Japanese in Battle

8/7/2019 Japanese in Battle

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CONTENTSINTRODUCTION

1 . T a c t i c a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a n d t h e P r i n c i p l e s o f W a r 2 . M o r a l e

C H A P T E R I . D E F E N C E1 . G e n e r a l P r i n c i p l e s . . . 2 . F r o n t a g e a n d D e p t h . . . . . . 3 . L a y o u t . . . . . . . .4 . F i e l d W o r k s . . . t6 . W e a p o n s . . . . . . . .6 . C o u n t e r A t t a c k . . . . . . .

C H A P T E R I I . T H E A D V A N C E T O1 . G e n e r a l2 . R e c o n n o i t e r i n g a n d S t r i k i n g E l e m e n t s . . .


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Instructors Reading this DSign E'3low


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1INTRODUc

i lE object of this pamphlet is to indioatJapanese behaviour in the field as theyitions generally. Principles and methods which the Japa;her armies are touched on lightly or passed over. Japaneseis strong peculiarities, is not dealt with in this pamphlet, xtics, major and minor. The description of Japanese taction of Japanese practice in the field rather than on the ruleslilitary handbooks, to which their practice often bears little

1. Tactical characteristics and the principles1. The Principles of War.As a general introduction theview the manner in which the Japanese apply the principn our Field Service Regulations.2. Offensive action.Japanese soldiers from the highesoughly imbued with the spirit of offence, in which they tend


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25. In their i|ate3?|3t jitl ' 'of the principle of concwMerjjr from/w^terii sum y^^tcularly from German met|n$Tt.hj3 handling offerees for an operation.The characteristic form of attack indicated in para.and involves advance on distant objectives in a numbesupporting. Of the in itial orders for the Manipur offenmentioned assault on any of the main objectives. Tothe enemy to withdraw was the first object. The destcome about by the disorganization inherent to a certaidrawal.In committing forces for the attainment of a main the principle of concentration in that they hold nothingcommitting even specialist troops in infantry roles. Athat the commander finds himself without reserves undefurther course of the operation. Both in attack and dsense of the term are conspicuously absent from Jap


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they themselves are God's chosen supermen soldiers ofand the added belief th a t death in ba ttle is the soldier's hthe perfect after life must lead to fanaticism.It is possible, however, that confidence in their legenit is to a large extent on myths, may be shaken by a serieby the Japanese in wars previous to the present one.10. There has been this year (1944) a slight but definthe Japanese troops in Burma still fight with courage atimes against much superior forces, the ir diaries contain faago. The Japanese forces in Burma have this year launchthe troops were told, were to bring them down into the plaBoth their offensives failed and as a result many soldierfanatical enthusiasm for the war which they had in the pathe job and go home ; others complain about their officers aor rather lack of itand the many discomforts of the condand die. The glories of dying for the Emperor have paled


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CHAPTER LDEFENCE1. General Principles

13. " Passive defence," it is stated in an official Jdisadvantage of making it easy for the British to buill v f g t | V p M ^tat\p djrfence a s m u c n a s possible. Eveork to k6ep*our;fbTee mobile ".yJ word defence risi I whenever possible, aordifig of the " intention " paragraph of adefence;" The unit will secure its present positions fornuing generally to disrupt the enemy's future attack ".The Japanese seldom sit and do nothing for long.may be preparing a surprise on one or both flanks.14. These threats vary greatly in scope : some area handful of men who, having approached under the cgrenades and fire an automatic weapon at a rear platooa mile or two from the nearest enemy. Others invol


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(Hi) Plain dotted with jungle-covered hills 100 to 2front for one battalion.The depth of such positions has been-1000 to 3000 yarare held by sacrificing mutual small arms support betwebe 2000 yards or more ap art . Artillery and mortar suppaffected by th is wide dispersion.19. It should not be assumed from the three examplJapanese will always be thin on the ground. In positiovital to the defence of some important centre, one finds tfrontage more in keeping with the text book. For exampla battalion occupied a frontage of under 1500 yards (see covers an important approach to Akyab, and is only sixIsland.

3. LayoutExamples of typical defence layouts, from platoon toshown at Appendix " A ". They show no remarkable dif


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*S Jo? W-frVW8 Uthidating GOT


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4. Field WorksWire

25. The Japanese have used comparatively little wire in the case of beaeh defences and around one aerodromhave been constructed both of normal height and also abas a double apron trip-wire fence.In front of positions so far captured in Burma the type seen consists of a row of 4 ft. posts to which are attach ed twire. This fence may run parallel to the foremost trench an20 yards from it, or it may zig-zag through the bushes andhill on which the locality is sited. In the latter case it appintention of leading troops, who follow it, in the direction boration of this lay-out is to construct two fences (see Exa


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8While automatic weapons are frequently to be found Japanese have no qualms about occupying the crest of a hitrench system is normally found, there is a new trend appautom atic weapons ; they are coming further down the hill. er has gone so far as to say th at M. Gs. should be sited on35 yards down the hill thus avoiding our artillery shells whhit the crest or to fall on the rear slope.Our troops attacking a hill feature about 70 feet high1944 were half way up the hill when they were enfiladed wappeared to come from a direction either level with or slighWhere the sides of a hill are very steep, however, autfound on the crest.In country of small hills interspersed with paddy fielguns are often dug into the banks of the square village poncountry.Mortars and Grenade Dischargers


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9placing charges and destroying the guns. Most of these atheir object.Defensivefire.During he defensive battle Japaneseforming-up places, lines of approach and assaulting troops a34. Up to the present Japanese guns have normally berare occasions, in pairs. A normal shoot is 12 to 24 roununless it is in a very safe place, is moved to an alternatartillery does not normally fire at night.W ith aircraft overhead guns near the battle area ceaseaway their positions.Snipers35. The extent to which snipers are employed varies In the Arakan recently (MarchApril 1944) they were hardlhand situa tion reports from the Imphal area include suchparticularly active " and " After X Bn had reached its seco


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10CHAPTER H.THE ADVANCE TO CO1. General

39. A force advancing is preceded by advanced guards are to gain information, brush aside minor opposition andforce is encountered, to give the main body time to deploy to fulfil these tasks Japanese covering troops advance witpossible front.The speed with which the advance is conducted canand it is important to note that the commonest reaction tovelopment.2. Reconnoitering and Striking Elem40. Provided the terrain permits the use of transport,umns are preceded by small parties of troops on bicycles accompanied by one or two tanks or armoured cars whichon first contact. These leading elements are particularl


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11CHAPTER IILATTACK

"Our plans and our reconnaissance must be kept secret an unexpected time and place We shall seldom be able to gthe opposing forces on terrain which permits a fairly easyDictum.

1. Major Tactics of the Attack48. A study of Japanese offensive operations indicatesalmost of a drill the Japanese constantly aim a t placing bodopponents' L of C, and th us compelling them either to attacchoosing, or to withdraw. These plans tend to overlookhelp the air arm can give to beleaguered garrisons.49. In the first Burma campaign, from the time that tSalween River at Moulmein until the last action at Shwegyare very few recorded instances of deliberate a ttack s. R


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12These tactics are clearly described in a training memyear. I t reads" The attack must be made in a direction texpect and where there is cover from enemy fire. on hill tops, use must be made of dead ground andinvariably bs assaulted from th e rea r. The enemywill usually be a guide as to which is the rear of the method of attack is usually successful... .Part of thdistract the enemy either byfireor shouting while a sethe reverse directions. I t m ust be remembered thadistraction is liable to come under enemy hand gtherefore always be placed beyond throwing rangeenemy artillery fire, and, in order to minimise casuadispersed. The time for the distraction of the enemwith the time of the attack from the rear by the m


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IBMaximum Artillery Effort on the Imphal F

(a) Firepower22 Med gun hows14 Mtn guns2 Regtl guns2 Bn guns(b) Wt of shelling200/300 rounds(c) Duration(t) General HF 15/45 min

and registration (V slo(n) HF prior to an 18/36 hrsattack (slow ra(in) HF prior to main 45/60 minassault


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14-anti-tajik potentialities have not yet been determined, is to thre at to our own tanks, b ut, as they all fire both arm our pshell, they are useful in the roles they have been given.63. In future there can be little doubt that, bearingwhich we gained by our surprise use of tanks, and our suctry to employ tanks on an increasing scale, mainly in closeMortars64. In the ttack, mortars are used well forward to..effectively defended localities holding up th e advance. T^ which machine guns cannot deal and for which artillery irsuitable. Centres of resistance are often indicated to mortracer, the mortar fire being directed at the intersection oAn important point is the mobility of the 81 mm mortalarger calibre than our 3" mortar, it weighs only 52 lbs, firabo ut 2000 yards. I t may, therefore, be met where our


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IS and training of special assault troops who have been chosgence.The operation begins with air attacks on aerodromes, aand headquarters, and later the air effort is directed agaiThe fire of all types of artillery is brought to bear ofire with medium artillery " is recommended for " demfire " .Assault69. Tke assault is to be made by infantry and engineeof tanks is envisaged " to neutralize loopholes and destroy p

The technique of the assault is thus described by anbattle of Hongkong :" Numbers of assault troops would infiltrate through darkness, and would hide in trees and bushes whence theyfrom the rear.


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16touch has been added by the employment of fifth coluwhere they will best serve as a point to march on. The sployed- by the Germans in Europe.Night attacks are, where possible, directed uphill anare usually well defined natural features such as a hill, bridA flare fired over the objective may be the signal for lights are occasionally fired to give direction.Control is exercised by imitating bird calls, and red flato show troops the direction of advance. Whilst the m ethothe leader knows where he isfool-proof, the employmen

prise and gives as much information to the observant defenFire Support73. The need for simplicity and for using small bodiesobjectives is still mentioned in training ins tructions which ability of a silent approachif necessary by crawlingas a p


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17CHAPTER IV.PATROLS AND RA

1. Information, Reconnaissance and PInformation76. The Japanese in Burma have been unable to im1 inch and 1\ inch Ordnance Survey maps of which theyoriginals, and reproductions upon which translations haThe information which the earlier maps provided was in by a detailed study in peace time of the probable area oInvolved the " planting " of commercial photographers in terest and other forms of " economic " penetration the prespionage.Considerable success was also achieved in organizing which it was possible to continue the collection of informabarbers, tattoo artists and all the other Japanese who had had either left hastily or been interned. With fifth column


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18(n) Raids to disrupt our rear communications anunit assigned to this task is called a Betsudotas " Detached force " or Flying column.{in) Penetration and occupation of a position. Polast man. The role is to pave the way for thleap-frog through it. The unit assigned thisor Penetration unit.

NOTE.The three term s in italics will be used in the pa80. There have been several examples of raid-units atassaults in Burma and on one occasion they penetrated to order to attack a Brigade Headquarters. One Gunner offfive counter-battery suicide attackseach made by a partysaid that as long as one was ready for them they were of nfive attacks he quoted we had a few casualties but not a saction.


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19CHAPTER V.ROAD BLOCKS

1. Purpose87. The Japanese employ road blocksto cut off a force retiring,to protect one or both flanks of an encircling moveor, as part of a defensive system.

2. Siting88. As far as possible road blocks are sited in positionprevent all movement until attacked and cleared; this isdefence when they are most likely to be encountered on dwhich is vital to an advancing force. The following sites past

Area of a bridge upon which several routes convergSingle road with dense jungle on both sides,


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20APPEND IX " A "E XAM PLES OF JAPANESE DEFExample 1The defences on " Massif" or " 162 "

M ass if was the name given to a mass of wooded height coveringby 2000 yards No rth of the Maungdaw Buthidaung road neheight of this feature is 100 to 150 feet. The No rth-W est corner ofin March (1944).The hill sides were very steep on this p osition an d defences were ton 'th e top of the hill, reliance being placed on na tu ra l camouflage foous trenc h along the to p of the hill linked up fox-holes, fire-trenches acases itself suitab le from which to fire. Shorb com mu nication trenc hlinked up fire positions with th e shelters an d dug -outs on the rear sloman dug-outs were also dug into th e side of the front-to-rear comm uThe three-strand wire fences were parbly hidden b y jungle and pfields. Th ey could by no mean s by rega rded a s a serious obstacle athe fact tha t th e points at which the inner fence approached nearescovered by M. Gr. emplacem ents. A few stran ds of tri p wire were ensteep face of the hill.


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2 1Example 2A Battalion Position at Rathedaungr-xcept in the case of the locality illustrated in Example 6 it is onl

i-'tion generally. I t is reproduced here because even witho ut deof th e frontage and dep th occupied by a ba ttalio n holding a defethickly wooded hills. This position was held by the Jap ane se for soing movements against it failed.Fo rw ard localities were sited on th e highest ground in th e sectordefence. Trenches in the most northerly localities were continuous.Our own positions were North of those shown in the


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2 2Example 3

Lophei Spur, Chin Hills1 he Japane se position on the Lophei Spur was built for a garrThe defence system was based on a few bun kers connected up tpos ts designed for riflemen. These ha d no hea d cover, but were concation trench by a covered trench. The occupant could remain iartillery fire or bom bing and, as soon as th e bombard men t stopped, communication trenches were 4 ft. to 5 ft. deep and the head cover of pine log 8 inches to 1 ft. in diameter, with 3 ft. to 4 ft. of earth in most of these positions and in the accomm odation shelters was froI n the main bunk ers firing slits were well construc ted and werwide outside, 8 inches in depth and 2 ft. in len gth . No baffle walls o

but most of the entrances w ere either long or curved. I t would havinto the actual chambers, but once in, they would have injured ormajor bunker positions had more than one way in, so th at even ifcould be reinforced throu gh anoth er passage . All th e shelters were rand fixed together by dogs. The standard of field engineering wawork had been carried out by the infan try garrison, with possibly a


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2 3Example 4"Boomerang ""This "is a small feature on the W est ban k of the Kalapanzin, No r

held by a Suicide Com pany (JTBAKU CH UTA I) of 4 officers3 MMGs, 9 LMGs and 3 Grenade Dischargers. The personnel of from various compan ies of th e same ba ttali on . After fierce fighting a batta lion of the 2nd Punjab Regim ent. According to a prisoner oder had warned this com pany th at any one returning from th e positioA num ber of short tunn els provided deep cover for th e garrison.


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24Example 5A Platoon localityyhe locality illustrated below was one of three forming a compan

frontage of jus t under 1000 yar ds. Ea ch locality was sited on aThe area was covered with dense jungle and 50 yard s was the ma xiposition until trees and bushes had been blasted away by aerial bomAs the localities were similar in layout and construction, only oneis described in detail below.Each locality was surrounded by a four-strand barbed wire fencthe foxholes, the wire perimeter measuring between 200 and 300 yaTwo interesting features of these all-round defence positions arestructe d beside almost every foxhole, and th e 3-bay LMG bun ker. Tat the end of a trench an d have an ear th and tim ber head cover abouof the 3-bay LMG post appear at Appendix " B ", Example 1.


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25Example 6Fart o! a Battalion Position"This is an interesting example of a defended locality consistingweapon pits . I t is possible th at a t least some of those on th e hill

and that shelter from the shelling and aerial bombardment to which subjected, has been provided by burrowing deep into the hill side. Taerial photograph and therefore shows only positions visible from assumed th at t he line of weapon pits was continued under the trees olity. I t should be noted th at in this drawing a black dot has been uand MG positions.This locality will be recognized as pa rt of the b attal ion p osition g


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26APPENDIX " B ".EXAMPLES OF MMG AND LM

Example 1The 3-Bay L M G PostTphese diagram s show a po st which was found in the platoon locali


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27


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23Example 2 rPosition dug into a roadside."This sketch illustr ates a position d ug into a roads ide. A num beencountered in Burma.

I M G ' P O S T COVERING ROAD APP

S U R F A C E .BALUES FOR. C O yg R &SUPPORT Of NATURALG A R N IS H FIRING SLIT


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29Example 3A M.M.G. Bunker."yhis pos t ha d 4 feet of earth on top . Th e logs from which the

to 12 inches in diameter. The under-growth around was thick, a distan ce of 5 yar ds th e firing slits could no t be seen. The bun kerthe Kalapanzin River and its banks.


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30Example 4/Another Type of Bunker-T"he drawing below was made from a photograph showing the res the bunkers in the "Massif" position, near Bu thid aun g. Otobliterated , leaving only a shambles of timb er, earth an d corrugarpointed and destroyed before we launched our attack on the positi


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31APPENDIX " C "

An Example of Japanese Offensive Tactics, ArakanFCOMPOSITION OF JAPANESE FORCES ENGAGEDGIVEN INTHEY APPEAR IN THE NARRATIVE.Tanahashi Force

Comd. Col. Tanahashi. 112 Inf. Regt. (less 1 Bn., less one M.M.G. PI).1 Bn., 143 Inf. Regt. (less 5 Coy.), (one mtn. gun attd.). 3 Bn., 55 Mtn. Arty. Regt . (Mtn. guns 2, Light mortars 4).55 Engineer Regt. (less one Coy. and two Plo, but with main sMaterials Coy. attd.).One Sec. Div. Wireless.Medical and Water Purifying personnel.

Kubo Force


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33On 5 Fe bru ary the Tan ahash i and Ku bo Forces were againRegim ent ad vanc ed so uthw ard tow ards th e hills in the area of Shwecour withdraw al Westw ard throug h the pacs at the foot of which Shwhowever, stay here, bu t continued South towards Ngakyed auk. Outhe area of Ba da na and inflicted hea vy casualties, prev enting furtby day light. The Jap ane se, however, reached this objective th at niIn the meanwhile, the restof this force advanced South with the end of the Nga kyeda uk Pass, bu t at midda y on 6 Feb ruar y they Ing ya ung . He re, they atta cke d all day but failed to dislodge our trconsiderable losses.Ku bo force crossed the Mayu Kang e, leap-frogging throug h 2 BShwechaing and reaching the Bawli-Maungdaw Roa d in the area the nigh t of 5/6 Fe bru ary . He re, they dam aged thre e bridges, ahills, contact then being lost.


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35

W^MM


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36Meanwhile, Colonel Tanahashi had been pushing that part of hiconcentrated South from Ingy aung through the hills, and by 9 Febout from the Bad ana Chaung south through the hills to A wlanbyin.Lt . General H an aya , the Comm ander of the D ivision, ha d by nowing our divisions West of the R ange , and ordered the Tan ahashi Forc

area with the intention of destroying our forces ther e. On the sameJapan ese in the area of the pass , where we cap tured p ositions and cou nter-a ttacks by the Japanes e on 10 and 11 Feb rua ry . The covering the Pass.During 9 and 10 Feb ruary , the Japan ese, as ordered, had bSinzweya Ngakyedauk area from N orth and South . The bulk of the area H ill 315, and 2 batta lion 144 Beg imen t had been take n fromattack, but the Japanese were unable to achieve any success.By 11 Feb rua ry the Japanes e had been pu t on the defensive geNgangyaung Bawli Road and on the Eastern slopes of the Mayu Rwhere he was concen trating his efforts again st our divisional box . nese had lost the initiative, and were suffering from difficulties of sufood. Fro m this dat e onward s the action became defensive on theat tempted to withdraw.


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37APPENDIX " D ".EXAMPLES OF NIGHT ATT

Example 1The Battle of Pa-anQ n 8 Feb rua ry 1942 a battalio n of the Balueh Regiment tooka village on th e w est bank of th e Salween Ri ver . The position opa dd y land, surroun ded by close jungle with thick undergrowth. Thbounded the south of the position and then ran north along the riverOn the opposite bank of the river, 1,200 yards away, the JapaPa -an . The role of the Balueh batta lion was to prevent this Japanethe Pa-an area.To accomplish this the battalion was disposed around the saucerin the centre. " A " Company held the river bank , " D " C ompaOom pany th e western face and " C " Com pany the southern face of thzeik road. In ad diti on , patrols were constantly maintained along thSouth and Mikayan in the North.Da ring the nigh t of 10/11 Feb ruar y one of these patrols report


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38


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39By first light " B " and " D " Company positions had fallen iCompany was surrounded. There remained nly a very weak " CHeadquarters after the night's fighting. ThM J H J | i&j&aa -âttackthe superior strength of the Japanese. f i p p f / f c l ! f^ 'By 0800 hours the enemy occupied the -&mqji$iti^&Mzeip. posComment.This operation serves as a g ^ W w f t w ^ly' ocharacteristic Japanese methods. Note the wfcre &.^^^îg;: mpveattack came in along the defenders L. of C, whilst all enemy"âdfivminutes before the night attack had been on their South flaOnce again the enemy used their now familiar methods of drawiThe parties of 12 to 15 men were probably sections, and advreported during the early phases of the Japanese war.

Example 2An attack in the Upper Chindwin

A report of an attack on a camp in the Upper Chindwin Area sta


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40Example 3.Diversionary Tactics:Tftluring th e nigh ts of ~4/5 an d 5/6 Nov emb er, 1943, th e Jap an, tjjd aitea of pts . 1619 and 1749. On the nigh t of 4/5 Novembe174$i feature was attac ked by a pa rty frd m the . South-West. At tattack was made by another party of enemyvfrom the East with riflThe att ack was beaten -off withou t casualties to ourselves, and, altiheard throughout the night, no further attack was made.The atta ck on the night of 5/6 Novem ber commenced at abountil 0300 hou rs. There was then a lull of some two hours, after whiwhich continued until daylight, when he finally withdrew . This attafeature, and is estimated to hav e been made by one or two platoons.dischargers were used, and the enemy attac ked from all directions.telephone lines in the area, bu t wireless comm unication was estabto the attack the enemy created a lot of noise, shouting and whistliCommentNote th at a diversionary atta ck ma y be mad e at nighHe re the silent app roach w as sacrificed in the hope th at noise would^numbers and affect our morale.

41APPENDIX " E "


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Weapon

1 Flame throwerT yp e " 1 00 " . .Type " 93 "Type " 93 " (modified)2 Hand grenadeType " 91 " (1931)Type " 97 " (1937)T y p e " 9 9 A "3 Type " 99 " (1939)7-7mm(-30 i n )LM G .

or

Weight(Pounde)

. 68 (empty)32 (empty)J2 (empty)

Action

4-5 sees,delayfuze.Automatic

AutomaticManualManualM. L.Automatic

AutomaticSA/QFSA/QF

M. L.M. L.ManualQF

AutomaticAutomaticor singleshot.

Max.Range(Yards)

3030 30

3,800

3,0002,640

175-7704,587

5,4508,000(Appro*.]5503,280

600-4,1503,0757,675

12,000 ft.(vertical),5,450yards horizontal)

EffectiveRange(Yards)

1,500

220-1760328-1,640440-2,640

1,500

1,100400

1,5002,100

Rate ofFire(R. P. M.)

800(cyclic)550

450(cyolic)

10201020

15

16

10

10

450-480(cyclic)120(cyclic).

1-175110 ozs.21-36

20-58-89-4

10-25122

150

815

1,660

52

340

468

1,220

836

Type "96 " (1936) 6-5 mm( 256 i n )LM G .4 Type " 99 " 7 7 mm. rifle5 Meiji 38 (1905) 6- 5 mm. rifle(long)6. Type "8 9 " (1929) 50 mm.(1-96 ins) grenade discharger7 Typ e "9 2 " (1932) 7-7 mm.MMG8 Typ e "97 " (1937) 20 mm.(-78 in) A. Tk. rifle9 Type" 94 " (1934) 37 mm. (1-45ins.) A. Tk. gun .

10 Type " 1 " (1941) 47 mm. (1-85ins.) A. Tk. gun .11 Type " 99 " 81 mm. (3*18 ins.)mortar . . . .12 Type "94 " (1934) 90 mm.(3-54 ins.) mortar13 Typ e "9 2 " 70 mm. (2-75ins.)battalion gun14 Meiji 41 (1908) 75 mm. (2-95ins.) mountain regimental gun15 Type " 93 " (1933) 13 mm. (-51

inJtwinHMG16 Type " 98 " (1938) .20 mm. AA/A. Tk. gun .

A drawing showing the ranges and characteristic* of various

GIPDM1476 Anny26-8-4435,000.

Documents

Japanese in Battle