The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 9 | Number 3 | Article ID 5394 | May 01, 2020

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Japanese Religious Responses to COVID-19: A PreliminaryReport

Levi McLaughlin

Abstract: As the novel coronavirus sweptJapan, religious practitioners of all typesresponded. This article provides an overview ofearly-stage reactions by individuals andorganizations affiliated with Buddhism, Shinto,New Religions, and other religious traditions inJapan. It features interviews with Japaneseclergy and lay followers who contended withsocial distancing and more dire consequencesof COVID-19, and it contextualizes theirresponses within media coverage, sectariansources, and historical research. As ithighlights trends in religious reactions to thecoronavirus, such as a divide between policiesenacted by “new” and “traditional” groups, thearticle discusses reasons for contrastingresponses and points to dilemmas that will faceJapan’s religious organizations after thepandemic subsides.1

Keywords: COVID-19; coronavirus; religion;Japanese religion; online religion; ritual;disaster; Buddhism; Shinto; New Religions;Shugendō; Soka Gakkai; Happy Science

Listen to the podcast by the author here(https://share.transistor.fm/s/05dc7dbe) onJapan on the Record.

Reverend Koike Yōnin, assistant priest atthe Shingon sect temple Sumadera inKobe, describes the benefits of shakyō

(sutra transcription) at home in a dharmatalk broadcast through YouTube

(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCerl5qprPtAhh3S1lSb8IIg). Source: Mainichi Shinbun

27 April 2020(https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200427/dde/007/

040/037000c)

Introduction: Putting COVID-19 intoPerspective

Widespread concern about the devastatingeffects of a novel coronavirus epidemic inWuhan province began spreading along withthe disease beyond China’s borders in January2020. From February 4, 3,700 passengersaboard the cruise ship Diamond Princess werequarantined in Yokohama harbor. Thirteenpassengers died, and 712 were confirmed inJapan as infected with the disease, which the

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World Health Organization (WHO) namedCOVID-19 on February 11.2 The Japanesegovernment enacted basic policies on February25 to forestall infection, which included callsfor residents to exercise “self-restraint”(jishuku). Schools across Japan were requestedto close from March 2, and many businessesshortened their hours or shut their doors. OnMarch 7, the Japanese government temporarilyhalted visas for 2.7 million Chinese and 17,000South Koreans. On March 24, the InternationalOlympic Committee announced that the Tokyo2020 summer games would be delayed untilJuly 2021.3 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairsissued a Level 2 travel warning on March 25,advising against non-essential travel outsideJapan. Expanded emergency measures wereannounced on March 28, and passage to andfrom Japan all but completely halted. Theworkforce turned to the daunting task oftelecommuting, even though at-home high-speed internet access rates in Japan remainlow.4

COVID-19 rates continue to rise in lateApril

(https://toyokeizai.net/sp/visual/tko/covid19/en.html)

Overall, Japan lagged behind the global trend

to flatten the curve of a logarithmic rise ininfection rates. In contrast to countries thatenforced strict quarantine measures, and insome cases threatened transgressors with legalpenalties, the Japanese government only issuedrecommendations. While many residentsundertook self-restraint and worked remotely, asignificant percentage of businesses remainedopen, commuters continued to crowd ontotrains, and school closings were uneven.5 OnApril 7, 2020, Prime Minister Abe Shinzōdeclared a state of emergency for seven ofJapan’s most populated prefectures. On April16, the emergency order was expanded to thewhole country in response to an alarming risein COVID-19 patients who were straininghospital capacity, a measure taken more than amonth after many other nations. At the end ofApril, testing indicated that Japanese casenumbers crested to 13,000 and were still rising(albeit at a reduced rate), and close to 400people had died of the disease. Concernsurrounds the fact that only a small percentageof the Japanese population was screened andthat recorded infection rates depended onwhether or not testing facilities were open.6

In mid-April, I began reaching out to religiouspractitioners in Japan via email, Facebook,Line, and other virtual means. I wanted toknow how they were dealing with the onset ofCOVID-19 in Japan; how adjusting to the callfor self-restraint affected believers’ activitiesand institutional policies; what kinds of ritualresponses individuals and institutions weredevising; how religious professionals handledmemorials, funerals, and other services forsocially distanced parishioners; and how clergycoped with a sudden loss of income as in-person services were canceled. One of the firstto respond was Reverend Asahikawa, a femalepriest at a Shingon temple in a community inWakayama prefecture, an hour from Osaka bytra in and a shor t d i s tance f rom herdenomination’s headquarters on Mount Kōya.7

She began her thoughtful and wide-rangingresponse by contextualizing the pandemic

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within living Japanese memory of othercalamities:

Right now, most Japanese are carrying onwith their activities even though they areafraid. We look for something that signifiesthat we can overcome the limits of afrightening situation, don’t we? We canfind portents in catch phrases manycitizens take up, sayings that emergenaturally in the situation. During the GreatEast Japan Earthquake disasters, thephrase was “bonds” (kizuna). Before,during the Second World War, it was “thiscannot be helped” (shikata ga nai). You areprobably going to think this is a verynegative way of expressing things, but theJapanese people believe in a theory ofdestiny (unmeiron). Even if they don’t usethe word “destiny” openly, they are part ofa culture of accepting everything thathappens to them. This manifests in thewords they use.

A traditional saying that provides manywith consolation now is:

Nodomoto to sugireba

Atsusa mo samusa mo higan made

Fukusuibon ni kaerazu

Literally “once the [drink] has passed thethroat, [memory of] its heat or cold will notreturn to the vessel until [one attains]enlightenment,” Asahikawa invoked akotowaza, a Japanese aphorism. It resonates toa certain extent with the English proverb “onceon shore we pray no more, danger past andGod forgotten,” with the notable difference thatthe Japanese expression offers promise thatunderstanding of pain and its origins will comewith awakening.8 Ultimately, what’s done is

done. We seek delivery from suffering in themoment, but once suffering is past we do notlinger on it. This expression is apt, Asahikawastressed. It is a form of taking responsibility, anindirect way people in Japan are employing toexhort one another to overcome the impulse forrecrimination in the heat of the moment. “It isimperative to see this as wisdom (prajñā) borneof a long history of quarantining and avoidingostracism in village society (murahachibu),”she explained.9 Dwelling on stress fosters socialdiscord. The pandemic requires some painfulswallowing of emotions, but this is pain to beput aside.

Pain is put aside, but religions are repositoriesof memory. Their activists retain experiencesand layer them atop one another to build afoundation for informed responses to calamity.Asahikawa’s wisdom was echoed in themessages I received from other clergy and fromlay followers. My respondents hailed fromBuddhist and Shinto organizations, NewReligions, and other groups that intersect withreligion in some fashion. All of them reprisedJapanese religion’s long history of combiningritual with pragmatic social engagement in theface of disasters of all kinds. They expressedhope, at times in prophetic terms, thatpersevering through COVID-19 would lead intoa brighter future. At the same time, they maderealistic assessments about how the pandemicwill exacerbate difficulties that afflict theirgroups, and Japan as a whole.

The Pandemic Exposes the “NewReligions” Stigma

Trends in Japanese religious reactions to thecoronavirus were apparent months before Abedeclared a nationwide state of emergency.There was a notable divide in operationalshutdown measures taken by groups that bearthe label “New Religion”—that is, groups

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founded in the last two centuries that areinstitutionally and categorically distinct fromolder sects—and organizations that enjoy the“traditional” designation, such as Buddhistdenominations and Shinto shrines. NewReligions mostly suspended in-person contactin mid-February while traditional groupscurtailed operations later and less completely.There was also an urban and rural divide.“Until March 16, there was a sense of danger,but we could travel freely and attend talks andthe like,” reported Reverend Asahikawa. “FromMarch 19, everything changed when Osaka andKobe enacted calls to self-restrain movement.We were to maintain two meters betweenpeople and limit gatherings to no more thanfive.” As late as April 22, Reverend Masaki, aJōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land) priest at atemple in rural Hyōgo prefecture, reported onlyminor shifts. “Ours is a farming village. Wedon’t have epidemic patients here like they doin cities, so I’m making my regular rounds.However, we have decided to delay ourtemple’s usual rites and ceremonies. There hasbeen only one funeral, and we were forced tolimit attendance to close relatives because ofcorona. We’re under emergency orders, so thiscan’t be helped (shikata nai).”

Journalists picked up on the fact that NewReligions were among the first Japaneseorganizations to shutter their offices andstrictly require that their participantscommunicate remotely. “On Sunday, February16, most districts held their monthly studymeeting (zadankai),” reported Mr. Andō, aTokyo-area member of the Nichiren Buddhism-based lay association Soka Gakkai. “Then onthe next day, late in the evening, we receivedan email just as we held our district planningmeeting. From February 18 until mid-March,we were to persevere in a new direction bycompletely canceling all activities—holding bigand small meetings, carrying out home visits,operating Culture Centers.” Tabloid reports

indicated that Soka Gakkai closed its generalheadquarters in Tokyo at Shinanomachi onFebruary 17.10 Articles in the religion’s dailynewspaper Seikyō shinbun announced that allShinanomachi facilities would shut fromFebruary 22. By March 20, Soka Gakkaiannounced a nationwide shutdown to April 19,and on April 28 the Gakkai administrationextended full-scale shutdown until May 31.11

“We are practicing self-restraint (jishuku).We’re learning [about the teachings] bywatching video-on-demand as a family. Someare studying doctrine by reading the Seikyōshinbun. Communication between members isonly via telephone and messaging. I’ve decidedto set 10 a.m. to noon every day as my time tochant daimoku [the title of the Lotus Sūtra].” Iwas informed of this by Mrs. Shibata, a long-term Gakkai friend. Her response typified anew normal that set in early for houseboundadherents.

Streets around Soka Gakkai’s Hall of theGreat Vow of Kōsen Rufu remain empty

after it closes its headquarters inShinanomachi, Tokyo. Photo: Ogawa

Kandai (https://president.jp/articles/-/34141)

Fears of coronavirus outbreak triggered presetJapanese biases. Rather than simply delivering

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news on how New Religions were closing theirheadquarters, media investigations in factactivated their shutdown. Soka Gakkaimembers confirmed to me that their religion’sadministrators were concerned about media-driven effects should COVID-19 infection belinked to their group. “I heard from anadministrator at the headquarters thatnumerous outlets were inquiring at SokaGakkai in regard to the religious group inSouth Korea that became a cluster,” wrote Mr.Nishino from Chiba prefecture. On February18, it was confirmed that a 61-year-oldparishioner of Shincheonji Church of Jesus inDaegu, one of the first Korean carriers, hadtransmi t ted the d i sease among hercongregation. By early March, more than 60%of thousands of confirmed Korean coronaviruscases were traced to the church. On March 2,the 89-year-old charismatic church founder LeeMan-hee bowed on his knees in apology at apress conference. The mayor of Seoul launcheda lawsuit on that day against Lee and elevenother church leaders, accusing them ofhomicide and injury through violating Korea’sInfectious Disease and Control Act. There werenationwide calls to dismantle the church afterit was revealed that Lee and others churchmembers initially refused to be tested. Policeraided the Shincheonji Church, acting onsuspicions that it was falsifying informationabout government-mandated testing of itscongregants. Subsequent investigationrevealed that there were no significantdifferences between infection statisticsgathered by the church and the Koreangovernment, and the church remainedoperational in late April.12

Shincheonji leader Lee Man-hin bows inapology at a press conference in Seoul, 2

March 2020(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/03/119_285434.html?fbclid=IwAR13ojYn5MSp

70Z-F5e0czD7-ve0H8-TgmTFXB0GzCS8T-Zlsm5_2TO_Iy0).

In their conversations with me, membersexpressed sensitivity to the negativerepercussions they, their fellow adherents, andtheir group as a whole would face should acoronavirus outbreak be linked to a Gakkaigathering. Soka Gakkai, like all large NewReligions, is a veteran survivor of moral panic.Ever since “religion” was imported fromEnglish into Japanese in the mid-nineteenthcentury, groups dubbed “false sects” (jashū),“newly-arisen” or “upstart religions” (shinkōshūkyō), or “cults” (karuto), have served asfunctional opposites for those keen ondeclaring religious orthodoxies.13 “New” and“traditional” are arbitrated by politicallymotivated classification schemes that cleaveboundaries between “real” and “false,” or“good” and “bad.” Groups that violateconvention through aggressive proselytizing,attracting socially marginalized converts,seeking influence in electoral politics, and byotherwise not lining up with the status quo areregarded routinely as “false” and “bad”examples against which to determine “real”and “good” religion.14 Debate persists in

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religious studies about whether or not “NewReligions” is a viable analytical category, giventhat dist inct ions between “new” and“traditional” practices tend to fall apart underscrutiny.15 The stigma that accompaniesCOVID-19 reinforces the fact that, scholarlyconcerns notwithstanding, the new / traditionalreligions divide has real-world consequences.What happened to the Shinjeonchi Churchremoved all doubt about what was at stake, butNew Religions in Japan most likely did not needthe reminder. Between mid-February and earlyMarch, numerous groups that bear the label“New Religion,” including Risshō Kōseikai,Shinnyo-en, Seichō no Ie, and Sekai Kyūseikyō,like Soka Gakkai, were some of the firstJapanese organizations of any sort to closetheir headquarters and cancel in-person events.

Reprising Ritual Responses through NewMedia

Of all of Japan’s New Religions, Kōfuku noKagaku, known in English as Happy Science,probably gained the most attention for itsCOVID-19 response. Indeed, thanks tocoverage in the New York Times, HappyScience almost certainly represents theJapanese religious response to the pandemicfor readers outside Japan. A 16 April 2020Times article titled “Inside the Fringe JapaneseReligion that Claims It Can Cure COVID-19”mobilized two click-bait tropes: “nefariouscults” and “those quirky Japanese.”16 By leaningheavily on eyebrow-raising details, the articlegestured toward prurient fears of an exotic“cult” and reprised the tried-and-true cliché ofJapan as wacky Other—a perennial, andessentially racist, media standard thatencourages readers to assure themselves oftheir comparative normalcy.17 To be fair “nuttycult” and “nutty Japan” clichés fit HappyScience like a glove. For a fee, the religionoffers “spiritual vaccines” to fight COVID-19,made available by its spiritual leader Ōkawa

Ryūhō.18 This service caught the attention ofthe Times writer when sash-wearing HappyScience adherents began handing outbrochures in the streets of virus-strickenManhattan. In thousands of books that bearOkawa’s authorship, through extravagant useof big budget animated films and other media,and via outreach by missionizing believers, thereligion publicizes reigen, or “spirit words,”which Ōkawa channels from aliens and thespirit world. These are messages fromprotector deities that hover above famousfigures, living and dead, such as Donald Trump,Xi Jinping, and John Lennon. Relying on hisauthority as a reborn Buddha and themanifestation of a creator divinity called ElCantare, along with other beings, Ōkawahighlighted messages he received aboutcoronavirus as an existential threat to Japan.19

Happy Science caught media attention fordefiantly gathering large numbers of membersjust as other New Religions closed down;Ōkawa addressed approximately 1300 followersand guests in Kagawa prefecture on February22 and 1200 in Miyagi prefecture on March 14.In his speeches and in the rel igion’spublications, the spiritual leader advancedHappy Science’s rightwing Japanese politicalagenda as it advertised his signature ritualpractice as the most effective means ofeliminating the disease.20 “This infection ismade in China,” Ōkawa announced. “To combata godless communist dictatorship that isspreading sorcery across the world to oppresshuman rights and exert its hegemony, I amthinking of a divine protection. Services at ourbranches and Viharas (shōja) focus primarily onwatching and listening to videos of dharmatalks and praying. We are not curtailing theseservices, but we are taking sufficientprecautions by using alcohol-based disinfectantand monitoring health conditions.”21

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Happy Science founder Ōkawa Ryūhōaddresses followers in Sendai on 14 March

2020(https://the-liberty.com/article.php?item_id=16

916).

There is no question that Happy Science is aspectacle. However, the Times report ignoredthe fact that, rather than setting itself apart asa “fringe religion” by promising delivery fromdisease via ritual, Happy Science in fact reliedon what are longstanding re l ig iousconventions, in Japan and elsewhere. Thoughthey elude lurid journalistic treatment, Japan’smainstays of temple Buddhism, shrine-basedShinto, the mountain asceticism traditionShugendō, and just about every other religiousexponent, new and old, carried out comparablerituals to combat the pandemic. Ritualprotection is, after all, religion’s job. From theearliest Japanese chronicles, the country’swritten record makes clear that illness was notdifferentiated categorically from othercalamities, such as political disarray, economicdistress, earthquakes, typhoons, tsunami,drought, or agricultural blight. All wereattributed to cosmic imbalances caused bypeople’s improper actions. Bad actions resultedin internal medical problems, small- and large-scale disasters in the human world, and cosmicupheaval. These linked phenomena could beput right through propitious actions along withrites and edification offered by a network ofgovernment-supported Buddhist temples calledkokubunji that were tasked with protecting the

land, and by ritual specialists who intercededwith the kami, deities understood to occupysacred sites across the land and throughout theheavens. Scholars in fact suggest that theimpetus for the kokubunji system was asmallpox (or similar) epidemic in the 730s thatkilled as much as one third of the population,including many powerful aristocrats.22 Today,reliance on biomedical expertise encouragespeople to categorize ritual responses to diseaseas lingering historical artifacts. Followingclassification systems that developed from thenineteenth century as people in Japanembraced the modern scientific episteme,rituals and teachings about the kami andbuddhas are sorted into legal entities that nowexist separately as either Shinto or Buddhist.But people in Japan today still live, at leastnominally, as parishioners of both. And eventhough most are liable to self-describe as non-religious, many will attend temples, shrines,and other sites to perform rituals at set pointsduring the year and at other times to satisfypersonal needs. The vast majority will rely ondata-driven scientific understandings of thecoronavirus epidemic to guide their actions andto seek treatment, but aid from the kami andbuddhas for deliverance from pestilence stillholds appeal.

This appeal is apparent in how mainstreammedia outlets held up examples of temple andshrine rituals as positive measures takenagainst coronavirus. Affirming a role it hasfulfilled since it was invested by governmentalauthority in the eighth century as the center ofthe kokubunji system, charged with alleviatingsuffering from calamities of all sorts, themassive Kegon sect temple Tōdaiji in Narabegan daily noon expiation rituals on April 1.23

On April 3, Sagawa Fumon, the temple’s bettō(chief administrator), sent out a message viathe Tōdaiji homepage calling on all Buddhisttemples, Shinto shrines, and Christianchurches, and for all lay people, to join inprayer at noon every day to memorialize thosewho have died of coronavirus and to usher

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Japan toward rapid delivery from the disease.In an April 24 tweet, the Tōdaiji priesthoodposted what became a widely forwardedphotograph of clergy from other majorBuddhist and Christian institutions lined up insolidarity before their temple.24

Tweet by Tōdaiji priest Morimoto Kōjōsending out a photo of Buddhist and

Catholic leaders united at the temple topray for a quick end to coronavirus and the

suffering it causes.(https://twitter.com/kojomrmt/status/12536861

00683452417)

Prior to this, the temple uploaded a broadcastof its expiation ritual before its famed GreatBuddha via Nikonikodōga, a popular Japanesevideo site akin to YouTube.25 Tweeting on April20, Tōdaiji priest Morimoto Kōjō sought toeliminate misunderstanding about whatviewers were seeing. This is not you looking in

on the Buddha, he asserted; this is the BuddhaVairocana looking out at you. “It is not as if youare looking at an image. We want you to feelthat the Great Buddha is looking out to protectyou all.”26 The celestial and primordial GreatSun Buddha gazes out, deftly employing theinternet to cast its benevolent and all-encompassing compassion over a beleagueredpopulace.

Worship inside Tōdaiji before the GreatBuddha is prohibited during the pandemic,

but it casts its protective gaze over all(https://twitter.com/kojomrmt/status/12522409

88057161728).

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Worshippers gather before the GreatBuddha at Tōdaiji on 31 March 2020.

(https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN4K5VF4N4FPOMB00Z.html)

Ritual expulsion of COVID-19 is widespreadacross Japan. On April 8, Shinto priests atMatatabisha, a branch shrine of the famedYasaka Shrine in Kyoto, performed a Giongoryōe, or “assembly at Gion for angry spirits,”specifically aimed at quelling malevolentpowers for the qu ick e l iminat ion o fcoronavirus. 2 7

Rites at the Shinto shrine Matatabisha inKyoto to quell COVID-19.

(https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/local/kansai/news/20200408-

OYO1T50009/?fbclid=IwAR2hsXeVYw9p6H2XdibsdgYfVJZUrw-

ZXLLFxpgPbgGsGaKynYD0HmbGjkA)

This ritual was, in a sense, business as usual forthe shrine.28 An annual spring festival at Gionbegan in the year 869. The Gion Festival is ahuge event that now attracts tens of thousandsof participants from all over the world. Worshipin the district, which comprised part of thecapital Heian-kyō (now Kyoto), still centers onreverence for “disease divinities” (ekijin),which are understood to cause pestilence,earthquakes, and other disasters. Thespectacular annual Gion festival—sadly, andperhaps ironically, canceled for 2020—beganas one of many rituals to quell powerfulpersonages that manifested as goryō, spirits ofdeceased members of the ruling class whoseanger at political events was credited as thecause of epidemic.

Shinto priests informed me that Jinja Honchō,the Association for Shinto Shrines thatoversees 80,000 ritual sites, has sent theirclergy newly-composed norito (prayers to thekami) that include wording aimed at riddingJapan of COVID-19. The priests have beenenjoined by their Association to perform theseprayers daily. Across Japan, Shinto shrines arehighlighting their historical contributions asproviders of solace and healing from epidemics.In western Tokyo, for example, Seta TamagawaShrine priest Takahashi Tomoaki has turnedpublic attention to the role his shrine hasplayed in invoking the power of Japan’s deitiesto counter epidemics. In a series of guest blogpos t s f o r a webs i t e tha t se rves h i sneighborhood, Takahashi guides readers on avirtual pilgrimage to Kasamori Inari Jinja, oneof several branch shrines that lie within theterritory consecrated for Seta Tamagawa;worship at the small outdoor facility does notrequire the presence of a priest, and socialdistancing residents can walk over there to

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pray.29

The modest shrine Kasamori Inari Jinja,disease protector in Futago Tamagawa,

western Tokyo.(https://futakoloco.com/14459/)

This branch shrine was founded in theTokugawa era (1603-1867), when it was sitednear the fifty-third station of the Tōkaidō, thehighway that ran from Edo (now Tokyo) to thehistoric capital Kyoto. Tradesmen, pilgrims,and other travelers would avail themselves ofthe worldly pleasures that awaited them at thestop, thus necessitating a specific deity for thetreatment of kasa, skin lesions resulting fromsyphilis. The shrine’s syphilis-relieving deityhas since been patronized during epidemics ofall sorts, and it now hosts an annual festivalevery April 15—sadly, like the Gion festival,canceled in 2020 thanks to understanding ofviral contagion.

Reverend Takahashi is an experienced disasterresponder. He oversees Seta Tamagawa inTokyo, but his birth family’s shrine is in aregion of coastal Iwate prefecture that wasdevastated by the 11 March 2011 tsunami.Takahashi’s family shrine and home housedhundreds of refugees for months after the

disaster, an experience that inspired him tofound dynamic reconstruction efforts, includingan NGO that combines reverence for the kamiof land and sea wi th expert i se f romparticipating scientists to encourage large-scale replacement of old growth forests in thedevastated region.30 For Takahashi, respondingto COVID-19 is contiguous with otherrevitalization efforts. The current crisis calls forpragmatic use of the most effective means togenerate care for people and tradition. Itdemands cutting-edge scientific research inconcert with cultivating public reverence forthe kami.

Ritual Crises, Online Adaptations, andTechnical Difficulties

Innovation in the face of emergency is nothingnew for Japanese religions. However, onlineaccess now allows practitioners unprecedentedchances to innovate across physical divides.Striking examples of this can be found inShugendō, a combinatory mountain asceticismtradition that maintains institutional bonds withShingon Buddhism and includes kami worship,challenging bodily austerities, secret teachingsand initiations, and other distinctive elementsfor worship at remote mountain sites. MajorShugendō affi l iate temples have beenresponding to the pandemic in ancient ways.For example, the Shingon temple Daigoji inKyoto on April 15 dedicated the centerpiece ofits three-week-long sakurae (cherry blossomassembly), a goma kuyō (fire pūjā) andperformance of kyōgen (comic ritual plays), toeliminating the disease.31 Another goma kuyōwas performed at noon daily at the Shugendō-affiliate temple Kinpusenji in Nara’s Yoshinodistrict to drive away the virus. On March 6,fifty shugenja (Shugendō renunciants) gatheredat a daikitōe, a “great prayer assembly,” agoma kuyō put on jointly by Kinpusenji and thetemple Ōminesanji. This was the first ritualcollaboration between these sites since they

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were separated in the Meiji era (1868-1912).32

The event was broadcast over social media andreceived hundreds of supportive messages.33

Shugendō ascetics gather on 6 March 2020at the daikitōe (great prayer assembly) atthe temple Kinpusenji to ritually expunge

COVID-19.(https://this.kiji.is/608594319445574753)

Shugendō followers who have been goingonline are confronting a particular COVID-19challenge: how can a pilgrimage traditionpersist if practitioners must stay home? CalebCarter, Assistant Professor of JapaneseReligions at Kyushu University who is aShugendō expert, kindly shared a write-up ofhis engagement with a ritual led online in earlyApril by a pilgrimage leader:

The service was organized by a Shugendōpriest (ordained through the Yoshinolineage) who leads a confraternity (kō) heestablished some years ago. He’s verycharismatic and personable. He and mostof the members are based in the Tokyoarea. Their main activity is to meetmonthly in the city and play the horagai(conch shell trumpet) together in aritual/prayer/training atmosphere. They

also regularly go to mountains together ontrips he organizes and charges a fee for,where they circuit the temples andshrines, pray to the deities, and play thehoragai. He communicates with the groupthrough a Facebook group he set up(about 100 members). Under the currentcircumstances, he decided to begin 90-minute services over Zoom with membersin their homes. There were eight of us,including him and me. In front of an altarof Tibetan thangka (paintings of sacredimages) and other Buddhist objects in hisfriend’s home, he led prayers to end thevirus, chanted the Heart Sutra, performedmudra (esoteric hand gestures), chanted anumber of mantra devoted to variousShugendō and Buddhist divinities, andplayed the horagai. He then led us in somelight self-massage techniques and anIndian-based chakra dhyāna (meditationfocused on the seven chakras). We finishedwith responses from each member.Despite a few technical hiccups, I thoughtit went smoothly and successfully.Everyone’s reactions were very positive. Ithink it was effective in bringing the grouptogether for a sense of community, sharinghow everyone is coping and advice on howto stay well, mentally and physically. Heplans to continue with these services,twice a month. I think he also hopesattendance will pick up over time.

The service Carter described is in keeping withrituals individuals across Japan took uponthemselves to move online. It is primarily local-level activists that employed online means ofseeing to their parishioners. Sect headquarters,by contrast, focused on measures their priestsshould follow for in-person services. In someinstances, sect guidelines lay out starkreminders of how important it is to curtailactivities to halt the pandemic. The Sōtō ZenHeadquarters page, for example, reported on

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coronavirus contagions traced to their events.In mid-March, four COVID-19 cases wereconfirmed among twenty-one attendees at aSōtō Zen wake (tsūya) and funeral ceremoniesi n M a t s u y a m a , E h i m e p r e f e c t u r e .Investigations revealed that at least oneinfected person visiting from Tochigi prefecturecame into close contact with other attendees.Sōtō Zen also uploaded a highly detailedflowchart with four scenarios for priests tofollow in cases of funerals for COVID-19 deathsand other circumstances.34 It warned that thevirus could spread beyond Matsuyamathroughout Japan, just as it was spreadingacross Spain and other countries. The sectissued a directive calling for funerals to bedelayed, if possible, and prohibited gatheringsof more than three people at cremations and itsother services until the end of Japan’s state ofemergency. It is worth remarking that the Zenmessage, unlike communications from NewReligions practitioners, did not dwell onconcern about what would befall theirorganization should it be linked to contagion.

The Tendai sect announced that its headtemple Enryakuji and all of its facilities wouldremain closed from April 15 until May 31, andit provided a long list of canceled events thatran well into the summer.35 On April 17, JōdoShinshū’s Ōtani sect headquarters at thetemple Higashihonganji in Kyoto uploaded aneight-point checklist for in-person ritualp r o t o c o l s .(http://www.higashihonganji.or.jp/news/info/35854/)This included applying sanitizer, requiringthat priests and parishioners wear masks, andreducing risk by avoiding the “three closes”:enclosed spaces with poor ventilation, closephysical proximity, and physical contact.Offering incense and other acts that requiretouching were to be curtailed. The Nichirensect headquarters issued more modestd i r e c t i v e s o n A p r i l 8 ,(https://temple.nichiren.or.jp/0041039-yodenji/event/p485/) urging its followers to stay in linewith government mandated self-restraint

measures and to otherwise seek to performduties as usual; the headquarters wouldannounce decisions on major events such asceremonies for the spring equinox and obon inthe summer one month in advance. A shortannouncement from February 26 by theAssociation of Shinto Shrines regardingcoronavirus remained at the top of theirhomepage news feed in late April. It assuredvisitors that its shrines had been advised tocarefully clean all of their facilities and carryout rituals using disinfectant while wearingmasks. (https://www.jinjahoncho.or.jp/3908) Inall cases, Japan’s sectarian headquarters arelimiting visitor access, and priests informed methat employees are carrying out much of theheadquarters’ business remotely via email andvideo meetings.

Even Buddhist and Shinto denominations thatoversee millions of parishioners lack thetechnological and human resources to provideonline services to their temples and shrines.They rely instead on local clergy to organizeinternet-based solutions. Examples ofgrassroots-level online outreach abound. TheFacebook-based “Online Rosary Linked SutraReading” (Onrain Juzu Tsunagi Dokkyō)connects the Gifu Prefecture-based JōdoShinshū priest Gotō Hiromi with worshippers,regardless of their sectarian affiliations. Hebegan the group after he was forced to cancelthis year’s higan (spring equinox) services andhome visits to his parishioners.36

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Reverend Gotō Hiromi broadcastsecumenical sutra recitations via Facebook.(https://www.facebook.com/readingsutras.onlin

e/)

Chūgai nippō, a venerable paper that coverstemple Buddhist and Shinto news, has turnedits attention to how religious professionalsacross Japan took up this challenge. On April24, the paper reported on the Pure Land(Jōdoshū) temple Kanchi’in in Tokyo, whosepriest Tsuchiya Shōdō has been broadcastingan online twenty-four-hour nenbutsu(invocation of the Buddha Amitābha) chantingservice for the last fifteen years. “The internetis absolutely our entryway,” Tsuchiya stated.“Meeting face to face is important, but now wecan’t meet, so we must go online.”37 A Chūgainippō report the previous day featured news ofthe Nichiren sect priest Kusumi Kenshō, whoseonline broadcast of higan services from histemple Myōhōji in Yokohama served as theexample for a Zoom tutorial run for fifteenpriests of different denominations.38

Other religions in Japan are also devisingonline solutions. In mid-March, the CatholicDiocese of Tokyo suspended in-personattendance and began livestreaming its Sundaymass, and the Catholic Tamatsukuri Church, acathedral in Osaka, limited its masses toYouTube from March 9. 3 9 In Kobe, theProtestant Nishinomiya Evangelical Churchbegan YouTubing its services from March 12,and the Tokyo-based United Church of Christ in

Japan set up a website in March called“Christ ian COVID-19” that providedinstructions for streaming services, prayerservices for the housebound, and where to sendmonetary donations.40 Tokyo Camii and TurkishCulture Center, a mosque and Muslime d u c a t i o n c e n t e r , m o v e d a l l o f i t scongregational prayers, classes, and Ramadane v e n t s i n t o Z o o m s e s s i o n s .(https://tokyocamii.org/notice/3233/) Thesynagogue Chabad Lubavich of Japan in Tokyoput out an online appeal for volunteers todeliver food to those in need during theC O V I D - 1 9 s h u t d o w n .(https://www.chabad.jp/templates/section_cdo/aid /4684844/ jewish /COVID-19 -Suppor t -Efforts.htm)

Moving examples of COVID-19’s harshconsequences and online solutions devised byclergy attracted attention from major Japanesemedia outlets. On April 14, the newspaperAsahi shinbun reported on a lonely service inlate March for a woman in her sixties who diedafter she contracted coronavirus whiletraveling overseas. Her cremation could onlybe attended by her son and two funeralcompany employees, and no funeral oratorywas performed. Even funerals for those whodied of causes other than coronavirus weremade wrenching by preventative measures; agesture as simple as passing a handkerchief toa weeping mourner sitting two meters awayhad to be curtailed. Across Japan, Buddhistpriests, the most familiar facilitators of deathrituals in Japan, did their best to overcomepainful divides created by anti-contaminationmeasures. Priests from fifteen templesaffiliated with eight different denominationswho performed services for a Nagoya funeralcompany called Shūraku, for example, providedvideo links to their sutra recitations for thebereaved via their smartphones.41

Priests who connected with me confirmed thatthey had embarked on a wide range of web-based outreach efforts. “I’m a stubborn and

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tenacious person,” asserted ReverendAsahikawa. “COVID-19 will not put a stop to myactivities. No matter what it takes, I musttransmit the teachings of the Buddha! I havebegun broadcasting my thoughts via YouTubebecause I can’t meet with people directly. Fromlast year, I started an internet radio broadcast,and I’ve been putting my efforts into that aswell.” Reverend Ōmori, a Jōdo Shinshū priestwho lives in Tokyo as a salaried employee whilehe still serves his family’s temple in ruralYamaguchi prefecture, discussed his onlineconnections with parishioners:

To get close with those who are sufferingbecause o f coronav i rus , we arebroadcasting sermons via YouTube andZoom. Even when I am not performingduties at my temple, I am able to streamservices from my home. All of this for nocharge, of course. In terms of my ownactivities, all of my lectures and sermonsbetween March and June are canceled.However, I have received many invitationsto write books, columns, and essays, andto stream dharma talks.

Up to now, there were many opportunitiesto meet directly with people to spread thedharma. Now, we are distanced as wecontinue with our mission—this is a bigdifference. We have not yet completelyadjusted to this style, and it still feelsinconvenient, but we’re figuring out howto reach out to those who are experiencingdukkha (suffering). The result is newchallenges.

Groups of every sort are relying on local-levelparticipants to stream regular activities. Mrs.Takeda, an enthusiastic participant in theethics training organization Rinri Kenkyūjo,reported to me that she is keeping her localmembers active by connecting with them daily

via Line. At 5:00 a.m. 364 days a year, RinriKenkyūjo members assemble at hundreds oflocations across Japan in “Good Morning EthicsAcademies” (ohayō rinrijuku), at which theyshare testimonials and recite writings of thegroup’s founder Maruyama Toshio (1892-1951)on filial piety, gratitude, reverence for Japanand the Emperor, and other values.42 In myethnographic engagements at Rinri Kenkyūjomeetings in Tokyo between 2018 and 2020, Iobserved that almost all regular Academyparticipants were women in their seventies andeighties. Mrs. Takeda, a gregarious person inher fifties, has been tasked by the group torecruit new members. She ensures that herhousebound charges overcome any technicaldifficulties by connecting to them every day at5:00 a.m. through a Line stream.

But not every group is able to connect virtually.When I asked my Soka Gakkai friends if theywere conducing zadankai or other meetingsonline, they laughed. “I feel that Soka Gakkai’sinternet skills are a bit behind,” chuckled Mr.Watanabe. “Think of it this way: there is anassistant regional headquarters leader near mewho to this day remains one of those whosteadfastly refuses to own a mobile phone.There are probably examples of districts whereyoung leaders with exemplary skills arerunning meetings online, but here we’rebasically encouraging one another other viatelephone and letters. We make contact todecide on a time to chant daimoku together.”Mr. Nishino, a Chapter (shibu) leader, confirmsthat communication is mostly limited to letters(by post or fax), phone messages, and calls. Hesupplements older communication methods byuploading short video encouragements(gekirei) to YouTube. “Encouragements” arestaple features of regular Gakkai meetings inwhich leaders urge their members towardsuccess by overcoming this-worldly troubles,frequently by quoting speeches and writings ofSoka Gakkai’s Honorary President IkedaDaisaku (1928- ). In a video dispatch on March9, Nishino read aloud from a recent Seikyō

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s h i n b u n a r t i c l e t h a t r e p r i n t e d a nencouragement Ikeda had delivered in 2003 ata satellite broadcast held during the SARSepidemic. “Hardship necessarily transformsinto treasure,” Ikeda declared. “For the public,for people, for society, fight through this!”

Harsh Financial Realities

A major motivator for religious professionals tomove their duties online is fear of losingincome. Clerics like Reverend Ōmori who relyon a salary can offer their Buddhist servicesfree of charge, but most full-time priests needdonations to support their families andmaintain their temples. Reverend Asahikawalaid out the economic realities she and otherpriests faced: “Buddhist practitioners live astemple priests (jūshoku) and as tonsuredmonast ics (sōryo ) . Pr iests are legalrepresentatives of religious juridical personswho manage temple operations and finances.Their activities gather earnings. Because ofCOVID-19, community-related activities, suchas funerals, sermons, and festivals, have beenreduced or canceled. Economic security thatdepends on voluntary donations, alms, andsupport payments for these services hassuffered a blow, and priests have no choice butto endure a loss of income.” Lost income doesnot mean lost commitment, the Reverendconfirmed. “We still lead the life of themonastic. Though we cannot expect to seeresults revealed before our eyes, we performdaily rites (gongyō), praying to protect thenation (chingo kokka) and for a bountifulharvest (gogoku hōjō).”

Japan’s religious juridical persons (shūkyōhōjin) are included among organizations thatmay apply for special financial assistanceincluded in a 108 trillion yen (US$997 billion)stimulus package negotiated by Japan’sgoverning coalition in early April.43 Part of thepackage provided aid to businesses thatsuffered losses occasioned by COVID-19. On

March 31, the Ministry of Health, Labour andWelfare laid out parameters on applications for“employment adjustment grants for businessesaffected by the COVID-19 pandemic” thatwould be covered; the measures received Dietapproval on April 7.44 These grants supportedbusinesses that were forced, either byvoluntarily complying with self-restraintguidelines or by government directive, to shutdown operations, and for those that suffereddrops in customers or orders during the periodof voluntary quarantine. The Diet bil lessentially enhanced measures already in placethat guaranteed salary payout by employers inthe event of voluntary business shutdown andclarified that the national emergency initiallydeclared on April 7 constituted a necessarycondition for businesses to receive specialgovernment aid. For a “special responseperiod” between 1 April and 30 June 2020, theamount the Ministry ordinarily supplied forbusiness relief increased for employee leaveallowance, up to 8,330 yen per employee perday.

Financial aid would certainly be welcomed byreligious professionals devastated by incomelost to coronavirus shutdown. However, whilelarge organizations with salaried employeesmay suit the relief grant parameters, it is lessclear how small-scale, family-based temples,shrines, churches, and other religiousinstitutions might fit the application.Additionally, religious groups applying forgovernment assistance will almost certainlyinvite public skepticism. Critics are liable topoint out that Japan’s 1947 Constitutionassures a division between religion andgovernment, and that government aid toreligions may violate constitutional intent.Criticism may also be inspired by the fact thatJapan’s 1951 Religious Juridical Persons Law,amended in 1996, ensures that “religiousactivities” are not taxed. This means that alarge proportion of religions’ income-generating undertakings are not subject totaxation, and that many religious activities

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elude state scrutiny. Religious juridical personsalso enjoy significant breaks on property taxes.Recent decades have seen a rise of publicdebate over the status of religions as kōekihōjin, or “public interest juridical persons,” alegal designation that requires that theyconduct activities intended for the public goodin exchange for tax relief.45 Critics accusereligions, particularly large ones, of beingelaborate tax evasion schemes. Religiousgroups have been forced to defend theiractivities as contributions to social welfareinitiatives and to Japan’s national wellbeing.They also point out that the vast majority ofreligious juridical persons are modest financialentities that rely on parishioner donations fortheir survival.46 In short, it should not besurprising if applications by religious groupsfor emergency governmental COVID-19financial assistance revive debates over the useof taxpayer money.

Conclusion: Pandemic Isolation andBeyond

For the clerics and lay practitioners profiledhere, the compound earthquake, tsunami, andnuclear meltdown disasters of March 11,2011—best known now as 3.11—loom large astheir most recent reference point for Japanesecalamity. When the earthquake struck that dayat 2:46 p.m., adherents immediately put asideregular activities to travel to northeast Japan.They waded into the wreckage to rescuesurvivors and pull out corpses. They put inthousands of man hours, brought thousands oftons of emergency supplies to help survivors,and gathered millions of yen in donations. Theyopened their temples, shrines, and otherfacilities as refugee centers, sometimes formonths at a time. Religions were frequently onthe scene before government agencies andNGOs arrived, and religion-affiliated activismcomprised a major percentage of the fundingand volunteer hours dedicated to the disasters’

aftermath. Long after the Japanese governmentdeclared recovery efforts a completed success,religious aid providers remain active in what isnow mostly designated a former disaster zone,caring for the bereaved and the dead. Theyperpetuate memory of the 3.11 disasters whilemost of the country leaves these calamities inthe past.47

COVID-19 raises difficult questions for religiousindividuals and groups on how best to mobilize,and if activists can turn to their 3.11experiences for cues on how to proceed. Howcan volunteers attend to those in need whenthey are supposed to remain quarantined? Howshould religions respond when the crisis is notin one afflicted zone but is everywhere peopleare to be found? How should religionscoordinate with a chaotic Japanese governmentresponse that has seen waffling at the nationallevel and inconsistent leadership by prefecturaland municipal politicians?

Religion in Japan, as it is elsewhere, tends to beintensely social. For the devout, life consists offrequent in-person meetings. In religiousgatherings of all types, believers depend oninspiration from one another. Their sense ofself relies on group activities, and the survivalof religious groups relies on solidarity theirparticipants cultivate through interpersonalbonds. Prolonged social distancing may exact atoll on Japan’s religions. It remains to be seenhow isolation will exacerbate differencesbetween internal constituencies and how it willaffect parishioners’ desire to return to regularparticipation.

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Members of the Rengekai (LotusAssociation), the monthly women’smeeting at the Jōdo Shinshū temple

Tenshinji in Chiba prefecture, practice theobon dance for the summer festival in

2015. Countless local-level gatherings likethis are on hold during the coronaviruscrisis. (http://tenshin.or.jp/archives/5996)

It is likely that, as the pandemic continues tounfold, Japanese religious reactions will mirrorthe variegated responses COVID-19 hastriggered worldwide. Coronavirus has seenindeterminate responses by the same activistswho bridged sectarian divides to create boldecumenical aid provisions after 3.11.Participants in the Interfaith ChaplaincyTraining Program, a dynamic initiative based atTohoku University in Sendai that grew out ofpost-3.11 religious aid to train clergy and laypractitioners as clinical caregivers, have beenurged to pray at 6:00 a.m. daily to memorializethose who have died of coronavirus and for thequick elimination of the disease; they areotherwise still working out how best tomobilize.48 Open questions remain about how,and if, chaplains who work in Japan’s hospitalsand other care facilities will be allowed to offertheir services. Timothy Benedict, an authorityon chaplaincy who is an Assistant Professor atKwansei Gakuin University, reported thatchaplains at a Christian hospital in Osaka havebasically stopped visiting new patients and can

only attend patients on wards i f theyspecifically request a visit. Visiting chaplainsmust wear protective gear, which has becomenotoriously difficult to acquire. Attendance atthe hospital’s chapel services is restricted, andthe hospital is asking overwhelmed staff towatch streamed services remotely. In otherwords, the COVID-19 crisis has called intoquestion whether and how clinical chaplaincycan secure its place in Japan during a medicalcrisis.

Nonetheless, religious aid workers willcontinue to operate on the front lines ofJapanese social welfare provision. The Buddhistpriests who connected with me detailed theirefforts. “We are gathering supplies fromvolunteers at the temple, from parishioners andtheir families, to help those who are afflicted bydifficulties that result from the call to self-restraint,” Reverend Ōmori told me. ReverendAsahikawa laid out comprehensive aid plansthat will address those who are suffering. Shelooked beyond the current crisis to plan howbest to help as Japan’s socioeconomictribulations deepen:

The virus will necessarily disappear. Allthings are in a state of continual change(shogyō mujō), so the virus will cease itsmovement. I’m thinking about what to doonce it’s gone.

In Japan, working from home is rare, andthere is a custom of needing to commuteto the office. Because of COVID-19, theoverall working from home percentageacross Japan has gone up 35%. If it ispossible to work from home and not travel,it’s possible for workplaces to shift frombeing concentrated in cities to residentialzones in local areas. Also, personal incomehas diminished since 1997. Particularly forthose under forty—they are making half ofwhat people over fifty make. And this yearhalf of women in Japan are over the age of

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fifty. To help women with a low income ofa lower age (because I’m a woman), I thinkI want to build a shared house.49

The city where I live in Wakayama is onehour by train to central Osaka. Houseshere were built about thirty-five to fortyyears ago without any concern foraccessible facilities for the disabled. Thenumber of elderly residents is going up.They are moving to care facilities andapartments, and the number of emptyhouses is increasing. I want to contributeto activity in the region by providinghousing and meals (I’m vegetarian, yousee) for women in my community.

We’ve been forced to remain home, butthis has given me time to plan.

Reverend Asahikawa provides an exemplarymodel of how Japan’s religious activists fusecommitment to enlightenment and well-informed assessments of this-worldlychallenges to devise meaningful contributions.COVID-19 is a daunting reality, but it is atemporary stage in a longer struggle withprofound difficulties. Buddhist sects likeReverend Asahikawa’s Shingon, like allJapanese religious institutions, face a grimfuture because of population decline andchanges in att i tudes among youngergenerations. Yet religious activists, clergy andlay alike, greet catastrophe with age-old ritualsas they initiate new means of meeting present-day needs. Their steady perseverance in theface of calamity deserves more attention than itreceives.

Russian-language summary of this article by Aliise Eishō Donnere, a scholar based in Sendai,Japan, is available. (https://youtu.be/rbkZrqCfMJE)

Levi McLaughlin is Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and ReligiousStudies at North Carolina State University. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton Universityafter previous study at the University of Tokyo, and he holds a B.A. and M.A. in East AsianStudies from the University of Toronto. Levi is co-author and co-editor of Kōmeitō: Politicsand Religion in Japan (IEAS Berkeley, 2014) and co-editor of the special issue “Salvage andSalvation: Religion and Disaster Relief in Asia” (Asian Ethnology, June 2016). He is author ofSoka Gakkai’s Human Revolution: The Rise of a Mimetic Nation in Modern Japan(https://www.amazon.com/Soka-Gakkais-Human-Revolution-Contemporary/dp/0824884280/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (University of Hawai`i Press, 2019).

Notes1 I am indebted to Micah Auerback, Erica Baffelli, Timothy Benedict, Caleb Carter, BryanLowe, Lauren Markley, Mark Rowe, Mark Selden, Shirahase Tatsuya, Jessica Starling,Takahashi Tomoaki, and Brian Victoria for their invaluable feedback. I am particularlygrateful to the clergy and lay practitioners who appear here under pseudonyms who so kindly

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offered insights that appear in this article.2 See the World Health Organization’s novel coronavirus updates here(https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019). Japan’s Ministry ofHealth, Labour and Welfare maintained a running update in English(https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/newpage_00032.html)on the government’santi-coronavirus measures, patient caseloads, and related data. The newspaper Asahi shinbunposted running updates(https://www.asahi.com/topics/word/%E3%82%B3%E3%83%AD%E3%83%8A%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A4%E3%83%AB%E3%82%B9.html?iref=com_rnavi_r1) on COVID-19 broken down byprefecture, The Japan Times updated a daily news roundup(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/liveblogs/news/coronavirus-outbreak-updates/)on coronavirus,as did the Kyodo News Service(https://www.47news.jp/national/new_type_pneumonia/4529976.html) and numerous otheroutlets. See also Toyo Keizai Online for statistical breakdowns of case numbers, testing rates,and other data. (https://toyokeizai.net/sp/visual/tko/covid19/en.html)3 The IOC announcement relieved pressure on the Abe administration and Tokyo GovernorKoike Yuriko, who had been criticized for delaying anti-COVID-19 measures in the hopes thatthe 2020 games would proceed. See Kingston, Jeff, “Abe Prioritized Olympics, SlowingJapan’s Pandemic Response.” (https://apjjf.org/2020/7/Kingston.html) Asia-Pacific Journal:Japan Focus Vol. 18 Issue 7 No. 5 (1 April 2020).4 Dilemmas Japan’s low-tech status poses for a quarantining population have attracted mediaattention (The Mainichi 26 April 2020(https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20200426/p2g/00m/0na/040000c)). One third of homes inJapan, and most offices, still have fax machines, and numerous homes lack late-modelcomputers that are linked to high-speed internet.5 See Kyodo News 6 April 2020(https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/04/95a68588ba74-many-schools-in-japan-reopen-after-monthlong-coronavirus-shutdown.html)); Reuters 8 April 2020(https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-japan/trains-full-on-first-day-of-japans-coronavirus-emergency-but-some-shops-shut-idUSL4N2BW123).6 The Japan Times 23 April 2020; The Asahi Shinbun 27 April 2020.7 Except in cases where they publish under their own names, or where they appear undertheir own names in published accounts, the clergy and lay activists featured in this articleappear under pseudonyms. I communicated with my interviewees in Japanese. Here, I providetranslated portions of their responses.8 Fukusuibon ni kaerazu functions independently as a rough equivalent of “there’s no usecrying over spilt milk.” Higan, “the other shore,” is a Japanese rendering of the Sanskritparyavasāna. It denotes persevering through karmic causality to awakening from conditionedexistence.9 In a Buddhist context, wisdom (Jp. chie, Skt. prajñā) is discriminating knowledge ofimpermanence and the causes of suffering, commonly understood as one of the requirementsfor attaining enlightenment. Murahachibu remains a common expression in Japan today usedto describe social rejection of community members. For studies of ostracism and itsnomenclatures in Japanese history, see Ehlers, Maren Annika, Give and Take: Poverty and theStatus Order in Early Modern Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018; Ooms,

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Herman, Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, Power, Law. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1996.10 President Online 4 April 2020 (https://president.jp/articles/-/34141).11 Seikyō shinbun 19 February, 20 March, 4 April, 28 April 2020.12 BBC News 2 March 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51701039); New YorkTimes 10 March 2020; The Korea Herald 17 March 2020(http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200317000667)13 For analysis of how “religion” was imported as Japan transformed into an imperial nation-state, see Isomae Jun’ichi, Kindai Nihon ni okeru shūkyō gensetsu to sono keifu: shūkyō,kokka, shintō. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004; Josephson, Jason Ānanda, The Invention ofReligion in Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012; Maxey, Trent Elliot, The“Greatest Problem”: Religion and State Formation in Meiji Japan. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 2014; Sawada, Janine Tasca, Practical Pursuits: Religion, Politics, andPersonal Cultivation in Nineteenth-Century Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press,2004.14 For discussion of how these categories have been applied to Soka Gakkai, and to NewReligions generally, see McLaughlin, Levi. Soka Gakkai’s Human Revolution: The Rise of aMimetic Nation in Modern Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2019. For analysesof how moral panic over New Religions has mobilized media, politics, and populism in modernand contemporary Japan, see Baffelli, Erica, “Contested Positioning: ‘New Religions’ andSecular Spheres.” Japan Review Vol. 30 (2017), 129-152; Dorman, Benjamin, Celebrity Gods:New Religions, Media, and Authority in Occupied Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai`iPress, 2012; Garon, Sheldon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1997; Klein, Axel, “Twice Bitten, Once Shy: ReligiousOrganizations and Politics after the Aum Attack.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39:1(2012), 77-98; McLaughlin, Levi, “Did Aum Change Everything? What Soka Gakkai Before,During, and After the Aum Shinrikyō Affair Tells Us about the Persistent ‘Otherness’ of NewReligions in Japan.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39:1 (2012), 51-75; Stalker, NancyKinue, Prophet Motive: Deguchi Onisaburō, Oomoto, and the Rise of New Religions inImperial Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2007; and Tsukada Hotaka, Shūkyō toseiji no tentetsuten: hoshu gōdō to seikyō itchi no shūkyō shakaigaku. Tokyo: Kadensha,2015. 15 For considerations of the “New Religions” genealogy in its Japanese and American contexts,see Thomas, Jolyon Baraka, Faking Liberties: Religious Freedom in American-Occupied Japan.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019. For examples of debates over how to apply the“New Religions” category, see Melton, J. Gordon, “Perspective: Toward a Definition of ‘NewReligion.’” Nova Religio Vol. 8, Issue 1 (2004), 73-87; Urban, Hugh. New Age, Neopagan, andNew Religious Movements: Alternative Spirituality in Contemporary America. Berkeley:University of California Press, 2015.16 New York Times 16 April 2020.17 See Wagenaar, Wester, “Wacky Japan: A New Face of Orientalism.” Asia in Focus No. 3(2016), 46-54. A Google search for “quirky Japan” or a similar term confirms the mediastereotype.18 Happy Science provided information on the service in English(https://info.happy-science.org/2020/1275/?fbclid=IwAR1d-p9hFzu2PzleDk3A5TlAHc89I3oWV

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SCiJqXDEdJeoS-Jv3fQIRFenEY). By 18 February 2020, the religion had already published abook in Japanese of mediated spirit messages regarding the disease titled “SpiritualInvestigations of the Novel Coronavirus Infection that Began in China”(https://www.irhpress.co.jp/products/detail.php?product_id=2320).19 For studies of Kōfuku no Kagaku (Happy Science) in Japan, see Astley, Trevor, “TheTransformation of a Recent Japanese New Religion: Ōkawa Ryūhō and Kōfuku no Kagaku.”Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 22:3-4 (1995), 343-380; Baffelli 2017; Tsukada, Hotaka,“Cultural Nationalism in Japanese Neo-New Religions: A Comparative Study of Mahikari andKōfuku no Kagaku.” Monumenta Nipponica Vol. 67 No. 1 (2012), 133-157; and Winter, Franz,“Kōfuku no Kagaku.” In Pokorny, Lukas and Franz Winter, eds., Handbook of East Asian NewReligious Movements. Leiden: Brill, 2018, 211-229. See also Japan Times 4 August 2009(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2009/08/04/issues/party-offers-a-third-way-happiness/#.XqmtthNKhQI).20 Tabloids reported on meetings the group held as Japan went into quarantine; examplesinclude the magazine Shūkan jitsuwa 20 March 2020(https://news.nifty.com/article/domestic/society/12151-602750/). Happy Science responded on7 April 2020 with a defamation lawsuit against the weekly Shūkan shinchō, demanding 22million yen (~US$200,000) in damages for an article the magazine published on 2 April 2020.(https://happy-science.jp/news/public/11465/11682/) 21 Shūkan jitsuwa 20 March 2020. Happy Science’s periodical The Liberty covered Ōkawa’s 14March 2020 address in Sendai (https://the-liberty.com/article.php?item_id=16916)at which heexpressed suspicion that the novel coronavirus had been developed in Wuhan laboratoriesand urged an investigation by the WHO.22 For links between epidemic and premodern Japanese epistemes, see Como, Michael,“Horses, Dragons, and Disease in Nara Japan.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 34/2(2007), 393-415; Farris, Wayne, Population, Disease, and Land in Early Japan. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1985; Rambelli, Fabio, “Gods, Dragons, Catfish, and Godzilla:Fragments for a History of Religious Views on Natural Disasters in Japan.” In Starrs, Roy, ed.When the Tsunami Came to Shore: Culture and Disaster in Japan. Leiden: Brill, 2014, 50-69;Wakabayashi, Haruko, “Disaster in the Making: Taira no Kiyomori’s Move of the Capital toFukuhara.” Monumenta Nipponica Vol. 70 No. 1 (2015), 1-38. For details on the kokubunjisystem and its founding as a means of combatting epidemics and accompanying calamities,see Yoshida Kazuhiko, “Kokubunji kokubun amadera no shisō.” In Suda Tsutomu and SatōMakoto, eds., Kokubunji no sōken. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kyōbunkan, 2011, 2-28.23 Mainichi shinbun 6 April 2020.24 A tweet by @kojomrmt on Twitter 24 April 2020(https://twitter.com/kojomrmt/status/1253893442809131009); NHK News Web 24 April 2020(https://www3.nhk.or.jp/kansai-news/20200424/2000028850.html).25 Asahi shinbun 18 April 2020.26 A tweet by (https://twitter.com/kojomrmt/status/1252240988057161728)@kojomrmt(https://twitter.com/kojomrmt) on Twitter 20 April 2020.(https://twitter.com/kojomrmt/status/1252240988057161728)27 Yomiuri shinbun 8 April 2020.(https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/local/kansai/news/20200408-OYO1T50009/?fbclid=IwAR2hsXeVYw9p6H2XdibsdgYfVJZUrw-ZXLLFxpgPbgGsGaKynYD0HmbGjkA)

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28 See McMullin, Neil, “On Placating the Gods and Pacifying the Populace: The Case of theGion ‘Goryō’ Cult.” History of Religions Vol. 27 No. 3 (1988), 270-293.29 See Takahashi’s blog posts for the Futago Tamagawa neighborhood site.(https://futakoloco.com/14459/)30 For information on Takahashi’s Sacred Forest Project (Chinju no Mori no Purojekuto), seehere (https://morinoproject.com/about). For discussions of ways the “sacred forest” ispromoted within contemporary Shinto, see Rots, Aike P., Shinto, Nature and Ideology inContemporary Japan: Making Sacred Forests. London: Bloomsbury, 2017.31 Mainichi shinbun 15 April 2020.32 Asahi shinbun 18 April 2020.33 Kyōdo News 6 March 2020.34 Detailed explanations of proper funeral procedures, flow charts for procedures in the eventof contagion, and histories of Sōtō Zen practices during disaster appear in documentsuploaded by the Sōtō sect’s Tokyo Yūdōkai(https://www.sotozen-net.or.jp/wp2/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200422guideline-1.pdf), orTokyo Bhavana Path Society(https://www.sotozen-net.or.jp/wp2/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200422flow.pdf).35 Enryakuji updates available here (https://www.hieizan.or.jp/news/covid19) and here(http://syukubo.jp/).36 Asahi shinbun 18 April 2020; Also see facebook posts.(https://www.facebook.com/readingsutras.online/?modal=admin_todo_tour)37 Chūgai nippō 24 April 2020.38 Chūgai nippō 23 April 2020.39 Kyodo News 16 March 2020; Yomiuri shinbun (Osaka edition) 13 April 2020.40 Yomiuri shinbun (Osaka edition) 13 April 2020; See updates from the United Church ofChrist in Japan (http://uccj.org/news/36449.html) and https://covid19jc.com/.41 Asahi shinbun 14 April 2020.42 Information on Rinri Kenkyūjō’s Good Morning Ethics Academies (Ohayō Rinri Juku) isavailable here (https://www.rinri-jpn.or.jp/katei/morning/).43 Agreement on the stimulus package was reached after a tense standoff within the nationalgoverning coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party and its junior partner Komeito, theparty founded by Soka Gakkai. Komeito’s success in forcing the LDP to adopt its payout policyaccompanied a drop in public approval of Prime Minister Abe’s handling of the coronaviruscrisis. See Kyodo News 18 April 2020.(https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/04/36b515737250-focus-coronavirus-putting-abes-teflon-image-to-the-test.html)44 Details on application procedures for entities suffering from income lost because of theCOVID-19 shutdown and the benefits available to each entity type were updated by theMinistry of Health, Labour and Welfare. See here.(https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/koyou/kyufukin/pageL07.html?fbclid=IwAR2QXNtwsdcsuE1zVHa89ggeB0cCLB5ul2mAuBu2jvnHURI586c9QXr7-h8)45 Discussion of suspicions raised by tabloid journalists and defense of religious practicespromoted by temple-based practitioners appears in Shūkan asahi 4 June 2010; Nelson, John,Experimental Buddhism: Innovation and Activism in Contemporary Japan. Honolulu:

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University of Hawai`i Press, 2013. 46 For discussions of the on-the-ground realities traditional practitioners face, includingfinancial and legal challenges, see Covell, Stephen G,. Japanese Temple Buddhism:Worldliness in a Religion of Renunciation. Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2005; Rowe,Mark M., Bonds of the Dead: Temples, Burial, and the Transformation of ContemporaryJapanese Buddhism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Starling, Jessica, Guardians of theBuddha’s Home: Domestic Religion in Contemporary Jōdo Shinshū. Honolulu: University ofHawai`i Press, 2019.47 For overviews of religious responses to 3.11, see Berman, Michael, “Religion OvercomingReligion: Suffering, Secularism, and the Training of Interfaith Chaplains in Japan.” AmericanEthnologist Vol. 34 No. 2 (2018), 228-240; McLaughlin, Levi, “Hard Lessons Learned:Tracking Changes in Media Presentations of Religion and Religious Aid Mobilization after the1995 and 2011 Disasters in Japan.” Asian Ethnology Vol. 75 No. 1 (2016), 105-137.48 Details on Interfaith Chaplaincy training at Tohoku University’s Department of PracticalReligious Studies are available here.(http://www2.sal.tohoku.ac.jp/p-religion/2017/cn8/pg27.html) See also Fujiyama Midori,Rinshō shūkyōshi. Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2020.49 For insight into the lives of women Buddhist priests in Japan, see Rowe, Mark, “ChartingKnown Territory: Female Buddhist Priests.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 44/1(2017), 75-101.