Jack Amariglio Marxian Value Theory and the Problem of the Subject the Role of Commodity Fetishism

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Rethinking

MARXISM Volume 2 Number 3 (Fall 1989)

Marxian Value Theory and

the Problem of the Subject:

The Role of Commodity Fetishism

Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari

An unnecessary gulf has come to exist between two important areas of

theoretical work in contemporary Marxism, with the theory of value (the

econom ics, if you will) on one side and the nature and role of subjectivity in

historical materialism (an anti-economism) on the other. Those concerned

with the problem of subjectivity have argued that Marxism ne eds to reject its

“theory of value.” Th e situation (of an apparent sch ism) has not been helpe d

by traditional academic disciplinary separations wh ich, to the ex tent that they

have influenced M arxists, have m ade the economists am ong them less than

totally sensitive to the insights and theoretical propositions of students of

subjectivity.1

To be sure, Marxism has had a theory of the subject, the theory of

commodity fetishism.

To

the extent that it attempts to join together the

analysis of commodity production and circulation with a discussion of

“ideology ,” comm odity fetishism does discuss the peculiar subjectivity typi-

ca l of capitalist social formations.: However-and this is the crux

of

the

matter-the most typical renditions of commodity fetishism have presented

that particular subjectivity as the effect of an underlying economic reality,

rather than as on e (overdetermined and o ve rd ete m in ing ) element in the

constitution of that very reality. These renditions of commodity fetishism



32

Am ariglio and Ca llari

thus have not

so

much treated subjectivity as an object for analysis in its own

right as they have functionally subsumed it to an economistic understanding

of “the commodity.”3

No matter how many levels of subjectivity traditional accounts of

commodity fetishism put forward to “mediate” the economy, these accounts

remain embedded in, or at least infected by, an economic determinism.4 They

seem to provide a solution to the problem of locating subjectivity within the

terrain of “material relations.” But this solution has meant asserting the pri-

macy of the economy “in the last instance,” rendering particular forms of

subjective consciousness (and action) as inevitable effects, even

in

those more

subtle versions in which these forms are said to have “feedback” effects on

1. Three recent books that treat at some length the “problem of the subject” in relation to

contemporary Marxian social thought are Sbve (1978), Smith (1988), and Giddens (1984).

For a kindred reading of value theory that treats “subjectivity” as an inherent part of its

investigation, see Spivak (1987).

2. See Kennedy (1985) for a brief but incisive description of what we refe r to as the

“traditional” reading of commodity fetishism. Kennedy’s meditations on M arx’s discussion

have some similarity, in key parts,

to

our view. This similarity is especially true of

Kennedy’s insight (1985, 993) that far from nailing down an economistic view of

“superstructural” elements, M arx’s discussion integrates completely the necessary effects

of particular legal concepts in the constitution of com modity relations. Kennedy, however,

criticizes Marx’s understanding (borrowed, as he points out, mostly from the classical

political economists) of legal concepts, particularly M arx’s views on contract and property.

Kennedy’s rendition of commo dity fetishism differs most from ours in his retention of the

notion that peo ple misperceive-they possess a “false consciousness” of-the role of

“nature” in economic outcomes.

3 .

There are many renditions of commodity fetishism; in

our

view, most of them, despite

their differences, are based on some type of economism.

In

this vast literature, readers can

consult early classics, such as Bukharin (196 9, 237-9; 1972, 48-50), or m ore recent (but

perhaps no less classic) texts such as Sweezy (19 70,3 4-4 0), Howard and King (1975, 39-

42), Ollman (1975, 198-204), Godelier (1977, 169-85) and Weeks (1981, 41-47) for

succinc t presentations

of

the issues at stake. O ne classic ,and early defense of determ inism

which attempts to handle the relation between an economy and the “psychology” o f society

is Plekhanov (1972). His account is noteworthy because he denies that, for Marxism, the

economy is “the prime social cause,” while he holds

on

to the view that “the psychology of

society adapts itself to its economy” (1972, 168). Th is defense is possible by substituting

for a sm ct determinism the notion that psychology can and m ust eventually be appropriate

to (but not an effect solely o f the economic relations. But the motor force of historical

change, in the last analysis, rests with “the development of productive forces” (169). See

also Cornforth (1954).

4 . In some versions, commodity fetishism permeates all spheres of social action and self-

consciousness, so that one can say, as does Ernest Mandel, that “Marx reduced human

alienation in society based on commodity production essentially to the reification of human

and social relations caused by comm odity relations” (1971, 184).



Commodity Fetishism 33

the economy.5

This

“solution,” then, ultimately negates the problem of sub-

jectivity.

To

the extent that fetishism is treated as a mere effect, the implicit

message to economists and others interested in explicating the economic

“base” of commodity relations is that there is no need for them to consider

too deeply the role of such fetishism in

producing

the conditions of existence

of that base.

By contrast to the economic determinist’s ultimate negation of the

problem of subjectivity, some critics have fully embraced the problem of

subjectivity, allowing an “autonomy” of cultural and ideological realms from

economic activities and institutions. But this strategy, we think, is no less

problematic than the one consonant with economic determinism since some

of the “autonomists,” freed from the straitjacket of economic determinism,

turn around and embrace some alternative determinism-the privileging of

culture, ideology, power, and

so

on-in positing the determinations that

constitute modern subjects and subjectivities.6 These critics contribute to the

schismatic situation by “leaving” the concerns of value theory

to

the

economists.

Our point, of course, is that the gulf that exists within Marxian discourse

is unnecessary and unproductive. The remainder of this article introduces an

5.

At times, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which som e Marxists fall back on

economism to describe commodity fetishism. For example, Derek Sayer

1983)

quotes

Marx from the

Theories

of

Surplus-Value

to the effect that Thomas Hodgskin, the

Ricardian socialist, believed that when “the effects of a certain social form of labour are

ascribed to objects,” this ascription was a “pure subjective illusion which conceals the

deceit and the interests of the exploiting classes” (Marx quoted in Sayer 1983,33). Marx’s

summary comment was that Hodgskin “does not see that the way of looking at things

arises out of the relationship [between objects] itself; the latter is not an expression of the

former, but vice versa.” Sayer goes on to say that for Marx, commodity fetishism “arises

specifically fro m the value-foxm.. .a form Marx is careful to describe as a ‘prosaically real,

and by no m eans imaginary, my stification’

33).

Ou r problem here is that we have no

disagreement with Marx’s quotation or Sayer’s interpretation provided that we all

understand the terms “imaginary,” “subjective illusion,” and

so

forth in the same way. If

the point is that fetishism i s a “material” fo rce or a description of a consciousness that is

necessary for commodity trade, then this reading avoids precisely the economism we

criticize. However, if fetishism is being treated by Sayer solely as an effect of the “real

relations” established by the value-form, and if this treatment does not see the constitutive

role of fetishism in creating those relations, then Sayer’s rendition falls within the purview

of our criticisms.

6. It may thus happen, in the rise of such other determinisms, that Marxism itself is

portrayed as the grandest of illusions: com modity fetishism and all that it implies about the

determination of subjectivity under commod ity capitalism may itself be an obfuscation and

reification, perhaps th e inevitable mystification resulting fro m a “productivist” mentality

(see Baudrillard

1975

for one such position).



34 Amariglio

and

Callari

alternative rendition of commodity fetishism in order to argue for a neces-

sary conjunction, within Marxian thought, of a value theory and a theory

of

the subject under conditions of commodity production and trade. Our pri-

mary concern is to show that, in considering the peculiar consciousness that

he summarized as commodity fetishism, Marx provided the means to break

substantially with any economistic derivation of subjectivity from supposedly

objective social relations in the accounts of commodity exchange. We believe

that Marx employed the concept of commodity fetishism to introduce ques-

tions about the “social constitution of the individual” with the aim of urging

his readers to locate the manifold forces that give rise to the particular form

of subjectivity involved in the “exchange of equivalents” under conditions of

generalized commodity trade. Premised on a nondeterminist approach, our

rendition of commodity fetishism depicts the social constitution of the indi-

vidual as much a “precondition” for commodity trade as an effect of this

trade.

Post-Marxism and Analytical Marxism

To

help our readers better situate our theoretical project, we briefly

compare it with two other recently publicized and highly contested

approaches, that of the “post-Marxism” of Ernest0 Laclau and Chantal

Mouffe, on the one hand, and that of Analytical Marxism, on the other.

Taking Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism first, we note our general

agreement (holding aside minor differences) with their rejection of

economism and their preference for notions of overdetermination and

“articulation” in presenting the constitution of subjects, subject positions, and

much else. With these notions, Laclau and Mouffe seek to avoid the “fixity”

assigned by economistic Marxism to the nature, positions, and “interests”

which subjects are presumed to have or occupy as a function of the ultimate

effects of the economy. However, and this is our point of contention, Laclau

and Mouffe consider their alternative presentation to be at odds with

all

strands of Marxism, including those that, as they acknowledge, have gone

farthest (they single out Gramsci) to overcome economism. In their view,

Marxism must be superseded or rejected

in

toto since all versions can be

shown

to

founder on an essentialist conception of the economy.

As an instance of such essentialism, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the

debates between economistic and anti-economistic versions of Marxism have

been “necessarily reduced to the secondary problem of the weight that should

be attached to the superstructures in the determination of historical




processes” (1985, 76). According to them, this reduction thus misses the

“primary problem” since even “the most ‘superstructuralist’ of con ceptions

retained a naturalist vision of the economy-ven when it attempted to limit

the area of its effects” (76).Calling this naturalist vision “the last redoubt of

orthodox essentialism,” Laclau and Mouffe declare their intention in their

text to “demonstrate that the space of the economy is itself structured as a

political space, and that in it, as in any o ther ‘level’ of society, those practices

[they] characterized as hegem onic are fully operative” (76-77).

While we are in full agreement with Laclau and Mouffe’s intention, we

entirely disagree with their view that an anti-essentialist depiction of the

econo my eludes M arxism per se. In contrast to Laclau and M ouffe, our view

is that Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism allows not only for an

investigation of how the economy interacts with elements “external to itself,”

but more pertinently, for a nondeterminist depiction of how the economy

itself cannot be constituted and understood except by reference to these

“noneconomic” elements. Understood in this way, commodity fetishism

requires a rejection of naturalist portrayals of the economy. Commodity

fetishism is Marx’s device to show just how economic relations influence

subjectivity, ideology, discourse, politics, and so on, and m ost impo rtantly,

to show how economic relations are themselves the “articulated” and

overdetermined outcomes of the combined effects of these “superstructural”

and other processes. Marx’s theory of value and his treatment of subjectiv-

it y -c o n jo in ed in the notion of comm odity fetishism-permit us to raise just

the types of ques tions regarding the overdetermined constitution of the econ-

omy, politics, and subjectivity which Laclau and Mouffe believe cannot

be

discussed within Marxism.

Turning now to Analytical Marxism, we defend the role for “value

theory” within Marxian thought in opposition to the Analytical Marxists’

ultra-economism.7 Reminiscent of the criticism in the early 1960s of the

famous C ambridge economist Joan R obinson

(1964,

especially

35-42),

Ana-

lytical Marxists view the theory of value as nothing more (and no more

useful) than Hegelian metaphysics. For these analysts, market behavior is

determined by subjects’ preferences and initial endowm ents (much as bour-

geois economics would have it), though they argue that the set of questions

they ask and their focus on exploitation qualify their work as Marxist. Be that

as it may, the project in this article is structurally different from that of the

7 . For an introduction to Analytical Marxism , see Roem er (1986; 1988) and Elster

(1985). For criticisms

of

this school, readers should look at Amariglio, Callari, and

Cullenberg (1989), Ruccio (1988), Lebowitz (1988), and Levine, Sober, and Wright

(1987).



36 Amariglio and Callari

Analytical Marxists because we do not intend at all to take “subjects” as given;

rather, we intend to find a way of theorizing about exchange, values, and

prices that compels a set of critical questions regarding just how subjects

come to

be

constituted.

In

opposition to the traditional readings of commodity fetishism and to the

rejection of Marxism, we insist that it is possible to retain a commitment to

Marxian value theory and yet avoid the relegation of subjectivity to a mere

“superstructure,” determined in the last instance by the economic base. In

opposition to the Analytical Marxists, we insist on retaining a value theory

which can allow a concerted and rigorous analysis of the intersection of the

economic with the noneconomic-something that their economic positivism

does not allow.

In

proposing a new, nondeterminist reading of commodity

fetishism, we are cognizant of the thesis that the value concepts in Capital are

necessarily structured into an economic determinist discourse (see, for

example, Cutler et al.

1977 .

But, while Marx’s discourse on value theory has

been read along determinist lines. such a reading is not inevitable. To defend

this contention, we discuss briefly the strategy and effects of economic deter-

minism on Marxian thought and develop, even more briefly, the alternative

discursive strategy made possible by the concept of overdetermination.8

The Concept of Value

and the Overdetermination of

Social Practice

The construction of value relations presumes and exemplifies a general

conception of the relationship between economic processes (e.g., commodity

circulation) and forms of social agency and subjectivity (e.g., individuality).

The confrontation between economic determinism and the critique of eco-

nomic determinism is partly about the nature of this relationship.9 While

economic determinism reduces forms of social agency to effects of the econ-

omy, the critique questions just this reduction; while economic determinism

8 . Th e concept of overdetermination was borrowed from Freud (1938) an d introduced

into Marxism by Althusser (1970) and has been developed further by Resnick and Wolff

(1987).

9 . While critical of the thesis in Cutler et al. (1977), we are much in debt to Hindess and

Hirst (1977) for the critique of empiricist and rationalist epistemologies (see also

Lecourt

1975). We are

also

indebted to Althusser and Balibar (1970) for conceiving of the project of

criticizing essentialism (see also Amariglio 1987). This critique of essentialism has been

carried out the farthest, and without abandoning the basic M arxian categories of class and

value, by Resnick a nd Wolff (1987). We ag ree with Resnick and Wolff‘s treatment of the

concept of overdetermination within the context of this critique of essentialism.




conceives of the political and cultural processes necessary to the social con-

stitution of forms of agency as themselves secured by the economy, the

critique assigns to these processes a degree of autonomy with respect to the

economy.

Economic Determinism

Economic determinism, as an essentialist discourse, is based on a

translation: the translation of a discursive privilege that Mam gave to the

concept of labor and to the concept of an economic process into an

ontological claim about the universality-the historical eternality and all-

pervasiveness-of labor and of economy. This translation is evident in the

economic determinist reading of the concept of value. This reading has two

parts: First, a “law

of

value” (the distribution of the labor of society) is

immanent in the very definition of “society”; that is, a society is defined in

terms of an organization that must solve the problem of allocating labor in

such a way as to secure the existence and reproduction of that society.

Second, the determination of the value of commodities is but a practical

expression of the operation of this universal law of value; commodities are

stamped with the mark of a solution to the problem of allocating social

labor-each commodity “represents” a part of the system of allocation of

labor time through its value. It is in order to preserve the privileged, onto-

logical status of this law-the idea that labor is chosen simply because it

reflects the “real,” forever-existing, and necessary basis for a society to meet

its material needs (see, e.g., Mandel 1970, chap. 2)-that economic deter-

minism proceeds to reduce cultural and political moments of social practice

to effects of the economy, an economy itself conceived as a structural

expression of the law

of

value. Hence, in economic determinism, this law of

value functions as an essence, first for the economy and then for culture and

polity.

To grasp how the essentialism of economic determinism is related to the

“ontological claim” that the law of value is more than just a historically con-

stituted theoretical “choice,” it may

be

useful to dwell for a moment on the

treatment of what Marx called “abstract labor” in his elaboration of the

theory of value. Quite a few Marxists have pointed out that Marx did not

regard abstract labor-the idea that not concrete labor, but labor in general,

is embodied in the exchange-value of a commodity-as a mere choice (in

opposition, for example, to a different choice, the “utility” of the classical

political economists). Rather, as Fischer

(1

982) discusses, Mam’s discursive

choice is seen to be due to his “discovery” of the “real” existence of abstract

labor within the capitalist labor process. Thus, some Marxists (Fischer cites,




for example, an article by Geoffrey Kay) claim that “abstract labor, a gener-

ality, can be actual” (1982, 28-see Shaikh 1982 and Finelli 1989 for other

such readings). Usually, such readings proceed to show either that regular-

ized commodity exchange can take place only on the basis of exchanged

goods, possessing some quantity of a “real” element common to all, such as

abstract labor, or that since the tendency to “homogenize” labor occurs

increasingly in capitalism, then the “abstraction” of labor makes utter sense

and does, indeed, exist as a “reality” of capitalism. Note, then, that the onto-

logical position-that abstract labor really exists-is consequently granted a

discursive privilege. Note as well that Mam’s discourse here,

the

theoretical

discussion of value,

is

likewise considered a privileged one since it alone rests

on empirically extant conditions. The real basis for the law of value is thus

shown, and the theory of value is simply an expression of its existence.

The essentialist structure of economic determinism is evident also in the

way it constructs the concept of consciousness as “false consciousness.” Eco-

nomic determinism in Marxist discourse identifies the consciousness of the

agents of commodity circulation as an objectification of human relations-

commodity fetishism or reification. With characteristic reductionism,

economic determinism locates the

origin

(essence) of this objectification in

the supposedly universal relations described by the law of value. It explains

this objectification as the necessary product of the disjuncture between the

economic processes of production and circulation in the system of private

producers. Since producers do not come into contact with each other except

through the process of circulation, the law of value can only assert itself by

reference to commodities as objects of circulation and not of production, that

is, by reference to “things” and through a consciousness of reification.

Moreover, consistently reductionist, economic determinism uses Marx’s

concept of commodity fetishism to argue that the self-identification of

economic agents as private individuals derives from a structurally produced

inability of these agents to

recognize

their true social nature, which consists

of their essential constitution by the social function of commodity circulation

as a distribution of labor time. The misrecognition, which some authors

(e.g., Hunt 1982; Lippi 1979) argue

is

entirely appropriate to the circum-

stances in which commodity producers find themselves, is that they fail to see

that the circulation of goods takes place according to the particular mecha-

nism (every society must have one) through which their socially productive

activity is organized in order to meet socially constructed needs.

Consequently, economic determinism has labeled Marx’s concept of

fetishism a theory of false consciousness.



Commodity Fetishism

39

The

Effects

of

Economic Determinism on Marxian Discourse

Now, we reject economic determinism-the derivation of the

consciousness of objectification from a pregiven economic structure and of

the labeling of this consciousness asfalselo-mostly because it has a destruc-

tive practical effect. The determinist construction of individuals as agents

possessing a false consciousness has led to a relative absence in Marxist dis-

course of a concrete analysis of the concept of individuality.“ For if, as

economic determinism has it, the process of historical social transformation

rests on the playing out of contradictions immanent in the economy, then in

principle it is not necessary,

either

for tracing out the historical social

transformations of the past

or

for mapping out a potential political transfor-

mation, to produce concrete analyses of individuality, of the social processes

that constitute it, and of the effects it has on social practices. The results of

this neglect have been a tendency to view political events as inevitable conse-

quences of transformations in an economic structure and a consequent

dismissal of forms of struggle that are not typically economic. Economism

displaced onto the terrain of political practice can result in what, in our view,

is a mistaken denigration of the questions of agency or subjectivity and of the

relation of forms of agency to the overdetermination of class (and nonclass)

struggles.

10.

Th e concep t of “false consciousness” is discussed by Lukhcs (1971) in the essay “Class

Consciousness.” Lukics argues that “the dialectical method does not permit

us

simply to

proclaim the ‘falseness’ of this consciousn ess and t o persist in an inflexible confrontation

of true and false. On the contrary, it requires

us

to investigate this ‘false consciousness’

concretely” (50).W hile we agree with Lukdcs on the need fo r a concrete investigation of

forms of consciousness, we disagree with his use of the term false consciousness. Indeed,

it is likely that Lukics himself found this term rather uncomfortable as can be seen in his

qualification that the term does not allow us to dispense with a concrete inv estigation of this

consciousness.

1 1. In this article, we treat the notion of the ‘‘individual’’-and we do so only in abstract

terms-because this form of agency has rarely been a primary ob ject of analysis in Marxist

discourse (though as one exception, different as it is from o ur views, see Tucker 1980). It

is not ou r intention to preclude a more complex analysis of this or o ther forms of social

agency in a capitalist social formation.

The

individual is not

the

only form o f social agency

within a capitalist social formation. In fact, our concern is with the possible effects of this

form of agency

on

class processes and on the class form of agen cy, which w e regard as the

main concerns distinguishing M arxist from non-Marxist discourse. Further, we believe that

the individual, as a form of agency, is not without its contradictions. The concept of

overdetermination suggests that the individual is

a

form of agency w hose constitution is

always produ cedreprodu ced within the context of historically specific conjunctures, that is,

as a changing ensemb le of qualities that influences and is effected partly by the historical

transformation of capitalist social relations.



40

Am ariglio and Callari

In

opposition to this economistic tendency, we believe that forms of social

agency, such as individuality or race, gender, and nationality self-ascription,

affect the constitution of the agency of class. These forms of social agency

must be analyzed in terms of their own historically specific determinations

and effects. The critique of economic determinism is a call for Marxist dis-

course to adopt a theoretical strategy that does not hinder analyses of the

cultural and political as well as economic constitution of such forms of social

agency as individuality-a theoretical strategy that would challenge the

discursively produced determinist instinct to dismiss the concept of the indi-

vidual as a figment of bourgeois imagination.

The Alternative Conceptual Structure

of

Overdetermination

Although Cutler et al. (1977) have suggested that the critique of economic

determinism requires a rejection of “the value categories in

Capital ”

we do

not think that such a repudiation

is

necessary in order to introduce into

Marxist discourse the constitutive role of politics and culture as well as the

economy in the determination of forms of social agency.12 It is, in fact, pos-

sible to theorize this role of politics and culture into the very construction of

the concept of value.

In order to exemplify the effects of noneconomic processes in the

constitution of value, we anticipate briefly our reading of that concept. Let

us

recall first that Marx defined the value of a commodity as a magnitude of not

simply labor time, but labor time deemed

social ly necessary

to the

12. The argument in Marx’s Capital and Capitalism Today is that Marx presents the

concept of value in an essentialist way (Cu tler et al. 1977). But, eve n if such a reading of

how Marx developed the concept of value were beyond dispute, it would not follow that

the concept itself has the power to structure the whole discourse of

Capital as

an essentialist

discourse and that, therefore, the concept of value has to be abandoned. S uch

an

argument,

by assigning such omnipotence to a single concept, would itself be an essentialist

argument. Cottrell (1981) has criticized Cutler et al. for their wholesale rejection of the

categories in Capital. A similar argument can be found in Callari (1986), which contains a

critical commentary on the tension between econom ic determinism, as exemplified in Rubin

(1979), and the critique of econ om ic determinism, as exem plified in C utler et al. Although

we agree with the gist of Cottrell’s argument, we disagree with his separation of Marx’s

value problem into a quantitative and a qualitative strand and with his judgment that “the

critique

of

essentialism hits home” o n the qu estion of a quantitative relationship in

commod ity relations. The quantitative relation of equality is theoretically introduced in the

analysis of commodity relations because of the nature of individuals as specifically

historical social agents and not because it is a property of an objective act

of

exchange.

To

present com mo dity relations as quantitative do es not necessarily imp ly an essentialist

rendition of the value categories.



Commodity Fetishism

41

production of that commodity. Marx’s construction of value, then,

introduces an element of social estimation. It is exactly through this element

that Marx allowed for the complexly combined effectivities of all social

processes (noneconomic as well as economic) in the constitution of his value

categories.

The constitution of the products of labor as commodities and the

determination of value requires more than the mathematical averaging (of

the various magnitudes of labor time expended by the different producers in

the production of each unit of the commodity) required in economistic

treatments of the concept of value. It requires just that confluence

of

cultural,

political, and economic processes which effects the constitution of social

agents as individuals, agents who recognize each other as equals, who objec-

tify human activity, and who act as rational (economic) beings. It is the

presence of such individuals that creates the possibility for, and gives mean-

ing to, any calculation of mathematical averages to begin with.

The notion of “combined effectivities of all social processes” is

summarized in the concept of overdetermination. By overdetermination, we

refer specifically to the nature of the

relationship among

cultural, political,

and economic processes that are discursively designated as participants in the

constitution of practices and forms of agency in a social formation. Specifi-

cally, overdetermination refers to the conception of a relation of

mutual

intereflectivity

among these processes.

Thus,

the concept

of

overdetermina-

tion is different from, say, the concept of a multiple determination,

according to which forms of social agency would be affected by a variety of

processes which exist separate and distinct from each other.

Overdetermination permits the rejection of the ontology that supports

economic determinism.

It

is not our concern, however, to replace one onto-

logical position (the empirical preeminence of the economy or the law of

value) with another one (the “real” preeminence of relations of overdetermi-

nation) on the grounds that the former is a simple and the latter is a complex

ontological assertion-or, indeed, on any other grounds. We make no onto-

logical claim for the pursuing analysis

because

we seek no epistemological

guarantee for Marx’s discourse or for our reading of it.

Marx’s Discourse in History:

Confronting the Economism of Classical Political Economy

Borrowing loosely from contemporary theories of semiotics-the

linguistic and cultural analysis of “signs”--we view the structure of Marx’s

value concepts as a structure of signs, a chain of signifiers whose order and




meaning is not reducible to an expression of given signifieds (the economy,

quantities of labor time, etc.). Instead, these signifiers-here, Marx’s value

concepts-are discursively constructed in a particular historical conjuncture

and with a particular set of politico-theoretical (discursive) priorities (see

Coward and Ellis 1977). All discourses (not only Marx’s, but also Smith’s or

Ricardo’s or the discourse of neoclassical economists) can be read as com-

prising different orders in which signifiers are articulated into discourse in

order to produce different meanings; that is, different discourses are differ-

ent constitutions of signs rather than different interpretations of an

empirically given object of analysis.

In

order to make sense of the set of meanings produced in a particular

discourse, we must take into account the relations of confrontation between

this particular discourse and other discourses. These relations of con-

frontation are themselves the partial result of the operation of different

politico-theoretical priorities in discourse. Thus, for example, the meanings

that Marx ascribed to his key concepts (e.g., value, economy, ideology) do

not have fixed, empirical referents. These meanings are construed as they are

because Marx, facing the meanings produced by classical political economy,

confronted this school of thought-its politico-theoretical priorities-by

setting out to produce a

diyerent

set of meanings exhibiting a

different

set of

priorities.

The task of reading the concepts

of

value and of commodity fetishism as

nondeterminist concepts is greatly facilitated by placing these concepts in the

context of a theoretical confrontation between Marx and the classicals.13 In

our view, the roots of economic determinism are to be found in classical

political economy, not in Mam. Mam developed his own value concept not to

enshrine the economic determinism of the classicals, nor to replace their

economism with an economism of his own, but to dispose of this economism

and to create the discursive conditions necessary for carrying out a nonde-

terminist theoretical construction of the capitalist social formation.

1 3 . It is interesting that C utler et al. 1977) have not paid much attention to the relationship

between Marx and the classical political economists. They argue that the problem

of

a

theory of value begins with Marx and not with the classicals and, thus, they concentrate

their attention on the internal structure

of

Marx’s discourse. By so doin g, they disregard

Marx’s commentaries in which he criticized the classicals’ economism. Had they

approached M arx’s discourse historically and intertextually, Cu tler et al. w ould have faced

a m ore difficult task in attempting to read that discourse as an economistic one.



Commodity Fetishism

43

The economism of classical political economy is expressed in the concept

of “the economy” as a self-regulating market structure.14 The conception of

the economic process as a self-regulating structure allows and urges the

classicals to present “society” as an expression of the economy. A s a self-

regulating process, the economy is autonomous and, thus, can be conceived as

a “subject” that expresses itself in culture and politics. The classicals

produced this subject by making the economic process itself the expression of

the economic rationality of given individuals and by reducing cultural and

political behaviors as well to expressions of this given economic rationality

(this economic rationality, then, functions as an essence in classical dis-

course) . l~ n short, classical political economy produced a conflation

between economy and society.

Marx criticized this conflation by producing a concept of value which

is

not the result of a given economic rationality nor an expression of a universal

law of value nor a sign whose fixed signified is “the economy,” but a discur-

sive sign of the effects of the complex relations of overdetermination among

economic and noneconomic processes in a capitalist social formation

(nowhere can this be seen better than in his sporadic discussions in the

Grundrisse [

1973, 136-2641 where, in opposition to classical political

economists, he adumbrated the legal, political, cultural, and psychological

presuppositions for the appearance of value, money, and capital).

Thus,

the

concept of value, far from being an economistic concept, questions the

economism of classical political economy. It is a concept produced by Marx

in an attempt to displace the presumably economic categories from the

comfortable ground on which they had rested since Smith onto a critical

discursive terrain that questioned the ontology/universality that the classicals

had assigned to the bourgeois concept of rationality.

Marx attempted to criticize this ontological/universal concept of

rationality by exposing it as a historically specific concept, a concept pro-

duced and sustained by a historically specific confluence of economic and

noneconomic processes. Marx theorized the historical specificity of this

14.

Karl Polanyi (1971) argues that the concept

of

“the economy” was a specific historical

construction. Polanyi (1957) presents an extended discussion

of

the historical conditions

under which this concept of an economy as a “self-regulating market system” emerged.

15. Adam Smith’s discussion of property rights in the Lectures on Jurisprudence (1978)

makes

it

clear that he viewed the source of these rights in the acts of labor with which

human

beings

appropriate nature. Callari (1981) discusses how, in th analytical structure

of

the classical political economists, “the economy” appears as an expression of the

relationship of the concept of rationality with which bourgeois discourse constructs this

relationship.



44

Amariglio and Callari

concept of a supposedly eternal rationality with the concept of commodity

fetishism. The concept of commodity fetishism functions, then, to create a

new (different) discursive space in which it becomes possible to carry out a

nondeterminist, nonbourgeois, construction of the capitalist social forma-

tion.

The concept of commodity fetishism plays a crucial role in a

nondeterminist reading of Marx’s discourse. Economic determinists have

viewed this concept as an expression of the ability of the economy to struc-

ture the consciousness of the social agents of commodity circulation and,

thus, to shape cultural and political relations into a mirror image of economic

relations. The nondeterminist view, in contrast, treats this concept as a sign-

a strategically located sign-that the relations between economic and

noneconomic processes are neither unproblematical nor unidirectional. The

very location of the concept of fetishism in the chapter on value argues for

our view that value relations do not exist independently of a consciousness of

objectification-an objectification which is a determining trait of the social

constitution of individuals. The key to the concept of value lies not in any

universal law of value, but in the historical conjunctures which reproduce

that objectification of human relations which is the content of bourgeois

consciousness and which Marx began to theorize with

the

concept of com-

modity fetishism. Far from being proof of the closure

of

Marx’s discourse at

the level of the economy, the concept of commodity fetishism is Marx’s way

of overturning the discursive privilege of the economy.

The Practice

of

Exchange and Commodity Fetishism

Exchange, a particular form of trade, has come to be synonymous with

“equal exchange.” However, there is nothing in trade per se that requires this

qualification of equality, and, indeed, specific social conditions are required

for this equality of exchange to be operative in trade (see Polanyi 1957,

56-

57).

For

us,

the concept of the “individual” summarizes just these conditions.

Bourgeois economic theory, in either its classical or neoclassical variants, has

derived equal exchange from its assumption of the individual with a set of

given attributes.

If

trade is understood as taking place between agents natu-

rally constituted as individuals, then this trade appears, and is immediately

explained, as an exchange of equivalents. In Marxist discourse, however, the

agents of trade in a capitalist social formation are constituted as individuals



Comm odity Fetishism 45

only historically. Hence, that trade should be n exchange of equivalents can-

not be simply assumed but must be theoretically produced.16

The first chapter of Capital analyzes the conditions under which trade

takes place as an exchange of equivalents. Marx conceived the circulation of

commodities as a process which continually tends towards equal exchange. In

our reading, however, this equality of exchange is posed not as an affirma-

tion but as a theoretical problem. Marx conceived the trading of commodities

as a trade of “labor times.”l7 The theoretical problem we see emerges from

the absence of any guarantee that these acts of trade involve equal magnitudes

of labor time.

In

fact, these are trades

of

unequal

magnitudes of

actual

labor

time.18 But, this inequality notwithstanding, for commodity circulation to

take place trade must be conceived by the agents of circulation-by individ-

uals-as

an

exchange of equivalents. There is thus a contradiction: the same

process of circulation is at once both an unequal exchange of quantities of

actual labor times and an exchange of

equivalents.

The theoretical problem

that Capital presents is the resolution of this (theoretically posed) contradic-

tion.

The social constitution of the agents of commodity circulation as

individuals is but a resolution of this contradiction in favor of the equality of

exchange, Marx uses the concept of commodity fetishism to theorize both this

16.

Here we are not posing the concept of equal exchange in oppo sition to the concept of

unequal exchange. Both concepts stand together:

to

say that an exchange is unequal would

presume that standards for equality had been established. What we are opposing are two

different concepts of tra de -o ne in which standardsfo r (in)equality are present and another

in which n o such standards

are

operative.

17.

To

begin the conceptualization of value relations in terms of this category of labor time

is not to assign to this category an ontological privilege. In our view,

Marx

began his

construction of the capitalist social formation with this category of labor in order to locate

his discourse in opposition to the discourse of the classicals, that is, in order to

problematize the classical conception of value and of labor. Marx’s point of entry is not

labor per se, nor production per se, nor value per se, but class relations (M arx 1973,100-8).

But, of course, a discourse is not erected in a vacuum. Rather, the specificity of a discourse

is constructed only in opposition to other discourses. Marx began his elaboration of the

class relations of a capitalist social formation by attacking the classical concep tion of class

relations at its strongest point, at the point where the concept of labor was used

to

construct

a concept of value-the classica l concept of value-which had as its effect the etem alization

of capitalist class relations.

18. Here we are not referring

to

the transformation problem and

to

the corresponding

deviations of prices of production from the exchange values of Cupirul vol. 1. The trading

of unequal quantities of actual labor times occurs in a “volume-one world” and is as much a

part of the definition of exchange value as of the definition of prices of production. A

nondeterminist conception of the transformation problem itself is found in Wolff, Roberts,

and C allari (1982).



46 Am ariglio and Callari

contradiction and its resolution in favor of equality. Co mm odity fetishism,

then, summarizes the qualities of individuals that transform the unequal

exchange of actual labor times into an exchange of equivalents.

Unequal Exchange

In commo dity producing societies, the social allocation or distribution of

labor time is conceptualized as taking place through relations of supply and

demand. W hen the society’s labor has been distributed in such proportions

that, for each commodity, quantities supplied and demanded are equal, a

(notional) state of equilibrium exists. Equilibrium is achieved through price

changes which act as “signals” that lead to the proper distribution of labor

time. Marx conceived the (notional) state of equilibrium as a state in which

the price of each com modity is equivalent to its exchan ge value. He deter-

mined this exchange value as a quantity of social necessary labor t ime

(SNLT)-necessary, that is, fo r the production of one unit of the comm odity

in question. This qu antity of S N LT is a numerical average. For exam ple, if

the social demand for commodity X were satisfied by 100 units of the com-

modity, an d if 1000 hours of the society’s labor were n ecessary to produce

these 100 units, then the S N LT , and the exch ange value, of com modity X

would be

10

hours.

Now, given the above, i t fo l lows tha t the exchange of any two

commodities by their respective producers could be conceptualized as an

equal exchange of actual labor times only if two very strict conditions were

satisfied: first, that there be an actual state of equilibrium in each market;

second, that for the production of each commodity there prevail one, and

only one, technique of production. As for the first condition, the absence of

equilibrium implies a divergence of price from value and, thus, a n exchange

of unequal quantities of actual labor times by definition. In the case of the

second condition, a diversity of techniques in the production of each of the

various commodities would guarantee an unequal exchange of actual labor

times even ifthere were an actual state of market equilibrium. The SNLT

attached to each unit of the com mo dity is an average and not the quan tity of

actual labor time required to produce the unit of the commodity being

exchanged. To return to the numerical example given in the text, let us

assume that the SN LT per unit of comm odity X is 10 hours. B ut, s ince these 10

hours are an average, it is possible fo r any one unit of this com modity to have

required more, or less, than this average number of hours for its production

(some producers, who work with a technique that results in above-average

productivity, may require only 8 hours of labor t ime per unit; other



Commodity

Fetishism 7

producers, who work with less than average efficiency, may require not 10

but 12 hours of labor time

.

To

continue with our example, let

us

assume two commodities,

X

and

Y

both with a SNLT of 10 hours-so that, at equilibrium, one unit of X would

be exchanged with one unit

of Y .

It can be shown that unless the two produc-

ers exchanging

X

and

Y

had produced their respective commodities with the

same relative degree of efficiency (relative, that is, to the average efficiency

in

their respective branches of production), the exchange of one unit of X for

one unit of

Y

would involve an exchange

of

unequal quantities of actual labor

times. The producer working with the relatively higher (lower) degree of

efficiency would trade a lower (higher) for a higher (lower) quantity of

actual labor time. One of the parties to this exchange would be a net gainer

and the other would be a net loser of actual labor time.

However, neither of these two conditions is theorized by Marx as a

normal state of affairs in a capitalist social formation. In general, then,

exchange involves a trading

of

unequal quantities of actual labor time.19

Equal Exchange: Individuals and Commodity Fetishism

The trading of unequal quantities of actual labor time is a theoretical

problem because the agents of trade are constituted as “individuals” whose

self-identity is in conflict with an unequal exchange. Those agents are defined

as individuals who are “rational economic beings” both in their consciousness

and in their behavior, who conceive of the network of social relations within

which they are inscribed as a network of (political and economic) equality (at

least potentially), and who treat the things they bring to market, and the

things they receive in exchange, as possessions-that is, they identify them-

selves, and behave, as private proprietors. Inequality in exchange would

violate this ensemble of qualities that defines individuals.20

19 . As Eng els expl ained (in his introduction to Marx 1963), the exchange of unequal

quantities of actual labor time is

necessary if

the price system is to function as a mechanism

for the distribution of

social labor time in a capitalist social formation. According to E ngels,

any required redistribution of labor time could only be effected by a deviation of market

price from SNLT. Th us, social reproduction, since in general it requires a redistribution of

labor time, can only be effected through an exchange of unequal quantities of actual labor

time. An additional reason can be given for this inequality in exchange. When we allow for

competition and technical progress, social reproduction entails a lack of intra-industry

uniform ity of techn iques. A s we have seen , this lack of uniform ity results in unequal

exchanges of actual labor time.

20.

Marx (1977, 280) spoke of the sphere of exchange, within w hich individu als operate,

as “a very Eden of the innate rights

of

man.. .the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality,

Property and Bentham.” Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham are, of course,



48


There is, then, a contradiction in the requirement that trade be both an

equal exchange and an exchange of unequal magnitudes of actual labor time.

For Marx, the need to resolve this contradiction arises out of a theoretical

strategy bent on affirming the historical specificity of the capitalist social

formation as one in which trade (the prevalent form of distribution) is con-

structed as

n

exchange of equivalents.

It was in order to provide a resolution to this contradiction that Marx

developed the concept of commodity fetishism.

A

resolution of the contra-

diction that affirms the existence of individuals must theorize the possibilities

for a transformation of trade (of unequal quantities of actual labor times)

into exchange (of equivalents). Such a transformation is possible only on the

condition that the object of exchange not be, and not be conceived as, actual

labor time. Equality of exchange can be theorized only by reference to a

property of the objects

of

trade other than actual labor times. It is possible to

define this property in a variety of ways, each of which signifies particular,

hence, different forms of consciousness and agency.

With the concept of commodity fetishism, Marx theorized that particular

consciousness which “objectifies” human activity and thus defines the prop-

erty of the objects of trade as a property of “things.” The neoclassical concept

of utility is one such theoretical expression of this consciousness (perhaps

among several), one that defines this property as the ability of things to pro-

vide satisfaction to individuals. In this neoclassical theoretical construct, a

property is chosen-to serve as a standard for the measurement of equality in

exchange-which is contained within the relationship of one human being, or

of a group of human beings (e.g., a household), to nature and which thus

preserves the individuality of these human beings.

Marx, for his own discursive purposes, chose a property not inherent in

“things” themselves.

To

theorize a standard of equality, he devised the con-

cept of socially necessary labor time, a concept not contained within the

concept of the relationship of a human being to nature. Through this concept,

Marx could simultaneously theorize the historical specificity of individuality

as a form of social agency and the social code through which market practices

shape the activities of the many individual private producers.

allusions to the qualities of private proprietorship, equality, and economic rationality.

Marx’s reference to Eden has to be understood as a critical reference to the bourgeois

conception of the individual as a being with innate attributes. The biblical metaphor is

exemplary

of

Marx’s critique of the bourgeois etemalization of exchange relations Marx

1977, 175 and n. 35).



Commodity Fetishism

9

Significantly, Marx’s own reference to things in the exposition of the

concept of commodity fetishism does not refer to empirical givens. Rather,

things stand as signs with somewhat shifting meanings. Most often, however,

under conditions of commodity exchange, things signify

both

the particular

type of consciousness that objectifies human activity into things and the set of

social processes that overdetermine this particular type of consciousness.

The

Social Constitution

of

Individuals

Exchange (of equivalents) is made theoretically necessary by the presence

of individuals. Thus, the concept of commodity fetishism is used by M a n

not

to derive

the consciousness and behavior of individuality as an effect of the

structure of commodity production and circulation,

but

only to

summarize

the qualities of individuality that construct trade as “exchange.” Commodity

exchange, then, is an

effect

of the social constitution of individuals and cannot

be used-as it is in economic determinism-to derive functionally the con-

sciousness of individuality (such a derivation could only proceed on the

assumption that trade must, by its nature, be constituted as an equal

exchange-an assumption which, if made, would only

naturalize

commodity

production and distribution). Commodity fetishism, therefore, allows

Marxist discourse to conceptualize the political and cultural, as well as eco-

nomic, constitution of individuality as a form of social agency.

There are (at least) three qualities that define the self-identity and

behavior of individuals: economic rationality, equality, and private propn-

etorship.21

In

the following pages, we first outline briefly the content of each

of these qualities as they are overdetermined by economic, political, and

cultural processes;22 then, we discuss how these qualities are condensed into

the practice of exchange.

21.

For a related discussion of these qualities and their importance to value theory, see

Harvey 1984, 17-24 .

2 2 . Our discussion, although it identifies and discusses the effects of noneconomic

processes in the overdetermination of the qualities of individuality, is structured more in

terms of the effects of th e economic process of exchange than those of noneconomic

processes. This focus on the effects of an economic process, however, is

not

a way to

reintroduce-through the back door,

so

to sped-an economic determinism. The reason

for our focus on the economic process of exchange is our professional training as

economists and, no doubt, an effect of the tradition of economic determinism within

Marxism.

Th is deficiency notwithstanding, w e believe that w e have laid out our argument

in a way that assigns to noneconomic processes as much of an effectivity as to economic

processes. Clea rly, the effects of econ om ic processes are not sufficient to constitute

individuals.



5


Economic Rationality

The attribute of economic rationality implies that individuals treat the

objects which they possess and trade as quantities that can be calculated.

Rational economic agents are

so

constituted that, first, they conceptualize use

values as

objects

that are separate and distinct from themselves and as

objects

that have the ability potentially to satisfy perceived needs; second, they quan

t i f y ,

assign numbers to, these objects; third, they construct a set of

procedures by which the

calculation

of these objects is conducted; and fourth,

they undertake action based

on

the results of these calculations (actions which

are perceived as “rational” because they take advantage of opportunities rec-

ognizable only through these calculations).

Rational economic agents are therefore not only defined by a particular

consciousness (objectification, quantification, and calculation), but they also

actively produce exchange as a site in which this consciousness is concretized.

Rational economic beings

actually

treat the social products that satisfy their

desires as entities that reside outside of themselves. They

actually

assign

“objectively”measurable values to these objects. They

actually

calculate these

values according to a given set of rules.23

Economic rationality presupposes the constitution of agents as “selves”

distanced and differentiated from “others.” Objectification, and indeed the

very notion of “object,” presupposes a consciousness of difference.

Individuals are agents that perceive differences not only among each other

but also between themselves and the products they produce, possess, and/or

consume. Without this differentiation, there would be no objectification; and

without objectification, neither quantification

nor

calculation would

be

pos-

sible,

Thus,

without this culturally constituted differentiation, trade could not

be conceived as “exchange,” either as equal or unequal.

The constitution of agents as “selves” differentiated from “others” is the

result of both economic and noneconomic processes. Thus, we may use

Freudian theory as one guide to understand this constitution

as

(partly)

23. Our

view here shares som e commonality with that of Michel D e Vroey when he states

that “if commodity exchange is to be possible, a theoretical space of measurement must

exist, so that the heterogeneous products of private labour can be transformed into

equivalent categories” (178). Thus, value “constitutes a sp ace of commensurability without

which

no

relation of equivalence could be established. Prior to any measurement, an

abstraction must be constructed” (178). He concludes that since value “refers to a

measurement whose validity is l imited to the point of exchange,” then it

is

“an

instantaneous measurement”; thus, “the idea of an ever-existing value, an ‘embedded’

value, makes

no

sense” (178).



Commodity Fetishism

51

effected during childhood and in the family-a cultural and political, as well

as an economic, site. The consciousness of objectification in a capitalist social

formation, however, is also partly produced by the participation of agents in

the process of exchange. Individuals may come to market with an ability to

objectify. Participation in the market, however, “teaches” individuals that

objectification must take a

particular

form: the treatment of the objects of

trade as quantifiable and as subject to calculation.

Equality

Individuals are agents who identify themselves through, and shape their

behavior in accordance with, the principle of equality (or inequality). This

equality has cultural and political, as well as economic, aspects. “Equality” is

as dependent on an operation of objectification as is “economic rationality.”

In

other words, objectification (and, with it, quantification and calculation) is

constituted not only through and in economic rationality, but also through

and

in

relations of equality. Thus, equality, through objectification, has eco-

nomic and noneconomic determinations, as does economic rationality.

In the sphere of exchange, the consciousness and behavior of equality take

the form of each agent’s identifying other aspects involved in trade as essen-

tially equal (or unequal) to himherself and treating the objects of trade as,

likewise, standing in relation to one another as equal (or unequal). In the

market, the operative social status of agents is that of ownerdtraders of

objects. In exchange, each individual looks at another in terms of the qualities

that the other’s objects possess. Since the perception that individuals have of

each other is narrowly focused on the things which they each possess, the

possibility of equating commodities allows individuals to construct

themselves as equal (or unequal), at least

in

exchange.

24. In the remainder of this paper, we use the terms “teach” and “learn” to describe the

process

of

the construction of the particular subjective knowledge that we call the

consciousness of individuals, a t least as it pertains to exchang e. By placing the terms teach

and learn in inverted commas, we signal a problem with these terms. The concepts of

teaching and learning are problematic for us because they imply cognition, recognition,

realization, d isco ve ry, etc., by an already constituted su bject of an empirical “given”

outsi de of that subject. This is not a conception of consciousness we support. What we

wish to convey with the terms teach and learn is the notion that the subjective knowledge

of

individuals in ex change is partly and actively constructed in the process of exchang e itself.

W e reject the idea that individuals, wholly formed, come to com prehend what is objectively

“there.” Rather, the subjectivity

of

individuals and the process of ex change are articulated

in a relation of overdetermination. It is interesting to note that we could n ot find (perhaps

another

of our

deficiencies) in the English language a w ord, or a short phrase, that avoided

the emp iricist epistemological connotations that teach and learn have.




But the construction of relations of equality is not purely economic. In a

capitalist social formation, the concept of equality is based on a quantification

of human relations that depends on cultural and political, and not just

economic, forms of objectification. Agents come to view each other as equal

(or unequal) insofar as they themselves “represent” a quantitative

accumulation of universally shared properties-rights or qualities-as well

as use-values. In order for agents to construct their social relations as

relations of equality (or inequality), they must “see” themselves and others as

differentiable entities that embody amounts of common qualities. Different

accumulations of these qualities constitute inequality of social status. Now,

“different” only means “unequal”-and “same” only means ‘‘equal’’-when

the standards are quantitative. Thus, to have the social status of “equals,”

agents must themselves be objectified, and that objectification must permit

the divisibility of these agents into quantities of attributes. The constitution of

these agents as quantities of attributes has a partial economic determination in

the activity of exchanging objectified and quantified articles of trade. But, it

is not difficult to point to political processes (the quantification of political

effectivities in the “one persodone vote” rule) and to cultural processes (the

quantification and, thus, differentiation of intelligence with the concept of an

“intelligence quotient”-see, for example, Gould 1981) that also partly con-

stitute agents in relations of equality (or inequality).

In

the history of Marxism, the bourgeois concept of equality is formulated

and taken apart most brilliantly in Lukics’s essay, “Reification and the Con-

sciousness of the Working Class” (in Luklcs 1971). Lukics claims that the

determination of relations of equality stems from commodity fetishism.

To

discuss the connections between economic and noneconomic expressions of

equality, Lukics works with a concept of commodity fetishism that is linked

to the concept of a false consciousness.

Thus,

for reasons that we have given

above, Lukics’s exposition of the concept of equality is for the most part

reductionist. For him, all of bourgeois consciousness, including the idea of

equality, is implicated in the analysis of capitalist economic relations.

By contrast, we argue that equality is not exclusively constituted (through

objectification, quantification, and calculation) in the economic process.

Equality, as a form of consciousness and directive for behavior, is not merely

a mystification of the “real” relations of production and distribution. On the

contrary, equality is a relation-a historically specific relation, to

be

sure-

whose effectivity is to constitute partly the agents of trade as individuals in

both economic and noneconomic spheres.



Commodity Fetishism

53

The equation of individuals to one another is the result of treating agents

themselves

as things and

is

not just the result of measuring agents in terms of

the commodities they own. This treatment of individuals as possessors of

measurable qualities or rights is partly a displacement of the equality of

things from the economic to the political and cultural realms. Thus, we agree

with Lukics that the concept of equality, as it is “learned” in exchange, does

have an effect of reifying social relations elsewhere. But, we disagree with

Lukics’s implication that the ideology of economic and political equality is

the effect of an underlying economic “reality.” Agents become individuals by

learning to construct themselves as equals in the economic process; but, it is

conversely the case that the cultural and political construction of equality is

partially constituted prior to and outside of exchange.

Private Proprietorship

The third, and last, quality of individuality is agents’ self-identification as

proprietors

of

commodities. Agents must view the products of their labor

and the fruits of trade as theirs to dispose of however they see fit-as long as

this disposal does not prevent other agents from acting similarly.

Proprietorship is partially determined by political and cultural processes.

The self-identification of agents as proprietors is only possible if these agents

are recognized by others as proprietors. In bourgeois society this recognition

of proprietorship is codified in private property laws, but it also depends on

the ideological conception and defense of these laws, and particularly on the

objectification through which agents are defined as selves differentiated from

others. Agents are viewed as individuals who have a “natural right” to some

portion of the products of social labor, a right usually attributed to “their”

contribution to that social labor.

What

is

at stake here is the particular identity of agents as proprietors.

Proprietorship is not exclusively defined by the objects that are owned (as

property). Rather, proprietorship is at least partly constituted by the network

of social relations within which labor functions as that which designates a

right (ideologically recognized as legitimate and politically defined) to the

objects which are owned. Individuals, then, enter into trade with an already

established legal and cultural status as private proprietors. In addition, the

identity of agents as proprietors is, of course, not solely an economic iden-

tity. For example, proprietorship can extend to the possession of political

rights or of cultural

or supposedly natural attributes (such as an “intelligence

quotient”).



54

Arnariglio

and

Callari

The Condensation of Economic Rationality, Equality, and Private

Proprietorship in the Social Practice

of

Individuals

The qualities of economic rationality, equality, and private proprietorship

are overdetermined by economic, political, and cultural processes. They are

also condensed in those social practices of individuals that constitute market

relations. Economic rationality, equality, and private proprietorship entail

each other in their particular respective definitions.

For rational economic agents, objectification is connected to the

quantification of the objects of trade. This quantification, however, is

inseparable from the self-identity of agents as equals. Exchange is a process

within which agents learn to quantify objects partly in order to ascertain their

own location in a social network constituted partly as relations of equality.

The quantification of objects of trade and the trading of equal quantities of

these objects-according to whatever standards of equality are used-

concretize the relations of equality among these agents. Economic rationality

and equality mutually condition each other and are condensed in any act of

exchange.

Economic rationality and equality mutually condition each other in at

least one other way. In the market, agents learn not only to calculate but also

to deploy a particular form of calculation. Individuals may come to market

already having learned rules of calculation (in, for example, educational

institutions). However, in order for an ongoing system of commodity circu-

lation to exist, individuals must learn, in the market, to join

abstract

rules of

calculation with particular

concre te

conditions

of

trade. The ongoing

participation of individuals in the market requires that all individuals use the

same set

of

rules of calculation.

A further condition of generalized commodity trade would be that each

individual use this set of rules of calculation consistently. This condition is

required if the agents

of

this social formation have learned, through cultural

processes, to objectify their very needs and to express their individuality as a

given set of needs. If these agents quantify their needs, the satisfaction of

these needs-through the consumption of use-values-proceeds by calculable

degrees. If the rules used by an individual to calculate the value of a use-value

to be acquired in exchange are not used consistently, then the continued abil-

ity of this individual to meet hisher needs in the market will be threatened. In

the absence of a set of rules that an individual can follow with regularity, the

provision of the means to satisfy needs through exchange would, at best, be a

coincidence-there would be no way to predict that any given act of



Commodity Fetishism

55

exchange would lead to the satisfaction of a given set of needs. Individuals

can, of course, change the rules they use to calculate their needs and to calcu-

late the degree to which a set

of

use-values would satisfy these needs. Such a

change, however, may very well entail, or be brought about by, a transfor-

mation of “personality.”

There is nothing

in

trade per se that prohibits different agents from using

different systems of calculation for either the same or for different com-

modities. The mere act of quantification is not sufficient to establish

exchange as a mutually perceived trade of equivalents.

In

a general system of

exchange, however, agents must come

to

equate

amounts

of

different objects

in the same ratio (e.g., four apples

=

two oranges). Thus, there must be

n

“agreed upon” system of calculation that is followed by all agents.25 The con-

cept of equal exchange is an outgrowth of the operation of this common

system of calculation. The moment

of

equality is understood by all concerned

agents as the moment of equilibrium, when their mutual calculations are in

agreement.26

The quality of proprietorship also has relations of mutual intereffectivity

with both economic rationality and equality.

In

order to recognize others-

and hence themselves-as proprietors, agents must be able to treat these

others as subject to the same laws, rights, and calculations as they are. Private

proprietorship is equally conferred on those who are able to show themselves

as capable of being equated in law to all others-slaves cannot be

proprietors-and who are able to demonstrate that their property is not

possessed through a transgression of the “rights” of others. The legal and

legitimate accumulation of commodities is protected by a guarantee of equal

rights to all.

Proprietors are partly defined by their prerogative to alienate their

possessions in trade. This prerogative, though, depends on a particular form

of objectification of the products of social labor.

To

be exchangeable, these

25 .

Money is the medium through which this “agreement” is enforced by the state.

26.

Of course, inequality in exchang e is not only possible but constitutes the actual norm

in a capitalist social formation. Marx’s Cupitnl is exemplary of the view that market

relations are always relations of d isequilibrium. How ever, as M arx attempted to capture

with the con cept of comm odity fetishism, the principle of equality in exchan ge is projected

ideologically o nto all social spheres and is “internalized” by individu als as the underlying

rule. Thi s principle of equality is also theoretically necessary to the conceptualization of a

state of equilibrium as brought about by forces of competition (in the Marxian and the

classical or neoclassical conceptions of competition). Interindustry movements by

comm odity producers are determined on the bases of a calculation by some producers that,

were they to remain in a particular industry, they would lose by having to sell their

comm odities at less than “their” values (i.e., the principles of equality w ould be violated).




products must be construed ideologically as quantifiable in addition to being

the private property of agents. Proprietors may recognize each other’s rights

to consume or alienate their possessions. However, if these rights are not to

be violated, any alienation of commodities must proceed according to the

logic of equality. Since private proprietorship

is

measured

to

some extent by

the quantities of commodities each agent possesses, the system of exchange

must preserve not only the right to consume or alienate commodities, but also

the basis of that proprietorship, the quantities accumulated by individual

agents. But this basis is crucially dependent upon relations of equality:

inequality in exchange would lead to an increase or diminution of the quanti-

ties of wealth possessed by each of the agents of commodity circulation.

Conclusion

From our perspective, the structure of Marx’s argument in

Capital

is such

that, far from taking the exchange of commodities as a given, it presents this

exchange as a problem-a problem which we have reproduced here as that of

a contradiction between equal and unequal exchange. The resolution of this

problem lies theoretically in Marx’s reference to a particular form of

subjectivity and consciousness, a subjectivity and consciousness of objectifi-

cation, which is characteristic of “individuals” as specifically historical

agents of a capitalist social formation. Our discussion of the category of value

in the context of this theoretical problem makes it clear, we believe, that the

structure of Marx’s argument can be read insightfully as a nondeterminist

one.

In

fact, our location of Marx’s discourse in opposition to the discourse

of the classicals suggests a way of construing Marxism as a pointedly antide-

terminist discourse. In place of economic determinism, the concept of

overdetermination can be used to structure Marx’s categories as depictions of

a complex, historical interaction among economic, political, and cultural

processes.

In our presentation, the act of exchange is not simply the site of an

economic

process, but also one of the key locations within capitalism in

which a symbolic order is partially constituted and learned. Thus, the con-

sciousness of individuality does not

reflect

objective economic conditions. If

individuality as a form of social agency were secured by the economy, then

we would only need to read the objective economic conditions and deduce

from them a consciousness and behavior whose determinations necessarily

would derive from a knowledge of those conditions. If this were the case,

either

agents would themselves have to “know” objectively the concrete




economic conditions and turn that knowledge into their own subjectivity,

or

we, the theorists, would have to presume that the consciousness of these

agents would have to mirror unconsciously-and, perhaps, in an inverted,

“false” form-the concrete processes in which these agents would be

inscribed. Presentations of the consciousness of individuality as a false

consciousness usually employ one or both of these presumptions.

The treatment of exchange as an overdetermined site in which a symbolic

order is partly constituted differentiates our reading from those that presume

already formed agents whose false consciousness prevents them from recog-

nizing the reality of an economic process that is external, but necessary, to

their essential constitution. The fact that individuals treat trade as an

exchange of equivalents does not warrant the conclusion that these agents

have a false consciousness. No discursive privilege should be assigned to the

ability, or willingness, of these agents to “see,” or “not see,” exchange as a

trading of equal, or unequal, labor times.

Marx argued that “value.. .transforms every product of labour into

a

social hieroglyphic”

(1977,

167). But, in our view, this statement and his

ensuing discussion can be read to suggest that the construction of commodity

exchange in terms of labor values (a form of “decipherment,” as M a n puts

it) is itself a particular consciousness produced within the capitalist social

formation. If the agents of exchange do

not

read commodity relations in

terms of the exchange of labor times, this must be explained in terms of the

socio-political generation of a particular form of subjectivity and conscious-

ness-individuality-and not in terms of an inability of these agents to

perceive

correctly

an underlying reality.

In a capitalist social formation, given the existence of individuals, trade is

constructed as an equal exchange. There are, however, different bases for

conceiving or enacting that equality. Marx conceptually constructed a basis

for equal exchange with the concept of socially necessary labor time. Neo-

classical theorists conceive equal exchange on the basis of utility. Of course,

the establishment of equality on the one or the other basis-assuming that

agents behave exactly in the ways depicted by Marx or the neoclassicals-

does have different economic, political, and cultural effects.

What Marx was getting at with the concept of commodity fetishism was

exactly a recognition of these different effects, not a reduction of bourgeois

ideology to an expression of a given economic structure. It is this reduction,

to which our argument stands opposed, that continues to deprive Marxism to

this day both of a theory of subjectivity founded on the premise of the

“relative autonomy” of forms of consciousness and action, and

of

a theory of




value in which social agency is a necessary and constituent aspect

of

the

depiction

of

the economic practices

of

market capitalism.

The fir st versions of this pa per were presented an d subsequently

published as D iscussion Paper I in its discussion pap er series) at the Associa-

tion fo r Economic and Social Analysis’s First Annual Conference on

Marxian Social Theory held at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in

April 1983 and at the History of Economics Society annual meeting in

Pittsburgh, May

1984.

Since then, the paper has been presented to , read by ,

and discussed by various audiences. Among the many people who commented

on the pap er in its multiple disguises, we wish to thank especially Dean Saitta,

John D avis, Bruce Roberts, Fred Curtis, and members of the Association f o r

Economic and Social Analysis fo r their helpful comments.

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Documents

Jack Amariglio Marxian Value Theory and the Problem of the Subject the Role of Commodity Fetishism