JCSP 38 PCEMI 38 Master of Defence ... - cfc.forces.gc.ca

CANADA AND SPACE DETERRENCE:

THE SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IMPACT

Major C.J. Marchetti

JCSP 38

Master of Defence Studies

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Minister of National Defence, 2014, 2015.

PCEMI 38

Maîtrise en études de la défense

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© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le

ministre de la Défense nationale, 2014, 2015.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 38 – PCEMI 38

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

CANADA AND SPACE DETERRENCE:

THE SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IMPACT

By Major C.J. Marchetti

“This paper was written by a student

attending the Canadian Forces College

in fulfilment of one of the requirements

of the Course of Studies. The paper is

a scholastic document, and thus

contains facts and opinions, which the

author alone considered appropriate

and correct for the subject. It does not

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opinion of any agency, including the

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Word Count: 22 374 Compte de mots : 22 374

ABSTRACT Space capabilities are pervasive and interwoven into the fabric of modern societies. They

facilitate the delivery of essential services, contribute to economy prosperity and have become an

essential element of the government’s activities to ensure national security and sovereignty. It is

critical to ensure access to the space systems that Canada depends on. The first line of defence is

space deterrence, in other words to deter potential hostile entities from interfering or damaging

our most vital space capabilities. Canada already has in place many of the key space deterrence

elements. This paper will explore space deterrence in the Canadian context, highlighting

Canadian contributions to Space Situational Awareness (SSA), a strategic area of national

interest led by National Defence in Canada. It concludes that continued involvement in SSA by

the Canadian Armed Forces will positively contribute to Canada's space deterrence posture, thus

allowing for continued access to critical space infrastructure.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ i

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. ii

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ iii

Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Governance .............................................................................................................................. 5

2. Space Deterrence ................................................................................................................... 11

3. Canada and the US ................................................................................................................ 22

4. Threats to Space Systems ...................................................................................................... 32

5. SSA ........................................................................................................................................ 53

6. SSA and the CAF .................................................................................................................. 60

7. How Can SSA Support Space Deterrence? ........................................................................... 64

8. Canada, Space Deterrence and SSA ...................................................................................... 65

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 72

Appendix 1 – List of Kinetic ASAT Tests.................................................................................... 75

Bibilography ................................................................................................................................. 76

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Growth in the On-orbit Population of RSOs by Category ............................................ 54

Figure 2. RSO Distribution ........................................................................................................... 55

Figure 3. US SSN Dedicated Sensors ........................................................................................... 56

Figure 4. Description of SSA Functional Capabilities.................................................................. 59

1

INTRODUCTION Since the launch of the first man-made satellite, Sputnik, by the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1957,

space capabilities have continuously been developed to support national interests. The United

Sates (US) and USSR embarked on a space race over half a century years ago, but they are no

longer the only ones exploiting space assets for a wide range of applications. Technology

advancements in materials development, propulsion, computer miniaturization, power generation

and instrument sensitivity have tremendously increased the capability of space-based platforms

and sensors. They have also allowed for a significant reduction in the cost of access to space.

The net result of such development in the space arena has been the significant increase in space

faring nations and the multiplication of countries possessing indigenous satellite systems.

The Cold War ended 25 years ago and since then, the international geopolitical landscape has

changed considerably. Americans still enjoy a significant space advantage over the rest of the

world with close to half of the active satellites currently in orbit owned by the US. Russia is the

next country with the most satellites in orbit, with over a fifth of what the Americans have. But

there are now tens of other players in space.1

Some are well known entities, others less so. It is

estimated that there are over 170 countries with interest in a variety of space systems and 11

national organizations which possess an indigenous launch capability.2

This state of affairs has

allowed a much wider proportion of the world population to gain access to space data and

1 As of January 2014, of the1167 total active satellites in orbit, there are 502 belonging to the US and 118

owned by the Russians, see Union of Concerned Scientists, ”USC Satellite Database,” last accessed 14 August 2014,

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-database.html. 2

William L. Shelton, testimony in House of Representatives, Hearing on National Defense Authorizations

Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed

Services, 113th

Congress First Session, 25 April 2013, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80769/html/CHRG-113hhrg80769.htm.

2

services. Space capabilities are now interwoven into the fabric of our modern society. They

provide weather information and forecasting, navigation, timing for bank transactions and

transportation tracking, communications services and imagery to facilitate land management to

name a few. Space products and services are far reaching. They can be found in commercial

applications supporting a wide-range of industries, they allow the government to provide key

services such as Search and Rescue (SAR), communications to remote settlements and increase

access to better medical services. The pervasiveness of space-based effects is such that modern

societies have grown accustomed to them and many do not even realize the extent of their day-

to-day dependence on space derived effects.

Space capabilities also grant a significant military advantage to those who have the means to

exploit them. The First Gulf War was a game changer in that it demonstrated the multiplier effect

space systems could bring to the battlefield. The US-led coalition military apparatus, already

conventionally superior, would totally dominate the battlefield in an incredibly short time. 3

It

quickly became clear that the exploitation of space-based systems integrated with army, air force

and navy powers provided a decisive advantage. Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR) assets could detect the location of enemy troops and equipment, as well as

terrain conditions; therefore providing a safe mean to collect information critical to the

commanders on the ground (as opposed to ISR done from air platforms, which could become

targets for enemy’s surface to air weapon systems). Voice and data exchanges between troops

went unhampered because of the availability of satellite communications over the theatre of

3 Department of Defense, Desert Storm “Hot Wash” 12-13 July 1991, last accessed 9 August 2014,

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document7.pdf.

3

operations. The adversary was not able to gain a military advantage without similar access to

space-based capabilities, and was quickly overwhelmed.

Since then, the power multiplier effect afforded by satellite systems has remained. Hence many

countries have developed various operational space capabilities. The space environment is now

congested, contested and competitive.4

It is congested due to an increasing number of objects in

space, contested because there are more and more actors wanting to ensure their access to the

space domain, and competitive because of the increasing role played by commercial entities in

the space area. Furthermore, the proliferation of actors in space has changed the geopolitical

landscape. Although the US remain the most powerful military space power in the world; there

are now several nations with capabilities that could potentially challenge this supremacy. The

American space advantage and their concurrent dependence on space systems expose a

vulnerability that could be exploited by hostile entities with the ability and intent to do so.

Satellites systems are technologically complex. They are designed to operate in the harsh

environment of space, but not to defend themselves against aggression. The hefty cost of

launching anything into space leads designers to build spacecraft to meet very narrow mission

requirements with the least amount of margin acceptable. Incorporating effective and usually

weighty defensive mechanisms on board would be cost prohibitive in most cases. Hence, modern

space systems remain vulnerable to attack, either from kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) systems or

less physically damaging methods such as jamming.

4 Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space

Strategy (Washington, DC: 2011), last updated 20 February 2014,

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_

Jan2011.pdf; United Nations General Assembly, Outer Space Increasingly ‘Congested, Contested and Competitive’,

sixty-eight General Assembly First Committee 17th

Meeting, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gadis3487.doc.htm.

4

Accepting that modern societies are highly dependent on space systems to maintain their standard

of living and for national security despite those systems vulnerabilities, how to ensure that access

to space capabilities can be maintained? An effective space deterrence posture could play a vital

role. The US, with their overwhelming reliance on space-based capabilities have in recent years

increasingly highlighted the importance of space deterrence. Canada is also highly dependent on

space systems, both indigenous and allied. What does space deterrence mean in the Canadian

context? Why is it relevant?

In the last decades, the Government of Canada (GoC) and National Defence have invested in

various space capabilities in order to deliver the required space effects for Canadians and the

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Those include undertakings in satellite communications, space-

based ISR, SAR capabilities; and position, navigation and timing. Another significant space

strategic area has been involvement in Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In broad terms, SSA

refers to knowing what is happening in space. With space becoming increasingly congested,

contested and competitive, SSA has become a critical precaution that facilitates continued safe

operations in the space domain. Furthermore, the US has deemed SSA essential to successful

space deterrence.5

What does it mean for Canada? Could SSA play a role in Canadian space

deterrence? This is what this research paper will examine. It will show that continued

involvement in SSA by the CAF will positively contribute to Canada's space deterrence

posture.

To frame the discussion, several aspects will be explored. The first chapter will provide a space

governance overview considering both the international and domestic contexts. The second

5 House of Representatives, Hearing on National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and

Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, …

5

chapter will explore space deterrence and Chapter 3 will discuss the Canada-US relationship as it

applies to space, focusing on the defence front. Threats to space systems will be discussed in

Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, SSA will be defined in details followed by a description of the CAF

involvement with SSA providing a historic of previous investments and potential future activities

in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 will discuss how SSA can support space deterrence. Finally, Chapter 8

will present several arguments on why pursuing investments in SSA would positively contribute

to Canada's space deterrence posture.

1. GOVERNANCE

Before addressing space deterrence and SSA, it is useful to discuss the existing space governance.

Over fifty years ago, Russia launched Sputnik, the first man-made satellite, which was followed a

few months later by the American Explorer-1 spacecraft in 1958. Subsequently, Russians and

Americans would embark on a space race to the moon. The space rivalry extended to the military

realm. For example, both the US and the USSR had ASAT programs and tested their capabilities

early on. It soon became apparent that the damage caused by such weapon was significant and the

aftermath effects were indiscriminate of the country of origin. For example, in

1962 the US detonated a nuclear weapon in space disabling six US and foreign satellites6, while

experimental kinetic hit by direct ascent systems by both countries created large amount of

debris that could have impacted any satellite indiscriminately (see Appendix 1). It rapidly

became apparent that a mechanism needed to be established to restrain a potential conflict to the

surface of the Earth and to prevent the weaponization of space. Hence the Partial Test Ban

6 Phil Plait, “The 50

th Anniversary of Starfish Prime: The Nuke that Shook the World,” Discover Magazine

, 9 July 2012, last accessed 9 August 2014, http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/badastronomy/2012/07/09/the-50th-

anniversary-of-starfish-prime-the-nuke-that-shook-the-world/.

6

Treaty (initially signed by the US, USSR and United Kingdom(UK)), which would ban the

testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space or at sea, was established in 1963. 7

This agreement was followed by the more comprehensive Outer Space Treaty (OST), which

entered into force in 1967.8

To this day, this international framework continues to be relevant

and the OST remains the only treaty preventing the deployment of nuclear weapons and other

weapons of mass destruction in outer space. 9

Aside from the OST, there exists four other space-

related multilateral treaties related to the rescue and return of astronauts and spacecraft10

, the

international liability for space activities11

, spacecraft registration obligations12

, and the activities

on the moon and other celestial bodies13

. Together, they form the main body of international

space law.

Aside from international treaties, there has been a trend towards putting in place codes of

conducts and best practices agreements. The rationale being that those types of arrangements are

less restrictive on the participants while encouraging them to behave as responsible space actors.

7

United Nations General Assembly, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer

Space and under Water, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/Partial_Ban_Treaty.pdf. 8

United Nations General Assembly, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” in United Nations General

Assembly, Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New-York, 2002):3-7, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf. 9

Nayef R.F Al-Rhodam, Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and

Governance (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012): 78-79. 10

United Nations General Assembly, “The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and The Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,” in United Nations General Assembly, Treaties

and Principles on Outer Space (New-York, 2002):8-10, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf. 11

United Nations General Assembly, “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space

Objects,” in United Nations General Assembly, Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New-York, 2002):11-18,

last accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf 12

United Nations General Assembly, “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,” in United Nations General Assembly, Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New-York, 2002):19-22, last

accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf. 13

United Nations General Assembly, “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and

Other Celestial Bodies,” in United Nations General Assembly, Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New-York,

2002):23-30, last accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf.

7

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) do not focus on specific capabilities, but on the intent or

the perception of the intent when using those capabilities.14

Canada proposed a 3D model

(Declare what you will do, Do what you had declared, Demonstrate that you did what you

declared). In this sort of cooperative monitoring, “the onus is on compliance demonstration” and

it “could be less adversarial than challenge inspections or invitations to observers”.15

Under the

United Nation (UN) Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and Conference on

Disarmament (CD), various agreements have been suggested. Examples include the Code of

Conduct proposed through the European Union (EU). There is also the Prevention of the

Placement of Weapons in Outer Space draft treaty (PPWT) proposed and favoured by Russia and

China, but this is not seen as palatable by the US due to both its restrictive nature and the fact

that it does not prohibit tests that could generate debris.16

Furthermore, Canada, which has had a

long-standing policy against the weaponization of space, submitted a working paper to the CD

recommending three rules for a future legally binding agreement that would address security

concerns in outer space while preventing the placement of weapons of mass destruction.17

No

consensus on a new international space agreement has been reached yet, although discussions

continue.

14 Philip Baines, “The Potential for Outer Space CBMs,” In United Nations Institute for Disarmement

Research, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security - Conference Report 30-31 March 2006 (Vienna,

2006):16-17. 15 Philip Baines, “The Potential for Outer Space CBMs,”…, 16-17. 16

United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 12 March 2012, last accessed 1 June 2014,

http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/paros.pdf; Nancy Gallaguer, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”

Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (University of Maryland, 2010): 9, last accessed: 20

February 2014, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf. 17

United Nations Conference on Disarmament, “CD Working Paper: On the Merits of Certain Drafts

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space Security,” last accessed 20

February 2014, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/615/92/PDF/G0961592.pdf?OpenElement.

8

An area that has experienced better success is with respect to debris mitigation. As space data

and services become increasingly pervasive in everyone’s day-to-day live, national entities

realize that space as a global common needs to be protected. One way to protect the space

environment is through debris mitigation mechanisms. Space faring states have taken steps to

establish internationally acceptable best practices with respect to debris mitigation. The UN

COPUOS through the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination (IADC) committee has helped to

standardize best practices with the development of a set of guidelines established in 2007.

Examples of such rules include the deorbiting of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites within 25

years after launch and pushing Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) spacecraft into graveyard

orbits.18

The guidelines are voluntary and because the norms involve additional costs due to an

added set of requirements that needs to be met, compliance and national enforcement fluctuate.19

Another international agreement is the EU-led Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. This

document reinforces the elements of the OST and highlights the requirement to maintain the

peaceful use of space, minimize the generation of long-lasting debris, and the need to refrain

from damaging space assets unless it is for overbearing security reasons.20

Similarly to the IADC

18 A graveyard orbit is one that is used to remove GEO spacecraft at the end of their operational life from

the orbital position they hold. Left-over propellant within the spacecraft is used to push it to a higher altitude often

called a ‘supersynchronous’ orbit in order to avoid a potential collision with active satellites in GEO and allow for a

subsequent satellite to be launched into that position. There are acceptable guidelines provided by the IADC to

calculate the appropriate graveyard orbit (see United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Space

Debris Mitigation Guidelines. Last accessed 9 Aug 2014.

http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/Space%20Debris%20Mitigation%20Guidelines_COPUOS.pdf). 19

Nancy Gallaguer, “International Cooperation and Space Governance Strategy,” In Space Strategy in the

21st

Century: Theory and Policy, ed. by Eligar Sadeh (New-York: Routledge, 2013):56-57; Nancy Gallaguer,

“Space Governance and International Cooperation,”…, 5; 20

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Space Security Conference 2012 Report, 3, last

accessed 20 February 2014, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/space-security-2012-en-306.pdf.

9

guidelines, the language in the Code of Conduct is not specific as to how the norms proposed are

to be followed.21

Although there have been progress, more work is required in this area. It has been suggested that

instead of focusing on preventing negative effects, these agreements should focus on the positive

outcomes they could bring through CBMs, for example. By getting buy-in from the participants

on the positive results brought by signing an agreement such as better sharing of information,

and moving away from wording that could be seen as self-serving, better success could be

obtained. The more buy-in one could get, the more respective national security could be

improved and the more secure it would make the space environment. Even if there are an

increasing number of non-state actors in space, by having a significant amount of countries

signing an agreement, potential hostile groups could be deterred from acting due to the possible

repercussions. If the level of threats to space systems could be decreased, then improved global

security would ensue.22

The dual nature of space technologies, in that they can be used for both civilian and military

applications, brings many challenges to international collaboration. Space assets that bring great

civilian benefits such as for banking, safety of navigation, environment monitoring can also

serve defense and security applications. Hence who should be directing and overseeing space

governance? SSA and navigation and positioning systems have traditionally been led by the

military (i.e.: US Space Surveillance Network, Global Positioning System (GPS), and Russian

GLONASS). Satellite communications are largely led by commercial entities (i.e.: Telesat and

Intelsat) while weather and space exploration fall to government civilian agencies (i.e.: US

21 Nancy Gallaguer, “International Cooperation and Space Governance Strategy,”…, 57. 22

Nancy Gallaguer, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”...

10

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Natural Resource Canada and

EUMETSAT for weather, and US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),

Canadian Space Agency (CSA), and European Space Agency (ESA) for space exploration).

Coordination of the radio frequency spectrum is overseen by the UN International

Telecommunications Union (ITU).23

Current international agreements are not sufficient to

guarantee the security and sustainability of the space environment and there is no one

overarching international body responsible for space cooperation.24

The UN COPUOS mostly

handles space aspects related to the peaceful use of space in the civil realm while the CD is

favoured for military issues. It has been argued that a more holistic approach to addressing space

issues is required. An organization or board empowered with an internationally accepted

mandate and legal authority would present a better option to ensure the stability and security of

the space common.25

In 2012, the first meeting of the UN COPUOS Working Group on Long-

Term Sustainability of Space Activities and the UN Group of Governmental Experts on

transparency and CBMs in outer space activities were held, which are expected to advance the

dialogue.26

Despite space security concerns relevant to all space actors and the recognized need for more

regulations, a consensus on a more comprehensive treaty reflective of the current space

environment has not been reached yet. The OST remains valid, but it was created in the Cold

War era. With the proliferation of space actors in the last few years, several aspects of the OST

23 United Nations International Telecommunications Union, Constitution of the International

Telecommunications Union, last accessed 9 August 2014, http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-

s/oth/02/09/s02090000115201pdfe.pdf. 24


Governance, …, 100. 25 Nancy Gallaguer, “International Cooperation and Space Governance Strategy,”…, 69. 26

Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013, ed. by Cesar Jaramillo (Kitchener: Pandora Print Shop,

2013):21, last accessed 20 February 2014, http://swfound.org/media/121668/SSI_Full_Report_2013.pdf.

11

need to be refined and new ones addressed.27

With the main goal to keep space a sanctuary

available for everyone to use now and in the future, it is important that international discussions

preventing the weaponization of space continues. It is also essential that any conflict in space be

deterred to preserve the space common safety and sustainability. Continuing the dialogue on

relevant international governance framework can support a deterrence posture as will be

discussed below.

2. SPACE DETERRENCE

In recent years, there has been reference to the concept of space deterrence in US literature,

although there has not been much discussion on a Canadian space deterrence posture and why it

is important to have one.28

What is space deterrence? Why is it relevant to Canada and the CAF?

This chapter will strive to define space deterrence providing a Canadian context and concluding

with the assumption that Canada does hold a spaced deterrence position, albeit not one that has

been clearly articulated yet.

According to the Oxford dictionary, deterrence comes from the noun deterrent, which is defined

as a “thing that discourages or is intended to discourage someone from doing something”.

Another definition is: “Measures taken by a state or an alliance of states to prevent hostile action

by another state”.29

Encyclopedia America is even more specific and states that deterrence is a

military strategy under which one power uses the threat of reprisal effectively to preclude an

27 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Space Security Conference 2012 Report…, 2. 28

Discussion on space deterrence in RAND Corporation, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A

Preliminary Assessment, Project Air Force, 2010, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG916.pdf. 29

“Deterrence,” last accessed 30 Mar 14, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deterrence.

12

attack from an adversary power.30

For this paper, the US definition of deterrence will be used:

“The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought

about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”31

Ultimately, it is

understood that a state or group looking at attacking another will select the course of action that

is expected to best serve their interest and values.32

The deterrence concept is often referred to in the context of nuclear powers. It stems from the

Cold War era when both the US and USSR possessed nuclear weapons and could potentially use

them against each other, in other words the mutually assured destruction military strategy. The

premise of deterrence is founded on two key principles. The first is that the state has the

necessary capability to inflict significant damage if it is attacked; the second is related to the will

to act. During the Cold War, both nations had proven that they possessed nuclear weapons and

had the ability to deliver them into enemy territory. It was also understood that if a nuclear attack

was launched, the detection technology was such that the attack could be sensed in time for the

other to also release nuclear weapons. Escalation of hostilities would ensue where more nuclear

attacks would be made, in which case mutual destruction was almost guaranteed. As mentioned

above, the ability to retaliate is only one part of the equation for deterrence to be successful, the

other is related to the will to retaliate in case of an attack. During the Cold War, there was tacit

understanding that Washington and Moscow would strike back if one were to attack the other.

30

“deterrence." Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition,

Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2014, last accessed 30 Mar 2014,

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/159558/deterrence. 31

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, last

updated 15 June 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 32

James D. Rendleman, “Strategy for Space Assurance,” in Space Strategy in the 21st

Century: Theory and

Policy, ed. by Eligar Sadeh (New-York: Routledge, 2013), 85.

13

The means of deterrence were understood and the main objective was to prevent nuclear war;

hence, nuclear deterrence succeeded.33

Since then, the geopolitical situation has become more complex. There are now a growing

number of emerging military powers striving for greater recognition, as well as an increasing

amount of non-state actors posing asymmetric threats. Traditional deterrence thinking thus needs

to be expanded to include non-nuclear capabilities, such as in the air, cyber and space domains,

as well as softer responses such as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, denial of cooperation and

membership in international organizations, which can induce significant factors to consider in

hostile entities’ decision-making process.34

The next question is whether the nuclear deterrence analogy can be extended to space deterrence.

On the surface, it might appear so. Looking at the US and Soviet Union again, they both possess

a significant number of space assets.35

They have also demonstrated in the past a kinetic ASAT

capability, covering the first aspect of a deterrence strategy.36

Now, would any of them be

willing to use this capability against each other? This is a lot more questionable. A kinetic attack

on a satellite would create thousands of debris objects, which would then threaten other

spacecraft indiscriminately. With the current international dialogue on debris mitigation

involving both countries, it is doubtful that either would retaliate with a similar attack. One could

33 Adam Lowther, Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue regimes and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century

(New-York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 1-2, 4. 34

William A. Chambers, “Foreword,” in Adam Lowther, Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue regimes, and

Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New-York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), XII-XIII. 35

As of 2013, the US possess 107 active military satellites while Russia has 58, see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, ed. by James Hackett (London: Routledge, March 2013),

72, 226. 36

See Appendix 1 and Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,” Stimson

Centre, 30 January 2014, 1, last accessed 20 February 2014, http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/responding-to-chinas-

counter-space-capabilities/.

14

argue that both countries would shy away from launching the first ASAT weapon to begin with.

The nuclear deterrence model is therefore not directly applicable to space deterrence.

That being said, space deterrence has still been successful if one is to look at the same players.

Although it seemed early on that war in space was inescapable, it has not materialized yet. Both

countries also refrained from placing weapons in orbit abiding to the OST despite significant

political tensions. Through this fine balance, space warfare has been avoided and space

deterrence has succeeded despite a lack of will to attack, then and now. This state of affairs can

be explained by several factors. First, both Washington and Moscow’s leadership understand that

space warfare would cause the escalation of hostilities in other domains and that satellite

launchers (which they both have) can quickly be re-assigned to deliver offensive military

payloads. Finally, space systems are inherently vulnerable as will be discussed at Chapter 4. In

other words, catastrophic damage is easily inflicted hence the reserve of both countries in

inflicting it for fear of escalation.37

Ultimately, space warfare has not been seen as serving

neither country’s best interests up to now.

In the last four decades the US and Russia have developed tacit understanding of their respective

political stratagems and red lines with respect to nuclear weapons and space. Despite different

ideologies, they have been successful in achieving a balance that has sustained the availability

and security of the space environment.38

As America’s closest neighbour, this stability between

the two military powers has greatly benefited Canada.

37 Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,”…, 1. 38

Michael Krepon, “Waiting for Trouble,” Space News, 31 March 2014, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/40055waiting-for-trouble.

15

What if one was to look at an emerging space power such as China? The situation with China is

different on several fronts. First, despite its immense advancement in the economic and

technological realms in the last few years, China remains a developing nation. It has high

aspiration to become a great power, but it has not achieved this status yet. Second, there are no

history of negotiation and/or cooperation between Washington and Beijing in the space domain,

aside from the work through the UN CD. Civilian space cooperation has historically been easier,

as the world has seen with the Apollo-Soyuz docking during the Cold War and more recently

with the ISS. However in the case of China, the interrelations between their civilian and military

programs have created discomfort. Furthermore, NASA was banned from working with China as

a result of the Chinese 2007 ASAT test as it made the US doubt Beijing’s intent.39

The situation

is similar in the research and development realm. Even during the Cold War, US and Soviet

laboratory officials frequently interacted (albeit with many safeguards), which allowed a certain

level of cooperation despite heightened tensions. In the case of China, researchers’ exchanges

have been restricted especially since 1999 due to nuclear espionage concerns.40

There are no

established communications channels between the US and China with respect to space, which

has created many uncertainties as to Beijing’s intentions and therefore made more complex the

deterrence calculus.41

Space deterrence is further complicated by the fact that the range of space actors with potentially

hostile intent is no longer limited to national entities. Despite the fact that there are issues with

China’s position and lack of transparency, it remains a sovereign country which aspires to be a

39 Joshua Philipp, “US Alert to China Space Threat” Epoch Times, 7 February 2014, last accessed 5 June

2014, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/493785-us-alert-to-china-space-

threat/#?photo=2&_suid=139386667079003522081204420897. 40

Michael Krepon, “Waiting for Trouble,”… 41

Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,”…, 1.

16

greater world power. With advances made in smaller satellite development and the globalized

markets, it is now easier for non-state actors to access space technologies and/or the means to

interfere with friendly space capabilities. These organizations would most likely not have similar

ideology and an understanding of what far reaching impact their hostile actions could have. They

are also harder to track, reason with and dissuade, which further increases the space deterrence

challenge.42

It has also been argued that not all hostile non-state actors might be deterred due to

different ideologies and that they most often operate outside the law of conflict.43

That brings us to the next question: is the possession of a kinetic ASAT capability essential for

effective space deterrence? As was observed during the Cold War, one of the main reasons that

nuclear deterrence worked between the US and the Soviet Union was because they both had

developed and successfully tested the technology for the delivery of nuclear warheads. Without

this, the balance of power would have most likely rapidly shifted to the one country with this

capability. With space deterrence, the answer points to the opposite. It is not that the possession

of demonstrated ASAT interceptors and launch capability would not help deterrence, but that to

achieve space deterrence, this ASAT technology is not a mandatory requirement. Latent

technologies exist which could cause severe damage to space assets and infrastructure, such as

jammers, lasers and cyber infiltrations. Hence the development of kinetic ASAT systems might

not be the most effective way to achieve space deterrence.44

It could also be argued that the

42 Toffler Associates, Protecting our Space Capabilities: Securing the Future (Manchester, MA: 2008), 8,

last accessed 9 June 2014, http://www.toffler.com/assets/1/6/2008_-_Protecting_Our_Space_Capabilities_-

_Securing_the_Future_080723v2.pdf. 43 Adam Lowther, Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue regimes and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century

…, 4. 44 Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,” …; Michael Krepon, “Promoting

National and Economic Security Interests in Space,” in Department of Defense, Joint Hearing on the People’s

Republic of China’s Counterpace Program and the Implications for U.S. National , House Armed Services

17

development of such systems could encourage other actors to build similar programs in order to

protect their space systems, which could then escalate into an ASAT arms race. Other means to

strengthen space deterrence are proposed below.

The main goal of space deterrence is to send the right messages to persuade hostile entities that

damaging the space systems we depend on would not be in their best interest as it would result in

a response that would bring worse consequences then if other courses of actions would be

chosen.45

Ways to boost a space deterrence posture include developing capabilities to operate in

a degraded environment, for example when access to space data and services is limited,

intermittent or outright unavailable due to hostile interference. By developing corresponding

doctrine and testing these capabilities through various exercises, it would demonstrate resilience

from mal intent and reduce the attractiveness of attacking space systems by potential adversaries

as independence from those capabilities would have been proven.46

Aside from looking at non-space means to discourage foes from targeting space systems,

leveraging other assets would provide another solution. By cooperating with commercial and

civil entities on their respective space platforms, such as through arrangements (Memorandum of

Understanding (MOUs), Project Arrangements (PAs), etc.), service contracts (in the case of

commercial imagery or satellite communications for example) or putting hosted payload on

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 28 Jan l accessed 20 February 2014,

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20140128/101680/HHRG-113-AS29-Wstate-KreponM-20140128.pdf. 45


Century: Theory and

Policy…, 85; Susan Helms, “Schriever Wargame 2010: Thoughts on Deterrence in the Non-Kinetic Domain,” Air

Force Space Command High Frontier, vol. 7, 1 (November 2010), 13; RAND Corporation, Deterrence and First-

Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment …, 24. 46

C. Robert. Kehler, “Implementing the National Security Space Strategy,” Milsat Magazine, April 2012,

last accessed 20 February 2014, http://milsatmagazine.com/story.php?number=1514333390.

18

someone else’s platform, the space capacity is disaggregated 47

making it harder for hostile

actors to interfere.48

It also increases the political and escalatory risks as those systems are used

for many entities, hence deterring disruption.49

Another way to enhance space deterrence is to

increase international partnerships. This would reduce the allure of attacking a space system

(unless one was looking at negatively impacting all of the countries involved in that partnership),

by risking upsetting other partners and hence facing retaliation by multiple nations. For example,

Canada has bought into the US Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) constellation along with

Denmark, Luxemburg, the Netherland and New Zealand.50

Entering into a cooperative

agreement with a nation like China could also increase space deterrence. Both states would then

invest and benefit from the space capability and hence the risk would be reduced that either

would be willing to disrupt the capability.

Increasing disaggregation of space capabilities would also serve to increase resilience to attacks.

In other words, dispersing space capabilities across multiple platforms would increase the

robustness of the system. It would ensure that even if one spacecraft was rendered useless, the

space capability would remain through the other satellites. For example, a study highlighted that

for the US GPS constellation to significantly reduce its accuracy, over one third would have to

be non-functioning.51

Building smaller satellites that could be replaced quickly would also be

47 Space disaggregation can be defined as: “The dispersion of space-based missions, functions or sensors

across multiple systems spanning one or more orbital plane, platform, host or domain.” See Department of Defense,

Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architecture, Air Force Space Command White Paper (Washington, DC:

2013), last accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130821-034.pdf. 48 C. Robert. Kehler, “Implementing the National Security Space Strategy,”… 49 RAND Corporation, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment …, xi. 50

Joakim Kasper Oestergaard, “About the WGS Program,” Barr Group Aerospace, 27 June 2014, last

accessed 9 August 2014, http://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Defense/Wideband-Global-SATCOM.html. 51

Toffler Associates, Protecting our Space Capabilities: Securing the Future …, 10.

19

effective. Although each of these spacecraft would most likely have a restricted ability compared

to the full scale version, it could be replaced more quickly and prevent a total capability loss.

Space deterrence can also be greatly strengthened through diplomatic means. Nuclear deterrence

succeeded through bi-lateral treaties, but space deterrence is more complex. With so many space

capabilities intertwined in the fabric of modern societies, it would be near impossible to curtail

their use solely for the purpose of avoiding space warfare.52

However, there are still diplomatic

ways to improve the space deterrence posture with the development of rules of the road and

international acceptable behaviours. There exist codes of conduct for navies, armies and air

forces, hence similar agreements could be put in place to cover defence space activities.53

Another aspect to consider is that the key elements of a space deterrence position need to be

developed, credible and advertised before the start of hostilities if they have any chance of being

effective. Due to the high dependence on space assets, the main objective of space deterrence

should be to deter any hostile act, either kinetic or non-kinetic, on space systems of interest.54

Threatening to retaliate with an appropriate response could include using conventional means,

not necessarily with ASAT systems. The complexity of the space environment and the

proliferating number of space actors makes it increasingly important, although it also presents a

significant challenge as each adversary can see the geopolitical world through a different lens.

As Major-General Susan Helms, former US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Director of

Plans and Policy expressed in 2010: “Deterrence is not static; effective deterrence strategies will

morph under conditions of crisis, and the level of uncertainty about your adversary’s decision

52

Richard Garwin, “Taming Antisatellite and Space Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 May

2007, last accessed 5 June 2014, http://thebulletin.org/taming-antisatellite-and-space-weapons. 53 Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,” … 54

Susan Helms, “Schriever Wargame 2010: Thoughts on Deterrence in the Non-Kinetic Domain,”…, 12.

20

process must be actively tracked and accounted for, or else you risk serious miscalculation and

unexpected deterrence failure.”55

A combination of general red lines and more specific

statements would probably be most appropriate in considering space deterrence. For example, it

is understood that a kinetic ASAT weapon launched at another country’s space asset would be

considered an act of war, and would hence result in significant retaliation. For reversible threats,

there is no clear formula as to what reprisal would be imposed for malevolent disruptions.56

A

level of interference with Western space systems has been experienced and tolerated in past

operations.57

This is not to say that it should continue, but that it should help devise a more

explicit space deterrence posture.

Many of the elements supporting space deterrence mentioned above are already part of the

Canadian efforts. For instance, the CAF is involved in the Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR)

program exploring ways to operate in a GPS degraded environment hence demonstrating a level

of resilience to GPS jamming.58

In addition, Canada participates in a variety of space related

international MOUs and arrangements. Many of those are with the US hence increasing the

space deterrent factor. In other words, a potential hostile actor wanting to interfere with or

threatened Canada’s access to space would also have to take into account the American military

power in its attack cost-benefit calculus before taking action. Moreover, Canada has been

investing in small satellite technology development as well as participating in international

forums to study the military utility of smaller satellites that would be more cost effective and

55 Susan Helms, “Schriever Wargame 2010: Thoughts on Deterrence in the Non-Kinetic Domain,”…, 13. 56

For a discussion on redlines applicable to the space environment, see Matthew Kleiman, and Sonia

McNeil, “Red Lines in Outer Space,” The Space Review, 5 March 2012, last accessed 9 August 2014,

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2038/1. 57

Susan Helms, “Schriever Wargame 2010: Thoughts on Deterrence in the Non-Kinetic Domain,”…, 14. 58

See Chapter 4 for more details.

21

support the disaggregation of space capabilities, which would make them more resilient to space

attacks. Finally, Ottawa has been participating in UN-led international committees on space

security, supporting the efforts for enhancing space security and sustainability. Most notably

with the release of the Canadian working paper on the merits of transparency and CBMs at the

CD in 2009, Canada is recognized as a “serious player on space security”.59

In summary, despite

not being involved in a kinetic ASAT program, Canada has taken steps to establish a space

deterrence position. It could be argued that this situation is due to a favourable arrangement of

circumstances, with the main reason attributable to its small space program and hence extremely

high reliance on commercial and allied space systems. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the

foundation for space deterrence exists.

Although a Canadian space deterrence position has not been articulated yet, the CAF has started

to look at space deterrence. For example, the CAF has been participating in the US Air Force

Space Command-led Schriever Wargame series where the space deterrence concept is being

explored, the draft 2014 National Defence Space Policy makes mention of space deterrence and

Colonel André Dupuis, Acting Director General Space has also highlighted its importance in

2014.60

For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that because Canada already has in place

many elements of space deterrence (active participation in UN space related forums and in

international agreements, involvement in NAVWAR, CAF involvement in relevant exercises and

R&D space investment), Canada holds an informal space deterrence posture.

59 Michael Krepon, “Canada Reclaims its Space,” Arms Control Wonk, 14 May 2010, last accessed 20

February 2014, http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2729/canada-reclaims-its-space. 60

André Dupuis, personal conversation, 9 May 2014.

22

A critical aspect of space deterrence has not been discussed up to now: SSA. For any space

deterrence posture to be effective, it must be possible to identify the originator of a hostile act or

whether the interference is non-intentional. The ability to rightfully attribute an attack then

allows for the right response to be exercised. It was straightforward to do during the Cold War

with respect to nuclear weapons as the detection technology allowed the location of launches to

be identified and there were very few players. These days, with tens of space actors, the

proliferation of space technologies and a variety of ways to interfere with space systems, the

ability to timely and correctly identify the perpetrator is essential. This is where SSA becomes

critical, which will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. But first, the unique Canada-US

relationship in the space domain will be examined as this cooperation has significant

implications for Canada’s space deterrence posture.

3. CANADA AND THE US

When discussing space involvement by Canada and the CAF, and specifically the concept of

space deterrence, it is important to highlight Canada’s close relationship with the US as this has

been a key driver of its defence implication in space. This chapter will provide a brief history of

Canada-US space engagements and draw attention to ongoing mutual activities.

Canada was the third country to develop and launch61

a national satellite in space with Alouette

in 1962. Alouette was developed by a team under Dr. John H. Chapman at the Defence Research

Telecommunications Establishment in Ottawa, Ontario to study the ionosphere. This first

61 The US provided the launcher for Alouette.

23

spacecraft was followed by Alouette 2 in 1965 and ISIS in 1969.62

Canada’s close cooperation

with its Southern neighbour also extended to the space arena. Canadian defense experts worked

with their American counterparts on several space defence initiatives in areas such as active

missile defence and space control. It is only towards the end of the 1960’s that support for these

programs was halted. Subsequent defence efforts focused on the exploitation of space assets for

military purposes highly leveraging allied systems, mainly from the US. In addition, there were

many government sponsored studies on the upper atmosphere and launch systems, which

resulted in the development of the indigenous Black Brant rocket and the launch facility in

Churchill, MA.63

In 1963, a comprehensive space defence program was approved which

included research and development on techniques and technologies for anti-satellite systems with

a focus on co-orbital approaches. Despite the significant progresses made, this program would

die down a few years later with the change in Canadian political leadership and international

geopolitical situation.64

The nature of the space environment, in which there is no boundary and objects in orbit

continuously rotate around the Earth, rapidly emphasized the strategic advantage space assets

could have for national security. For example, optical sensors integrated on space platforms

could provide routine coverage of enemy territory or other areas of interest and communications

could be secured anywhere in the world through satellite communications. It was also understood

that a country that had the technology to put a satellite in space also had the capability to launch

62

David Emerson, Jacques Roy, Sandra Pupatello, and Jim Quick, Reaching Higher: Canada’s Interests

and Future in Space (Ottawa: Publishing and Depositary Services, 2012): 11, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://aerospacereview.ca/eic/site/060.nsf/vwapj/Space-e-online.pdf/$file/Space-e-online.pdf. 63

Andrew Godefroy, “The Intangible Defence: Canada’s Militarization and Weaponization of Space,” In The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, ed. by Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited,

2006): 328-329. 64

Andrew Godefroy, “The Intangible Defence: Canada’s Militarization and Weaponization of Space,” …,

336-337.

24

ballistic missiles from their homeland across extremely long distances. What this meant is that

the US and the USSR, who had proven their capability to launch satellites, could also now aim

ballistic missiles at each other. Those missiles could hold large payloads including nuclear

warheads. Considering the reach of Russian ballistic missiles and that their trajectory would have

them cross over Canadian territory to reach the US, it was natural that Canada would want to join

force with its closest ally. The North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) agreement was to

solidify the Canada-US relationship and highlight joint roles in the deterrence against Soviet

attacks. With the technology advances made on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the deterrence

element would soon thereafter include ballistic missile and space systems.65

In the early 1980s, the NORAD role was expanded to include the detection, monitoring and

tracking of space objects.66

At the same time, US President Ronald Reagan launched the Space

Defence Initiative (SDI). Although Canada declined to participate in this effort which was

perceived as involving the deployment of weapons in space (something that the Canadian

government was opposed to), it would nevertheless lead Canada to renew its space efforts.67

A

Senate Special Committee on National Defence recommended the establishment of a

comprehensive defence space program to protect national security, which would involve the

initial deployment of eight to 12 military spacecraft. The government did not approve the

recommendations and aimed at a much reduced commitment instead focused on the ground

segment. It would replace the aging Distant Early Warning (DEW) system supporting NORAD

65 Andrew Godefroy, “Is the Sky Falling? Canada’s Defence Space Programme at the Crossroads,”

Canadian Military Journal (Summer 2000): 52. 66 Andrew Godefroy, “The Intangible Defence: Canada’s Militarization and Weaponization of Space,”…,

339.

340.

67

Andrew Godefroy, “The Intangible Defence: Canada’s Militarization and Weaponization of Space,”…,

25

with a new set of radar stations, the North Warning System (NWS) in the late 1980s.68

The lack

of political support and understanding for space activities in support of national sovereignty led

the Americans to pursue space defence unilaterally as it became clear that Canada did not have

the will nor the capacity to address space policy issues. It would not be until 1987 that the new

defence white paper would recognize space as a strategic area of interest and that the first

National Defence Space policy would be released.69

The end of the Cold War tempered the proposed efforts, but the strategic importance of space for

national security remained, which was reinforced with the First Gulf War. During this conflict,

the multiplier effect of space systems was clearly demonstrated and Canada witnessed it

firsthand. The US-led coalition successfully employed space-based technologies such as satellite

imagery, surveillance and reconnaissance, weather, communications and the newly deployed

GPS constellation to rapidly bring the conflict to an end with minimal allied casualties.70

Canada

was unprepared to take advantage of space capabilities and instead relied almost entirely on

American space systems for communications, navigation and intelligence gathering.71

This war

experience would bring the realization that access to space technologies would be essential to

dominate in future conflicts. Furthermore, if Canada wanted to continue to participate and be in a

position to leverage US systems, a more extensive defence space policy was required as well as a

more comprehensive space program. These developments led to the 1992 National Defence

341.

68 Andrew Godefroy, “The Intangible Defence: Canada’s Militarization and Weaponization of Space,” …,


341-342; Department of National Defence, National Defence Space Policy (Ottawa: Canada Communications

Group, 1987). 70

Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC:

April 1992), last updated 20 February 2014,

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/404.pdf. 71

Andrew Godefroy, “The Intangible Defence: Canada’s Militarization and Weaponization of Space,” …,

344-345.

26

Space Policy72

and the establishment of the Director of Space Development (DSpaceD) in 1997

under the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), a joint organization (as opposed to falling

under the Air Force’s purview). Despite challenging fiscal realities and defence reductions, the

space policy was aimed at affirming Canada’s commitment to be a partner in space activities,

although actual level of efforts and expenditures would be limited. Securing continued close

cooperation with the US was to be a focal point for DSpaceD to ensure the CAF’s ability to

leverage American capabilities while identifying burden sharing opportunities. 73

The amount of staff and financial resources allocated to DSpaceD was not significant, but it

allowed for the continuation of the space efforts and planning of future space engagements and

activities both on the national level and with the US. In the late 2000s, DSpaceD would embark

on a space awareness campaign within National Defence to better inform the senior leadership as

to the criticality of space assets for military operations in order to garner internal support and

ensure that everyone understood the role of DSpaceD and its mandate to provide space effects

for soldiers, sailors and airmen/airwomen. It would also draft an updated National Defence

Space Policy and Space Strategy, both key documents in detailing Canada’s commitment to

space security.74

In 2010, the DSpaceD was elevated and became the Director General Space Development

(DGSpace), which included a small influx of personnel. The organization main focus is to

72 Department of National Defence, National Defence Space Policy (Ottawa: Canada Communications

Group, 1992).


345-347. 74

Both the National Defence Space Policy and Strategy are still awaiting release in 2014.

27

“deliver agile, effective and affordable space support to the military”.75

Since the First Gulf War,

space capabilities have continued to be more thoroughly integrated into all aspects of military

operations. New space technologies have been developed furthering the space assets multiplier

effect on the battlefield. Canada’s resources remain limited and hence its dependency on

American space systems endures. However, DGSpace is constantly looking at ways to increase

Canada’s burden sharing capabilities. For example Sapphire, a contributing sensor to the US

Space Surveillance Network (SSN) was successfully launched in 2013 and now produces

hundreds of observations per day.76

Another one is the stand-up of the Canadian Space

Operations Centre (CANSpOC) in 2012 as a node to the US Joint Space Operations Center

(JSpOC) with an aim to keep a closer eye on Canadian satellites of interest, either government-

owned, commercial or allied; and to provide a space common operating pictures to support CAF

operations.77

In 2014, Canada’s space defence collaboration with the US is significant. Key areas are

highlighted below:

a. Satellite communications. The CAF has invested in the US Advanced Extremely

High Frequency (AEHF) constellation of satellites in order to provide persistent and

secure tactical communications to the warfighters in theatres of operations around the

world. In June 2013, Canada became the first international partner to connect and use

75 Brigadier General Rick Pitre, Director General Space Testimony in House of Commons, Standing Senate

Committee on National Security and Defence, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security

and Defence, no. 10, 19 Nov 2012, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/411/SECD/pdf/10no..pdf.. 76

Paul Maskell, “Sapphire: Progress and Status,” Presentation, 21 February 2014. 77

Alicia Coulter, “Supporting Operations Through Space,” The Maple Leaf, vol. 17, 5 May 2014, last

accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=supporting-operations-through-

space/ht6x4r56.

28

the first of six AEHF satellites. It is touted that “one satellite can provide greater total

capacity than the entire legacy five-satellite Milstar constellation”. 78

This key

arrangement will allow Canada’s military forces access to a portion of the satellites’

capacity for survivable anti-jamming communications, while ensuring interoperability

with Canada’s closest allies.79

Furthermore, another agreement was put in place using

a similar model with the US WGS constellation of geostationary satellites. This

capability provides a much larger capacity with high data rate transmission of voice

and data information worldwide. The data is encrypted although not to the same level

as what is offered by the AEHF constellation80

;

b. Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT). Under the NAVWAR umbrella, Canada, the

US, the UK and Australia work at ensuring that their military forces continue to have

guaranteed access to the GPS signals while denying their use by potential adversaries.

The NAWWAR program looks at emerging threats, develop various equipment and

techniques to allow operations in GPS-denied environment and to achieve PNT

superiority81

;

78 “Canada Makes First Call on AEHF; First Partner Nation To Connect Terminals To Protected

Communication Satellite,” Lockheed Martin, 20 June 2013, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.lockheedmartin.ca/us/news/press-releases/2013/june/0620-ss-aehf.html. 79

Brigadier General Rick Pitre, Director General Space Testimony in House of Commons, Standing Senate


and Defence… 80

Brigadier General Rick Pitre, Director General Space Testimony in House of Commons, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security

and Defence... 81



and Defence…

29

c. ISR. The space environment offers a unique vantage point for ISR sensors. By

continually orbiting the Earth, a satellite can over time map and capture data from all

around the globe (depending on the chosen orbit). The sensor can be focused on

specific areas of interest and provide invaluable information on potential enemies and

highlight changes in the landscape. ISR space-based sensors are used daily by the

intelligence and defence planning community.82

For example, Canada’s space-based

synthetic aperture radar capabilities have many applications including some

particularly suited to defence operations such as wide area surveillance of the oceans

and intelligence applications. By enabling Earth observation without the requirement

for sun illumination as in the case for optical sensors, space-based radars can operate

day and night and image areas of interest independent of weather. The Radarsat-2

satellite is an exquisite example of this capability.83

Under the Polar Epsilon project,

the CAF has built data receiving ground stations on both coasts in order to provide

near-real-time information from Radarsat-2, which has dramatically increased

maritime domain awareness.84

Much of the fusioned Radarasat-2 data acquired by the

CAF is shared with the US as their geography has very similar requirements.85

The

US possess a very extensive suite of space-based ISR sensors. Through various

82

Space Foundation, The Space Report 2012: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity, Arlington,

2012: , 25; David Emerson, Jacques Roy, Sandra Pupatello, and Jim Quick, Reaching Higher: Canada’s Interests

and Future in Space …, 20. 83

Radarsat-2 is a radar satellite built, owned and operated by MacDonald Dettwiller and Associates. The

Canadian Government partially funded the construction and launch of Radarsat-2 in exchange for data throughout

the life of the mission, see Canadian Space Agency, “Radarsat-2,” last modified 18 February 2011, http://www.asc-

csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/radarsat2/. 84



and Defence… 85

Due to commercial restrictions, the Radarsat-2 processed data cannot be shared as is with the US, but

once it is fusioned with other information and built into an intelligence product, it can be provided.

30

intelligence arrangements, Canada benefits tremendously from the data obtained from

those assets;

d. Search and Rescue (SAR). Canada and the US, along with France and Russia, are the

founding nations of COSPAS-SARSAT, an organization supporting world-wide SAR

through repeater payloads hosted on a variety of satellites. The organization now

boasts 43 member states and is responsible for savings over 30,000 lives since its

inception in 1982.86

In Canada, the Department of National Defence (DND) has the

mandate to lead Canadian efforts in this association. In the past, Canada has provided

payloads for LEO platforms.87

Current activities are focused on Medium Earth Orbit

(MEO) SAR, specifically the inclusion of Canadian-built SAR payloads on the next

generation of US GPS satellites slated to start launching in late 2015.88

; and

e. Research and Development (R&D). Canada-US cooperation in space R&D is also

noteworthy. Throughout the years, there have been many space related MOUs and

PAs, such as the Trilateral Technology R&D Project (TTRDP) Small Satellite

Military Utility Assessment PA. Many of these arrangements also include other close

allies. With the proliferation of space technologies, the realities of financial

constraints and the realization of the need for disaggregation (distribution of space

86 “COMDEV MEOSAR Payload Clears Initial Design Review,” Space News, vol. 25, No. 9, 3 March

2014: 14. 87

Department of National Defence, “Reports on Plans and Priorities 2013-14,” last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2013-other-national-search-rescue-

secretariat.page. 88

“COMDEV MEOSAR Payload Clears Initial Design Review,”`…

31

capabilities across various platforms89

) to protect space capabilities, international

R&D cooperation is recognized and continues to expand; and

f. Space Surveillance Awareness (SSA). Canada has a long history in SSA. It began in

the 1960s through NORAD, when Baker-Nunn cameras were installed on Canadian

soil. Those ground-based optical sensors had for main function to collect, analyze and

transmit satellite tracking data to NORAD. Later on as the list of on orbit satellites

grew, they were also used to track Resident Space Objects (RSOs) for the US SSN. 90

Since then, the CAF have remained involved with SSA most recently with the launch

of Sapphire, the first military operational satellite and the Near-Earth Object

Surveillance Satellite/High Earth Orbit Surveillance System (NEOSSat/HEOSS)

microsatellite, a SSA technology demonstrator. SSA will be discussed in more details

in Chapter 5.

This list is not exhaustive, although it covers some of the most significant Canada-US

collaborative efforts in the defence space area. With the CAF’s space program limited resources,

being able to effectively leverage American space systems is key to fulfilling Canada’s space

requirements in the delivery of the defence mandate.91

It has been stated that the CAF “would

never be able to make up from a loss of access to US (space) capabilities”.92

This chapter

89 Space disaggregation can be defined as: “The dispersion of space-based missions, functions or sensors

across multiple systems spanning one or more orbital plane, platform, host or domain.” See Department of Defense,

Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architecture, Air Force Space Command White Paper (Washington, DC:

2013), last accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130821-034.pdf. 90

Paul Maskell, and Lorne Oram, “Sapphire: Canada’s Answer to Space-Based Surveillance of Orbital

Objects,” AMOS Technical Paper, 2008, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.amostech.com/TechnicalPapers/2008/SSA_and_SSA_Architecture/Maskell.pdf. 91

Andrew Godefroy, “Is the Sky Falling? Canada’s Defence Space Programme at the Crossroads,”…, 51. 92


32

highlights the fact that space security in Canada is intimately intertwined to that of the US. Some

political directions and policy differ. For example, Canada does not participate in ballistic

missile defence although this decision is being reassessed.93

The development of kinetic ASAT

technologies is also something that is not being pursued by Canada, as this would be in

contradiction of Ottawa’s policy against the weaponization of space. Nevertheless, the close

relationship between the two countries is such that most US space security concerns affect

Canada to some extent, and vice versa. For example, threats to space systems that are worrisome

to the US are also of interest to Canada. It is straight forward for threats coming from the space

environment itself as those affect any satellites indiscriminately and they cannot be controlled. It

is different in the case of hostile threats, where Canada’s close relationship with the US brings an

added level of complexity as will be discussed in the next chapter.

4. THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS

Nations are increasingly reliant on space capabilities to provide a wide range of data products

and services that are used in daily life and critical to the functioning national economies. This

dependence is also clearly apparent on the defence side. Space capabilities offer a tremendous

advantage on the modern battlefield to those who control them. ISR assets, navigation,

positioning and timing systems, and satellite communications are all critical to successful

military operations for modern militaries. Furthermore, space systems offer a clear advantage in

strategic decision-making for national and collective security by enabling a means to validate

treaties and arm-control measures, as well as increasing the ability to respond to environmental

93 House of Commons, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canada and

Ballistic Missile Defence: Responding to the Evolving Threat, June 2014, last accessed 9 August 2014,

http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/secd/rep/rep10jun14-e.pdf.

33

disasters on the ground.94

During the First Gulf War in Iraq, the application of space capabilities

was integrated with the planning and execution of military operations for the first time.95

The

overwhelming advantage provided by space systems was realized not only by the coalition, but

also by potential foes. Since then, the US and its allies have become increasingly reliant on space

assets in the achievement of their mandates for national and international security. Unfortunately,

this reliance on space capabilities has also brought important vulnerabilities that have not

escaped would-be enemy’s attention.96

US Air Force General W.L. Shelton, Commander Air

Force Space Command declared in 2014 that the continued mission success due to the successful

integration of space capabilities into joint operations has “encouraged potential adversaries to

further develop counter-space technologies and attempt to exploit our systems and

information”.97

Hostile states and groups search for ways to impede US and allied access to

space data and services in order to decrease their space advantage in an attempt to level the playing field.

98 Furthermore, many allied strategic space assets were conceived during the Cold

War when the enemy was known and well-defined. They were most often large systems

94 C C. Robert. Kehler, “Implementing the National Security Space Strategy,”…; “Final Frontiers,” Asia

Pacific Defence Forum, 1 October 2013, last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/print/features/2013/10/01/feature-pr-9. 95

Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War… 96 Joshua Philipp, “US Alert to China Space Threat”… 97

House of Representatives, Hearing on National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and

Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 113th

Congress First

Session, 25 April 2013, last accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-

113hhrg80769/html/CHRG-113hhrg80769.htm; Al-Qaeda is known to actively pursue ways to impede with the jamming and control of US unmanned aerial systems Those technologies could easily be applied against space

systems. See Craig Whitlock, and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Document Detail Al-Qaeda’s Effort to Fight Back Against

Drones,” The Washington Post, 3 September 2013., last accessed 9 August 2014,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-documents-detail-al-qaedas-efforts-to-fight-back-

against-drones/2013/09/03/b83e7654-11c0-11e3-b630-36617ca6640f_story.html; Iran demonstrated their jamming

and hacking capabilities in 2011 when they captured a US RQ-170 unmanned aerial systems. See Peter B. De

Selding, “Jamming No Mere Nuisance for Middle East Satellite Operators,” Space News, 23 March 2012, last

accessed 5 June 2014. http://www.spacenews.com/article/jamming-no-mere-nuisance-middle-east-satellite-

operators. 98

C. Robert. Kehler, “Implementing the National Security Space Strategy,”…

34

designed for a single-purpose and with minimal protection mechanisms.99

Those space systems

were defined based on the perceived threat at the time, as opposed to looking at the future

security environment to determine which system would be best suited. The current security

environment is very different and much more complex with a wide range of space actors whose

intent is not always well characterized.100

There is an increase in the number of countries and

organizations developing military space capabilities, which has widen the range and probability

of space systems threats.101

Threats to space systems can be broadly divided into three categories: natural, secondary impact

and hostile threats. These will be defined in more details below:

a. Natural Threats. Satellites operate in a very harsh environment. They are exposed

to the vacuum of space and extreme temperatures as they go in and out of the

sun’s view. There are also meteoroids of varying sizes. Satellites are travelling at

a speed of several kilometers per second while orbiting the Earth102

, therefore

even an impact with a tiny object could be catastrophic. Moreover, space weather

phenomena can cause high energy particles to interfere with sensitive spacecraft

systems such as solar panels and other electronics.103

It is possible to harden

99 Rami R. Razook, and Frank C. Belz, “Meeting National Security Space Needs in the Contested

Cyberspace Domain,” Aerospace Crosslink Magazine, Spring 2012:1, last accessed 20 February 2014, http://www.aerospace.org/2013/07/26/meeting-national-security-space-needs-in-the-contested-cyberspace-domain/;


Century: Theory and Policy…,

83. 100 Department of National Defence, The Future Security Environment 2013-2040, Ottawa: 2013. 101

Claire Jolly, “How Secure is Outer Space? Assessing the Threat to Space,” last accessed 20 February

2014, http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/how-secure-is-outer-space-assessing-the-threat-to-space/. 102 Satellites in LEO orbit on average at 7-8km/sec, while those in GEO have speeds in the order of

3km/sec. 103 The NRCan website provides some more detailed explanation on space weather impact on spacecraft,

see Natural Resources Canada, “Space Weather Effects on Satellites,” last modified 21 November 2013,

http://www.spaceweather.gc.ca/tech/se-sat-eng.php.

35

satellites to a certain extent, but it would be very difficult to make them able to

withstand all space weather conditions;

b. Secondary Impact Threats. This type of threat is related to the hazards created by

unintended interference. The frequency spectrum is one area where there are

increasing risks for interference with an ever increasing number of active

satellites in space. As spacecraft become closely integrated into progressively

more complex networks and infrastructure, the risk of interference rises.104

The

GEO belt is a prime example. At GEO altitudes, spacecraft orbit the Earth every

24 hours, which means that a satellite in GEO remains over the same location over

the Earth at any given time. Hence there are only a limited amount of locations

where one can put a spacecraft. The geosynchronous orbit offers an excellent

vantage point for communications satellite as they continually cover the same

Earth footprint. As such, geosynchronous orbits are preferred and desired by many

space-faring nations to provide national satellite communication coverage. Most

GEO satellite operators are careful to move their spacecraft out of the GEO region

once they have reached the end of their useful life to then launch another

spacecraft to take its place. As more nations and commercial operators vie for the

key GEO belt slots, it becomes overcrowded and there is greater potential for

interference despite technology developments that allows for more effective use

of the frequency spectrum, such as frequency hopping, digital signal processing

104 Claire Jolly, “How Secure is Outer Space? Assessing the Threat to Space,”...

36

and frequency-agile transceivers.105

In the past, each GEO satellite had a

requirement for a minimum of three degree spacing between each spacecraft. This

requirement was decreased to two degrees by the ITU to accommodate a larger

amount of GEO space systems.106

As the GEO spacecraft are located on average

42,000 km from the Earth surface, the power and frequency bandwidth required

are significant. With less space between satellites, the risk of interference

increases.

Another side effect of more closely spaced spacecraft is the increased potential for

collisions. As the Earth is not a perfect sphere, there are variations in the satellite

orbits. In other words, to remain at a precise location in the GEO belt, the orbits

of the satellites have to regularly be slightly adjusted (through the use of

propulsion mechanisms). They also have to sometimes be manoeuvred so as to

avoid a potential collision with another spacecraft.107

This matter is complicated

by the fact that there are also many inactive satellites in the GEO belt. As

mentioned earlier, current operators are careful at removing satellites before they

become inactive, but that was not the case in the early days of space exploration.

At the time, there were so few space actors that this issue was not recognized.

These dead satellites migrate through the GEO belt and can require operators to

move their satellite to avoid a collision. As the objects are so far away, they are

also difficult to track from the ground, which compounds the threat of collisions.

105 Nancy Gallaguer, “International Cooperation and Space Governance Strategy,” In Space Strategy in the

21st Century: Theory and Policy…, 55-56; Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 11. 106 Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011), 89. 107

Claire Jolly, “How Secure is Outer Space? Assessing the Threat to Space,”…

37

When discussing the risk of collisions in space, inactive satellites in the GEO belt

are not the only concern. There are hundreds of defunct satellites orbiting the

Earth. They are located across the range of available orbits and all present a

potential threat. The collision between an active Iridium satellite and an inactive

Russian Cosmos spacecraft in 2009 highlights this fact. Despite both being

tracked by the US SSN, insufficient warning was provided and Iridium operators

did not manoeuvre their satellite in time to avoid the collision.108

Compounding

the issue is that such an impact creates a cloud of debris, which then multiplies the

collision risk. There are also many rocket bodies left-over and other objects,

which are also travelling at several kilometers per second and could impact with

another object. There is no doubt that the space environment where Earth orbiting

satellites co-exist is getting increasingly congested. With over 20,000 man-made

objects, 10 centimeters or more in size, being tracked and an estimated 300,000

larger than 1 centimeter and millions smaller pieces out there109

, the dangers of a

non-intentional collision are real. Operational satellites often have to manoeuvre

to avoid potential impact with inactive objects.110

These objects not only threaten

108

Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook …, 89; Rathgeber, Wolfgang, Kai-Uwe

Schrogl, and Ray A. Williamson, The Fair and Responsible Use of Space: An International Perspective (New York:

Springer Wien, 2010): 73. 109

Claire Jolly, “How Secure is Outer Space? Assessing the Threat to Space,”… 110

For example, a French intelligence space asset had to perform a collision-avoidance manoeuvre on 23

April 2014, see Peter B. De Selding, “France Maneuvers Intel Satellite to Avoid Dead Weather Spacecraft,” Space

News, 23 April 2014: A3. Another example is with the recently launched European Sentinel-1A, which had to

perform a collision avoidance manoeuvre less than 48 hours after separation from the rocket, which was the first

time such a move needed to be executed during the Launch and Early Operations of a spacecraft, see Peter B. De

Selding, “Close-Call: Europe’s just Launched Sentinel-1A Dodges Dead Satellite,” Space News, 10 April 2014, last

accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/40164close-call-europe%E2%80%99s-just-

launched-sentinel-1a-dodges-dead-satellite.

38

active satellites, but also the manned International Space Station (ISS). Several

times a year, it has to be maneuvered to avoid debris objects.111

This situation is

only expected to worsen due to trends such as an increase in commercial space

assets being launched and more countries developing national space capabilities.

Moreover, there is a push for smaller satellites such as cubesats and nanosats,

which are more difficult to detect and track.112

There has also been a growth in

technical developments in the fields of spacecraft propulsion, automation and

rendezvous, which makes traditional tracking of satellites more complex as the

objects no longer follow orbital mechanics models113

; and

c. Hostile Threats. Finally, the last category refers to those threats purposefully

intended to cause harm. This third type of threat has arisen due to man-made

factors because of economic and military competition and the militarization of

space.114

Those threats can be further defined as reversible or non-reversible. A

space system is comprised of one or more spacecraft, a ground segment for

Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT&C) of the satellite, and corresponding

data links. Any of those elements is susceptible to disruption by hostile actors.

Reversible threats are those that do not cause permanent damage. Electronic

111 Joshua Philipp, “US Alert to China Space Threat,”…; Alex Brown, “How to dodge a space bullet in

Three (Not so Easy) Steps,” National Journal, 3 (April 2014), last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/how-to-dodge-a-space-bullet-in-three-not-so-easy-steps-20140403. 112

There is no universally approved definition for cubesats and nanosats. They are generally considered to

be 10cm3 and/or 10 grams or less. 113

Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook…,77. 114

The militarization of space refers to the use of space for military purposes. It is different than the

weaponization of space, which refers to the deployment of weapons in space. Article IV of the OST prohibits the

placement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space, see Patrick Gleeson, “Legal Aspects

of the Use of Force in Space,” (master thesis, McGill University, 2005), 87-95.

39

jamming is one example. It is most commonly done from the ground, but could

also be performed by a neighbouring spacecraft. Jamming will prevent the

effective transmission of a signal and hence could thwart key commands being

sent to the satellite or prevent telemetry or data to be downloaded from the

spacecraft. GPS jamming is a real threat in military operations made possible

through the now wide availability of GPS jammers.115

They can easily be built for

less than $100 with commercial off the shelf parts and instructions from the

internet.116

There has been an increase in intentional jamming by criminal

organizations and national entities which have disrupted GPS signals and satellite

communications.117

Laser blinding is another example. It is done from the ground

through high-power lasers and is used to disrupt the operation of the spacecraft

and its sensors.118

Non-reversible threats are those that will render a satellite permanently disabled.

The most frequently cited example of this type of threat is a kinetic ASAT attack:

a high-energy kinetic collision between two objects in space rendering both

unusable. Orbital mechanics makes the trajectory of any satellite (without

propulsion) highly predictable once some key parameters are known, most of


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 113th

Congress First

Session, 25 April 2013, last accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-

113hhrg80769/html/CHRG-113hhrg80769.htm. 116

Brigadier General Rick Pitre, Director General Space Testimony in House of Commons, Standing

Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National

Security and Defence… 117

Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013… 118

Todd Lowery, “Call it MIRACL,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 1998): 5-6,

last accessed 9 August 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_10/miracloct.

40

which are available or can be derived from open-source data.119

This reality

makes space systems inherently vulnerable. There are different types of kinetic

ASAT systems, either direct ascent (where the ASAT is launched atop a rocket or

plane and aimed directly at the target) or co-orbital (where the ASAT is launched

and then manoeuvred close to the target). Kinetic ASAT systems create large

amount of debris that can then impact any satellite indiscriminately.120

Aside from kinetic ASAT systems, there other ways to cause irreversible damage

to a space system, such as high-power micro-wave weapons or lasers.121

For

example in the case of optical satellites, if one was to use an extremely high

power laser, it could burn a charge-coupled device (CCD) and hence render the

sensor useless. The coherent and highly directional beam of lasers can cause

damage at distances of thousands of kilometres, although they require a very high

level of precision.122

Ground stations can also be the targets of attacks, which

could cause irreparable damage to the mission if a TT&C segment was destroyed.

As command antennas are usually fewer in number than payload data download

antennas, if a spacecraft was operated through only one ground station, its

119 The JSPoC provides two-line element sets of most space objects tracked by the US SSN. They are

available online, see Department of Defense, Space Track website, last updated 20 February 2014,

https://www.space-track.org/auth/login. 120

See Appendix 1 for a list of kinetic ASAT test; Nayef R.F Al-Rhodam, Meta-Geopolitics of Outer

Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance…, 78. 121


Governance …, 79. 122


Governance …, 80.

41

destruction would prevent any further communications with the spacecraft, hence

rendering the space system useless. 123

Finally, there is a growing awareness of the cyber threats to space systems. It has

become increasingly important to be able to fuse information from various

sources to provide intelligence analysis for the soldiers, sailors, airmen and

airwomen, and there is a corresponding requirement for increasing networking

capability to allow for timely communications across the globe. This enabling

connectivity applies to space ISR and satellite communications assets and it has

also injected vulnerabilities.124

As with ground-based networks, a satellite

computer system could be infiltrated and interfered with. Cyber-attacks could be

aimed at the physical, hardware or software layer of a space system. For example,

in the case of software infiltration, the impact could be disastrous as software

changes are not always easy to do depending on the platform and how it was

designed. Once a bug is injected in a space system, it might not be able to recover.

There have already been reported US cyber-attacks on cryptographic certificates

used for the command of satellites as well as on the German space research

centre. 125

123 Toffler Associates, Protecting our Space Capabilities: Securing the Future…, 3. 124

Brigadier General Rick Pitre, Director General Space Testimony in House of Commons, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National


Rami R. Razook, and Frank C. Belz, “Meeting National Security Space Needs in the Contested

Cyberspace Domain,”…, 2; “German space research centre under espionage attack,” Space Daily, 3 April 2014, last

accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/German_space_research_centre_under_espionage_attack_report_999.html.

42

For the purpose of this research paper, hostile threats are of utmost interest. With the increasing

number of space actors whose intent is not always known, it is expected that counterspace

capabilities of potential adversaries will proliferate and become more robust in a reduced

timeline.126

Countries such as China are already developing space system negating capabilities

such as laser blinding systems and kinetic space weapons.127

Hostile intent with respect to space systems is often related to asymmetric warfare. As mentioned

earlier, Western armed forces are highly dependent on space systems in the conduct of their

operations. As the majority of operations are performed in a joint fashion, the Western militaries

always have a net military advantage over weaker opponents. This superiority combined with the

inherent vulnerabilities of space technologies could lead potential adversaries to favour

asymmetric threats in space in order to even the balance of power. In other words, foes that

cannot compete with conventional warfare means could use asymmetric acts, such as the

malevolent use of spacecraft and sabotage, on allied space systems as a way to gain an

advantage.128

It has even been argued that future conflicts will inevitably include asymmetric means directed at space technologies.

129 Three actors will be addressed: Russia, China and non-

state actors.

RUSSIA


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services… 127 Claire Jolly, “How Secure is Outer Space? Assessing the Threat to Space,”… 128


Governance …, 89. 129


Governance …90.

43

During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow put in place many arrangements and measures to

prevent catastrophic conflict escalation. The nuclear threats were real on both sides of the

Atlantic, but there was a tacit understanding that neither would impede each other’s space

systems.130

Although no longer an open enemy of the US and its allies, Russia remains a nation

of interest. The unfavorable state of its economy and declining technology advance momentum

have not discontinued their investment in military space capabilities. For example, the Russians

are providing the only available spacecraft able to bring astronauts to the ISS. They are also

developing the Angara next generation of launch vehicles to replace their current aging

launchers.131

They retain the second largest fleet of military space systems after the US.132

Furthermore, despite opposing co-orbital kinetic ASAT systems through the PPWT proposal and

advertised position against the placing of weapons in space, Russia’s actions suggest that they

continue the development of active airborne kinetic ASAT capabilities with the Sokol Eshelon

and Kontakt programs.133

The recent situation in Crimea and Ukraine has shown that in many aspects, Russia is not aligned

with Western policies. The tensions in early 2014 have strained Moscow’s relations with the

Western world. Most notably Russia has been excluded from the G8 (a select group of leading

industrialized nations that they were part of since 1997), which has now become the G7

130 J James D. Rendleman, “Strategy for Space Assurance,” in Space Strategy in the 21

st Century: Theory

and Policy…, 83-84. 131 Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 14. 132

Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 16; The International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance 2013…,226. 133

Jana Honkova, “The Russian Federation’s Approach to Military Space and Its Military Space

Capabilities” (Arlington: The Marshall Institute, November 2013): 34-40, last accessed 9 August 2014,

http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Russian-Space-Nov-13.pdf.

44

following Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. 134

For a while, it seemed space

cooperation would continue unhampered, especially with regards to manned space flight with the

launch of the ISS crew (Expedition 40) on 28 May 2014. 135

However, the Russian Deputy Prime

Minister announced in May 2014 that in response to sanctions imposed on Russia they would no

longer support the ISS after 2020, would prohibit the use of Russian engines for the launch of US

national security satellites (the Russian built RD-180 engines are used on the American Atlas 5

rockets) and would decommission ten GPS ground stations located in Russia.136

Moreover, the

Canadian government technology demonstrator Maritime Monitoring and Messaging

Microsatellite (M3MSat) was prohibited from being shipped and launched from Russia in June

2014 as planned.137

The decision came from the GoC and it highlights the decreasing level of

comfort between Canada and Russia. It is not to say that Moscow would be willing to take

hostile action, but it is something to consider in evaluating threats to space systems Canada relies

on.

CHINA

China continues to expand its space program and has made important strides in achieving space

power status. With the launch of two ‘taikonauts’ on their indigenous rocket in 2003, China

became the third country after the Russians and Americans to launch their own astronauts in

134 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Trade and Development. “G7/G8”,” last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.international.gc.ca/g8/index.aspx. 135

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, ”International Space Station: Expedition 40,” last

accessed 5 June 2014, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/expeditions/expedition40/. 136

Warren Fernster, “U.S. Sanctions, Russian Response Fraying Once-Strong Space Ties,” Space News,

vol. 25, No. 20, 19 May 2014:1,16. 137

David Pugliese, “Russian Sanctions Have Killed Canadian Satellite Launch,” Ottawa Citizen, 23 April

2014., last accessed 5 June 2014,

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/technology/Russian+sanctions+have+killed+Canadian+satellite+launch/9772896/stor

y.html.

45

orbit.138

It has also been the third nation to land a spacecraft on the moon in December 2013.139

Beijing space exploration exploits are paralleled by a tremendous development in military space

capabilities. China possesses its own national PNT system in the Beidou constellation (the

Chinese equivalent of the American GPS), numerous imaging and other intelligence assets,

weather satellites, and a series of satellite telecommunications systems. Anti-satellite capability

development is also a key aspect of their space program.140

The Chinese have demonstrated their

kinetic ASAT technology when they destroyed one of their defunct satellites in 2007. This event

will be remembered as one that showcased Chinese progress but more for the amount of

resulting debris, the largest debris cloud ever created.141

Previous kinetic ASAT tests done by the

US and the Russians had involved destroying their own satellites that was orbiting at very low

altitude. Hence the debris created would burn up in the atmosphere in a matter of months,

therefore limiting the risk that a piece would unintentionally collide with another spacecraft.142

In

the Chinese test, the object destroyed was at a much higher altitude. It resulted in an impressive

cloud of debris that will remain in orbit for centuries. Moreover, these debris objects are in a

very similar orbit to Canada’s Radarsat satellites. Radarsat-1 was turned off last year after over

15 years in orbit delivering an incredible amount of data143

, but Radarsat-2 is still active.

Although it has not entered in collision with any pieces of debris yet, Radarsat-2 has been moved

138 “China Sends First Man Into Space,” BBC News, 15 October 2003, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/15/newsid_3699000/3699842.stm 139

http://www.space.com/23968-china-moon-rover-historic-lunar-landing.html. 140 Joshua Philipp, “US Alert to China Space Threat”... 141

Joshua Philipp, “US Alert to China Space Threat”…; Lauchie Scott, “Orbital Debris Implications

Resulting from the ASAT Intercept of 11 January 2007,” Technical Report, Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa,

December 2007, 2. 142

This is due to the atmospheric drag lowering the debris objects’ speed hence their altitude. The drag

increases at lower altitudes. 143

Canadian Space Agency, “Radarsat-1: Seventeen Years of Technological Success,” last modified 9 May

2013, http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/media/news_releases/2013/0509.asp.

46

a few times in order to avoid a potential impact.144

While the Chinese most likely did not intend

to threaten Canadian satellites with their ASAT test, a direct result of this experiment is that

while Radarsat-2 remains active (which could be for many more years if one is to look at the

Radarsat-1 legacy), there will always be a threat of collision. Space surveillance technology is

such that objects as small as 10 centimeters can be detected, but there are also thousands of

smaller pieces that are not tracked, each of which could cause a catastrophic impact.

Compounding this issue is that the government is planning a follow-on to Radarsat-2, referred to

as the Radarsat Constellation Mission (RCM), which will consist of three satellites that are to be

launched in a similar orbit.

Although China has proven its kinetic ASAT capability, it is unclear whether they would be

willing to use it against Canadian or allied assets. The subsequent ASAT tests conducted after

2007 used a much lower orbiting target, which minimized the debris created, hinting that they

were becoming a more responsible space nation.145

However, their responsible behaviour in

space should not be assumed.146

Chinese officials have not been forthcoming with respect to

their kinetic ASAT testing. For example, in May 2014 a Dong Ning-2 ASAT missile was

launched, although it was reported to be for a scientific mission under the national Chinese

27.

144 Lauchie Scott, “Orbital Debris Implications Resulting from the ASAT Intercept of 11 January 2007,”…,

145 Weeden, Brian, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in

Space,” Secure World Foundation, 17 March 2014:1, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://swfound.org/media/167224/Through_a_Glass_Darkly_March2014.pdf. 146

Michael Krepon, “Promoting National and Economic Security Interests in Space,”…

47

Academy of Sciences.147

Another anti-satellite test took place in July 2014, this one claimed to

be a land-based missile interceptor.148

China’s intentions are of concern. The links between Beijing military and civil space programs

are blurry and although there is a lot of publicity about their space program being for science and

exploration, it is believed to be directly supporting defence activities.149

With their kinetic ASAT

testing and other space endeavours, it would seem that China is prepared to explore the full

spectrum of space capabilities to “expand the limits of conventional war to the space domain”.150

It has been reported by Dr. Ashley Tellis, expert on South Asia affairs, that “Chinese military

planners are deeply focused on neutralizing US space capabilities because of their belief that

such neutralization is essential to whittle down dominance on which the US military depends for

its success”.151

Beijing has also recently increased activities related to the development and

deployment of over 50 satellites in the next few years for surveillance and Earth monitoring,

which could also serve intelligence purposes.152

Furthermore, the Chinese are pursuing the

development of the Long March-5, their next generation of indigenous launchers, aiming at

landing a taikonaut on the moon.153

Other countries are also concerned about China. For example

147 Joshua Philipp, “US Alert to China Space Threat”... 148

Mike Gruss, “U.S. State Department Says China Conducted an Anti-satellite Test,” Space News, vol. 25,

No. 31, 4 August 2014: 10. 149

Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 16. 150


Century: Theory

and Policy…, 84. 151

Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Counterspace Programs - Only More Bad News,” in Department of Defense,

Joint Hearing on the People’s Republic of China’s Counterpace Program and the Implications for U.S. National

Security, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 28 Jan 2014, last accessed 9 June 2014,

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20140128/101680/HHRG-113-AS29-Wstate-TellisA-20140128.pdf. 152

“China eyes ‘global monitoring network,” Space Daily, 3 April 2014, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_eyes_global_monitoring_network_of_surveillance_satellites_999.html. 153

Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 14.

48

India and Israel are building a missile defence system and pursuing nuclear weapon development

in order to protect against nuclear strikes that could come from China.154

Looking at its space history, capabilities and intent, China is believed to be the nation most likely

to pose a threat of space systems disruption.155

Despite China’s involvement in the UN CD,

based on the Chinese efforts deployed in the space area in the last decade, it is reasonable to

assume that within the next twenty years they will have fully operational national satellite

communications, space-based navigation and ISR assets that will most likely be integrated with

their other military capabilities. It is expected that Chinese reliance on space systems will hence

increase similarly to what has been seen in other space powers.156

This dependence is hopefully

going to increase China’s conscience with regards to instability intent. Therefore, Canada should

continue monitoring Chinese space development and activities to ensure that none become a

threat to Canadian space systems of interest.

NON-STATE ACTORS

As space technologies become more common and accessible, the number of nations and

commercial entities owning spacecraft systems increases. As mentioned above, there are now

over 170 states which use space assets for national and commercial benefits.157

Non-state actors

can also exploit space technologies. For example, many universities develop small but capable

154 “Israel, India Agree on Missile Defence System Against China,” World Tribune (2 April 2014), last

accessed 9 August 2014, http://www.worldtribune.com/2014/04/02/israel-india-agree-on-missile-defense-system-

against-china-pakistan-nuclear-strikes/. 155

Micah Zenko, “Dangerous Space Incidents,” Council on Foreign Relations, Contingency Planning

Memorandum 21 (April 2014), last accessed 9 August 2014, http://www.cfr.org/space/dangerous-space-

incidents/p32790?sp_mid=45655631&sp_rid=dGdyaWV2ZUBuYXRpb25hbGpvdXJuYWwuY29tS0. 156


Century: Theory

and Policy…, 83. 157


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services…

49

space systems (such as Canada’s University of Toronto Space Flight Laboratory), and rebellious

groups use satellite communications to broadcast their message.158

Hezbollah even owns a

satellite television channel with an annual budget in millions of dollars and which is used to

broadcast anti-American propaganda.159

It is also now possible for hostile non-state actors to

acquire systems, which could be used to disrupt space assets.160

Developing elaborate anti-

satellite technologies remain complex and expansive, but jammers and cyber warfare equipment

are commonly available. There exist some groups such as the Taliban which would have the

means to develop more advanced anti-satellite systems that could potentially pose a threat to

space capabilities, although this is not likely in the near future as there are other much less

expansive ways to cause disruption.161

The future security environment points to asymmetric capabilities that could be developed by

potential adversaries, which will make the space common even more complex. This chapter has

shown the range of threats faced by space systems. Many of the threats presented could be

directed at Canadian space systems or those Canada depends upon. It is important to highlight

that Ottawa needs to be concerned not only with assets owned by the Canadian government, but

national commercial systems such as communications satellites by Telesat and the Radarsat

systems, as well as allied system such as the US AEHF, WGS and GPS constellations, which

Canada relies on. These space capabilities are critical not only for military operations and

national security, but to ensure the Canadian way of life. It could be argued that, with Canada’s

158

Jeffrey Lewis, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Outer Space Activities, in United Nations Institute for

Disarmement Research, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security - Conference Report 30-31 March

2006 (Vienna, 2006): 32. 159

Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (London: C. Hurst & Co,

2013): 332. 160 laire Jolly, “How Secure is Outer Space? Assessing the Threat to Space,”… 161

Eric Schmitt, “Many Sources Feed Taliban’s War Chest,” The New York Times, 18 October 2009, last

accessed 9 August 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/19taliban.html.

50

stance against space weaponization and limited government-owned assets and space budget, why

should Canada be worry about hostile threats to space systems? Why would anybody want to

inflict damage or interfere with Canadian space capabilities or those it relies on? Three reasons

could be possible. The first relates to Canada’s close relationships with the US. As mentioned in

Chapter 3, Canada’s space security is intimately linked to that of its Southern neighbour. The

Americans possess the largest fleet of space assets, which Canada is largely dependent upon. It is

recognized that Washington has more potential adversaries than Ottawa. Considering those facts,

there is a larger chance that US systems could be attacked. Depending on the damage caused, the

impact to Canada could be significant. For example, interference or loss of one of the WGS

satellites during a military operation with Canadian soldiers on the ground could prevent the

transmission of key information or commands that could result in a loss of life. Significant

degradation of the GPS signals or malicious infiltration of time delay would be disastrous for

pilots and precision-guided weapons. It would also cause havoc for Canadian banks and hydro-

electric power grids, which are both dependent on the precise timing provided by GPS, resulting

in the loss of power for countless households and a significant loss in revenues.

Secondly, Canada usually participates in military operations with the US and other NATO

nations. As part of a coalition, participating countries therefore become the ‘enemy’ from an

adversary point of view and Canadian assets could become a target as much as any other allied

space systems. As discussed in Chapter 4, space systems are inherently vulnerable, which makes

them prime targets for asymmetric attacks. As it has been experienced in recent conflicts such as

in Afghanistan and Libya, opponents that have been weaker from a conventional stand-point

have reached for asymmetric warfare tactics. There have been reports of jamming and laser

51

blinding although no significant damage ensued.162

Ram Jakhu, associate professor for the

Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University has reported that there has been a dramatic

increase in intentional jamming in recent years.163

He cited the deliberate interference during

political unrest in the Middle East (Arab Spring) as an example, aimed at preventing the

dissemination of information.164

Iran and Syria have been the source of much of the recent

intentional jamming.165

Civilian infrastructure and systems can also be targets. For example, Eutelsat noted that jamming

incidents with their space systems doubled between 2010 and 2011; and tripled between 2011

and 2012. They were able to attribute the interference to Iran, Syria or Bahrain in most of the

cases.166

Future security trends and the increased proliferation of accessible counter-space

technologies indicate that disruption of space systems will continue. It can be expected that the

level of potential damage could increase as jamming incidents and capabilities proliferate and

missile system and directed energy weapon development continues.167

Finally, the Canadian government is becoming more involved in space. Aside from launching

two spacecraft in 2013 (Sapphire and NEOSSat) and another one ready to go (M3MSat), it is

planning two new constellations in the next few years: one is the RCM and the other the Polar

162Micah Zenko, “Dangerous Space Incidents,”… 163

Mike Gruss, “Military Satellite Communications | Panel Ties U.S. Troop Rotations to Satellite

Interference Spikes.” Space News, 24 June 2013, last accessed: 5 June 2014,

http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/35948military-satellite-communications-panel-ties-us-troop-

rotations-to. 164 Peter B. De Selding, “Jamming No Mere Nuisance for Middle East Satellite Operators,”… 165

Mike Gruss, “Military Satellite Communications | Panel Ties U.S. Troop Rotations to Satellite

Interference Spikes.”… 166

Clare Hill, “Satellite and Internet Jamming Worsening,” Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, 28

November 2012, last accessed 9 August 2014, http://www.cba.org.uk/latest/satellite-and-internet-jamming-

worsening/. 167


52

Weather and Communications (PCW) constellation. Those will add five satellites considered key

for national sovereignty to the government-owned space inventory. Combined with the changing

geopolitical environment and rise in the number of space actors, it will become imperative for

Ottawa to ensure spacecraft system access and protection as they could also become targets.

The potential hostile threats to Canada’s space systems and those it relies on need to be addressed

to continue enjoying the data and services space capabilities bring. Canada needs to start looking

more carefully at protecting the space asset systems it depends on, while developing mechanisms

to counter space interference by other states/organizations. As it has been demonstrated, kinetic

ASAT systems are not the only hostile threat to satellites, there exists a wide range of options to

hamper Canada’s ability to exploit space assets. Although there is a

need to develop the capabilities to contend with the threats to the space systems Canada relies

on, an effective space deterrence posture is also required. Such a stance would allow Canada to

increase the chances that a conflict could be averted early on and encourage space stability by

preventing the escalation of hostilities in space. It would also align with its diplomatic mid-

power legacy and national policy supporting the peaceful use of space.168

Space deterrence and

means to strengthen it were discussed in Chapter 2. It is now time to examine a critical enabler of

space deterrence: SSA, and demonstrate how it could positively contribute to Canada’s space

deterrence posture.

168 Department of National Defence, National Defence Space Policy (Ottawa: Canada Communications

Group,1998).

53

5. SSA SSA is an area that has received increased international attention in the last decade due to the

space environment becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive. SSA comprises

all of the information that is required to provide an alertness of the space environment. It is

concerned with space weather, natural phenomena that can disrupt satellites (as defined in

Chapter 3), as well as the tracking and identification of orbiting space objects. A decline in

debris production was observed in the 1990s and early 2000s mostly due to debris mitigation

measures adopted by many countries, but this trend came to end after the Chinese ASAT test in

2007 and the unintentional collision between an Iridium and defunct Cosmos satellite in 2009,

which both created large clouds of debris that will remain in orbit for decades to come.169

169


54

Figure 1. Growth in the On-orbit Population of RSOs by Category

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, vol. 18, no. 1 (January

2014), last accessed 5 June 2014, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv18i1.pdf.

The US has been leading the SSA efforts for many years through the USSTRACOM JSpOC,

which is responsible for the SSN.170

The main purpose of the SSN is to detect and track RSOs

orbiting the Earth, including the launch of new spacecraft. The tracked RSOs are comprised of

active and inactive satellites, as well as thousands of pieces of debris. The JSpOC routinely track

170 Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook…, 89.

55

on average 23,000 RSOs.171

Figure 2 shows their current distribution. The cluster of objects

close to the Earth’s surface represents the LEO satellites. Further out, forming a ring, are the

GEO spacecraft. Each takes 24 hours to rotate around the Earth and thus always oversee the

same region.

Figure 2. RSO Distribution

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Orbital Debris Graphics – GEO Images,” last accessed

9 August 2014, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/photogallery/beehives.html.

The SSN is comprised of a range of optical and radar sensors distributed across the globe and

tasked by the JSpOC. Most of the systems are ground-based, but there are also a few space-based

sensors, such as Canada’s National Defence’s Sapphire satellite. The location of current sensors


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services…

56

is displayed at Figure 3. Current sensor technology enables the SSN sensors to reliably track

objects down to 10 centimeters in size in LEO ( and 1 meter in GEO), but models points at a

population of over 500,000 objects under that size that are currently not tracked and seemingly

invisible to the SSN and spacecraft operators.172

These smaller objects could catastrophically

damage satellites and manned spacecraft at any time.

Figure 3. US SSN Dedicated Sensors

Source: Department of Defense, “USSTRACOM Space Control and Space

Surveillance,” last updated January 2014,

http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/11/Space_Control_and_Space_Surveillance/.

Without its own space doctrine, Canada turns to its closest ally to frame the SSA rationale.173

US

joint doctrine publications define SSA as: “the requisite current and predictive knowledge of the

space environment and the operational environment upon which space operations depend.” It

encompasses four functional capabilities, namely Characterization, Detection / tracking /


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services… 173


57

identification, Threat warning and assessment, and Data integration and exploitation.174

As

Figure 4 demonstrates, SSA is very broad and is critical to successful space operations. It is truly

the central piece that “enables all operational activities”.175

The US SSN is but one piece of the

SSA puzzle as it is focused mainly on the detection, tracking, identification and cataloging of

RSOs. The new JSpoOC Mission System being deployed will provide enhanced computing

capability in order to provide better detection and characterization of orbital and hostile threats,

but other capabilities are required to complement the SSN in order to provide complete SSA.176

Although the US has tried to do it all by themselves, the complex nature of SSA has proven a

tough challenge. Those efforts have been further complicated by the harsh fiscal realities, which

have affected space military spending.177

Sharing SSA knowledge is mutually beneficial and

helps all spacecraft operators in that it can increase spaceflight safety while minimize the risk of

on-orbit collision by providing threat warning. The importance of SSA in providing a greater

understanding of the RSOs population, space environment and potential threats for the safety of

spaceflight is recognized.178

The US National Space Security Strategy clearly highlights a need

for greater cooperation in the SSA realm to fill the current gaps and add capabilities.179

These

developments have led the Americans to take steps to share SSA information with commercial

entities, as well as seek international SSA partnerships. For example, Canada signed a bilateral

174 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, last updated 29 May 2013,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 175

C. Robert. Kehler, “Implementing the National Security Space Strategy,”… 176


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services... 177


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services…. 178

Rathgeber, Wolfgang, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, and Ray A. Williamson, The Fair and Responsible Use of

Space: An International Perspective…, 78. 179

Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space

Strategy…

58

SSA MOU in 2012.180

Australia, Italy and Japan are other nations with which the US now

possess data sharing arrangements with and more are in the works.181

Moreover, to complement

the JSpOC , the US is pursuing efforts to expand this SSA centre of excellence into a Coalition

Space Operations Center (CSpOC) with its closest allies.182

The Canadian contribution will be

discussed in the next chapter.

The US is not the only country working on providing better SSA. Europe is also putting in place

its own SSA system. This effort is led by the European Space Agency, a civilian organization.183

Russia also possesses a significant network of sensors for SSA mainly focused on LEO objects,

although they do not share the data. In addition, China and India possess extensive telemetry,

tracking and control infrastructure.184

Canadian involvement with SSA was briefly mentioned in

Chapter 3. It is now time to look at Canada’s past, current and future participation and

contribution to SSA.

180

Department of National Defence, “Space Situational Awareness and the Sapphire Satellite,” last

modified 30 January 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=space-situational-awareness-and-the-

sapphire-satellite/hr0e3oag. 181

Warren Fernster, “U.S., Canadian Governments Sign SSA Data-Sharing Accord,” Space News, vol. 25,

No. 2, 13 January 2014: 3. 182

C. Robert. Kehler, “Implementing the National Security Space Strategy,”… 183


Space: An International Perspective…, 83. 184 Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 12.

59

Figure 4. Description of SSA Functional Capabilities

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, last updated

29 May 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.

60

6. SSA AND THE CAF Canada has a long history in SSA. It started under NORAD with the installation of a Baker-Nunn

camera at RCAF Station Cold Lake, Alberta in 1961 and another one a few years later in St.

Margaret, New Brunswick. In the 1990’s, the Baker-Nunn cameras were discontinued due to

obsolescence and Canada looked at ways to continue contributing to the SSN.185

In parallel with

the National Defence ground-based SSA efforts, the Department of External Affairs (a precursor

to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development) sponsored a study in the mid-

1980s for a space-based remote sensing sensor for arms treaty verification from space, referred

to as PAXSAT, although this initiative never resulted in a satellite development program.186

In

1996, the Americans launched an experimental space-based optical sensor to track RSOs, the

Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) with for payload the Space-Based Visible (SBV) sensor.187

Due to SBV’s mission effectiveness, it was later operationalized and integrated as a contributor

sensor to the US SSN until 2008.188

With SBV, Canada saw a potential niche that would

continue its involvement in SSN. National Defence henceforth put in place the Surveillance of

Space Project. The option analysis identified a small optical satellite as the best way forward,

which would be named Sapphire. It would be complementing the American Space Based Space

185 Paul Maskell, and Lorne Oram, “Sapphire: Canada’s Answer to Space-Based Surveillance of Orbital

Objects,”… 186

Walter Dorn, “Paxsat: A Canadian Initiative in Arms Control.” Peace Magazine (October-November

1987): 17, last accessed 9 August 2014, http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v03n5p17.htm; Department of Foreign

Affairs, Trade and Development, “PAXSAT ’A’ Space Remote Sensing: Space-to-Space,” DFATD Library, vol. 1,

January 1985, last accessed 7 August 2014, http://dfait-

aeci.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b4108942E_001#ooe.b4108942E_001/16?r=0&s=1&_suid=14076122145750 04656093

3163765195. 187

Grant H. Stokes, et al., “The Space-Based Visible Program,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory Journal, vol. 11,

no. 2 (1998), last accessed 5 June 2014, https://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/journal/pdf/vol11_no2/11_2space.pdf. 188

Herbert J. Kramer, “Space-Based Surveillance System,” Earth Observation Portal, last accessed 20

February 2014. https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/s/sbss.

61

Surveillance (SBSS) satellite, which was launched in 2010.189

Sapphire was delivered to orbit in

February 2013 and is the first Canadian operational military satellite. The spacecraft has now

completed commissioning and is producing hundreds of daily observations that are fed directly

to the SSN as a contributing sensor to the network.190

Another Canadian spacecraft was launched at the same time as Sapphire, this one a R&D

microsatellite. This satellite is a joint technology demonstrator between National Defence and

the CSA with two primary missions. The first is a CSA mission to track asteroids referred to as

Near Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat). The second is led by the Defence Research

and Development Centre-Ottawa (DRDC-O) and has for main objective to track man-made

objects in space to support SSA, called High Earth Orbit Space Surveillance (HEOSS).191

The

latter mission is very similar to that of Sapphire, the difference being that it is aiming at

demonstrating the utility of microsatellites to perform space-based surveillance of the space

environment. It also seeks to further explore what can be done for SSA with a small space-based

optical sensor and how it can help filling some of the current gaps.

In parallel with the development of space-based SSA systems, Canada signed a bilateral SSA

MOU with the US, which was followed in 2012 by a SSA Data Sharing Agreement, tightening

the bilateral cooperation. This accord allows for streamlined access to critical information

pertaining to the planning of satellite manoeuvres, collision prevention and support in case of

189 Department of Defense, “Space-Based- Space Surveillance,” last updated 26 March 2013,

http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=20523. 190 Paul Maskell, “Sapphire: Progress and Status,” ... 191

Lauchie Scott, Martin Lévesque, and Stefan Thorsteinson, “Toward Microsatellite Based Space

Situational Awareness,” AMOS technical Paper, 2013, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.amostech.com/TechnicalPapers/2013/International_Programs/SCOTT.pdf.

62

anomalies.192

In order to better exploit this SSA information and provide more timely space

effects to soldiers, sailors and airmen/airwomen, the CAF stood up the CANSpOC as part of the

CSpOC in 2012.193

In addition to providing burden-sharing with allies, one of the main goal of

the CANSpOC is to access all relevant SSA information focusing especially on Canadian space

assets of interests, including commercial space systems the CAF are dependent upon.194

The

CANSpOC will “deliver the critical space enablers to our forces and our strategic partners within

government in close cooperation with our allies around the world”.195

It is expected to reach full

operational capability in 2015.

In addition to ongoing activities with Sapphire, NEOSSat/HEOSS and the CANSpOC,

significant efforts are being made to look at follow-on capabilities. For example, the Surveillance

of Space 2 project has recently completed its option analysis to continue the Canadian SSA

contribution after Sapphire. Although Sapphire was only launched in 2013 and has a design life

of five years, the traditional length of space project development means that the follow-on

endeavour needs to be started now to ensure that the new capability will be in place before

Sapphire is retired. After a thorough examination, the recommended option for the project is for

a mix of ground and space-based systems.196

The Sapphire follow-on is not only important for

Canada to continue its SSA contribution, but also due to the SSN gap in space-based sensors.

192 Warren Fernster, “U.S., Canadian Governments Sign SSA Data-Sharing Accord,”… 193




Department of National Defence, “Draft Concept of Operations – Canadian Space Operations Center,”

Ottawa, 2014; Brigadier General Rick Pitre, Director General Space Testimony in House of Commons, Standing






Paul Maskell, “Option Analysis for the Surveillance of Space 2 Project,” Department of National

Defence, 16 April 2014.

63

Currently, the US SBSS is also on orbit but its follow-on will not be launched until 2021 mainly

due to an austere fiscal environment which delayed the program.197

This will leave a four-year

potential gap in American systems; hence the Canadian SSA contribution becomes even more

critical.198

Moreover, the US has identified a requirement for further capabilities to be developed in the SSA

area. For example, it is necessary to improve the tracking of RSOs, especially those smaller in

size that are currently not detectable, provide better characterization and object identification,

and increase computer analysis power. In addition, it is necessary to enhance the capability to

detect anomalies and differentiate between non-intentional and hostile behaviour in space.199

By

continuing investing in SSA capabilities, Canada can once again help fill the gap.

On the R&D side, there are also plans to continue SSA research. The NEOSSat/HEOSS science

is expected to start in the later part of 2014. The microsatellite will be a key asset to observe

RSO’s of interest, detect anomalies and look at SSA aspects operational space-based sensors do

not have time to focus on. Furthermore, a new ambitious SSA focused research project was

recently approved. It will further SSA expertise in RSO detection and identification, trend

analysis, assessment of emerging technologies and explore ways of improving SSA capabilities

to fill identified gaps.200


Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services... 198

Gruss, Mike. “With SBSS Follow-on in Limbo, U.S. Space Surveillance Gap Looms.” Space News, vol.

25, No. 8, 24 February 2014:1. 199



Department of National Defence, “Charter for Space Situational Awareness and Emerging Technologies

Project,” Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa, April 2014.

64

7. HOW CAN SSA SUPPORT SPACE DETERRENCE? It is now appropriate to present the arguments for how SSA can support space deterrence. As

discussed in Chapter 2, two main conditions are required for successful deterrence. The first is

related to having the capability to inflict significant damage as a result of a space attack and the

second refers to the intent to actually use that capability in response. There is currently no

‘defence or deterrence strategy to prevent an attack on space assets’201

However there is a need

to influence the cost benefits analysis as to no longer favor potential enemies.

SSA in itself does not fulfill any of the two conditions for space deterrence. However because

deterrence is dependent on knowing the state of play, SSA becomes a critical piece of any space

deterrence posture.202

It is the foremost enabler.203

US General John F. Sheldon stated: “effective

deterrence is strengthened by the fact that SSA could potentially indicate the nature and origin of

any attempted attack on a satellite”.204

Ultimately, SSA helps to maintain the peaceful use of

space by providing better awareness of what is ‘out there’ and enabling attribution.205

As discussed at Chapter 5, SSA allows for the identification and tracking of RSOs in order to

provide warning of potential collisions in orbit. It also provides the means to differentiate

between natural and hostile actions in space through the identification of anomalies and

provision of warning and information on various satellites which can then by processed to allow

201 Toffler Associates, Protecting our Space Capabilities: Securing the Future…, 4. 202 Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,”… 203



John B. Sheldon, “Space Power and Deterrence: Are we serious?” (Washington, DC: The Marshall

Institute, November 2008), last accessed 20 February 2014, http://marshall.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/08/616.pdf. 205


Space: An International Perspective…, 77.

65

for proper response or to minimize damage caused to space assets.206

SSA has inherent

deterrence importance, because if hostile agents recognize that their disruption could be quickly

detected, correctly attributed and advertised, they would have to consider the potential long-term

impact of angering their target owner. If that would be the US or a close ally, the punishments

could be significant.207

Moreover, SSA contributes to space stability and security by “preventing misunderstandings and

false accusations of hostile actions”. If the SSA data is shared, it furthers its contribution to

space sustainability as it becomes a type of CBM by increasing transparency.208

If it is not

possible to attribute disruption accurately, then potential adversaries could see that as an

opportunity to hamper allied space systems access without the risk of retaliation. Therefore

reliable SSA and better understanding the space environment becomes essential to allied forces

for space deterrence.209

8. CANADA, SPACE DETERRENCE AND SSA

The previous chapters have explored space governance, the space deterrence concept, Canada’s

close relationship with the US, the space threats and SSA. Some key points have been

ascertained:

a. Space governance is incomplete. Aside from the outdated 1967 OST, there are no

internationally legally binding agreements addressing space weaponization and

ensuring space security and sustainability. Although there have been attempts at

206 Michael Krepon, “Responding to China’s Counter-space Capabilities,”… 207 RAND Corporation, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment…, 48. 208 Project Ploushares, Space Security Index 2013…, 12. 209


Space: An International Perspective…, 100.

66

developing a new treaty, there does not seem to be much appetite by the

preeminent space nations to adopt another legally binding agreement. Instead the

trend is for CBMs and codes of conduct, which are less restrictive but still allow

for some internationally acceptable space guidelines to be established. There is

also no international body that could enforce these ‘rules of the road’, although

the UN Security Council could fill this role as this would contribute to

maintaining peace and security.210

With more and more countries possessing

space assets and an even higher number increasingly dependent on space data and

services, the lack of space governance and international space authority is

concerning;

b. Space deterrence is complex. It does not follow the traditional nuclear deterrence

model on several aspects, most notably because there are more than two primary

actors and potential hostile threats to space systems are more widespread than

during the Cold War. Furthermore, ASAT technology is not mandatory for space

deterrence. There are many other ways to establish a space deterrence posture

such as through disaggregation and diplomatic means. Canada is already involved

in most of these approaches and it is assumed that it holds an informal space

deterrence posture;

c. The unique CA-US relationship in the space arena dates back to the beginning of

the space age. It has endured despite the sometimes wavering Canadian political

210 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Charter, last accessed 20 February 2014,

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml.

67

commitment. Due to the net security and military advantage provided by space

assets, space data and services have been increasingly integrated into military

operations. Therefore both countries are heavily reliant on space systems. Canada

is highly dependent on the Americans for the provision of satellite

communications, PNT, imagery and weather to name a few. Although new

Canadian government systems are being planned and developed, the fiscal and

political reality is such that it is extremely doubtful that Ottawa could become

self-sufficient in the next decade. Hence any threat to American systems that

Canada is dependent upon should be of great interest;

d. Threats to space systems exist. There are an increasing number of nations already

in possession or developing technologies that could cause both reversible and

irreversible damage to space systems. There are also a growing number of non-

state actors with the capabilities to interfere or cause severe damage to space

assets and infrastructure. Satellite systems are inherently vulnerable despite

efforts to increase their protection; therefore they make excellent targets for

asymmetric attacks;

e. SSA has been a strategic space area for Canada since the 1960s. Through

relatively small contributions, the CAF have obtained a tremendous amount of

data in return. Through the Surveillance of Space 2 project and the defence R&D

SSA program, efforts are continuing. SSA has secured Canada’s position as a

space faring nation and a responsible space user. Canada has developed a niche

68

capability that is contributing to making the space common safer and more stable.

Gaps in SSA capabilities have been recognized and with its SSA history, Canada

is extremely well positioned to continue making a significant contribution in this

area, both through capital investments and R&D activities; and

f. SSA is a key element for space deterrence as it provides the ability to differentiate

between natural or unintended interference with space assets of interest and

malicious intent. It also allows for attribution, which is critical in identifying the

perpetrator and hence determining the proper response.

It is now time to return to the original question this research paper is attempting to answer: Will

continued involvement in SSA by the CAF positively contribute to Canada’s space deterrence

posture? Three arguments points to the affirmative. The first is related to the close link between

effective space deterrence and SSA, the second is focused on the CA-US relationship, and the

last argument is linked to the extension of the Canadian SSA involvement. Each will be further

discussed below.

SSA is a key enabler of any space deterrence stance. It is absolutely essential to be able to

correctly attribute any disruption to space systems. Without the capacity to identify the

perpetrator, it would not be possible to devise the right response. Without knowing the state or

organization behind the hostile act, it would be unfeasible to identify with certainty its intent and

hence extremely challenging to tailor a space deterrence strategy. Canada’s direct involvement

with SSA through the US SSN and recent CANSpoC establishment increase Canadian SSA

knowledge and the ability to differentiate between unintentional and hostile interference.

69

Furthermore, the important research efforts in this area enable better detection and identification

techniques to be developed and used operationally. Consequently, because SSA is such a critical

element for successful space deterrence, the CAF’ participation in SSA strengthens the Canadian

space deterrence posture.

Secondly, Canada has been linked to the US in SSA since the beginning of space exploitation.

The US possess the most extensive SSA network and expertise in the world. Other countries are

building and expanding their capabilities, but none can rival the Americans yet. Canada enjoys a

privileged relationship with the US in SSA and is currently the only foreign country with a

national asset as a contributing sensor to the SSN. Moreover, Sapphire is only one of two active

space-based systems devoted to the SSA (the other being the US SBSS), which offers a key

vantage point to observe RSOs above LEO. Through this direct contribution and unique

partnership, Canada benefits from access to key SSA data obtained by other sensors and can

leverage American analysis expertise. Therefore Canada not only gets data from its own assets,

but also has access to the considerable American SSA apparatus. If a potential adversary were to

attempt attacking Canadian space systems or those it is dependent upon, both Canadian and

American SSA could be used to identify the offender, which would greatly reduce the chance

that it would remain anonymous. Although Ottawa’s stance on space deterrence is not clearly

stated as of yet, it is understood that any serious interference or attack on space systems used for

national security would not go unanswered. The government’s refusal to launch a Canadian

defence technology demonstrator from Russia in response to Moscow’s behaviour in Crimea and

Ukraine highlights the fact that the space systems are key national assets even if their capability

is limited as in the case of research spacecraft. If a hostile agent knew there would be high

70

chances that it would be identified, its willingness to attack would be greatly diminished if it was

not in a position to sustain significant retaliation. Hence Canadian SSA participation with the US

supports a stronger space deterrence posture.

Finally, the third argument is related to the level of Canadian SSA involvement. The last ten

years have seen a significant increase in SSA spending, most notably through the establishment

of a ground-based optical research sensor as well as a space asset (Sapphire). This has led to

closer ties with the US, but also greatly contributed to the development of indigenous space

expertise. A case in point, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is now

recognized as a SSA centre of excellence by the GoC and its allies, and has launched a SSA

technology demonstrator (NEOSSat) in 2013, it also hosts world-renowned SSA experts.

Furthermore the recent stand-up of the CANSpOC has brought a more operational element to

SSA in Canada, as it is collocated with the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) Centre.

In addition, the CSA is also aspiring to play a greater role in SSA, which will broaden the

Canadian SSA expertise outside the defence area. Through the ongoing activities related to the

Surveillance of Space 2 project, which aims at continuing the Canadian contribution to SSA and

the SSA R&D program, Canada demonstrates that it is considering SSA as a strategic capacity

and it is committed to allocating resources from the limited pool available to this space area.

Continued National Defence investment and work devoted to SSA in filling the gaps will further

increase the capabilities and expertise. It is therefore reasonable to expect that with continued

investment, better SSA will be available to Canada, either through more sensitive or better

positioned sensors or through improved analytical capabilities. It will then become even easier to

differentiate between malevolent interference with Canadian satellites of interest or natural event

71

effects. Even if it is assumed that hostile actors will also continue to develop ASAT technologies

and other asymmetric means to disrupt space systems, better SSA will always be valuable and

allow the friendly force to maintain an advantage. If the work continues on both sides at the same

rate, this superiority should prevail. Continuing to invest in SSA and ensuring that involvement

is advertised will positively contribute to Canada’s space deterrence position. Exploring

collaborative opportunities in SSA with Russia and China could also reinforce space deterrence.

If Canada was to stop its involvement with SSA and focus on other areas of its space program,

what impact would it have? First, SSA is increasingly important to better understand the

environment as more and more spacecraft are being launched. The international community

recognizes the requirement for better SSA and more countries are developing systems for that

purpose. If Ottawa, after years of involvement in the area, decided to no longer invest in SSA, it

is expected that it would reflect poorly on the country as this is a domain clearly identified as

critical for space flight safety. Secondly, Canada’s SSA participation is closely linked to that of

the US. It is doubtful whether the Americans would still share all of their data without any

contribution in return. As the need for SSA data would still remain as long as Canada owns

spacecraft and is dependent on space assets (which will continue for the foreseeable future),

Canada would most likely be relegated at getting only a scrubbed down version of the data,

similar to those provided to commercial entities and other minor space player. Canada would

lose its privileged status at least on the SSA realm and could miss key information that could

impact the safety of its assets. Third, there would be a loss of national expertise in the area that

has taken years to acquire and therefore Canada could no longer be considered as a leader in

SSA research. Finally, losing expertise and access to critical SSA information would also

72

negatively impact the Canadian space deterrence position. Without key SSA data and analysis,

attribution would be much more difficult in case of a space system disruption. It would deprive

Canada of this key space deterrence enabler. Now, what is the probability that Canada would

stop investing in SSA? It is estimated very low. As Colonel André Dupuis, Acting DGSpace

stated in 2014: “SSA will not only remain a strategic area for Canada, but it will grow”.211

The

ongoing and future planned activities indicate that SSA involvement will in fact continue.

CONCLUSION

The security environment is complex and is expected to remain so.212

There are now tens of

space actors and with space technologies becoming increasingly easier to acquire, it is

anticipated that this number will continue to grow. Most actors are using space capabilities to

better lives and to improve the management of resources, but the intent of some other nations

and organizations are not as clear and could even be hostile to Canada and its allies. Satellite

systems are inherently fragile. This vulnerability combined with a significant dependence on

space systems and the proliferation of space agents, some who could have unfriendly intentions,

creates an unhealthy situation that if realized could negatively impact the Canadian way of life.

In other words, this combination yields a fertile ground for hostile entities to consider space

systems as targets for disruption. Depending on the level of interference or damage created, it

could have dire consequences.

Ideally, any conflict involving space systems should be avoided. Deterring anyone from

disrupting Canada’s space systems or those it is dependent upon should be a national strategic

211 André Dupuis, personal conversation, 9 May 2014. 212

Department of National Defence, The Future Security Environment 2013-2040…

73

objective. Although all the right elements for effective space deterrence are present in Canadian

space related efforts, a formal space deterrence stance has not been developed and advertised by

the government. Red lines detailing which level of disruption could be tolerated would need to

be established as well. SSA allows for the monitoring of the space environment and enables the

attribution of space events affecting space systems. Hence Canadian active involvement in SSA

allows for the detection and characterization of hostile offenders and for the determination of

when a red line threshold has been crossed. SSA therefore becomes a key element for space

deterrence.

It has been argued that Canada holds an informal space deterrence posture. This position is

reinforced through participation in SSA activities, both nationally and with the US. It was further

established that continued investments in the SSA realm will positively contribute to Canada’s

space deterrence posture. Although this paper has mostly explored SSA’s role in space

deterrence, Chapter 2 has highlighted that there are several ways to reinforce space deterrence

which do not require a kinetic ASAT program or other active space countermeasures. It would be

in Ottawa’s best interest to more seriously consider adopting a formal space deterrence stance

now that the threat to Canadian space assets, although real, can be considered to be low. As a

Schriever Wargame clearly demonstrated, once hostilities appear imminent it is extremely

difficult to plan and establish an effective space deterrence position.213

Recent discussions on space security at high levels of the Canadian government are a good sign

that there is more political interest to address this issue. Canada has already made great strides

towards space deterrence; a consolidated position considering its closest allies would better

213 Susan Helms, “Schriever Wargame 2010: Thoughts on Deterrence in the Non-Kinetic Domain,”…,

74

prepare the nation if the threat level was to increase while strengthening Canada’s role in

international space security.

75

APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF KINETIC ASAT TESTS

The following tables present successful kinetic ASAT tests. 214

US KINETIC ASAT TESTS

Program/Operation Date of Test

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Target

Object

Interceptor

Object

Interceptor

type

Trackable

Debris

Created

ASM-135 13/09/1985 Solwind ASM-135 Direct ascent 285

Burnt Frost 21/02/2008 USA 193 LEAP* Direct ascent 174

*LEAP: Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile, launched from a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3).

SOVIET KINETIC ASAT TESTS


(dd/mm/yyyy)

Target

Object

Interceptor

Object

Intercept

or type

Trackable

Debris

Created

Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS)

20/10/1968 Cosmos 248

Cosmos 249, Cosmos 252 (IS)

Co-orbital 251


23/10/1970 Cosmos 273

Cosmos 374, Cosmos 375 (IS)

Co-orbital 145


25/02/1971 Cosmos 394

Cosmos 397 (IS) Co-orbital 116


03/12/1971 Cosmos 459



17/12/1976 Cosmos 880



19/05/1978 Cosmos 970

Cosmos 1009 (IS-M)

Co-orbital 5


18/04/1980 Cosmos 1171

Cosmos 1174 (IS-M*)

Co-orbital 41


18/06/1982 Cosmos 1375

Cosmos 1379 (IS-M)

Co-orbital 3

*Upgraded version of the IS interceptor.

CHINESE KINETIC ASAT TESTS


(dd/mm/yyyy)

Target

Object

Interceptor

Object

Intercept

or type

Trackable

Debris

Created

Unknown 11/01/2007 Fengyun 1C

SC-19 Direct ascent

3280

214

Weeden, Brian, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space.”

Secure World Foundation, 17 March 2014. Last accessed 20 February 2014.

http://swfound.org/media/167224/Through_a_Glass_Darkly_March2014.pdf.

76

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