JIABS 33.1-2

JIABSJournal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011)

The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (ISSN 0193-600XX) is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. As a peer-reviewed journal, it welcomes scholarly contributions pertaining to all facets of Buddhist Studies. JIABS is published twice yearly. As announced at the XVIth IABS Congress in Taiwan, the JIABS is now available online in open access at http://archiv. ub.uni-heidelberg.de/ojs/index.php/jiabs/ index. Articles become available online for free 60 months after their appearance in print. Current articles are not accessible online. Subscribers can choose between receiving new issues in print or as PDF. We are kindly requesting all authors that could be opposed to this decision to inform the Editors by June 2012. Manuscripts should preferably be submitted as e-mail attachments to: [email protected] as one single file, complete with footnotes and references, in two different formats: in PDF-format, and in Rich-Text-Format (RTF) or OpenDocument-Format (created e.g. by Open Office). Address books for review to: JIABS Editors, Institut fr Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Apostelgasse 23, A-1030 Wien, AUSTRIA Address subscription orders and dues, changes of address, and business correspondence (including advertising orders) to: Dr Jrme Ducor, IABS Treasurer Dept of Oriental Languages and Cultures Anthropole University of Lausanne CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland email: [email protected] Web: http://www.iabsinfo.net Fax: +41 21 692 29 35 Subscriptions to JIABS are USD 55 per year for individuals and USD 90 per year for libraries and other institutions. For informations on membership in IABS, see back cover.

EDITORIAL BOARDKELLNER Birgit KRASSER Helmut Joint Editors BUSWELL Robert CHEN Jinhua COLLINS Steven COX Collet GMEZ Luis O. HARRISON Paul VON HINBER Oskar JACKSON Roger JAINI Padmanabh S. KATSURA Shry KUO Li-ying LOPEZ, Jr. Donald S. MACDONALD Alexander SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina SEYFORT RUEGG David SHARF Robert STEINKELLNER Ernst TILLEMANS Tom

Cover: Cristina Scherrer-Schaub Font: Gandhari Unicode designed by Andrew Glass (http:// andrewglass.org/fonts.php) Copyright 2011 by the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. Print: Ferdinand Berger & Shne GesmbH, A-3580 Horn

JIABSJournal of the International Association of Buddhist StudiesVolume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011)

Articles William Chu The timing of Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty (13681643) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vincent EltsChingEr Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part II

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5 27

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Richard F. nanCE Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth On the privileged lie in Indian Buddhist literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander WynnE The tman and its negation A conceptual and chronologi cal analysis of early Buddhist thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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75

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Contents

Indian Buddhist metaethicsContributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 2328 June 2008

Guest editor: Martin T. Adam

Peter harvEy An analysis of factors related to the kusala/akusala quality of actions in the Pli tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abraham vlEz dE CEa Value pluralism in early Buddhist ethics .

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175 211

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Martin T. adam No self, no free will, no problem Implications of the Anatta lakkhaa Sutta for a perennial philosophical issue . . . . . . . . Bronwyn Finnigan Buddhist metaethics .

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239 267 299

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Stephen JEnkins On the auspiciousness of compassionate violence

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Jay L. garFiEld What is it like to be a bodhisattva? Moral phenomenology in ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tom J. F. tillEmans Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics

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333 359

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Miracles and superhuman powers in South and Southeast Asian Buddhist traditionsContributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 2328 June 2008

Guest editor: David V. Fiordalis

David V. Fiordalis Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine

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381 409

Bradley S. Clough The higher knowledges in the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya.

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Kristin sChEiblE Priming the lamp of dhamma The Buddhas miracles in the Pli Mahvasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patrick PrankE On saints and wizards Ideals of human perfection and power in contemporary Burmese Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . Rachelle M. sCott Buddhism, miraculous powers, and gender Rethinking the stories of Theravda nuns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Luis O. gmEz On Buddhist wonders and wonder-working . Notes on the contributors

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435

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489 513

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The timing of Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty (1368-1643)William Chu

Before proceeding to the main thesis of my paper, I need to review some well known facts about Buddhist-Confucian dynamics in the late imperial era. The rationalist Song Neo-Confucians known traditionally as the Cheng-Zhu school (; after the Cheng brothers Cheng Hao 10321085 and Cheng Yi 10331107, and Zhu Xi 11301200) had asserted the exclusive orthodoxy of their tradition. They repudiated all Confucians who professed syncretistic interest or sympathies toward Buddhism and Daoism, and highlighted the doctrinal incompatibilities between Confucianism and other heretical religions (yiduan ). To Zhu Xi in particular, Buddhism was irredeemably at odds with the Confucian sagely lineage. Zhus staunchly purist stance was targeted at those Confucians who heartily professed dual allegiances to both religions. Another group of Confucians, in contrast, headed by Lu Jiuyuan (11391193), that eventually rose to become Zhus major rival for Confucian orthodoxy, also harbored deep reservations about Buddhism and reiterated the need to vigilantly fend off the latters spiritual allure. But despite Lu Jiuyuans self-proclaimed loyalty to Confucianism, followers of Zhus school often branded Lu an apostate, one who was secretly a sympathizer of Buddhism and, in fact, cherished a much buddhicized interpretation of Confucianism. In the Ming dynasty, Wang Yangming (14721529) relented on Confucian exclusivism. Although still upholding the supreme status of Confucianism, Wang saw that the Buddhist training was not diametrical to Confucian enlightenment and could in fact serve as a stepping stone. His unapologetic use of BuddhistJournal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 525

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jargons earned him infamy among his Confucian colleagues, who jeeringly referred to him as the de facto successor to the Chan of the Five dynasties, and as one who reverently upheld the teachings of Bodhidharma and Huineng.1 Such accusations were not completely baseless, for Wangs teachings were often direct paraphrase of the words of legendary Buddhist Chan patriarchs, as the following demonstrates:2The innate conscience knows right from wrong; the innate conscience is also neither of right or wrong. Knowing right from wrong is what constitutes propriety, while being oblivious to (unbounded by) right and wrong and thereby realizing the marvelous, is [what defines] the so-called enlightenment. , . , . , .3

In this case, Wang Yangming summarized his understanding of Confucian morality in verses that were unmistakably appropriated from the Buddhist Platform stra. Compare what Wang said with what Hanshan Deqing (15461623 C.E.) the most prolific Buddhist writer in the Ming wrote, their similarity becomes apparent:[People] do not know that the two opposite polarities of good and evil are in fact dualistic dharmas coming from the outside [of ones innate nature], and have nothing to do with the original essence of our selfnature. That is why those who do evil in the world could at times mend their ways and become good, and good people can also be converted to evils way. This is sufficient to prove that [worldly] virtues could not be stable or reliable. For that if one did not cultivate goodness all the way [to eventually consummate in enlightenment], what is apparently moral is really not ultimately moral. As for the presently expounded highest good, it constitutes enlightening and illuminating the veriCited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 181. Although Robert Sharf has argued that that the shared terminology of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism might not have been due to deliberate borrowing (see Sharf 2001), in the case of Wang the assimilation of Buddhist ideas and terms was quite deliberate and self-consciously done, as would be made clear in this study. 3 Cited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 384.2 1

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

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table essence of the self-nature, which is originally devoid of either good or evil. , , . , , . , , .4

We may recall, however, that Zhu Xi found precisely such Chan teaching of there is neither right nor wrong (wushi wufei ) to be logically and morally reprehensible. Zhu interpreted what might be explained by Buddhists as transcendence from right and wrong as reckless antinomianism, a disregard for conventional morality. He said:The difference between we the Confucians and the Buddhists lies in that, we Confucians have reasonable rules and principled guidelines. For the Buddhists, they have none of these. , . .5

Antinomianism and moral laxity were some of the most denigrating and inveterate polemics the Confucians had historically maintained about Buddhism, Wang was conscious of the danger of becoming labeled as an antinomian or moral nihilist. The strategy he employed to differentiate his own position from that of the allegedly amoral Buddhism was, ironically, also the same one many Buddhists resorted to in vindicating Buddhism of this same charge. Wang Yangming posited a bipartite approach where he would put forth both the need to maintain moral rigorousness and the transcendence from inflexible dogmatism. Wang Yangming described his understanding of the innate knowledge of the good (liangzhi ) very much in terms of the language of Buddha-nature. He posited the Mind or the innate knowledge as an all-encompassing, ontological basis for both good and evil. Yet the Mind is only functionally actualized when good is cultivated. In the same way, Chan followers had always described the Buddha-nature as having both an ontological aspect and a functional aspect. Example: For4 5

Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iv, p. 2380. Cited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 379.

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Zongmi (780841), the Chan patriarch in the Tang dynasty, the essence aspect of the mind has to be emphasized along with the responsive functioning6 aspect with the same vigor, if both the transcendent and the responsive nature of the Mind are to be maintained.7 And ever since Neo-Confucians attack on the alleged Buddhist amoralism, Buddhists had become especially cautious and vocal when articulating their moral stance, arguing that morality without transcendence is ritualism or mundane Dharma, and that transcendence without morality is false enlightenment. Yunqi Zhuhong (15351615) was reiterating this dominant Buddhist doctrinal ethos in the Ming dynasty when he made the same point:Although the mind is originally luminous, yet as one does good or evil deeds, their traces will make the mind soar high or sink to the groundHow can one say that evil deeds do not matter simply because the mind in its essence cannot be designated as good or evil? If one is addicted to the biased view of emptiness, he will deviate from perfect understanding. Once you realize that both good and evil are nonexistent, [it is all the more compelling that] you should stop evil and do good.8

Using unmistakably Chan language, Wang Yangming also explained that at the ontological aspect, the innate knowledge transcends the absolutism and dualism of mundane values; but at the functional level, it is ever discerning about good and evil, and actively pursues good and avoids evil. This two-tiered scheme that validates transmundane wisdom without sacrificing the practical need to defer to conventional virtues9 was a common Buddhist motif that could be traced back not only to the Platform stra, but

Peter Gregorys analysis of the historical conditions and mentality that gave rise to this comparable bipartite moral scheme (Gregory 2002: 237 244) contains many interesting parallels to the Ming scenario. 7 Araki Keng (1975: 45) suggested that the solid wall of principle erected by Zhu runs the danger of curbing the vitality of the Mind. 8 Cited in Greenblatt 1975: 109. 9 David Kalupahana (1992: 6067) had explained the sustained Buddhist attempts at avoiding absolutism.

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also to such early texts like the Dhammapada.10 Although Wang Yangming might be subverting Zhus moral absolutism in substantive ways, by bringing such a blatantly Buddhist interpretation into Confucianism, Wang still maintained Zhus polemic that [Chan] Buddhism is morally degenerate. In other words, even as Wang simultaneously relegated Buddhism and Zhu Xis intellectual legacy by charging that Buddhism was hopelessly oblivious to and delinquent of secular moral duties, and that Zhu was trapped in inflexible dualistic thinking Wangs philosophical views overlapped with important Buddhist ideas popular in the Ming dynasty. His position was much closer to Chan Buddhist ideology than he allowed himself to admit.11 Wang Yangming was responsible for still another Confucian transformation that was to prove conducive to the upsurge of Mingdynasty syncretism. One of the most powerful appeals Buddhism had in distracting, if not converting, some of the best minds from the Confucian establishment was its systematic outline of a spiritual mrga the cultivational and soteric technology and its promise of ultimate transformations through the application of its prescribed techniques. In the face of Buddhisms systematic, graduated program of moral and meditative training, many Confucians could not but concede to Buddhist superiority in soteric sophistication. The intricate and elaborate ways in which Buddhists conceived of their spiritual path was the result of the traditional emphasis Buddhists placed on its careful formulation. Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello had explained this emphasis in the following way:[T]he concept of the path has been given in Buddhism an explication more sustained, comprehensive, critical, and sophisticated than that provided by any other single religious traditionThroughout the10 The Platform stra contained the following passage that illustrates such a two-tiered scheme for morality: , , . . Similarly, the Dhammapada urged the practice of good yet posited that only by being unattached to even what is the good can one truly be called a spiritual aspirant (Brahmin). Compare verse 183 and 412 in Dhammapada, Kaviratna trans. pp. 73 & 159. 11 See some examples of Wangs critical remarks in Chen (Rongjie) 1984: 7780.

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two-and-a-half millennia of its pan-Asian career, Buddhism has been consistently explicit in declaring itself to be, above all else, a soteriology, a method of salvation, rather than, say, a creed. Its unflagging concentration on the path, whether for the purpose of advocating and charting that path or for the purpose of qualifying and criticizing it, has not only led to the careful and detailed delineation of numerous curricula of religious practice and to the privileging of such delineation over other modes of Buddhist discourse.12

In order to compete, the re-systematization endeavor of the Song Neo-Confucians was to delineate a comparably enticing system of personal cultivation (gongfu lun ) that could outstrip the near dominance Buddhists had always held in this domain. One of the key leitmotifs Confucians had toiled for centuries to configure in its soteriological system concerned a practice known as the extension of knowledge (zhizhi ).13 It was one phase of training in a series of graduated steps leading to ever higher spiritual and ethical goals as prescribed in the Confucian classic the Great Learning (Daxue ). Though vague and abstruse in its language, the text provided a rare indigenous outline of soteric path for the Neo-Confucians, who were in a desperate need to discover something from their own textual tradition rather than appropriating from Buddhism what they supposedly ostensibly lacked. Zhu Xis canonization and propagation of the so-called Four Classics (which included the Great Learning) very likely have been propelled by such a mentality. Through this act of canonization, he had undoubtedly changed the character of Confucianism in posterity. The fact that the Four Classics were readily and heartily received by fellow Confucians as the sine qua non primers for the tradition very likely had something to do with their usefulness to buttress Confucianism in those most glaringly deficient areas. With the exception of the Analects, all the Four Classics (the Analects,Buswell and Gimello 1992: 23. It should be noted that Lu Jiuyuan was one of the first to bring about this transformation in the Song. In many ways Wang Yangming simply rediscovered and fine-tuned Lus system rather than having single-handedly invented the many implications of an idealist philosophy. See Chan 1963: 572573; Liu 1964: 165166; and Qian 1962: 137.13 12


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the Mengzi, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean) in fact were only elevated to their revered prominence from relative obscurity after Zhu Xis unreserved commendation of them.14 Each of the three newly promoted Confucian texts served an important soteric purpose. The Mencius (Mengzi ) discusses the Confucian ideal of sagehood and the actualization of the heavenly virtues. The idea of attaining sagehood as outlined in the Mencius served as a worthy competing ideal to the Buddhist notions of Buddhahood and enlightenment. The Great Learning spelled out the specific praxis involved for that actualization: one sets out to realize the Confucian goal of bringing harmony to the world through a stepby-step self-transformation. The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong ) served to explicate the mechanism and principles underlying those Confucian systems of spiritual cultivation: the principle of emotional and practical moderation was advised in this text as the connecting theme for Confucian practice. It also provided much of the philosophical expressions with which Zhu built his metaphysical theories such as that of the heavenly nature and the universal principle15 metaphysical theories that were in one capacity intended to compete with the elaborately constructed Buddhist cosmology. In the Great Learning, there is a passage on the sequence of stages to be accomplished by those cultivators intent on illuminating the luminescent virtue and bringing harmony to the world. The first two of the stages are the investigation of things (gewu ) and, as we have previously discussed, the extension of knowledge. As many scholars have noted already, Zhus understanding of this process was that it is an inductive one. He believed that only through wide learning and unceasing exploration of the naMencius was beatified by Zhu himself to become the greatest Confucian sage second only to Confucius (yasheng ). Both the Great Learning and the Doctrine of Mean were excerpts from the Book of Rites by the Younger Zai (Xiaozai liji ) singled out by Zhu for their pertinence to his vision of a new Confucianism. 15 See Zhu Xis exegesis on this part of the Book in Chen (Rong) 1984: 2223.14

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ture of external things would the seeker arrive at a universal principle which pervades them all.16 He considered Buddhisms introspective and subitist quest undertaken in the mind ground to be too introverted and perfunctory to generate any concrete, reliable, generalizable knowledge. By collapsing what should otherwise be a thorough investigation of the myriad phenomena into a single, idealist principle, Buddhism appeared to Zhu to be oversimplifying a serious learning process and too complacently engrossed in the self. One of Zhus supporters in the Ming expressed this distaste toward Buddhisms allegedly reductionist approach to investigating things:Some practitioners had only heeded to the aspect of the oneness of principle while overlooking the aspect of its divergent ramifications. In the case of Buddhism, even its professed oneness of principle [that it so favored] differed from the one principle that was advocated by the [Confucian] sages. , . , , 17 .

This was where Wang Yangming introduced yet another important revolutionary modification of Zhus epistemic approach. While Zhu Xi claimed to have applied his mind in search of the principle amidst the various phenomena and things ,18 Wang braved the antithetical position. Wang sug-

16 Zhu Xis logic was that, The so-called nature is the myriad principles scattered in various places. This is what makes it the nature [of all things] . Cited in Qian 1962: 117. Therefore only by a tireless investigation into various things would the principle be revealed. Zhus conclusion was that, As for our attempt to extend our knowledge, [the key] lies in searching to the limit of things and thereby fully reveal their principle This is the reason that the beginning-leveled teaching of the Great Learning always required the apprentice to pursue the investigation of all things without exceptions under Heaven, basing on principles that one had already comprehended, in order to extend it to its utmost limit. , , , , . Ibid., p. 120. 17 Cited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 389. 18 Cited in Sun, Liu and Hu 1995: 280.


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gested that the Way of the sages is already endowed in my nature. Those who directed their search for the principle in objects and phenomena are misled , , .19 Wang thought that a deductive and introspective extension of knowledge could avoid the pitfalls of becoming inevitably fragmentary and aimless as was the case in Zhus externally-directed system. Instead of looking outward, Wang felt that nothing other than the mind provides a more direct access to the universal principle, and that understanding the mind itself would suffice to meet the qualification of investigating things and extending knowledge as stipulated in the Great Learning.20 Very few Confucians dared to suggest a rearrangement or bypassing of steps on this prescribed sequence, yet Wang Yangming was ready not only to place the process of rectifying the mind before the investigation of things, thereby reversing its traditional order, he altogether relegated the whole idea of graduated, step-by-step practices as an inferior approach to the recovery of the original mind. In such a manner, Wang also seemed to evince the same loathing to externally-directed investigation and entertained the possibility of a direct, sudden realization of this process in very much the same way the mature Chan school would. Wangs antithetical position to Zhu in this regard was a paradigmatic case for those who are studying the sudden versus gradual polarity in religious studies.21 It was fashionable for Buddhist exegetes to brandish their knowledge of literati culture by writing commentaries for the Confucian Classics. The interesting point was that, Wangs interpretation of the cultivational outline in the Great Learning as a subitist and introspective path was strikingly similar to the way Buddhists had interpreted the Confucian text. This is not to downplay the important, though at times subtle, differences between Wangs understanding of the Mind and that of the mainstream, Ming-dynasty Buddhist; but for our purpose, their similarities are the focus.Cited in Wu 1994: 171. For example, Wang emphasized that the entirety of the investigation should be performed on just this body and mind , . Cited in Sun, Liu and Hu 1995: 280. 21 Gregory 1997: 8.20 19

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When the Buddhist monk Deqing commented on another two of the cultivational stages in the Great Learning the rectifying of the mind (zhengxin ) and the making sincere of the intention (chengyi ) Deqing, too, saw those stages as perfectible in a single enlightened instant:The mind is originally luminous. Only because it was clouded by desires that it becomes dullAs soon as the Single Reality had been recovered, all delusions would no longer ariseOnce enlightened, there would be no further delusions; [In fact,] the extinction of delusions is itself the equivalent [of the realization] of the Single Reality. , , , .22

Most of the commentaries written by the Ming Buddhists on the Confucian Classics had in similar fashion attempted to reinterpret the Confucian cultivational stages within the rubric of Buddhist subitist soteriology. Although within the Buddhist tradition itself, there were proponents for both the gradual and the sudden paradigms, the subitist school had decidedly won the ideological battle since the eighth or ninth century. The influential Buddhist systematizer Zongmi categorized the Chan tradition into three major strands, and the one deemed the most advanced on his list of hermeneutical taxonomy was the School of Directly Revealing the Mind and the Nature (zhixian xinxing zong ) not surprisingly, that was the most subitist strand of the three.23 Deqing also echoed this unanimous Buddhist predilection for the subitist and idealist doctrine throughout the Ming dynasty,The marvel of the great Dao lies in that it could be better accessed through intuitive realization. Even when it comes to mundane knowledge such as the art of elocution, governance of the world, linguistic convention, and various means of livelihood, one could not fail to come to grasp that which is marvelous by simply penetrating into any of these secular enterprises.

Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iii, p. 1959. Zongmis panjiao schemes were recorded in the Chanyuan zhuquan jiduxu. T. 48.2015.23

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. , .24

Another Buddhist monk in roughly the same period, Ouyi Zhixu (15911655), in this respect even praised Wang for having reversed Zhu Xis claim to Confucian orthodoxy. The Buddhist monk esteemed Wang for having superseded the spiritual accomplishments of all previous Confucians and for that Wangs enlightenment might not be qualitatively different from Buddhist enlightenment:Wang Yangming had gone beyond what the Confucians in the Han and the Song had accomplished, and had directly succeeded to the [true legacy] of the Mind School as taught by Confucius and Yan [Hui]. The teaching [Wang] had instructed people with throughout his life [could be summed up] in the words of attaining to ones innate knowledge of the good. It corresponds to and perfectly illumines the Self-NatureIt does not direct people to search outside, because the entirety of its practice is rooted in the Self Nature. , . , , .25

Most of the points outlined so far are not new in the Buddhist scholarship. But I will now direct the discussion to how these points shed lights on Ming Yogcra. In all the aforementioned ways Wang brought about the key catalysts for a syncretistic culture some highly buddhicized recast of Confucian ideas. The Buddhists capitalized on these buddhicized elements to advance their own polemical agenda, by demonstrating how these elements could best be qualified, harmonized, and criticized in Buddhist hermeneutics. It was against this background of a brooding Confucian intellectual revolution and the resultant change in the inter-religious dynamic, that the return of the Buddhist Yogcra thought to scholastic spotlight in the high culture of the Ming dynasty becomes more understandable. To the Buddhist syncretists, it must have been apparent that Wang Yangmings brand of idealism could best be received and countered by Buddhisms own counterpart of idealism in the24 25

Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iv, p. 2405. Ouyi dashi wenxuan, p. 178.

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Yogcra tradition. One of the most visible common denominators between the two traditions had been their evolved convergence in the discourse on the mind. The newly resurrected Yogcra tradition assumed a peculiar form in which the traditional category consciousness was treated interchangeably with the notion of the Mind in the Tathgatagarbha thought. The so-called Eminent Monks of the Wanli Era (Wanli si ga oseng ), Hanshan Deqing (15461623),26 Daguan Zhenke (15431603), Yunqi Zhuhong (15351615),27 and Ouyi Zhixu (15991655) were interesting subjects of study not simply because of their reputable literary and spiritual accomplishments, but also in the unanimity of their fascination with syncretism, Yogcra, and Tathgata-garbha. This striking unanimity probably reflected powerful intellectual and cultural trends of their times. The convergence of these seemingly discrete and unconnected subjects of their fascination (again, syncretism, Yogcra, and Tathgatagarbha) was in fact the logical conclusion of development within Buddhism and Confucianism as well as their re-engagement in the Ming. I do not wish to unduly downplay the Eminent Monks undeniable individual differences, but it is in their striking resemblance not fully attributable to their mutual influence that reflected those compelling cultural forces that are in turn the focus of this paper. Though Wang Yangming and his followers had always perceived themselves to be continuing the idealist legacy initiated by none other than Mencius himself, Wangs originality stood out in his spilling forth the creative, ontological implications in explicit terms:The innate knowledge of good is the numinous Spirit of creation our numinous Spirit has created the heaven and the earth, as well as the myriad things therein. All things in the universe, however, ultimately return to nothingness. [The Spirit] carries out the creating

For more on Hanshans life and syncretistic efforts, see Hsu 1979. Zhuhongs life and contribution to Buddhist revival movement in Ming is covered in detail in Y 1981.27

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process in all moments, and constantly transforms [all things], never pausing for even a breath-long instant. , , , , . , , .28

Compare this notion to Buddhisms own Lakvatrastra narrative on the creative Embryo of the Tathgata, and we can easily discern the likeness between Wangs idealism and the Buddhist one that was encapsulated in the Yogcra-Tathgatagarbha hybrid thought:The Tathgatagarbha is the causative force behind both the wholesome and unwholesome [deeds]. It can function everywhere in creating the different realms of rebirth. Just like a conjuring illusionist, it could magically manifest [the appearances of] the various realms of rebirth. , , , .29

The synthesis of Tathgatagarbha and layavijna (the StoreHouse Consciousness described by the Yogcra school) was well underway when the first Chinese encountered these disparate Buddhist teachings on the nature of consciousness and mind. The ubiquitous influence of Tathgatagarbha thought in Chinese Buddhism since the eighth century, as Chinese Buddhist scholars have frequently noted, swept through practically all Chinese Buddhist schools. The result was a reinterpretation of all Buddhist ideas within Tathgatagarbha light, including the notion of layavijna. Although Tathgatagarbha and layavijna are definitely distinct concepts with very different doctrinal implications, by the Ming they were by and large harmonized and largely read as interchangeable. The Four Eminent Monks close alignment with the Tathgatagarbha thought was not confined to only their understanding of Yogcra, but was evident in their Huayan, Tiantai, Chan, and Pure Land scholarship as well, where traditionally disparate teachings were collapsed into variants of an all-unifying Tathgatagarbha28 29

Cited in Araki (Yang) 1978: 372373. Dasheng ru lengqie jing, T. 16.619620.

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idealism. The Eminent Monks sweeping reduction of all Buddhist teachings into a uniform doctrine was not without precedent in Chinese Buddhism. In fact the sectarian traditions of almost all surviving Buddhist schools each had its histories of eventually coming to terms with and assimilating the doctrines of an ontological Buddha-hood characteristic of the Tathgatagarbha thought. For the Yogcra system to be amenably conforming to the then Tathgatagarbha-permeated Buddhist culture, all the Four Eminent Monks saw the synthesis of Tathgatagarbha and layavijna under the rubric of the One Mind to be the most convenient and least problematic formulation to that end. Zhenke wrote,The four divisions of the Eighth Consciousness were initially not distinct entities [from the Eighth Consciousness itself]. It was because that the True Suchness [has the tendency to] responsively adapt to conditions, that it as a result permutated into various [manifestations like the four divisions]. The meaning of True Suchness responsively adapt to conditions is a most difficult doctrine to be clearly elucidated. For if the True Suchness was at the beginning unadulterated and free from being perfumed [by contaminating influences], what determined its initial activation to responsively adapt to conditions? If one unceasingly investigate this [problem of theodicy], one might suddenly become enlightened to itAt that point one could clearly understand [all] the books written on the subject of the Mind-Only teachingTherefore, for those who aspire to transcending the world and shouldering the responsibility of propagating the Path, could they afford not to wholeheartedly direct their attention to the study of the school concerning the Dharma-nature,30 the school of Dharmacharacterization,31 and the school of Chan?30 Traditionally both the Madhyamaka and the Tathgatagarbha teachings had been understood by many Chinese to be pointing to a substrative reality, therefore the Chinese often indiscriminately lodged the former with the latter under the category of the Xing School, or Dharma-nature School. After the Tathgatagarbha tradition became the undisputed dominant doctrinal tradition in China, however, the Dharma-nature School was increasingly being used to refer specifically to only Tathgatagarbha-oriented teachings. Many scholars are wrong in assuming that, throughout Chinese history, the designation Xingzong was reserved only for the latter group. One example where such an error was made was in Ran 1995: 11. 31 Xiangzong was a rather pejorative descriptive term for the


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, , , . , , , , ? , , , , ?32

Zhenkes Yogcra disputations were clearly tailored to the doctrinal assumptions of the Awakening of the Faith, an indigenous Tathgatagarbha text traditionally received by Chinese Buddhists with paramount esteem. The text, though rather succinct, devised deft solutions to reconcile many apparently contradictory doctrines between the Yogcra and Tathgatagarbha schools by positing the so-called nature-origination (xingqi ) formal causal theory. The Awakening of the Faith proved most useful a scriptural authority to call upon whenever someone attempted to equate Yogcra conception of the consciousness with the Tathgatagarbha Mind. The text provided (what appeared to be) canonically sanctioned precedent of submitting major Buddhist tenets to the all-subsuming Tathgatagarbha teaching and was especially useful for the Ming Yogcras purpose. Most of the Eminent Monks Yogcra interpretative frame rested so much on the cardinal themes of the Awakening of the Faith (with some of them expressly acknowledging to have done so), that one could not help but to come to the impression that the Yogcra tradition in the late Ming was only studied to be rendered compliant to the school of Dharma-nature (another common name for the Chinese Tathgatagarbha tradition). Zhixu was one such person who self-professedly took the apocryphal text to legitimize Yogcra-Tathgatagarbha synthesis:What the Consciousness-Only School described as [From the perspective of] the Real, [dharma] characteristics are undifferentiated, it is exactly what the Awakening of Faith explained under the Gate of the True-Suchness aspect of the One Mind. As for what theYogcra system coined by its rival traditions. Since the Yogcra school was perceived by people like Fazang of the Huayan tradition as merely delving into the feature/phenomenal aspect of reality rather than penetrating into the deeper substrative level, they labeled it a Faxiang zong, or a Dharmafeature/Dharma-phenomena School in contrast with the Faxing zong, or a Dharma-nature School. 32 Man[ji] Zokuzky 98, pp. 580581.

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Consciousness-Only School described as [From the perspective of] the mundane, [dharma] characteristics are differentiated, it is just pertaining to the Gate of the arising-and-perishing aspect of the One Mind as explained in the Awakening of Faith. , , ; , , .33

Attempting at harmonizing the Dharma characteristic tradition (a common name for the Chinese Yogcra tradition) with the Dharma-nature tradition, Deqing cited the same text and conflated the defiled Store-House Consciousness and the unadulterated Tathgatagarbha as different aspects of the same One Mind. As a result he amalgamated what was traditionally perceived as diametrical strands of Buddhist theories of the mind:[Avaghoa] authored the Awakening of Faith in order to extirpate [peoples] unwholesome attachmentsand [he] synthesized the doctrinal strands of Dharma-nature and Dharma-characteristics, so that they could be consolidated in [their common] source [in the One Mind]. [].34

These developments within Buddhism, and the rise of Confucian idealism through the work of Wang Yangming, gave Ming Buddhists and Confucians compelling reasons to argue for their syncretistic cause now that they had found a highly homogenous, mutually inspired discourse on the Mind that served as the perfect medium for their syncretistic dialogue. The catalyzing effect of Wang Yangmings system not only could explain the philosophical outlook of the Ming Yogcra scholarship (one that was conflated and reconfigured in such a way it was uncannily consonant with Confucian idealism), it could also account for Yogcra scholarships precise timing of reappearance. In other words, the timing of Yogcras revitalization in the Ming coincided perfectly with the rise of Wang Yangmings thought. Zhenkes disciple Wang

33 Ibid., p. 232. I had to redo the punctuation of the Chinese passage in order to make it intelligible. 34 Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. ii, p. 1024.


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Kentang (?1613?) had recounted a semi-mythical story about the origin of the Yogcra learning in the Ming. This was a little-known story in and since Wangs time as far as I could tell, but which nonetheless spoke volumes on the timing of Yogcra resurgence. Upon closer scrutiny, the story could provide us some inkling regarding how the Ming Buddhists themselves explained the sudden resuscitation of the school after such long dormancy:I have heard the Great Master Zibo (Zhenke) said that, the transmission of the [Fa]xiang school (the Chinese Yogcra) had discontinued for long. The Dharma Master Luan [Pu]tai,35 while on one of his learning journeys, had stopped underneath the eaves of a household to shelter himself from the falling rain. He heard the sound of someone giving a Dharma talk inside [the house], and upon listening more closely, it turned out to be about the Faxiang (again, the Chinese Yogcra) teaching. He immediately entered the house to greet the people inside, and saw that it was an old man explaining [the teaching] to an old woman. Master Tai then bowed and asked to be instructed [in the teaching]. He consequently stayed at the place for more than a month, until [the old man] had completed instructing [Tai] of his learning. [Tai] suspected that the old man and the old woman were no ordinary mortals, they should in fact be the magical incarnation of [enlightened] sages. , . 36, , , . , . , , . , .37

The semi-mythical nature of the story is reminiscent of other Buddhist tales that attempt to relate the emergence of a new teaching. One such example involves Ngrjunas journey into the Dragon Kings Palace where he received Mahynastras and brought the new teaching to the world. Another story of similar nature: Asagas ascension into the Tuita heaven where he was said to have received instructions from the Bodhisattva MaitreyaLuan Putai (?1511?) was an otherwise unknown figure save through his two surviving works on Yogcra currently included in Man[ji] Zokuzky 98, p. 513. 36 This character is sometimes written with the radical. 37 Cited in Shi 1987: 201.35

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on the intricacies of Yogcrabhmi.38 Such Buddhist tales were likely an admixture of partial historical truths, dramatized fiction, and other projections of culturally specific symbols used to account for the obscure and sometimes questionable background of new teachings.39 It would be hard to separate facts from fictions in stories like these. But the semiotics and circumstantial information contained therein were often predicated on more concrete historical backgrounds. As the provenance of Ngrjunas Mahynastras and the authorship of the Yogcrabhmi were concealed by their great antiquity and the hazy memories that reported them, these stories provided assurances of legitimate origins of otherwise questionable teachings. By the same token, as the beginning (if there was such a thing in the singular form and implying a complete prior discontinuance) of the Yogcra revival in the Ming was shrouded in mystery even to its contemporaries, there must had existed an almost subliminal compulsion to attribute its origin to legitimate and comprehensible sources, even if that attribution could only find expression in symbolic dramatization. Just like Asaga purportedly started his Yogcra career after having received Bodhisattva Maitreyas personal tutelage on the matter, thereby locating his source of inspiration in an acknowledged authority, the protagonist of our story at hand Luan Putai also was said to have rekindled the moribund Chinese Yogcra school after receiving the divine revelation of the teaching through otherworldly intermediaries. Moreover, Luan Putai published the [only known] Yogcra works in 1511 (In the Xinwei year of the38 Interestingly enough, Deqing also had the experience of dreaming about ascending into the presence of the same Bodhisattva. According to his own relating of the story, this dream was the occasion after which he came to grasp the true meanings of Yogcra teachings. See the section on age 33, Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iv, pp. 29022905. It is puzzling how Western studies of Deqings life consistently leave out this richly symbolic event in his life. 39 See, for example, Robert Buswells discussion on the symbolism and social-religious factors that were embodied in the dragon king motif in Buddhist mythological lore (Buswell 1989: 5160).


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Zhengde reign era of Emperor Wu of the Ming dynasty ), that is, almost immediately after Wang Yangming had put forth and promulgated his idealism. Since it would only be natural that we place Luan Putais reported divine encounter before the publication date of his Yogcra book that is, before Luan Putai became so proficient in Yogcra as to have been able to write about it the divine source of inspiration that was said to have sparked off a renaissance uncannily coincided with the most opportune time period when important conditions conducive to that renaissance were just becoming ripe. Whether the story originator(s) recounted the story conscious or unconscious of this coincidence, the conclusions we can draw from the story nonetheless corroborate our theory concerning the significant role played by Wang Yangmings thought in the Ming-dynasty Yogcra tradition.

Abbreviations and bibliography AbbreviationsT. Takakusu, J. and K. Watanabe, eds. 19241932. Taish shinsh daizky. Tokyo: Taish issaiky kankkai.

Primary sourcesChanyuan zhuquan jiduxu . T. 48.2015. Dasheng ru lengqie jing . T. 16.619620. Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, 4 volumes. (). 1989. Reprinted in Hong Kong: Puhui Lianshe (reprint). Liuzu dashi fabao tanjing . T 48.2008 Ouyi dashi wenxuan . Compiled by Zhongjing . 1976. Reprinted in Taipei: Fojiao chuban she. Is the 1976 edition used here the reprint? In this case, change Reprinted in Taipei: Fojiao chuban she to Taipei: Fojiao chuban she (reprint)

Secondary sourcesAraki, Keng. 1975. Confucianism and Buddhism. In The Unfolding of NeoConfucianism, 3966, eds. William de Bary and the Conference on Seventeenth-Century Chinese Thought. New York and London: Columbia University Press.

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Araki Keng . Trans. with Rushi . 1978. Yangming xue yu mingdai foxue . In Zhongguo jinshi fojiaoshi yanjiu , ed. Lan Jifu . Taipei: Dasheng Wenhua. Araki Keng T . Trans. with Yang Baiyi . 1978. Yijing yu lengyan jing . In Zhongguo jinshi fojiaoshi yanjiu , ed. Lan Jifu . Taipei: Dasheng Wenhua. Buswell, Robert. 1989. The Formation of Chan Ideology in China and Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Buswell, Robert, and Robert Gimello. 1992. Introduction. In Paths to Liberation: The Mrga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought, 136, eds. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimello. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chen Rong . 1984. Sishu Jijie . Tainan: Zhengyan. Chen Rongjie (Wing-tsit) . 1984. Wang Yangming yu chan . Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng. Greenblatt, Kristin. 1975. Chu-hung and Lay Buddhism in the Late Ming. In The Unfolding of NeoConfucianism, 93140, eds. William de Bary and the Conference on Seventeenth-Century Chinese Thought. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Gregory, Peter. 1987. Introduction. In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, 19, ed. Peter Gregory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. _____ 2002. Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Hsu, Sung-pen. 1979. A Buddhist Leader in Ming China: The Life and Thought of Han-Shan Te-Ching. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Kalupahana, David. 1992. A History of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Kaviratna, Harischandra, trans. 1980. Dhammapada: Wisdom of the Buddha. Pasadena, CA.: Theosophical University Press. Liu, Wu-chi. 1964. A Short History of Confucian Philosophy. New York: Dell Publishing. Qian Mu . 1962. Songming lixue gailun, vol. i (). Taipei: Zhonghua Wenhua. Ran Yunhua . 1995. Cong Yindu fojiao dao Zhongguo fojiao . Taipei: Dongda. Sharf, Robert H. 2001. Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.


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Shi Shengyan . 1987. Mingmo fojiao yanjiu . Taipei: Dongchu. Sun Kaitai , Liu Wenyu and Hu Weixi . 1995. Zhongguo zhexueshi . Taipei: Wenjun. Wu Guang . 1994. Rudao lunshu . Taipei: Dongda. Y, Chn-fang. 1981. The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late Ming Synthesis. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology1 Part IIVincent Eltschinger

For Jacques May

The first part of this essay (Eltschinger 2009) concentrated on the basic features and likely sources of Dharmakrtis understanding of ignorance (avidy). Against the Vaibhikas, but with Vasubandhu the Koakra, Dharmakrti defines ignorance as a counter- or anti-knowledge, i.e., as a cognition that counteracts true (perceptual) knowledge (vidy) by displaying contrary/erroneous objectsupports and aspects (vipartlambankra). According to him, ignorance amounts to pseudo-perception (pratyakbhsa), hence conceptual construction (vikalpa), superimposition (samropa) and concealment (savti). The core of Dharmakrtis philosophy, the so-called apoha theory, provides an exhaustive picture of both ignorance as conceptuality and inference as a corrective (though conceptual) principle. This conception of ignorance, however, fails to account for the most dramatic form of the Buddhist ignorance, viz. its being responsible for defilements, rebirth and suffering. InThis study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 Philosophische und religise Literatur des Buddhismus). Most sincere thanks are due to Isabelle Rati, Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser and Ernst Steinkellner. Lambert Schmithausen also deserves my wholehearted gratitude for having gone through this essay with incomparably great care and erudition. My most sincere thanks are due to Cynthia Peck, who kindly corrected my English. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 27741

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order to account for this eschatologically valued form of ignorance, Dharmakrti equates avidy with the personalistic false view (satkyadi). Consistently enough, ignorance as satkyadi is but a specialization or instantiation of ignorance as conceptuality insofar as the satkyadi exhausts itself in ones superimposing such conceptual constructs as self/I (tman, aham) and ones own/mine (tmya, mama) on reality. Both Dharmakrti and his commentators evolved exegetical strategies in order to argue for the orthodoxy of this equation of ignorance with a false view (di), which Vasubandhu clearly refuses in the Abhidharmakoa (but not in his commentary on the Prattyasamutpdastra). As for the sources of Dharmakrtis conception, they are very likely to consist of the Prattyasamutpdastra and its numerous idealistic interpretations (Yogcrabhmi, Vasubandhus Vykhy). In the second part of this essay, I shall first inquire into Dharmakrtis account of dependent origination (prattyasamutpda), viz. his interpretation of ignorance as the origin of defilements (craving, etc.), clinging and rebirth. I shall then turn to the philosophical core of this study by attempting to show how Dharmakrtis views on ignorance and the two truths/realities provide the basic framework of his epistemological theory. This is tantamount to claiming that Dharmakrtis epistemology, in locating ignorance and defining the cognitive means of opposing it and entering the path toward salvation, is Buddhistic in both its inspiration and its finality. As a consequence, his philosophy should cease to be regarded as a dry academic endeavour deviating from the spirit of Buddhism as a salvation system.

2.1. Dependent origination2.1.1. In his account of the future Buddhas philosophical reflections on the eve of his career, Dharmakrti presents the cause of suffering (dukhahetu) in the following way: The cause [of suffering, i.e., of rebirth,] is attachment bearing upon the conditioning factors, [an attachment that is] due to the belief in self and ones own.2PV 2.135ac1: tmtmyagrahakta sneha saskragocara / hetu sneha = t according to PVP D56a7/P64a4 and PV D117b34/P143b7;2

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

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According to Devendrabuddhi, craving proceeds from ones adhering to the painful conditioned factors that are intrinsically free from self and ones own, under the aspects of self and ones own.3 This is tantamount to saying that defilements such as craving only occur once unreal aspects have been superimposed on dharmas, specifically on the five constituents one clings to, which lack these aspects entirely. While commenting on another passage, Devendrabuddhi claims that defilements such as desire (another equivalent for attachment and craving) proceed from ones superimposing aspects such as permanent, pleasurable, self and ones own on the impermanent, painful, selfless and empty constituents.4 One may adduce here a huge number of passages presenting one and the same idea: The personalistic belief is responsible for ones superimposing contrary aspects such as self and ones own on the selfless and empty constituents.5 As Dharmakrti himself has it, desire [arises] from the superimposition of another [i.e., unreal] nature on something (dharma) that does not have this nature.6 PV 2.270 provides us with Dharmakrtis most significant statement as to how craving takes place once unreal aspects have been as-

kyabuddhi (PV D117b4/P143b78) unambiguously explains gocara as viaya. 3 PVP D56b1/P64a56: sdug bsal du gyur pai dus byas bdag da bdag gi da bral ba la bdag da bdag gii rnam par mon par en pas jug pa es bya bai don to //. 4 PVP D60b23/P69a45: mi rtag pa da sdug bsal ba da sto pa da bdag med pai phu po rnams la rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gir sgro btags nas jug pa dod chags la sogs pa de dag 5 E.g., PVP D88a45/P101b4: e bar len pai phu po la la ga rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gi rnam pa yod pa ma yin no //. PVP D88a6/ P101b56: e bar len pai phu po la la rtag pa la sogs pai rnam par dzin pai es pa ya rnam pa med pa dzin pa can yin no //. 6 PV 2.196ab: tmntarasamropd rgo dharme tadtmake /. Devendrabuddhi explains (PVP D84a7b1/P97a12): dod chags la sogs pai ra bin du ya gyur ba ma yin te / di ltar de bdag med can te / rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gi da bral bai yul du gyur pao // chos la ste phu po la sogs pai ra gi o bo lao // bdag gan sgro btags phyir te rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gii ra bin gan du sgro btags pai rgyui phyir mon par en pai mtshan id kyi chags pa skye bar gyur ro //.

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cribed to reality: Having[, due to ignorance,]7 superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. lasting, pleasant, mine, I, etc., on the four [Nobles] Truths,8 one experiences craving [for superimposed objects such as delight, etc.].9 According to Devendrabuddhi andPVP D116a1/P134b2: sgro btags nas ni mi es pai phyir At least according to the Vaibhikas, each of the four Nobles Truths is to be successively contemplated under four different aspects: the Truth of suffering under the aspects impermanent, painful, empty and selfless; the Truth of origin under the aspects of (distant/material) cause (as a seed), arising, (serial) causation and (joint) condition; the Truth of extinction, under the aspects of extinction, calm, excellent and salvation; the Truth of the path under the aspects of path, fitness, access and conducive to release (AKBh 343,1619 on AK 6.17c1: dukha caturbhir krai payaty anityato dukhata nyato ntmata ca / samudaya caturbhir hetuta samudayata prabhavata pratyayata ca / nirodha caturbhir nirodhata ntata pratato nisaraata ca / mrga caturbhir mrgato nyyata pratipattito nairyikata ca /. The sixteen aspects are listed at PVP D62a37/P71a16). The AKBh records a lengthy discussion pertaining to four different ways of interpreting these sixteen aspects (see AKBh 400,1401,17 on AK 7.13a, Koa 7.3039, Pruden 19881990: IV.11101116). According to the fourth exegetical pattern, each of these aspects aims at counteracting (pratipaka) a particular false view (di): The aspects anitya, dukha, nya and antman counteract the false views of permanence, pleasurableness, ones own, and self; the aspects of hetu, samu daya, prabhava and pratyaya contradict the false views of the absence of a cause, of a unique cause such as God or primordial matter (according to AKVy 628,3031), of an evolution of being, and of an intelligent creation; the aspects nirodha, nta, prata and nisaraa oppose the false views that release does not exist, that release is painful, that the bliss of dhynas is the most excellent, and that liberation, because it is subject to falling again and again, is not definitive; as for the aspects mrga, nyya, pratipad and nair yika, they respectively counteract the false views that there is no path, that this is a wrong path, that there is another path, and that the path is subject to retrogression; see AKBh 401,1117, Koa 7.3839, Pruden 19881990: IV.11151116. The explanations provided by Dharmakrtis commentators are too few to allow us to determine which interpretation, if any, they favoured. Devendrabuddhi and kyabuddhi content themselves with listing the four aspects superimposed on each of the last three Truths (see PVP D115b67/P134a8b2 and PV D147b35/P182a8b2). On the sixteen aspects, see Wayman 1980. 9 PV 2.270: sthira sukha mamha cetydi satyacatuaye / abhtn oakrn ropya parityati //. Note PV D147b57/P182b24: sgro8 7


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kyabuddhi, ignorance,10 i.e., the false view of self, has one grasp aspects that are contrary to the real ones, i.e., superimpose an I on what is selfless and a mine on what is empty. But ignorance is also responsible for deluded persons taking momentary things to be lasting (sthira) or even unchangeably permanent (kasthanitya),11 or holding intrinsically painful things to be pleasurable, i.e., not to be under the sway of cankers (ssrava) or dependent on causes (hetuparatantra) in each of their successive phases (pratikaam).12 2.1.2. According to Dharmakrti and his commentators, the personalistic false view is the (principal) cause (nidna), the origin(yoni,

btags nas ni yos su sred ces bya bai tshig gis log par sgro dogs pa son du so ba can gyi sred pa id gsal bar bstan pa yin no // sgro dogs pai yul la jug pai sred pa de ya sgro dogs pai rnam pa id yin la / sgro dogs pai rnam pa can gyi yul can gyi on mos pa da e bai on mos pa thams cad id ma rig pa id yin pa And with the pda (= PV 2.270d) ropya parityati, [Dharmakrti] clearly indicates craving, which presupposes erroneous superimposition. As for this craving, directed [as it is] to an object of superimposition, it also has the aspect of superimposition, and all the kleas and upakleas, which bear on an aspect of superimposition, are [nothing] but ignorance 10 PVP D115b34/P134a4: ma rig pa des kya sdug bsal la rtag pa es bya bai rnam par dzin par byed do //. PVP D115b6/P134a78: re ig de ltar sdug bsal gyi bden pa la mi es pa mi rtag pa la sogs pai rnam pa las phyin ci log tu sgro dogs pa yin no //. See also PV D147a12/P181b35. 11 According to Devendrabuddhi, all that is produced and lasts more than one moment is permanent (PVP D115b4/P134a56: skad cig ma las dus phyis gnas pai a tshul can du skyes pa thams cad rtag pa id do //. To be compared with Vibh. 102 n. 1: nityam iti vcye kat para sthy sarvo nitya ity artha /). According to kyabuddhi, all that is either unchangeably permanent or lasts for at least a second moment is permanent (PV D147a67/P182a23: ther zug tu gnas pai rtag pa ga yin pa da skad cig ma gis pa la sogs par gnas pai a tshul can dus gan du gnas pa can ga yin pa de thams cad ni dir rtag par dod pa yin gyi ther zug tu gnas pa id ni ma yin no es de bstan par gyur ro //). 12 According to PVP D115b5/P134a6: bde ba es bya bai zag pa da bcas pa ma yin paam skad cig ma re re la rgyui gan gyi dba la[s] phyin ci log tu btags pao //. dukha(bhta) is regularly explained as ssrava in PVP; see, e.g., PVP D57b7/P66a1 and PVP D58a3/P66a5.

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prabhava), or the root (mla)13 of all (kinds of) moral faults (doa), defilements (klea, upaklea) or moral impurities (mala).14 Among the expressions denoting the fact that defilements such as desire originate from the false view of self, one also meets with cause (kraa, alone or with preceding utpatti, pradhna; hetu),15 arising (jti, utpatti)16 and suffixal elements such as pr vaka, maya,17 hetuka, ja, mla, or kta. Defilements originate from the personalistic false view (satkyadaranaja, jig tshogs su lta bai ra bin), are (causally) preceded/accompanied by the false view of self or by the adherence to self and ones own (bdag tu lta ba son du so ba can, tmtmybhiniveaprvaka), arise from the false view of self (bdag tu lta ba las byu ba), or have ignorance for their cause (avidyhetuka).18 They are all based on the beliefs in I and mine (ar dzin pa da a yir dzin pa dag la gnas pa) and arise in dependence on a mind that complies with the false view of self and ones own (bdag da bdag gir lta bai rjes su brel bai sems la ltos nas gyur ba).19 2.1.3. As we have seen, the belief in self and ones own is the cause of suffering, i.e., attachment bearing on the conditioning factors. In other words, ignorance is the cause of craving (t), which13 Respectively PV 1.223ab (nidna gl. pradhnakraa PVSV 402,23 24), PV 2.211a, PVSV 111,11, PV 2.197ab1 (mla gl. da poi rten PVP D84b2/ P97a4), PV 2.212c. 14 E.g., PV 2.197a (doa), PV 1.222a (sarvs doajtnm), PV 2.214d1 (sarvadoa), PVSV 401,2425 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 ([sarva]klea), PVP D60a23/P68b4 (on mos pa da e bai on mos), PV 2.212c (mal sarve). On upaklea, see also PV D133a45/P164a4. 15 E.g., PVSV 50,28 (kraa), PVSV 401,29 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (utpattikraa), PVSV 402,2324 (pradhnakraa), PVSV 401,21 (hetu). 16 E.g., PV 1.222b (jti), PVSV 401,22 and 26 (utpatti). 17 Rendered in Tib. as ra bin (can). But note PV D137b3/P916b6: ra bin ni o bo id dam rgyu yin no //. 18 Respectively PVSV 111,19, PVP D93b1/P108a1 (on ra bin, see above, n. 17), PVP D60a23/P68b23, PVSV 8,20, PVP D93a5/P107b5, PVSV 401,24 and 25. 19 Respectively PVP D93b12/P108a12 and PVP D67b4/P77a67.


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is nothing but the traditional sequence of dependent origination, where both function as the cause of suffering: As defilements, they give rise both to other defilements (e.g., t updna) and to act(ion)s (kriy, e.g., avidy saskra, or updna bhava), the latter being in turn responsible for new foundations (vastu) of existence (e.g., saskra vijna, or bhava jti).20 Insofar as they give rise to actions leading to new existential foundations, ignorance and craving21 are the two causes of (re)birth ([punar] janman) and transmigration (sasra),22 which are the hallmarks of suffering.23 Whereas Devendrabuddhi simply defines sufferingSee AK 3.27 and AKBh 134,26135,3, Koa 3.69, Pruden 19881990: II.407. 21 PVP D56a6/P64a3: skye bai mtshan id can gyi sdug bsal gyi rgyu; PVP D57b3/P65b4: bdag da bdag gi la chags pai mtshan id can gyi sdug bsal gyi rgyu; PVP D115b6/P134a8: sred pai mtshan id can sdug bsal gyi rgyu; PVP D116a1/P134b3: sred pa sdug bsal gyi rgyur gyur pa; PVP D115b2/P134a23: sdug bsal gyi rgyu ni sred pa yin no es bstan zin to // de ya ma rig pa las byu ba According to kyabuddhi, craving is kun nas chi bai rgyu, the cause of bondage, and according to PVP D58b1/P66b4, attachment leads to kleas, punarbhava and janmaparigraha. 22 Dharmakrtis commentators provide us with various definitions of sasra. (1) PVP D62b34/P71b23: khor bar khor bas na khor ba ste / skye ba da chi bai rgyun no //, to be compared with PVV 62,1112: janmamaraaprabandha sasra /. (2) PVP D95b6/P110b3: (bdag gir yos su dzin pa) rtsom pa la sogs pai mtshan id can gyi khor ba , which kyabuddhi (PV D138b67/P171a78) comments as follows: bdag gir yos su dzin pa la sogs pa rtsom pa la sogs pai mtshan id can gyi khor ba es bya ba la bdag gi id du gzu bai srid pai los spyod kyi mtshan id can gyi dos po la mon par chags pa son du so ba can gyi dzin pa ni yos su (P om. su) dzin pao // rtsom pa ni mon par bsgrub pao //. Tib. mon par bsgrub pa may translate either abhinirhra (BHSD s.v., 52b53a) or (more surely) abhisaskra (BHSD s.v., 57b): Defining [re]existence (bhava) in the context of dependent origination, Vasubandhu (Vaibhika definition, AKBh 132,2021) says: sa paunarbhavika karmopacinoti , he accumulates action(s) that is/are conducive to rebirth. Note also TSP 230,89/K184,21 22 (unidentified quotation): cittam eva hi sasro rgdikleavsitam /. 23 PV D148a1/P182b6: ma rig pa da sred pa ni sdug bsal gyi rgyu id yin te / phyin ci log pai ra bin can es bya bai don to //. Suffering is also defined in terms of dukhattraya. PVP D62b4/P71b34: sdug bsal rnam pa gsum gyis dos sam brgyud pas sdug bsal ba yin no //, which kyabuddhi, having named the three painfulnesses (PV D120b5/20

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as (re)birth (skye bai mtshan id can gyi sdug bsal), Dharmakrti characterizes it as the constituents undergoing transmigration (dukha sasria skandh).24 It comes as no surprise, then, that Dharmakrti declares that as long as (s)he adheres to a self, the [person who experiences craving remains] in sasra.25 According to Devendrabuddhi, for whom the personalistic false view is the cause of the connection (pratisandhi) to a new existence (punarbhava),26 the [person] who is under the sway of the false view of self has the notion of pleasure (sukhasaj) with regard to suffering [and] will be connected to a new existence.27 The link between the false view of self, attachment and rebirth can be summarized as follows: Thus when there is adherence to a self, a multitude of [moral] faults such as attachment to ones own arise, and the attachment to a self causes [one] to take a [new existential] place (sthna).28 2.1.4. Let us consider now the genealogy29 of defilements from the personalistic false view. As we shall see, Dharmakrti provides aP147b5), comments as follows (PV D120b67/P147b57): (1) dukh vedan is suffering in a direct way as dukhadukhat (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way); (2) sukh vedan is suffering in a direct way as parimadukhat (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way); (3) asukhdukh vedan is suffering in a direct way as saskradukhat (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way). On dukhattraya, see Schmithausen 1977. 24 Respectively PVP D56a6/P64a3 and PV 2.146c. 25 PV 2.218cd (leaving tena untranslated): tentmbhiniveo yvat tvat sa sasre //. 26 PVP D85a67/P98a34: jig tshogs lta ba ya srid par i mtshams sbyor bai rgyur gyur pa Note also, referring to the sahaja satkyadaranam (PV 2.200d), PVP D85b5/P98b23: de ya srid pai rgyu yin no //. 27 PVP D85a6/P98a3: ga la bdag tu lta ba yod pa de ni sdug bsal la bde bai du es can yin te / ya srid par mtshams sbyor bar gyur ro //. 28 PVP D58a7b1/P66b34: de ltar na bdag tu mon par en pa yod na bdag gir chags pa la sogs pai skyon gyi tshogs jug par gyur i / bdag tu chags pas kya gnas yos su len par byed do //. 29 Genealogy as a free rendering of Karakagomins krama (lit. sequence, succession; PVSV 401,2526: kena puna kramea do satkyadarand utpatti /).


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coherent picture of the sequence avidy(ayatanaspara vedan)tupdnabhavajti, although some items in his account have no explicit equivalent in the traditional twelvemembered chain of dependent origination. In Dharmakrtis opinion, the false view of self may be held directly responsible for the rise of at least three factors: the notion of otherness, the belief in ones own, and attachment/craving. In an interesting statement, Dharmakrti points out that once [the notion of] a self exists, the notion of the other (parasaj) [arises, and] from this distinction between self and other [is born] grasping and aversion; bound to these two, all the moral faults arise.30 For reasons that I shall explain below, I am inclined not to follow the traditional explanation that links grasping/attachment to (the notion of) the self and aversion to the notion of the other.31 For the time being, let us leave this problem out of consideration and focus on the genealogy of otherness: As long as the mind adheres to a self (tmeti), [it has] the notion of a self (tmasaj), and once this [notion] exists, all that [the mind] does not grasp in this way is [held to be] other.32 InPV 2.219 (ry metre): tmani sati parasaj svaparavibhgt parigrahadveau / anayo sampratibaddh sarve do prajyante //. Delusion (moha), covetousness (lobha) and hatred/aversion (dvea) are traditionally held to be the three root-defilements (mlaklea) or roots of evil (akualamla); see AK 5.20c and AKBh 291,8. Note, e.g., AK 5.48a2b: rgotth hrkyauddhatyamatsar. From out of lust there proceeds disrespect, dissipation, and avarice (Pruden 19881990: III.843, Koa 5.91). For definitions of hrkya, auddhatya and matsara, see AKBh 59,1920 (Pruden 19881990: I.200, Koa 2.170), AKBh 312,17 (Pruden 19881990: I.194, Koa 2.161) and AKBh 312,1617 (Pruden 19881990: III.842, Koa 5.90). AK 5.48a2b: krodherye pratighnvaye. From out of hatred there proceeds envy and anger (Pruden 19881990: III.843, Koa 5.91). For definitions of krodha and ry, see AKBh 312,16 (Pruden 19881990: III.842, Koa 5.90) and AKBh 312,19 (Pruden 19881990: III.842, Koa V.90). 31 PVP D95b1/P110b56: bdag id du bzu ba la yos su dzin pa ni mon par chags pao // gan id du rnam par phye ba la sda ba yin te / yos su dor bao //. PVV 87,1516: svaparavibhgc ca krat svaparayor yathkrama parigraho bhivago dvea paritygas tau bhavata /. 32 PVP D95a7/P110b45: ji srid du blo bdag ces mon par en pa de srid du bdag tu du es pa da de yod na de ltar mi dzin pa ga yin pa de thams cad gan yin no //.30

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another statement, Dharmakrti declares that the false view of self generates the belief in ones own (tmyagraha).33 Persons deluded by the false view of self regard the constituents of being both as a self and as belonging to the self, but this feeling of property may well be extended beyond the constituents and range over parts of the world that have been posited as other than the self. The personalistic belief is responsible for yet another factor, which is variously termed desire (rga), craving (t), grasping (pari graha) or attachment/love (sneha), and clearly corresponds to the eighth link of dependent origination, i.e., craving. In spite of this functional equivalence, I am inclined not to consider these terms as (always) synonymous, and to believe that Dharmakrti introduced a causal sequence between them, thus splitting the traditional eighth link into two. If I am correct, from the false view of self arises first attachment or love for the self and ones own, and then craving for the things that are regarded as beneficial or pleasurable to the self. This can be seen in the following stanza: The one who sees a self has a constant love for this [self, thinking of it as] I. Because of [this] love [for the self] he craves for the delights [of this self, and his] thirst conceals [from him] the drawbacks [of the things he deems conducive to these delights].34 Here, both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin interpret love as love for the self.35 Whereas attachment is directed to the self (but bears upon the conditioned factors), craving is directed to the delights (sukha) of the self,36 i.e., to the things that are deemed conducive to these delights,37 or to impure (ssrava) things that are (deemed) favourable (anugrhaka) in that they are conducive to the delights (of the self).38 Besides the frequent occurrence of expressions suchPVSV 111,18: tmadaranam tmyagraha praste /. PV 2.217: ya payaty tmna tatrsyham iti vata sneha / sne ht sukheu tyati t dos tiraskurute //. Note that kyabuddhi interprets doa as jtijarmaraa (PV D138b1/P170b8). 35 PVP D95a6/P111a2, PVV 87,3. 36 PVP D95a6/P111a2: bdag gi bde la sred gyur 37 PVV 87,34: sukhasdhanatvendhyavasitn vastnm 38 PVP D95b1/P111a45: bde ba sgrub par byed pa id du e bar gro ba zag pa da bcas pai dos po On anugrhaka, see also PVSV 402,8:34 33


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as tmasneha,39 tmtmyasneha40 or even satkyasneha,41 we also find Devendrabuddhis definition of sneha: [We call] love an inclination for self and ones own which presupposes the [aforementioned delusion]. 42 According to Dharmakrti, self-love and attachment for what belongs (or ought to belong) to the self is in turn the cause of aversion (pratigha) and hatred (dvea): Indeed, the one who, without grasping (parigraha), sees that there is neither I nor mine, does not love anything and, [being so] unattached, does not hate anything [either], for there is no [aversion] for that which does not hinder the self or ones own, nor for that which opposes the [said] hindrance. 43 One can show aversion or hatred only for that which hinders (< uparodha) or harms (< p) what has been taken as self and ones own:44 Hatred [arises] with regard totmtmyatvena tadanugrhakatvena parikalpya 39 E.g., PVP D58a12/P66a3. 40 PVP D57b3/P65b4. Love for self and ones own is said to be directed to the object that is clung to as self and ones own (tmtmyatvbhinivie viaye tmtmyasneha, PVSV 401,2627). 41 E.g., PVP D90b5/P104b7: jig tshogs la chags pa. 42 PVP D60a2/P68b2 3: de son du so ba can gyi bdag da bdag gir en pa ni chags pao //. Note also PVP D94b7/P109b45: chags pa ni bdag tu mon par chags pao // (maybe: sneha tmany abhivaga). 43 PVSV 111,1517: na hi nha na mameti payata parigraham antarea kvacit sneha / na cnanurgia kvacid dvea / tmtmynuparodhiny uparodhapratightini ca tadabhvt /. 44 According to PVSV 402,12: tmtmyatvena ghtasya ya uparodha p /. Note also Devendrabuddhis definition of dvea at PVP D60a2/P68b3: de (= chags pa) son du so ba can rjes su chags pai yul la gnod par byed pa la mnar sems pa ni e sda o //. Hatred is maliciousness with regard to that which injures the object of attachment[, a maliciousness] that presupposes the [afore-mentioned love]. The Sanskrit original for Tib. mnar sems pa is unclear. I would conjecture vypannacitta, although, to the best of my knowledge, mnar (ba) is not attested as a translation of vypanna(/vypda): vypannacitta = gnod sems at AKBh 251,10 and 12 on AK 4.81ac1 (de pense mchante in Koa 4.178) as well as in the Sacetan yastra quoted in AKVy 400,915 on AKBh 237,18. Jaini 2001:221: The kleas are like roots which produce as well as sustain an evil volition. Abhidhy, vypda, and mithydi are not called roots, but are recognized as intensive states of the three roots of evil (akualamla), viz. lobha, dvea, and moha respectively.

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that alone which offers opposition (pratiklavartin) by its hostility to that which love for the self and ones own bears upon (viayabhta). Therefore, there is no hatred without love for the self and ones own. 45 Dharmakrtis unambiguous derivation of aversion from love is the reason why I cannot agree with Devendrabuddhis and Manorathanandins interpretation of PV 2.219b (svapara vibhgt parigrahadveau), which presupposes that what is other than the self can only arouse hatred. In Dharmakrtis eyes, that which is other than the self gives rise to aversion only insofar as it opposes love, but arouses craving as soon as it is regarded as pleasurable to the self. Craving for the delights of the self and that which is conducive to them generally implies ones running around in search of pleasure. This is indeed the Vaibhika definition of the ninth link of dependent origination, appropriation or clinging (updna),46 and what Dharmakrti obviously has in mind in PV 2.218ab: Seeing [but] qualities [to the things that he deems pleasurable to the self], he craves [for them, thinking of them as having to become] mine, and appropriates (upd) the means [that are conducive] to them. 47 But Dharmakrti also holds love for the self to be the cause of the three different kinds of craving that the oldest layers of Buddhist canonical literature have made responsible for rebirth (paunarbhavika): craving for (future) existence (bhavat), craving for sensual pleasures (kmat), and craving for non-existence/annihilation (vibhavat).48 AccordingAll evil volitions are essentially rooted in and spring from one or another of these three basic passions (mlaklea). 45 PVSV 402,1315: tmtmyasnehaviayabhtavirodhena ya sthita pratiklavart tatraiva dvea / tasmn ntmtmyasneham antarea dvea iti /. 46 AK 3.23cd: updna tu bhogn prptaye paridhvata /. 47 PV 2.218ab (ry metre): guadar parityan mameti tatsdhanny updatte /. 48 PVP D79b34/P91a78: de la sdug bsal kun byu phags pai bden pa ga e na / ga sred pa di ni ya srid par byu ba can dga bai dod chags da bcas pa de da de la mon par dga bai a tshul can / di lta ste dod pai sred pa da srid pai sred pa da jig pai sred pa yin no es gsus so //. PVA 134,33135,2: ukta hi bhagavat tatra katamat samudaya ryasatyam / yeya t paunarbhavik nandrgasahagat tatratatrbhinandin / yad


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to him, craving for sensual pleasures is to be interpreted as the actions (pravtti) of living beings to secure what they hold to be pleasurable (sukhpti), whereas craving for annihilation refers to those of their actions that aim at avoiding suffering (dukhnpti). This matches again perfectly with the Vaibhika account of the tenth link of dependent origination, viz. bhava (literally existence), which is to be understood as the act(ion) that results in future existence (bhaviyadbhavaphala karma): bhava refers to the act(ion)s resulting in rebirth (paunarbhavika) that are accumulated by those who run around (under the sway of craving) in order to quench their thirst.49 In these stanzas, Dharmakrti brings together both meanings of bhava, i.e., action to secure the pleasures of the self, and the (future) existence that they inevitably lead to: The cause [of suffering] is the longing for [re]existence, because human beings reach a specific [existential] place [and condition] due to [their] hope of obtaining it. The [afore-mentioned longing for existence] is [called] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being [only] acts with the desire of obtaining pleasure and avoiding suffering, these two [i.e., craving for pleasure and craving for the avoidance of suffering,] are regarded as the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for annihilation. And since love for the self is the cause [of it, this dual action] pertains to everything for [the living being] who has the notion of [something] pleasurable with regard to [something] unpleasurable. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage].50

uta k[m]at bhavat vibhavat ceti PVV 74,1011: nankta bhagavat tatra katama samudaya ryasatya paunarbhavik nandrgasahagat tatratatrbhinandin yad uta kmat bhavat vibhavat ceti For the Pli text, see Vetter 1990: 87, n. 1. 49 AKBh 132,1921 (together with AK 3.24ab): sa bhaviyadbhavaphala kurute karma tad bhava / sa viay prptiheto paridhvan paunarbhavika karmopacinoti so sya bhava /. 50 PV 2.183a2185: hetur bhavavch parigraha / yasmd deavieasya tatprptykto nm // s bhavecch ptyanptccho pravtti sukhadukhayo / yato pi prina kmavibhavecche ca te mate // sar vatra ctmasnehasya hetutvt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasajasya tasmt t bhavraya //.

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2.1.5. Although the standard formulation of dependent origination is traditionally held to range over three (Vaibhika) or two (Yogcra, Sautrntika) lifetimes,51 at least some of its members can also be seen at work on the much shorter sequence of a few interdependent psychological events. According to Vasubandhu, desire follows (anuete, or: is connected to, samprayukta) a pleasant sensation (sukh vedan), whereas aversion follows (or: is connected to) an unpleasant sensation (dukh vedan).52 Dharmakrti agrees with this commonsense statement.53 Depending on whether a given tangible object (spraavya) is considered favourable (anugrhaka) or unfavourable to the self, the pleasant or unpleasant sensations born from the contact between this object and the sense faculties are conducive to the rise of defilements such as desire or hatred.54 This obviously conforms to the prattyasamutpda sequence linking a sensory basis (yatana), contact (spara) between the former and an object, sensation, and craving. But as we have seen, to deem a given object favourable or unfavourable to the self belongs to the personalistic false view. Note should be made here that the erroneous aspects which the personalistic false view consists of overlap in part with those traditionally called wrong notions or misconceptions (viparysa), which amount to four55 and

For a useful overview, see Kritzer 1999: 6772. AKBh 312,12: trivedanvat tri bandhanni / sukhy hi vedany rgo nuete lambanasamprayogbhym / dukhy dvea /. AK 5.55ab + AKBh 316,6 and 8: sukhbhy samprayukto hi rga / sukhasaumanasybhy rga samprayukta / dveo viparyayt / dukhbhym ity artha / dukhena daurmanasyena ca /. 53 See PV 2.151c2d: rgder vikro pi sukhdija /, and the discussion below. 54 According to PVP D66a56/P75b56: reg byai khyad par gyi don phan dogs par byed pa da de las gan pai rjes su byed pas bde baam sdug bsal lam (sic) dod chags la sogs pa skye ba da rjes su mthun pa yin pa 55 To take the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, the impure as pure, and the selfless as a self (AKBh 283,57: catvro viparys / anitye nityam iti / dukhe sukham iti / aucau ucti / antmany tmeti /). With the exception of the (im)pure, they correspond to the erroneous aspects one superimposes on the Truth of suffering (see above, n. 8).52

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are regularly held to be caused by imagination (sakalpa).56 ntarakita and Kamalala provide interesting materials regarding the rise of defilements from wrong notions. According to ntarakita, defilements such as desire arise once [erroneous aspects] such as beautiful, ones own, lasting [or pleasant] have been superimposed on a woman, etc.57 A little later, he says: [A sensation] such as a pleasant or unpleasant [one] arises in the presence of a [sensory] object[, say a woman]. For those who despise [suspending] wisdom (pratisakhyna) [and] are subject to improper reflection, this [sensation] gives rise to defilements such as desire or hatred, which are [themselves] born from the ripening of a homologous latent tendency.58 What does this amount to? The contact between an obOn sakalpa, see May 1959: 181n. 586, PrP 451,9 ff., and the following excerpts: PVP D68a45/P77b878a1: ci ste di la ya kun tu rtog pa ya yan lag id du rtog par gyur ba dei tshe kun tu rtog pa ya bdag da bdag gi da gtsa ba da bde ba la sogs pai mi can gyi mtshan id kyi sa bon yin no //. PVP D67a34/P76b56: ga gis bud med ga ig gi gzugs la sogs pa la kun tu rtog par byed ci dod chags kyis gdus pa de ni TSP 666,25667,9/ K547,89: attngate pi viaye sakalpavad abhivddhasukhdiviparysasya pusa pratisakhynanivttau te rgdn prabalatva dyate /. MMK 23.1: sakalpaprabhavo rgo dveo moha ca kathyate / ubhubhaviparysn sambhavanti prattya hi //. PrP 452,45: tatra hi ubham kra prattya rga utpadyate / aubha prattya dvea / viparysn prattya moha utpadyate / sakalpas tv e traym api sdhraakraam utpattau /. PVSV 166,29167,2 gl. sakalpita (PV 1.70d) as ropita. To sum up, sakalpa is the bja of the wrong notions or, equivalently, of the erroneous aspects, which in turn form the bases (raya < ritya) or conditions (pratyaya < prattya) of the defilements; to put it as shortly as Candrakrti, sakalpa is the common cause (sdhraakraa) for the rise of the defilements. On sakalpa, see also below, nn. 68 and 69. 57 TS 1951ac/K1952ac: ubhtmyasthird ca samropygandiu / rgdaya pravartante Pleasant according to TSP 667,1314/ K547,1214 thereon: tm*tmyanityasukhdykrn abhtn evropayanto gandiu pravartante, na ca ubhdirp viay /. *TSPK with no equivalent of tm. 58 TS 19531954d1/K19541955d1 (leaving tu untranslated): viayopanipte tu sukhadukhdisambhav / tasmt samnajtyavsanparipkaj // rgadvedaya kle pratisakhynavidvim / ayoniomanaskravidheynm Note also PV 2.157ac: sajtivsanbhedapratibaddhapravttaya / rgdaya PVV 66,810: sajtivsan56

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ject and a sense faculty generates an affective sensation (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral). People who do not devote themselves to meditative practices such as the contemplation of the loathsome (aubhabhvan),59 and are therefore under the sway of improper reflection, superimpose erroneous aspects on the object: that it is a women, of course, but also that she is attractive, desirable, (at least virtually) ones own, etc. Affective sensation as well as the superimposed aspects is in turn responsible for the actualization of the latent tendency of desire.60 Commenting on his masters two stanzas, Kamalala provides us with a more systematic account of the sequence at stake: For such is the sequence [of events]: When an object is present, a pleasure born of the sense faculty arises. And for those who, in the absence of any [suspending] wisdom, abide in the improper reflection consisting of wrong notions such as self, this pleasure brings to maturity (vipka) the latent tendency imprinted by previous desire, etc. From this [coming to] maturity, defilements such as desire arise. Therefore, the objects [themselves] are not directly the cause [of defilements].61 How should we untmtm yagrahamlasya sajte (Vibh. 66 n. 1: satkyadaranasya) prvapr vbhyastasya rgder vsan parparargdijanik aktayas ts bheda parasparatas tatra pratibaddh pravttir janma ye te tath Here, sajtivsan is analysed as a genitive tatpurua: latent tendencies of the homologous [defilements which are rooted in the belief in self and ones own]. But according to Devendrabuddhi and kyabuddhi, the compound is to be analysed as a dvandva (PV D123a23/P150b7): sajti refers to the satkyadi (tmtm yadi in PVP D68a68/P78a3 5) whereas the vsan(bheda) consists in the prvargdyhitabja. 59 TSP 666,2223/K547,6: aubhdipratisakhyna. According to PVP D67a67/P77a12, rgdi do not occur in those who have the aubhdisaj. Note also Kamalalas definition at TSP 666,23/K547,67: aubhdylamban rgdipratipakabht praj pratisakhynam /, which may be compared with AKVy 389,13 on AKBh 226,1314: pratisakhynasya tatpratipakabhvanlakaasya, where tat = klea (context: nirva). Note also AKBh 4,1 on AK 1.6ab1: dukhdnm ryasatyn pratisakhyna pratisakhy prajviea (see also Koa 1.8, and AKVy 16,47). 60 On latent tendencies and their actualization, see Eltschinger 2009: 57 58, nn. 5355. 61 TSP 667,1922/K547,26548,2: ea hi krama viayopanipte satndriyaja sukham utpadyate, tasmc ca sukht pratisakhynavaikalye


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derstand this strong insistence on the responsibility of improper reflection in the rise of defilements? 2.1.6. That improper reflection62 is closely connected with ignorance/personalistic belief and is part of the process leading to the rise of defilements can be easily substantiated.63 The problem raised by the source materials is rather that they testify to contradictory views regarding the relationship between improper reflection and ignorance/personalistic belief. Some sources (mainly Yogcra) introduce improper reflection in the definition of the personalistic belief, which is held to be the manner deluded people improperly consider the five constituents of being as self andsaty tmdiviparysalakayoniomanaskre sthitn prvargdyhitavsanparipko bhavati, tato rgdaya kle pravartanta iti na skd viay kraam /. Note also Prajkaraguptas remarks while commenting on Dharmakrtis polemics against a Materialist upholding medical ideas (PVA 122,2223): sukhdijo hi rgdir na kaph[]dibhv / sukha ca kasyacit kathacid upalabdham ntaravsanprabodht / tato na rgdayo doebhya iti yuktam /. Though ntarakita and Kamalala cannot be suspected of allegiance toward Vaibhika thought, their views are reminiscent of an interesting passage in the AK(Bh), according to which a defilement arises out of three factors: first, its propensity (anuaya) has not been eliminated; second, an object (viaya, dharma) that is conducive to the actualization of desire for sensual pleasures (kmargaparyavasthnya) is present and perceived (bhsagata); thirdly, an improper reflection occurs with regard to the said object. AK 5.34, together with AKBh 305,1920: aprahd anuayd viayt pratyupasthitt / ayoniomanaskrt klea tad yath rgnuayo praho bhavaty aparijta kmargaparyavasthny ca dharm bhsagat bhavanti tatra cyoniomanaskra eva kmarga utpadyate /. 62 AKBh 54,23: manaskra cetasa bhoga /. AKVy 127,33128,2 thereon: manaskra cetasa bhoga iti / lambane cetasa varjanam / avadhraam ity artha / manasa kro manaskra / mano v karoty varjayatti manaskra /. PVSV 50,2951,12: ayonia itydy asyaiva samarthanam / yoni padrthnm anityadukhntmdi / samyagdaranapras[]tihetu tvt / ta asaty lambata iti yonia / yoni yoni manaskarotti sakhyaikavacand vpsym (P 5.4.43) iti aspratyayo v / tathbhta csau manaskra ceti yoniomanaskro nairtmyajnam /. 63 On ayoniomanaskra and avidy, see La Valle Poussin 1913: 89, and especially Mejor 2001. On the improper reflections conditioning and reinforcing dis, see the passage of AN I.31 alluded to by Mejor (2001: 50 + n. 5); see also AKBh 5.3233 in Mejor 2001: 51.

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ones own.64 Some materials regard improper reflection as caused by

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JIABS 33.1-2