservat�veCaxtonPresspubl�shedh�srev�s�on�stSecondWorldWarstudyPerpetual War for Perpetual Peace(1953),wh�lebarnesalsopubl�shedessays�nconservat�veper�od�calsl�ketheNational Review.35

Wh�leFbiagentsmon�toredbarnes’sact�v�t�esdat�ngfrom1936(unt�l1944),the�rsurve�llanceonly�ntens�f�edwhenhebecameaspokespersonfor the ant�-�ntervent�on�st movement. h�stor�an roy Turnbaugh hasexpla�nedtheFbi’s�nterest�nbarnesasareact�ontoh�snewDealcr�t�-c�smsofthebureau—that�thadpropagand�zed�ts�mage�nthe1930sandwasnotabovereproach.Turnbaughtherebyconcludedthatwhenbarnesbecameacr�t�cofroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy,hooverusedth�sopportun�tytoenactretr�but�on.Wh�leononelevelth�sassessmenthasmer�t,theFbi’s�nterest�nbarnes�sbestunderstoodw�th�nthelargercontextoftheFbi’sw�despreadsurve�llanceoftheant�-�ntervent�on�sts.36

in February 1936, barnes began to make publ�c comments aboutthe Fbi that were not �n harmony w�th hoover’s carefully crafted publ�c�mage.asaresult,theFbid�rectord�spatchedagentstomon�torbarnes’stalks. One agent attended a talk barnes gave �n Scranton, Pennsylvan�a,on the top�c of cr�me where the professor sa�d that ne�ther hoover northeattorneygeneralhadactuallydoneanyth�ngtostemracketeer�ng.One

35. letter,FrankW.Scotttoharryelmerbarnes,31January1941,harryelmerbarnesPapers,box27,amer�canher�tageCenter(hereafterahC),Un�vers�tyofWyom�ng,lara-m�e,Wy.OnbarnesseeJustusD.Doenecke,“harryelmerbarnes,”Wisconsin Magazine of History56(Summer1973):311–23;Doenecke,“harryelmerbarnes:Prophetofa‘Usable’Past,”History Teacher8(February1975):265–76.itshouldbenotedthat,later�nl�fe,barnesden�edGermanrespons�b�l�ty forstart�ngtheSecondWorldWarandhebecameaholo-caustden�er.SeeJust�ceDoenecke,The Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941(malabar,Fl:Kr�eger,1997),22. 36. royTurnbaugh,“TheFbiandharryelmerbarnes:1936–1944,”Historian42(may1980): 385–98. See also roy Turnbaugh, “The Quest for Truth and Just�ce: harry elmerbarnes”(Ph.D.d�ss.,Un�vers�tyofill�no�s,1977).

15�Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

comment,�npart�cular,caughttheattent�onofthesnoop�ngagent.barnesreportedly sa�d that hoover had “hoodw�nked the publ�c w�th a lot ofcheap publ�c�ty �n the track�ng down of a few cr�m�nals.” The professorstated further that vaunted cr�m�nals l�ke John D�ll�nger, among others,were�nreal�tyonly�ns�gn�f�cant,small-t�mecrooks.SuchcommentsledFbiagentstoconcludethatbarneshad“Commun�st�ctendenc�es.”Wh�leFbiagentsm�ghthavebeenledtoth�ss�mpl�st�cconclus�on,barnestookgreatpa�nstodenythathewasacommun�st.inapr�l1941,for�nstance,hefeltcompelledtowr�tetheind�anapol�sbranchoftheamer�canleg�ontoprotestthe�rcondemnat�onofh�masacommun�st.37

barnes’s cr�t�c�sm of the Fbi was not restr�cted to one speech. innovember 1936, wh�le �n St. lou�s, he aga�n cr�t�c�zed the bureau �n afash�ons�m�lar toh�sprev�ouscommentary.hecla�medthatFbiagentssoughtonly “small fry” cr�m�nalswh�le �gnor�ng themore soph�st�catedmobsters,therebythrow�ng“dust�ntotheeyesofthepubl�c.”Thesenewpubl�ccommentspromptedFbioff�c�allou�sn�cholstorecommendon9December1936:

Wh�le�tm�ghtbeadv�sableto�gnorebarnes,neverthelessifeelthatsuchremarksassetforthaboveshouldnotgounchallengedastheyarederoga-toryandconveythe�mpress�onthatbarnes�sattempt�ngtod�scred�tourbureau, and i feel that h�s hand should be called, part�cularly when heby �nnuendoquest�onsourhonesty.Therefore, �t �s suggested that somev�gorous representat�ve of the bureau �nterv�ew barnes and ask h�m forany �nformat�onorev�dence thathehasas to the“10,000mostdanger-ouscr�m�nalswhoscorntosteallessthan$10,000atat�me”whom“theFederal Department of Just�ce does not choose to meddle w�th.” Then�f barnes �s unable to furn�sh any accurate �nformat�on regard�ng themwh�chcomew�th�nour�nvest�gat�vejur�sd�ct�on,�t�ssuggestedthathebesummar�lyplaced�nh�sproperplace.it�sbel�evedthat�twouldbe�nad-v�sabletowr�teh�maletter.however,�ftheabovecourse�snotdeemeddes�rable,theniwouldl�ketosuggestthattheD�rectorcons�derthefeas�-b�l�tyofquot�ngbarnes�nsomefutureaddressas�llustrat�veoftheho�ty

37. letter,SaCPh�ladelph�atohoover,10February1936,Fbi100–6715-X;memoran-dum,r.JosephtoTolson,14February1936,Fbi100–6715-X1.(TheharryelmerbarnesFbif�lecanbefound�nh�spapers,box196,attheamer�canher�tageCenter,Un�vers�tyofWyom�ng.)letter,barnestohomerCha�llaux,18apr�l1941,barnesPapers,ahC;let-ter,Cha�llaux tobarnes,6may1941,barnesPapers,ahC.Onhoover’scarefullycraftedDepress�on-era �mageseer�chardG�dPowers,G-Men: Hoover’s FBI in American Popular Culture(Carbondale:Southernill�no�sUn�vers�tyPress,1983).

15� Chapter �

to�typrofessorswhoare so �mpract�calandwhoreallyareunderm�n�nggoodlawenforcementratherthanbolster�ng�t.38

irrespect�veofn�chols’ssuggest�on,sen�orFbioff�c�alsapparentlydec�dednottopursuetheseends. Cur�ously,barnesfelloffthebureau’sradarunt�l1940.inDecemberofthatyear,wh�leperus�ngthef�lesofanunnamedleft-lean�nggroup,Fbiagents learned that barnes had g�ven h�s endorsement to the magaz�neSoviet Russia Today.agentsalsofoundbarnes’snamel�stedasamemberof the nat�onal Comm�ss�on for Defense of Pol�t�cal Pr�soners and as aboardmemberofPeople’slobby,inc.G�venthesef�nd�ngsandknowledgethatbarneswasconnectedtosomerecentbutunspec�f�ed“quest�onableact�v�ty” �n Wash�ngton, D.C., Fbi agents tr�ed to ascerta�n h�s “presentwhereabouts.” The�r �nterest centered on whether barnes was currently“engaged �nany formofun-amer�canact�v�ty.”Forunspec�f�edreasons,hooverendedth�sspec�f�c�nqu�ry�nJanuary1941butd�dnotlose�nter-est�nbarnesaltogether.39

barnesaga�ncaughttheattent�onofFbioff�c�alsdur�ngthesummerof1941whenan�nformantcla�medtheprofessorwasaF�fthColumn�stand naz� mouthp�ece. Then, �n July, another �nformant accused h�m ofbe�ng assoc�ated w�th “rad�cal and sem�-rad�cal” groups and act�v�t�esworldw�de. as ev�dence, the �nformant l�sted barnes’s var�ous jobs andassoc�at�ons, wh�ch were, to h�m, a clear �nd�cat�on of commun�sm. atyear’send,eventhearmy’s�ntell�genceapparatus—miD—hadre�teratedtoFbioff�c�alsthatbarneswas“adangerousman.”barneswasnot�gnorantofthesecharges,butwaspuzzledbythembecause,ashetoldafr�end,“theFbi has been consult�ng me frequently th�s spr�ng about appo�ntmentsto the�r force.” none of the var�ous charges leveled aga�nst barnes weresubstant�ated, nor d�d �t seem to matter. Taken as a whole, the chargesconf�rmedforFbioff�c�als(andothers)thatbarneswasasubvers�veand,thereby, a domest�c secur�ty threat. These accusat�ons, wh�ch co�nc�dedw�thbarnes’scr�t�c�smsoftherooseveltadm�n�strat�on,ledFbioff�c�alsby1943toattempttodevelopased�t�oncaseaga�nsth�m.40

38. memorandum,lou�sn�cholstomr.Joseph,9December1936,Fbi100–6715-X2. 39. report,SaCWash�ngtonDCtoFbihQ,17December1940,Fbi100–6715–1;let-ter,hoovertoSaCWash�ngtonDC,7January1941,Fbi100–6715–1. 40. letterandenclosure,hoovertoSaCWash�ngton,DC,23June1941,Fbi100–6715–3;memorandum,K.r.mcint�retomr.Kramer,3July1941,Fbi100–6715–4;bl�ndmemo-randumreharryelmerbarnes,3July1941,Fbi100–6715–4;letterandenclosure,ColonelJ.T.b�sselltohoover,5December1941(Fbidocumentnumberm�ss�ngbut�nbarnesFbi

159Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

it�scur�ousthatbarnesd�dnotdrawmoreattent�onfromFbiagentsdur�ng1941and1942.Only�n1943d�dFbiagents�nvest�gatebarnes�naconcertedefforttoprosecuteandtherebys�lencetherabble-rous�ngpro-fessor.Th�scanonlybeunderstood�nthecontextofothersed�t�oncasesofthet�me—thatdur�ngwart�methegovernmentbel�eved�tcoulds�lence�ts more outspoken cr�t�cs—and, moreover, that the domest�c secur�tystatehaddevelopedsuff�c�entlyw�th�ntheFbitoproceedw�thsuchcases.Justpr�ortothedevelopmentof�tssed�t�oncase�n1943,Fbiagentswere�nformedthataprofessoratKansasC�tyUn�vers�ty,aProfessorTr�mblewho was assoc�ated w�th amer�ca F�rst, had used barnes’s college text,Social Institutions, �n 1942. S�nce the textbook was publ�shed after theamer�canentrance�ntowar,andbecause�twascr�t�calofthegovernment,the�nformantbel�evedthebookwasan�nd�rectattempttod�scred�ttheroosevelt adm�n�strat�on. as corroborat�on, a Professor mannhe�m wasquoted�nreferencetothebookthat�twas“obnox�ousand...notthetypeofl�teratureforcollegefreshmen.”Throughoutthetextofthebookbarneswas accused of us�ng “a subtle style” wh�le “cleverly” try�ng to turn thegovernmenttowardfasc�sm.Support�ngth�scontent�onwasthefactthatbarneshadl�stedoneofGeorgeSylvesterv�ereck’sbooks�nh�sb�bl�ogra-phy.TheKansasC�ty,m�ssour�,f�eldoff�ceofferedtofollowupthematterbycollect�ngpassagesfromthebookbuthooverrejectedtheproposalas“unnecessary.”41

barnes was not obl�v�ous to the concerns vo�ced �n 1942 about h�stextbookSocial Institutions.h�sed�toratPrent�cehall,S.e.Carll,wrotebarnesandaskedh�mtorev�ewcarefully thestatementshemade �nh�sbook. G�ven Carll’s concerns w�th th�s spec�f�c book at th�s part�culart�me,�tseemsl�kelythatFbiagents�nterv�ewedorcontactedh�m�nsomemanner.inanyevent,Carllassuredbarnesthathed�dnotth�nkhewasgu�ltyof sed�t�onyet admon�shedh�m,probablynot co�nc�dentally, thatan�mpress�onablestudentcouldshowthebooktoh�sorherparents,who,notunderstand�ngthecontextofbarnes’swr�t�ng,m�ght“takeexcept�onto�tandcons�der�tthe�rpatr�ot�cdutytoreportthebooktotheFbi.Then

f�le);letter,barnestoralphT�eje,6July1941,barnesPapers,ahC.Patr�ckWashburnd�s-cussesthegovernment’spursu�tofsomeof�tsmorevocalcr�t�csafter1942forsed�t�on�n“FDrversush�sOwnattorneyGeneral:TheStruggleoverSed�t�on,1941–42,”Journalism Quarterly62(W�nter1985):717–24. 41. report,SaCKansasC�ty toFbihQ,23December1942,Fbi100–6715–6; letter,hoovertoSaCKansasC�ty,2February1942,Fbi100–6715–6.SeealsotheJust�ceDepart-ment’sunredactedcopyofth�sreport�nf�le146–28–840,box103,Class�f�edSubjectsF�le,recordGroup(rG)60,nat�onalarch�vesandrecordsadm�n�strat�on(nara),CollegePark,mD.

1�0 Chapter �

yourtroublebeg�ns.”Wh�letheed�torcla�medth�sposs�b�l�tywasmerely“hypothet�cal,” he conf�ded that “strange th�ngs can happen �n t�mes ofstress.”moreover,concernw�thanonconform�sttextbookandconcurrentFbi �nvest�gat�on for sed�t�on, reflects the develop�ng domest�c secur�tystate.Dur�ngtheColdWar,collegetextbooksthatfellshortofconsensush�story, suchas thosewr�ttenbyCharlesandmarybeard,wereroundlyattackedandsubsequentlyabandonedbypubl�shers.infact,onelead�ngtextbookauthoroftheColdWareraadv�sedstudentsthat“[t]heFbiurgesamer�cans to report d�rect to �ts off�ces any susp�c�ons they may haveabout Commun�st act�v�ty on the part of the�r fellow amer�cans.” Such�nform�ngwasnotun�quetotheColdWar,and�ndeedwasal�veandwelldur�ngtheeraofthedomest�csecur�tystate.42

yet�twasonly�n1943thattheFbiandtherooseveltadm�n�strat�onpursuedbarnes �naneffort toprosecuteh�mforsed�t�on.asprev�ouslynoted, he was not the only �nd�v�dual the roosevelt adm�n�strat�on tar-geted us�ng the sed�t�on statutes. Follow�ng the amer�can entrance �ntotheSecondWorldWar,therooseveltadm�n�strat�onandFbi�nvest�gated,deta�ned, and prosecuted a number of �nd�v�duals for mak�ng allegedlysed�t�ous statements. accord�ng to ass�stant attorney General Wendellberge, the government was prepared to use prov�s�ons of the esp�onageandSm�thacts,aswellasthesed�t�ousconsp�racystatuteaga�nst“d�sloyalutterance,”tos�lencevocalgovernmentcr�t�cs.bergestressedtoattorneyGeneralb�ddlethat“wemustrememberthatthegoodcommonsenseandpatr�ot�smoftheamer�canpeoplearethe�rcountry’sgreatestsafeguardsaga�nst d�sloyal utterance” because “passers of spur�ous co�n are be�ngrecogn�zedforwhattheyare”andthatthe�rv�ews“w�llberejected.”C�v�ll�bert�esseemednottobean�ssuew�thberge.43

b�ddle, however, was more c�v�l l�bert�es–m�nded than e�ther bergeorrooseveltand, �nfact,orderedthereleaseofanumberof �nd�v�dualsthegovernmenthadarrestedanddroppedthe�rprosecut�ons.Theattor-neygeneralwantedtoavo�drecklessprosecut�ons l�kethosecarr�edoutdur�ngtheF�rstWorldWarwhenamer�canc�t�zenscr�t�c�zedPres�dentW�lson’s pol�cy. among those b�ddle released, for example, was ell�s O.Jones, who had publ�cly advocated �mpeach�ng roosevelt for seek�ng a

42. letter,S.e.Carll,ed�tor,Prent�cehall,tobarnes,25apr�l1942,barnesPapers,box28,ahC;ralphhenryGabr�elasquoted�nPeterCharleshoffer,Past Imperfect: Facts, Fic-tions, Fraud—American History from Bancroft and Parkman to Ambrose, Bellesiles, Ellis, and Goodwin(newyork:Publ�caffa�rs,2004),46. 43. memorandum,ass�stantattorneyGeneralWendellbergetob�ddle,24march1942,Franc�sb�ddlePapers,FDrl.

1�1Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

wardeclarat�on.b�ddlealsopreventedtheadm�n�strat�onfromus�ngtheSm�thacttos�lencesomemembersofthepress.yetdesp�teth�srestra�nt,otherswhoweremorepronounced�nthe�rop�n�onsweresoughtand�nsome�nstancesprosecuted.These�ncludedtheth�rtywhowere�nd�cted�n1944.FbiD�rectorhoover,sens�ngtheadm�n�strat�on’s�nterest�npol�t�-cal�ntell�genceon�tscr�t�cspr�ortoPearlharborand�tsdes�retos�lencesomeafterward,tr�edtodevelop�nformat�onthattheJust�ceDepartmentcoulduseto�ssue�nd�ctmentsforsed�t�on.harryelmerbarneswasoneofthef�rstsuchcaseswh�chpeakedw�ththe�nd�ctmentoftheth�rty.44

by1943Fbiagentsbeganact�velytodevelop�nformat�ononbarnessotheJust�ceDepartmentcouldprosecuteh�m“undertheSed�t�onStatutes.”Theeffortbegan�nalbany,newyork,wheretheSaCreportedthatbarneswas “long assoc�ated” w�th commun�st front groups and “�solat�on�stmovements.”Theagentrecogn�zedtheprofessoras“stronglyant�-br�t�shandnot�ceablyopposedtoPres�dentrooseveltand[the]presentadm�n�s-trat�on,”andwhenhereadanewspaperart�clereflect�ngth�shed�spatchedanagentto�nterv�ewthejournal�stwhowrote�t.45

in the�r efforts to develop a sed�t�on case, Fbi agents �nterv�ewednumerouspeople todeterm�nebarnes’spol�t�calv�ews.One �nterv�ewee�nalbany,namedreg�neKurlander,volunteeredthataftershemetbarnes�nCleveland,shedeterm�nedhewas“completelyFasc�standnolongeral�beral.”Shesa�dbarnescla�medthatroosevelthadmaneuveredthecoun-try�ntowarw�thPearlharbor,andreportedthathehadmaded�sparag�ngcommentsaboutW�nstonChurch�llandCh�angKa�-shek.46

by march, the Kansas C�ty, m�ssour�, f�eld off�ce aga�n reported onbarnesandh�stextbook,conclud�ngthathewasasubvers�veandtherebyl�able for prosecut�on. One “conf�dent�al �nformant,” probably a profes-sor at Kansas C�ty Un�vers�ty, cr�t�c�zed barnes as an academ�c becausehe “debunks and cr�t�c�zes everyth�ng called ‘amer�can�sm.’” Th�s same�nformant,whobel�evedbarneswasnotafasc�stbut“�ncl�nedtoSoc�al�smandCommun�sm,”alsooffered theop�n�on thathewas “a short s�ghted

44. Franc�s b�ddle, In Brief Authority (Garden C�ty, ny: Doubleday, 1962), 234–35;Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45 (l�ncoln: Un�vers�ty of nebraskaPress,1983),533–34;Washburn,“FDrversush�sOwnattorneyGeneral,”717.Onthevar�-ousc�v�ll�bert�esv�ewsw�th�ntheJust�ceDepartment,seer�chardW.Steele,Free Speech in the Good War(newyork:St.mart�n’sPress,1999). 45. report, SaC albany to Fbi hQ, 23 January 1943, Fbi 100–6715–8; report, SaCalbanytoFbihQ,23January1943,f�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara;memoran-dum,hoovertoSaCalbany,2march1943,Fbi100–6715–8. 46. report, SaC albany to Fbi hQ, 23 January 1943, Fbi 100–6715–8; report, SaCalbanytoFbihQ,23January1943,f�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara.

1�� Chapter �

rat�onal�st who would go so far as anarchy; he �s pedagog�cally danger-ous.”The�nformantaga�nresurrectedthespecterofbarnes’sbookSocial Justice,comment�ngthat�twas“badforstudentsbecause�tpresentsatooone-s�dedv�ewpo�ntandcr�t�c�zesamer�can �dealsandtrad�t�ons to theextreme.”allofth�ssuggestedtoFbioff�c�alsthatbarneswas�ndeedgu�ltyofsed�t�onor,poss�bly, theytookwhat �nformat�ontheydeveloped �rre-spect�veof�tseff�cacytoserv�ceadm�n�strat�ondes�resforprosecut�ons.47

Fbiagentswerethend�spatchedtobarnes’shometownofCooperstown,new york, to ascerta�n more spec�f�c �nformat�on about h�m. One Fbiagent �nterv�ewed the Cooperstown ass�stant postmaster, J. G�lchr�est,toascerta�n�ftherewasanyth�ngunusualaboutwhatbarnesrece�ved�nthema�l;G�lchr�estreportednoth�ngunusual.anagentalso�nterv�ewedthed�rectoroftheCooperstownbranchofthenewyorkStateh�stor�calassoc�at�on,whoreportedthatafterbarnesspoketothegrouph�srepu-tat�on �n the commun�ty plummeted. also offer�ng cr�t�cal commentarywerethetownclerk,v�llagecomm�ss�oner,mayor,andseveralother�nd�-v�duals.ToFbiagents,thesecomments,�ntoto,furtherconf�rmed,appar-ently,thatbarneswasl�ableforprosecut�onforsed�t�on.48

by late apr�l 1943, w�th the above const�tut�ng Fbi off�c�als’ accu-mulated�nformat�onaboutbarnes,FbiD�rectorhooverforwarded�t toWendellbergeforh�sop�n�onasto“av�olat�onoftheSed�t�onStatutesand�f you bel�eve further �nvest�gat�on �s warranted.” The ass�stant attorneygeneral responded that the ev�dence collected d�d not warrant prosecu-t�on and he suggested that Fbi agents d�scont�nue the�r probe. hoover,therefore, adv�sed the albany f�eld off�ce to suspend �ts �nvest�gat�onbutadv�sedthemthat�ffurther�nformat�on“ofased�t�ousnature”wererece�ved,�tshouldbereported.49

Fbiagents,�ndeed,cont�nuedtocollect�ntell�genceonbarnes.inmayanagent�nKansasC�ty,st�ll�nterested�nbarnes’sbookSocial Institutions, tr�edtoascerta�n“thephraseologyofcerta�npassages”becausetheyalleg-edly “�nd�cated the subject’s ant�-amer�can sent�ment.” The agent wasunabletocompleteh�stask,however,becauseh�s�nformant—astudent—

47. report,SaCKansasC�tytoFbihQ,9march1943,Fbi100–6715–10;report,SaCKansasC�tytoFbihQ,9march1943,f�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara. 48. report, SaC albany to Fbi hQ, 30 march 1943, Fbi 100–6715–12; report, SaCalbanytoFbihQ,30march1943,F�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara. 49. memorandum,hoovertoberge,19apr�l1943,Fbi100–6715–12;memorandum,bergetohoover,26apr�l1943,Fbi100–6715–14;memorandum,hoovertoSaCalbany,14may1943,Fbi100–6715–14;memorandum,hoovertoberge,19apr�l1943,F�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara;memorandum,bergetohoover,26apr�l1943,F�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara.

1�3Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

hadf�n�shedtheclassworkandnolongerhadacopyofthebook.(Whytheagentwasunabletof�ndh�sowncopy�sunknown.)Then,�nJune,thenewyorkC�tyspec�alagent�nchargereportedbarnes’sassoc�at�onw�thboththeamer�caCounc�lonPubl�caffa�rsandthenat�onalComm�tteeofinternat�onalJur�d�calassoc�at�on,andthathewasaCommun�stpartyspeaker. Th�s �nformat�on, some of wh�ch was purely speculat�ve, sug-gestedtoFbioff�c�alsthatbarneswasased�t�on�stnotfromanyev�dencebutbecausehe“expressed[a]verypess�m�st�catt�tude toward[the]U.S.notw�thstand�ngtheoutcomeofthewar.”50

The follow�ng month an Fbi agent �n albany arranged an �nterv�eww�thoneofbarnes’scolleagues,Dr.D�xonFox,ah�stor�anoftheUn�tedStatesandpres�dentofUn�onCollege.TheagentaskedFoxaboutbarnes’sspeech before the new york State h�stor�cal assoc�at�on—Fox was �tspres�dent—and whether he bel�eved �t to be �nd�cat�ve of sed�t�on. Fox’sanswersseemtohavetemperedFbioff�c�als’v�ewofbarnes.hetoldthemthat�nh�stwenty-f�ve-yearassoc�at�onw�thbarnes,hefoundtheprofessortoholdsomeanglophob�cfeel�ngsyetbel�evedh�m“tobeent�relyopen.”Foxaddedthatbarneshadthe“d�spos�t�oncaus�ngh�mtotakethes�deof them�nor�ty �nmostd�sputes”and �twas th�s thatbestexpla�nedh�sbehav�or.Th�s�nterv�ewwasconv�nc�ngenoughforFbioff�c�als,lead�ngthemtoclosethesed�t�oncaseaga�nstbarnes.51

Theclosureof the sed�t�oncased�dnotendFbioff�c�als’ �nterest �nbarnes, however. in December 1943, barnes appl�ed to be a consultanttotheOff�ceforemergencymanagement(Oem)oftheWarProduct�onboard,ajobrequ�r�nganFbibackgroundcheck.Fbiagents’�n�t�alrev�ewresurrectedh�s1936cr�t�c�smsofthebureauandh�sprom�nentpos�t�onasanant�-�ntervent�on�st.Whenhooverlearnedofbarnes’sdes�retojo�ntheadm�n�strat�on,heorderedh�ssubord�natesto“[s]eethathe�sthoroughly�nvest�gatedashe�sobv�ouslyafoulball.”52

G�venbarnes’spastandhoover’sop�n�onastoh�squal�f�cat�onsfortheOempos�t�on,heordereda“v�gorous”andw�despread�nvest�gat�on�nvolv-�ng f�eld off�ces �n new york, new Jersey, north Carol�na, Pennsylvan�a,m�ch�gan,massachusetts,andWash�ngton,D.C.eachf�eldoff�cereported

50. report,SaCKansasC�tytoFbihQ,13may1943,Fbi100–6715–15;report,SaCnewyorkC�tytoFbihQ,7June1943,Fbi100–6715–16;report,SaCnewyorkC�tytoFbihQ,7June1943,F�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara. 51. report,SaCalbanytoFbihQ,30July1943,Fbi100–6715–17;report,SaCalbanytoFbihQ,30July1943,F�le146–28–840,box103,rG60,nara. 52. letter, Dallas Dort, Off�ce for emergency management, to hoover, 8 December1943,Fbi100–6715–17X;memorandum,G.C.Callantoladd,19January1944,Fbi100–6715–17X.

1�4 Chapter �

�n w�th �nformat�on that only re�terated the �nformat�on culled from theprev�ous �nvest�gat�ons of barnes. The new york f�eld off�ce, however,concludedon9February1944thatbarneswas“adangerousman”duetoh�s“superlat�veegot�sm”andh�s“fla�rforthespectacular.”becausebarnesallegedlyhatedtheamer�cangovernment,thenewyorkoff�cedeterm�nedthathe“woulde�therhavesomepart�nourgovernmentorgotoja�l.”53

W�th the f�eld off�ces report�ng �n, hoover used the �nformat�on toensure barnes was not appo�nted to the government pos�t�on. he for-wardedtoGeorgeGould,theass�stantof�nvest�gat�onsatOem,themostderogatory �nformat�on collected on barnes. hoover then wrote Gouldto �nform h�m of barnes’s cr�t�c�sm of the Just�ce Department’s newDeal cr�mecontrolprogram.healso sa�dbarnes cla�med thatb�gbus�-nesshadan�nterest�nprotect�nglargecr�mesynd�cateswh�letheJust�ceDepartment“hoodw�nkedthepubl�cbytrack�ngdownsecondratecr�m�-nalsl�keD�ll�nger,apoorhuntedboy,whowasden�edh�sconst�tut�onalr�ghttosurrender.”54

it�sunclearwhetherhooverhadsucceeded�nconv�nc�ngGouldnotto h�re barnes, but the effort was, �n any event, fleet�ng. h�stor�an royTurnbaugh,whohas�nt�matelystud�edbarnes’sl�fe,wrotethatevenbeforehooverhadforwardedh�s�nformat�ontoGould,thepr�son�ndustryh�redbarnes as a consultant.55 hoover’s act�on, nevertheless, �s demonstrat�veofh�s longeffort toservetherooseveltWh�tehouse’spol�t�cal �nterestsandoftendo�ngsow�thoutprompt�ng fromsuper�ors. italsoshowstheevolut�on of the domest�c secur�ty state �nasmuch as w�th barnes, Fbiagentswentfrommon�tor�ngfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs,tosed�t�on�sts,to“un-amer�cans”l�kebarnes.

—■■■■■■■—

laura houghtal�ng ingalls was a noted female av�ator dur�ng the 1930swho, among other unusual aeronaut�cal ach�evements, won $2,500 �n

53. memorandum, hoover to SaC new york, 19 January 1944, Fbi 100–6715–17X;memorandum,G.C.Callantoladd,22February1944,Fbi100–6715–2[5?];report,SaCnewyorktoFbihQ,9February1944,Fbi100–6715–24;memorandum,SaCnewyorktohoover,17apr�l1944,Fbi100–6715–39.Forthevar�ousFbireportsfromthel�stedf�eldoff�ces,seebarnes’sFbif�le,ser�als100–6715–18Xto–38. 54. Personalandconf�dent�al letter,hoover toGeorgeGould,26February1944,Fbi100–6715–35;conf�dent�alletter,hoovertoGeorgeGould,17march1944,Fbi100–6715–35;memorandum,Tammtohoover,12February1944,Fbi100–6715–37;memorandum,laddtohoover,22march1944,Fbi100–6715–34. 55. Turnbaugh,“TheFbiandharryelmerbarnes,”397.

1�5Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

ana�rrace fromnewyorktoCal�forn�a. intermsof theprewar fore�gnpol�cydebate,shehadmuch�ncommonw�thhermalefly�ngcounterpart,Charlesl�ndbergh.bothwerenotedfl�ersandbothwerecolorfulandcon-trovers�alspeakersfortheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.butunl�kel�ndberghand other prom�nent amer�ca F�rst members, ingalls was the only s�g-n�f�cant member to have been prosecuted successfully for v�olat�ng theFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact—thelawthatFbioff�c�alsemployedt�meand aga�n �n an attempt to develop cases aga�nst roosevelt’s prom�nentfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs.her�nd�ctment�nDecember1941,andsubsequentprosecut�on,becameablackmarkontheleg�t�macyoftheant�-�nterven-t�on�stmovement. yetherprosecut�onwasanexcept�on.amongs�ncereandma�nstreamant�-�ntervent�on�sts—those �dent�f�ed �n the amer�ca F�rst Comm�tteeandnotrad�calfr�ngegroups—ingalls’scasestandsout�nbr�ghtcontrast.56Wh�le some amer�ca F�rst members �ndeed held controvers�al v�ewsregard�ngnaz�Germanyandamer�canentrance�ntotheeuropeanwar,mostneveracteduponthem.Whatbestexpla�nsingallsasanexcept�ontotherulewasherna�veté.Sheadm�redallegedGerman“eff�c�ency”andthecountry’seffortstorebu�ld�tssoc�etyam�dtheGreatDepress�on,wh�ch,�npart,ledhertoacceptmoneyfromaGermanembassyoff�c�altosupple-mentexpensesshe�ncurredwh�lemak�ngspeechesfortheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.andwh�le shehad �ndeedv�olated the letterof the law—asst�pulated�nthereg�strat�onact—hermot�vesdonotappeartohavebeen�ns�d�ous nor was there any genu�ne naz� �nfluence w�th�n the amer�caF�rstComm�ttee. Th�s makes ingalls’s prosecut�on s�gn�f�cant �n two ways. F�rst, �treflects Fbi off�c�als’ strategy �n pursu�ng roosevelt’s prom�nent, andleg�t�mate,fore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs.That�s,todevelop�nformat�onthatm�ghthaveledtoasuccessfulprosecut�onundertheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact (among other laws), wh�ch, �n turn, would have d�scred�ted the�roppos�t�onefforts.Second,hercasestandsoutas �llustrat�veof thev�ewthat leg�t�mate cr�t�cs were somehow subvers�ve, a des�gnat�on that wasl�ghtonev�denceyetvaluable�njust�fy�ng�ntensescrut�ny.indeed,afterhav�ngsuccessfullyprosecutedtheingallscase,Fbioff�c�alshadhopedtouse�tasamodelforfutureprosecut�onsofotherma�nstreamcr�t�csbutespec�allythosewhowereassoc�atedw�ththeamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.

56. Fr�ngecr�t�cswereprosecuted�nthesamemannerasingalls,butshewasnotonthe�r level.These�ncludeW�ll�amDudleyPelley,Fr�tzKuhn,andGeraldl.K.Sm�th,allofwhomwereconf�rmedant�-Sem�tesandlead�ngf�gures�npro-naz�groups.

1�� Chapter �

ingallsf�rstcameunderFbiscrut�nynotforanycontrovers�alfore�gnpol�cypos�t�ons,butforheruntoward�nqu�ryaboutwork�ngfortheFbi.Shortlybeforetheoutbreakoftheeuropeanwar,�naugust1939,ingallsfound herself w�thout ga�nful employment �n e�ther the a�rl�ne �ndustryorthem�l�tary.ingallsthendec�dedtowr�tehooverask�ngto“workforyouthroughthemed�umofmya�rplanesandperhapsservemycountryas well—someth�ng i long to do; even though i am a woman—even �nt�mes of peace.” hoover outr�ght rejected ingalls’s offer but, undaunted,sherenewed�t,stress�ngthattheremustbeapos�t�onforawomanofhertalents.57

F�rmly an advocate of gender-spec�f�c roles, hoover frowned uponemploy�ng ingalls. The employment request, moreover, prompted Fbiagents to delve �nto her background where they found �nformat�on thatbesm�rchedhercharacter.agentstooknot�ceofa29September1939art�-cle�ntheNew York Timesthatl�nkedingallstoCather�neCurt�s,58whomFbioff�c�alsregardedas“Fasc�st�nherlean�ngsandaff�l�at�ons,”�nasmuchasthetwounsuccessfullyhadpet�t�onedtheSenatetoholdhear�ngsonthewar.asaresultoftheSenate’sreject�on,ingallsflewhera�rplaneatalowalt�tudebetweentheCap�tolandtheWh�tehousewh�ledropp�ngant�warpamphlets.Theram�f�cat�onsofth�sweres�gn�f�cantforingalls�nthatshelostherp�lot’sl�cense(forv�olat�ngrestr�cteda�rspace)andhadprov�dedhooverarat�onale—beyondh�schauv�n�sm—�ndecl�n�ngingalls’ssecondrequestforajobw�ththeFbi.59

by 1941 ingalls became a prom�nent speaker for the amer�ca F�rstComm�ttee—she was cons�dered l�ndbergh’s female counterpart—lead-�ngFbioff�c�alstotakearenewed�nterest�nheract�v�t�es.60attherootof the�r �nterest was, unsurpr�s�ngly, her role as a controvers�al fore�gnpol�cy cr�t�c. and �t was dur�ng the spr�ng and summer of 1941 whenFbiagents f�rst learnedof ingalls’scontactw�th theGermanembassy �n

57. letterandresumé,lauraingallstohoover,20august1939,Fbi100–34712–1X2;letter,nathantoingalls,25august1939,Fbi100–43712–1X2;letter,ingallstonathan,13September1939,Fbi100–43712–1X2.(TheingallsFbif�lecanbefound�nWayneCole’spapersattheherberthooverPres�dent�all�brary.) 58. Cather�neCurt�slaterbecameaspeakerfortheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee.Shealsobecameheadofoneofther�ght-w�ngmother’sorgan�zat�onsthatopposedthewar,Womeninvestors�namer�ca. 59. letter,hoovertoingalls,2October1939,Fbi100–34712–1X2;bl�ndmemorandumrelauraingalls,9September1941,Fbi100–34712–8;“repealFoesPlanStrategyforF�ght,”New York Times,29September1939,12. 60. Foracontemporaryv�ewofingallsseem�chaelSayersandalbertKahn,Sabotage! The Secret War against America(newyork:harper’s,1942),209.

1��Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

Wash�ngton. ingalls, qu�te na�vely, bel�eved that she—personally—could�n�t�atearapprochementbetweentheUn�tedStatesandGermanybyus�ngheraeronaut�calfame.Th�s�swhatledhertocontacttheGermanm�n�sterplen�potent�aryandchargéd’affa�res,hansThomsen,toobta�ntravelv�sastolondonandult�matelyberl�n.61

asingallscont�nuedtopursuehertravelplans,an�nformantrelayedtoFbiagentsthatingallshadd�scussedtheposs�b�l�tyoffly�ngtoGermany“on a good w�ll tour to tell the German people that the amer�cans arenotobta�n�ngthetruth.”Toarrangethetour,ingallscontactedDr.hansborchersandCapta�nFr�tzW�edemann,bothGermanconsularoff�c�als�nnewyorkandSanFranc�sco,respect�vely.The �nformantalsorelatedtoFbiagents that ingallsallegedlybel�eved that“Germany �sbu�ld�ngacountry[wh�le]amer�ca�s�nchaos.TheGermanshavethebestbra�ns�ntheworldandarethef�nestorgan�zers.youw�llbesurpr�sedtoseewhatthey �ntendtodo �nafr�ca.Theyhavesc�ent�f�cm�ndsandthere �sn’talazybone�nthebodyofaGerman.”62Th�sconst�tutedtheextentofFbiagentsearlymon�tor�ngofingalls. Dur�ngaugust,ingallsmovedtoWash�ngton,D.C.,wherehercontactw�th German embassy off�c�als grew closer. ingalls made arrangementsthrough an employee of the D�str�ct of Columb�a, Jul�a Kraus, to meetGermanembassyoff�c�albaronUlr�chvonG�enanth�nordertofurtherherplansforagoodw�lltour.Then,�nSeptember,shemeth�mtw�ceandononeoccas�onbaronUlr�chgaveherapackageconta�n�ngpropagandapamphlets.Otherthanth�s,thecontentofthemeet�ngsrema�nsunknown;nevertheless,thebas�sforherlaterprosecut�onundertheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onactwasla�d.63

ingalls’slatertroubleactuallycenteredonherworkasatravel�ngspeak-er for amer�ca F�rst. her problem lay �n the fact that the amer�ca F�rstComm�ttee agreed only to pay her travel�ng expenses, wh�ch left her �nf�nanc�al stra�ts and, w�thout further funds, unable to cont�nue speak-�ng.Toremedy th�s, ingalls �mprudentlyusedhernewcontactsw�th theGermanembassytosupplementthefundssherece�vedfromamer�caF�rst.inOctober1941sheconcludedanagreementw�thbaronUlr�chthroughwh�chshewouldrece�ve$250permonthtosupplementhertravelexpens-es.itwasingallswhocameupw�ththedollarf�gurebecause,shesa�d,asafl�ght�nstructorshewouldeas�lyearnapprox�mately$300permonth.64

61. bl�ndmemorandumrelauraingalls,9September1941,Fbi100–34712–8. 62. ib�d. 63. bl�ndmemorandumrelauraingalls,18December1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl. 64. ib�d.

1�� Chapter �

Th�sledFbioff�c�als,w�thnoev�denceotherthanherassoc�at�onsandoppos�t�ontoroosevelt’sfore�gnpol�cy,tosuspectthatingallsm�ghthavepassed�nformat�onaboutnat�onaldefense�ssuestotheGermanembassy.hoover,therefore,orderedan�nvest�gat�onofingallsandnot�f�edthestatedepartmentof theGermanembassyconnect�on.65Fbiagentsmon�toredhermovementsbutfoundtheeffortunproduct�vebecauseingallsrestr�ct-edherday-to-dayact�v�t�estov�s�t�ngtheoff�cesofamer�caF�rst.becauseofthel�m�tat�onsofphys�calsurve�llance,Fbiagentsemployedan�llegalw�retapand �llegalbreak-�ndur�ng the ingalls �nvest�gat�on.areport �nher Fbi f�le states that“most of the information �n the possess�on of thebureauhasbeenobta�nedfromh�ghlyconf�dent�alsourceswhich are not competent evidence �ntheeventofa tr�al.”W�retapswere �llegalandany�nformat�on obta�ned from one or an �llegal break-�n (v�olat�ng Fourthamendment r�ghts), therefore, were �nadm�ss�ble �n court. add�t�onally,as the br�gham case �llustrates, Fbi agents euphem�st�cally referred tow�retaps as “conf�dent�al sources.” Fbi agents e�ther w�retapped ingallsorobta�ned�nformat�onaboutheract�v�t�esfromtheFbi’sw�retapoftheGermanembassy.ThesameFbireportconf�rmstheuseofaw�retap. itreads:“�nformat�ondevelopedtoday�nd�catesthatlauraingallshasmadenumerouseffortstocontactvonG�enanthby telephone andhasthreatenedtocometoh�shome.Ononeoccas�onhe hung up the telephone during the conversation. . . .”Knowledgeof th�scouldonlyhavecomefromaw�re-tap.66

UpontheGermandeclarat�onofwaraga�nsttheUn�tedStateson10December, baron Ulr�ch term�nated h�s contact w�th ingalls. F�ve dayslater,hoover�nqu�redw�thh�sJust�ceDepartmentsuper�orsastowhetheringalls “should be taken �nto custod�al detent�on at th�s t�me.” Theyadv�sedhoovernottodeta�ningalls.hooverthensubm�ttedreportstothedepartment’scr�m�nald�v�s�on,buthewassubsequentlyadv�sedthatsuf-f�c�entev�denced�dnotex�sttol�nkingallstotheGermanembassy�nany

65. Personalandconf�dent�al letterandbl�ndmemorandum,hoovertoberle,9Sep-tember1941,Fbi100–34712–8;letter,hoovertoSaCnewyork,12September1941,Fbi100–34712–8X;letterandFbireport,hoovertoberle,16September1941,Fbi100–34712–9. 66. memorandum,J.K.mumfordtoladd,10October1941,Fbi100–34712–20;mem-orandum,D.a.Fl�nntoladd,16December1941,Fbi100–34712–64.hooverm�ghtevenhaveused�nformat�onobta�nedfromaw�retapandsubm�tted�ttotheJust�ceDepartmentfor prosecutor�al purposes, or used w�retap �nformat�on �n the development of cr�m�nalev�dence.Dur�ngthelate1940sth�shadhappenedw�ththeJud�thCoploncase,and�twasdeemedfru�tofthepo�sonoustreeandnotadm�ss�ble �ncourt.SeeTheohar�s,Spying on Americans,100–6.emphas�sadded�nquotes.

1�9Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

cr�m�nalmatter.butabreakthrough �n thecasewasmadeafter ingalls’sor�g�nal l�a�son w�th the German embassy, Jul�a Kraus, conf�ded to FbiagentsthatbaronUlr�chhadpa�dingallstosupplementherspeak�ngtour.FbiagentsthensecuredtelegramssenttoingallsfromKrausthatprovedrece�ptofmoney.ingallswasthenquest�onedaboutthemoney,therece�ptof wh�ch she never den�ed, for wh�ch she was subsequently arrested. inthemeant�me,hooverforwardedasummaryoftheingallsmattertotheWh�tehouse.67

S�nceingallshadacceptedmoneyfromafore�gnpowerw�thouthav-�ng reg�stered herself as an agent of that power, the Just�ce Departmentsoughttochargeherw�thv�olat�ngtheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact.U.S.attorneyshadplannedtochargeingalls�ntwoways:f�rst,forfa�l�ngtoreg�sterasafore�gnagentand,second,forconsp�r�ngw�thbaronUlr�chtov�olatethereg�strat�onact.Wendellberge,headofthecr�m�nald�v�s�on,dec�dedtoproceedonlyw�ththef�rstcharges�nce�twasthesafestroutetoprosecut�on.68

On23December1941afederalgrandjury�nd�ctedlauraingallsforfa�l�ngtoreg�sterasapa�dagentoftheGermangovernment.accord�ngto her prosecutors, ingalls was a F�fth Column�st who had “used herprest�geaga�nst theamer�canpeopletod�sun�tethematthepa�dd�rec-t�onof theGermanGovernment.” interest�ngly, ingalls’s lawyerusedtheFbi’sreject�onofherserv�cesaspartofherdefense.Theingallsdefenselamelycla�medthatafterhooverhadrejectedingalls,hehadalsopubl�clyaskedamer�canstoass�stthebureau�n�tswork(byoffer�ng�nformat�on)andthereforeingallshaddec�ded“toengage �ncounteresp�onagework.”in short, ingalls’s defense was that she had used her contacts w�th theGermanyembassytocollect �nformat�on foramer�candefenseasaself-styled“�nternat�onalmatahar�.”Th�spart�culardefensed�dnot�mpresse�ther theprosecut�onorFbiD�rectorhoover,whocommented:“Ofallthes�llyclaptrapth�stakesthepr�ze.”69

67. memorandum,D.a.Fl�nntoladd,16December1941,Fbi100–34712–64;memo-randum,laddtohoover,17December1941,Fbi100–34712–50;memorandum,laddtohoover,18December1941,Fbi100–34712–6?;personalandconf�dent�alletterandbl�ndmemorandum,hoovertoWatson,18December1941,Off�c�alF�le10-b,FDrl. 68. memorandum, ladd to hoover, 19 December 1941, Fbi 100–34712–98; memo-randum,m.ne�landrews toWendellberge,19December1941, f�le146–6–162,rG60,nara. 69. ind�ctment,United States v. Laura Ingalls,23December1941,Wash�ngton,DC,F�le146–6–162,rG60,nara;“m�ssingallsGetsPr�sonSentence,”New York Times,21Febru-ary 1942, 1, 21; memorandum, n�chols to Tolson, 27 January 1942, Fbi 100–34712–152;memorandum,Fl�nn toKramer,3February1942,Fbi100–34712–138;clos�ngreporton

1�0 Chapter �

irrespect�veofFbioff�c�als’v�ewoftheingallsdefense,theywerecon-cernedwhen�nearlyFebruary1942theyd�scoveredthatFbiagentshadv�olated ingalls’s Fourth amendment r�ghts �n order to gather ev�denceaga�nsther.W�thoutawarrant,Fbiagentshadusedath�rdparty—mrs.ralphrev�lo—whowaslook�ngafteringalls’slosangelesres�dencewh�leshe was away, to ga�n entrance and remove documents. The documentsweredeterm�nednottobecentraltotheingallsprosecut�onand,therefore,werenotused,yethoovercensuredthelosangelesf�eldoff�ceforpro-ceed�ngw�than�llegalsearchthatsen�orFbioff�c�alshadnotauthor�zed.S�gn�f�cantly,theywerenotcensuredforus�ng�llegaltact�cs—theFbihadalongh�storyofsuchact�on—butforbe�ngcarelessabout�t,wh�chcouldhaveledtonegat�vepubl�c�tyforhooverandposs�blyhavedestroyedtheingallsprosecut�on.butw�thnoembarrassmentforthcom�ng,theIngallscase proceeded between 9 and 13 February and, after about an hour’sdel�berat�on,averd�ctofgu�ltywasreturned.ingallswassentencedtoaja�ltermofbetweene�ghtmonthsandtwoyears,ofwh�chsheservedtwentymonths.70

Follow�ngherconv�ct�on,Fbioff�c�alsdec�dedtousetheIngallscaseasatemplateforposs�bleprosecut�onofotheramer�caF�rstComm�tteemembers, espec�ally those who could be l�nked to ingalls. The head ofthe Fbi’s Wash�ngton, D.C., f�eld off�ce �nformed h�s super�ors that awarranted search of ingalls’s D�str�ct of Columb�a apartment producedal�stofamer�caF�rstmembers,speakers,andspeak�ngdates.Theagentalsorelayedthatthel�stwasbe�ngreta�neds�ncethoseon�t“arebel�evedto be proper subjects for �nvest�gat�on.” moreover, �n the event that thebureau pursued amer�ca F�rst, the �nformat�on obta�ned “would be ofcons�derablevalue.”hooverthenorderedth�s�nformat�ontobe�ncluded�ntheamer�caF�rstComm�tteesummaryreport,and�tappearedwhen,popularly, �t was bel�eved the comm�ttee planned to reenter amer�canpol�t�cs.71

ingalls’s v�ews of naz� Germany and her bel�ef she could prevent adestruct�vewarwere,tosaytheleast,na�ve.Shehadalsov�olatedtheletterofthelaw,asdef�ned�ntheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact,andthereforewasgu�lty—ingallseventuallyadm�ttedasmuchthoughshealwaysden�ed

laura ingalls case, m. ne�l andrews, 16 February 1942, F�le 146–6–162, rG 60, nara;“m�ssingallsSaysFbirejectedher,”New York Times,12February1942,23. 70. ib�d.;“ingallsJuryG�vesverd�ctofGu�lty,”New York Times,14February1942. 71. letter,SaCWash�ngton,DCtohoover,11march1942,Fbi100–34712–175;letter,hoovertoSaCWash�ngton,DC,26march1942,Fbi100–34712–175.

1�1Blossoming: November 1941 to March 194�

that she was a “consc�ous” agent.72 even so, as a member and popularspeaker for amer�ca F�rst—she made over f�fty speeches from the sum-merof1941unt�lPearlharbor—ingalls’sprosecut�onwasatyp�cal.mostamer�caF�rstmembersd�dnotassoc�atew�thGermanoff�c�als,letaloneaccept money from them. but ingalls’s case, to Fbi off�c�als, seemed totyp�fythe�nherentnatureoftheamer�caF�rstComm�tteeby1942.andthecaseseemedtoprovethathoover’stact�csaga�nstsuchfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs, �rrespect�ve of �llegal �nvest�gat�ve techn�ques and c�v�l l�bert�esv�olat�ons,wereval�d:t�meandaga�nFbiagentstr�edtodevelop�nforma-t�on towarrantprosecut�onsunder thereg�strat�onact,esp�onageact,sed�t�onstatutes,orotherlaws.hersuccessfulprosecut�on,moreover,bothbolsteredthev�ewofleg�t�matecr�t�csassomehowsubvers�veanddemon-stratedclearlytheevolut�onofthedomest�csecur�tystatethatwouldsee�tshe�ghtw�ththeGreatSed�t�onTr�alof1944.

—■■■■■■■—

The br�gham, barnes, and ingalls cases �llustrate the evolut�on of thedomest�csecur�tystatefromanevolv�ngpol�t�calarmoftheWh�tehousebefore Pearl harbor to an even more aggress�ve and sem�autonomousagency after the declarat�on of war. late �n 1941 Fbi off�c�als obta�nedauthor�zat�onforaw�retapofbr�gham,andby1942—w�ththecountryatwar—reauthor�zed thew�retapon the�rownauthor�ty.The fru�tsof th�sw�retap�nvolvedwhatoneFbioff�c�alregardedas“valuable”�nformat�on,wh�ch�stosay,pol�t�cal�ntell�gencethatwassubsequentlysharedw�ththeadm�n�strat�ononmorethanoneoccas�on.TheFbi’sefforttodevelopased�t�oncaseaga�nstbarnesalsoreflects thebureau’sevolut�onby1942.Fbiagentssoughttos�lenceth�sprom�nentcr�t�cunderthesed�t�onlawsdur�ngwart�me,andtheyd�dsow�thoutprompt�ngfromtheadm�n�stra-t�on. F�nally, the ingalls case �llustrates an Fbi strategy sought t�me andaga�naga�nstpol�cycr�t�cs:tol�nkthemtofore�gngovernmentsandpros-ecute them as unreg�stered fore�gn agents. Wh�le ingalls was someth�ngofananomalyamongleg�t�mateant�-�ntervent�on�sts,hercasewastobethebas�sforproposedsubsequentprosecut�onsofcr�t�cs.Wh�letheeffortult�matelyfa�led,�tstandsasastepp�ng-stonetowardthemorewell-knowncaseof1944�nvolv�ngth�rty-threesed�t�on�sts.

72. “m�ssingallsGetsPr�sonSentence,”New York Times,21February1942,1.

a close exam�nat�on of the Fbi’s surve�llance of Charles l�ndbergh; theamer�caF�rstComm�ttee;SenatorsburtonWheeler,Geraldnye,andDav�dWalsh; Congressman ham�lton F�sh; those assoc�ated w�th the v�ctoryProgram �nvest�gat�on; the br�gham fam�ly; harry elmer barnes; lauraingalls;andothersconf�rmstheunderly�ngpol�t�calnatureofFbioff�c�als’efforts.FbiD�rectorJ.edgarhooversought �neach�nstancetocatertothe roosevelt adm�n�strat�on’s pol�t�cal and pol�cy �nterests—that be�ngto mon�tor the pol�t�cal act�v�ty of �ts ant�-�ntervent�on�st fore�gn pol�cycr�t�csand,�fposs�ble,todevelop�nformat�onthatwouldd�scred�tthem.intheingallscase,for�nstance,eventhoughFbiagentshadarespons�b�l-�tyto�nvest�gateatruev�olat�onoftheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact,underscor�ngthe�reffortswasades�retodevelopasuccessfulprosecut�onofnotanesp�onageagentbutoneofthepres�dent’sfore�gnpol�cycr�t�cs.Fbiagents,moreover,wentsofarastouse�llegal�nvest�gat�vetechn�ques(w�retapp�ngand�llegaltrespass)todevelop�nformat�on“most”ofwh�chwas“notcompetentev�dence”fortr�al.Furtherh�ghl�ght�ngthepol�t�calnatureofth�s�nvest�gat�on�sthefactthatFbioff�c�alsd�dnotseekas�m�-larcaseaga�nstthe�ntervent�on�stF�ghtforFreedomComm�tteewho,asmarkl�ncolnChadw�nhasshown,s�m�larlyv�olatedtheFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact.Thebureau’sconcernw�ththeadm�n�strat�on’spol�t�cal�nterests�sfurtherunderscored�nthev�ctoryProgramleak�nvest�gat�onwhere Fbi off�c�als focused exclus�vely on ant�-�ntervent�on�st cr�t�cs tosat�sfythedes�resofsomeh�gh-leveladm�n�strat�onoff�c�alstoholdthemrespons�bleandtod�scred�tthe�rarguments. Fbi surve�llance efforts aga�nst the ant�-�ntervent�on�sts were w�de-spread, thorough, and respons�ve to roosevelt’s pol�t�cal �nterests. Fbiagents employed the use of �nformers, �llegal w�retaps, �llegal trespass,

ConClusIon

1��

1�3Conclusion

ma�l covers, off�c�al �nvest�gat�ons; perused organ�zat�ons’ pr�vate f�les;collected derogatory �ntell�gence; prov�ded publ�c op�n�on leaders w�thFbi-obta�nedpol�t�cal�ntell�gence(us�ngbl�ndmemoranda);l�kelyl�a�sedw�th br�t�sh �ntell�gence about the ant�-�ntervent�on�sts; and sought todevelopcasesaga�nstthemthatwouldhaved�scred�tedthe�refforts�nthecourts.hooveralso recommended toh�s super�ors theuseof thegrandjurythat,desp�te�tsworkbe�ngtechn�callysecret,would�nvar�ablydrawpubl�cattent�onthroughleakstocreatepressurethatwouldservetocastdoubtontheleg�t�macyofthepres�dent’scr�t�cs. The Fbi’s surve�llance was not l�m�ted or “never s�gn�f�cantly mob�-l�zed”andPres�dentroosevelt’spurposeswerealsonot“essent�allybenev-olent,”asprev�ousstud�es �nd�cated.1 instead, theyreflectedan �ntens�veFbi�nvest�gat�veeffortandacallousd�sregardbyhooverandrooseveltfor h�s leg�t�mate pol�t�cal opponents’ c�v�l l�bert�es. more spec�f�cally,onecancharttheFbi’seffortsw�ththe�ntens�f�cat�onofthefore�gnpol-�cy debate. Dur�ng 1939 and 1940, Fbi agents pass�vely mon�tored ant�-�ntervent�on�st neutral�ty advocat�on. Dur�ng the f�rst half of 1941 andthelend-leasedebate,thatsurve�llancemarkedly�ntens�f�edwhencr�t�csd�rectlycr�t�c�zedthepres�dent’spol�c�es,�nclud�ngFbieffortstodevelop�nformat�on that had the potent�al to d�scred�t l�ndbergh and amer�caF�rst.butdur�ng the secondhalfof1941,when theGreatDebatedead-locked, Fbi agents focused on congress�onal ant�-�ntervent�on�sts whowereblock�ngneutral�tyactrev�s�onandontheaFC’sf�nanc�alsources.butafterthedeclarat�onofwar,and�nto1942,Fbieffortstodeveloppros-ecut�onsanduseof�llegal�nvest�gat�vetechn�quess�gn�f�cantlyexpanded.W�thwarnolongeronthehor�zonbutareal�ty,theFbireachedthelevelofadomest�csecur�tystatefreelypursu�ngcr�t�csw�thlessfearofback-lash wh�le few amer�cans dared cr�t�que government act�on to preservesecur�ty. Takenasawhole,Fbisurve�llancedur�ngth�sper�odrevealsas�m�larpattern of behav�or that occurred dur�ng the Cold War (�.e., the use of�llegal �nvest�gat�ve techn�ques w�thout approval, d�ssem�nat�ng pol�t�cal�ntell�gencetopubl�cop�n�onleaders,ut�l�z�ngseparatef�l�ngproceduresto�nsulatethecollect�onofsens�t�ve�nformat�on,andextens�velymon�-tor�ngWh�tehousecr�t�csunderasecur�tyrat�onale).Th�spatternsug-geststhatthebureau’sroleandfunct�on�ngasan�nst�tut�onofthenat�onal

1. Charles F. Croog, “Fbi Pol�t�cal Surve�llance and the isolat�on�st–intervent�on�stDebate, 1939–1941,” Historian 54 (Spr�ng 1992): 442; Kenneth O’re�lly, “a new Deal fortheFbi:Therooseveltadm�n�strat�on,Cr�meControl,andnat�onalSecur�ty,”Journal of American History69(December1982):639.

1�4 Conclusion

secur�tystatecanbedatednotw�ththeonsetoftheColdWarbuttotheper�odoftheGreatDebate. in return for sat�sfy�ng var�ous adm�n�strat�on pol�t�cal �nterests,hoover,anarchconservat�ve�nal�beraladm�n�strat�on,notonlypreservedh�s bureaucrat�c pos�t�on as Fbi d�rector but also obta�ned over t�me�ncreased author�ty for h�s bureau. When attorney General Cumm�ngssought topubl�c�ze thecr�me �ssuedur�ng theearlynewDeal toensurepassage of h�s cr�me leg�slat�on, w�th hoover’s enthus�ast�c ass�stance hewassuccessful.Then,�n1934,hooverrespondedtoWh�tehouserequestsfor�nformat�onabouttheact�v�t�esoffasc�stgroups�namer�ca.by1936,pleasedw�thhoover’sreports,Pres�dentrooseveltsteppedupFbieffortswhenheverballyauthor�zedthebureauto�nvest�gatedomest�cfasc�standcommun�stmovements.hooverthensoughtandwon�n1939anexecut�veorderestabl�sh�ngtheFbiasthesoledomest�c�nvest�gat�veagency.aftertheonsetof theeuropeanWar, �n1940,roosevelt further �ncreasedFbi�nvest�gat�veauthor�tybysecretlyauthor�z�ngtheuseof�llegalw�retaps�nnat�onaldefensecases.hooversubsequentlyexplo�tedth�sexecut�ved�rec-t�ve todevelopanot �ns�gn�f�cant levelof �nvest�gat�veautonomy forh�sFbiwhen theattorneygeneral showedd�s�nterest �nmon�tor�ngw�retapusage. am�d all of th�s, hoover also developed or rev�sed spec�al f�l�ngproceduresthatensuredtheconf�dent�al�tyofsens�t�veFbioperat�onsand�nformat�on.yet�t�san�mportantd�st�nct�onthatallofth�soccurreddur-�ngaper�odof�nternat�onalcr�s�sthatresulted�nachargedpol�t�caldebatethatperm�ttedhoovertocatertotheadm�n�strat�on’spol�t�calconcerns. anexam�nat�onofthe�ncreas�ngnumberofFbiagentsandtheagen-cy’s annual appropr�at�ons dat�ng from 1934 further alludes to hoover’ssuccess�ndevelop�ngh�sFbidur�ngth�sper�od.in1934theFbiemployed391 agents and a support staff of 451 and was appropr�ated $2,589,500.by1936,theyearroosevelt�ncreasedFbi�nvest�gat�veauthor�tytohave�t focus on �ntell�gence �nvest�gat�ons, the bureau had nearly doubled�ts agents to 609 w�th a support staff of 971. its 1936 appropr�at�on was$5,000,000.WhentheGreatDebatebegantodom�nateamer�canpol�t�csby1941,theFbiemployed1,596agentsand2,677supportstaffw�thabud-getof$14,743,300;and�n1942�temployed2,987agentsand5,000supportpersonnelandhadabudgetof$24,965,000.Toroundoffthe�ncreases,bythe f�nalyearof thewar(1945) theFbihad4,370agents,7,422supportstaff,andanappropr�at�onof$44,197,146.2

TheFbi’ssecret�verelat�onsh�pw�thbr�t�sh�ntell�gencealso�llustrates

2. Fbiagent,staff,andappropr�at�onf�guresarerepr�nted�nathanTheohar�setal.,The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide(Phoen�x,aZ:OryxPress,1999),4–5.

1�5Conclusion

theembryon�cor�g�nsofthe�nst�tut�onals�deofthelaternat�onalsecu-r�ty state. a hallmark of the Second World War, Cold War, and War onTerror�sm, the �nt�mate �ntell�gence relat�onsh�p between the Un�tedStatesandGreatbr�ta�nhad�tsor�g�nsdur�ngtheGreatDebate.TheFbi’s“spec�alrelat�onsh�p”w�thbr�t�sh�ntell�gencebegan�n1940and�ncreas-�nglybecamemore�nt�mate.andwh�lewemaynotbeabletodef�n�t�velyascerta�ntheprec�sescopeandnatureoftheFbi’srelat�onsh�pw�thbr�t�shSecur�ty Coord�nat�on, both sought s�m�lar goals �n regard to Pres�dentroosevelt’s ant�-�ntervent�on�st fore�gn pol�cy cr�t�cs. Together, w�th theFbi �nvest�gat�ve tact�cs d�scussed prev�ously, the bureau’s close l�a�sonw�thfore�gn�ntell�genceagenc�es(�nclud�ngtheroyalCanad�anmountedPol�ce)furthersuggests(strongly)thatthenat�onalsecur�tystate’sor�g�nscanbedatedtothepre–SecondWorldWarera. ant�-�ntervent�on�stssuspectedthatFbiagentsweremon�tor�ngthe�rpol�t�calact�v�t�es,andwh�le thebureau’seffortsult�mately fa�ledtod�s-cred�t them, �t nevertheless created a certa�n ch�ll�ng effect. l�ndberghbel�evedthattheFbihadw�retappedh�stelephoneand,�ndeed,Fbiagentscollected �nformat�on about the av�ator �nd�rectly from an �llegal w�re-tapandshared �tw�th theWh�tehouseand the federalprosecutorwhowas to quest�on, and perhaps d�scred�t, l�ndbergh before a grand jury.3add�t�onally, harry elmer barnes, Senator Wheeler, and Congressmanham�ltonF�shallexpressedconcernsdur�ngthedebatethatc�v�ll�bert�eswouldsuffer,wh�letheamer�caF�rstComm�tteewentsofarastoobta�nconf�rmat�onfromhooverthattheFbihad�nnomannercollected�ntel-l�genceonthemthroughaw�retap.yetFbiagentshad, �nfact,gathered“valuable”pol�t�cal�ntell�genceaboutthegroupv�athebr�ghamw�retap.Fbiagentsevencollected�nformat�onfroman�llegalw�retapandan�llegaltrespassoflauraingalls’sapartment,andothercr�t�calcommentsaboutthe adm�n�strat�on from a w�retap on Grunewald. John T. Flynn, of thenew york branch of amer�ca F�rst, moreover, feared hoover’s Fbi wasak�n to the Gestapo, and the ant�-�ntervent�on�st per�od�cal UncensoredaccusedtheFbiofmon�tor�ngleg�slators.4

3. Charlesl�ndbergh,Wartime Journalsof Charles A. Lindbergh(newyork:harcourt,brace,Jovanov�ch,1970),515,600;letter,Charlesa.l�ndberghtoFrankl�nD.roosevelt,16July1941,Pres�dent’sPersonalF�le1080,FDrl;“l�ndberghSeeksrooseveltinqu�ry,”New York Times,18July1941,6;“l�ndberghFearslossofl�bert�es,”Charleston Gazette,4Octo-ber1941,�nFbi100–4712–164.h�stor�anWayneCole�nterv�ewedl�ndberghextens�velyandaskedh�maboutFbiw�retapp�ng.Colereportsthatl�ndberghd�d�ndeedbel�evetheFbihadtappedh�stelephone.letter,WayneS.Coletoauthor,12December1994;conversa-t�onw�thWayneS.Cole,14July1999,Wash�ngton,DC. 4. Onant�-�ntervent�on�stconcernsaboutbe�ngmon�toredseeJustusDoenecke,The

1�� Conclusion

roosevelt and sen�or adm�n�strat�on off�c�als found hoover’s reportsto be valuable. after rece�v�ng the f�rst of hoover’s pol�t�cal �ntell�gencereports�n1940,rooseveltthankedtheFbid�rector�napersonalletter.bylate1941,whentheGreatDebatebecamestalematedoverneutral�tyrev�-s�on,rooseveltd�rected theattorneygeneral tohave theFbi �nvest�gatethemoneysourcesbeh�ndtheamer�caF�rstComm�ttee�nthehopesthatagrandjuryprobewouldendthe�mpasse.Sen�oradm�n�strat�onoff�c�alsalso pressed for an Fbi �nvest�gat�on of ant�-�ntervent�on�sts �n order tohold them respons�ble for the v�ctory Program leak. but most unsubtlewas inter�or Secretary ickes’s use of Fbi �nformat�on—wh�ch had beendevelopedunbeknownsttoh�mpartlythroughan�llegalw�retap—�nh�scr�t�cal book manuscr�pt on l�ndbergh. Clearly, sen�or adm�n�strat�onoff�c�als foundhoover’s reports tantal�z�ngand, �n some �nstances,usedth�s�nformat�on. Th�s study, therefore, complements the work of h�stor�ans who haveexam�ned the Fbi, ant�-�ntervent�on�sts, and the nat�onal secur�ty state.TheFbi’sextens�vepol�t�calsurve�llancedur�ngtheGreatDebatecannowbeunderstoodaspartofthebetter-knownh�storyoftheFbi’spol�t�calsur-ve�llancedur�ngboththeredScareandColdWarper�ods.Th�sbookalsoaddstotheworkofh�stor�ansofant�-�ntervent�on�smwhohaveneglected�t due to a lack of documentat�on, research spec�al�zat�on, or h�stor�calfocus.andwh�lewem�ghtnotbeabletounderstanddef�n�t�velyhowtheadm�n�strat�onm�ghthaveusedthe�nformat�onprov�dedbyhoover,�ts�nterest�sread�lyapparent.Th�sstudyfurtherbroadensourapprec�at�onofthenat�onalsecur�tystatewh�chhasbeenanalyzed�nnumerousways.intermsoftheFbi,�twastheper�odoftheGreatDebatewhen,forthef�rstt�me,thebureauextensively andsystematicallymon�toredadm�n�strat�oncr�t�cswh�leseek�ngtounderm�nethem.TheFbi’smethodsarestr�k�nglys�m�lartothoseemployed,thoughonamuchlargerscale,dur�ngtheColdWarandbeyond. insum,theFbisurve�llanceofroosevelt’sant�-�ntervent�on�stfore�gnpol�cycr�t�csdenotestheor�g�nsoftheColdWarFbi’snat�onalsecur�tyapparatus.Forthef�rstt�metheFbiextens�velymon�toredanadm�n�stra-t�on’sleg�t�matecr�t�csus�nga“domest�csecur�ty”rat�onalewh�lev�ew�ngthemas“subvers�ve”or“un-amer�can”tobecomean�ntell�gencearmoftheWh�tehouse.Fbioff�c�als,oftenus�ng�ntrus�veand�llegaltechn�ques,

Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941(malabar,Fl:Kr�egerPubl�sh�ngCo.,1997),84–85;Doenecke,Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941(bos-ton:rowmanandl�ttlef�eld,2000),270–76.

1��Conclusion

recommendedthe�nd�ctmentofthesecr�t�csundertheSm�thact,Fore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact,esp�onageact,orconsp�racystatues,atact�ctheywould employ aga�nst domest�c commun�sts dur�ng the Cold War andeventuallyabandonw�ththeadventoftheCOinTelPrOs.Theseact�onsv�olatedthec�v�ll�bert�esoflaw-ab�d�ngpol�t�calopponentsandcontr�b-utedach�ll�ngeffect�n�mportantpubl�cdebateovernat�onalpol�cy.Fromthese or�g�ns Fbi D�rector hoover was able to create �n the Fbi a more�ntrus�ve,powerful,andautonomous�nternalsecur�tyagencydur�ngtheColdWar.butwh�leth�sevolut�onhad�tsbas�sdur�ngtheGreatDebate,�twasnotapredeterm�nedfactthattheFbiwouldbecometheColdWaragency�td�d.Un�quec�rcumstances,suchasharryTruman’sascendancyto the pres�dency and hoover’s later m�srepresentat�ons of execut�veorders,dur�ngtheColdWareraperm�ttedhoovertodeveloptheFbi�ntoamore�ntrus�veandautonomousagency.5nevertheless,hoovercouldnothaveaccompl�shedth�sw�thoutthebas�sla�ddur�ngtheGreatDebate.

5. SeeathanTheohar�s,“TheFbi’sStretch�ngofPres�dent�alD�rect�ves,1936–1953,”Political Science Quarterly91(W�nter1976–77):649–72.

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1�9

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Index

al�enDeportat�onact,20al�enenemyreg�strat�onSect�on,20.

See alsoJ.edgarhooveramer�caF�rstComm�ttee(aFC),1,4,

5,6,41,54,60,64,65,66,70–72,79,87,92,96,100–101,108,120,126,155,165,167,170,171,172;allegedfasc�stl�nks,62,80–81;andbr�ghams,142,143,144,145,147,149,152,153;andbr�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on,81–86;conservat�venatureof,62,82;Fbiand,66,73;Fbi�nvest�gatesfund�ngof,68–69,78–79,96–100;�nv�tesFbicheckoffiles,66–67;andl�ndbergh,63;object�veof,61,63;or�g�nsof,60,61;popularpercept�onsof,62,82;startofFbisurve�llance,63

allen,George,94amer�canFellowsh�pForum,46amer�canleagueforPeaceand

Democracy,4anderson,h.Carl,120ant�-�ntervent�on�stpress,1,9,78ant�-�ntervent�on�sts,40;d�rect

cr�t�c�smofroosevelt,60;h�stor�ography,8–13;assubvers�ve,5–6

arnold,henry,74,130,131n52auhagen,Fr�eder�chernst,46barnes,harryelmer,31,68,141,

155–64,156,172,174;andamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,155;backgroundof,155–56;booksof,155,156,159–60,162,162–63;cr�t�c�smof

Fbi,157,164;Officeofemergencymanagement,163–64;andPoland,40

barkley,alben,106beekman,Gustave,106bennett,harry,128–29.See also

Charlesl�ndbergh;henryFordbennett,Ph�l�p,134berge,Wendell,75,103,136,160,162,

169berle,adolf,57,112b�ddle,Franc�s,70,71,97,98,103,123,

127,129,134,136,141,143,144,154,160;andw�retaps,150

bonaparte,Charles,18bonusmarch,23–24borah,W�ll�am,43;deathof,47borchers,hans,167bowles,Chester,67br�ghamfam�ly,141,142,145,149,

151,153;assass�nat�onthreat,142,143,144;barbara,142;Constance,142,150;Dan�el,142;establ�shmentofw�retap,143,150;ethel,142,150;fam�lyof,141–42;�nformantdeveloped,145;andl�ndbergh,145–48,148;startofFbisurve�llanceof,143.See alsoamer�caF�rstComm�ttee

br�t�sh�ntell�gence,2,36,55–58;Fbirelat�onsw�th,2,56,72.See alsobr�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on

br�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on(bSC),56–58,84,175;andamer�caF�rst

193

194 Index

Comm�ttee,81–86;establ�shmentof,57–58;andFbi,94;andF�sh,110;andl�ndbergh,82–83;andnye,85.See Alsobr�t�sh�ntell�gence

brookhart,Sm�th,48,49burch,Frank,97bureauofident�ficat�on,26burns,W�ll�amJ.,22

Carll,S.e.,159–60.See alsoharryelmerbarnes

Carrel,alex�s,77.See alsoCharlesl�ndbergh

Castle,W�ll�am,41,64Chicago Tribune,40,70,78,114,115,

119,120,123,130,132,136,137Church�ll,W�nston,57,59COinTelPrO,2,177Comm�tteetoDefendamer�caby

a�d�ngtheall�es,60,63congress�onalfrank�ngcontroversy,

53–54,91,111;andamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,92–93;andbr�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on,94–95;andnye,90–91;andv�ereck,92–94;andWheeler,87–90

Cool�dge,Calv�n,3,22Corcoran,Thomas,50,51Couch,m.bertrand,76Cox,Oscar,106Cr�meControlProgram,9,25,26–28,174Cumm�ngs,homer,26,27–28,37Curt�s,Cather�ne,166

Daugherty,harry,22Dennett,Prescott,92Denn�s,lawrence,141DepartmentofJust�ce,17,18,48,53,

54,58,99.See alsoFederalbureauofinvest�gat�on;J.edgarhoover

D�ll�nger,John,19,27,27n28D�v�s�onofinvest�gat�on,26domest�cfasc�sm,30,33–34domest�csecur�tystate,12–13,55–56,

140,141,151,164,176–77

Donovan,W�ll�am,103,152Dyeract,19,27

early,Stephen,26,44,49,68–69,104,123;requestsforFbi�nvest�gat�on,48,49;onv�ctoryProgramleak,121

eklund,laurenceC.,103–4ernst,morr�s,98–99,105,106esp�onageact,2,20,75,103,121,136,

160,171

Federalbureauofinvest�gat�on(Fbi),3,6;1916appropr�at�onsstatute,34,37;andbr�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on,56–57,83;Cleggandh�ncem�ss�on,72–73;earlyh�storyof,17–24;fil�ngprocedures,23,52,77,91,106,151;andFOia,6–7;growthof,174;h�stor�ography,7–13,173;andhomosexuals,106;and�ncreasedpower,4,174;�ntell�gence�nvest�gat�ons,34;OfficeofPr�cemanagement,67;andStephenson,57;v�ewofamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,62.See alsoJ.edgarhoover

F�fthColumn,1,33,34,36,43,98,158,169

F�ghtforFreedomComm�ttee,80,84,85,86,93,120,172

F�rstWorldWar,19–20,36F�sh,ham�lton,53,87,90,95,108–110,

172,174;backgroundof,107–8;andfrank�ngcontroversy,92–94;andPoland,40;andrece�ptofquest�onablemoney,109–110,110–112;asroosevelt’snemes�s,107;startofFbisurve�llance,108

Flynn,JohnT.,66,85,126,175Ford,Gerald,r.,60Ford,henry,27,27n28,73,115,128–

29.See alsoCharlesl�ndberghFore�gnagentsreg�strat�onact,2,

2n1,79,84,93,98,101,103,109,111,165,167,169,170,171,172

195Index

Fox,D�xon,163.See Alsoharryelmerbarnes

Foxworth,P.e.,144,145,148Freedomofinformat�onact(FOia),

6–7

Garvan,Franc�s,25Genau,Joseph,125,126,132Generalintell�genceD�v�s�on,21Germanamer�canbund,30,34,54,81Gerow,leonard,118,124G�enanth,baronUlr�ch,167,168,169Glass,Carter,120GreatSed�t�onTr�al,141,171Grunwald,henry,48–52;l�nksto

hoover,50;andnye,48–49,90–91;w�retapof,50–52

hansen-Sturm,G.T.,109,110hard�ng,WarrenG.,22hatch,Carol,88henn�ng,arthur,133–34,135,136h�ggs,James,129–30h�ll,George,92,95hoke,henry,53,89,95,109,110holt,rush,53holtzoff,alexander,47–48hoover,herbert,22,23–24hoover,J.edgar,1,20,21,22,23,23,

25,26,27,37,48,78,98,100,101;andamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,62,69–70;andbr�ghams,144;cater�ngtoroosevelt,4,5,52,58,66,69,94,114,123,140;andingalls,166,169;as�ntervent�on�st,5,101;andlend-lease,64–65;andl�ndbergh,75–76,129;1936meet�ngw�throosevelt,33–34;andpol�t�cal�ntell�gencetotheWh�tehouse,68,69,70,103,109,112,147,149;pragmat�sm,3,4,5;referr�ngletterstoJust�ceDepartment,48,54,88;relat�onsh�pw�throosevelt,2,3,24–25,55;v�ctoryProgramleak,123,125,127,129,134–35,136–37,140;and

Wheeler,88,103,105;w�retapp�ng,51,151,153

hopk�ns,harry,72,117,151hull,Cordell,30,34

ickes,harold:andl�ndbergh,146,146n13,147–48;onv�ctoryProgramleak,123

imm�grat�onbureau,21ingalls,laura,141,145–46,164–71,

172,174;backgroundof,164–65;custod�aldetent�on,168;Fbitrespassof,168,170;legaldefenseof,169;startofFbisurve�llance,166;w�retapof,168

Jackson,robert,50,51JamesTrueassoc�ates,46Johnsonact,33,59Johnson,Stanley,136Jones,ell�sO.,46,160–61

Kahn,alberte.,97—100Knox,Frank,48,49,52,71,103–4,123Kraus,Jul�a,167,169

ladd,D.m�lton,50,52,104,111,150;w�retapp�ng,51

laGuard�a,F�orello,73lend-lease,59–60,63,64,65,66,69,

70,72,72,87,117,128;andhouseofrepresentat�ves,64;andSenate,64,69

l�ndbergh,Charles,1,6,66,73,100,104,107,115,154–55,165,166;allegedfasc�stl�nks,46–47;allegedF�fthColumn�st,43;allegednaz�,44;andamer�caF�rstComm�ttee,61,65;Fbicollect�onofderogatory�nformat�on,77–78,174;Fbicorrespondencefile,43;andickes,146–47;andlend-lease,65;oppos�ngroosevelt,41,45–46,65;andPoland,40;rac�smof,45;res�gnat�onfromarmya�rCorpsreserve,65;andrutherford

19� Index

compla�nt,74–76;startofFbisurve�llance,41–42,44,46–47;andv�ctoryProgramleak,117,126,128–29,134;andWh�tehousetelegrams,44;yellowper�lremark,146,147

longworth,al�ceroosevelt,61ludlow,lou�s,35lundeen,ernest,53,92

macarthur,Douglas,24macn�der,hanford,64maloney,W�ll�am,93,94,95,112manley,Chesly,120,121,130,131,

132–33,134–35,136mannact,19marsh,henry,50marshall,George,116,118mcCloy,JohnJ.,121,124mcCorm�ck,robert,78,114n1,133mcDonald,ThomasC.,48,49mcGu�re,matthew,75,90mcintyre,marv�n,106,113mcW�ll�ams,Joseph,46m�l�taryintell�genceD�v�s�on,48,50,

75–76,132,147,151,158moley,raymond,30moody,bla�r,89morgan,aubrey,84morgenthau,henry,44,49moros�n�,em�l,145motorveh�cleTheftact(Dyeract),

19,27murphy,Frank,37

nat�onalCopperheads,46nat�onalsecur�tyletters,15nat�onalsecur�tystate,2,11–12,55,

141neutral�tyact,32–33,35,40,42,43,

59,73,87,96,144,172newWorldmovement,46n�chols,lou�s,63,68,157–58;

w�retapp�ng,51norr�s,GeorgeW.,115

nye,Gerald,29,31,53,87,90,95,172,174;asallegedspy,42,47–49;andcashandcarry,42;andfrank�ngcontroversy,90;startofFbisurve�llance,42;andv�ctoryProgramleak,135.See alsohenryGrunewald

OneGunClub,143,145,148,149,150,152,154.See alsobr�ghamfam�ly

Paget,S�rJames,56,56n34Palmer,a.m�tchell,21,22,25Patterson,Joseph,78,133Patterson,robert,117Pearson,Drew,94Pepper,Claude,71P�nkertonact,17Progress�veera,17,24Proh�b�t�onbureau,26

rad�calbureau,21,23roosevelt,eleanor,154–55roosevelt,Frankl�nD.:1934

author�zat�on,31;1936author�zat�on,33–34,174;b�ography,28–29;andF�sh,107–108;andfore�gnpol�cy,29–30,39–40,59–60,96,140;andneutral�tyacts,32–33;op�n�onofWheeler,64;andpol�t�calsurve�llance,3;quarant�nespeech,35;relat�onsh�pw�thhoover,3,24–25,45,141;andrequest�ngFbi�nformat�on,44,68,113,109;sed�t�on,141;andStephenson,57;v�ctoryProgramleak,114,117,121–22,123,138;v�ewofl�ndbergh,44,65;w�retapp�ngd�rect�ve,50–51,143

roosevelt,Theodore,17,18,24royalCanad�anmountedPol�ce

(rCmP),55,56,174rumr�ch,Guenther,36rutherford,marv�n,74–76

19�Index

Sabotage!: The Secret War against America(SayersandKhan),97,97n26

Sarles,ruth,120.See alsoamer�caF�rstComm�ttee

Sayers,m�chael,97–100SecretServ�ce,18,31,143,144sed�t�on,19,140,158,159,160,161,163Sed�t�onact,20,162,171September11attacks,13–16Sherwood,robert,96Sm�thact,2,2n1,46,141,160Sm�th,Gerald,l.K.,46Social Institutions(barnes),159,162Social Justice(barnes),162Span�shC�v�lWar,33Stephenson,W�ll�am,56–58,83,94,

137.See alsobr�t�sh�ntell�gence;br�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on

St�mson,henry,44,48,89,117,119;onv�ctoryProgramleak,120–21,122,123,125,133,135

Stokes,D�llard,93,95Stone,harlanF�ske,22,23,125

Tamm,edwarda.,63,71,99,109–110,123,124–25,134,135;andnye,90

Thomsen,hans,167Thorkelson,J.,53Tolson,Clyde,68,89,100,200Trohan,Walter,116,127,131n52Truj�llo,rafael,111–12,112n61Tyd�ngs,m�llard,54

vanDusen,Dr.henry,84v�ctoryProgram,136,172,176;and

br�t�shSecur�tyCoord�nat�on,137–38;publ�c�zed,114–15,123–24

v�ereck,GeorgeSylvester,92–94,95,109,111,141,159.See alsocongress�onalfrank�ngcontroversy

v�llard,OswaldGarr�son,40Völkisher Beobachter,36,108

Wallace,henry,123,142

Walsh,Dav�d,87,105–106,107;allegedhomosexual�ty,106

Walsh,Thomas,22,25–26,130Washington Times-Herald,114,119,

123,130,136,137Watson,edw�n,26,64,100,109,113,149Webb,mrs.vanderb�lt,109Webster,edw�nS.,146,147Wedemeyer,albertC.,115;as

ant�-�ntervent�on�st,116–17,118;backgroundof,115–117;developmentofv�ctoryProgram,118–19;onFbi�nvest�gat�on,125–26,128,137;leakofv�ctoryProgram,118–19;onv�ctoryProgram,118.See alsov�ctoryProgram

Welles,Sumner,112Wheeler,burtonK.,22,25,29,53,

54,70,87,95,102–5,107,126,172,174;congress�onalfrank,54,87–90,92;cr�t�c�smofFbi,52–53;andhoke,89;andhoover,88,105,103;andPoland,40;andv�ctoryProgramleak,123,130,131–32,137–38;v�ewoflend-lease,64

Wheeler,John,67Wheeler,mrs.John,67–68Wh�te,W�ll�amallen,60Wh�teSlaveTrafficact(mannact),19W�edemann,Fr�tz,167W�lson,Woodrow,19,29,40W�nchell,Walter,77w�retapp�ng,15,22,49,50,100,168,

172,174,176;br�ghamw�retap,143,144,145,147,148,149,150,153–54;euphem�smsforw�retaps,144;andSupremeCourt,50

W�seman,W�ll�am,56.See alsobr�t�sh�ntell�gence

W�therow,James,47WomenUn�ted,144Wood,robert,64,66,70;onw�retaps,

153.See alsoamer�caF�rstComm�ttee

Woodr�ng,henry,48,49