JEŠIĆ - ekof.bg.ac.rs · «pragmatični kejnzijanci». Slično se može reći i za povratak originalnoj teoriji Džona Majnarda Kejnsa, koja je iz različitih teorijskih i pragmatičnih

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EKONOMSKEIDEJE I PRAKSA

BROJ 24

KVARTALNI ČASOPIS IZ OBLASTI EKONOMIJE, POSLOVNE EKONOMIJE I MENADŽMENTA, STATISTIKE I POSLOVNE INFORMATIKEEKONOMSKI FAKULTET UNIVERZITETA U BEOGRADU / BEOGRAD, MART 2017 WWW.EKOF.BG.AC.RS/PUBLIKACIJE/CASOPISI/EKONOMSKE-IDEJE-I-PRAKSA/ U

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EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSAKVARTALNI ČASOPIS IZ OBLASTI EKONOMIJE, POSLOVNE EKONOMIJE I MENADŽMENTA, STATISTIKEI POSLOVNE INFORMATIKE

IzdavačCentar za izdavačku delatnostEkonomskog fakulteta u BeograduKamenička 6, tel. 3021-045, faks 3021-065E-mail:[email protected]

Dekan Ekonomskog fakultetaProf. dr Branislav Boričić

Priprema i štampaČUGURA Print, Beogradwww.cugura.rs

Godina2017.

REDAKCIJA ČASOPISA EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA

Glavni urednik časopisaprof. dr Miomir Jakšić

Urednici časopisaprof. dr Marko Backovićprof. dr Vlade Milićevićprof. dr Aleksandra Praščevićprof. dr Saša Veljković

Sekretar redakcijeMilutin Ješić

Tehnički sekretarIva Dimitrijević

Kontakt redakcijeTelefon: +381 11 3021 210Faks: +381 11 2639 560e-mail: [email protected]

Članovi Redakcijeprof. dr Marko Backovićprof. dr Predrag Bjelićprof. dr Zoran Bogetićprof. dr Božidar Cerovićprof. dr Čedomir Čupićprof. dr Radmila Dragutinović - Mitrovićprof. dr Ðorđe Ðukićprof. dr Nikola Fabrisprof. dr Miomir Jakšićprof. dr Nebojša Janićijevićprof. dr Radovan Kovačevićprof. dr Vlade Milićevićprof. dr Aleksandra Praščevićprof. dr Gojko Rikalovićprof. dr Žaklina Stojanovićprof. dr Miroslav Todorovićprof. dr Saša Veljkovićprof. dr Siniša Zarić

International Editorial BoardSnježana Brkić, professor, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and HerzegovinaVeselin Drašković, professor, University of Montenegro, MontenegroDavor Dujak, professor, University of Osijek, CroatiaGordana Ðurović, professor, University of Montenegro, MontenegroRana Eskinat, professor, Anadoly University, TurkeyIrena Kikerkova, professor, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, FYRMYoji Koyama, professor emeritus, Niigata University, JapanPerica Macura, professor, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and HerzegovinaÐuro Medić, professor, University of Zagreb, CroatiaBožo Mihailović, professor, University of Montenegro, MontenegroMićo Radović, professor, University of Montenegro, MontenegroSrđan Redžepagić, professor, University Nice Sophia Antipolis, FranceYannis Tsekouras, professor emeritus, University of Macedonia, Greece

SADRŽAJ

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMAAleksandra Praščević

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVALjubodrag SavićDragana RadičićVladimir Mićić

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?Gorana Krstić

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIESYilmaz Bayar

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -Dragan AleksićNemanja Vuksanović

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5Amir Fejzić

ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECEMilutin Ješić

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ALEKSANDRA PRAŠČEVIĆ1

E-mail: [email protected]

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMAFROM THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS TO THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM

JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: F50, F2, P10

APSTRAKT:

Cilj ovog rada je da se razmotre konsekvence koje je globalna ekonomska kriza imala na promene ne samo svakodnevne ekonomske politike, već i na globalni kapitalizam. Kriza savremenog kapitalizma svoje uporište ima u dugotrajnoj ekonomskoj stagnaciji (tokom «ere sekularne stagnacije») koja još uvek traje, a koja je dovela do pooštrovanja konflikata u okviru nacionalnih ekonomija, usled pogoršane ekonomske perspektive građana, ali i konflikata između zemalja koji potiču od konfrontiranja dva ekonomska modela: libe-ralnog i merkantilističkog, čija je uspešna kohabitacija u prošlosti omogućavala globalni ekonomski rast, ali i korist za obe strane. Odgovor u vodećim ekonomijama u vidu uspona politike ekonomskog nacionalizma, protekcionizma i ograničavanja slobodnog kretanja roba, kapitala i ljudi koji je prisutan u populističkoj retorici je neadekvatan jer zane-maruje prave izvore problema – tendencije da se razlike između kolektivnih društvenih aktera povećavaju u svetu neoliberalizma. Rešenja koja se predlažu govore o krajnje po-

1 Ekonomski Fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA8jednostavljenom pristupu koji ne može dovesti do prevazilaženja ekonomskih i društvenih problema, već je neophodan novi društveni konsenzus.

ABSTRACT:

The aim of this paper is to consider the consequences that the global economic crisis has had on the changes not only of everyday economic policy conducting, but also on the global capitalism. The crisis of modern capitalism has its foundation in the long-term economic stagnation (during the "era of secular stagnation"), which is still ongoing, and that led to escalation of conflicts within the national economy, due to reduced economic perspective of citizens, as well as conflicts between countries stemming from the con-frontation between two economic models: the liberal and mercantilist, whose successful cohabitation allowed in the past global economic growth, but also the benefit for both sides. The answers provided in populist rhetoric of politicians in leading economies in the form of the rise of economic nationalism, protectionism and numerous restrictions for the free movement of goods, capital and people are inadequate because they ignore the true source of the problem - the tendency of capitalism to widen differences between col-lective social actors in the world of neoliberal globalization. Suggested solutions include extremely simplified approach that can not lead to overcoming the economic and social problems in modern capitalism; instead of them a new social consensus should be made.

KLJUČNE REČI:GLOBALNA EKONOMSKA KRIZA, KAPITALIZAM, EKONOMSKA POLITIKA

KEY WORDS:GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS, CAPITALISM, ECONOMIC POLICY


1. UVODDeset godina nakon što je zvanično otpočela dvogodišnja recesija u SAD-u (decembar 2007 – jun 2009), a koja je ubrzo prerasla u globalnu ekonomsku krizu, svetska ekono-mija ukazuje da je i dalje zarobljena u epizodi prolongiranog usporenog rasta. Objašnjenja ovakvih nepovoljnih ekonomskih kretanja tokom protekle decenije su bila mnogobrojna, zasnovana na različitim teorijskim konceptima. Slično se može reći i za primenjene mere ekonomske politike. Iako je sama globalna recesija imala sve elemente standardnog ci-kličnog pada, specifičnost se odnosila na njenu oštrinu, brzinu globalnog širenja i ne-poznanicu o efektima preduzetih mera ekonomske politike. Svi navedeni elementi su ukazivali na zaključak da se ona može porediti sa Velikom Depresijom iz 1930-ih, a mere ekonomske politike su bile kontraciklične u pokušaju da se oporavi agregatna tražnja i to na globalnom nivou. Ekspanzivne monetarna i fiskalna politika koje su ekstenzivno primenjivane u velikom broju zemalja, u cilju podsticanja privredne aktivnosti i izlaska iz recesije, bile su kejnzijanskog karaktera a na scenu su posle više decenija stupili tzv. «pragmatični kejnzijanci». Slično se može reći i za povratak originalnoj teoriji Džona Majnarda Kejnsa, koja je iz različitih teorijskih i pragmatičnih razloga gotovo u potpuno-sti zanemarivana u glavnom toku makroekonomije od monetarističke revolucije i uspona neoliberalnog ekonomskog, ali i političkog projekta. Međutim, na početku recesije nije bilo moguće predvideti ne samo njeno trajanje, već još više u kojoj će meri oporavak biti slab i dugotrajan. Slično je i sa problemima javnih finansija koji su primarno nastali kao posledica kombinacije preduzetih mera ekonomske politike, finansijske krize i oštre rece-sije, ali i post-recesione stagnacije. Upravo su ovi problemi doveli do toga da se nakon kejnzijanskih mera za otklanjanje recesije, preduzmu potpuno suprotne mere – štednje (engl. austerity measures) i fiskalne konsolidacije u velikom broju zemalja, izazivajući dodatne recesione pritiske i produžavajući stagnaciju.

Pored mnogih pitanja vezanih za konkretne mere ekonomske politike, tokom poslednje decenije su pokrenuta i dublja konceptualna i teorijska pitanja karaktera kapitalizma i naročito njegovih oscilacija. U prvi plan je tako došlo pitanje rastuće nejednakosti u ras-podeli kao jedno od ključnih mogućih uzročnika prolongirane krize. Istovremeno, kreatori ekonomske politike suočili su se i sa problemom gubitka poverenja građana u buduća ekonomska kretanja, ili konkretnije – u kapitalizam. Ovo je naročito prisutno u vodećim ekonomijama.

Upravo su navedene teme u fokusu ovog rada, kao i pitanje da li se mogu očekivati konceptualne promene u pravcu značajnijeg prihvatanja tzv. državnog kapitalizma, ali i protekcionizma i ekonomskog nacionalizma, kao posledica prolongirane stagnacije, ili je u pitanju samo pooštrena i populistička retorika kreatora politike koji pokušavaju da povrate poverenje svojih građana u politiku i budućnost kapitalizma i obezbede izbornu pobedu.

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA10

2. STANJE GLOBALNE EKONOMIJE U ERI SEKULARNE STAGNACIJEMeđu mnogim teorijskim objašnjenjima stanja svetske privrede u protekloj deceniji je i ono koje prati koncept razvijen od strane jednog od najvažnijih američkih kejnzijanaca – Alvina Hansena (Summers, 2016), koji je baveći se američkom privredom tokom 1930-ih govorio o «eri sekularne stagnacije» utvrđujući faktore koji su do nje doveli i ukazujući na moguće načine za njeno prevazilaženje. Hansen je, naime, izdvojio kao najznačajniji problem – nemogućnost sistema da dostigne punu zaposlenost u uslovima nepostojanja programa kojim bi se stimulisala potrošnja1. Objašnjenje se zasniva na uključivanju i Vikselovog koncepta neutralne kamatne stope, a dugotrajna stagnacija može nastati kao rezultat povećane sklonosti štednji koja nije praćena odgovarajućim povećanjem investi-cija, već upravo suprotno i to usled smanjene agregatne tražnje. Posledice se ogledaju i u snižavanju realne kamatne stope koja se spušta ispod nivoa neutralne stope, ne pridono-seći, međutim, rastu održivih investicija, već eventualno rizičnom ponašanju koje može izazvati pregrevanje i pucanje ekonomskog balona i otpočinjanje bolne recesije. Slično se može očekivati i od pada kamatne stope koja je posledica monetarne ekspanzije2. Upra-vo je globalnoj krizi prethodila i globalna neravnoteža između štednje i investicija zbog zasićenja povećanjem štednje na svetskom nivou.3

Diskrepanca između štednje i investicija može biti posledica raspodele dohotka i bogat-stva u korist bogatih koji imaju manju sklonost potrošnji. Ovo je veoma blisko Kejnsovom konceptu efektivne tražnje (Keynes, 1936). Upravo je problem nejednakosti u raspodeli dohotka aktuelizovan od vremena uspona neoliberalnog koncepta i insistiranja na liberal-no-tržišnoj ekonomiji, koja počiva na kapitalu i odustajanju od kejnzijanske države bla-gostanja i kapitalizma pune zaposlenosti. To je vremenom u posebno nepovoljnu poziciju stavilo one koji primaju radne dohotke (radničku i srednju klasu). Nedostatak intervencije u raspodeli kroz bilo kakvu politiku raspodele, što se duguje neoklasičnom političkom projektu, decenijama je u vodećim zapadnim ekonomijama prevazilažen stabilnim eko-nomskim rastom, kao i olakšanim zaduživanjem stanovništva. Međutim, globalna kriza je stavila tačku na takve mogućnosti, doprinoseći da problem raspodele, koji nije preko noći nastao, postane očigledan. Na probleme raspodele koji su intenzivirani od 1980-ih i pobede neoliberalnog koncepta, ukazao je Piketi, o čemu će u radu još biti reči (Piketi, 2015).

Stanje globalne ekonomije danas u mnogome nalikuje na objašnjenja koje je ponudio Hansen (Praščević, 2016). To se prvenstveno odnosi na nisku stopu rasta svetske eko-nomije (WGP), koja značajno zaostaje za decenijom pre krize – prosečna stopa od 2012. godine je 2.5%, za razliku od pretkriznih 3.4% (1998-2007)4. Ovakve tendencije se

1 Hansen (1939), str. 42 Primersemoženaćiuameričkojmonetarnojpoliticiuperioduprekrize,natržištunekretnina2006.godineisloma

tržištahipotekarnihkredita,kadasunapravljeneočiglednegreškeuprevazilaženjublageikratkerecesijeiz2001.go-dine,odstupanjemodTejlorovogpravila–previšeekspanzivnamonetarnapolitikakojajeomogućiladanovacpostanejeftinilakodostupan.(Praščević(2008),str.50)

3 Tojezaposledicuimalosniženjeneutralnekamatnestopeširomsveta.OvojeprvenstvenopoticaloodvisokihnetosuficitazabeleženihuNemačkoj,Japanu,SrednjemIstoku,anajznačajnijisubiliuKiniinaDalekomIstoku.(Prašče-vić(2012),str.52)

4 WorldEconomicSituationandProspects,UnitedNations(2017)


duguju niskim stopama rasta u mnogim regionima sveta – prvenstveno u razvijenim eko-nomijama, ali i padu ekonomija u tranziciji, pa i usporavanju ekonomija sa nastajućim tržištima. To se duguje značajnom usporavanju rasta investicija u mnogim vodećim eko-nomijama, ekonomijama u razvoju i naročito ekonomijama u tranziciji. Iako su kamatne stope i dalje na istorijsko niski nivoima (naročito u EU, uz blagi rast u SAD-u) to ne podstiče u dovoljnoj meri investicije već je i dalje prisutan nepovoljan uticaj u začaranom krugu: tražnja – investicije – trgovina – produktivnost. U njemu se pokazuje da je agregat-na tražnja od ključnog značaja i da su nepovoljni faktori koji su na nju uticali na global-nom nivou, od političkih (nestabilnosti, geopolitičkih konflikata i rizika) do ekonomskih (primena mera štednje, problemi javnih finansija i zaduženosti, izostanak značajnijeg fiskalnog stimulansa i jasne ekonomske politike da se potrošnja podstiče), odlučujući za slab ekonomski rast. Potvrdile su se tako tokom ove prolongirane stagnacije pouke vezane za monetarnu i fiskalnu politiku5 koje su se pokazale kao tačne tokom poslednje globalne krize, a koje su upravo u skladu sa Hansenovim konceptom samo-generišuće stagnacije.

Kao jedan od simptoma globalne stagnacije svakako se pojavljuje usporavanje rasta svet-ske trgovine koje je je 2016. godine zabeležilo jednu od najnižih stopa rasta u poslednjih 30 godina, od svega 1,2%.6 Pored cikličnih faktora to se duguje i strukturi globalne agregatne tražnje, povećanoj ekonomskoj i političkoj neizvesnosti, ali i ograničavanju da-lje liberalizacije koja je tokom 1990-ih i 2000-ih dovela do ekspanzije svetske trgovine. Zbog toga i brinu najave mera ekonomske politike kojima bi se slobodan protok ljudi, kapitala, roba i usluga dalje ograničavao, naročito kada potiče od vodeće svetske eko-nomije – SAD-a. Reč je, naravno, o najavljenim promenama politike novog predsednika SAD-a koje u velikoj meri podsećaju na elemente merkantilističkog sistema7 u domenu protekcionizma i ekonomskog nacionalizma (korišćenjem različitih formi zakonskih ogra-ničenja slobodnih tokova kapitala i roba – carinske i necarinske barijere, zabrana seljenja proizvodnje iz SAD-a u druge zemlje sveta pod pretnjom plaćanja penala), ograničavanja protoka ljudi i sl. Bez obzira što najavljene mere ne nailaze na podršku ostalih poluga vlasti u SAD-u, one i dalje predstavljaju pretnju za buduća globalna kretanja, u najma-njoj meri povećavajući neizvesnost i podstičući i kreatore ekonomske politike u drugim zemljama da se slično ponašaju.

Posebno su važna i nepovoljna kretanja na tržištima rada širom sveta, kao i usporeni rast produktivnosti rada zabeležen u većini razvijenih, kao i ekonomija u razvoju i tranziciji. To se takođe duguje nedovoljnom investiranju zbog čega izostaju inovacije, poboljšanje veština radne snage, kao i poboljšanje kvaliteta infrastukture. Zbog toga su od odluču-jućeg značaja ulaganja u ključna područja, kao što su istraživanje i razvoj, obrazovanje i infrastruktura, a koja su tesno povezana sa državom i njenom ekonomskom politikom jer su u pitanju javne investicije. Davno napuštanje kejnzijanskog koncepta kapitalizma pune

5 Mishkin(2010),Romer(2011)6 WorldEconomicSituationandProspects,UnitedNations(2017)7 Iakojemerkantilizamdavnonapuštenaekonomskadoktrinakojajedominiralausurovomperioduprelaskau

kapitalizamukomesunastajalenacionalnedržave,nacionalnatržišta,aliiobrisisvetskogtržišta,zapravojeonapredstavljalaprvuekonomskuteorijukojasezalagalazadržavnuintervencijuitospecifičnu–uograničavanjuuvozaipodsticanjuizvozaBezobziraštojeovadoktrinazamenjenasuperiornijom–klasičnompolitičkomekonomijomsaidejamaekonomskogliberalizma,univerzalnihekonomskihzakonitostiislobodnetrgovine,nekielementimerkantili-stičkogsistemasuostaliprisutnidodanašnjihdana.Toseprvenstvenoodnosinapodrškudržavenacionalnojprivredi(izvoznoorijentisanojindustriji)ioslanjanjuekonomskograstanaizvoznojtražnji,uzsuzbijanjedomaćetražnje(politi-komzaradaideviznogkursa,kaoiograničavanjemuvozacarinamaikvotama).UnovijojistorijitakavprimermožemonajočiglednijepronaćiuekonomskojpoliticiKine.(JakšićandPraščević(2011),str.13).

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA12zaposlenosti i prepuštanje tržišnim rešenjima na fleksibilnim tržištima rada kojima je tre-balo osloboditi profite i obezbediti izvore za buduća investiranja, koje se u decenijama pre krize pokazalo opravdanim, danas nije tako primamljiva opcija. U velikom broju zemalja se očekuje od države da svojim merama podstakne zapošljavanje, pa čak i u vodećim svetskim ekonomijama, koje su pri tome i kolevke ekonomskog liberalizma.

3. PROMENE DOMINANTNIH TEORIJSKIH KONCEPATA I VARIJETITI KAPITALIZMA Poslednja globalna kriza i post-recesiona stagnacija podsetile su nas da je kapitalizam nestabilan ekonomski sistem i da je tu karakteristiku ispoljavao od samih početaka svog razvoja. Uporedo sa beleženim oscilacijama privredne aktivnosti i ostvarenim ekonom-skim rezultatima, kapitalizam se takođe menjao uključujući različite karakteristike – više ili manje konkurentska tržišta, veću ili manju intervenciju države, značajniju ili manje značajnu regulaciju, čak i državno vlasništvo nad privrednim subjektima i sl. Sve je to određivalo različite varijetete (tipove) kapitalizma koji su se kroz istoriju smenjivali, što je često bila posledica ekonomskih kriza. Uporedo sa ovim promenama išle su promene u dominaciji ekonomskih teorija, koje su se od XX veka prvenstveno odnosile na makroe-konomke škole koje su na različite načine videle mesto i ulogu države i njene ekonomske politike, sposobnosti ekonomskih subjekata da na tržištima deluju, ali i razlike u funk-cionisanju tržišta – veće ili manje postojanje tržišnih neuspeha (engl. makret failures).

Takođe treba istaći da se razlike u tipovima kapitalizma mogu i geografski posmatrati: anglosaksonski (atlanski), kontinentalno – evropski i razvojni (azijski). Postoje i mnoge druge kategorizacije koje razlikuju tipove kapitalizma – «liberalno-tržišne ekonomije» od «koordinisano-tržišnih ekonomija» (Hall and Soskice, 2001)8, ili «racionalni kapitalizam» od «akcionarskog kapitalizma» (Dore, 2002), ili «privatno (liberalni) kapitalizam» na-spram «državnog kapitalizma» (Wolff and Resnick, 2012)9 ili tri tipa kapitalizma – «tržiš-ni kapitalizam», «rukovođeni kapitalizam» i «državni kapitalizam» (Schmidt, 2002). Ove razlike se tiču prvenstveno razlika u karakteristikama: institucija tržišta rada i regulacije, uloge države, karaktera konkurencije, uloge radničkih sindikata, značaja i uloge fiskalne politike, obrazovne politike, inovacija, korporativnog upravljanja i načina finansiranja.

3.1 Posleratne promene u kapitalizmu i globalna ekonomska kriza

Posleratni razvoj kapitalizma otpočeo je značajnom promenom u formi prihvatanja dr-žavne intervencije i razvoja tzv. kejnzijanske države blagostanja. Razloga i opravdanja za primenu državnog kapitalizma bilo je mnogo – od straha od pojave nove recesije, preko potrebe za ubrzanim privrednim oporavkom, izgradnjom infrastrukture i podizanjem proi-zvodnih kapaciteta zemalja koje su iz Drugog svetskog rata izašle razorene. Koncept kapi-

8 HallandSoskice(2001),str.8.9 WolffandResnick(2012),str.311


talizma pune zaposlenosti koji je u tom periodu primenjivan imao je i političko uporište jer je trebalo da obezbedi da kapitalističke ekonomije zaštiti od prodora komunističkih ideja sa Istoka (Sovjetskog bloka), kao i od eventualnog povampirenja u ratu poraženih politič-kih snaga10. Zbog toga je kapitalizam morao da omogući poboljšanje životnog standarda većeg dela stanovništva, poboljša njihovu obrazovnu strukturu i smanji razlike između društvenih klasa (bogatih i siromašnih). Sve je to relativno uspešno obezbedio kejnzija-nizam, sve do trenutka kada su se 1970-ih pojavile atipične recesije, praćene visokim i upornim inflacijama. Uz visoku nezaposlenost i inflaciju, privrede su patile i od pada u visini profitne stope, a rast nadnica je prevazilazio rast produktivnosti. Sve je to zahtevalo radikalni zaokret u formi povratka tržištu i odricanja od kenzijanske države blagostanja.

SLIKA 1: PROMENE U KAPITALIZMU I DOMINANTNE EKONOMSKE TEORIJE

Kejzijanska država blagostanja: ubrzan posleratni ekonomski razvoj, smanjila razlike između društvenih aktera, zasnovana na konceptu kapitalizma pune

zaposlenosti i perspektivi radne snage

Ekonomija slobodnog tržišta:ideološka promena u upravljanju kapitalizmom (deregulacija, liberalizacija i

privatizacija), smanjena uloga rada i pove čćan zna aj kapitala, radikalni antikejnzijanizam u makroekonomiji: nova neoklasična sinteza, uspeh u brobi protiv

inflcije i zna ččajnim stopama ekonomskog rasta (smanjenje cikli nih privrednih fluktuacija)

Recesije 1970-tih, epizode visokih inflacija

Globalna ekonomska kriza (2007 – 09)

Era sekularne stagnacije: Pragmatični kejnzijanizam (2007-10),

Mere fiskalne konsolidacije i štednje zbog problema javnih finansija (od 2010)Usporen ekonomski rast i problemi tržišta rada

Državna intervencija («pro-biznis» država) i elementi merkantilizma

Nakon decenija uspešne primene koncepta makroekonomije slobodnog tržišta i domi-nacije nove neoklasične sinteze zasnovane na poznatim makroekonomskim neutralno-stima11 (hipoteza o životnom ciklusu potrošnje, Modiljani – Milerova teorema, hipoteza o prirodnoj stopi, hipoteza o racionalnim očekivanjima, Rikardo – Barova teorema ekvi-valencije), otpočela je poslednja globalna recesija, koja je podsetila na činjenicu da su ciklične fluktuacije karakteristika tržišnih ekonomija.

Ne čudi uspeh radikalnog antikejnzijanizma i njegov intelektualni monopol u prethod-nim decenijama koji se ogledao i u uticaju na ekonomsku politiku čije su okosnice bile

10 Praščević(2012),str.29-31.11 Akerlof(2007),str.9.

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA14preporuke monetarističke i novoklasičarske makroekonomije – uvođenje pravila umesto diskrecionih prava, jedinstveni cilj monetarne politike u vidu cenovne stabilnosti, uklju-čivanje fiskalnih pravila kojima bi se održavalo zdravlje javnih finansija, unapređenje institucionalnih okvira vođenja makroekonomske politike – nezavisnost centralne banke i obavezivanje monetarnih vlasti, obezbeđenje kredibiliteta i reputacije kreatora ekonom-ske politike. Naime, izgledalo je da se zbog produžavanja perioda ekonomskih ekspanzija i skraćenja i ublažavanja recesija, na ciklične padove može gledati kao na primere iz ekonomske istorije koji se u savremenom kapitalizmu neće ponoviti, prvenstveno zbog napretka u vođenju ekonomske politike koji je poticao iz razvoja savremene makroeko-nomije. Tome je doprineo i važan faktor globalnog prihvatanja neoliberalnog koncepta vođenja ekonomije, kao i uspeh neoliberalnog političkog projekta, koji se ispoljavao u talasima demokratizacije i ekonomske tranzicije u bivšim socijalističkim ekonomijama, ali i u promenama ekonomske politike u zemljama Latinske Amerike nametnutim Vašin-gtonskim konsenzusom, koje nisu uvek bile i uspešne. Upravo je Vašingtonski konsen-zus zbog svoje jednostavnosti i jasnosti postao sinonim za program ekonomskih reformi izgradnje «tvrdog slobodnotržišnog kapitalizma» namenjen tranzicionim zemljama, ali i svim ostalim ekonomijama sa nastajućim tržištima. Takođe je predstavljao i sinonim za glavni tok makroekonomije i preovlađujući liberalni model razvoja12.

3.2 Liberalni naspram merkantilističkog modelaPoznati ekonomista Dani Rodrik odredio je razvoj ekonomske nauke kao borbu između dve suprotstavljene škole: liberalizma i merkantilizma (Rodrik, 2013). On ovu borbu smešta u širi kontekst koji prevazilazi samu merkantilističku doktrinu ili klasičnu političku ekonomiju i neoklasičnu školu, vezujući je za okvir sukoba dve forme kapitalizma: privat-no-liberalnog i državnog kapitalizma. Oni počivaju na različitim ekonomskim modelima, a kao što je u radu već istaknuto u prošlosti se smenjivala njihova dominacija, isto kao što je moguće uočiti i njihovu uspešnu «kohabitaciju» u svetu globalizovane ekonomije.

Već je istaknuto da nisu sve zemlje usvojile liberalni model. Neke su se opredelile i za «merkantilistički model» uključivanjem državne intervencije, direktnih podsticaja do-maćoj privredi u formi različitih subvencija, značajne implementacije industrijske politi-ke, pomoći države nastupu domaće privrede na svetskim tržištima, ali i ograničenjima pristupa stranih kompanija domaćem tržištu, politikom podcenjenog deviznog kursa, ograničenjima domaće tražnje, održavanjem veštački niskih troškova rada (nadnica) radi obezbeđenja konkurentnosti na svetskom tržištu, ali i radi ograničenja uvoza i sl. Ovakav model bio je prisutan u mnogim azijskim ekonomijama, a najekstremniji je primer Kine. Iako ona ne predstavlja primer kapitalističke ekonomije, ona veoma uspešno dobija bitku na svetskim tržištima sa vodećim tržišnim ekonomijama i danas predstavlja drugu ekono-miju sveta, pod i dalje vođstvom Komunističke partije Kine, što ne predstavlja značajno opterećenje za primenu merkantilističkog modela. Naime, merkantilistički metod ne za-hteva nužno političku demokratiju, niti politički liberalizam, već je upravo poželjno su-protno – ograničenje političkih sloboda koje olakšava delovanje države i njenog aparata.

12 Praščević(2014),str.14.


TABELA 1: MERKANTILISTIČKI NASPRAM LIBERALNOG MODELA

Merkantilistički model Liberalni modelCentralno mesto: PROIZVOÐAČ Centralno mesto: POTROŠAČ

Državna intervencija i to u formi države orijentisane na pomoć privrednim subjektima (tzv.

«pro-biznis» država)

Konkurentska tržišta – «ekonomija slobodnog tržišta»

Korporativistički pristup: država i privatni biznis imaju zajedničke ciljeve koje treba realizovati i korišćenjem ekonomske politike i državne

intervencije

Striktna razdvojenost države i privatnog biznisa jer državu opterećuje predatorska priroda, a ponašanje poslovnih ljudi je zasnovano na

aktivnostima traganja za rentom. Njihova simbioza je pogubna za ekonomiju

Značaj IZVOZNE TRAŽNJE kao izvora ekonomskog rasta – izvoz je pokazatelj

ekonomske vitalnosti ekonomije, a uvoz zavisnosti nacionalne ekonomije.

Makroekonomski cilj je obezbediti što veći obim uvoza za manji obim izvoza (Fridman, 1978).

Uvoz može pomoći ekonomski razvoj i rast trgovinske razmene.

Kineska velika ekonomska transformacija kako se naziva kineski ekonomski razvoj u pro-teklih 35 godina primenio je metode koji nalikuju onima primenjenim u periodu prelaska u kapitalizam. Bez obzira na osporavanja ili negodovanje javnosti i političke elite u vode-ćim ekonomijama usmerenim prema zemljama koje primenjuju merkantilistički model, treba ukazati da su obe strane od toga imale koristi.

4. KRIZA GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA I USPON POLITIČKOG POPULIZMAPoslednja globalna kriza nije nas samo podsetila na nestabilan karakter kapitalističkog sistema već i na činjenicu da njega karakterišu dva suprotna procesa – smanjenje i pove-ćanje razlika između kolektivnih društvenih aktera (društvenih klasa). Upravo ove tenden-cije imaju i ekonomske i političke konsekvence. Nakon što je u periodu kejnzijanske drža-ve blagostanja došlo do smanjenja ovih razlika u razvijenim tržišnim ekonomijama, što je bilo i posledica političkih ciljeva u posleratnom periodu kada je bilo potrebno zaustaviti mogući prodor komunističkog uticaja sa istoka, uspon neoliberalnog ekonomskog i poli-tičkog projekta imao je potpuno suprotne efekte. Konsekvence neoliberalne globalizacije, pada socijalističkog bloka i političke demokratizacije bivših socijalističkih zemalja, kao i intenzivnog ekonomskog razvoja ekonomija sa nastajućim tržištima značajno su uticale na promenu ekonomske pozicije ne samo čitavih ekonomija, nego i njihovih građana, a naročito pojedinih segmenata društva. U razvijenim ekonomijama to se prvenstveno odnosi na položaj radničke i srednje klase i to u dva važna elementa:

- promena u ekonomskoj poziciji unutar nacionalne ekonomije koja potiče od rastuće nejednakosti u raspodeli dohotka koja se duguje upravo neoliberalnom konceptu oslo-bađanja kapitala od preobimnog oporezivanja (snižavanjem poreskih stopa i smanjiva-njem progresivnog oporezivanja)13,

13 Piketi(2015)

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA16- promena u poziciji na globalnom nivou usled ekonomskog rasta ekonomija sa nasta-

jućim tržištima, a u Evropi i ekonomija u tranziciji, u kojima je došlo do poboljšanja ekonomske pozicije građana i naročito njihove buduće perspektive (bez obzira što u mnogim od tih zemalja i dalje postoji značajno siromaštvo, teški uslovi rada, neispunje-nost standarda zaštite životne sredine i sl.).

Sve to čini građane vodećih ekonomija nezadovoljnim ekonomskim i političkim sistemom, uključujući i sam koncept demokratskog upravljanja. Ovo nezadovoljstvo se primarno odnosi na nacionalne države, ali u EU je usmereno i na sam koncept i način ustrojstva Evropske Unije. Političke partije na političkoj levici i desnici nemaju odgovore na ovakve ekonomske i društvene izazove, delimično i zato što su oni neočekivani, odnosno zato što je razvoj savremene makroekonomije ukazivao na uspešnost ostvarenog makroekonom-skog konsenzusa u kome je čitav niz danas aktuelnih pitanja bio u potpunosti zanemaren. To se prvenstveno odnosi na zanemarivanje značaja postojanja i delovanja kolektivnih društvenih aktera, insistiranjem na reprezentativnom ekonomskom subjektu, što je pri-sutno još od mikroekonomske revolucije krajem XIX veka, ali je delimično bilo osporeno Kejnsovom i kejnzijanskom ekonomijom, da bi ponovo bilo aktuelizavano u makroeko-nomskoj teoriji monetarizma i Nove klasike. Drugo, zanemarivan je uticaj funkcionalne raspodele dohotka (između faktora proizvodnje – rada i kapitala) na ukupna makroeko-nomska kretanja, na koga su inače u razvoju ekonomske misli ukazivali različiti teoretičari tražnje (od Fransoa Kenea u XVIII veku, preko Marksa u XIX, do Kejnsa i kejnzijanaca u XX veku). Treće, pretpostavljalo se da kapitalizam osigurava i demokratiju.

4.1 Konvergencija ekonomskih ciljeva političkih partija i globalna ekonomska kriza

Uspeh koncepta neoliberalne globalizacije i moderne makroekonomije u vodećim eko-nomijama (SAD-a, EU, Japana) bio je praćen, ili tačnije uslovljen i konvergencijom eko-nomskih ciljeva različitih političkih opcija, u formi približavanja levičarskih i desničarskih partija. To je dovelo do brisanja razlika u domenu ekonomskih ciljeva između partija koje su tradicionalno imale različito biračko telo koje je poticalo od razlika u političkim – ideološkim programima u oblasti ekonomije. Posebno je uočljivo odustajanje od soci-jal-demokratskih i levičarskih ideja. Zbog toga su mnoge partije prestale da budu partije radničke i srednje klase (npr. Demokratska partija u SAD-u ili Laburalistička partija u Britaniji), postavši kontrolisane od liberalne elite koja nije mnogo zainteresovana za po-goršanje pozicije miliona radnika (naročito je to očigledno u SAD-u). Tehnološki napredak i promena proizvodne strukture dovela je do rasta sektora usluga, tako da je smanjen broj proizvodnih radnika u razvijenim ekonomijama što je takođe doprinelo smanjenom inte-resovanju za ovaj segment društva od strane političkih partija. Približavanje ekonomskih politika u vidu odustajanja od ideoloških ciljeva radničke klase bilo je uslovljeno i posto-janjem uspešnog konsenzusa u makroekonomiji koji je značio odustajanje od originalnih Kejnsovih i kejnzijanskih postavki i prihvatanje klasičarskih ideja. S obzirom na decenijski uspeh ovakve ekonomske politike, ove partije nisu imale problem pobede na izborima.

Posledice ovakvog približavanja su bile, međutim, dalekosežne, a danas, u periodu post-recesione stagnacije, su posebno očigledne. Iako su pozitivne posledice bile u smanjenju


uticaja političke nestabilnosti usled smanjenog faktora političke neizvesnosti na makroe-konomsku nestabilnost jer je postalo manje važno koja će politička opcija pobediti na izborima pošto sve imaju veoma slične ekonomske ciljeve, negativne posledice su danas mnogo vidljivije. One se odnose na gubitak poverenja glasača – građana u etablirane poli-tičke partije. To se posebno odnosi na levičarske ili socijal-demokratske partije, zbog čega, paradoksalno, raste zainteresovanost radničke i srednje klase za desničarske partije koje uspešnije koriste populističu retoriku, naročito svaljujući krivicu za loš ekonomski položaj domaćeg stanovništva na ostatak sveta, neretko videvši krivca u globalizaciji, ekonomskoj politici drugih zemalja ili međunarodnim integracijama. Uz uspon populizma, dolazi i do pojave novih političkih pokreta koji lakše od političkih partija okupljaju glasače, ali i dalje sa nejasnim ciljevima koje tek treba artikulisati, gde postoji jasna opasnost da se nakon izbora promene najavljeni ekonomski ciljevi i proklamovana ekonomska politika.

4.2 Primeri SAD-a i Evropske Unije U uslovima izrazitog raslojavanja i rasta nejednakosti u vodećim ekonomijama14, koje sasvim sigurno nisu posledica samo globalne ekonomske krize, moderni kapitalizam se nalazi u krizi, uvodeći u krizu i sam koncept demokratskog upravljanja. Za razliku od rani-jih iskustava, kada je izrazito socijalno raslojavanje bilo vezano za nerazvijene ekonomije sa nekonsolidovanim demokratskim sistemima, ovakva pojava u razvijenim ekonomijama i konsolidovanim demokratijama predstavlja iznenađenje. Odgovori, politički i ekonom-ski, međutim, ne mogu se smatrati iznenađujućim. U domenu politike, pored uspona populizma koga uglavnom obezbeđuje politička desnica, uočljiva je i pojava autoritarnih političkih vođa koji nude građanima jednostavna rešenja njihovih ekonomskih problema, a koja često prate anti-liberalne ideje (u ovom slučaju u domenu politike), proklamovanje ekonomskog nacionalizma i svaljivanje odgovornosti na druge zemlje, a u mnogo manjoj meri se ističe istinski problem raspodele dohotka i bogatstva na nacionalnom nivou. Tako se u još većoj meri zaoštrava politička trilema svetske ekonomije između: 1) nacionalnog suvereniteta, 2) hiper-globalizacije svetske ekonomije i 3) demokratske politike (Rodrik, 2007). Ona svoje specifičnosti dobija u novim političkim i ekonomskim pojavama i kre-tanjima u SAD-u i EU, koje karakteriše izraziti uspon političkog populizma, dokazujući da će nacionalne države ostati «fundamentalni teren za borbu između konkurentskih društvenih snaga»15.

Najavljena politika novog predsednika SAD-a, Donalda Trampa izazvala je značajne kon-troverze, kako u američkoj javnosti i društvu, tako i među ekonomistima. Elementi ove ekonomske politike mogu se podvesti pod primere merkantilističkog sistema i to njegovo zalaganje za: ponovno pregovaranje oko pojedinih trgovinskih sporazuma (jer međuna-rodna trgovina treba da bude slobodna, ali «fer» za Ameriku), uvođenje barijera uvozu proizvoda u SAD, pomoć američke države američkom biznisu, otežavanje mogućnosti ulaska stranih kompanija na američko tržište, ograničavanje američkim kompanijama preseljenje proizvodnje iz SAD-a u druge zemlje pod pretnjom plaćanja penala, odusta-

14 Odperiodaglobalnekrizeprisutnojeznačajnousporavanjerastaproduktivnostiradauvećinirazvijenihekonomija,arastrealnihnadnicačakzaostajezarastomproduktivnosti.Istovremenodošlojedoporastabogatstvanajbogatijihuokvirimanacionalnihekonomijainaglobalnomnivou.PremaPiketijuovetendencijetežedasvetvrateustanjepredPrvisvetskiratkadajesamo10%stanovnikaraspolagalosa90%procenataukupnogkapitalauEvropi.Danas,10%populacijeraspolažesaoko60%kapitalauEvropi,auSAD-usačak70%.

15 Robinson(2010),str.306

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA18janje od potpisanog učešća u programu zaštite životne sredine i borbe protiv klimatskih promena, ograničavanje slobodnih tokova ljudi – ograničavanje ulaska građanima poje-dinih zemalja u SAD i sl.

Navedenim merama bi trebalo obezbediti posao za američke radnike, povećati konku-rentnost američke privrede, poboljšati devastiranu američku infrastrukturu, poboljšati poziciju SAD-a u međunarodnoj politici. Sve ovo je praćeno oštrom retorikom u kojoj se problemi američkih građana prvenstveno pripisuju efektima ekonomske politike drugih zemalja (naročito Kine), kao i poboljšanju ekonomske pozicije građana u drugim ze-mljama, kao i ponašanju političke elite SAD-a koja je zaboravila na američke radnike i američke građane.

Detaljnija analiza predloženih mera, međutim, ukazuje na značajna ograničenja, odnosno da one ili ne mogu biti implementirane, ili da će ukoliko i budu primenjene imati potpuno suprotne efekte od onih koji se žele. Naročito zabrinjava izraziti ekonomski nacionalizam koji se propagira.

U Evropskoj Uniji je institucionalni kontekst u kome dolazi do uspona desničarskog populizma još složeniji nego u SAD-u. Evropski integracioni procesi su originalno bili motivisani ciljem otklanjanja unilateralnih i destruktivnih politika evropskih zemalja, ne samo u domenu ekonomske politike. U specifičnim posleratnim uslovima hladnog rata bilo je neophodno izbeći ekonomski nacionalizam, protekcionističku politiku i pokušati sa izgradnjom jedinstvene evropske, u prvom redu ekonomske politike. Sa razvojem i implementacijom evropskih integracionih procesa se otpočelo u kejnzijanskim okvirima kapitalizma pune zaposlenosti. Ipak na promene u ciljevima, ali i u institucionim okvirima i u ovom slučaju uticao je uspon neoliberalnog ekonomskog i političkog projekta, koji je u okvirima EU imao posebne specifičnosti. Tome je svakako doprineo pad Berlinskog zida koji je okončao podelu Evrope i čime su otpočeli procesi ekonomske tranzicije i političke demokratizacije, ali i proširenja EU. Za mnoge građane bivših socijalističkih zemalja koncept kapitalizma slobodnog tržišta bio je sinonim za slobode (političke i ekonomske), a pridruživanje EU postao im je primarni cilj koji će omogućiti ekonomski prosperitet.

Pre globalne ekonomske krize podrška procesima evropske integracije u svim evropskim zemljama bila je značajna. Za građane iz novopridruženih zemalja ovo je bio način da obezbede korist od zajedničkih javnih dobara i politika EU, a za građane «starih» člani-ca korist se ogledala u proširenju zajedničkog tržišta, kao i u političkoj kontroli i uticaju nad većim delom Evrope. Ipak, globalna ekonomska kriza je i u ovom slučaju podstakla ekonomske i političke procese koji su doveli u sumnju samu evropsku integraciju, njene motive, ograničenja i institucionalne okvire. Ovo je najočiglednije u slučaju izglasavanja «bregzita», odnosno izlaska Velike Britanije iz Unije, ali i u usponu desničarskih, izolaci-onističkih i evro-skeptičnih politika u mnogim zemljama članicama. Problemi su daleko dublji i kompleksniji, a u dobrom delu su posledica činjenice da je većina Evropljana iz-gubila veru u sopstveni ekonomski progres u okvirima Evropske Unije. Delimično je to po-sledica i činjenice da su decenijama zanemarivani elementi evropskog socijalnog modela.

Evropski socijalni model koji se zasnivao na kombinaciji ekonomskog rasta, visokog ži-votnog standarda i dobrih radnih uslova, a koji je bio primamljiv svim Evropljanima, doveden je u pitanje procesima globalizacije i još više globalnom krizom, ali i procesima


proširenja Unije. Ne treba zaboraviti da je proširenje imalo uticaja na tržište rada jer su se kao konkurencija pojavili radnici iz novih zemalja Unije, a došlo je i do preseljenja proizvodnje u ove zemlje zbog nižih troškova proizvodnje, prvenstveno usled nižih nad-nica. Dakle radnici u vodećim ekonomijama Unije dobili su konkurenciju koja je značila i manje radnih mesta za njih i moguće pogoršanje radnih uslova. Post-recesiona stagna-cija nametnula je potrebu reformi tržišta rada u pojedinim članicama EU, koja bi značila povećanu fleksibilnost, kao i reformu radnog zakonodavstava uključujući i produženje radnog veka zaposlenih.

Usled izrazitih makroekonomskih problema u pojedinim zemljama Unije koji uključuju prvenstveno probleme javnih finansija primenjeni su paketi mera štednje koji su još više pogoršali poziciju građana (npr. Grčka), pokazujući nedostatak solidarnosti između zema-lja članica i dovodeći u pitanje institucionalni okvir evropske integracije. Naime, postalo je aktuelno pitanje da li EU garantuje minimum socijalne pravde za sve svoje građane, bez obzira u kojoj zemlji članici žive. Negativan odgovor, je danas aktuelizovao ulogu nacionalnih kreatora ekonomske politike zemalja članica i njihovu odgovornost prema sopstvenim građanima za ekonomske rezultate. Evropska administracija trpi kritike usled očigledne birokratizacije i nesposobnosti da se realizuju ciljevi zbog kojih su integracije preduzete – promocija ekonomskog rasta, obezbeđenje ekonomskog prosperiteta, dosti-zanje pune zaposlenosti i promocija blagostanja.

Još jedan važan faktor koji je uticao na negativna politička i ekonomska kretanja u Evro-pi je svakako migrantska kriza, kao i problemi bezbednosti i česti teroristički napadi u zemljama EU. Oni su dodatno podstakli okretanje nacionalnim državama, izolacionizam i zatvaranje granica, kao i odbijanje da se učestvuje u podeli tereta prihvata migranata. Ovo je važan faktor koji je takođe doprineo uspehu populističke retorike i procesima koji umanjuju perspektivu značajnije političke integracije u okviru EU.

5. ZAKLJUČAKNakon decenije od početka dvogodišnje globalne ekonomske krize svet je suočen sa prolongiranom samo-generišućom stagnacijom čija je posledica i kriza kapitalizma, koja ima različite forme – od društvene krize u kojoj se intenziviraju sukobi između različitih društvenih snaga i zbog koje građani gube poverenje u budući ekonomski prosperitet, do nedostajućih izvora ekonomskog rasta. Ovo se prvenstveno odnosi na vodeće ekonomije sveta – visoko-industrijalizovane zemlje konsolidovane demokratije. U njima su do izra-žaja došle i ranije poznate tendencije funkcionisanja kapitalističkog sistema – ciklične fluktuacije, kao i tendencija povećanja razlika između kolektivnih društvenih aktera. Iako poznate, ove su tendencije zanemarivane u decenijama stabilnog prosperiteta pre global-ne krize, tokom koga je uspešno primenjivan neoliberalni ekonomski i politički projekat. Međutim, izgleda da ni danas nisu obezbeđeni adekvatni odgovori ekonomske politike, niti konceptualne promene funkcionisanja tržišnih ekonomija koje bi podrazumevale us-postavljanje novog društvenog dogovora koji bi u obzir uzeo interese svih društvenih grupa, neku vrstu «novog dogovora» između kapitala, rada i države, umesto retoričkog populizma.

OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA20

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LJUBODRAG SAVIĆ1


DRAGANA RADIČIĆE-mail: [email protected]

VLADIMIR MIĆIĆ2


JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVAPUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AS A POSSIBLE MODEL OF FUNDING LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS

JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: H41, H54, R53

APSTRAKT:

Za potrebe ubrzanog i održivog ekonomskog razvoja i realizacije poslovnih poduhvata, jav-nih nabavki odnosno izgradnje infrastrukture i pružanja usluga od javnog značaja, a zbog nedostatka finansijskih sredstava u budžetu lokalnih nivoa javne vlasti, njihove poslovne neefikasnosti i odsustva znanja i veština da adekvatno reaguju na različite nepredviđene okolnosti i podmiruju mnogobrojne i raznovrsne potrebe građana i društva u celini, u ze-

1 Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu2 Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA24mljama tržišne privrede, pristupa se savremenim modelima finansiranja, prvenstvenom primenom koncepta javno-privatnog partnerstva. Uvreženo je mišljenje da javno-privatna partnerstva predstavljaju ogromni potencijal za lokalni i sveukupni ekonomski razvoj jed-ne zemlje. U Republici Srbiji, nasuprot iskustvima dobre prakse, realnim mogućnostima i očekivanjima, još uvek nisu iskorišćeni potencijali koje ovaj model finansiranja neosporno nudi.

ABSTRACT:

For the purpose of rapid and sustainable economic development and the realization of business ventures, public procurement, construction of infrastructure, and the provision of public service interests, and due to the lack of funds in the budget of local levels of public authorities, their business inefficiency and lack of knowledge and skills to ad-equately react to various unforeseen circumstances and settled many and varied needs of citizens and society in general, in the countries of market orientation, access to the latest models of financing, the primary application of the concept of public-private part-nerships. The conventional wisdom is that public-private partnerships represent a huge potential for local and overall economic development of a country. In the Republic of Serbia, in contrast to the available experiences of good practice, the benefits and real possibilities and expectations that this indisputable funding model provides, are not yet exploited.

KLJUČNE REČI:JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO, ODRŽIVI LOKALNI EKONOMSKI RAZVOJ,JAVNE INVESTICIJE, JAVNI INTERES.

KEY WORDS:PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP, SUSTAINABLE LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,PUBLIC INVESTMENTS, PUBLIC INTEREST.


1. UVODSve je izvesnije da države i njihovi subcentralni (lokalni) nivoi vlasti nisu u mogućnosti da same zadovolje rastuće potrebe za infrastrukturom i uslugama, što iziskuje podršku osta-lih sektora društva. Tradicionalni izvori nedovoljni su za potrebe finansiranja investicija na subcentralnom (lokalnom) nivou. Angažovanje kapitala privatnog sektora, posredstvom projekata javno-privatnih partnerstava (JPP), rešenje je kojim se nastoji premostiti jaz između realizacije javnih investicija i budžetskih ograničenja lokalnih nivoa javne vlasti.

JPP se vezuje za reformu sistema neefikasne državne uprave i ono je alternativa konven-cionalnom modelu obezbeđivanja (finansiranja, izgradnje, rekonstrukcije, upravljanja i održavanja) infrastrukturne i pružanja usluga od javnog značaja. Ovaj model zasnovan je na raspodeli resursa, rizika, troškova, odgovornosti i koristi u svim fazama realizacije investicionih projekta, čime se obezbeđuje potencijal za privredni razvoj.

Upliv privatnog menadžmenta u javne poslove ima brojne pozitivne efekte, u smislu pove-ćanja efikasnosti poslovanja, lakšem pristupu resursima, većoj pokretljivosti i prilagodlji-vosti privatnog kapitala tržišnim kretanjima. Privatni sektor je inovativniji, kompetentniji i fleksibilniji u odnosu na javni sektor, čiji je primarni cilj opšti interes društva. Koncept JPP poželjan je u uslovima nedostataka ekonomskog i fiskalnog sistema, a saglasno pro-pisima, poslovnim običajima, dobroj praksi i javnom interesu. U nekim zemljama sve više i zastupljen model saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora sa svrhom realizacije investicionih projekata i izgradnje infrastrukture i pružanja komunalnih javnih usluga, koji su inicijal-no u nadležnosti subcentralnih (lokalnih) nivoa vlasti. Važno je napomenuti da javni i privatni interesi, mada u datoj situaciji i odnosu partnerski koncipirani, ostaju u stanju permanentne i latentne konkurencije.

2. DRUŠTVENI I EKONOMSKI ZNAČAJ JPP -- DOMETI I OGRANIČENJAPoslednjih decenija primena koncepta JPP beleži snažan uspon u evropskim zemljama, a odnedavno i u svetu.3 Gotovo da nema razvijenije zemlje koja nije uvela ovaj model finansiranja javnih investicija. Inače, ekspanzija u primeni JPP otpočinje sedamdesetih i osamdesetih godina XX veka u projektima izgradnje javne infrastrukture, poznatih pod nazivom BOT (eng. Built-Operate-Transfer, odnosno sagradi–upravljaj-predaj). Ovaj mo-del naročito je dobio na popularnosti početkom devedesetih godina XX veka kada je u Velikoj Britaniji predstavljen nov oblik saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora pod nazivom Inicijativa za privatno finansiranje (Private Finance Initiative - PFI).

JPP nemaju jedinstvenu i opšteprihvaćenu definiciju, pre svega zbog kompleksnosti i velikog broja varijanti modela JPP. U srži ovih koncepata jeste dugoročna i kooperativna ugovorna saradnja između javnog i privatnog partnera za potrebe finansiranja javnih in-

3 UvidukoncesijaudruživanjejavnogiprivatnogsektoraurealizacijiinfrastrukturnihprojekatapotičeizXVIIIiXIXveka.

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA26vesticija (javne infrastrukture i usluga javnog karaktera), koje su tradicionalno u domenu javnog sektora.

Vremenom je došlo do diversifikacije u razvoju koncepata JPP. Pored BOT i PFI modela, razvijeni su novi oblici saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora, kao i raznovrsni ugovorni aran-žmani među njima. U praksi postoji oko dvadesetak različitih modela JPP koji se međusob-no razlikuju u stepenu uključivanja javnog i privatnog sektora u projektovanje, izgradnju, održavanje, finansiranje, operacionalizaciju i upravljanje infrastrukturnim projektima, kao i u odnosu na raspodelu rizika. U literaturi se uglavnom identifikuje pet osnovnih modela udruživanja javnog i privatnog sektora, i to: (a) ugovori za usluge tzv. servisni ugovori (Service contracts/Outsourcing); (b) menadžerski ugovori (Management contracts); (c) iznajmljivanje/lizing (Leases); (d) BOT modeli (Build-Operate-Transfer) i njegove varijante (DBO (Design-Build-Operate), DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate), i dr.) i (e) koncesije (Concessions). U praksi primenjeni aranžmani JPP obično su hibridi navedenih modela.4 Danas postoji značajna osnova za razvoj novih koncepata JPP. S obzirom na očekivanu diversifikaciju potreba i preferencija od strane građana i modeli JPP tokom godina evolui-raju u kompleksnije, inovativnije i fleksibilnije, kako bi se ispunila očekivanja i realizovale dodatne, veće koristi za javni sektor i društvo u celini.

Empirijska istraživanja pokazuju da su ovi koncepti saradnje izuzetno perspektivni i kao ta-kvi doprinose privrednom i društvenom razvoju zemlje. S tim u vezi, neophodna je: detaljna analiza i ocena finansijske isplativosti projekta, efikasna alokacija rizika između ugovornih strana kao i primena načela zaštite javnog interesa, efikasnosti, transparentnosti, jednakog i pravičnog tretmana, slobodne tržišne utakmice, proporcionalnosti, zaštite životne sredine, autonomije volje i ravnopravnosti ugovornih strana. Saradnja je zasnovana na shvatanju da i javni i privatni sektor imaju koristi od udruživanja finansijskih resursa, znanja, umeća i stručnosti kako bi se zadovoljile različite potrebe društva.5 JPP nude alternativu potpunoj privatizaciji i omogućavaju javnom sektoru da određuje, kontroliše i zadržava odgovornost zarad očuvanja opšteg interesa društva.

Interesantna su zapažanja nekih autora koji konstatuju da je JPP izraslo na napetosti i kontroverzi temeljnih karakteristika javnog i privatnog sektora. Njegova suština jeste saradnja, a ne konkurencija, i to objedinjavanjem preduzetničkog način razmišljanja i ponašanja javnopravnih subjekata i javne odgovornosti i obavezu čuvanja javnog interesa privatnopravni sektor, čime izostaje borba za prevlast.6 Privatni sektor ili investitor obez-beđuje novi vid menadžmenta, tržišnu i finansijsku disciplinu i odvažniji je u finansiranju velikih i kompleksnih projekata. Suština JPP svodi se na alokaciju rizika i to na onog partnera koji poseduje bolje performanse u smislu kontrole i upravljanja nepredviđenim događajima. S druge strane, ovaj koncept omogućava privatnom sektoru pristup dugo-ročnim investicijama kojima obezbeđuje profit posredstvom sigurnih i ugovorenih cena, naplaćenih od krajnjih korisnika. Sagledavajući i kombinujući performanse oba sektora, i to društvenu odgovornost javnog sektora sa finansijama, integracijom novih tehnologija, upravljačkom efikasnošću i preduzetničkim duhom privatnog sektora, odluka da li prihva-titi JPP ili primeniti tradicionalno finansiranje, bazirana je na poređenju troškova i dobiti investicije.

4 Đorđević (2012), str. 45-46 i Vasiljev (2015), str. 20-21.5 Ilić (2012), str. 4-5.6 Videtiopširnije:Cvetković(2013),str.15.


Kapitalne investicije subcentralnih nivoa i lokalnih samouprava čine značajan udeo u javnom sektoru. Stoga i ne iznenađuje činjenica što politika EU ističe značaj JPP. Njima se ostvaruje:7 smanjenje fiskalnog pritiska na budžete svih nivoa javne vlasti (čak i onih koji zakonom imaju sposobnost zaduživanja8); porast obima infrastrukturnih ulaganja; transfer rizika; realizacija projekata unutar planiranog finansijskog i vremenskog okvira; porast vrednosti za novac poreskih obveznika kao krajnjih korisnika; smanjenje nivoa javnog duga; poboljšanje kvaliteta javnih usluga i sniženje njihovih cena, i dr.

Kako bi se obezbedila unificiranost sprovođenja projekata JPP na nivou EU, 2003. godine Evropska komisija donela je Smernice za uspešna JPP,9 a 2004. godine i Zelenu knjigu o JPP.10 Njihova svrha su rasprave o konceptu i oblicima JPP, podsticanje i unapređenje saradnje između javnog i privatnog sektora i razmena iskustava najbolje prakse članica, a s obzirom na odsustvo jedinstvene zakonske regulative. Države EU stvorile su sopstvene normativne okvire za projekte JPP koje čine zakoni o JPP, koncesijama i javnoj nabavci i podzakonska akta. EU nastoji da kroz JPP privuče dodatne resurse u javni sektor kako bi investicijama u inovacije postala konkurentnija. Ideja finansiranja posredstvom JPP, kao jednog od perspektivnih načina kojim se mobilišu sredstva iz privatnih izvora, istaknu-ta je u Strategiji Evropa 2020,11 a u funkciji održivog rasta, povećanja produktivnosti, smanjenja nezaposlenosti, socijalne kohezije, očuvanja životne sredine i boljeg kvaliteta života. U njenoj realizaciji ulogu imaju regionalne i lokalne vlasti, kao i privatni investitor.

U svrhu jačanja organizacionih kapaciteta javnog sektora u realizaciji projekata JPP, pro-mocije i razmene dobrih iskustava, saradnjom Evropske investicione banke, Evropske komisije, država članica EU i zemalja kandidata, 2008. godine oformljen je Evropski centar znanja za JPP (European PPP Expertise Centre - EPEC). Globalna ekonomska kriza usporila je ove procese saradnje u Evropi, pa i u EU, s obzirom na činjenicu da su finansijska sredstva ponestala i u kasama privatnog sektora.

7 Ilić (2012), str. 7-8.8 Zakon o javnom dugu, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 61/05, 107/09, 78/11. i 68/15.9 European Commission (2003).10 European Commission (2004).11 Kronja (2011), str. 11-30.

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA28 GRAFIKON 1. EVROPSKO JPP TRŽIŠTE OD 2006 -2015, VREDNOST I BROJ PROJEKATA

Vrednost (u milijardama evra) Broj projekata

Vrednost projekata tokom prve polovine godine Vrednost projekata tokom druge polovine godine

_____ Broj projekata

Izvor:EuropeanInvestmentBank(2016),MarketUpdate,ReviewoftheEuropeanPPPMarketin2015,EIB,Luxem-bourg,str.1.

Periodi fiskalnih restrikcija i pritisaka u pravcu smanjenja broja zaposlenih i ukupnih troš-kova rezultirali su smanjenjem vrednosti projekata JPP. Tokom 2015. godine na evrop-skom kontinentu ugovoreno je 49 projekata posredstvom JPP, ukupne vrednosti 15,6 milijardi evra. Najveći broj projekata zaključila je Velika Britanija (15 projekata tokom 2015. godine u odnosu na 24 projekta tokom 2014. godine), u vrednosti od 2,4 milijar-de evra što je za 4,2 milijarde evra manje u odnosu na 2014. godinu. Inače, po vrednosti projekata, Turska zauzima prvo mesto (9,2 milijarde evra tokom 2015. godine u odnosu na 3,5 milijarde evra u 2014. godini).


GRAFIKON 2. PREGLED ZAKLJUČENIH JPP PROJEKATA U 2015. GODINI, U ODABRANIM ZEMLJAMA

Ukupna vrednost projekata po zemljama (u milionima evra) Broj projekata po zemljama

Turska V. Britanija Francuska Holandija

Irska Španija

Nemačka Belgija Finska

Danska Grčka

Poljska Izvor:EuropeanInvestmentBank(2016),MarketUpdate,ReviewoftheEuropeanPPPMarketin2015,EIB,Luxem-bourg,str.2.

Ukoliko posmatramo projekte sa aspekta učešća pojedinih sektora, uočava se izrazita dominacija sektora saobraćaja i transporta po vrednosti, odnosno sektora obrazovanja po broju projekata. Prosečno, vrednost projekta ugovorenog posredstvom ovog oblika finansiranja u 2015. godini iznosila je 319 miliona evra, u odnosu na 229 miliona evra tokom 2014. godine.12

GRAFIKON 3. PREGLED ZAKLJUČENIH JPP PROJEKATA U 2015. GODINI, PO SEKTORIMA

Ukupna vrednost projekata po sektorima (u milionima evra) Broj projekata po sektorima

Transport

Zdravstvo

Obrazovanje

Javne usluge

Zaštita životne sredine

Rekreacija i kultura

Izvor:EuropeanInvestmentBank(2016),MarketUpdate,ReviewoftheEuropeanPPPMarketin2015,EIB,Luxem-bourg,str.3.

12 EIB (2016), str. 7.

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA30Neke od manjkavosti ometaju uspešnost JPP. U izvesnim slučajevima domaći privatni sektor je finansijski slab ili je nedovoljno zainteresovan za određen investicioni aranžman, dok međunarodni finansijeri nisu kadri sagledati potencijal koji određen projekat nosi. Pored toga, projekti JPP pate od:13 nedostatka javne kontrole; sumnje da će težnja za profitom zaseniti javni interes; korupcije i netransparentnosti; neizvesnosti i nedostat-ka iskustava; neadekvatne procene i podele rizika; nerazvijenih ili nedovoljno razvijenih mehanizama za rešavanje eventualnih sukoba interesa; različitih strategija i prioriteta JPP; neretko lošeg planiranja; manjka informacija i/ili nespremnosti njihove razmene; nedostatka liderstva i posvećenosti; negativnog publiciteta, itd. U većini slučajeva je du-gotrajan proces ugovaranja saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora usled nedostatak znanja i političke volje. Sve navedeno može dovesti do zloupotrebe ovog koncepta. Javne, a po-sebno lokalne, vlasti vrlo teško opredeljuju se za promene, gajeći sumnju u ovakav način poslovanja. Ciljevi javnog i privatnog sektora ne moraju biti identični, a ni kompatibilni.

3. TRANSFER RIZIKA I REALIZACIJA VREDNOSTI ZA NOVAC – PREDUSLOVI USPEHA KONCEPTA JPPU suštini koncepta JPP nalazi se potreba upravljanja investicijama, a svaka investicija i partnerstvo nose širok spektar interesa, konflikata i rizika. Za razliku od tradicionalnog mo-dela finansiranja projekata, pri realizaciji JPP, rizici se transferišu onima koji su sposobniji da njima efikasnije upravljaju, preduzimajući potrebne mere u pravcu njihovog smanjenja i otklanjanja štete kao posledice njihovog delovanja. U projektima JPP stepen uključenosti privatnog sektora srazmeran je stepenu alociranog rizika. Što je manje učešće privatnog sektora u JPP, manji je i rizik, i obratno. Privatizacijom se celokupan rizik alocira na privatni sektor. U uslovima tradicionalnog finansiranja svi rizici trošak su javnog sektora, odnosno građana kao poreskih obveznika.

S obzirom da su brojni i značajni rizici involvirani u realizaciju javnih investicija, neophodan je sistemski pristup u identifikaciji, analizi, evaluaciji i alokaciji rizika, kao i utvrđivanju dinamike javljanja i težine posledica koje ovi rizici nose, usled čega se konstituiše „registar rizika”.14 Kako determiniše uspeh JPP, u njegovom koncipiranju angažovani su ekspertski i konsultantski timovi. Praćenje izvesnih i potencijalnih rizika, njihova podela i uspešno upravljanje njima, najznačajniji su segment ugovaranja saradnje između javnog i privatnog sektora i ostvarivanja vrednosti za novac, što je i osnovni kriterijum isplativosti i efikasnosti modela JPP.15

Činjenica je da se poslovnim rizicima efikasnije upravlja u privatnom sektoru, dok se na javni sektor uobičajeno alociraju pravni, politički i ekološki rizici. Identifikacija i alokacija rizika koje projekat nosi izuzetno je kompleksna, a sam proces može trajati. Pri tom, težnja da se rizik prenese na privatnog partnera nije garancija da će javni sektor u većoj meri ostvariti i zaštititi interes društva. Sagledavanje matrice rizika integrisano je u izradu kom-paratora troškova javnog sektora (Public Sector Comparator, PSC), instrumenta kojim se

13 Ilić, (2012), str. 8.14 Ilić (2012), str. 7.15 European Investment Bank (2015).


porede ukupni životni troškovi projekta realizovanim posredstvom JPP u odnosu na one koji bi nastali da je izabran tradicionalni način finansiranja.

Vrednost za novac16 (Value for money) predstavlja pozitivnu razliku između sadašnje vred-nosti ukupnih životnih troškova nastalih kao produkt tradicionalnog načina finansiranja i fi-nansiranja modelom JPP. Konceptom JPP ostvaruje veća vrednost za novac ukoliko su ispu-njene sledeće pretpostavke: (a) efikasno upravljanje rizicima i njihova adekvatna alokacija između javnog i privatnog partnera u svim fazama realizacije projekta; (b) angažman struč-njaka17 koji razumeju tržišne prilike i imaju sposobnost da učine projekat bankabilnim;18 (c) ugovorom o JPP definisane realne potrebe za infrastrukturnim projektima, čime je osi-gurana njihova efikasna i odgovorna dugoročna isporuka; (e) precizna procena troškova osiguranja od eventualnih nepredviđenih događaja; (f) detaljan plan finansijskih i investici-onih aktivnosti tokom životnog veka projekta. Veću vrednost za novac moguće je ostvariti skraćivanjem roka izgradnje objekta, porastom kvaliteta usluga, povećanjem obima usluga za istu cenu, isporukom istih usluga po nižim cenama, prenosom dela ili celokupnog rizika sa javnog na privatnog partnera, itd.19

4. KONCEPT JPP U REPUBLICI SRBIJIUsled potrebe za izgradnjom nove javne infrastrukture, JPP predstavlja potencijal i razvojnu šansu i za Republiku Srbiju. Ulaganjem u dobra od opšteg interesa i efikasnijim pružanjem usluga od javnog značaja ukazala se neophodnost stvaranja institucionalnog okvira. U Re-publici Srbiji, donošenjem zakonske regulative u ovoj oblasti, uspostavljen je sistem finan-siranja putem JPP i ustanovljene su smernice za korišćenje benefita udruživanja javnog i privatnog sektora. Zakon o JPP-u i koncesijama,20 usvojen 2011. godine, u saglasnosti je sa praksom koja postoji u većini zemalja EU, na temeljima evropskog kontinentalnog prava. Istovremeno, donet je i Zakon o komunalnim delatnostima,21 a godinu dana kasnije i Zakon o javnim nabavkama.22

Komisija za javno-privatna partnerstva, kao međuresorno javno telo, formirana je 2012. godine, sa osnovnim zadatkom pružanja stručne pomoći pri realizaciji projekata JPP. Komisija je sačinjena od eksperata čiji je cilj zaštita javnog interesa i utvrđivanje metodo-logije proračuna vrednosti za novac i komparatora troškova javnog sektora, kao indikatora isplativosti modela JPP. Bez saglasnosti Komisije nijedan predlog JPP ne može biti pro-cesuiran, odnosno ne može biti pokrenut postupak izbora privatnog partnera ili postupak javne nabavke. Na bazi zvaničnih izvora ove institucije objavljenih na internet stranici, Komisija je dala pozitivno mišljenje na ukupno 45 projekata.23

16 Agencija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2014).17 Brdarević (2012), str. 35-36.18 http://www.eu-projekti.info/eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/PREZENTACIJA-TURCIN.pdf,[Pristup:31/01/2017],str.

2. 19 Brdarević (2012), str. 34.20 Zakon o JPP-u i koncesijama, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 88/11, 15/16. i 104/16.21 Zakon o komunalnim delatnostima, „Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 88/11. i 104/16.22 Zakon o javnim nabavkama, „Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 124/12, 14/15. i 68/15.23 Videtiopširnije:http://www.ppp.gov.rs/misljenja-komisije.[Pristup:14/02/2017]

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA32Komisija je 2013. godine sačinila Metodologiju24 kao važan korak u procesu donošenja odluke da li određeni projekat realizovati posredstvom JPP ili tradicionalnim finansira-njem iz kredita. Na taj način se izbegava favorizovanje JPP na štetu tradicionalnog finan-siranja i uprkos činjenici da JPP ne opterećuju kreditnu sposobnost javnog sektora jer samostalno obezbeđuju potrebna sredstva za projekat. Izbor javnog i privatnog partnera sprovodi se kroz postupak javne nabavke, u skladu sa Zakonom o javnim nabavkama.25

Bitnu ulogu u realizaciji i nadzoru realizacije ugovora o JPP ima i resorno ministarstvo, kao i odgovarajući organi autonomne pokrajine i lokalnih samouprava, nadležni za po-slove finansija. Podzakonski akti za sprovođenje Zakona o JPP usvojeni su 2013. godine kada je donesena Uredba o nadzoru nad realizacijom javnih ugovora o javno-privatnom partnerstvu26 i Pravilnik o načinu vođenja i sadržini Registra javnih ugovora.27 Time je konstituisan zakonodavni i institucionalni okvir za implementaciju projekata JPP. Takođe, i drugi zakoni utiču posredno ili neposredno na koncept JPP.

Kompleksnost modela JPP usled: velikog broj učesnika, nedostatak znanja i iskustava, nereformisanog javnog sektora, nerazvijenog tržišta, nedostatka finansijskih sredstava, nedostatka podrške i inicijative od strane države, kao i nerazvijena svest o prednostima JPP, prepreka su intenzivnijem razvoju ovog koncepta u našoj zemlji. Zbog toga je uglav-nom korišćena privatizacija ili tradicionalan način finansiranja javnih dobara i usluga.

Slabosti domicilnog ambijenta, od makroekonomske nestabilnosti, nerazvijene infrastruk-ture, nezaposlenosti, siromaštva, korupcije, međusobno recipročnog nepoverenja i nera-zumevanja interesa partnera, kao i odsustva relevantnih informacija za potrebe njihove dugoročne saradnje, do nedovoljnog saznanja o neophodnosti investiranja u očuvanje životne sredine, ozbiljno ugrožavaju potencijal koji bi implementacija koncepta JPP mo-gla da ponudi u našoj zemlji.28 Svi ovi nedostaci imaju za posledicu duge pregovore i veće troškove čineći ove projekte manje atratkivnim potencijalnim investitorima. Uslov efikasnosti ovog procesa su reforme i inovacije savremenih na domaćem finansijskom tržištu. Primenom koncepta JPP efekti bi se odrazili na pospešivanje ekonomskog rasta i razvoja, smanjenje inflacije, stope nezaposlenosti, javnog duga i uravnoteženје budžeta.

U Republici Srbiji javljaju se domaći i inostrani finansijeri projekata JPP. Pored domaćih finansijera i finansijskih institucija, finansijeri i finansijske institucije iz drugih zemalja su veoma važan izvor ne samo finansijske već i savetodavne podrške. Među njima se izdva-jaju Evropska banka za obnovu i razvoj, Međunarodna finansijska korporacija i Svetska banka (koja je nadležna za prikupljanje informacija najbolje prakse iz celoga sveta i koja poseduje najveću bazu projekata realizovanih posredstvom ovog koncepta).29

Lokalni nivoi javne vlasti u našoj zemlji učestvuju u konkursu dodele sredstava posred-stvom koncepta JPP u okviru jedne od jedanaest tematskih oblasti i to: unapređenje grad-ske/opštinske uprave; održivi razvoj i zaštita životne sredine; podrška lokalnom ekonom-skom razvoju; komunalne usluge i stanovanje; socijalna politika; prostorno i urbanističko

24 Komisija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2013).25 Pavlović- Križanić (2012), str. 21. 26 Uredba o nadzoru nad realizacijom javnih ugovora o javno-privatnom partnerstvu, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 47/13.27 Pravilnik o načinu vođenja i sadržini Registra javnih ugovora, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 57/13 i 110/13.28 Videti opširnije: Kronja (2011), str. 11-30.29 The World Bank (2017).


planiranje; inicijative namenjene mladima; učešće građana u odlučivanju; unapređenje položaja manjina; etika i transparentnost, kultura i sport.

Može se oceniti da kod nas još uvek ne postoji značajnija praksa u pogledu primene pro-jekata JPP. Primeri dobre prakse JPP na lokalnom nivou vlasti tiču se upravo jednostav-nijih projekata. Do sada je priliv privatnog kapitala na lokalnom nivou zabeležen najviše u oblastima koje zahtevaju manje investicije, kao što su: usluge linijskog prevoza putnika (Loznica, Ruma, Novi Sad, Niš, Šabac, Srbobran, Topola, Negotin, Paraćin, Kanjiža, Be-ograd), izgradnja i održavanje sistema javnog osvetljenja (Kruševac, Bor, Petrovac, Vrbas, Vranje, Varvarin, Žabalj), izgradnja i održavanje kanalizacione mreže (Stara Pazova), pro-izvodnja i distribucija toplotne i električne energije i grejanje na biomasu (Zrenjanin, Niš, Batočina, Vrbas, Pirot), upravljanja čvrstim otpadom (Topola, Žagubica, Grocka), usluge parkiranja (Šabac). Ovo su JPP čija su finansijska ulaganja do 40 miliona evra i rizici najmanji. Važno je da primeri dobre prakse budu neki osnov za razvoj i korišćenje JPP od strane drugih gradova i lokalnih nivoa vlasti, mada je svaki projekat JPP specifičan, jer svaki grad i opština ima svoje specifične potrebe.

Najveće investicije iziskuju sektori vode i kanalizacije, a procena je da je za Beogradski vodovod i kanalizaciju potrebno obezbediti investicije od 987 miliona evra. Iako ga prate brojne kontroverze, najpoznatiji projekat JPP je u oblasti javnog prevoza u Beogradu (Bus Plus). Što se tiče trenutnog svetskog trenda JPP, najviše ovakvih projekata je u oblasti saobraćaja i puteva, izgradnje mostova, sportskih hala i telekomunikacija.30

Iako postoje primeri dobre prakse JPP na lokalnom nivou u Republici Srbiji njihov do-sadašnji razvoj pokazuje brojne manjkavosti. Nedostatak modela JPP predstavlja tran-sparentnost ugovora, praćenje i mehanizmi izvršenja ugovornih obaveza partnera. Veliki problem je i mehanizam zaštite od moguće korupcije i efikasna primena antikorupcijskih mera koji su predviđeni u Zakonu o JPP i koncesijama. Takođe, i odgovor na pitanje da li je model JPP u najbolje i najefikasnije rešenje za pružanje usluga i izgradnju infrastruk-turnih objekta zahteva ozbiljne i sveobuhvatne investicione i tržišne analiza.

5. ZAKLJUČAKDugoročne investicije neophodne su ekonomijama naročito u kontekstu krize javnih fi-nansija. Stoga je i cilj iznalaženje novih načina zadovoljenja sve raznovrsnijih potreba društva koje se povećavaju gotovo svakodnevno.

U projektima JPP partneri zadržavaju sopstveni identitet, a njihova međusobna saradnja bazirana je na jasnoj i preciznoj podeli odgovornosti, prava, obaveza i rizika. Ključna ka-rakteristika koncepta JPP jeste porast efektivnosti i ekonomičnosti, odnosno ispunjavanje visokih standarda u obezbeđivanju javnih dobara i pružanju usluga, kao i smanjivanje pritiska javnih investicija na budžet.

Praksa je pokazala da je uspeh JPP srazmeran stepenu uređenosti javnog sektora u smislu ekonomskih sloboda, demokratskog društva i tržišnog načina privređivanja. Što je

30 http://ipf.rs/privatno-javno-partnerstvo-u-srbiji/[Pristup:05/03/2017]

JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA34javni sektor jedne države slabiji u pogledu navedenih vrednosti, time je otvoreniji prostor za zloupotrebe.

Strateško planiranje podrazumeva izradu sveobuhvatnog pristupa u postupku traženja re-šenja. Politički ciklusi i želja za brzim rešenjima i instantnim boljitkom neretko rezultiraju poslovanjem u neusaglašenim vremenskim okvirima koji su nekad isuviše kratki za rea-lizaciju projekata. Takve kratkoročne agende i ograničeni horizonti dovode do nerealnih očekivanja i neodrživih rešenja. Uspostavljanje kvalitetnih partnerskih odnosa, optimalna raspodela i upravljanje rizicima, saradnja na svim nivoima javne vlasti u cilju eksploata-cije prednosti svakog od nivoa, stvaranje dodatne vrednosti putem međusobne razmene veština i znanja javnog i privatnog sektora, podizanje konkurentskog nivoa učešćem ve-ćeg broja finansijera u implementaciji projekata JPP, podizanje kvaliteta pruženih javnih usluga i dr., ključne su odrednice njihove uspešne implementacije.

6. LITERATURAAgencija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2014), Značenje i postupak izračuna vrijednosti za novac kod projekata JPP, br. 6, verz. 2, Agencija za JPP, Zagreb.

Brdarević, Lj. (2012), Motivi lokalne vlasti za uspostavljanje javno-privatnih partnersta-va“, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd.

Cvetković, P. i Sredojević, S. (2013), Javno-privatno partnerstvo, Priručnik za sprovođe-nje na nivou lokalne samouprave, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština, Beograd.

Đorđević, S. (2012), „Javno-privatna partnerstva: komparativna praksa“, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd.

European Commission (2003), Guidelines for successful Public-Private Partnership, EC, Brussels.

European Commission (2004), Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Commu-nity Law on Public Contracts and Concessions, EC, Brussels.

European Investment Bank (2011), Priručnik za pripremu projekata JPP, Priprema, na-bava i provedba projekata JPP, EPEC, Luxembourg.

European Investment Bank (2015), Value for Money Assessment Review of approaches and key concepts, EPEC, Luxembourg.

European Investment Bank (2016), Market Update, Review of the European PPP Market in 2015, EIB, Luxembourg http://www.eib.org/epec/library/epec_market_update_2015_en2, [Pristup: 14/02/2017]

Ilić, N. (2012), „Osnovne ideje koje stoje iza novih zakonskih rešenja“, Polis br. 2, Stal-na konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd.


Komisija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2013), Metodologiju za analizu dobijene vred-nosti u odnosu na uložena sredstva (value for money) u javno-privatnom partnerstvu i koncesijama, Vlade Republike Srbije, Beograd.

Kronja, J. et al. (2011), Vodič kroz strategiju Evropa 2020, Evropski pokret Srbija, Fond za otvoreno društvo, Beograd.

Pavlović-Križanić, T. (2012), „Lokalna javno-privatna partnerstva u Srbiji- između propi-sa i realnosti“, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd.

Vasiljev, V. (2015), Javno-privatna partnerstva u Evropskoj uniji i Srbiji - razvoj modela, tržišta i zakonskog okvira, doktorska disertacija, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd.

The World Bank (2017), Benchmarking PPP Procurement: Assessing Government Ca-pability to Prepare, Procure, and Manage PPPs, WB, Washington.

Zakoni, uredbe, pravilnici

Pravilnik o načinu vođenja i sadržini Registra javnih ugovora, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 57/13 i 110/13.

Uredba o nadzoru nad realizacijom javnih ugovora o javno-privatnom partnerstvu, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 47/13.

Zakon o javnim nabavkama, „Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 124/12, 14/15. i 68/15.

Zakon o javno-privatnom partnerstvu i koncesijama, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 88/11, 15/16. i 104/16.

Zakon o javnom dugu, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 61/05, 107/09, 78/11. i 68/15.

Zakon o komunalnim delatnostima, „Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 88/11. i 104/16.

Internet stranice:

http://www.eu-projekti.info/eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/PREZENTACIJA-TURCIN.pdf [Pristup: 31/01/2017]

http://www.ppp.gov.rs/ [Pristup: 14/02/2017]

http://ipf.rs/privatno-javno-partnerstvo-u-srbiji/ [Pristup: 05/03/2017]


GORANA KRSTIĆ1


WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?

DA LI BI POVEĆANJE NISKOG INTENZITETA RADA DOVELO DO SMANJENJA SIROMAŠTVA I NEJEDNAKOSTI U SRBIJI?

JEL CLASSIFICATION: D31, D63, P2

ABSTRACT:

This paper presents a relationship between low work intensity, poverty and inequality in Serbia over 2012–2014 period, based on data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). Low work intensity contributes significantly to the risk of poverty, con-sidering that approximately two out of three persons living in households with very low work intensities run the risk of poverty. On the other hand, only 40% of persons at risk of poverty live in such households, which indicates that there are other causes of poverty, such as low wages and social transfers that have not been sufficient to raise equivalised income above the risk of poverty threshold. The results suggest that an increase in work

1 FacultyofEconomics,UniversityofBelgrade

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?38intensity of household members would result in a poverty decrease, but would also de-crease income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.

APSTRAKT:

Ovaj rad prikazuje vezu između niskog intenziteta rada, siromaštva i nejednakosti u Srbiji u periodu 2012-2014. na osnovu podataka Ankete o prihodima i uslovima života (SILC). Nizak intenzitet rada značajno doprinosi riziku od siromaštva budući da približno dva od tri lica koja žive u domaćinstvima sa veoma niskim intenzitetom rada je i u riziku od siromaštva. Sa druge strane, samo 40% lica koja su izložena riziku od siromaštva živi u ovakvim domaćinstvima, što ukazuje i na druge uzroke siromaštva, kao što su niske za-rade i socijalni transferi koji nisu bili dovoljni za povećanje ekvivalentnog dohotka iznad praga rizika od siromaštva. Rezultati pokazuju da bi povećanje intenziteta rada članova domaćinstva dovelo do smanjenja siromaštva, ali i do smanjenja nejednakosti dohotka, merene Gini koeficijentom.

KLJUČNE REČI:RIZIK OD SIROMAŠTVA, NIZAK INTENZITET RADA, NEJEDNAKOST, SRBIJA

KEY WORDS:POVERTY RISK, LOW WORK INTENSITY, INEQUALITY, SERBIA


1. INTRODUCTIONThe at-risk-of-poverty rate and percentage of persons living in households with very low work intensity are two out of three components of the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclu-sion indicator formulated by the EU in 2010 with the aim of encompassing other intan-gible aspects of poverty and exclusion from the labour market.

The at-risk-of-poverty rate, low work intensity and income inequality in Serbia can be monitored since 2013, when the first Survey of Income and Living Conditions was con-ducted, according to the internationally harmonized Eurostat methodology. These indica-tors for Serbia are among the highest compared to EU countries. Every fourth person in Serbia (25.4%) in 2014 had equivalised disposable income below the national at-risk-of-poverty threshold, while every fifth person below the age of 60 lived in a household with very low work intensity (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, SORS 2016). Income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient was 38.2 (SORS, 2016). Despite that, research on income inequality is sporadic (Milanović 2003; Krstić 2011, 2016; Ranđelović and Žarković-Rakić 2011), unlike research on poverty and unemployment, and this topic has not been a priority on the agenda of policy makers.

The number of persons exposed to poverty risk increased in 2013, while it remained almost unchanged in 2014 , although the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line) in-creased, which indicates that persons at risk of poverty also benefitted from an income increase. The percentage of persons under the age of 60 living in households with very low work intensity increased by 17% in 2014 compared with 2012, which is primarily a consequence of the increase in the share of persons living in these households in the first two income quintiles. Income inequality in this period, although very high, remained almost at the same level.

The main objective of the paper is to analyse and quantify the relationship between low work intensity, poverty and inequality in Serbia using the Survey of Income and Living Conditions data. In accordance with the set objective of research, the following hypoth-eses have been formulated:

H1: Increase in work intensity of household members may result in a lower at-risk-of-poverty rate;

H2: Increase in work intensity of household members would result in a reduction of in-come inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient.

Having in view the objective of research, as well as defined hypotheses, the paper is structured in six sections. After the introduction, the poverty measurement methodology, work intensity and inequality, as well as data used will be presented in section two. The results of the relative poverty analysis (i.e. the risk of poverty) will be presented in part three. The impact of low work intensity on poverty will be analysed and quantified in sec-tion four, while the impact of low work intensity on inequality in income distribution will be analysed in section five. Relevant conclusions will be derived at in the last part, along with implications for public policies, and a proposal for the direction of further research.

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?40

2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

At risk of poverty rate

According to the concept of relative poverty, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the share of people (in the total population) with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (Eurostat, 2012). The main advantage of poverty measurement according to this methodology is in its comparabil-ity with poverty indicators among EU countries using this concept, considering that the poverty line is determined relative to a certain percentage of the national income median (60%) in every country. Relative poverty indicators in Serbia are fully comparable with relevant EU indicators.

The disposable net income of a household includes monetary labour income, income from property, pensions, social and other transfers which the household receives from persons who are not members of their household. That is income, after taxes and con-tributions have been paid, that is available to the household for spending or saving. Fol-lowing the Eurostat methodology, income in-kind of the household is not included. The equivalised disposable income is calculated by dividing a household’s disposable income by the modified OECD equivalence scale (the first adult member of a household is given a weight of 1, other adult members of a household are given a weight of 0.5, while a weight of 0.3 is given to each child under the age of 14). The relative poverty line is alternatively referred to as the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (Eurostat, 2012a).

It is necessary to stress that the at-risk-of-poverty rate, according to the Eurostat defini-tion, ‘does not measure poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents of the country, which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living’.2 This concept of rela-tive poverty is based on financial assets (or lack thereof) which should enable individuals to satisfy needs that are considered standard within their particular society.

The concept of relative poverty is not most appropriate for monitoring changes in the at-risk-of-poverty rate over time, since a change in this indicator may be a consequence of a rise or fall of the poverty line (resulting from a change in income distribution), rather than the consequence of a change in income of persons who were at risk of poverty. If the pov-erty line and the at-risk-of-poverty rate move in the same direction (increase or decrease), we cannot arrive at a proper conclusion regarding the at-risk-of-poverty rate trend. How-ever, if these two indicators move in opposite directions, we can conclude with certainty that a change in the at-risk-of-poverty rate has occurred, not as a consequence of a changed poverty line, but due to a change in income of the population. For example, if poverty line increases and the at-risk-of-poverty rate decreases, then the income increase of a part of the population was such that it rescued them from an at-risk-of-poverty situ-ation. Similarly, if the poverty line is lowered, like in many EU28 countries due to the economic crisis, and poverty risk increases, then the decline in the population’s income contributed to the fact that many found themselves at risk of poverty (Krstić, 2014). To avoid possible misinterpretation of changes in this rate, Eurostat calculates the at-risk-of-

2 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:At-risk-of-poverty_rate


poverty rate fixed in time (that is year 2008), as well as the persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate (Eurostat, 2012).

The rate of persons living in households with low work intensity – is defined as the share of persons under the age of 60, living in households in which adults (aged 18-59) worked, on average, less than 20% of the total number of months in which they could have worked during the reference period (Eurostat, 2012). The reference period refers to 12 months in a year preceding the year of the survey. For example, a two-member house-hold with very low intensity is a household in which none of the working-age members work or one member works four hours two days a week, assuming a full-time 40-hour workweek. This indicator points to exclusion from the labour market, which is the main reason for social exclusion. A significant number of these persons receive social assis-tance; periodically participate in the labour market, and have hindered access to health, educational and cultural services (Еurostat, 2013).

Other categories of work intensity are the following: low (from 20% to less than 45%), medium (from 45% to 55%), high (over 55% to 85%) and very high (over 85% to 100%).

Income inequality

To measure income inequality we have used the Gini coefficient, defined as the average difference between all possible income pairs in a population (xi,j), expressed as a part of the total income (Gini, 1912):

(1)

where µ is the average income, and N is the number of households.

GE−generalised entropy is defined by the following formula (Shorrocks, 1980):

(2)

where µ is the average income, α is a parameter which represents a weight allocated to the income distance between different parts of distribution which may take any real value. For lower α values, GE is more sensitive to changes in the lower part of income distribution, while for higher α values, GE is more sensitive to changes in the upper part of income distribution. The most frequent values for α are 0, 1 and 2. G(2) is one half of the square of the coefficient of variation.

GE-generalised entropy may be decomposed according to selected population groups (Cowell and Jenkins, 1995) so that total income inequality (I) equals the sum of inequali-ties between selected groups (Ib) and residual inequality within the group (Iw):

I= Ib+ Iw (3)

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?42Ib is defined as:

(4)

Iw is defined as:

(5)

(6)

where fj is the share in total population, and vj the share in total income of every group j.

Inequality within a group is defined as the weighted sum of inequalities within each group, where weights are population shares and income shares. Inequality between the groups is calculated for the entire population when every individual income y within a group is replaced by the average income of that group j, so that this inequality reflects the difference in average income between the groups.

The decomposition of inequalities between groups and within a group has been made for α=2 i.e. for one half of the coefficient of the variation square.

Data

The paper draws on the data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) which is carried continuously since 2013 and is a regular annual statistical survey used to assess financial poverty, on the basis of household income, according to a methodol-ogy which is comparable with EU standards. In 2015, the survey encompassed 5,680 households and 15,552 persons aged 16+. The reference period for income and labour market activity is the previous year. The survey is representative at the national and re-gional levels.

SILC provides data on total income of households and of household members, and on income components, and therefore presents the best source of data for measuring poverty and inequality, given that the risk of poverty and inequality estimates are based on the household income.

SILC also provides data on the social and demographic characteristics of persons, their professional activities (for persons aged 16 and over), education, quality of life, and/or their health condition, material deprivation and living conditions, as well as data on characteristics of households, housing conditions and costs. On the basis of these data, it is possible to measure not only financial poverty, but also intangible aspects of poverty, such as material deprivation and low work intensity of household members.


3. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATEAccording to SILC data (for 2013-2015), in the 2012–2014 period, approximately one fourth of Serbia’s population was exposed to poverty risk (Table 1). This does not neces-sarily mean that these persons are poor, but that they are at greater risk than others to become poor, as their equivalised income is below the income considered necessary to achieve a normal living standard in Serbia. This amount – at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line) per person per month in Serbia was RSD 13,680 in 2012. Although the concept of relative poverty is not the most suitable for comparison over time, as already explained in the section on methodology, the increase in the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Serbia by one percentage point in 2013 relative to 2012, together with the drop in the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line), indicates that the number of persons at risk of poverty increased in 2013. The at-risk-of poverty rate remained almost unchanged in 2014, although the at-risk-of-poverty threshold increased by 11%, which indicates that persons at risk of poverty also benefitted from an income increase. Had there been no increase in income of these people, the at-risk-of-poverty rate would be much higher.

TABLE 1. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE IN SERBIA, 2012−2014

2012 2013 2014

At-risk-of-poverty rate, % 24.6 25.6 25.4

Relative at-risk-of-poverty gap, % 36.6 39.9 37.6

At-risk-of-poverty threshold, monthly, in RSD (60% of the median equivalised income)

One person 13,680 13,480 14,920

Household with two adults and one child under the age of 14 24,624 24,134 26,856

Household with two adults and two children under the age of 14 28,728 28,157 31,332

Source:SORS(2016),Communication:SurveyofIncomeandLivingConditions(SILC)No.084.DataforrelevantyearsbasedonSILCfor2013,2014and2015.

Serbia’s at-risk-of-poverty rate is significantly above the average value for 28 EU coun-tries (17.3%), and at the level of this indicator in the country with the highest at-risk-of-poverty rate in the EU (Romania).3

The relative at-risk-of-poverty gap measures the difference between the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line) and median equivalised income of persons who are below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and is expressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (Eurostat 2012). Unlike the at-risk-of-poverty rate, which shows who is ex-posed to poverty risk, the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap shows how much funds they lack (in % of at-risk-of-poverty threshold) to escape poverty risk status. An increase in the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap from 36.6% in 2012 to 39.9% in 2013 indicates that the position of people at risk of poverty had deteriorated, because their income was further from the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in 2013 than in 2012, although the value of the at-

3 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_li11&lang=en

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?44risk-of-poverty threshold was lower due to a decline in the population’s income. In 2014, although the at-risk-of-poverty rate remained unchanged, the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap was reduced, indicating that the position of persons at risk of poverty somewhat improved, because they lacked less income than in the previous year to escape the situ-ation of poverty risk.

4. LOW WORK INTENSITYSerbia’s labour market is characterised by low activity among the working-age popula-tion, a low employment rate and high unemployment. In contrast to these labour market indicators, which relate only to the number of active or employed persons, the work intensity of household members indicates the amount of work, i.e. how many household members worked, in relation to the potential number of months. The other significant advantage of this indicator is in the fact that activity and work intensity are not observed at the level of the individual, but rather at the household level, as a person’s welfare is not solely dependent on the intensity of one’s work but also on the work intensity of the other members of one’s household.

Work intensity of household members is very low in Serbia, with a significantly higher share of these people under the age of 60 (21.2%) than the European average (10.5%) (Figure 1). Compared with individual EU countries, only Ireland had a higher share of persons living in households with very low work intensity than Serbia (Krstić, 2015) in 2013 (21.1% vs. 20.5%).

FIGURE 1. THE PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS (0-60 YEARS) LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH VERY LOW WORK INTENSITY IN SERBIA AND EU

Source:RZS(2016),SaopštenjeAnketaoprihodimaiuslovimaživotabr.084[Communication:SurveyofIncomeandLivingConditionsNo.084].DataforEUaccordingtoEurostat(2016).


‘The high rate of very low work intensity of household members in Serbia can be attrib-uted to the high inactivity of the working-age population, as well as the fact that a low percentage of such persons live with other adults who work. Serbia has the highest share of people who do not work, particularly the unemployed, in the working-age population compared with EU countries’ (Krstić, 2015, pp. 83). It is even higher than in countries with the greatest share of these persons (Ireland, Greece and Croatia).

The profile of persons living in households with very low work intensity indicates that pensioners and the unemployed, persons with lower levels of education, as well as chil-dren whose parents have less than an elementary level of education or who have finished primary school only, are at greatest risk of living in such households (Krstić, 2015). The risk of an individual to belong to this category of households decreases with an increase of their level of education or their parent’s level of education, since a higher level of edu-cation is in negative correlation with unemployment and inactivity.

FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS (0-59) LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH VERY LOW WORK INTENSITY BY INCOME QUINTILES, 2012 AND 2014

Source:AuthoronthebasisofEurostatbasedata:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_lvhl13&lang=en

Observed by income quintiles, the percentage of persons living in households with very low work intensity decreases with an increase of equivalised income (Figure 2), which is expected because low equivalised income is the result of low work intensity of household members. Pensioners and the unemployed account for the greatest share among these people, and employed persons account for only 1.6%.

The number of persons under 60 who live in households with very low work intensity has increased by 132,000 in 2014 relative to 2012, representing a 17% increase. This increase is primarily the consequence of an increase in the number of people living in these households from the first two income quintiles (Figure 3).

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?46Poor results achieved in poverty reduction in the period of economic boom during the 2000s in the EU can partially be explained by the fact that there was no reduction in the number of jobless households, despite an increase in the employment rate (Vanden-broucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Cantillon, 2011).

FIGURE 3. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH VERY LOW WORK INTENSITY IN SERBIA, 2014, %

15.410.1

5.6

At-risk-of-poverty rate

25.4

Very low work intensity, 15.7

Source:RZS(2016),SaopštenjeAnketaoprihodimaiuslovimaživotabr.084[Communication:SurveyofIncomeandLivingConditionsNo.084].

Figure 3 shows relationship between the proportion of persons exposed to risk of poverty and the proportion of persons living in households with very low work intensity in Serbia. Almost 10.1% of the population are exposed to both risks. These are persons in house-holds where members do not work or work very little, and who also have relatively low incomes. Out of total number of persons living in households with very low work intensity, almost two thirds face risk of poverty, as work and work intensity of household members is the main precondition for higher income and a better living standard. However, only 40% of persons in risk of poverty live in households with very low work intensity. This in-dicates that low wages, in combination with work intensity above very low, are the main reasons for poverty within this population segment, in addition to social transfers which were insufficient to increase equivalised income above the at-risk-of-poverty threshold.


FIGURE 4. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE FOR EMPLOYEES (AGED 18-59) BY WORK INTENSITY OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, 2012 AND 2014

Source:AuthoronthebasisofEurostatbase:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_iw03&lang=en

Work intensity of household members has considerable effect on the at-risk-of-poverty rate of employees. The greatest risk of poverty among employed is in households with low work intensity (34.1% in 2014), meaning that approximately one in three employed persons living in these households with low work intensity is exposed to the risk of pov-erty (Figure 4). The at-risk-of-poverty rate further decreases with an increase of work intensity, from 19.3% in households with medium work intensity to 7% in households with very high work intensity, similarly, as shown by the data for the EU28 average.4 This means that only a very high work intensity of a household may result in a significant reduction of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, having in mind that the average at-risk-of-poverty rate of employed equalled 13% in 2014 (SORS, 2016). In 2014 as compared to 2012, at risk of poverty of employed decreased the most in households with very high work intensity, and the least in households with low work intensity.

5. INEQUALITY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTIONAccording to SILC data, inequality of income distribution in Serbia measured by the Gini coefficient is very high and was relatively stable in the 2012–2014 period (Table 2). The Gini coefficient in Serbia equalled 38.2 in 2014, which is a slightly higher value than the average for the 28 EU countries (31) and higher than the value of the Gini coefficient of countries with the greatest inequality, such as Lithuania (37.9), Romania (37.,4) and

4 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_li06h&lang=en

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?48Bulgaria (37).5 Compared with countries in the region, the greatest income inequality, after Serbia, was recorded in Macedonia (35.2) which is not in the EU, but is included in the EU-SILC reporting system (Figure 5).

TABLE 2. GINI COEFFICIENT AND EQUIVALISED INCOME QUINTILE SHARE RATIO IN SERBIA, 2012-2014

2012 2013 2014

Gini coefficient (*100) 38.0 38.6 38.2

Quintile share ratio 8.6 9.8 9.0

Source:RZS(2016),SaopštenjeAnketaoprihodimaiuslovimaživotabr.084.[Communication:SurveyofIncomeandLivingConditionsNo.084]

Note:Incomeinkindisexcludedfromthetotalincome.

Income inequality in Serbia is also high when measured by the quintile share ratio, which was 9 in 2014. This means that 20% of the wealthiest population in Serbia had 9-fold higher equivalised income relative to 20% of the poorest. The value of this indicator is significantly higher compared to the average value for 28 EU countries, which equalled 5.2 in 2014, but also higher than in countries with the highest values recorded in Roma-nia (8.3), Lithuania (7.5), Macedonia (7.2 in 2013) and Bulgaria (7.1).6

FIGURE 5. THE GINI COEFFICIENT FOR SERBIA, MACEDONIA AND EU COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST GINI COEFFICIENT, 2014

Note:TheGinicoefficientmultipliedby100.

Source:AuthoronthebasisofEurostatdatabasedata.DataforMacedoniareferto2013.

5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi190&plugin=16 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi180&plugin=1


Bearing in mind that the first Survey of Income and Living Conditions was carried out in 2013, we may discuss fluctuations in income inequality over the previous period based on the Household Budget Survey data. Data from this Survey show that income inequal-ity, measured by the Gini coefficient, dropped from 2006 until the start of the global economic crisis in 2009 (from 35.4 to 31.2; Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2012), then began to increase. A significant increase in income inequality is evident in the period from 2010 to 2012 (from 33 to 38), which is to some extent the result of the various sources of data (the HBS in 2010, and SILC in 2012). One of the reasons for this leap in income inequality over a period of two years may be explained by the fact that all of the components of income, especially wages, which most contribute to inequality, are better covered by SILC than by the HBS, taking into account that the HBS was designed first and foremost to cover expenditures and not income. Although comparable data over a long-term period is not available, making it difficult to discuss trends, it is certain that income inequality in Serbia in comparison to the EU average was higher over the entire preceding decade.

SILC results point out that actual income inequality is somewhat lower than presented due to underestimated social transfers in SILC and due to the exclusion of income in kind according to Eurostat methodology. Both factors affect mainly the population with the lowest income. However, their impact on the presented inequality is not more than 1.5 percentage points (Krstić, 2016).

Many factors have contributed to such high-income inequality in Serbia. Besides others, these include a high rate of very low work intensity of household members, high share of non-standard forms of employment (part-time, temporary jobs, self-employment), pre-dominantly within the shadow economy, as well as a modest redistributive role of direct taxes and social transfers (Krstić, 2016). Low coverage with social transfers, particularly monetary social assistance and child benefits, and very low progressiveness of the Ser-bian tax system explain the relatively modest, according to international standards, redis-tributive role of direct taxes and social transfers. Ranđelović and Žarković-Rakić (2011) and Žarković-Rakić (2015) also point to a relatively low redistributive role of direct taxes and social transfers in Serbia on the basis of the 2007 Living Standards Measurement Survey, relative to EU countries (Medgyesi, 2014). Their role is also modest compared to the countries in the region, such as Croatia and Slovenia (Čok, Urban and Verbič, 2013).

TABLE 3. INCOME INEQUALITY BY WORK INTENSITY OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AND TOTAL INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION, 2012

Share in personsShare in equivalised

incomeGini GE(2)

Very low 18.14 8.73 0.451 0.472

Low 13.07 8.87 0.328 0.212

Medium 19.86 17.51 0.321 0.249

High 16.83 19.20 0.307 0.182

Very high 32.09 45.69 0.324 0.245

Total 100.00 100.00 0.388 0.333

Inequality within a group 0.270

Inequality between groups 0.063

Source:Calculationsbyauthor.SILC2013.

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?50Table 3 presents income inequality by work intensity of household members. It also shows the decomposition of total income inequality (measured as G(2), i.e. half the squared coefficient of variation) to inequality between households with different work intensity and residual inequality within these households using the formula given in the methodological section for α=2.

Income inequality is the highest for households with very low work intensity and de-creases with rising work intensity of household members. Both inequality measures, the Gini coefficient and G(2), show similar trends with change in work intensity of household members. Differences between households with different work intensities explain 19% of the total income inequality, based on the G(2) inequality indicator between groups. This means that 81% of the total income inequality can be attributed to inequality within households with different levels of work intensity. From a policy point of view, elimination of the difference in average incomes between these households would result in reduced inequality by only 19%. Therefore, reduction of inequality within these households would result in a significant reduction of inequality by 81%.

6. CONCLUSIONSerbia is characterised by very low work intensity, a high at-risk-of-poverty rate and high income inequality in the 2012–2014 period. These indicators are much higher than the EU average, but also among the highest compared to individual EU countries. The contri-bution of this paper is that the effects of work intensity of household members on poverty and income inequality in Serbia are quantified for the first time on the basis of individual data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions.

The results show that higher work intensity of household members reduces the poverty risk of employed persons. This confirms the first hypothesis of this paper. The highest poverty risk of employed persons is faced by households with low work intensity, where approximately one employed person in three is exposed to poverty risk, and the lowest in households with very high work intensity (7%). This means that only a very high work intensity of a household may lead to a significant reduction in the at-risk-of-poverty rate.

An analysis of inequality by work intensity of household members indicates that income inequality is the highest for households with very low work intensities and it decreases with an increase in work intensity of household members. This confirms the second hypothesis of this paper. The decomposition of income inequality by work intensity of household members shows that a reduction of income inequality within households with different work intensity has the biggest impact on reducing income inequality in Serbia, while the elimination of differences in average income between these households would result in the reduction of inequalities by only 19%. Policies that contribute to greater employability of individuals, such as education, lifelong learning and active employment measures, would reduce inequality in market income - income that an individual earns on the labour market, before redistribution policies start to produce effects (Krstić and Žarković-Rakić, 2017).


The main prerequisite for poverty reduction is GDP growth, accompanied by a rise in employment, as well as a decrease of income inequality. Data show that employment significantly reduces poverty risk, however, it does not always guarantee better welfare or an escape from poverty, as the quality of employment is a key determining factor of this. Adverse effects of dismissal of workers from enterprises undergoing transition on total demand and living standards in the forthcoming period may be partially compensated for by the positive effects of better-quality employment in more productive sectors, as well as extended coverage of the poor with the right to monetary social assistance. In addition, striking a balance between social protection and employment incentives is particularly important for poverty reduction, as it would provide incentives to social assistance ben-eficiaries to find employment.

In conclusion, it is necessary to mention that one of the limits of this paper is in that we cannot track the dynamic changes of these three indicators over an extended previous pe-riod, bearing in mind that the Survey of Income and Living Conditions began to be carried out from 2013. Also, we believe that actual income inequality is lower 1.5 percentage points than those presented, due to underestimated social transfers in SILC and due to the exclusion of income in kind.

Further research in this area should provide answers to the questions; what additional factors, besides increased work intensity, such as education, work experience, type of employment, sector of activity, etc., could contribute to reducing poverty and income inequality in Serbia and what is their importance. This would enable the analysis of other policies that may contribute to reducing poverty and income inequality in Serbia.

LITERATURECantillon, B. (2011), “The paradox of the social investment state: growth, employment and poverty in the Lisbon era”, Journal of European Social Policy, 21(5), 432-449

Cowell, F.A. and S.P. Jenkins (1995), “How Much Inequality can we Explain? A Method-ology and an Application to the USA”, Economic Journal, Vol.105, pp. 421-30

Eurostat (2010), Income poverty and material deprivation in European countries

Eurostat (2012a), “Working paper with the description of the Income and living condi-tions dataset”, Lot 1: EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on income and Living Condi-tions): Methodological studies and publications

Eurostat (2013), Smarter, greener, more inclusive? Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy

Eurostat (2016), Newsrelease 199/2016

Government of the Republic of Serbia (2012), Praćenje socijalne uključenosti u Srbiji

WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA?52Gini, C. (1912), Variabilita e Mutabilita, Bologna

Krstić, G. (2014), “Pokazatelji siromaštva i socijalne isključenosti u Srbiji i EU: Metodolo-gija, kretanje i karakteristike” in B. Jovanović Gavrilović i J. Žarković Rakić (red.), Reforme i razvoj: Stanje, rezultati i početak pregovora Srbije sa EU (pp. 117-132), Faculty of Eco-nomics, University of Belgrade

Krstić, G. (2015), “Work conditions and work intensity of household members”, in Ser-bia Income and Living Conditions 2013 (pp.73-96), Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade

Krstić, G. (2016), “Why income inequality is so high in Serbia: Empirical evidence and measurement of key factors”, Economic Annals LXI, No.220, pp.23-46

Krstić G. i Žarković-Rakić J. (2017), “Dohodna nejednakost u Srbiji: uzroci i preporuke za politiku”, Zbornik radova sa Naučne konferencije Naučnog društva ekonomista Srbije i Ekonomskog fakulteta u Beogradu Ekonomska politika Srbije u 2017.

Milanović, B. (2003), “Incidence of Social Transfers; Inequality”, in Bogićević et al., Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor (pp.43-66). Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Social Affairs and Center for Liberal Democratic Studies, Belgrade

Medgyesi, M. (2014), Components of income inequality and its change in EU countries, 2004-2010, ImPRovE Discussion Paper 14(01). Antwerp

Ranđelović, S. & Žarković-Rakić, J. (2011), “Adressing Inequality and Poverty with Tax Instruments”, Economic Annals LVI, No.190, pp.7-26

Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2016), Communication: Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) No. 084

Shorrocks, A. F. (1980), “The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Mea-sures”, Econometrica Vol. 48 (3), pp. 613–625

Sen, A. (1977), On Economic Inequality (2nd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press

Vandenbroucke, F., and Vleminckx, K. (2011), “Disappointing poverty trends: is the so-cial investment state to blame?”, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 21, pp. 450-471

Čok, M., Urban, I., & Verbič, M. (2013), “Income Redistribution Through Taxes and So-cial Benefits: The Case of Slovenia and Croatia”, Panoeconomicus, Vol 5, pp. 667-686

Žarković Rakić, J. (2015), “Employment effects of tax cuts in a transition country: evi-dence from Serbia”, Post Communist Economies, 27(3), pp. 397-412


YILMAZ BAYAR1


PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

JEL CLASSIFICATION: G10, G20, G28, H83, C33

ABSTRACT:

Financial development has been accepted as an important component of economic growth together with the considerable improvements and expansions in financial sec-tor during the recent years. Therefore, the determinants of financial development have gained importance. This study researches the interaction between public governance and the development of financial sector in 15 Central and Eastern European countries over the 2002-2015 period employing panel regression. The results of the paper revealed that most elements of the public governance are important factors for the development of financial sector.

1 FacultyofEconomicsandAdministrativeSciences,DepartmentofEconomics,UsakUniversity.

KEY WORDS:PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES54

1. INTRODUCTIONFinancial development has become an important factor behind the long-run economic growth in the context of endogenous growth theories, because an improved financial sec-tor allocates resources efficiently and thus can boost long term economic growth (e.g. see Valickova et al., 2015; Nyasha and Odhiambo, 2015; and Sehrawat and Giri, 2015). In this context, the drivers underlying the development of financial sector have gained importance in the recent years and many empirical studies have revealed that institu-tions, trade and financial openness, geography, economic growth, economic develop-ment, population, religious, language and ethnic characteristics have been major factors behind the development of financial sector (Huang, 2010). In this regard, the quality of public administration comes into prominence as a key determinant of financial develop-ment, because public administration is the dominant actor which designs and regulates the financial environment and the functioning of financial system.

Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries experienced significant changes in public governance during the economic transformation with transition to liberal market econo-mies from closed centrally planned economies over the period 1990s-2010s. In the transition process, CEE countries have experienced an institutional and economic trans-formation in both public sector and private sector. On the other side, the integration pro-cess of some CEE countries with the EU (European Union) supported and accelerated the transformation through the existing EU criteria and financial support. As a consequence the CEE countries have come a long way in terms of good governance over time. This study researches the effects of improvements in the public administration and legal in-frastructure on the development of financial sector in 15 CEE countries over 2002-2015 period employing panel regression analysis.

Our paper will be one of the early studies researching the interaction between the quality of public administration and financial development and make contribution to the relevant literature with this aspect. Within this framework, we scrutinize the relevant studies in the next part of the paper. Then we introduce the data and method employed in the study. We implement econometric analysis and discuss the findings in the section of empirical analysis. Finally the study draws to the close with the Conclusion section.

2. LITERATURE REVIEWThree main hypotheses, law-finance hypothesis of La Porta et al. (1997), the hypotheses of endowment and economic institutions Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004), have been developed to explain the interaction between institutional development and development of financial sector. La Porta et al. (1997) asserted that solid legislative institutions and regulations towards the protection of the investors and creditors may affect the develop-ment of financial sector positively by way of adaptability and political. Acemoglu et al. (2001) also specified that states form different legal systems including regulations about the protection of investors and property depending on their endowments and influence development of financial sector. Lastly, Acemoglu et al. (2004) claimed that institutional


development may affect the economic activity positively by means of shaping the eco-nomic incentives such as property rights, allocation of the resources. Consequently in-stitutional development has potential to affect financial development through increasing protection of investors and creditors, provision ownership rights and efficiently allocation of funds theoretically. Therefore we expect a positive impact of institutional quality on development of finance sector.

The empirical studies have reached the findings supporting the theoretical consider-ations stated above (institutional development affects the development of financial sector positively) (e.g. see La Porta et al., 1997; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Law and Demetriades, 2006;, Baltagi et al., 2007; Billmeier and Massa, 2007; Gries and Meierrieks, 2010; Huang, 2010; Le et al., 2015; Mbulawa, 2015). These empirical findings verified that regulations and environment in which financial institutions work are important determi-nants for development of finance sector.

In one of the pioneering studies, La Porta et al. (1997) investigated the interaction be-tween financial development and law in 49 countries and found that the countries with weaker investor protection in terms of law had less developed capital markets. On the other side Chinn and Ito (2006) investigated the interplay among financial openness, institutions and financial development in 108 countries during the period 1980-2000 and found that financial openness began to make contribution to the development of stock markets after reaching a certain threshold level of institutional quality. Law and Demetriades (2006) also examined the relationship among openness, institutions and financial development in 43 developing countries over 1980–2001 period with dynamic panel regression and revealed that institutional improvement affected the development of financial sector positively.

In another study, Baltagi et al. (2007) investigated the relationship among financial development including banking sector development and capital market development, openness and institutions in different groups of countries during changing time peri-ods employing dynamic panel regression and revealed that institutional development influenced development of banking sector and capital markets positively. On the other side, Billmeier and Massa (2007) researched the factors behind the development of stock markets in 17 countries from Middle East and Central Asia over 1995 and 2005 period with panel regression and revealed a positive interaction between stock market development and institutional progress. Zoli (2007) also investigated the determinants of financial development in emerging European countries over 1995-2006 period with panel regression and revealed that institutional improvement affected the development of financial sector positively.

Huang (2010) researched the interaction between institutional development and de-velopment of financial sector in 90 non-transition economies over 1960–1999 period employing panel regression and revealed that institutional development affected financial development positively. Gries and Meierrieks (2010) also examined the factors behind the development of financial sector in 19 African countries during the period 1984-2007 and revealed that institutional improvements influenced the development of financial sec-tor positively. In another study, Law and Azman-Saini (2012) researched the influence of institutional development on the capital market development and banking sector de-

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES56velopment in 94 countries consisting of developed and developing countries over 1996-2004 period employing dynamic panel regression and discovered that high institutional development was important especially for the development of banking sector, but the nexus between institutional improvement and capital market progress was contingent.

In another study, Cherif and Dreger (2014) examined the determinants underlying the development of banking sector and capital market in MENA states for the period of 1990-2007 period employing panel regression and revealed that institutional develop-ment influenced the development of banking sector and capital market positively. Le et al. (2015) also investigated the factors behind the development of financial sector in 26 Asia and the Pacific states over 1995-2011 period with regression analysis and revealed that public governance and institutional improvement had positive influence on financial development in developing countries. Finally, Mbulawa (2015) investigated the major determinants of financial development in 11 Southern Africa Development Com-munity states over the period 1996-2010 employing panel regression and discovered that improvements in the public administration affected the development of financial sector positively.

3. DATA AND METHODWe researched the interaction between various indicators representing public governance and the development of financial sector in 15 CEE countries including (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) during 2002-2015 period with panel regression analysis. The existence of data formed our sample and the time dimension of the all cross-sections were the same in the panel, in other words we used a balanced panel in the study.

3.1. DataFinancial development was represented by domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) in the paper extracted from World Bank (2017a), because it was used by most of stud-ies about the financial development (e.g., see Lane and McQuade, 2013; Petrovski and Kjosevski, 2014) and the share of banking sector in the whole financial system. On the other side, six components of public governance indicators of World Bank (2017b) were employed as proxy for quality of public administration. The components of public gover-nance and their symbols are displayed in Table 1 and each indicator shows the political stability, functioning of the public sector and legal system with a scale changing from -2.5 (weak) and 2.5 (strong) (see World Bank (2017b) and Kaufmann et al. (2010) for the detailed information about definitions and calculation of six public governance indicators).


TABLE 1. DATASET DESCRIPTION

Variables SYMBOL SOURCE

DCRD Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank (2017a)

VAA Voice and accountability World Bank (2017b)

PS Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism World Bank (2017b)

GE Government effectiveness World Bank (2017b)

RQ Regulatory quality World Bank (2017b)

ROL Rule of law World Bank (2017b)

COC Control of corruption World Bank (2017b)

Source:Authors’ownelaboration.

Gauss 11.0, WinRATS Pro. 8.0, and Stata 14.0, programs were utilized for implementa-tion of econometric analysis. The summary and correlation matrix of the dataset were presented in Table 2 in Appendix and the correlation matrix indicated that there were no multicollinearity problems among the explanatory variables.

3.2. Econometric model and methodThe econometric model seeks to research the effect of public governance or public ad-ministration quality on financial development. In this regard, the model is established as follows:

(1)

The subscripts i and t index in Equation 1 symbolize the countries and time respectively. Two dummy variables (respectively D1 and D2) representing the EU membership and recent financial crises were included in the model to see the impact of EU membership and the crises on the development of financial sector. Furthermore, μ indicates unobserv-able country specific effects in the model, while ε shows the error term in the model.

First, cross-sectional dependency was investigated within the scope of econometric anal-ysis, because the results of the cross-sectional independency test give an idea to us about the selection of proper unit root tests. The first generation unit root tests (e.g. Maddala and Wu (1999), Hadri (2000), Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003)) do not take notice of cross-section dependence probably causing low power and size distortions, while sec-ond generation unit root tests (e.g. Bai and Ng (2004) and Pesaran (2007)) consider the cross-section dependence (Hurlin and Mignon, 2007). In this paper Pesaran (2004) LM CD (Lagrange Multiplier Cross-sectional Dependency) test and LM adj. test of Pesaran et al. (2008) were employed to investigate the existence of cross-sectional dependency, because time dimension of the (T=14) was found to be lower than cross-section dimen-sion (N=15). CIPS (Cross-sectionally augmented IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)) test

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES58was implemented to analyze the integration levels of the series considering the results of cross-sectional dependency.

In the next stage of the study, Chow (F)(1960), Hausman (1978) and Breusch and Pa-gan (1980) tests were implemented for the determination of FEM (fixed effects model) or REM (random effects model) to be estimated. Finally, serial correlation problem was tested with Wooldridge (2002) test, while heteroskedasticity problem was tested with Greene (2003) test.

4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Cross-sectional Dependency TestThe existence of cross-sectional dependency among the series was investigated with LM CD test of Pesaran (2004) and LM adj. test of Pesaran et al. (2008) and the test results were displayed in Table 3. The null hypothesis (there is cross-sectional independency) was declined at 5% significance level, since the probability values were found to be lower than 0.05. So we concluded that there was cross-sectional dependency among the series. Furthermore, the homogeneity of the slope coefficients were investigated by the adjusted delta tilde test of Pesaran and Yamaga (2008) and the results showed that there was heterogeneity among the slope coefficients (Table 3, Appendix).

4.2. CIPS Unit Root TestPesaran (2007) CIPS panel unit root test dependent on CADF (covariate-augmented Dickey-Fuller) test was implemented to analyze the stationarity level of the series con-sidering the cross-sectional dependency among the series and the results were displayed in Table 4 in Appendix. CIPS statistics are attained with averaging the CADF statistics of each series. All the variables were found to not be stationary at the level, since the CADF and CIPS statistics were higher than the critical values, but they became stationary after first-differencing.

4.3. Model SelectionFirst Chow (1960), Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Hausman (1978) pretests were implemented to decide whether REM or FEM model and the results of pretests were displayed in Table 5. The result of BP model suggests the REM, while the result of Chow test suggests the FEM. Lastly, the result of Hausman test offered the use of REM between FEM and REM.


TABLE 5. MODEL SELECTION PRETEST RESULTS

TEST P VALUE DECISION

Chow (F) test (H0: Pooled OLS is effective) 0.001 FEM

BP (χ2) test (H0: OLS is effective) 0.028 REM

Hausman test (H0: REM is efficient) 0.174 REM

Source:Authors’ownelaborationbasedontheresultsofthepre-tests.

4.4. Model EstimationWe employed different algorithms in the context of the regression analysis and imple-mented the estimation using the algorithm of white cross-section having the minimum sum of the squared errors; the outcomes of the estimated model were displayed in Table 6. The outcomes indicate that all the public governance indicators except voice and ac-countability (VAA) had positive impact on financial development. Our explanatory vari-ables explained 59% of the changes in the dependent variable and the coefficients indi-cated that rule of law (ROL) and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS) had the largest influence on the financial sector development. Finally, the coefficients of the dummy variables representing the EU membership and the recent financial crises (global financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) revealed that the EU mem-bership affected the development of financial sector positively, while the recent crises affected the development of financial sector negatively.

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES60 TABLE 6. PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS

Dependent variable: DCRD COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STATISTIC PROB.

DVAA 8.653939 6.470423 1.337461 0.1826

DPS 0.239977 0.033702 7.120622 0.0000

DGE 0.089908 0.048648 1.848131 0.0270

DRQ 0.133173 0.044318 3.004930 0.0040

DROL 0.258527 0.048739 5.304283 0.0000

DCOC 0.104502 0.035696 2.927534 0.0039

D1 6.117016 2.203266 -2.776340 0.0060

D2 -6.325827 2.226916 -2.840622 0.0050

C 43.81498 5.224054 8.387160 0.0000

Effects SpecificationS.D. Rho

Cross-section random 10.20685 0.5543

Period random 5.507364 0.1614

Idiosyncratic random 7.309075 0.2843

Weighted StatisticsR-squared 0.596159 Mean dependent var 7.686105

Adjusted R-squared 0.564165 S.D. dependent var 8.397499

S.E. of regression 7.677332 Sum squared resid 11847.23

F-statistic 36.13163 Durbin-Watson stat 2.922233

Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000

4.5. Diagnostic TestsThe heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, which are major assumptions be-hind the regression, were investigated for the reliability of the findings. We investigated autocorrelation problem with autocorrelation test of Wooldridge (2002) and investigated heteroskedasticity problem with Greene (2003) test and results were presented in Table 7. Given the findings of the test, no autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems were revealed in the model.

TABLE 7. RESULTS OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS

Test P VALUE

Wooldridge test 0.261

Greene heteroskedasticity test 0.195

Source:Authors’ownelaborationbasedontestresults.


4.6. Discussion of the ResultsThe relevant theoretical literature (law-finance hypothesis of La Porta et al. (1997), the hypotheses of endowment and economic institutions of Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004)) asserted that institutional development affects the development of financial sec-tor positively, because the quality of public administration and rule of law have direct impact on the designing, regulating, and the functioning of the financial system. On the other hand the findings of the relevant empirical literature (e.g. see La Porta et al., 1997; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Law and Demetriades, 2006;, Baltagi et al., 2007; Billmeier and Massa, 2007; Gries and Meierrieks, 2010; Huang, 2010; Le et al., 2015; Mbulawa, 2015) were found to be consistent with the theoretical expectations.

The regression coefficients of the study denoted that political stability and absence of vio-lence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law had positive impact on the development of financial sector, but voice and ac-countability did not have significant impacts on the financial development. So our results were found to be consistent with the findings of both theoretical and empirical studies. Furthermore, the coefficients of the dummy variables representing the EU membership and the recent financial crises (global financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) revealed that the EU membership affected the development of financial sector posi-tively, while the recent crises affected the development of financial sector negatively. The EU membership is expected to influence the development of financial sector positively through making contribution to the development of institutions and legal infrastructure. On the other hand the financial crises can block the development of financial sector nega-tively by affecting both demand and supply sides of financial markets through leading loss of confidence and increasing the bankruptcies of financial institutions.

5. CONCLUSIONFinancial sector has become an important factor behind the economic expansion by mo-bilizing the funds and directing the funds to the most productive ventures in the economy. Therefore, many researches have focused on the factors underlying the development of financial sector during the past three decades. In the paper, we researched the interac-tion between various dimensions of public governance and the development of financial sector in 15 CEE economies over the period 2002-2015 employing panel regression. We discovered that all the components of public governance including political stability, quality of governing institutions and regulatory environment (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption), and rule of law except voice and account-ability had positive influence on the development of financial sector. We also revealed that a dummy variable representing the recent financial crises had negative impact on financial development, while the dummy variable representing the EU membership af-fected the development of financial sector positively. The EU membership made a posi-tive contribution to the development of financial sector with raising the development level of institutions, while the financial crises affect the development of financial sector nega-tively through loss of confidence and increasing the bankruptcies of financial institutions

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES62Consequently, the results of the study are consistent with the predictions of the theoreti-cal literature and the relevant empirical findings and suggest that improvements in the quality of both public administration and legal infrastructure will contribute to the devel-opment of financial sector.

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APPENDIX TABLE 2. DATASET SUMMARY

Variables OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX

DCRD 210 46.6375 18.5541 0.1858704 101.2876

VAA 210 0.6105 0.4090 -0.2229555 1.171905

PS 210 0.3866 0.5622 -1.1809 1.202154

GE 210 0.3855 0.5587 -0.9707849 1.200911

RQ 210 0.6398 0.5262 -0.6475093 1.674902

ROL 210 0.2830 0.5887 -0.9704201 1.364578

COC 210 0.1145 0.45977 -0.6475093 1.26802

VAA PS GE RQ ROL COC

VAA 1.0000 0.118431 0.145538 0.161553 0.162784 0.145065

PS 0.1184 1.000000 0.265097 0.157332 0.276615 0.162485

GE 0.1455 0.265097 1.000000 0.379314 0.491370 0.258150

RQ 0.1616 0.157332 0.379314 1.000000 0.496248 0.158233

ROL 0.1628 0.276615 0.491370 0.496248 1.000000 0.366012

COC 0.1451 0.162485 0.258150 0.158233 0.366012 1.000000

TABLE 3. RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE AND HOMOGENEITY TESTS

Cross-sectional dependency testsTest Statistic p-value

LM (Breusch and Pagan (1980)) 76.78 0.002

LM adj* (Pesaran et al. (2008)) 54.91 0.013

LM CD* (Pesaran (2004)) 35.28 0.005

Homogeneity testsTest Statistic p-value

Delta_tilde 39.671 0.001

Delta_tilde_adj 28.442 0.004

*two-sidedtest

TABLE 4. UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS

Test DCRD VAA PS GE RQ ROL COC

CADF -5.823 -6.048 -5.112 -9.564 -8.739 -7.033 -5.379

CIPS -5.104 -5.982 -4.977 -8.203 -8.037 -6.826 -4.831

MaximumlaglengthforCADFwastakenas4andoptimallaglengthwasdeterminedconsideringSchwarzinformati-oncriterion.

CriticalvaluesfortrendandinterceptwereprovidedfromPesaran(2007).

Thecriticalvaluesat1,5,and10%levelofsignificanceforCADFare-5.46,-4.17,and-3.63respectively.

Thecriticalvaluesat1,5,and10%levelofsignificanceforCIPSare-3.09,-2.83and-2.69respectively.


DRAGAN ALEKSIĆ1


NEMANJA VUKSANOVIĆ2


IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -IS THERE A DISCRIMINATION ON THE LABOUR MARKET? - CASE OF SERBIA IN THE MIDST OF ECONOMIC CRISIS -

JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: J24, J31, J71.

APSTRAKT:

Istorijski razvoj modernog društva zasnovan na patrijarhalnom obrascu funkcionisanja porodice, jasno je podelio uloge muškaraca i žena. Tek u godinama nakon industrijske revolucije, podela na žene - koje obavljaju poslove unutar domaćinstva, i muškarce – koji rade da tržištu, počela je polako da nestaje. Masovno uključivanje žena na tržište rada, koje se dogodilo tokom 20. veka, doprinelo je tome da se ovaj jaz između muškaraca i žena drastično smanji. Međutim, čak i u praskozorju trećeg milenijuma, izvesne razlike u položaju na tržištu rada između muškaraca i žena i dalje postoje. Diskriminacija žena,

1 Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu.2 Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -68posmatrano u okvirima svetske privrede, prisutna je u kontingentskom (employment gap) i cenovnom (wage gap) obliku. Očekivano, Srbija nije izuzetak po ovom pitanju. Cilj ovog rada jeste da ispitamo stepen kontingentske i cenovne diskriminacije žena na tržištu rada u Srbiji, kao i uticaj svetske ekonomske krize na njen intenzitet. Rezultati sugerišu da umerena diskriminacija žena svakako postoji, kao i da kriza nije u značajnoj meri dopri-nela pogoršanju relativnog položaja žena.

ABSTRACT:

The historical development of a modern society based on patriarchal family pattern clear-ly divided the roles of men and women. Years after the industrial revolution, division on women – who are producing family goods at home, and men – who are working on the labour market, began to slowly disappear. The vigorous rise of women participation on the labour market, which occurred during the 20th century, made its contribution in narrowing this gap between men and women. However, even in the dawn of the third mil-lennium, some differences of main labour market indicators between men and women still exist. Discrimination of women, speaking in terms of the world economy, has had quantitative (employment gap) and price (wage gap) form. As expected, Serbia is no exception in this regard. The aim of this paper is to examine the degree of employment gap and wage gap of women on Serbian labour market, as well as the impact of the global economic crisis on its intensity. The results are showing that moderate discrimination of women undeniably exists, but on the other hand, the global economic crisis has not con-tributed to the deterioration of their relative position on the labour market.

KLJUČNE REČI:DISKRIMINACIJA ŽENA, TRŽIŠTE RADA, RAZLIKE U ZARADAMA, ZAPOSLENOST.

KEY WORDS:DISCRIMINATION OF WOMEN, LABOUR MARKET, GENDER PAY GAP, EMPLOYMENT.


1. UVODIako su svi vidovi diskriminacije, među koje spada i rodna, u razvijenim zemljama sveta zabranjeni najvišim pravnim aktima3 i regulisani velikim brojem specifičnih zakona i pod-zakonskih akata, oni de facto i dalje postoje. Različiti oblici diskriminacije, koji svoje ko-rene vuku iz daleke prošlosti i klasnih podela, egzistiraju i u današnjem vremenu i to čak u najrazvijenijim, i po shvatanjima najtolerantnijim, društvima koja, i pored značajnog napredovanja na razvojnoj lestvici, još uvek nisu uspela da je se reše. Jedan od segme-nata društva i ekonomije u kojem je takođe prisutna diskriminacija, jeste tržište rada, na kojem ona ima veliki broj pojavnih oblika, a mi ćemo se u nastavku ovog rada fokusirati na onaj koji u podređeni položaj stavlja žene.

I pre samog stupanja na tržište rada, žene se, usled svojih prirodnih karakteristika, su-sreću sa najmanje dva problema koji ih u samom startu stavljaju u nepovoljniji položaj u odnosu na muškarce. Radi se o (1) egzogenim uticajima na donošenje odluke o tome koliko i na koji način će se neki posao obavljati, kao i o (2) diskriminatornom pristupu prilikom razgovora za posao. Prvo, primera radi, samohrana majka sa malim detetom mora u znatno većoj meri da prilagodi optimalan izbor između rada i dokolice za razliku od muškarca i drugo, čitav korpus pitanja prilikom konkurisanja za posao, a koja se tiču fizičkog izgleda i planiranja porodice imaju znatno veći ponder u procesu izbora kandi-data kod žena, nego što je to slučaj kod muškaraca. Ukoliko za trenutak zanemarimo navedene inicijalne poteškoće sa kojima se žene suočavaju prilikom traženja posla i posmatramo isključivo zaposlene žene, videćemo da diskriminacija ne prestaje, naprotiv – još je izraženija, dok posledice koje ona prouzrokuje postaju sve ozbiljnije. Diskrimi-nacija zaposlenih isključivo na osnovu pola, u užem smislu se može klasifikovati u dve podgrupe. Prvu, koja podrazumeva fizička i psihička maltretiranja od strane nadređenih (vertikalni mobing) ili kolega (horizontalni mobing) na radnom mestu, od čega su najčešći slučajevi neka vrsta seksualnog uznemiravanja, zatim očekivanje od žena da obavljaju ra-zličite vanposlovne aktivnosti poput kuvanja kafe, održavanja higijene radnog mesta i sl. Druga podgrupa diskriminacije na radnom mestu se manifestuje nejednakim vrednova-njem rada pojedinaca na istim pozicijama isključivo usled pola kojem pripadaju. Drugim rečima, iako apsolutno istih karakteristika, žena i muškarac nemaju jednaku platu, pri čemu je potonji u favorizovanom položaju.

Motivacija za pisanje ovog rada sastoji se iz potrebe da se ovako važnoj temi ozbiljnije posveti pažnja u naučnim i pre svega ekonomskim krugovima, jer njome nije dovoljno da se bave samo psiholozi i sociolozi, već ona svojom interdisciplinarnošću zahteva in-terakciju pomenutih nauka sa ekonomijom. Pored rezultata koji su dobijeni na bazi ras-položivih podataka i koji će biti prezentovani u radu, ukazaćemo na dalje smernice koje treba slediti ne bi li se ovaj fenomen još detaljnije istražio i u skladu sa tim preduzele adekvatne mere za njegovo efikasno rešavanje. Rad osim uvoda obuhvata još četiri celine i strukturiran je na sledeći način. Najpre, da bismo shvatili rastući problem diskrimina-cije, moramo poći od istorijskih kretanja koja su se u prošlosti dogodila i koja svedoče o povećanoj aktivaciji žena na tržištu rada. Upravo sekularni trendovi i razlozi koji objašnja-vaju njihovu putanju biće predmet drugog dela našeg rada. Treći deo sačinjavaće nadasve bizarni primeri polne diskriminacije sa kojima se susrećemo u svetskoj i posebno u praksi

3 Primeraradi,američkimustavomuUSA,UgovoromEvropskezajedniceiz1958.(tzv.Rimskimugovorom)nateritori-jisadašnjeEU.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -70u Srbiji. U četvrtom delu bavićemo se slučajem Srbije i ispitati stepen diskriminacije u dva nivoa – količinskom (koji podrazumeva razlike u kontingentima na tržištu rada) i cenovnom (u šta spada razlika u zaradama između muškaraca i žena). Za indikatore kod kojih je to moguće, osvrnućemo se na stanje koje je važilo pre ekonomske krize, a zatim i na trend koji je prisutan nakon 2008. godine, kako bismo sagledali posledice koje je kriza ostavila na rodnu diskriminaciju u Srbiji. Rezultati dobijeni u trećem delu poslužiće nam da iznesemo zaključne stavove, kao i da na bazi njih formulišemo određene preporuke i smernice za dalja istraživanja.

2. ISTORIJSKI OKVIR I TEKUĆA KRETANJA NA TRŽIŠTU RADAPremda statistika tržišta rada nije toliko stara nauka, te ne raspolažemo egzaktnim po-datkom, procenjujemo da je napredak koji su žene na tržištu rada ostvarile nakon Drugog svetskog rata veći od onog koji su napravile od postanka sveta pa do početka 20. veka. Tradicionalno patrijarhalno društvo, što je bio primarni obrazac po kojem se svet razvijao u prošlosti, rezervisalo je mesto ženama u domaćinstvu, u kome je trebalo da obavljaju mnoštvo kućnih poslova u koje spada i negovanje dece. Izlazak iz takvog okvira nije bio prihvatljiv, tako da je, osim u pojedinačnim slučajevima, radna aktivnost žena van doma-ćinstava bila marginalizovana. Ovome su dodatno doprinela i različita religijska i verska učenja koja ili ograničavaju ili u potpunosti zabranjuju ženama da uzmu aktivno učešće na tržištu rada, od kojih su neka važeća i danas. Tek emancipacijom žena i razvojem pokreta za ljudska prava, odnosno prava žena, otpočela je faza ubrzanog rasta njihove participacije na tržištu rada, i posledično, dolazilo je do sve veće zaposlenosti.

Pored toga što su žene u poslednjih 75 godina napravile veliki iskorak u sustizanju muš-karaca prema osnovnim indikatorima tržišta rada, one su napredovale i u pogledu kva-liteta poslova na kojima se zapošljavaju kao i stepenu uključenosti u obrazovni sistem. Primera radi, većinu fakultetskih studenata u razvijenim zemljama, a takođe i u Srbiji (55%)4, čine žene. Ipak, iako se situacija drastično popravila i iako je jaz između muš-karaca i žena po ovom osnovu smanjen, i dalje postoje razlike u stepenu participacije na tržištu rada i visini plate.

TABELA 1 – STOPA AKTIVNOSTI I STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI U SAD (U %)

1948. 1962. 1972. 1982. 1992. 2002. 2012.

Stopa aktivnosti 32.7 37.9 43.9 52.6 57.8 59.6 57.7

Stopa zaposlenosti 31.3 35.6 41 47.7 53.8 56.3 53.1

Izvor:WomenintheLaborForce,BLS.

U Tabeli 1 prikazani su podaci koji u potpunosti potvrđuju uvodnu rečenicu ovog dela rada. Ako pogledamo stope aktivnosti i stope zaposlenosti nakon Drugog svetskog rata i u 2012. godini, kao poslednjoj godini za koju je bio dostupan ovaj podatak, možemo

4 RZS “Žene i muškarci u Srbiji“ (2014), http://www.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/userFiles/file/Stanovnistvo/ZeneiMus/ZiM_srp-ski_web.pdf


uočiti da su one gotovo udvostručile svoju vrednost - preciznije, porasle su za 25 i 22 procentna poena. Imajući u vidu da su za isti vremenski period oba analizirana pokaza-telja kod muške populacije porasla za oko 10 procentnih poena, jasno je koliko su žene uspele da poboljšaju svoj položaj. Zanimljiva je činjenica da su obe stope nešto više u 2002. nego u 2012. godini. Razlog negativnog kretanja bazičnih pokazatelja tržišta rada ženskog stanovništva, koje je u ovom desetogodišnjem periodu zabeleženo prvi put posle šezdesetogodišnjeg rasta, jeste ekonomska kriza. Kako kretanja analiziranih indikatora tržišta rada koincidiraju sa kretanjima odgovarajućih indikatora kod muškaraca, jasno je da, generalno gledano, kriza nije imala diskriminatorni karakter5.

Objašnjenje sekularnog trenda određeni autori nude u obliku praćenja putanje razvoja privrede (Becker, 1985). Nakon industrijske revolucije propulzivnost se razvijala kod onih proizvodnih i prerađivačkih grana u kojima su tradicionalno bili zaposleni samo muškarci i u kojima su se obavljali teški fizički poslovi. Pridodajući ovome ekstenzivan oblik bav-ljenja poljoprivredom u kome takođe konvencionalno prednjače muškarci, ženama nije ostavljeno mnogo prostora da pronađu zaposlenje. Tehnološki napredak koji je potom usledio, u velikoj meri je doprineo rapidnom usponu tercijarnog sektora, što je imalo za posledicu postepeno smanjenje relativnog učešća dveju, do tada vodećih, privrednih grana - poljoprivrede i industrije. Sektor usluga doživljava neverovatnu ekspanziju sa ra-zvojem informacionih tehnologija što je u razvijenim zemljama sveta dovelo do drastičnog povećanja zarada određenom broju žena koje su u njemu zaposlene. Neaktivnim ženama u tom periodu sa jedne strane visoka zarada na tržištu se čini izuzetno privlačnom, dok sa druge strane proizvodnja porodičnih dobara postaje previše skupa, zbog prevelikog opurtunitetnog troška. Time je mladim majkama bivalo isplativije da svoje vreme provode na tržištu zarađujući naprasno uvećane dohotke i njima plate nekog ko će brinuti za decu u njihovom odsustvu, umesto da i dalje samostalno brinu o deci. Međutim, upravo pove-ćana zarada, koja je bila glavni uzrok veće participacije i zaposlenosti žena, modifikovala je obrazac funkcionisanja porodice usled finansijskog osamostaljenja žena, te je tako zabeleženo sve manje onih koje su se opredeljivale da imaju više dece, broj razvoda je bio u porastu, kao i broj domaćinstava u kojima ima dece, a u kojima je žena glava porodice.

TABELA 2 – STOPA AKTIVNOSTI I STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI ŽENA U IZABRANIM EVROPSKIM DRŽAVAMA (U %)

Stopa aktivnosti

1993. 2015.

Nemačka 60.9 73.1

Francuska 59.9 67.6

Velika Britanija 66.3 71.7

Stopa zaposlenosti

1993. 2015.

Nemačka 55.0 69.9

Francuska 51.8 61.1

Velika Britanija 61.1 68.0

Izvor:ObradaautoranabazipodatakaEurostat.

5 Naravno, reč je o tome da su se indikatori muškog i ženskog stanovništva kretali u istom smeru. Potrebna su detaljnija merenaj kada je reč o intenzitetu posledica krize po svaki od polova.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -72Slična slika o aktivnosti i zaposlenosti žena, bez obzira što su podaci dostupni za nešto kraći interval, dobiće se ukoliko pogledamo neke od najrazvijenijih evropskih država. Po-daci iz Tabele 2 pokazuju da su žene u tri navedene zemlje za samo dvadesetak godina uspele značajno da unaprede svoj položaj, posebno u Nemačkoj gde je za tako kratak vremenski period stopa aktivnosti porasla za više od 12 procentnih poena, a stopa zapo-slenosti za skoro 15 procentnih poena. Usled dostupnosti podataka za ove tri evropske zemlje u mogućnosti smo da analiziramo šta se dešava u pogledu sužavanja rodnog jaza kada su u pitanju ovi pokazatelji. Naredna dva grafika pokazuju racio stopa aktivnosti i zaposlenosti kod muškaraca i žena6, gde vrednosti bliže jedinici označavaju veću rodnu ravnopravnost, i obratno, bliže nuli - veći stepen diskriminacije. Posmatranjem linija trenda na graficima, moguće je uočiti nekoliko zanimljivih tendencija. Prvo, žene u Ve-likoj Britaniji su početkom 90-ih godina prošlog veka bile u relativno dobrom položaju u odnosu na muškarce (posmatrano prema ostalim evropskim zemljama), prilikom čega je njihova stopa zaposlenosti činila čak 83% stope zaposlenosti muškaraca. Drugo, ini-cijalno dobru startnu poziciju žene u Velikoj Britaniji nisu mnogo poboljšale u proteklih skoro četvrt veka, što potvrđuje vrednost racia stopa zaposlenosti koji se u ovom periodu uvećao za svega 0,04 (4pp). Dodatno, sudeći po trajektoriji kretanja vrednosti racia oba pokazatelja stiče se utisak da je ekonomska kriza, relativno posmatrano, najteže pala že-nama u Velikoj Britaniji. Treće, bez obzira na to što su žene u Nemačkoj imale, u odnosu na žene u ostalim posmatranim zemljama, inicijalno najlošiju poziciju, u prethodnom periodu bile su najuspešnije u smanjivanju jaza u odnosu na muškarce, te je tako nivo stope zaposlenosti žena čak na 90% stope zaposlenosti njihovih muških sunarodnika.

GRAFIK 1 – RACIO STOPE AKTIVNOSTI MUŠKARACA I ŽENA, IZABRANE ZEMLJE


6 Racio stopa aktivnosti je definisan kao količnik stope aktivnosti žena i stope aktivnosti muškaraca. Analogno tome, racio stopa zaposlenosti predstavlja količnik stope zaposlenosti žena i stope zaposlenosti muškaraca.


GRAFIK 2 - RACIO STOPE ZAPOSLENOSTI MUŠKARACA I ŽENA, IZABRANE ZEMLJE


3. POJAVNI OBLICI DISKRIMINACIJEDiskriminacija žena je danas prisutna u raznim oblicima i intenzitetima. Ipak, akcenat ćemo staviti na primere koji se često mogu zapaziti na tržištu rada. Činjenica koja možda i više zabrinjava od same diskriminacije, jeste ta što se slučajevi neadekvatnog ponašanja prema osobama ženskog pola relativno slabo prijavljuju nadležnima. Žene, usled nedo-statka informacija o tome kome da se obrate za pomoć i posebno iz straha od gubitka posla, nerado javno govore o diskriminaciji koju doživljavaju i posledično, retko takve slučaje prijavljuju. U nastavku ovog dela rada navešćemo nekoliko tipičnih slučajeva diskriminacije i mobinga nad ženama koji se u praksi često sreću.

Najčešći slučaj diskriminacije dešava se pri samom konkurisanju za posao. Veliki broj oglasa za posao, posebno onih u kojima se eksplicitno navodi da se traži ženska osoba, zahteva da se uz biografiju obavezno dostavi i slika kandidata, odnosno kandidatkinje. Iako su zahtevi ovog tipa zabranjeni zakonom, u praksi se ovakvi oglasi neretko sreću i predstavljaju primer diskriminacije na bazi fizičkog izgleda. Još ozbiljnija diskriminacija događa se prilikom intervjua za posao, gde, ne samo da u pojedinim slučajevima fizički izgled ima veoma veliki ponder pri finalnom odabiru, već se, isključivo ženama, postavlja čitav set osetljivih pitanja intimne prirode koja su zakonski zabranjena. Pitanja koja su najučestalija odnose se na to da li imaju ili planiraju decu, kada planiraju da zasnuju porodicu, kao i da li imaju stalnog partnera. Ukoliko žena odbije da odgovori na bilo koje od ovih pitanja, po automatizmu se njena konkursna prijava ne uzima u razmatranje, dok se od žena koje su pristale da na ova pitanja daju odgovore biraju samo one „podobne“, odnosno one koje u skorijoj budućnosti ne planiraju da rađaju decu. Neretko se događa da prilikom potpisivanja ugovora sa poslodavcem žene budu primorane da sklope i neku

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -74vrstu prećutnog dogovora sa njim, gde se obavezuju da - u određenom vremenskom pe-riodu - neće ostati u drugom stanju. Nadalje, zabeleženi su i slučajevi gde bi, nakon što poslodavac sazna da se žena nalazi u drugom stanju, ista dobijala otkaz pre otvaranja trudničkog bolovanja.

Nakon što se žena zaposli nastupa drugi vid diskriminacije koji bi delimično mogao da se okarakteriše i kao mobing. Od žena se uglavnom očekuje da na poslu, pored radnih zadataka, obavljaju i tzv. tradicionalno ženske poslove. Tako se žene često nalaze u situ-aciji da se od njih očekuje da kuvaju nadređenima kafu, obavljaju ulogu sekretarice iako to nije u opisu njihovog posla i sl. Poseban vid uznemiravanja kojem su žene na radnom mestu izložene, jeste seksualno uznemiravanje, najčešće od strane nadređenih. Ukoliko žena pak ne prihvati nepristojnu ponudu nadređenog dva su moguća ishoda – ili (1) izgu-bi posao ili (2) zadrži radno mesto, ali uz limitiranu mogućnost za napredovanjem, kao i uz visok stepen psihičkog maltretiranja koje u dužem vremenskom periodu može dovesti do ozbiljnijih zdravstvenih problema.

Međutim, da diskriminacija nije karakteristična samo za nerazvijene zemlje i zemlje u razvoju, svedoči najnoviji primer multinacionalne kompanije Google. Ova kompanija, pod velom stimulisanja žena, koje u njoj rade, da što više napreduju u karijeri, ponudila im je mogućnost da zamrznu sopstvene jajne ćelije o trošku kompanije i zasnuju porodicu kada budu na vrhuncu svoje karijere i pošto se u potpunosti profesionalno ostvare. Jasno je da se, iza ove „podsticajne“ politike i navodne brige o zaposlenima krije veoma perfidan vid diskriminacije žena, kojima se ovom prilikom narušava prirodni proces i potencijalno oduzima prilika da dožive iskustvo materinstva. Pri čemu, rezultati medicinskih studija koje su vršile kredibilne institucije pokazuju da žene koje nisu rađale do 30. godine znat-no češće oboljevaju od različitih oblika neizlečivih bolesti (MacMahon, B et al, 1970; The American Cancer Society, 2017). Iz ovog razloga postoji bojazan da bi, ukoliko se i druge kompanije, ugledajući se na Google, odluče na ovakvu „stimulativnu“ politiku, dugoročno posmatrano došlo do značajnih demografskih promena, što bi u krajnjem slučaju uticalo na prirodne tokove radne snage. Dakle, zaključujemo da Srbija nije izolovan slučaj po pi-tanju diskriminacije i da se protiv iste treba boriti svim raspoloživim sredstvima i uključiti sve nadležne institucije.

4. DISKRIMINACIJA U SRBIJI

4.1. Žene kao ranjiva grupa na tržištu radaTržište rada je visoko fragmentirani deo realne ekonomije na kome se uparuju među-sobno nejednako kvalifikovani radnici sa heterogenim poslovima iz različitih privrednih delatnosti. U slučaju takvih raznorodnosti koje dolaze i sa strane ponude i sa strane tra-žnje, mnogo je teže očekivati njihovo efikasno uparivanje i postizanje tržišnog optimuma. Uglavnom, ravnoteža koja se na ovom tržištu postiže je suboptimalna, a jedan od razloga je taj što na njemu postoje određene osetljive grupe koje se, zbog svojih prirodno-demo-grafskih, obrazovnih i fizičkih karakteristika tradicionalno nalaze u lošijem položaju od


proseka ukupnog stanovništva. Takve grupe nazivamo ranjivim, a njihova ranjivost pred-stavlja multidimenzionalni pojam i može se sagledati prema širini, dubini, heterogenosti i tranzitornosti (Aleksić, 2014.).

Upravo zbog lošijih osnovnih pokazatelja na tržištu rada – stope zaposlenosti, stope nezaposlenosti i stope aktivnosti – kao i relativno nižih zarada u odnosu na muškarce, koje su delimično posledica i diskriminacije, žene spadaju u ranjive grupe na tržištu rada. Ne samo to, već gledajući kroz prethodno definisanu multidimenzionalnu prizmu, žene sačinjavaju apsolutno najširu ranjivu grupu, odnosno najbrojniju grupu čiji članovi imaju osetljiv položaj na tržištu rada. S obzirom na to da je brojnost grupe visoko korelisana sa heterogenošću njenih članova, odnosno većom raznorodnošću unutar grupe, javljaju se dodatne poteškoće prilikom kreiranja specifičnih programa aktivne politike tržišta rada, kako bi se njeni pripadnici doveli u bolji položaj.

Ukoliko posmatramo slučaj Srbije videćemo da je, prema poslednjem popisu iz 2011. godine, broj žena ne samo približan broju muškaraca, već je njihov broj za oko 200.000 veći od broja muškaraca7. Međutim, i pored toga što su osobe ženskog pola brojnije, ako upoređujemo ukupno stanovništvo, situacija na tržištu rada bitno je drugačija. Posma-trano prema Anketi o radnoj snazi iz 2015. godine, aktivnu populaciju radnog uzrasta čini za oko 400.000 više muškaraca nego žena8. Već na prvi pogled jasan je problem koji žene imaju u vezi sa participacijom na tržištu rada. Dodatno, podaci o ukupnoj zaposlen-osti pokazuju da je broj zaposlenih muškaraca za čak 360.000 veći od broja žena, a da je pritom broj nezaposlenih muškaraca tek za oko 40.000 veći od broja nezaposlenih žena. Dakle, posmatrano prema osnovnim kontingentima, čak i one žene koje participiraju na tržištu rada, nalaze se u bitno lošijem položaju od pripadnika suprotnog pola.

Rezultati istraživanja koje je sprovedeno neposredno pre izbijanja aktuelne ekonomske krize, a koje se bavilo položajem žena na tržištu rada u Srbiji (Babović, 2007.), ukazuju da se, sa pravnog aspekta, položaj žena u Srbiji značajno poboljšao, čemu je uglavnom doprinelo unapređenje radnog zakonodavstva. Ipak, kao glavni nedostaci ističu se rela-tivno dugi sudski procesi čija je osnova diskriminacija, veliki broj nerešenih slučajeva kao i neadekvatna evidencija kršenja radnih prava žena. Kada su u pitanju ekonomski aspekti analize, pored tradicionalno lošijih osnovnih pokazatelja tržišta rada (za koje vidimo da su i danas nepovoljniji u odnosu na iste pokazatelje kod muškaraca), kao poseban problem ističe se nedostatak vertikalne mobilnosti žena. Drugim rečima, mogućnosti za napredo-vanje žena daleko su manje nego kada su u pitanju njihove kolege muškarci.

Imajući u vidu da po svim navedenim pokazateljima žene predstavljaju najobimniju ran-jivu grupu na tržištu rada u Srbiji, bilo kakav dodatni vid diskriminacije može značajno narušiti njihov dalji položaj9. Iz tog razloga u nastavku ćemo se baviti intenzitetom dis-kriminacije koja ima dva pojavna oblika oblika: (1) količinski (gender employment gap) i (2) cenovni (gender pay gap), kao i pitanjem da li je, i u kojoj meri, ekonomska kriza doprinela povećanju diskriminacije na tržištu rada. „Količinska” ili bolje rečeno kontin-

7 http://popis2011.stat.rs/,RZS.8 Republički zavod za statistiku (2015), http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.aspx?pKey=26.9 Naravno, jasno je da između ranjivosti na tržištu rada i diskriminacije postoji multikolinearnost, te da diskriminacija

može da bude odgovorna za ranjiv položaj u kojem se žene nalaze. Međutim, postoje i ostale ranjive grupe (mladi, stariji, osobe sa niskim i bez kvalifikacija i sl.), za čiju ranjivost diskriminacija nije direktno odgovorna, tako da nećemo detaljnije ulaziti u kauzalnost između ovih dveju varijabli.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -76gentska diskriminacija odnosi se na podređeni položaj koji žene imaju u pogledu bazičnih indikatora tržišta rada i zbog kojih nemaju jednake šanse u pronalaženju zaposlenja na tržištu rada. Potonja se odnosi na one žene koje su pronašle zaposlenje, ali za svoj rad, isključivo zbog pola kome pripadaju, zarađuju niže radne dohotke.

4.2. Diskriminacijaženanatržišturadamerenakontingentskimpristupom

Najbolji pokazatelj kojim se može izmeriti stepen kontingentske diskriminacije žena na tržištu rada, prema makro pristupu, jeste izračunavanje dubine njihove ranjivosti. Pod dubinom ranjivosti podrazumeva se stepen odstupanja osnovnih indikatora tržišta rada ženskog stanovništva u odnosu na ukupno ili neku drugu referentnu grupu stanovništva (Krstić i dr, 2010.). U praksi je moguće pratiti apsolutna i relativna odstupanja pojedi-nih pokazatelja od proseka stanovništva. U okviru naše metodologije, prednost ćemo dati relativnim pokazateljima. Za relativne indikatore smo se odlučili iz prostog razloga što, generalno gledano, ekonomija kao nauka prednost daje ovoj grupi pokazatelja, a u konkretnom slučaju, iz razloga što bolje mere relativni položaj, a samim tim i stepen diskriminacije kod žena. Egzaktniju sliku o položaju žena korišćenjem relativnih pokaza-telja dobićemo zbog toga što se, prilikom njihovog izračunavanja vodi računa i o iznosu promene (što je zajedničko sa apsolutnim pokazateljima), ali i o početnoj vrednosti po-smatranih veličina (što apsolutni pokazatelji zanemaruju). U skladu sa izloženom meto-dologijom, posmatraćemo trend dva najvažnija osnovna indikatora na tržištu rada – stopu aktivnosti i stopu zaposlenosti – koji ukazuju na dve veoma važne stvari – prvo, kakva je uključenost žena u tokove na tržištu rada i drugo, kakva je pozicija onih žena koje se nalaze na tržištu rada.

U Tabeli 3 prikazane su vrednosti stopa aktivnosti, zaposlenosti i nezaposlenosti muškog i ženskog stanovništva u 2008. godini. Kao dodatak, za detaljniju analizu, ovi indikatori su ne samo razvrstani po polovima, već i po obrazovnom nivou. Iz prikazanih podataka se jasno može videti inferioran položaj žena i to na osnovu svakog od predstavljenih pokazatelja. Stopa nezaposlenosti žena je za skoro 4 procentna poena viša u odnosu na stopu nezaposlenosti muškaraca, što će reći da je ta vrednost ovog pokazatelja veća za 25% kod ženskog stanovništva u odnosu na istu vrednost kod muškaraca. Ako se do-datno udubimo u sadržinu indikatora i nastavimo da analiziramo nezaposlenost prema obrazovnom nivou, doći ćemo do još interesantnijeg rezultata. Najveći jaz između stopa nezaposlenosti žena i muškaraca postoji kod osoba sa nižim i srednjim obrazovanjem, što je nekako i očekivano, dok je kod osoba sa visokim obrazovanjem taj jaz manji od 2 procentna poena, što je upola manje od prosečnog jaza. U najnepovoljnijem položaju, kada se posmatra stopa nezaposlenosti, sigurno se nalaze žene koje imaju III, IV i V ste-pen obrazovanja, jer odstupanje nezaposlenosti žena ovog obrazovnog nivoa u odnosu na odgovarajuću kategoriju muškaraca je skoro 5,5 procentnih poena, što je znatno iznad proseka.


TABELA 3 – OSNOVNI INDIKATORI TRŽIŠTA RADA U 2008. GODINI

Ukupno (15-64)

STOPA NEZAPOSLENOSTI STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI STOPA AKTIVNOSTI

MUŠKARCI ŽENE MUŠKARCI ŽENE MUŠKARCI ŽENE

12,40% 16,10% 62,30% 46,00% 71,10% 54,80%

Obrazovanje

NIŽE 11,40% 15;00% 49,10% 32,10% 55,40% 37,80%

SREDNJE 13,90% 19,20% 65,30% 46,80% 75,80% 57,90%

VIŠE 7,70% 9,50% 75,40% 75,80% 81,60% 83,80%

Izvor:Krstić,G.idr.,(2010),„PoložajranjivihgrupanatržišturadaSrbije“Fren.

Stopa zaposlenosti, takođe, ukazuje na diferencijalni tretman među polovima. Ukoliko posmatramo sve obrazovne nivoe, jasno možemo uočiti poražavajuću realnost koja se manifestuje razlikama u stopi zaposlenosti od čak 16,3 procentna poena. U poređenju sa vrednošću od 62,3%, koja predstavlja stopu zaposlenosti muškaraca, vrednost 46% čini se zabrinjavajuće niskom, taman toliko da žensko stanovništvo kategoriše kao ranjivu grupu koja treba da ima prioritetan tretman prilikom vođenja politike zapošljavanja i po-litike tržišta rada. Gledano prema obrazovnom nivou, slično kao i stopa nezaposlenosti, stopa zaposlenosti žena najviše zaostaje za istom stopom muškog stanovništva upravo kod osoba sa nižim i srednjim nivoom obrazovanja, uz malu različitost, a to je da su ta zaostajanja još veća. Ipak, kao delimična uteha ostaje činjenica da je za žene sa visokim i višim obrazovanjem imalo posla. I ne samo to, već je njihova stopa zaposlenosti, bila veća nego stopa zaposlenosti njihovih muških kolega.

Stopa aktivnosti se zajedno sa stopom zaposlenosti može kvalifikovati kao vodeći osnovni indikator tržišta rada koji nam sugeriše da žensko stanovništvo treba svrstati u posebno osetljivu grupu. U 2008. godini, oba pokazatelja identično ukazuju na relativno nepo-voljniji položaj žena. Diskrepanca i u stopi aktivnosti, kao i u stopi zaposlenosti, je ista i iznosi oko 16 procentnih poena. Po obrazovnoj strukturi zanemarljivo veći jaz, u odnosu na stopu zaposlenosti, prisutan je kod žena sa nižim nivoom obrazovanja, dok je kod onih sa srednjim, gotovo nepromenjen. I u ovom slučaju, žene sa višim obrazovanjem su u povoljnijem položaju od njihovih kolega suprotnog pola. Učešće žena sa višom školom i fakultetom na tržištu rada je veće od učešća muškaraca za više od 2 procentna poena.

Na narednim graficima prikazano je kako se relativni položaj žena na tržištu rada menjao sa protokom vremena i kako je na njega uticala tekuća ekonomska kriza. Na apcisama sa leve strane nalaze se podaci o stopama aktivnosti/zaposlenosti muškaraca i žena, dok su sa desne strane iskazani podaci o vrednosti količnika ovih pokazatelja (racio zaposlenosti i racio aktivnosti). Važno je napomenuti da podaci iz 2015. godine nisu u potpunosti uporedivi sa podacima iz pređašnjeg perioda. Do prekida uporedivosti dveju vremenskih serija je došlo usled metodoloških promena koje su se dogodile prilikom sprovođenja Ankete o radnoj snazi od strane Republičkog zavoda za statistiku10. Proširivanje uzorka, prelaženje na sistem permanentnog ispitivanja u toku čitave godine, primena kvartalnog umesto polugodišnjeg izveštavanja, samo su neki od benefita do kojih se došlo nakon ovih metodoloških promena, a koje su pritom bile nužne da bi se upitnik koji se sprovodi

10 Saopštenje za javnost o revidiranim podacima, RZS.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -78u Srbiji uskladio sa odgovarajućim LFS – om koji se sprovodi na teritoriji EU. Upravo iz tog razloga važno je napomenuti da je metodološki nekorektno direktno porediti, posebno apsolutne brojeve (broj zaposlenih, nezaposlenih i sl.). Pošto je u našem slučaju reč o stopama i trendu, metodološke promene ne mogu imati toliko snažan uticaj da promene smer kretanja pomenutih vrednosti, te smo iz tog razloga u period posmatranja uključili i 2015. godinu.

GRAFIK 3 - STOPA AKTIVNOSTI MUŠKOG I ŽENSKOG STANOVNIŠTVA U SRBIJI I VREDNOST NJIHOVOG RACIA, 2008-2015.

125%

126%

127%

128%

129%

130%

131%

132%

133%

134%

135%

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015*

Muškarci Žene Racio ak�vnos�

Izvor:ObradaautoranabazipodatakaAnketeoradnojsnazi,RZS.

GRAFIK 4 - STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI MUŠKOG I ŽENSKOG STANOVNIŠTVA U SRBIJI I VREDNOST NJIHOVOG RACIA, 2008-2015.

Izvor:ObradaautoranabazipodatakaAnketeoradnojsnazi,RZS.


Posmatrajući prikazane trendove moguće je izvući nekoliko ključnih zaključaka o položaju žena na tržištu rada u proteklih osam godina. Prvo, trend kretanja oba posmatrana indi-katora i kod žena i kod muškaraca pratio je identičan obrazac i odgovara subperiodima (2008-2012. i 2013-2015.) kroz koje je tržište rada u Srbiji prošlo od početka eko-nomske krize. Inicijalni talasa krize, koja se sa finansijskog tržišta veoma brzo prelila na realni sektor, najpre je prouzrokovao oštar pad svih osnovnih pokazatelja tržišta rada, da bi potom usledio postepeni oporavak prilikom kojeg je porasla aktivnost i zaposlenost, kako muškog tako i ženskog stanovništva. Iz tog razloga, zadržavajući se samo na gruboj proceni obrasca kretanja posmatranih indikatora, pogrešno se može zaključiti da kriza nije imala bilo kakav uticaj na intenzitet diskriminacije.

Drugo, da bismo utvrdili uticaj krize koristićemo nešto sofisticiraniju meru koja se sastoji iz količnika oba pokazatelja kod muškaraca i žena. Upoređivanjem vrednosti racia tokom perioda ekonomske krize steći ćemo precizan utisak o tome koliko se relativni položaj žena promenio, i samim tim, kako se kretao intenzitet diskriminacije. Vrednosti racia (zelena linija na graficima) od 130 kada je u pitanju stopa aktivnosti i 135 kada je reč o stopi zaposlenosti pokazuju da su, u godini koja je prethodila krizi, stope aktivnosti i za-poslenosti kod muškaraca bile za 1,3 i za 1,35 puta veće nego kod žena, respektivno, što je ukazivalo na prisustvo značajne diskriminacije i pre početka krize. Praćenjem trenda racia uočavamo da su njegove maksimalne vrednosti (134 i 138) zabeležene u 2012, tj. u godini koja je nastupila nakon poslednje recesije koju je Srbija zabeležila, a da je direktna posledica ekonomske krize11. Nakon toga usledio je privredni oporavak, i para-lelno sa njim, oporavak na tržištu rada. Tako da se za merenje uticaja ekonomske krize na diskriminaciju ne sme uzeti ceo posmatrani interval, jer bi to imalo uticaj na pristras-nost dobijenih rezultata. Posmatrano na ovaj način, možemo zaključiti da su negativne posledice koje je ekonomska kriza proizvela po privredu uticale na to da se kontingentska polna diskriminacija na tržištu rada neznatno poveća. Treba imati u vidu da je reč o porastu vrednosti racia od svega nekoliko procentnih poena, te ne treba prenagljivati u donošenju zaključaka o snažnom porastu diskriminacije usled ekonomske krize.

Treće, iako bi nas posmatranje čitavog vremenskog perioda navelo da donesemo pogrešne ocene o uticaju krize na intenzitet diskriminacije, ono nam može poslužiti da sagledamo trenutni položaj žena. U fazi oporavka, koja je nakon 2012. godine primetna na tržištu rada, kuriozitet je to da su žene beležile bolje rezultate, mereno prema osnovnim indika-torima. Relativno brži oporavak žena doveo je do toga da se njihov relativni položaj, za svega tri posmatrane godine (2013-2015.) u odnosu na položaj muškaraca, značajno poboljšao. Tako je u 2015. godini stopa aktivnosti muškaraca za 1,28, a stopa zaposlen-osti za 1,31 puta veća od stopa aktivnosti i zaposlenosti žena, respektivno. Poredeći ove vrednosti racia sa vrednostima iz 2008. godine dolazimo do zaključka da je nivo diskrimi-nacije u 2015. niži od onog pre 7 godina. Međutim, kao i u slučaju donošenja zaključka o uticaju krize, i ovde treba biti obazriv, jer zabeleženo smanjenje diskriminacije, mereno prema našoj metodologiji, iznosi tek nekoliko procentnih poena.

11 Recesija u Srbiji zabeležena je potom i u 2014. godini, ali su njeni uzročnici visoki fisklani deficit i u vezi sa tim smanjen priliv kapitala iz inostranstva, razorne poplave koje su se te godine dogodile i ostali interni nedostaci unutar privrede.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -80

4.3. Diskriminacija žena na tržištu rada merena cenovnim pristupom

Najprihvatljiviju teoriju o tome zbog čega se plate muškaraca i žena razlikuju dao je G. Becker u svojoj knjizi o ljudskom kapitalu (Becker, 1964). Po ovom pristupu, podsticaji za ulaganje u neku aktivnost zavise od koristi koje će se tom aktivnošću kasnije ostva-riti. U kontekstu participacije na tržištu rada, odnosno u skladu sa tim koliko vremena planiraju da provode radeći na tržištu umesto unutar porodice, žene će doneti odluku o tome koliko da ulažu u svoj ljudski kapital. Drugim rečima, s obzirom na komparativne prednosti koje iz prirodnih razloga žene imaju u odgoju dece, smatra se da će one rela-tivno manje vremena provoditi na tržištu rada proizvodeći tržišna dobra i usluge, a da će relativno više učestvovati u proizvodnji porodičnih (netržišnih) dobara i usluga. Ovako racionalno percipiranje od strane žena uticaće na to da njihov optimum po pitanju ulaga-nja u obrazovanje ili ljudski kapital koji se može valorizovati na tržištu, bude nešto ispod optimuma koji biraju muškarci. Posledično, niži nivo ljudskog kapitala dovodi do nižih zarada, usled kojih se žene nalaze u podređenom položaju. Takođe, podela odgovornosti unutar porodice može uticati na podelu rada na tržištu, te će tako žena prihvatiti manje plaćen posao, a koji je bliže mestu stanovanja ili posao sa radnim vremenom kraćim od punog i manjom dnevnicom, što agregatno dovodi do jaza u zaradama.

Iako je ovaj teorijski pristup i danas potpuno validan i može da objasni veći deo razlika u zaradama između muškaraca i žena, postoji jaz u platama koji se ne može zasnivati samo na razlici u ljudskom kapitalu. Sa protokom vremena, žene ne samo da su povećale svoje učešće na tržištu rada, već su drastično povećale učešće u ukupnom broju studenata, pri čemu one u većini razvijenih zemalja, ujedno i u Srbiji, čine većinski deo na gotovo svim fakultetima. I pored smanjenja obrazovnog jaza, ili štaviše, pravljenja jaza u sopstvenu korist, žene i dalje bivaju manje plaćene. Da bi se utvrdio precizan razlog nejednakog tretmana polova i eventualno postojanje diskriminacije, bilo je neophodno kontrolisati veliki broj varijabli, uključujući i one koje se odnose na ljudski kapital (godine provedene u obrazovnom sistemu, obrazovni profil, uspeh tokom studiranja i sl.). Izolovanjem ovih varijabli, određeni autori su pokazali da i dalje postoje značajne razlike u zaradama izme-đu muškaraca i žene, na štetu potonjih (Oaxaca, 1973.). Dekompozicijom muškaraca i žena u dve grupe i kontrolisanjem njihovih individualnih karakteristika, neobjašnjeni deo regresije predstavlja prisustvo diskriminacije. Naravno, pored diskriminacije uticaj na velike razlike u platama bi mogle da imaju i druge varijable koje nisu uključene u model, ali pošto su se istraživanja ovakvog tipa u prethodne četiri decenije masovno sprovodila, a modeli stalno unapređivali i tako nadograđeni pronalazili prisustvo diskriminacije u određenoj meri, nedvosmisleno je da deo razlike u platama predstavlja direktan oblik diskriminacije.

U ovom radu bavićemo se isključivo razlikom u platama muškaraca i žena na bazi poda-taka o zaradama prosečnog radnika/radnice po određenim karakteristikama i na taj način proceniti platni jaz koji trenutno postoji na štetu žena. Za te svrhe poslužiće nam podaci iz Ankete o radnoj snazi koja je sprovedena 2013. godine. Predmet naše analize biće za-poslene osobe, starosti 15-64 godine, koje su pristale da daju odgovor na pitanje o visini zarade u prethodnom mesecu. Podatke o prijavljenim zaradama ćemo najpre podeliti sa brojem sati koje je osoba radila u toku tog meseca, a zatim ćemo tako dobijenu satnicu


logaritmovati. Ovoj transformaciji pribegavamo zbog toga što podaci o iznosu zarade po satu nemaju normalnu raspodelu (asimetrična je ulevo), tako da poređenje aritmetičkih sredina između polova ne bi bila adekvatna mera. Logaritmovanjem podataka dobijamo raspodelu koja je sličnija normalnoj, dok u tom slučaju za poređenje polova koristimo logaritme geometrijske sredine originalnih satnica, jer na geometrijsku sredinu daleko manji uticaj imaju ekstremne vrednosti (kojih ovde ima pre svega na desnom repu ras-podele), nego što je to slučaj sa aritmetičkom sredinom. Kako bismo procenili razliku u zaradama muškaraca i žena primenićemo regresioni model u čijoj specifikaciji je pol jedina objašnjavajuća promenljiva. Dobijena vrednost regresionog koeficijenta u ovako specifikovanom modelu ekvivalentna je razlici logaritmovane satnice muškaraca i žena i predstavlja vrednost neprilagođene cenovne diskriminacije. Rezultati koje budemo dobili biće indikativni i u kombinaciji sa obrazovnom strukturom u zemlji će nam omogućiti da izvršimo indirektne grube procene o stepenu diskriminacije u Srbiji.

Razlika u zaradama između prosečnog muškaraca i žene u Srbiji data je u Tabeli 4. Cenovna diskriminacija na tržištu rada itekako je prisutna, što se može videti i po po-slednjoj koloni tabele, u kojoj vrednost svakog polja počinje sa negativnim predznakom. Poređenjem logaritmovane satnice prosečnog zaposlenog muškarca i prosečne zaposlene žene na tržištu rada u Srbiji, vidimo da je zarada žena u proseku niža za 3,3%. Kako bismo istražili koja podgrupa žena trpi najveću cenovnu diskriminaciju, u nastavku ćemo da uporedimo logaritmovane satnice prosečnih muškaraca i žena po grupama koje smo formirali na osnovu individualnih karakteristika zaposlenih, preduzeća, kao i vrste posla koji se obavlja.

TABELA 4 – RAZLIKA U PLATAMA IZMEÐU MUŠKARACA I ŽENA U SRBIJI, 2013.

PROSEK LOGARITMOVANE SATNICEß1

MUŠKARCI ŽENE

Ukupno 5.126 5.093 -0.033

Nivo obrazovanja

Nisko 4.891 4.777 -0.114

Srednje 5.053 4.96 -0.093

Visoko 5.504 5.449 -0.055

Tip vlasništva

Privatno 4.994 4.924 -0.07

Javno 5.289 5.262 -0.027

Radno vreme

Puno 5.118 5.081 -0.037

Kraće od punog 5.577 5.535 -0.042

Vrsta zaposlenja

Formalno 5.16 5.118 -0.042

Neformalno 4.835 4.828 -0.007

Izvor:ObradaautoranabazipodatakaAnketeoradnojsnazi2013,RZS.

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -82Posmatranjem 3 velike grupe obrazovnih nivoa12 ispostavlja se da je najniža nadnica po satu za one sa najmanjim nivoom obrazovanja, što i jeste u skladu sa teorijom o ljud-skom kapitalu. Takođe, sasvim je i očekivano da niskoobrazovane žene trpe najviši nivo cenovne diskriminacije od svih obrazovnih nivoa, primajući u proseku 11,4% nižu platu od muškaraca istog obrazovnog nivoa. Razlika u zaradama muškaraca i žena srednjeg obrazovnog nivoa, u proseku je ispod 10%, u korist muškaraca, dok u slučaju visokog obrazovanja, prosečna primanja žena zaostaju svega 5,5%.

Ispostavlja se da, posmatrano prema tipu vlasništva, diskriminaciju većeg intenziteta trpe žene koje su zaposlene u privatnom sektoru, čije su plate u proseku za 7% niže od plata muškaraca. Situacija u javnom sektoru gotovo da je dvostruko bolja, gde žene iako zaostaju za svojim kolegama, to zaostajanje u zaradi iznosi nešto manje od 3%. Postoje najmanje dva objašnjenja zbog čega je razlika u platama manja nego u privatnom sek-toru. Prvo, za razliku od privatnog sektora koji obuhvata i preduzeća koja zapošljavaju radnike na osnovu formalnog ugovora o radu i ona koja to čine bez formalnog ugovora ili sa ugovorom, ali uz uskraćenje nekog od dodatnih prava iz radnog odnosa13, javna predu-zeća posluju isključivo u granicama zakona. Pošto javnim preduzećima upravlja država ili češće kontroliše barem jedan njihov deo, u radu opisani oblici kontingentske diskrimina-cije znatno su ređi, nego što je to slučaj u privatnom sektoru. Drugo, karakteristike žena zaposlenih u javnom sektoru po pravilu su nešto iznad karakteristika prosečne zaposlene žene u privredi, prvenstveno posmatrano prema obrazovnom nivou i radnom iskustvu. Tako da su, uslovno rečeno, nadprosečno obrazovane žene koje rade u javnom sektoru zaslužne što je platni jaz značajno manji nego onaj u privatnom sektoru. Međutim, ovde dolazimo i do suštinski možda najvažnije stvari kad govorimo o cenovnoj diskriminaciji žena. Naime, kako smo to u uvodnom pasusu ovog dela rada naveli, tek kontrolisanjem individualnih karakteristika muškaraca i žena može se videti koji deo razlike u zaradama je posledica nedostatka obrazovanja, a koji direktne diskriminacije. Intuitivno, pošto zna-mo da su žene u javnom sektoru obrazovanije od muškaraca, a takođe uočavamo da u proseku primaju za oko 3% nižu platu, to nesumnjivo znači da je stepen stvarne cenovne diskriminacije prema ženama u javnom sektoru visoko iznad dobijene razlike u zaradama od svega 3%.

U pogledu radnog vremena, zaostajanje u zaradama gotovo da je identično kada se po-smatraju žene koje rade puno radno vreme i one koje rade radno vreme kraće od punog i ono iznosi oko 4%. Ipak, neznatna razlika od 0,5 procentnih poena postoji na štetu žena koje rade radno vreme kraće od punog, što jeste statistički beznačajno, ali kada se uzme u obzir struktura zaposlenosti, ova razlika može da ima šire konsekvence. Naime, uključujući sve grupe koje su navedene u tabeli 4, jedino u slučaju osoba koje rade radno vreme kraće od punog, žene čine veći broj u uzorku od muškaraca. Tako da, iako razlika nije mnogo velika, velik je broj žena koji biva diskriminisan po ovom osnovu, zbog činjenice da part-time poslovi zbog svojih karakteristika mnogo više odgovaraju ženama (posebno određenim podgrupama žena) i one ih češće prihvataju.

12 U prvu grupu spadaju osobe bez obrazovanja, osobe sa 4 razreda osnovne, osobe sa nedovršenom osnovnom školom i osobe sa završenom osnovnom školom. Druga grupa je sačinjena od zaposlenih lica koja imaju srednje i srednje struč-no obrazovanje, dok poslednja grupa obuhvata one koji su završili više škole, fakultete pa sve do onih koji imaju naziv doktora nauka.

13 Prava na bolovanje, prava na godišnji odmor, na uplaćivanje radnog staža i sl.


Poslednji nalaz do koga smo došli tiče se jaza u platama na formalnom i neformalnom tržištu rada. Pomalo neočekivano, žene na neformalnom tržištu u proseku bivaju mnogo manje cenovno diskriminisane (0,7%) od svojih koleginica na formalnom tržištu (4,2%). Potencijalno objašnjenje za, na prvi pogled, kontraintuitivne rezultate, može biti to da tipovi neformalnih poslova koje žene prihvataju zahtevaju viši nivo kvalifikacija, i samim tim donose veću zaradu u odnosu na vrste poslova koji se nude muškarcima na neformal-nom tržištu. Takođe, uzrok ove gotovo rodne jednakosti po pitanju plata u neformalnom sektoru može biti i izuzetno mali broj opservacija koji je postojao za muškarce i žene u neformalnom sektoru, što svakako delimično baca senku na dobijene rezultate.

Za potrebe poređenja stepena diskriminacije tokom krize koristićemo nalaze studije o ra-zlikama u platama po polovima za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, koja je obuhvatala i tržište rada u Srbiji i koja je rađena prema sličnoj metodologiji (Avlijaš i dr, 2013). Analiza se zasnivala na podacima iz Ankete o radnoj snazi koji su prikupljani u polugodišnjim tala-sima od 2008. do 2011. godine (sa par izuzetaka). Stavljanjem naših prethodno dobi-jenih rezultata iz 2013. godine u kontekst studije koja se odnosila na prosek pomenutog trogodišnjeg perioda, dolazimo do zaključka da se intenzitet neprilagođene cenovne dis-kriminacije, posmatrano na ukupnom nivou, nimalo nije promenio. Prosečna žena, i dve godine kasnije, i dalje prima za 3,3% manju platu od prosečnog muškarca na tržištu rada u Srbiji. Sa druge strane, kada je reč o detaljnijim pokazateljima, do određenih promena je ipak došlo. Tako se recimo stepen diskriminacije zaposlenih žena sa niskim i srednjim nivoom obrazovanja smanjio sa 12,5% na 11,4% i 10,7% na 9,3% respektivno, dok je kod žena sa visokim obrazovanjem on neznatno porastao sa 5,1% na 5,5%. Još jedno značajno smanjenje intenziteta diskriminacije tokom krize dogodilo se u javnom sektoru, gde su žene sa platnim jazom od 3,7% svoj položaj poboljšale za 1 procentni poen, te sada ova razlika iznosi 2,7%. Navedeno kretanje još jednom ukazuje na činjenicu da je javni sektor znatno otporniji na negativne posledice krize, te su tako i žene koje su pro-porcionalno više zastupljene u njemu uspele da u određenoj meri poprave svoj položaj.

5. ZAKLJUČCI I PREPORUKETradicionalistički obrazac društva, verska shvatanja i patrijarhalni način funkcionisanja porodice doprineo je tome da žene pre 20. veka budu veoma malo uključene u tržišne aktivnosti, i pre svega bivaju okrenute proizvodnji porodičnih dobara i usluga. Emancipa-cija žena, kao i razvoj privrednih delatnosti sredinom prošlog veka, u kojima su one svoje porodične obaveze mogle da usklade sa radom na novonastalim tržištima, doprinelo je njihovoj sve većoj participaciji. Drastičnim porastom učešća žena u strukturi radne snage, pitanje diskriminacije dobilo je na značaju. Ispostavlja se da su, čak i pošto se kontrolišu varijable poput nivoa obrazovanja, radnog iskustva i sl, primanja žena značajno niža, te je ova razlika u primanjima pripisana diskriminaciji. Iako je primetno da sa protokom vremena intenzitet diskriminacije slabi, ona i dalje ostaje važan faktor nejednakih zarada između polova u svetu.

Ni Srbija nije izuzetak po ovom pitanju. Žene se na tržištu rada u Srbiji nalaze u nimalo zavidnom položaju. I pored toga što su brojnije, a u proseku čak i obrazovanije od muš-karaca, njihovi osnovni indikatori tržišta rada znatno su lošiji od istih indikatora kod muš-

IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -84karaca, a njihove zarade znatno niže. Upravo zbog postojećeg stanja, žene danas čine svakako najbrojniju ranjivu grupu na tržištu rada u Srbiji. Na osnovu analize dostupnih podataka potvrđeno je postojanje kako kontingentske tako i cenovne diskriminacije i to umerenog intenziteta. Aktivnost i zaposlenost muškaraca na tržištu rada viša je za oko 30% , dok u slučaju zarada ta razlika u korist muškaraca iznosi 3,3%. Dobijene vrednosti se u potpunosti kreću u opsegu proseka evropskih zemalja, što je i bio glavni razlog da stepen diskriminacije u Srbiji ocenimo kao umeren.

Rezultati pokazuju da su tekuća ekonomska kriza i negativne posledice koje su iz nje proistekle, dovele do blagog porasta kontingentske, ali ne i cenovne diskriminacije. Dok je jaz u platama tokom krize ostao nepromenjen (3,3%), uključenost i zaposlenost žena na tržištu rada se pogoršala u prvim godinama ekonomske krize. Međutim, njihov oporavak, koji je usledio nakon 2012. godine, doprineo je tome da žene, posmatrano po kontingent-skom pristupu, budu manje diskriminisane u odnosu na godinu koja je prethodila krizi. Sa druge strane, iako je intenzitet cenovne diskriminacije ostao nepromenjen tokom kri-ze, on se promenio kod pojedinih grupa žena. Tako se stepen cenovne diskriminacije od izbijanja ekonomske krize povećao u privatnom sektoru i neznatno kod žena sa visokim obrazovanjem, dok su razlike u zaradama u odnosu na muškarce uspele da smanje žene zaposlene u javnom sektoru i žene sa niskim i srednjim nivoom obrazovanja. Ako za tre-nutak zanemarimo uticaj krize na intenzitet diskriminacije i njeno povećanje kod žena sa visokim obrazovanjem, posmatrano po svim obrazovnim nivoima visokoobrazovane žene su u mnogo boljem položaju od ostalih žena, iz prostog razloga što su njihova zaostajanja u zaradama (5,5%) značajno manja u odnosu na zaostajanja ostalih obrazovnih nivoa (srednje 9,3% i nisko 11,4%). Upravo iz ovog razloga potencijalni spas od diskriminacije žene mogu pronaći u obrazovanju, jer je razlika u platama, i posledično cenovna diskri-minacija, obrnuto proporcionalna nivou obrazovanja i godinama koje je ženska osoba provela na školovanju. Ovo može da predstavlja korisnu smernicu i za kreatore ekonom-ske politike i politike tržišta rada, koji bi trebalo da žene proporcionalno više uključuju u aktivne programe tržišta rada iz grupa dodatnog obrazovanja i obuka, kako bi doprineli rešavanju problema polne diskriminacije. Pored ovoga, neophodno je primeniti i neki od standardnih paketa mera koji doprinose postizanju rodne ravnopravnosti na tržištu rada (Eurofund, 2016.), kao na primer: promovisanje inicijativa i politika koje imaju za cilj podsticanje uključivanja žena na tržištu rada, stvaranje fleksibilnog zakonodavnog okvira u pogledu prava na roditeljsko odsustvo i fleksibilnijeg sistema predškolskog obrazova-nja, uspostavljanja poslovne kulture koja omogućava fleksibilan rad i sl. Kao najvažnija preporuka Eurofund-ove studije (koja je u saglasnosti i sa našim nalazom), ističe se doprinos koje obrazovanje ima u smanjenju diskriminacije žena na tržištu rada, te je stoga neophodno insistirati na podsticanju žena da se permanentno usavršavaju. Štaviše, obrazovanje predstavlja ključno sredstvo u politici Evropske uniji u borbi protiv rodne neravnopravnosti i polnih stereotipa.

Kao što smo to prethodno pomenuli, da bi se utvrdio precizan nivo diskriminacije ne-ophodno je na dostupnim podacima primeniti metod dekompozicije prilikom čega bi se, kontrolisanjem varijabli koje predstavljaju individualne karakteristike zaposlenog, izolovao čist uticaj cenovne diskriminacije na stepen razlike u zaradama. Pošto je za korišćenje navedenog metoda potreban veći uzorak koji trenutno nije moguće obezbediti, zadržaćemo se na rezultatima koje smo dobili prilikom izračunavanja neprilagođenog ni-voa cenovne diskriminacije, sa namerom da u narednom periodu dobijene rezultate pro-


verimo izračunavanjem prilagođene cenovne diskriminacije. Rezultati naše grube procene dovoljno su validni da nesumnjivo možemo da potvrdimo da diskriminacija, bilo cenovna, bilo kontingentska, u Srbiji postoji, te se protiv nje mora boriti uključenošću i interakcijom velikog broja različitih institucija i podizanjem globalne svesti o prisustvu ovog fenomena u našem društvu. Time će sa jedne strane biti manje onih koji će se odlučiti da diskri-minišu žene na tržištu rada, dok će sa druge biti veći broj žena koje prepoznaju i koje su spremne da prijave bilo kakav oblik diskriminacije.

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IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE -86INTERNET IZVORI

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AMIR FEJZIĆ1


SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5

JEL CLASSIFICATION: F23, F36, F43

ABSTRACT:

The countries of the SEE5 or the Western Balkans countries are less developed European countries. Per capita GDP of the EU economies is a few times higher than in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, foreign capital inflows into the SEE5 are much lower than into the EU. The SEE5 countries see FDI as an important factor in resolving the problem of low productivity and scarce local capital. Although it is a well-accepted thesis that foreign direct investment could boost economic growth of host countries, this paper examines the real effects of the aggregate and sectorial FDI net inflows to SEE5 countries. The empirical estimates typically based only on the aggregate FDI data may not be the appro-priate way because the growth effects of FDI are likely to depend on the sector in which FDI takes place. Empirical analysis, using time series cross section data for the period 2000-2014, shows that the impact of FDI net inflows on growth at the aggregate level is positive and strong, in the primary sector inclines to have a negative effect on growth, in the manufacturing sector have positive effects on growth and in the service sector exerts strong and positive effect on growth.

1 SchoolofEconomicsandBusiness,Sarajevo,BosniaandHerzegovina.

KEY WORDS:FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, SECTORIAL COMPOSITION, SEE5,SPILLOVER, PRODUCTIVITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH.

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-588

1. INTRODUCTIONVarious international organizations and financial institutions recommend foreign direct investment (FDI) as the source of direct capital financing, which brings enormous positive externalities such as technology transfer, knowhow and management skills to the host country. That is, the positive externalities may arise when a foreign firm is more efficient than domestic firms. In such a case, domestic firms can improve their productivity by copying the technology and management skills of a foreign firm. Based on the assump-tion that FDI is an important incentive for economic growth, many developing countries undertake reforms in order to attract higher FDI net inflows.

Southeast Europe (SEE5): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia struggle to achieve sufficient growth rates and to converge with the standard of living of the developed EU members. For the analyzed time period, there is a conside-rable cross country variation in growth rates between SEE5 countries, which have been low and negative in some countries. Low domestic savings and investment rates in the SEE5 countries appear to be a consequence of large current account deficits. Levels of unemployment and poverty are continuously high. The level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in SEE5 countries is especially high. According to the World Bank data, at the end of 2015 Serbia recorded the highest value of non-performing loans with 22.8% and Macedonia, FYR the lowest level of non-performing loans with 11, 0%. A high level of non-performing loans could have a significant impact on credit, unemployment, real GDP growth and inflation. At the same time, governments cannot find the right formula to solve this problem. In these small open economies, monetary policy is constrained and public expenditure is limited. Therefore, the need to attract foreign investors is evi-dent. FDI give SEE5 countries an opportunity to speed up their economic growth and to converge with the standard of living of the developed EU members. Both the transition process and the European Union (EU) accession process have further supported the call for FDI inflows.

On the other hand, the impact of FDI may largely vary depending on characteristics of the sector and its linkages to the rest of the economy and not all forms of foreign inves-tment seem to be beneficial to host economies. For example, even if a foreign firm is not more efficient, domestic firms might be forced to improve their efficiency because of the increased competition from foreign firms through so called horizontal linkage. That is, the increased market share of the foreign company might also crowd out the domestic firms and push them to less efficient production levels (Aykut and Sayek, 2007). As reported by UNCTAD (2001), the linkage potential differs across primary, manufacturing and services sectors. The scope for linkages between foreign affiliates and local suppliers in the primary sector is often limited and production processes tend to be continuous and capital intensive. Still, it is easier to source externally when the technology is divisible into discrete stages and services than to do it as a continuous process. By contrast to the primary sector, often mentioned benefits, such as transfers of technology and manage-ment knowhow, introduction of new processes, and employee training tend to relate to the manufacturing sector rather than the agriculture or mining sectors (Alfaro, 2003). UNCTAD (2001) see the manufacturing sector as the sector with a wide broad range of linkage intensive activities, which largely varies by industry. To summarize, FDI flows in the manufacturing sector is expected to have larger impact in the economy through


a broad range of potential linkage intensive activities. The service sectors are found to receive considerably larger amounts of foreign investment in SEE5 countries, which acco-unt for 69.24% of total recorded FDI. Service sectors are almost entirely non-tradable, which makes, to a great extent, FDI in the service sector market seeking FDI that aims to access local markets of host countries with large markets, per capita income, market growth prospects, access to regional and global markets and structure of domestic mar-ket. In this context, participation of SEE5 countries in free trade agreements, regional trade integration schemes and EU approximation processes increases regional demand and potential market size.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of FDI net inflows on the SEE5 eco-nomic growth during the 2000-2014 period. That is, this paper examines the effects of aggregate and sectorial FDI net inflows to SEE5 and possible implications for economic growth. The empirical estimates typically based only on aggregate FDI data may not be the appropriate approach due to the fact that the growth effects of FDI are likely to de-pend on the sector in which FDI takes place. Also, this paper analyzes the specific area of Europe, which despite many positive developments during the last two decades, may still face an image problem. Regardless to this possible image problem, FDI to the SEE5 are driven by factors, similarly to other transition economies, which are related to the “absorption” capacity of the country that receives the foreign investment. The importance of the absorption capacity of a country in this paper is represented by control variables like the human development index, inflation, government spending, private credits by banks, institutional quality, openness and unemployment.

The paper is structured as follows: literature review in section II, model specification, data description and estimation method in section III, empirical results are presented in section IV and section V ends with the conclusion.

2. LITERATURE REVIEWThe vast amount of literature on the impact of FDI on economic growth can be basically grouped into three main approaches. The first approach, which is used in this study, sees FDI as an important factor in resolving the problem of low productivity and scarce local capital in many developing countries (Alfaro et. al, 2000, Carkovic and Levine, 2002, Alfaro and Charlton, 2007, Tang, 2015, Apostolov, 2016, among others). That is, inflow of foreign direct capital is assumed to have significant impact on the economic growth of a host country. The second approach recognizes the importance of economic growth itself as an important determinant of attracting FDI to the host countries (Agosin and Mayer, 2000, Hansen and Rand, 2006, Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos, 2015, among others). In other words, FDI inflow into the host countries might be the result of economic growth. Finally, the third approach examines the possibility of a two way causality between FDI and growth (Choe, 2003, Zhao and Du, 2007, Argiro and Dimitrios, 2011, among others).

There are also two well-known methods in the literature to measure the relevance of FDI on growth based on FDI stocks data and on FDI flows data. Few studies clearly explain

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-590why they use a specific measure of FDI, but rather assume that the different data have to be equivalent to each other. Wacker (2013) discusses the measurement of foreign direct investment and highlights that there is no a priori best way to measure Multinational Cor-porations’ activities or to estimate its determinants and concludes that the choice rather depends on the circumstances. Different approaches to the FDI impact on economic growth are the result of various opinions and standpoints of authors. For instance, Aykut and Sayek (2007) see the shift to the sectorial composition of FDI inflows, as well as its variation among countries, as a partial explanation of the shortfalls of results in terms of the FDI impact on economic growth. On the other hand, Kumari (2014) in his literature survey pointed out that the positive effects of FDI vary across different regions, sectors and countries, therefore, a country specific studies must be done to check the relation between FDI and economic growth. Also, it is important to consider the composition of the sample of countries covered by panel studies (Alfaro, 2003). However, most of the empirical studies assert that FDI are beneficial to economic growth (Alfaro et al., 2000, Zakari et al., 2012, Hong, 2014, Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos, 2015, among others) but there are also some studies that begun to question FDI’s role on growth (Agosin and Mayer, 2000, Carkovic and Levine, 2002, Tang, 2015, among others).

Thesis that FDI can have important positive effects on economic growth of host counties is a well-studied subject in the economics literature, which argues that FDI can be a source of capital accumulation, knowhow, good governance, increased labor force pro-ductivity and decreased unemployment, increased exports and technology while encou-raging the development of local companies and economic growth. On the other hand, the impact of FDI may largely vary depending on characteristics of a sector and its linkages to the rest of the economy and not all forms of foreign investments seem to be beneficial to host economies. Hence, Alfaro (2003) suggests differentiated efforts towards attracting different forms of FDI flows and pointed out that countries, which might want to target certain sectors, need to be weighed against bureaucratic costs and increased potential for corruption.

Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) indicate that resource seeking FDI stock in the primary sector tends to involve a large up front transfer of capital, technology and knowhow, and to generate high foreign exchange earnings. For the manufacturing sector, they conclude that efficiency seeking FDI in some parts of manufacturing draws on the relative factor endowment and the local assets of host economies. According to authors, this type of FDI is more likely to bring in technology and knowhow that is compatible to the host countries’ level of development, and to enable local suppliers and competitors to benefit from spillovers through adaptation and imitation. They state that market seeking FDI in services and other parts of manufacturing can benefit host countries’ consumers by intro-ducing new products and services, by modernizing local production and marketing and by increasing the level of competition in the host economies. However, fiercer competiti-on may also lead to the crowding out of local competitors, especially if foreign affiliates command superior market power. In addition, high resource FDI flows to the primary sector tend to reduce the competitiveness of the country in other sectors (Dutch dise-ase), increase rent seeking behavior and deterioration of institutions (Aykut and Sayek, 2007). In contrast to all these unlikely positive growth effects, Nunnenkamp and Spaz (2004) conclude that the typically high export orientation of FDI in the primary sector may counterbalance negative factors. Aykut and Sayek (2007) also agree that, in the


presence of solid institutions, FDI to the primary sector may generate positive impact in a country. In the same way, Kee (2011) looks at how the product scope and productivity of domestic firms may improve due to increased access to new and better varieties of local intermediate inputs caused by the larger presence of foreign direct investment firms in the same industry and conclude that when FDI and domestic firms share common local input suppliers, an exogenous increase in the presence of FDI firms in the industry will cause domestic firms to perform better in terms of product scope, sales per worker, output per worker and productivity. Aykut and Sayek (2007) see market seeking FDI in the service sector, where forward linkages for FDI are well-defined, as massive potential impact of FDI in the sector. For example, FDI in the banking sector can have an important impact on both the efficiency and stability of the banking system through increased competition and increased access to global financial markets. On the other hand, Nunnenkamp and Spaz (2004) are of the view that although market seeking FDI in services can benefit host countries’ consumers by introducing new products and services, by modernizing local production and marketing and by increasing the level of competition in the host economies, these benefits in the case of strong competition may also lead to the crowding out of local competitors, especially if foreign affiliates command superior market power.

Obviously, various sectors may require different conditions to cause a positive impact on the economy, as well as specific factors that may influence the impact of FDI ranging from motivation to financing of the investment. Alfaro (2003) uses cross country data of 47 countries for the period 1981-1999 and suggests that total FDI inflows exert an ambiguous effect on growth, but also concludes that although it may seem natural to argue that foreign direct investment can convey great advantages to host countries, the benefits of FDI can largely vary across sectors. When she distinguished among different sectors, she found little support for FDI spillovers or positive effects in the primary sec-tor, a positive effect of FDI on growth in manufacturing, while impact was ambiguous in the service sector. Aykut and Sayek (2007), using cross country data between 1990 and 2003, investigate the impact of sectorial composition of FDI inflows on the host country’s economic growth and conclude that not only the magnitude of FDI is important but also the sector in which the FDI occurs. Their empirical evidence suggests that, as the sectorial composition of FDI gets skewed towards the manufacturing sector, there is a significant and positive effect on economic growth. On the contrary, when the sectorial composition of FDI gets skewed towards the services or the primary sector there is a negative and mostly significant effect on economic growth. That is, the growth effects of FDI may be puzzling not only due to the characteristics of the host economy but also due to the sectorial characteristics of the FDI themselves. Botric (2010) pointed out that FDI in South Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2010 was biased toward the non-tradable sector and consumption and that FDI was more frequently related to the privatization process, and repeatedly to service sector privatization, while the greenfield investment share was rather low. Khaliq and Noy (2007) investigated the impact of FDI on econo-mic growth using detailed data for FDI inflows to Indonesia over the period 1997-2006 and found that on the aggregate level, FDI were observed to have a positive effect on economic growth. However, on the sectorial level, they conclude that the composition of FDI matters in terms of its effect on economic growth and varies across sectors. Chakra-borty and Nunnenkamp (2008) investigated the relationship between FDI and economic growth in India by applying cointegration and causality analyses on the basis of industry specific FDI stock data for the period 1987–2000. At the aggregate level, they conclu-

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-592ded that the impact of output growth in attracting FDI was relatively stronger than that of FDI in inducing economic growth. It turns out that the growth effects of FDI in India widely vary across sectors and they found no evidence at all of any causal relationship between two variables in the primary sector and only transitory effects of FDI on output in the services sector.

Most macroeconomic studies identify the linkage between FDI and growth in combina-tion with factors which are related to the absorption capacity of a country (Carkovic and Levine, 2002, Alfaro, 2003, Aykut and Sayek, 2007, Blin and Ouattara, 2008, Zakari et al., 2012, Hong, 2014, Tang, 2015, among others). Inclusion of all related control variables in the conditioning set highlights the importance of a supportive environment in the country. These considerations give the impression that the sector in which FDI occurs plays an important role, but also implies that effects of FDI on a host economy might depend on global trends, local conditions and policies. Rojec and Penev (2011) analysed local conditions of five Western Balkan countries (WB5) and concluded that the most competitive disadvantages inhibiting more FDI inflows in WB5 countries were small domestic market with low per capita income, relatively high country risk, slow progress in structural and institutional reforms, underdeveloped infrastructure, inefficient government bureaucracy and high administrative barriers. According to Rojec and Penev (2011) the best way for Western Balkan countries to attract more FDI in the future is to strengthen structural reforms and to speed up their EU approximation processes.

3. THE MODEL, DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Model Specification Following Tang (2015), Estrin and Uvalic (2013), Aykut and Sayek (2007), Alfaro (2003), Carkovic and Levine (2002), I will focus on the direct effect of the different types of FDI on economic growth by using of time series cross section (TSCS) regressions with 5 countries for the time period 2000-2014. However, this approach differs from previous literature in that I incorporate a set of additional variables and use more quality FDI data. Data are measured at regular yearly time intervals, well arranged by both cross sectional and time series variables and organized as a balanced panel. Initially, I calculated the impact of overall FDI net inflows on economic growth based on the following equation:

GROWTHit = ß0 + ß1Yit + ß2Xit + ß3Iit + uit. (1)

In equation (1) GROWTHit above is GDP per capita growth (annual %) and Yit is initial GDP per capita in PPP. Xit is a matrix of the following control variables: the Human De-velopment Index (HDI) as a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators; investment as the ratio of gross capital formation and GDP; inflation as the measure of the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator; government spen-ding as final consumption expenditure, which includes all current government expenditu-res for purchases of goods and services; PCBANK as the ratio of private credit in Banks and GDP; IQALITY as the aggregated indicator of institutions quality measured as the


average of the 8 sub-indices, which is constructed from the EBRD indices of structural and institutional reforms; openness as average of exports plus imports as a share of GDP for the period; unemployment as the percentage of total labor force. Finally, Iit represents total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inflows. uit represents error and coefficients ß0, ß1, ß2 and ß3 refer, respectively, to the intercept and to the slope parameters.

The findings of initial attempts to statistically identify externalities from FDI suggest that the presence of FDI creates positive external effects in host economies. However, recent new empirical results seriously challenge these findings in two important ways. First, not only do they suggest that positive spillovers may be less prevalent as previously thought, but, more importantly, they also indicate that the presence of foreign firms may lead to significant negative externalities (Jordaan, 2005).

Hypothesis that FDI in primary, manufacturing, and services sectors exerts different effects on economic growth in SEE5 countries is tested trough formulas 1 and 3 and presented in tables 4 to 8.

GROWTHit = ß0 + ß1Yit + ß2Xit + ß3I

jit + uit. (2)

In equation (2) Ijit represents total Foreign Direct Investment net inflows in primary, ma-nufacturing, or services sectors, respectively and all other variables in equation (2) are analogous to equation (1). According to Alfaro (2003), the inclusion of only foreign in-vestments in each sector does not capture the effects of other foreign direct investments. Hence, equation (3) is intended for the estimation of FDI net inflows for each sector.

GROWTHit = ß0 + ß1Yit + ß2Xit + ß3I

Pit + ß3I

Mit + ß3I

Sit + uit. (3)

Where P denotes foreign investment in the primary sector; M in the manufacturing sector, and S in the service sector.

3.2. Data Description

In order to explore the roles of different types of FDI the dataset of a real data panel has been constructed for the period 2000-2014, for 5 observed SEE5 countries.

The GROWTH as a core variable in the model, will be traded as a dependent variable to-gether with a matrix of the control variables. This variable is presented as the annual per-centage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. The GROWTH dependent variable is log (annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita). The FDI net inflows represent the value of inward direct investment made by a non-resident. Accurate construction of FDI data by sectors for a cross section of countries over the last decade and a half for SEE5 countries was quite demanding. In order to overcome these difficulti-es, I collected FDI data from different sources. Detailed information on FDI net inflows by sector for SEE5 countries is available in various reports by countries. FDI variable is log (1+Total FDI inflows/GDP). Data of FDI by sectors are as follows: FDIPRIM is log (1+FDI inflows in Primary Sector/GDP); FDIMANUF is log (1+FDI inflows in Manufacturing Sec-tor/GDP) and FDISERV is log (1+FDI inflows in Service Sector/GDP). Yit is initial GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), which represents gross domestic

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-594product converted into international dollars using the purchasing power parity rates and it is calculated as the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. The Initial GDP variable is the log (real GDP per capita) at the beginning of the period. The Human Development Indicator (HDI) is a common measure for economic and social development and it is intended to quantify the entire socio economic aspect of progress, referring to achievements of a country in fundamental human development dimensions. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human de-velopment: life expectancy, attended education and achieved living standard. The scores for three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using the geometric mean.2 The HDI variable is log (HDI). Investment, as the ratio of gross capital formation and GDP, consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. The investment variable is log (Gross Capital Formation/GDP). Inflation, as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit de-flator, shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The inflation variable is the log of (average inflation of the period). Government spending includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of em-ployees). It also includes most national defense and security expenditures, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation.

TABLE 1. LIST OF VARIABLES.

NAME UNIT SOURCE

country code state_id

year year

log(GROWTH) log_growth per cent WDI

log(FDI) log_fdi per centNational Banks of analysed countries/

Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency

log(FDIPRIM) log_fdi_prim per centNational Banks of analysed countries/


log(FDIMANUF) log_fdi_manuf per centNational Banks of analysed countries/


log(FDISERV) log_fdi_serv per centNational Banks of analysed countries/


log(Initial GDP) log_initial_gdp US$ WDI

log(HDI) log_hdi index UNDP

log(Investment) log_investment per cent WDI

log(Inflation) log _inflation per cent WDI

log(Government spending) log_gov_spending per cent WDI

log(PCBANK) log_pcbank per cent WDI

log(IQALITY) log_iquality index EBRD-own estimation

log(Openness) log_openness per cent WDI

log(unemployment) log_unemployment per cent WDI

Source:author’sinterpretation

2 FormoredetailsrefertoTechnicalnotesofUNDPforcalculatingthehumandevelopmentindices.


The government spending variable is log (average share of government spending/GDP) over the period. PCBANK is the ratio of private credit in Banks and GDP. Domestic cre-dit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository corporations. The PCBANK variable is log (private credit in Banks/GDP). The IQALITY is the aggregated indicator of the quality of institutions measured as the average of the 8 sub-indices, which is constructed from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indices of structural and institutional reforms (see Sachs, 2001; Di Tommaso et al., 2007). The main components of the IQUALITY institutional proxy are markets and trade, the financial sector and enterprises. The IQA-LITY variable is log (aggregated institutional proxy). Openness is the average of exports plus imports as a share of GDP for the period. The openness variable is log (average of Exports + Imports as a share of GDP) for the period. Finally, total unemployment (% of total labor force), refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available and seeking employment. The unemployment variable is log (unemployment).

Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 2. There is considerable cross country variation. For instance, the mean GDP growth rate for SEE5 countries is 3.596% per annum, with a standard deviation of 3.218. The growth rate range from –5.859% in Montenegro to 10.51% also in Montenegro. The aggregate mean of FDI, as a percen-tage of GDP inflows for SEE5 countries, less than 1% does not look much. According to Estrin and Uvalic (2013), FDI net inflows to Western Balkans countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are less than it would be expected on the basis of the size and location of their economies in comparison with all 27 transitions economies. Total FDI inflow less than 0.02% in all SEE5 countries at the beginning of 21st century is probably the result of the political risk and economic insta-bility, as well as competition from more promising transition economies. The situation in SEE5 countries has improved along with the progress of the accession process to the European Union. Unfortunately, the financial crisis of 2007–09, also known as the glo-bal financial crisis, negatively affected FDI net inflows into SEE5 countries. For instance, maximum FDI as a percentage of GDP inflow into Bosnia and Herzegovina was 0.145% in 2007 before the crisis started with the minimum about 0.02% in 2009 and 2012. The situation in other countries is almost the same. The sectorial distribution of FDI as a percentage of GDP has been different across sectors and countries. For example, the services sector accounted for most FDI net inflows in all SEE5 countries for the period, on average 69.11% of total. Botrić (2010) analyzed the FDI determinants on the overall economy level with an aim to provide the answer whether the same factors as in Central and Eastern European countries are relevant for the SEE5 countries and concluded that determinants of foreign direct investment in the region also fits the overall picture which is biased towards the service sector.

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-596 TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, SEE5 COUNTRIES (2000-2014).

(2) (3) (4) (5)

VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum

Growth Rate 3.596 3.218 -5.859 10.51

Aggregate FDI 0.0830 0.0926 0.00251 0.558

FDI in Primary Sector 0.00472 0.00670 3.00e-05 0.0304

FDI in Manufacturing Sector 0.0209 0.0336 0.000710 0.281

FDI in Service Sector 0.0574 0.0636 0.00160 0.280

Initial GDP 2,577 443.7 1,986 3,248

Human Development Index 0.724 0.0365 0.656 0.802

Investment/GDP 24.59 7.001 10.55 40.67

Inflation 7.113 13.70 0.0310 89.25

Government Spending 18.82 4.503 10.71 23.33

Private Credit by Bank 32.74 19.14 3.632 86.94

Institutional Quality 0.441 0.129 1.00e-04 0.667

Openness 44.21 9.354 12.09 66.74

Unemployment 22.39 7.231 12.40 37.30

Source:author’scalculationbasedonWorldBank’sDevelopmentIndicators

The argument for such development according to Botrić (2010) could have been the relatively slow progress in government reform, which has created barriers to a different structure of investment. Concerning the manufacturing sector, there are subnational diffe-rences across countries: Albania 17.47%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 36.05%, Macedonia, FYR 28.93%, Montenegro 25.53% and Serbia 22.49%. The lowest percentage of FDI inflow is in the primary sector ranging from 3.84% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 13.23% in Albania.

Table 3 and Figures 1 to 4 suggest that there is a positive correlation coefficients between per capita growth rates and the share of total FDI in GDP, manufacturing FDI and growth and service FDI and growth. However, the relationship between growth and FDI in the primary sector is very weak and negative.


TABLE 3. THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES.Va

riab

le

log_

grow

th

log_

initi

al_g

dp

log_

fdi

log_

fdip

rim

log_

fdi_

man

uf

log_

fdi_

serv

log_

hdi

log_

inve

stm

ent

log_

infla

tion

log_

gov_

spen

ding

log_

pcba

nk

log_

iqua

lity

log_

open

ness

log_

unem

ploy

men

t

log_growth 1log_initial_gdp -0.1581 1log_fdi 0.2101 0.3985 1log_fdiprim -0.0274 -0.0174 0.6193 1log_fdi_manuf 0.1158 0.3229 0.8104 0.4320 1log_fdi_serv 0.2471 0.4160 0.9676 0.5637 0.6451 1log_hdi -0.2537 0.5402 0.6041 0.3915 0.4126 0.6120 1log_investment 0.4202 -0.3737 0.1871 0.1956 0.0529 0.2182 -0.1126 1log_inflation 0.4226 0.2009 -0.0181 -0.1444 -0.0781 0.0287 -0.0238 -0.0798 1log_gov_spending -0.1640 0.6784 0.1916 -0.2103 0.2245 0.1911 0.3268 -0.6459 0.1614 1log_pcbank -0.2628 0.2457 0.4079 0.3184 0.3281 0.3855 0.5228 -0.3373 -0.1901 0.5276 1log_iquality 0.0478 -0.0857 0.4335 0.4267 0.2710 0.4313 0.1398 0.1721 -0.4988 -0.0367 0.2723 1log_openness -0.1836 0.3640 0.3928 0.1728 0.2214 0.4274 0.3817 0.1142 -0.3580 0.3730 0.4657 0.4047 1log_unemployment -0.3258 0.3284 -0.1678 -0.3121 -0.0334 -0.1874 -0.1407 -0.3933 -0.2906 0.5198 0.2976 0.0414 0.3976 1

Source:author’scalculation

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-598 FIGURE 1-4. CORRELATION BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH AND FDI (2000-2014).

Source:WorldBank’sDevelopmentIndicators

3.3. Estimation MethodA panel data set contains 5 entities, each of which includes 15 observations measured at 1 through t year time period. Hence, the temporal units are more numerous (T>N), the pool is called “temporal dominant” (Stimson 1985). Data are measured at regular year time intervals, well arranged by both cross sectional and time series variables and organized as a balanced panel. The panel data set is a fixed panel, hence the same indi-viduals are observed for each period (Greene, 2008). The methodological approach is the Pooled TSCS analysis. This methodology solves many problems of traditional methods of comparative research. First, concerns about “small N” problem is relaxed because pooled TSCS cases are “country-year”. Second, the regression analysis of pooled data combining space and time may depend on higher variability of data. Third, the pooled TSCS analysis deal with the possibility of capturing not only the variation of what emerges through time or space, but the variation of these two dimensions simultaneously (Podestà, 2002).

However, using the OLS procedure and pooled data tends to generate several econome-tric problems. First, the total FDI net inflows variable in Iit is assumed to be endogenous.


Because causality may run in both directions, from foreign direct capital inflows to growth and vice versa, these regressors may be correlated with the error term. Second, time invariant country characteristics (fixed effects), such as geography and demographics, may be correlated with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error term, which consists of the unobserved country specific effects and the observation specific errors. Third, because the serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and causes less efficient results, it is necessary to examine the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model. Fourth, the problem of heteroscedasticity where variance of error term is different across observations.

While pooled OLS based methods adequately deal with violations in assumptions of homoscedasticity, non-autocorrelation and cross sectional independence they have two shortcomings (Hoehn at al., 2014). First, pooled OLS treats the data set as a pure cross section where each N-T observation is effectively seen as a separate observation. Second, pooled OLS based estimation critically depends on the assumption of strict exogeneity. The most widely used models for addressing these shortcomings are random effect(s) models, also called a variance components model (RE) and a fixed effects model (FE). The main difference between these two models is their treatment of the unobserved N specific effect. While in an RE framework the unobserved N specific effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the unobserved N specific effect in FE is, in a manner of speaking, simply an additional parameter to be estimated. Before any eco-nometric estimation technique is applied, I tested whether to use FE or RE. In the panel model data, I found both significant fixed and random effects. To decide between fixed or random effects, I ran a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects (see Green, 2008). The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that unique errors (uit) are not correlated with regre-ssors. I do not reject the null hypothesis (Proba > chi2 = 0.7161), and I may conclude that individual effects (uit) are not correlated with regressors in the model and thus the random effect model is preferred.

Reverse causality between FDI and economic growth might be a possibility in the equa-tions’ specification. Higher FDI inflows cause higher economic growth rates, but it is also possible that higher economic growth rates may lead to greater FDI inflows. If this holds true, then coefficient estimates may be higher. To check the potential endogeneity betwe-en economic growth and FDI inflows, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an au-gmented regression test (DWH test). The null hypothesis of the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests is that the variable under consideration can be treated as exogenous. Here both test statistics are highly significant, Durbin (score) chi2 (1) = 2.41173 (p = 0.1204); Wu-Hausman F (1,64) = 2.12639 (p = 0.1497), so the results of the endogeneity test rules out reverse causality between economic growth and FDI net inflows. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data yields results p value of 0.033. Hence, the test rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity. Hence, the panel data set has problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.

To solve possible problems of contemporaneous correlations, heteroscedasticity and se-rial correlation, several models have been developed to deal with these complications. Parks (1967) proposes a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) based algorithm de-

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5100veloped to account for heteroscedasticity, as well as for temporal and spatial dependence in the residuals of TSCS models method that Kmenta (1986) made popular. However, the Parks-Kmenta method could be inappropriate for use because of at least two reasons. First, this method is infeasible if the panel’s time dimension, T, is smaller than its cross sectional dimension, N, and second, Beck and Katz (1995) show that the FGLS produces coefficient standard errors that are underestimated. They report on Monte Carlo expe-riments in which the PCSE estimator produces accurate standard error, or little loss in efficiency compared to the FGLS. On the other hand, Reed and Webb (2010) were able to reproduce Beck and Katz’s results when they used the same experimental parameters that Beck and Katz employ and they find that the PCSE estimator fell short of the cla-ims made by Beck and Katz. According to Reed and Webb (2010), the PCSE estimator could be less efficient than FGLS. Another possibility to deal with serial correlation and heteroscedasticity is the use of regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors procedure developed by Hoechle (2007)3. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, auto correlated, and possibly correlated between the groups (panels). Finally, I ran the pooled OLS regressions without any dummy variables. Many studies have attempted to study the effect of foreign direct investment on growth by employing pooled OLS with White’s correction of heteroscedasticity regression method (Alfaro, 2003; Tintin, 2012).

4. ESTIMATION RESULTSTables 4 to 8 show five different regression results, which are carried out on TSCS data using four regression analysis techniques: Pooled OLS regression; XTSCC regression; FGLS regression and PCSE regression.

Table 4, showing results of the estimation that uses the aggregate FDI net inflows, pre-sents the main results of the estimation. The regressions show the aggregate FDI to have significant and positive effect on growth. That is, efficiency spillovers exist and higher fo-reign presence increases economic growth in host countries. The pooled OLS and XTSCC report slightly higher coefficient values of aggregate FDI compares to FGLS and PCSE, 1.093 and 0.942 respectively. As shown in Table 4, the coefficient of estimation is quite similar between Pooled OLS and XTSCC and between FGLS and PCSE techniques of estimation. The three other capital flow variables (investment, government spending and private credit in banks) show the interesting results. The parameter estimates of inves-tment and government spending have a positive and significant effect on growth in the context of SEE5 countries across different specifications. The coefficient of the private credit in banks variable across different specifications has a negative and statistically insi-gnificant value. The investment and government spending coefficients are very significant with the expected signs across all four estimations. These results suggest that domestic investment and public investment contributes to growth.

3 RegressionwithDriscoll-Kraaystandarderrorsprocedure(xtscc).TheprogramproducesDriscollandKraay(1998)standarderrorsforlinearpanelmodels.Thatis,xtsccestimatespooledordinaryleast-squares/weightedleast-squaresregressionmodelswithDriscollandKraaystandarderrors.


TABLE 4. THE EFFECT OF AGGREGATE FDI ON GROWTH.

Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita (2000-2014)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE

log_initial_gdp -0.160 -0.160 -0.139 -0.137

(0.336) (0.316) (0.273) (0.278)

log_fdi 1.093** 1.093** 0.942** 0.942**

(0.375) (0.383) (0.377) (0.377)

log_hdi -1.903 -1.903*** -1.765** -1.769**

(1.123) (0.584) (0.775) (0.785)

log_investment 0.408** 0.408*** 0.422*** 0.421***

(0.101) (0.1000) (0.121) (0.121)

log_inflation 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.101***

(0.0172) (0.0332) (0.0288) (0.0286)

log_gov_spending 0.318* 0.318* 0.369** 0.371**

(0.135) (0.171) (0.174) (0.177)

log_pcbank -0.0211 -0.0211 -0.0284 -0.0280

(0.0795) (0.0354) (0.0476) (0.0478)

log_iquality 0.415 0.415* 0.450* 0.457*

(0.298) (0.231) (0.259) (0.259)

log_openness -0.174 -0.174 -0.251* -0.255*

(0.227) (0.222) (0.134) (0.134)

log_unemployment -0.0681 -0.0681 -0.0811 -0.0834

(0.154) (0.0946) (0.107) (0.108)

Constant 1.224 1.224 1.276 1.281

(2.547) (2.864) (2.031) (2.064)

Observations 75 75 75 75

R-squared 0.587 0.587 0.581 0.886

Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses;***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

The coefficient of domestic investment estimated by pooled OLS and XTSCC amounts to a value of 0.408 and by FGLS and PCSE to 0.422. The coefficient on government spen-ding varies between 0.318 and 0.371. The other control variables (human development indicator, inflation, institutions quality, openness and unemployment) differentially affect economic growth. By comparison with the pooled OLS and XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE estimations yield more different results on the control variables. The coefficient on HDI remains negative for all four estimation techniques, while its significance changes from

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5102insignificant for pooled OLS to significant for the other three regressions. A negative correlation between HDI and growth is also found in the study of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). Using the cross country estimates of physical and human capital stocks, they ran the growth accounting regressions implied by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function and found that human capital enters insignificantly in explaining per capita growth rates. Van Leeuwen (2007) gave a credible explanation of a negative HDI sign and pointed out that the problem with inserting physical capital in growth equations with human capital was that during periods with declining growth rates of production (which is the case of SEE5 countries), physical capital investments also declined. If the human capital stock exhibits a constant growth rate or even an increasing growth rate, it would create an insignificant or even negative human capital coefficient. Korotayev and de Munck (2013) indicate that the negative correlation between HDI levels and econo-mic growth rates can also be detected among countries with HDI scores over 0.7 (SEE5 countries have an average HDI score of 0.724 and negative pairwise correlation between the HDI and economic growth rates, -0,254). Inflation, as a proxy for macroeconomic stability, is significant and has a positive sign. Although there is a huge disagreement on the relationship between inflation and economic growth both on a theoretical and empi-rical basis, it can be concluded that in the case of SEE5 countries inflation is positively correlated with economic growth. As noted in Table 4 the pooled OLS coefficient of insti-tutional quality is positive and statistically insignificant, but for all other three regression techniques coefficients on institutional quality are as expected positive and statistically significant. This suggests that institutional quality exerts a substantial influence on eco-nomic growth. Finally, this study also examines the impact of openness to international trade and unemployment on growth. As shown in Table 4, both coefficients on openness and on unemployment are statistically insignificant and have negative sign, except for openness in FGLS and PCSE estimations, where both coefficients are statistically signifi-cant. A negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate of the trade, as a share of GDP in FGLS and PCSE regressions, implies that international trading is not beneficial for SEE5 countries economic growth. Researchers have not been able to provide an explicit answer to the question of whether trade openness support a higher economic growth. Huchet-Bourdon et al. (2011) suggest that trade may impact growth negatively in countries which have specialized in low quality products. According to Dowrick and Golley (2004) marginal impact of trade on growth in the 1980s and 1990s is higher for the richer countries than it is for the poorer countries and marginal impact is estimated to be negative for countries below the productivity level, approximately $3,000 per capita. For selected developing and least developed economies, Abbas (2014) concluded that the increase in trade liberalization deteriorates economic growth of developing and least developing countries.

Tables 5 to 8 present the pooled OLS, XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE results for the estimation that uses FDI net inflows in each sector. Results for FDI in the primary sector are shown in Table 5. As in the primary sector, the scope for linkages between foreign affiliates and local suppliers is often limited and production processes tend to be continuous and capi-tal intensive, therefore a negative and insignificant effect of FDI on growth in the primary sector is not surprising. FDI in the primary sector, which also usually use few local inter-mediate goods, have limited linkages to domestic economy and they are largely export oriented. But Aykut and Sayek (2007) concluded that the negative economic impact of FDI in the primary sector is not the inevitable outcome and that FDI in the primary sector may, in the presence of solid institutions, generate a positive impact in a country.


TABLE 5. THE EFFECT OF FDI IN PRIMARY SECTOR ON GROWTH.


(1) (2) (3) (4)


log_initial_gdp 0.103 0.103 0.0617 0.0652

(0.327) (0.307) (0.292) (0.298)

log_fdiprim -2.301 -2.301 -1.392 -1.473

(5.622) (3.451) (4.220) (4.218)

log_hdi -1.646 -1.646** -1.354* -1.323*

(1.112) (0.681) (0.790) (0.798)

log_investment 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.507*** 0.508***

(0.0864) (0.0756) (0.118) (0.118)

log_inflation 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.0992*** 0.0985***

(0.0228) (0.0381) (0.0294) (0.0293)

log_gov_spending 0.300* 0.300* 0.340* 0.338*

(0.120) (0.154) (0.200) (0.204)

log_pcbank 0.0267 0.0267 0.00215 0.00224

(0.103) (0.0443) (0.0497) (0.0498)

log_iquality 0.798* 0.798*** 0.675** 0.678**

(0.324) (0.255) (0.265) (0.265)

log_openness -0.203 -0.203 -0.304** -0.310**

(0.232) (0.241) (0.139) (0.139)


(0.133) (0.118) (0.110) (0.110)

Constant -0.936 -0.936 -0.139 -0.133

(2.278) (2.632) (2.070) (2.102)


R-squared 0.548 0.548 0.533 0.930


Walsh and Yu (2010) also indicated that local conditions matter and that countries are generally interested in attracting FDI into the primary sector. FDI in the SEE5 countries could therefore be further increased by profound institutional reform. Compared with the main results of estimation, the control variables, except for private credit in banks, kept their sign and significance.

Table 6 provides the estimation results of regressions which are related to the effect of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector on growth. FDI in the manufacturing sector have a positive and significant effect on growth, except for pooled OLS, where the

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5104coefficient is statistically positive but statistically insignificant. Positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate of FDI in the manufacturing sector in XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE regressions range from 1.176 to 1.230. The obtained results seem to be in corre-lation with the notion that FDI in the manufacturing sector play a positive role in eco-nomic growth generation. Although the manufacturing industry according to Estrin and Uvalic (2013) has, after the strong process of deindustrialization in the 1990s, actually continued to decline in most SEE5 countries, FDI in the manufacturing sector are more likely to bring in technology and knowhow, generate foreign exchange earnings for host economies and as a result, one would expect a relatively strong growth impact of FDI in the manufacturing sector (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004).

TABLE 6. THE EFFECT OF FDI IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR ON GROWTH.

Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita (2000-2014)(1) (3) (4) (5)


log_initial_gdp -0.00565 -0.00565 -0.0482 -0.0478(0.295) (0.296) (0.281) (0.287)

log_fdi_manuf 1.176 1.176*** 1.234** 1.230**(0.675) (0.364) (0.599) (0.599)

log_hdi -1.710 -1.710** -1.632** -1.621**(1.127) (0.625) (0.756) (0.764)

log_investment 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.455*** 0.456***(0.0927) (0.0684) (0.118) (0.118)

log_inflation 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.110***(0.0229) (0.0378) (0.0291) (0.0290)

log_gov_spending 0.301* 0.301* 0.360** 0.362**(0.118) (0.157) (0.176) (0.179)

log_pcbank 0.00334 0.00334 -0.0248 -0.0245(0.0860) (0.0409) (0.0480) (0.0481)

log_iquality 0.669* 0.669*** 0.570** 0.572**(0.292) (0.216) (0.249) (0.249)

log_openness -0.161 -0.161 -0.221 -0.226(0.240) (0.248) (0.138) (0.139)

log_unemployment -0.115 -0.115 -0.114 -0.114(0.133) (0.101) (0.109) (0.109)

Constant -0.124 -0.124 0.494 0.506(2.183) (2.617) (2.071) (2.100)


R-squared 0.560 0.560 0.546 0.933



Table 7 presents the estimation results for FDI in services equation. The results are in line with the expectation that FDI in the service sector exert positive impact on economic growth. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant between 1 and 5 percent significance level. The size of FDI in the service sector ranges between 1.542 and 1.796. Even though market seeking FDI in the service sector may create fiercer competition and may also lead to the crowding out of local competitors, especially if foreign affiliates command superior market power, the presented results suggest that SEE5 countries benefit from this type of FDI. That is, FDI in the service sector support introducing new products and services, by increasing the level of competition and by modernizing local production and marketing, as well as by providing the necessary funding, efficiency, sta-bility and by lowering the cost of services.

TABLE 7. THE EFFECT OF FDI IN SERVICE SECTOR ON GROWTH.



log_initial_gdp -0.203 -0.203 -0.186 -0.186(0.355) (0.342) (0.274) (0.280)

log_fdi_serv 1.796** 1.796** 1.543*** 1.542***(0.640) (0.741) (0.568) (0.568)

log_hdi -1.959 -1.959*** -1.629** -1.628**(1.127) (0.593) (0.790) (0.802)

log_investment 0.388** 0.388*** 0.414*** 0.414***(0.110) (0.127) (0.122) (0.122)

log_inflation 0.0998*** 0.0998*** 0.0910*** 0.0907***(0.0189) (0.0308) (0.0289) (0.0288)

log_gov_spending 0.323* 0.323* 0.360** 0.363**(0.125) (0.171) (0.176) (0.179)

log_pcbank -0.0231 -0.0231 -0.0225 -0.0223(0.0743) (0.0334) (0.0458) (0.0461)

log_iquality 0.336 0.336 0.433 0.441*(0.257) (0.283) (0.265) (0.265)

log_openness -0.206 -0.206 -0.305** -0.309**(0.222) (0.201) (0.131) (0.132)


Constant 1.704 1.704 1.851 1.865(2.803) (3.132) (2.044) (2.080)


R-squared 0.599 0.599 0.591 0.861


SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5106Table 8 presents the estimation results of the FDI net inflows for each sector. The results are to a certain degree consistent with previous findings. Negative and insignificant effect of FDI net inflows in the primary sector on growth changed from negative and insignifi-cant to negative and significant, except for the pooled OLS where estimated coefficient remains negative and insignificant. On the other hand, FDI in the manufacturing sector remain positive but significance changed from significant to statistically insignificant. The size of coefficient decreased (e.g. PCSE regression) from 1.230 to 0.746. The coeffici-ents for FDI in the service sector remain positive and significant.

There may exist the lagged FDI due to delayed effect on growth. In empirical studies very often the lagged FDI variable is used with intention to deal with endogeneity or time lag-ged effects (Alfaro, 2003, Agosin and Machado, 2005, Aykut and Sayek, 2007, Cha-kraborty and Nunnenkamp, 2008, Tang, 2015 among others). FDI would bring about technology transfer and management skills, but these benefits would take some time to exert influence on the SEE5 growth. Hence, the FDI net inflows would have a lagged effect on SEE5 growth. Optimal one period lag length for this model is calculated on the comparison of regression results with alternative lag structures (see, Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp, 2008). The findings are reported in Tables 9 to 13. The coefficients in Table 9, regarding the impact of the lagged aggregate FDI on growth in comparison with the aggregate FDI, remain positive for the pooled OLS and XTSCC regressions, changed sign to negative for FGLS and PCSE regression and changed to statistically insignificant for all four regressions.

.


TABLE 8. THE EFFECT OF FDI FOR EACH SECTOR ON GROWTH.


VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSElog_initial_gdp -0.181 -0.181 -0.159 -0.157

(0.392) (0.357) (0.268) (0.274)

log_fdiprim -7.824 -7.824** -8.536** -8.654**(6.156) (3.324) (3.917) (3.913)

log_fdi_manuf 0.487 0.487 0.738 0.746(0.264) (0.429) (0.731) (0.729)

log_fdi_serv 2.017* 2.017** 1.805*** 1.809***(0.795) (0.898) (0.621) (0.620)

log_hdi -1.945 -1.945** -1.737** -1.747**(1.177) (0.693) (0.777) (0.789)

log_investment 0.330* 0.330** 0.351*** 0.349***(0.137) (0.132) (0.119) (0.119)

log_inflation 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.0942*** 0.0939***(0.0119) (0.0338) (0.0281) (0.0279)

log_gov_spending 0.184 0.184 0.228 0.228(0.178) (0.175) (0.180) (0.183)

log_pcbank -0.000214 -0.000214 0.00324 0.00414(0.0825) (0.0320) (0.0443) (0.0446)

log_iquality 0.437 0.437 0.540** 0.552**(0.337) (0.308) (0.259) (0.259)

log_openness -0.173 -0.173 -0.277** -0.280**(0.231) (0.189) (0.128) (0.128)


Constant 1.957 1.957 2.094 2.105(3.114) (3.319) (1.991) (2.028)


R-squared 0.617 0.617 0.608 0.929


Lagged FDI in the primary sector, Table 10, as expected, has a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient. Positive and statistically significant effect of FDI on growth in the manufacturing sector for XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE regressions, when lagged FDI is included, changed to negative and statistically insignificant, Table 11. The coefficients for lagged FDI in the service sector, presented in Table 12, remain positive but significance turn to insignificant. That is, the lagged aggregate FDI and the sectorial composition of FDI don’t have an important impact on SEE5 countries’ growth since the 95% confidence interval crosses the threshold for what is considered to have an important effect. Finally,

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5108Table 13 reports estimated coefficients of the lagged FDI net inflows for each sector. In the primary sector coefficient remain negative and insignificant, except for XTSCC regre-ssion where significance decrease from 0.05 to 0.1. On the other hand, lagged FDI in the manufacturing sector changed from positive to negative and from statistically insigni-ficant to statistically significant at 10 per cent level for FGLS and PCSE regressions. The coefficients for lagged FDI in the service sector remain positive but significance decreases to insignificant, except for the XTSCC regression where significance decreases from 5 per cent to 10 per cent.

TABLE 9. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED AGGREGATE FDI ON GROWTH.


(1) (2) (3) (4)


log_initial_gdp -0.0181 -0.0181 0.0418 0.0449

(0.325) (0.366) (0.291) (0.296)

lag_fdi 0.338 0.338 -0.0386 -0.0464

(0.374) (0.409) (0.376) (0.375)

log_hdi -1.629 -1.629** -1.262 -1.238

(1.149) (0.657) (0.804) (0.812)

log_investment 0.487** 0.487*** 0.523*** 0.525***

(0.111) (0.0941) (0.123) (0.123)

log_inflation 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.100***

(0.0258) (0.0372) (0.0300) (0.0299)

log_gov_spending 0.323* 0.323* 0.368** 0.368**

(0.121) (0.164) (0.183) (0.187)

log_pcbank 0.00130 0.00130 0.00122 0.00148

(0.0984) (0.0401) (0.0494) (0.0495)

log_iquality 0.707* 0.707*** 0.677*** 0.680***

(0.301) (0.209) (0.260) (0.260)

log_openness -0.169 -0.169 -0.311** -0.318**

(0.256) (0.223) (0.142) (0.142)


(0.138) (0.124) (0.112) (0.113)

Constant -0.146 -0.146 -0.113 -0.114

(2.267) (3.160) (2.098) (2.124)


R-squared 0.545 0.545 0.514 0.912



TABLE 10. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN PRIMARY SECTOR ON GROWTH.


(1) (2) (3) (4)


log_initial_gdp 0.0815 0.0815 0.0434 0.0443

(0.319) (0.330) (0.287) (0.294)

lag_fdiprim -1.010 -1.010 -1.778 -1.817

(4.466) (2.783) (3.336) (3.328)

log_hdi -1.620 -1.620** -1.376* -1.345*

(1.223) (0.728) (0.803) (0.811)

log_investment 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.509*** 0.510***

(0.0977) (0.0758) (0.119) (0.119)

log_inflation 0.119** 0.119*** 0.0996*** 0.0988***

(0.0279) (0.0371) (0.0297) (0.0296)

log_gov_spending 0.323* 0.323* 0.360* 0.361*

(0.127) (0.165) (0.185) (0.189)

log_pcbank 0.0257 0.0257 0.00322 0.00317

(0.106) (0.0382) (0.0498) (0.0498)

log_iquality 0.772* 0.772*** 0.662*** 0.665***

(0.279) (0.213) (0.256) (0.256)

log_openness -0.201 -0.201 -0.297** -0.304**

(0.231) (0.248) (0.139) (0.140)


(0.143) (0.125) (0.113) (0.114)

Constant -0.881 -0.881 -0.0918 -0.0735

(2.272) (2.780) (2.068) (2.098)


R-squared 0.541 0.541 0.524 0.930


SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5110 TABLE 11. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR ON GROWTH.



log_initial_gdp 0.0750 0.0750 0.0693 0.0722(0.283) (0.328) (0.288) (0.295)

lag_fdimanuf -0.118 -0.118 -0.885 -0.891(0.731) (0.465) (0.629) (0.628)

log_hdi -1.580 -1.580** -1.216 -1.181(1.190) (0.653) (0.796) (0.805)

log_investment 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.525*** 0.527***(0.109) (0.0796) (0.118) (0.118)

log_inflation 0.119** 0.119*** 0.0998*** 0.0990***(0.0284) (0.0376) (0.0294) (0.0293)

log_gov_spending 0.336** 0.336* 0.382** 0.381**(0.112) (0.161) (0.184) (0.188)

log_pcbank 0.0211 0.0211 -0.00249 -0.00275(0.0905) (0.0440) (0.0467) (0.0467)

log_iquality 0.771* 0.771*** 0.700*** 0.703***(0.299) (0.206) (0.255) (0.255)

log_openness -0.208 -0.208 -0.329** -0.337**(0.251) (0.245) (0.139) (0.140)


Constant -0.851 -0.851 -0.259 -0.252(2.054) (2.777) (2.073) (2.105)


R-squared 0.541 0.541 0.516 0.931



TABLE 12. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN SERVICE SECTOR ON GROWTH.


(1) (2) (3) (4)


log_initial_gdp -0.0905 -0.0905 -0.0526 -0.0498

(0.339) (0.359) (0.292) (0.297)

lag_fdiserv 0.816 0.816 0.435 0.423

(0.522) (0.576) (0.567) (0.567)

log_hdi -1.651 -1.651** -1.319 -1.301

(1.142) (0.653) (0.802) (0.811)

log_investment 0.449** 0.449*** 0.484*** 0.486***

(0.115) (0.103) (0.126) (0.127)

log_inflation 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.102*** 0.101***

(0.0228) (0.0357) (0.0300) (0.0299)

log_gov_spending 0.318* 0.318* 0.371** 0.371**

(0.130) (0.167) (0.182) (0.185)

log_pcbank -0.0143 -0.0143 -0.0192 -0.0187

(0.0927) (0.0402) (0.0507) (0.0509)

log_iquality 0.663* 0.663*** 0.624** 0.628**

(0.267) (0.221) (0.259) (0.259)

log_openness -0.150 -0.150 -0.280** -0.286**

(0.254) (0.212) (0.142) (0.142)


(0.145) (0.121) (0.113) (0.114)

Constant 0.456 0.456 0.586 0.583

(2.389) (3.156) (2.127) (2.153)


R-squared 0.553 0.553 0.538 0.902

Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses;***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5112 TABLE 13. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN EACH SECTOR ON GROWTH.



log_initial_gdp -0.0985 -0.0985 -0.0641 -0.0618(0.368) (0.379) (0.286) (0.292)

lag_fdiprim -3.541 -3.541* -1.688 -1.724(4.382) (2.010) (3.695) (3.688)

lag_manuf -0.723 -0.723 -1.146* -1.145*(0.630) (0.437) (0.682) (0.682)

lag_fdiserv 1.348 1.348* 0.887 0.879(0.780) (0.653) (0.638) (0.638)

log_hdi -1.742 -1.742** -1.398* -1.381*(1.276) (0.647) (0.796) (0.804)

log_investment 0.413** 0.413*** 0.457*** 0.459***(0.115) (0.114) (0.127) (0.127)

log_inflation 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.101*** 0.100***(0.0228) (0.0366) (0.0293) (0.0292)

log_gov_spending 0.290* 0.290 0.381** 0.381**(0.133) (0.183) (0.177) (0.180)

log_pcbank -0.00881 -0.00881 -0.0262 -0.0256(0.100) (0.0406) (0.0510) (0.0511)

log_iquality 0.661* 0.661** 0.647** 0.651**(0.264) (0.238) (0.255) (0.255)

log_openness -0.140 -0.140 -0.273* -0.279**(0.238) (0.213) (0.141) (0.142)


Constant 0.662 0.662 0.716 0.718(2.667) (3.234) (2.099) (2.126)


R-squared 0.564 0.564 0.543 0.919


5. CONCLUSIONStable and well-developed government policies of SEE5 countries, investing conditions, financial and institutional policies are important sources of GDP growth and FDI inflows. Political history of the SEE5 countries, with conflicts, economic uncertainty and low


growth, have sharply limited the inflow of FDI and still give the impression to have a negative effect on FDI inflow. However, FDI inflow to the SEE5 countries could be further increased by market economic reforms which will result in economic and political stabi-lization. That is, economic and political stabilization of SEE5 countries, together with the implementation of a common market in the SEE5 countries, could increase the attractive-ness of this region and lead to an improvement of investment conditions. Therefore, SEE5 countries should support the business climate and positive institutional changes which will in return promote the urgently needed increase of FDI inflows in the SEE5 countries.

For the SEE5 economies as a whole, this paper finds that there is a statistically significant connection between FDI flows and growth. At the aggregate level, the impact of FDI net inflows on growth is positive and strong. At the sector level, it becomes apparent that FDI net inflows into the primary sector inclines to have a negative effect on growth. Unlike to the primary sector FDI, FDI net inflows in the manufacturing sector have positive effects on growth in the SEE5 countries. Plausible reason for this positive correlation between FDI net inflows in the manufacturing sector and growth may be found in its deeper backward and forward linkages. Strong and positive of FDI net inflows in service sector on growth suggests that the service sector might be source of positive spillover effects from FDI in the SEE5 countries.

These findings suggest that both the aggregate FDI net inflows and the sectorial compo-sition of these flows are important factors of economic growth. Although, not all forms of FDI net inflows have the same effect on growth, targeting different types of FDI net inflows shouldn’t be based on selective FDI policies. According to Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) for a selective approach to be successful in attracting growth promoting FDI, policymakers would have to know exactly about the quality of each FDI project and its effects on the local economy, which appears to be an overly heroic assumption. This me-ans that SEE5 policymakers, instead of choosing selective approach towards FDI, should help to maximize the benefits of FDI.

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Alfaro Laura (2003), "Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter?", Harvard Business School.

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Alfaro Laura and Charlton Andrew (2007), "Growth and the Quality of Foreign Direct Investment: Is All FDI Equal?", Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-072.

SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5114Alfaro Laura, Ozcan Kalemli, Chanda Areendam and Sayek Selin (2000), "FDI and Eco-nomic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets", Working Paper (University of Hou-ston).

Aykut Dilek and Selin Sayek (2007), "The Role of the Sectorial Composition of Foreign Di-rect Investment on Growth", In Do Multinationals Feed Local Development and Growth?, edited by L. Piscitello and G. Santangelo. London: Elsevier.

Bellemare Marc F. and Masaki, Takaaki and Pepinsky, Thomas B. (2015), "Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effects", SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-stract=2568724.

Benhabib Jess and Spiegel M. Mark (1994), "The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development, Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data", Journal of Monetary Eco-nomics.

Blin Myriam and Ouattara Bazoumana (2009), "Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Mauritius: Evidence from Bounds Test Cointegration", Économie internationale 117.

Botrić Valerija (2010), "Foreign Direct Investment in the Western Balka ns: Privatization, Institutional Change, and Banking Sector Dominance "ECONOMIC ANNALS, Volume LV, No. 187 / October - December 2010.

Carkovic, M. and Levine R. (2002), "Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Econo-mic Growth?" University of Minnesota, University of Minnesota, Working Paper.

Chakraborty Chandana and Nunnenkamp Peter (2008), "Economic Reforms, FDI, and Economic Growth in India: A Sector Level Analysis", World Development Vol. 36.

DeMello, L.R., Jr. (1999), "Foreign Direct Investment-Led Growth: Evidence from Time Series and Panel Data", Oxford Economic Papers.

Di Tommaso, M. L., Raiser, M., and Weeks, M. (2007), "Home Grown or Imported? Initial Conditions, External Anchors and the Determinants of Institutional Reform in the Transition Economies", The Economic Journal, Vol. 117.

Dowrick Steve and Golley Jane (2004), “Trade Openness and Growth: Who Benefits”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 38- 56.

Drukker M David (2003), "Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-Data Models", The Stata Journal (2003), Number 2.

Eicher T. and Schreiber T. (2007), "Institutions and Growth: Time Series Evidence from Natural Experiments", University of Washington, Department of Economics, Working Pa-per No. UWEC-2007-15.


Estrin Saul and Uvalic Milica (2013), "Foreign Direct Investment into Transition Economi-es: Are the Balkans different?", LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series.

Hansen H. and Rand J. (2006), "On the Causal Links between FDI and Growth in Deve-loping Countries", World Development 29.

Hoechle D. (2007), "Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Ccross-Sectional Dependence", Stata Journal 7(3), 281312.

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Hong Liming (2014), "Does and How does FDI Promote the Economic Growth? Evidence from Dynamic Panel Data of Prefecture City in China", IERI Procedia 6, 57-62.

Huchet-Bourdon M., Mouel L. C., and Vijil M. (2011), "The Relationship Between Trade Openness and Economic Growth: Some New Insights on the Openness Measurement Issue. XIIIeme Congres de I'Association Europeenne des Economistes Agricoles AAE), pp. 1-17.

Iamsiraroj Sasi and Doucouliagos Hristos (2015), "Does Growth Attract FDI?", Economics Open-Access, Oppen-Assesment E-Journal.

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MILUTIN JEŠIĆ1


ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECEPRIKAZ KNJIGE: NIKOLA FABRIS I RADOICA LUBURIĆ, „FINANSIJSKO OBRAZOVANJE DECE I OMLADINE“, HERAEDU I MEDEON, 2017.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE CHILDREN GROWTH

BOOK REVIEW: NIKOLA FABRIS AND RADOICA LUBURIĆ, „FINANCIAL EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH“, HERAEDU AND MEDEON, 2017.

1. UVOD O FINANSIJSKOM OBRAZOVANJUU okviru formalnog obrazovanja, na prostoru našeg regiona, oduvek se malo pažnje pri-davalo finansijskom obrazovanju. Retki su đaci koji su tokom svog formalnog obrazovanja zaslugom pojedinaca – učitelja i nastavnika čuli bar nešto o osnovnim pojmovima koji spadaju u ovaj domen. Stoga je uglavnom sve što deca treba da nauče još u ranoj mlado-

1 EkonomskifakultetUniverzitetauBeogradu

ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECE120sti ostavljeno na odgovornost roditeljima. Međutim, zbog izmenjenog tipa sistema, pre-malo slobodnog vremena koje roditeljima stoji na raspolaganju da ga provedu sa svojom decom, propagiranja lošeg sistema vrednosti i društvenog nagrađivanja neodgovarajućeg ponašanja u normalnom sistemu vrednosti, omladina po završetku obaveznog formalnog školovanja ostaje gotovo finansijski nepismena. A upravo je to period u životu, kada te-melji koji se tada postave igraju ključnu ulogu u budućoj mogućnosti „opterećenja“ koje svaki pojedinac može podneti u toku života.

Finansijska edukacija stvara mogućnost da osoba bude finansijski pismena i finansijski sposobna.2 Finansijsko obrazovanje posebno je važno jer se u kasnijem periodu života po jedinici mogu susresti sa važnim finansijskim odlukama koje ih mogu ponekad odvesti i na pogrešan put. Makroekonomske posledice finansijske nepismenosti su očigledne pre svega kada se privreda nalazi u zoni recesije. Nedostatak ušteđevine za slučaj neza-poslenosti, prezaduženost, problemi u otplati kredita, neadekvatne metode finansiranja kapitalnih dobara i dobara za tekuće potrebe, samo su neke od konsekvenci nedovoljnog stepena finansijskog obrazovanja. Finansijsko obrazovanje formalno ili neformalno, treba da počne što ranije. Prema OECD publikaciji, u Velikoj Britaniji 52 % tinejdžera pre 17 godine je postalo zaduženo.3 U manje razvijenim zemljama taj procenat je svakako manji, ali jasno je da finansijske instrumente počinje da koristi sve mlađa populacija.

Na nacionalnom nivou mora se napraviti plan razvoja u oblasti finansijske edukacije. Taj plan treba da uključi sve zainteresovane strane, da jasno definiše ciljeve, sredstva, obaveze i evaluacije. Podrška finansijskoj edukaciji može da bude viđena kao glavni jav-ni, privatni i cilj svih drugih zainteresovanih strana, kao kritična dugoročna investicija u ljudski kapital.4

2 ChildSocialandFinancialEducation(2012),p.3.3 FinancialEducationsinSchools(2012),p.7.4 Ibid.,p.7.


ILUSTRACIJA 1. PROCES RAZVOJA NACIONALNOG PLANA FINANSIJSKE EDUKACIJE DECE I OMLADINE

Izvor:Fabris,N.iLuburić,R.(2016),p.71.

Treba imati na umu da čak i da formalno obrazovanje bude upotpunjeno sa nekim od predmeta koji se tiču finansijskog obrazovanja, ipak najveći deo posla ostaje na rodite-ljima da na vreme nauče svoju decu o veštini upravljanja novcem. Najlakše je to učiniti usputno, uključivanjem dece u svakodnevne odluke porodice o finansijama, prvo kao pasivne posmatrače, a potom u kasnijem periodu kao članove sa aktivnim glasom.

Knjiga koja je predmet ovog prikaza, predstavlja važan iskorak u odnosu na dosadašnje pridavanje značaja neformalnom finansijskom obrazovanju dece i omladine. U nastavku sledi kratak prikaz najznačajnijih smernica roditeljima koje se mogu naći u knjizi.

ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECE122

2. KONCEPTUALNI OKVIR I DOPRINOS KNJIGE Knjiga N. Fabrisa i R. Luburića bavi se tematikom finansijskog obrazovanja dece i omladi-ne, pre svega iz ugla roditelja. Autori na jednostavan način pokazuju kakva uloga roditelja treba da bude u vaspitavanju dece, te kako tu ulogu ostvariti. U knjizi je obrađena tema finansijske edukacije dece od 3 godine do tinejdžerskog doba.

Cilj knjige je priprema deteta da donosi finansijske odluke jednog dana, a te odluke ima-ju dalekosežne posledice u životu svakog pojedinca. Stoga je veoma bitno još od ranog uzrasta deteta otvoriti detetu vidike, ukazati mu na opasnosti, šanse i zamke sa kojima će se susresti kada bude počelo da donosi finansijske odluke. Kroz celu knjigu provlači se i pristup pokušaja i pogrešaka deteta. Jako je važno da dete nauči da uči iz sopstvenih grešaka, da kasnije kada finansijske odluke velike važnosti budu realizovane ne dođe do takvih grešaka. Dragoceno iskustvo na „malim finansijskom odlukama“ u ranom periodu života igra važnu ulogu u kasnijem životnom dobu.

Knjigom provejava par važnih poruka roditeljima, koje ovom prilikom želimo da istakne-mo:

• Formalno obrazovanje ne može zameniti rad roditelja sa decom. Ovo pogotovo važi za finansijsko obrazovanje.

• Finansijsko obrazovanje dece treba da počne što pre. Period kada pojedinac počne da donosi finansijske odluke dođe brzo. Zato na vreme treba voditi računa da dete stekne odgovarajuća znanja, koja će povećati njegove sposobnosti da donese pravu odluku kada za to dođe vreme.

• Starije dete treba pustiti da samostalno donese neke odluke. Čak i u slučaju da po-greši, detaljno mu treba objasniti šta su uzroci i posledice greške. Ne treba zaboraviti da je neuspeh sastavni deo uspeha.

• Dete treba naučiti da razlikuje želje od potreba. Ovo je neophodno bez obzira koliko je porodica u kojoj raste dete imućna.

• Dete od malih nogu treba da razume koncept štednje. Motivi za štednju, odnos štednje i potrošnje, a u kasnijem periodu i načini plasiranja štednje moraju biti jasno predočeni detetu.

• Negativni uticaji na decu (pre svega preko medija) ne mogu biti izbegnuti. Ipak, decu treba podsticati na kritički stav prema tim vrstama uticaja.

• Roditelji treba da finansijski edukuju decu tako što će praviti finansijske planove. Oni u zavisnosti od uzrasta mogu imati veoma jednostavnu formu.

Knjiga je koncipirana tako da uvaži značaj uzrasta za finansijsku edukaciju dece. Jasno je naznačeno šta kom uzrastu odgovara. Pisana je jednostavnim jezikom, pa će svakom roditelju biti jasno koji su najbolji načini za finansijsku edukaciju deteta. Ne samo da su


dati saveti, već i pomoć roditeljima u vidu raznih igrica koje mogu da igraju sa svojom decom, kako bi ona lakše prihvatila nova saznanja iz oblasti finansijskog obrazovanja.

U knjizi su obrađena ključna pitanja finansijskog obrazovanja: odnos prema novcu, za-rada, odnos potrošnje i štednje, stav prema agresivnom marketingu, upravljanje ličnim finansijama deteta, finansijski sistem itd. Na kraju knjige postoji i kviz koji će pomoći roditeljima da provere stečena znanja svog deteta. Pored toga, postoji i leksikon finan-sijskih pojmova, koji i roditeljima može pomoći u razumevanju nekih njima nedovoljno poznatih pojmova.

Na osnovu svega, jasno je da je doprinos knjige N. Fabrisa i R. Luburića veliki. Ova knjiga ima široki društveni značaj. Koncepti iz domena finansijskog obrazovanja mogu se naučiti iz tri izvora: formalno obrazovanje, neformalno obrazovanje, sopstvene greške u kasni-jem životnom dobu. Naravno, u kontekstu iskustava zemalja regiona jasno je da prvi vid obrazovanja za sada nema tu ulogu. Stoga neformalno obrazovanje ima još veći značaj. Neki roditelji čak i ako žele, ne znaju pravi način da svoju decu finansijski edukuju. Ova knjiga im u tome može pomoći. Ipak, kako kažu autori, nijedna knjiga ne može da zameni praktično iskustvo.5

Značaj ove knjige je još veći ako imamo u vidu da je ona jedna od retkih na našem je-ziku. Dakle, veoma važna oblast u odrastanju dece, finansijsko obrazovanje, konačno je utemeljena i stvoreni su svi preduslovi za njen dalji razvoj. Roditelji koji žele aktivno da učestvuju u finansijskom obrazovanju svoje dece, pred sobom imaju pravi materijal za taj kompleksan put.

3. LITERATURAChild Social and Financial Education (2012), A companion to the Child Friendly Schools Manual, UNICEF, December 2012.

Fabris, N. i Luburić, R. (2016), „Financial Education of Children and Youth“ Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 65-79. DOI: 10.1515/jcbtp-2016-0011

Fabris, N. i Luburić, R. (2017), Finansijsko obrazovanje dece i omladine, HERAedu i MEDEON, Beograd.

Financial Educations in Schools (2012), International Network on Financial Educations, OECD, 2012.

5 Fabris,N.iLuburić,R.(2017),p.18.

© 2017.Sva prava su zadržana. Nijedan deo ove publikacije ne može biti reprodukovan niti smešten u sistem za pretraživanje ili transmitovanje u bilo kom obliku, elektronski, mehanički, fotokopiranjem, snimanjem ili na drugi način, bez prethodne pismene dozvole autora.

CIP - Кaтaлогизaцијa y пyбликaцијиНaроднa библиотекa Србије, Беогрaд

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EKONOMSKE ideje i praksa : kvartalničasopis iz oblasti ekonomije, poslovneekonomije i menadžmenta, statistike i poslovne informatike / glavni urednik MiomirJakšić. - 2017, br. 24 (mart)- . - Beograd(Kamenička 6) : Centar za izdavačku delatnostEkonomskog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2014-(Beograd : Čugura print). - 24cm

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JEŠIĆ - ekof.bg.ac.rs · «pragmatični kejnzijanci». Slično se može reći i za povratak originalnoj teoriji Džona Majnarda Kejnsa, koja je iz različitih teorijskih i pragmatičnih