Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: Militant Islamist Terror

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Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh: Militant Islamist Terror

Mr. Adam E. Stahl

April 30, 2007First published by http://www.ict.org.il

Radical and militant Islamist organizations have existed as an opposing force to

Bangladeshs secular and democratic system since Bangladeshi independence in

1971.1

Once a surreptitious force in Bangladesh, these organizations are now

operating overtly, as is witnessed by a steady increase in Islamist terror attacks across

the country; (Bangladesh saw over 500 explosions in 2005, all carried out by militant

Islamists). Membership of Bangladeshi radical and militant Islamist organizations is

rapidly increasing because of two key factors: deep economic turmoil and severe

political instability. These factors are a consequence of the ongoing political rivalry

between the country's two main political parties, the Bangladeshi National Party

(BNP) and the Awami League (AL). An increase in membership to radical Islamist

organizations is proving that Bangladesh is becoming a nexus of militant Islam in

South Asia, as many Bangladeshi militant Islamist organizations have been linked to

al-Qaida.2 Furthermore, the secular and democratically elected BNP has built a

coalition with politically oriented Islamist groups such as the Jamaat e-Islami (JI),

Bangladeshs largest radical political Islamist party and the Islami Oiyka Jote (IOJ).

This was done to ensure the BNPs hold on power. The by-product of this is that these

groups have elected representatives as well as a legitimate voice to distribute their

ideology. It is noteworthy that the JI and IOJ, though radical, are not involved in

executing terrorist attacks. They are, however believed to be connected tounderground militant Islamist terror organizations, which have carried out well-

organized and fatal attacks against governmental and non-governmental targets, such

1For the purpose of this paper the term militant Islamists refer to those individuals and organizationsthat use terrorist attacks to promote their agenda. Radical Islamists refer to Islamist parties wishing toimpose Sharia, without the employment of terrorist attacks to attain their goals.2 (The al-Qaida-fundedHarakat ul-Jihad al-Islamis leader signed Bin Ladens 1998 fatwa and joinedthe global jihadists declaration of war on the United States Terrorism Report-Bangladesh. 1 March2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).

http://www.tkb.org/MoreTerrorismReport.jsp?countryCd=BG


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as suicide attacks on the cultural wing of Bangladeshs Communist Party as well as a

recent stabbing of a university professor, Abdul Alim.3 Though a multitude of

Bangladeshi Islamist terror organizations exist, one group is worthy of attention:

Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (The Party of Holy Warriors). The organization is

Bangladeshs largest Islamist terror organization.4 It receives funds from foreign

patrons, such as Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti Islamic charities, proving that

international support for their cause exists beyond Bangladeshs borders. The purpose

of this paper is to briefly observe the structure, and tactics as well as the financing and

stated goals of theJamaatul Mujahideen-Bangladesh.

Jamaatul Mujahideen-Bangladesh (JMB) is the countrys largest and most

portentous militant Islamist terror organization. The JMB or Party of the Mujahideen

is believed to have established itself in 1998 in Jamalpur, a district of Bangladeshs

capital city, Dhaka;5

Jamalpur is one of Bangladeshs most impoverished areas, in

terms of both income and human development.6

The organizations aim is to replace

Bangladeshs democratic and secular system with an Islamic theocracy. Following

one JMB-perpetrated attack, a flyer at the scene read the ruler of our country is an

opponent of Allah because the government is made by a completely non-Islamic

system.7 This is one reason why the JMB has consistently targeted Bangladeshs

judiciary, as it sought to stall the implementation of the countrys secular laws, which

the judiciary has protected.8 The government, due to rising internal and external

concern, decided to ban the organization on 23 February 2005. Subsequently,

Bangladeshi security forces arrested the JMBs top leaders on terrorist, terrorism

related or sedition charges. However, there is no evidence that the loss of leadership

has caused the organization to vanish from the militant Islamist scene.

3 Rajshahi University teacher stabbed. 3 February 2007. The Daily Newspaper.http://www.newagebd.com/2007/feb/03/met.html4Concerning this briefing note, an Islamist terror organization is an organized group of individuals

from the Muslim community that carryout attacks to further radical political and religious objectives.5 Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm6 World Bank Support Community-Driven Development in Bangladesh. 18 March 2003. WorldBank. http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/bwi/2003/0317bangladesh.htm7 Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh-Founding Philosophy. The Memorial Institute for the Preventionof Terrorism (MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=44978 Singh, Supriya. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February

2006.Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf


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Name Position Date of Arrest Charge

Sheik Maulana AbdurRahman

Spiritual leader 2 March, 2006 Links toterrorism,

murderSiddiqul Islam (BanglaBhai)

JMB OperationalChief

6 March, 2006 Links toterrorism

Dr. MuhammadAsadullah al-Ghalib

JMB leader February 2005 Sedition

Ataur Rahman Sunny Shura member;Dhaka region

14 December2005

Links toterrorism

Abdul Awal Sarker Shura member;Rajshahi region

18 November2005

Links toterrorism

Salauddin Shura member;Sylhet region

25 April 2006 Links toterrorism

Farouk Hussein Khan Shura member;Rangpur-Dinajpurregion

26 April 2006 Murder;Links toterrorism

Rafik Hassan Shura member;Khulna region

28 February2006

Murder;links toterrorism

NOTE: Links to terrorism refers to the nationwide JMB-perpetrated bombings thatoccurred on 17 August 2005.

JMB Leadership

Until the recent flurry of arrests the JMB had three key leaders.9, Sheik Maulana

Abdur Rahman,was considered the spiritual leader of the JMB. Rahman was born in

Charshi Khalifapara village in Jamalpur Sadar Upazila, the same district where the

JMB was founded.10 Rahmans father was Abdullah Ibn Fazal, famous for his

collaboration with the Pakistani Army during Bangladeshs 1971 War for

Independence.11 There is little doubt that Fazals experiences in fighting alongside the

Pakistanis against a secular Bangladesh influenced his sons radical Islamist views.

Rahman is also a former member of the JIs student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir

(ICS).12 The JI sent Rahman to study at Medina University in Saudi Arabia.

Following the completion of his studies at theAhle Hadith madrassa, (Followers of

9 Kumar, Dr Anand. Bangladesh: Attempt to Restrain Islamists before Elections Lacks Sincerity.11/10/2006. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1988.html10 Rahman Spread Vicious Tentacles in Only Seven Years. Vol. 5 No. 625. 2 March 2006. The DailyStar. http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/03/02/d6030201033.htm11 Profile of a militant. 2 March 2006.New Age: The Daily Newspaper.http://www.newagebd.com/2006/mar/02/front.html12 Ahsan, Zayadul. Inside the Militant Groups-Profile of Shaikh Abur Rahman. 28 August 2005. The

Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm


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the Hadith)13 he served as a translator and interpreter, which brought him to

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India for work.14 His work as a translator brought him in

close contact with diplomatic representatives from Middle Eastern countries.15

Rahman would later travel to Afghanistan for jihadist training and fighting with the

Mujahideen against the Soviets in the 1980s; Rahman would later be recruited by al-

Qaida.16

He also trained in Muzaffarabad, a known haven for Islamist militants in

Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. His connections in Muzaffarabad led to future ties

between the JMB and the Pakistani Islamist organization, Lashkar e-Taiyeba.17

According to one report, Rahmans most recent visit to Pakistan was in 2003.18

Rahman subsequently returned to Bangladesh where he formed the JMB. It is also

reported that Adbur Rahman was the emir of the smaller and more radical Jagrata

Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), a Taliban-like militia, which has claimed

responsibility for at least two attacks, killing one individual.19

Many analysts claim

that the JMJB is either an alias or splinter of the JMB. Both groups were formed in

the same year, are led by the same leaders, and aspire to the same goals.20

In

November 2005, a Bangladeshi court found Rahman guilty and sentenced him, in

absentia, to life in prison for his role in the murder of two judges in a suicide attack. 21

Rahman surrendered to the Rapid Action Battalion at a hideout in East Shaplabagh in

Sylhet City on 2 March 2006 following a two-day standoff.22 Bangladeshi authorities

executed Rahman on 30 March 2007 for his role in terrorism.23

13 Ahle Hadith. Probe News Magazine. Vol. 5, No 37. March 9-15 2005.http://www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=59614 Ahsan, Zayadul. Inside the Militant Groups-Profile of Shaikh Abur Rahman. 28 August 2005. TheDaily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm15 Ahsan, Zayadul. Inside the Militant Groups-Profile of Shaikh Abur Rahman. 28 August 2005. TheDaily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm16 Rahman, Maulana Abdur. 14 February 2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention ofTerrorism (MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=631017 Kumar, Anand. Bangladesh: An Attempt to Restrain Islamists Before Elections Lacks Sincerity.

Paper No 1988. 11/10/2006. South Asia Analysis Group.http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1988.html18 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh. South Asia Terrorism Portal.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm19 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh. South Asia Terrorism Portal.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm20 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangaldesh. 1 March 2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention ofTerrorism (MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=458721 Bangladesh JMB chief surrenders. 2 March 2006.ISN Security Watch.http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=1495822 Manik, Julfikar Ali and Shamim, Ashraf. JMB Chief Abdur Rahman Pinned Down. Vol. 5, No.625. 2 March 2006. The Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/03/02/d6030201011.htm23 Six JMB Kingpins Executed.Associated Foreign Press.

http://www.thebangladeshtoday.com/archive/March'07/31-03-2007.htm


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Siddiqul Islam was believed to be the operational chief of the JMB. He was from the

village of Kamipara in the northern industrial Bogra District. Until his arrest in 2006

Islam resided in Bagmara, Rajshahi District, which borders the Indian state of West

Bengal.24 This area has seen an increase in Indo-Bangladeshi tension due to alleged

infiltration of up to 6,000 Bangladeshi Islamic Jihadists into West Bengal on a daily

basis.25

Islam was popularly referred to by his nom de guerre, Bangla Bhai (Brother

of Bengal), though he had a slew of aliases: Azizur Rahman, Siddiqur Rahman,

Azizur Islam, and Omar Ali Litu.26

Islam fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan

in the 1980s. Similar to Rahman, upon Islams return to Bangladesh he joined the JIs

student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir(ICS). He became a priority target for

Bangladeshi security forces following the successful 17 August 2005 bombings.

Government forces apprehended him in March 2006. Siddiqul Islam, like Abdur

Rahman, is also a commander in the JMJB.27

Analysts have conjectured that Siddiqul

Islams leadership role in both organizations may prove that two groups are actually

one organization working under various aliases.28 Other reports claim that the JMB is

the youth front ofal-Mujahideen the parent organization that began working in the

mid 1990s29 Despite varying reports it is unknown whether the JMB and JMJB are

formally linked. On 6 March 2006, Bangladeshi security forces surrounded Islams

hideout in Muktagacha, a town north of Dhaka. In the ensuing gun-battle, an

explosion left Islam with shrapnel and burn injuries.30 He was taken to a hospital in

Mymensingh and underwent surgery. Islam was imprisoned in a sub-jail, not a

24 Singh, Supriya. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February

2006.Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf25 Rane, Anil. Bangladesh trying to push thousands of Islamic Jihadists infiltrators into West Bengalof India-Indian security forces clashes with Bangladesh rifles. 20 August 2005. India Daily Online.http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/4271.asp26 Singh, Supriya. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February2006.Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf27 Siddiqul, Islam. 14 February 2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.(MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=631228 Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=449729 Singh, Supriya. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February2006.Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf30 Top Bangladeshi Militant Held. 6 March 2006.BBC News Online.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4777526.stm


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secured facility, in the town of Mirpur.31 Like Rahman, Islam was executed on 30

March 2007 for his role in terrorist activites.

Dr. Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib, a professor of Arabic Studies at Rajshahi

University, is also a top leader in the JMB as well as the chief of another radical

Islamist organization, Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB).32

As chief of

AHAB, which is a mass platform for JMB activities, al-Ghalib was running a

magazine, Al-Tahreek.33

Al-Ghalib was arrested in February 2005. He was charged

with sedition at a northwestern Natore District court, along with 14 others.34

JMB Structure

The JMB is well organized with multiple wings (departments), which form the

structure of the group. It has a full-time force of 10,000 members, reportedly costing

$1250 per individual per month, totaling $150 million each year.35

The part-time

members are estimated to number 100,000 and it is reported that the organization has

a 2000-man standby suicide brigade.36

At the top of the JMB lies theMajlis e-Shura, the highest policymaking decision body

of the organization. As of late 2006, Bangladeshs Security Forces Rapid Action

Battalion (RAB) successfully arrested all seven members of the Shura Council;

Bangladeshi authorities have executed four of the members.37 Each Shura member is

allocated a specific region seemingly to ensure that different terror cells operate

independent of one another, thereby restricting information should one cell become

apprehended.Abdur Rahman was in overall command as the spiritual leader. Siqqul

31 Kumar, Anand. Bangladesh: Attempt to Restrain Islamists before Elections Lacks Sincerity. 10October 2006. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1988.html32 Bangladesh. South Asia Intelligence Review. Vol. 3, No. 33. 28 February 2005. South AsiaTerrorism Portal. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_33.htm33 Rajamohan, PG. Recent Developments in Bangladesh: Implications for Security. No. 1921. 11January 2006. http://www.ipcs.org/US_related_seminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=193434 Bangladesh 15 on Sedition Charges. 28 February 2005.BBC News Online.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4303985.stm35 Bangladesh Today.International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. 121. 23 October 2006, p. 16.http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/121_bangladesh_today.pdf36 Holt, Andrew. Islamists Pose a Growing Threat to Stability in Bangladesh. Terrorism Focus, Vol.3, Issue 2. 18 January 2006. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236987037 Bangladesh Assessment 2006. Para 4. South Asia Terrorism Portal.

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/index.htm


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Islam, (a.k.a. Bangla Bhai) was the Operational Commander and Head of the

Chittagong region (Coastal, southeast); Ataur Rahman Sunny, also executed on 30

March 2007, was responsible for the Dhaka region (Capital, center); Abdul Awal

Sarker headed the Rajshahi region (Northwest); Salauddin, (a.k.a.Salehin), oversaw

the Sylhet region (Northeast); Farouk Hussein Khan, (a.k.a. Khaled Saifullah), (a.k.a.

Shaikh Tariq) was in charge of the Rangpur-Dinajpur region (North), and Rafik

Hassan (a.k.a. Hafez Mahmoud) oversaw the Khulna region (Southwest). Khan and

Hassan have been sentenced to death for their connection to a September 2004 murder

in Jamalpur.38

A third member, Hafez Mahmoud told authorities of Abdur Rahmans

location, which led to Rahmans subsequent arrest.39

In total, four members of the

Majlis e-Shura, including Rahman, have been executed.

Below the Shura Council lie the finance department, public relations wing, a

recruitment branch, and intelligence cells, which are thought to have penetrated

governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations.40

Not much is known

about this part of the group due to the nature of the work undertaken by these

members, which demand that they remain quiet.

Arms

The JMB utilize conventional explosives. The organization carried out its first attack

in 2003 in Dinajpur in which three individuals were injured.41 That attack was

organized by detonating seven bombs simultaneously. Subsequent attacks were

organized in much the same manner, leaving a very familiar al-Qaida signature. By

2005, JMB-led attacks were more confident, though the death toll from the attacks

remained relatively low. On August 2005, the JMB perpetrated a nationwide series of

bombings in which 450 near-simultaneous explosions occurred in 64 of the countrys

38 Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Incidents-2006. South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm39 Raman, B. Funds for BD Blast came from UK. March 9, 2006 International Terrorism Monitor:Paper No. 33. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1727.html40 A Lakh is a unit in the Indian number system, which is the equivalent to 100,000. The SATPassessment claims 10 Lakh or 1 million trainees. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). SouthAsia Terrorism Portal. (2007)http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm41 Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm


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65 districts.42 Despite the massive amount of explosions used in this operation, only

one individual was killed and 100 left injured. Within months the JMB began to

tactically shift their attacks to suicide terrorism; Bangladeshs first suicide terror

attack occurred on 29 November 2005 in Gazipur and Chittagong, with two bombs

detonated within 40 minutes of one another. The attacks claimed 9 lives, including

two lawyers and one police officer, leaving nearly 80 left injured.43

Both suicide

attacks targeted the judiciary, a common target for the JMB whose goal is to establish

an Islamic state in Bangladesh. The first attack occurred at the Gazipur Bar

Association building. The second attack, carried out by Abul Bashar, attacked a police

checkpoint near the courts in Bangladesh's second largest city, Chittagong; Bashar

was not killed in the explosion.44

Numerous raids on known JMB hideouts revealed

the extent of the organizations arsenal. The outfit has access to time bombs,

detonators, petrol bombs, and RDX explosives. Further, the analysis of the arsenal

revealed that the JMB has been able to secure its weaponry from regional militant

groups in Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, and China.45

Much of the arms are believed

to arrive to Bangladesh via water transport, which places further emphasis on the

coastal areas of Chittagong and Coxs Bazaar, known havens for radical Islamists.

The possible use of non-conventional weaponry by the JMB cannot be ruled out. On

30 May 2003 in Paiya, Bangladeshi security forces apprehended four suspected JMB

members with a 225 gram ball of uranium oxide, believed to have been

manufactured in Kazakhstan; a 23-page explosives manual was also found; the

believed plot was to create a radioactive dirty bomb.46

42 Kurlantzick, Josh and Suri, Anirudh. Bangladesh: State in Decline. 15 January 2007. CarnegieEndowment for International Peace.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18968&prog=zgp&proj=zsa43 Buerk, Roland. Bangladeshs Escalating Extremism. 29 November 2005.BBC News Online.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4482320.stm44 Twin JMB suicide strikes spell carnage in courts. 30 November 2005. The Daily Star.http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2005/12/01/week.htm45 Singh, Supriya. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB): A Profile. IPCS Special Report No. 11.February 2006.Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf46 Perry, Alex. A Very Dirty Plot. 9 June 2003. Time Asia.

http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,501030616-457395,00.html


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Funding

The JMB funds come from national and international sources, which emphasizes the

true magnitude of the organization, as obtaining funds from overseas is not an easy

task. According to MIPT, Private citizens from countries throughout the Middle East

allegedly contribute to the JMB, while international NGOs based in the Persian Gulf

also provide also provide a significant source of funding.47

The Kuwaiti Revival

Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), a financier of the JMB, is an international

organization that has succeeded in spreading Whabbism within numerous Muslim

countries.48

Funds from the RIHS have aided in the construction of 1,000

mosques, 10 madrassas, four orphanage-cum- madrassas, and a kidney dialysis centre

across the country. The mosques and madrassas were later proved to be centers of

militant activities of the JMB.49

In 2005, more evidence of foreign links to

Bangladeshi militant Islam came to light with the arrest of Maolana Abu Noman

Muhammad Amanullah, who admitted to having direct links to the 17 August 2005

nationwide bombings; Amanullah was an Imam of the RIHS-funded Ahle Hadith

mosque at Andariapara.50 In 2002, US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil placed both a

criminal and international jihadist tag on the RIHS. The Treasury Department held

that the RIHS had been stealing from widows and orphans to fund al-Qaeda

terrorism.51 This led the US Department of State to blacklist the RIHS on 9

September 2002 for providing financial assistance to Islamist terrorists.52

The Saudi Arabian based charity, al-Haramaine Islamic Institute, has also been

accused of funding JMB activities.53 The Saudi-based institute was banned in by the

47 Jamatul Mujahideen Bangaldesh. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=449748 Bosnian Investigation Confirms Balkananalysis.com Terror Report.Balkan Analysis.com Securityand Intelligence Brief 3.06/30/2006.Balkananalysis.com. http://www.balkanalysis.com/security-intelligence-briefs/06302006-bosnian-investigation-confirms-balkanalysiscom-terror-report/49 Singh, Supriya. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB): A Profile." IPCS Special Report No 11.February 2006.Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf50 JMB threatens to kills 3 more judges. The Daily Star. 29 November 2005.http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/11/29/d51129011614.htm51 Novak, Jane. "Bangladesh: Fertile Ground for Democracy or Extremism?." 29 April 2005. WorldPress.org. http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2071.cfm52 Ramachandran, Sudha. Mixing Aid with Terror. 22 September 2005.Asia Times Online.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI22Df01.html53 Holt, Andrew. Islamists Pose a Growing Threat to Stability in Bangladesh. Terrorism Focus, Vol.

3, Issue 2. 18 January 2006. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369870


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U.S. in September 2004; further, on 6 July 2004, the United Nations Security Council

added the al-Haramaine branches in Albania, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and

the Netherlands to the Qa'ida section of its "consolidated list".54 Other organizations

and charities from the Gulf States, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, have also

been implicated in providing funds for the JMB.55 Pakistani organizations are also

alleged to have funded the JMB. There are also reports that non-Middle Eastern

donors assist in funding the JMB. According to one South Asia Analysis Group report

the 17 August 2005 bombings were organized with funding received from the UK.

Atur Rahman, a captured member of theMajlis e-Shura, admitted during a confession

the August 17 bombings were carried out with the help of a sum of Pound Sterling

10,000 received from two supporters of the JMB in the UK.56

In addition, the JMB is

tied to local businesses to fund its activities, such as the lucrative shrimp industry in

Bangladeshs southwest region, specifically Khulna.57

The JMB is also linked to

criminal activity such as money laundering in order to support its activities and

training camps in nearly 60 districts across Bangladesh.

Conclusion

Though the JMB has not claimed responsibility for an attack in nearly 16 months does

not mean that it has ceased to exist. It remains Bangladeshs largest, most-well

organized and well-financed Islamist terror organization; currently, JMB mosques and

training camps can be found in at least 56 of Bangladesh 65 districts.58 Despite the

high-profile arrests of all members of the Majlis e-Shura and the subsequent

execution of four Shura members,it is highly improbable that the JMB will cease its

operations. Recent reports suggest that JMB members have begun to regroup in

Barisal, under the auspices of at least two veteran Afghan War fighters, Hannan

54 "Security Council Committee Adds Two Individuals, Five Entities to al-Qaida Section ofConsolidated List." Press Release SC/8143 8/7/2004.http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8143.doc.htm55 Zayadul, Ahsan. Foreign funding, local business keep them going. Vol. 5, No. 441. 22 August2005. The Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/22/d5082201044.htm56 Raman, B. Funds for BD Blast came from UK. 9 March 2006. International Terrorism Monitor:Paper No. 33. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1727.html57 Bangladesh Assessment 2006. Para 4. South Asia Terrorism Portal.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/index.htm58 Bangladesh Today.International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. 121. (23 October 2006), p. 16.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/121_bangladesh_today.pdf


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Uddin and Mawlana Mohiuddin Faruki59; the latter is believed to be the trainer of the

JMBs 2000-man suicide brigade.60 Various militant jihadi terror organizations, such

as al-Qaida of Iraq, have lost their leaders only to be replaced forthwith by another

motivated individual. The key to countering a resurgence of JMB activity does not lay

in the arrests of the organizations leaders alone. The government of Bangladesh

needs to focus on two key areas.

First, there must be greater effort put forth in the comprehensive fight against

Bangladeshi militant Islam. The March 2006 terrorism crackdown emphasized the

willingness of the Bangladeshi government and the capability of its security forces to

tackle militant Islam in the country. However, the sporadic clean ups efforts are

insufficient and must occur on a regular basis. Further, the government cannot defeat

terrorism on its own and therefore Bangladesh must better cooperate with the

international community in the realm of counterterrorism.

Second, the two main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the

Awami League (AL) must mend their differences, or at the very least cooperate on

issues directly affecting national security. The turmoil that these parties have already

caused has created a political vacuum that radical Islamist groups have begun to seize

upon, as witnessed by the presence of JI and the IOJ representatives in Parliament.

Further, the socio-economic services that the government has failed to provide to

Bangladeshis are direct results of this political rivalry. Radical Islamists, such as the

JMB, have begun to fill this void successfully. To counter the JMB, the AL and BNP

must mend their differences. Should this mending fail to materialize, the JMB, along

with other radical Islamists groups, will grow in popularity and threaten the existence

of the secular and democratic system.

59 Eight Hisbut Tawhid Militants Arrested in Meherpur. Detail of Terrorism Update-Bangladesh.Para 2. 14 April 2007. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailed_news.asp?date1=4/14/2007#660 JMB Cadres Regrouping in Barisal in Different Names. The Daily Star. Vol. 5, Number 1020. 14

April 2007 http://www thedailystar net/2007/04/14/d70414070174 htm

Documents

Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: Militant Islamist Terror