Johnman & Lynch - The Road to Concorde, Franco-Brit Relations (2002)

The Road to

Concorde: Franco-British

Relations and the Supersonic

Project

L E W I S J O H N M A N A N D F R A N CE S M . B . L Y N C H

In November 1962 the French and British governments signed a treaty committing

themselves irrevocably to nancing and building together the western world's rst

commercial supersonic airliner. That the treaty was signed only weeks before

President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's attempt to join the European Commu-

nities and before he signed the Treaty of Friendship with the Federal Republic of

Germany is usually explained in terms of technological convergence in the

aeronautical industry.1 Technological imperatives, it is argued, overrode the historic

differences and rivalries between Britain and France to produce one of the most

sophisticated and enduring aircraft in the world. However, as this article will testify,

the choice of partners to build a supersonic aeroplane owed as much to political

factors as to technological imperatives.

While both Britain and France shared a concern to retain a modern aeronautical

industry in a world increasingly dominated by American rms, Britain and France

were not natural allies. The British aeronautical industry had the technical ability to

compete with the Americans in long-range ight, but British policy-makers

vacillated between espousing a policy based on competition and one based on

partnership with the United States. The industry was also constrained by the fact

that during the war years it had built almost no civil aircraft whatsoever. The French

aeronautical industry on the other hand, handicapped by the years of technical

stagnation during the Occupation, had the more modest ambition of dominating

the west European aeronautical industry.2 This was to be achieved with the help of

the renascent West German aeronautical industry, freed after 1954 from Allied

restrictions.3 However, a combination of factors political, nancial, technical and

1 Emmanuel Chadeau, Le Reve et la Puissance. L'avion et son siecle (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 366370;

Elliot J. Feldman, Concorde and Dissent. Explaining High Technology Project Failures in Britain and France

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), xiv13.2 Roger Beteille, `Airbus; or the Reconstruction of European Civil Aeronautics' in William M.

Leary, ed., From Airships to Airbus. The history of civil commercial aviation, Vol. 1: Infrastructure and

Environment (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 16.3 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (hereafter MAE) 356: Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser,

Contemporary European History, 11, 2 (2002), pp. 229252 # 2002 Cambridge University Press

DOI:10.1017/S0960777302002035 Printed in the United Kingdom

strategic meant that it was France and Britain who co-operated to construct the

rst viable supersonic airliner, rather than Britain and the United States or France

and West Germany.

The British civil aeronautical industry

It was in Britain, where interest in applying the breakthrough to supersonic ight,

rst achieved by an American bomber pilot in 1947,4 was keenest. British civil

aircraft production had been, since the Second World War, marked by high

ambition and huge disappointment. The industry had concentrated on the produc-

tion of ghter and bomber aircraft during the war, a division of labour which put

the British industry at a disadvantage relative to that of the United States in terms of

civil production in the post-1945 period. As early as 1943, however, a committee

had been established, under the chairmanship of Lord Brabazon, to draw up plans

for civil aircraft development and production.5 The new Labour government of

1945 embraced the industry and the plans with enthusiasm, stating that `a vigorous

and far-sighted policy is needed to plan and proceed with new British aircraft which

can lead the world'.6 Nevertheless, Britain was compelled to buy American aircraft

in the immediate postwar period in order to operate competitively. The British

knew that they did not have any domestically produced civil aircraft which could

compete with the Americans. Nationalising the industry was not on the political

agenda.7 The Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aircraft Requirements

reporting in 1946 was, however, bullish in its conclusions, postulating that `there is

no reason to suppose that we cannot compete successfully with the Americans'.8

Competition with the United States for supremacy in the skies would be a leitmotiv

for the British government and the aircraft industry for the next twenty-ve years.

Ambition, however, was tempered by disappointment, as delays, cost overruns

and constant arguments between the airline companies and the government over

aircraft ordering, stymied the government's plans. The situation was so bad that the

Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, commissioned a report from a committee of

businessmen into the ordering of civil aircraft. As this committee quickly recognised,

`even if the recommendations of the Brabazon Committee, taken as a whole, had

been appropriate to the immediate postwar needs of the airlines, the subsequent

partial and hesitant implementation which they in fact experienced would have

Ministere de l'Air, `Note sur les situations respectives des industries aeronautiques francaises et

allemandes', 15 Oct. 1954.4 Michael J. H. Taylor, The Aerospace Chronology (London: Trueservice Press, 1989), 165.5 K. Hayward, The British Aircraft Industry (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 40.6 Public Record Ofce (hereafter PRO), Cabinet (hereafter CAB) 129/12 CP(46)317 `Civil

Aircraft Requirements', Joint Memorandum by the Minister of Supply and the Minister of Civil

Aviation, 2 Aug. 1946.7 Geoffrey Owen, From Empire to Europe. The Decline and Revival of British Industry since the Second

World War (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 304.8 CAB 129/12 Interdepartmental Committee on `Civil Aircraft Requirements', First Interim

Report, 23 July 1946.

230 Contemporary European History

caused difculties'.9 Indeed, the whole problem of attempting to forecast adequate

designs for numerous routes and markets had, almost of necessity, been made in an

environment which lacked much information. Consequently, `as matters have

turned out the period since the end of the war has been a most unfortunate

experience, both for British civil aviation and for the Aircraft Industry'.10 The

British, through the Brabazon Committee, had invested much faith in the ying

boat (the airline equivalent of the luxury liner) and the belief that air travel would

remain the preserve of the rich.11 The Americans, on the other hand, were

preparing for a mass market in civil aviation transport.

Furthermore, the high hopes of the Brabazon Committee and its successors that

Britain could wrest the lead in civil aviation from the United States had been

disappointed. Of the original programme only two aircraft, the Vickers Viscount

and the de Havilland Dove, had done well in export markets, and the optimism

engendered by the Brabazon Committee and the Saunders-Roe Princess ying boat

had all but vanished. Indeed, as the Minister of Supply noted in 1952, `both projects

were started as part of this country's postwar effort to establish a lead in civil

aviation', but `the development of the giant types is taking much longer and costing

much more than was expected', and `civil operators have lost interest in these

projects'.12 Hope remained that the Americans could yet be bested, since, as was

noted, `we are on the threshold of success with smaller types, notably the jet-

engined Comet'.13 The government, however, remained aware that the lead in jet

technology was tenuous, and were noting that `American civil aircraft manufacturers

are becoming increasingly alive to the challenge from Britain, and are intensifying

their efforts to shorten the technical lead which our industry has established'.14 As a

result, the Minister of Supply asked for and received `super-priority' from the

Cabinet for production of the de Havilland Comet marks II and III, the Bristol

Britannia and the Viscount. Yet again, however, hope was to be unfullled, as the

Comet was grounded in 1954 following a series of disasters induced by metal

fatigue, and the turboprop-powered Vickers Vanguard failed to compete with pure

jets, such as the French-built Caravelle.

The French civil aeronautical industry

Indeed the Caravelle was the one notable achievement of the French civil aviation

industry in the years after 1945. Since its peak during the First World War, when it

had been the main supplier of the Allied war effort, the French aeronautical industry

9 PRO, CAB 129/29, `Report of Committee on Procedure for Ordering of Civil Aircraft', July

1948.10 Ibid.11 Graham Coster, Corsairville: The Lost Domain of the Flying Boat (London: Viking, 2000), passim.12 PRO,CAB 129/50C(52)58, `Brabazon and Princess Aircraft', Memorandum by the Minister of

Supply, 13 Oct. 1952.13 Ibid.14 PRO, CAB 129/55 C(52)331, `Super-Priority for Civil Aircraft', Memorandum by the Minister

of Supply, 13 Oct. 1952.

The Road to Concorde: Franco-British Relations and the Supersonic Project 231

had suffered a period of long decline.15 Rescue efforts during the 1930s, which

included the rationalisation and then the nationalisation of a large section of the

industry, failed to place it in a position to cover even the French needs during the

Second World War.16 Consigned to making German models with increasingly out-

dated technology under the Occupation, the industry was considered to be of minor

importance both by the General Staff and the Monnet planners after the end of the

Second World War. A new policy, however, was outlined by the Communist,

Charles Tillon, appointed by de Gaulle as Minister of Aviation in the rst postwar

government. This policy was designed to restore the French aeronautical industry to

international prominence and to preserve it as a bastion of the Communist Party,17 a

policy to which the development of the Caravelle made a remarkable contribution.

Taking advantage of the prevailing political climate, which was supportive of

nationalisations, Tillon was able to extend the aviation nationalisation programme

begun by the Popular Front government of 1936. In the course of 1945 he set up

the Ofce National d'E tude et de Recherche Aeronautique (ONERA) to co-

ordinate research and development. He completed the nationalisation of Air France

begun by Pierre Cot in 1933. Finally and most importantly, he formed a new

nationalised engine-building rm, the Societe Nationale d'E tude et de Construction

de Moteurs d'Aviation (SNECMA), from the aeroplane engine division of Renault

and from Gnome-et-Rhone, both of which were nationalised after the liberation

for having collaborated with the Germans.

In the case of airframe construction, some private rms were absorbed by the

pre-existing nationalised ones. Thus the Societe Nationale des Constructions

Aeronautiques du Nord (SNCAN) took over the private rm Caudron, the Societe

Nationale des Constructions Aeronautiques du Sud-Ouest (SNCASO) took over

Farman, and the Societe Nationale des Constructions Aeronautiques du Sud-Est

(SNCASE) absorbed some of the research facilities of the Latecoere rm in

Toulouse. A few rms were, however, left in private hands, notably Dassault and

Breguet, but in general the new enlarged nationalised sector accounted for nearly 90

per cent of the employment in the industry by 1946.18 It was not, however, until

1949, with the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, that the French government was able

to formulate an agreed policy towards the aircraft industry. As it stated at the time,

`the needs of national defence and of the aeronautical industry are intimately

linked.'19 Planning for the future of the industry was then, and for the duration of

the Fourth Republic, conducted within the framework of NATO, with civil

aviation being no more than an offshoot of the military sector. A commission of

15 Guy Jalabert, Les Industries aeronautiques et spatiales en France (Toulouse: Privat, 1974).16 Charles Christienne, Patrick Facon, Patrice Buffotot, Lee Kennett, French Military Aviation. A

Bibliographical Guide (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1989), 8081.17 Herrick Chapman, State Capitalism and Working-Class Radicalism in the French Aircraft Industry

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 257.18 Ibid., 256275.19 Ministere des Armees, Section Air, E84922 Projet de Loi (Loi no. 491052 du 2.8.1949) visant a

l'adoption d'un programme quinquennal de construction aeronautique. Expose des motifs. `Besoins de

la defense nationale et industrie aeronautique sont intimement lies.'


enquiry, under the chairmanship of Frederic Surleau, recommended that the French

companies should abandon their efforts to compete with American companies in

the construction of long-distance airliners and strategic bombers, and should

establish a long-term plan for aircraft construction in France which would focus on

medium-range aeroplanes. This more modest strategy won the support of a majority

in the National Assembly, and in August 1950 the National Assembly nally

approved a ve-year construction plan for aviation. The plan was submitted to both

the British and the Americans but it was from Britain that the French government

sought technical assistance on the grounds that British technology could be adapted

more easily to t French capabilities than that of the United States. This resulted in

the French building, under licence from Britain, a number of ghter planes

including the Vampire V, Hawker F3, and the Venom.20

On the civil side, of the 217,000 million francs assigned to the aircraft industry

under the plan only 6 per cent was earmarked for civil research. Having taken the

decision not to compete with the British and the Americans in long-range ight, the

committee charged with formulating a policy for civil aviation correctly predicted

that jet aircraft would replace propeller-driven ones over the following ten years.21

It also correctly predicted that the seating capacity of its choice of medium-haul

aeroplane, named the Caravelle, should be larger than that of the existing aeroplanes

the DC3, the Convair and the Viscount.22 Built by SNCASE under the dynamic

leadership of the young technocrat Georges Hereil, the Caravelle, launched in 1955,

was to capture a large part of the market for fast medium-sized jets in the later

1950s. However, the success of the Caravelle notwithstanding, the French civil

aeronautical industry was seen to be handicapped in relation to not only the

American but also the British industry in a number of respects. These ranged from

the cost of raw materials (special steels were almost three times more expensive in

France than in Britain); short production runs with increased unit costs (in 1955 the

United States produced 7,000 aeroplanes of which 3,400 were commercial, whereas

France produced 900 of which 60 were commercial); and the size of French rms

(in the United States Douglas Aircraft employed 72,000 and Boeing 65,000, in the

United Kingdom Hawker Siddeley employed 78,000 and Rolls Royce 35,000,

while in France SNCASE employed 8,500, SNCASO 6,200 and SNECMA 9,500).

Concern with the small size of French rms prompted the merger of SNCASE and

SNCASO to form Sud Aviation in 1957. The following year SNCAM, SNCAC

and SFECMAS merged to become Nord Aviation.23 And nally, and perhaps most

importantly, the French aircraft industry was seen to be handicapped by its inability

to make engines. Those for the Caravelle were made by Rolls Royce.

20 Sabine Marie Decup, FranceAngleterre. Les Relations Militaires de 1945 a 1962 (Paris: Economica,

2000), 2423.21 Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarragne, Histoire de l'aviation militaire francaise (Paris, Limoges:

Charles-Lavanzelle, 1980), 48182.22 A. Avrane, M. Gilliand, J. Guillem, Sud Est Caravelle (London, New York, Sydney: Jane's

Publishing Company, 1981), 912.23 Jalabert, Les Industries, 12931.


However, in the military sphere there were areas in which the French were

increasingly able to satisfy British needs. These included the supply of the Alouette

helicopter, used extensively in Algeria, and the ground-to-air missiles, the SS11. In

recognition of the growing importance of the two countries to each other in

defence, particularly in the aftermath of Suez, an Anglo-French steering committee

for co-operation in defence research and development was set up in 1957. The

committee's terms of reference were governed by a protocol whereby neither

government could divulge information to a third party without the permission of

the other government. Within months of the committee's creation the two

governments had signed the CrepinCockburn agreement covering the delivery of

electrical and electronic systems.24 For Britain to have signed such an agreement

with France was a measure of the technical progress made in France since the end of

the war. However, for Britain the story was not so positive.

The British road to Concorde

The grounding of the Comet by Britain in 1954 seemed to bring to an end the

struggle between the United Kingdom and the United States for the lead in civil

aviation. This may not have been much of a struggle in the mind of the United

States, which won it hands down, but it certainly remained so in the mind of

Britain. The Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC-8 looked set between them to carve

up the major shares of the international airline market, while the cancellation by the

British government of the Vickers V-1000 in 1955 compounded the misery. Still,

the industry could hardly have been said to have been in decline. Employment in

the industry in the United Kingdom had risen from 171,800 in 1948 to nearly

300,000 in 1955. The industry remained protable, having made 8.7 million on an

average capital employed of 48.3 million in 1949. The gures for 1955 were a

prot of 24.9 million on an average capital employed of 135.6 million. The

value of aircraft exports rose from 26 million in 1948 to 64 million in 1955.

Certainly this was dwarfed by the value of US exports, which stood at 260 million

in 1955, but Britain's earnings far outweighed those of its major European

competitors.25 The industry, therefore, could hardly be described as on its uppers,

but with the decision to produce a supersonic ghter, the English Electric Light-

ning, hopes soared again that the United Kingdom could gain a signicant

technological lead over the United States by applying supersonic propulsion to civil

aircraft.

The long road to Concorde began shortly after the grounding of the Comet,

when the new deputy director of the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough,

Morien Morgan, set up a working group to look into the future of civil aviation and

24 Decup, France Angleterre, 24752.25 All gures from the Report of the Committee of Inquiry in Aviation Industry (Plowden

Report), 196465, CMND. 2853.


into supersonic ight in particular.26 By autumn 1956 the Ministry of Supply,

anxious to become involved and to widen the scope of the enquiry, called a

meeting. This was attended by a battery of ofcials from the Ministry of Supply, the

Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, the airline companies, BOAC and BEA,

and the aircraft industry: de Havilland, Vickers-Armstrong, Hawker-Siddeley, Rolls

Royce, Short Brothers and Harland, and the Bristol Aeroplane Company, the

agenda being to consider the design and production of a supersonic civil aircraft.

The chairman, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Supply, Sir Cyril

Musgrave, outlined a two-stage process: rst, an intensive twelve-month research

period involving the government and all the companies to determine whether such

an aircraft was feasible, and a second stage involving a design competition with

entries from rms and groups. BOAC and BEA were immediately split on whether

the speed of the aircraft should be Mach 1 just beyond the speed of sound, or

transonic or Mach 2 supersonic and whether the design should be for a

medium-range or transatlantic model, although neither company denied the

attraction of going supersonic. It was left to one of the doyens of the industry, Sir

Frederick Handley Page, to question whether the prestige and economics of the

project would justify the scale of effort being envisaged, and to point out that

improvements in subsonic aviation could well render the economics of supersonic

ight redundant. These, as it would transpire, were prescient concerns, but the prize

of overhauling the Americans tended to sweep all before it. In Musgrave's view,

`they could not let the matter go by default. There might well be improvements in

subsonic aircraft but they could not waste time on an attempt to overhaul the

American lead'.27 In the event all the companies and the two aircraft corporations

agreed to participate in initial design and production studies. Indeed, in the

aftermath of the 1956 Suez asco the need to address American domination was felt

all the more keenly in some circles of government. It led Foreign Secretary Selwyn

Lloyd to propose in January 1957 his `grand design' for a radical reorientation of

British foreign policy towards Western Europe. Lloyd, who had been Minister of

Supply with responsibility for military aircraft before becoming Minister of Defence

when the West European Union was created, was predisposed towards Britain

working closely with the emerging Common Market. As he had once observed,

`the F[oreign] O[fce] have been loyal to the Anglo-US relationship to such an

extent that I have had from time to time to try to impress the importance of

renascent Europe'.28 In addition to the proposed free trade area between the

Common Market and the rest of the member states of the Organisation for

European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) he advocated a closer political and

military association between the Western European Union (WEU) member states

within NATO. While the Cabinet rejected Lloyd's proposal on the grounds that it

26 Jock Bruce-Gardyne and Nigel Lawson, The Power Game: An Examination of Decision-making in

Government (London: Macmillan,1976), 1011.27 Ministry of Aviation (hereafter AVIA) 63/67, `Supersonic Civil Aircraft', Minutes of a Meeting

held on 1 Oct. 1956.28 D. R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Cape, 1989), 281


would be inconsistent with the maintenance of the Anglo-American alliance, it did

support the general concept of a closer association between the United Kingdom

and western Europe. Concluding that a good start had been made on the economic

front with the proposal to set up a free trade area in western Europe, the Cabinet

agreed to resume discussions on closer military and political co-operation at a later

date.29 One outcome, as we have seen, was the creation of an Anglo-French

steering committee for co-operation in defence research and development.

In the meantime, with the government having to step in to bail out both the

Bristol Aeroplane Company and BOAC because of problems with the Bristol

Britannia in October 1957, it seemed that much of the aircraft industry's future lay

in supersonic developments.30 By November the Supersonic Transport Aircraft

Committee (STAC) had produced an interim report on the progress made since

1956. The theoretical and experimental researches produced no unforeseen pro-

blems or difculties and in the committee's view, `our condence in the possibilities

of supersonic transport still appear sound'. The committee, however, did highlight

excessive noise levels at take-off and landing as a potential problem, although on the

plus side, `intensive efforts to improve the overall technical efciency will lead to

substantial reductions in the direct operating costs of supersonic civil aircraft'.31 The

STAC's nal report was presented to the Ministry of Supply in March 1959 and the

ministry called in representatives of the airline companies and the Society of British

Aircraft Constructors for discussions. The committee had eventually settled on two

specic research requirements, a short-range aircraft capable of 1,500 nautical miles

at Mach 1.2, and a non-stop transatlantic aircraft acapable of Mach 2. There were no

technical problems to prevent either model ying, and the only decisions that

needed to be made were to build one model, both models or none. Once again,

however, the all-pervasive image, indeed fear, of the United States entered the

equation. As Morien Morgan, now chief scientic ofcer in the Ministry of Supply,

put it in summing up the Ministry of Supply's position:

unless this country decided to embark on a supersonic transport aircraft venture fairly soon,

there would be little doubt that we would be out of the race for ever, and if that occurred,there could be no prospect of a comeback.32

Fear of losing out to the Americans once again, it seemed, was every bit as important

as the technical or economic aspects of the project.

It was left to the airline representatives to ask searching questions about the

project. The BEA representatives cast doubt on the economic viability of a

supersonic aircraft on short and medium hauls, and recommended spending less on

making incremental improvements to subsonic models. Nor was Sir George

29 CAB 129/84 CP(57) 6, Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5 January 1957.30 On this issue, see CAB 129/89 C(57) 233, `Civil Aviation: Britannia Aircraft', Memorandum by

the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 14 Oct. 1957, and CAB 129/90 C(57)252, `Britannia

Aircraft', Memorandum by the Minister of Power, 30 Oct. 1957.31 AVIA 63/31, `Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee', Interim Report, Nov. 1957.32 Ibid., `Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee', Minutes of a Meeting held on 26 Mar.

1959.


Cribbett of BOAC convinced of the merits of a Mach 2 long-haul model on

economic grounds. The chairman of the meeting, Air Chief Marshal Sir Claude

B. R. Pelly, probably somewhat annoyed by the attitudes of the air carriers, asked `if

he was correct in believing that BOAC were saying that they would prefer not to

have a supersonic aircraft?'33 Cribbett's reply was that the company would be

content to have supersonic aircraft by 1970 if the economics were right but that the

margin of protability was very narrow and, if the supersonic aircraft failed by even

5 per cent per capacity ton mile to meet subsonic costs, `BOAC would not wish to

purchase supersonic aircraft, and would not be worried if the Americans brought

such an aircraft into service, and in his view, this opinion would be held by many

other airlines'.34 It was left to Sir Aubrey Burke of the Society of British Aircraft

Constructors to rally the troops. Burke was in no doubt that supersonic airliners

would come, and he was certain that the United States and Russia would `embark

upon such projects for prestige reasons and the United Kingdom should do so as

well'.35 A start should be made as soon as possible with the aim of introducing the

supersonic aircraft at a time when the present generation of aircraft reached the end

of their working lives in the early 1970s.

Events now moved quickly. By the end of April the Ministry of Supply had

made a range of decisions: there could not be support for two different models, and

the balance of advantage lay with the longer-range version; the industry should be

invited to produce `brochure studies' putting forward realistic estimates of total

project costs; and, most importantly, given that the UK market for supersonic

aircraft would be small, it was important to widen the market and that `co-operation

with another country with this object was desirable, though the practical difculties

were enormous'.36 Co-operation with one or more Commonwealth countries,

with Canada the main contender, was considered, as was co-operation with a

number of European countries and, somewhat astonishingly given the earlier

concern to compete with the United States, cooperation with the United States was

also considered. Indeed it was the view of Harold Watkinson, Minister of Transport

and Civil Aviation, that Britain could scarcely hope to match the United States in

straight competition.37

The Minister of Supply, Aubrey Jones, responsible for military aviation, was

more open-minded in his report to the Prime Minister on 2 July. The report

distilled the essence of the ministry's view that, while to embark on the project

would be costly, not to embark upon it would be to opt out of advanced civil

aircraft design. Jones reported that he had suggested to the French Government that

they start discussions with a view to a joint undertaking, that design-study contracts

33 AVIA 63/30, `Supersonic Civil Transport', Note of Meeting in the Minister's Room, 29 Apr.

1959.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Kenneth Owen, Concorde and the Americans. International Politics of Supersonic Transport

(Washington, DC, and London: Smithsonian Institution Press,1998),17.


should be placed with Hawker Siddeley and the Bristol Aeroplane Company, and

that Treasury approval had been sought. Jones believed that the British government

had made a great error in foreign policy by not joining the Common Market, and in

the wake of de Gaulle's veto of the free trade area proposal sought to improve

relations by offering to collaborate with the French on the supersonic project.38 To

Jones `these steps would ensure that this country continued its work in this eld

without, however, committing the Government at this juncture to any great

expenditure'.39 This message was given added force a few weeks later by the

Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation. Reporting on a visit by a British

delegation to the International Civil Aviation Organisation Conference in San

Diego, where it had been suggested that the ICAO would examine the potential

problems raised by supersonic aircraft, Watkinson was at pains to stress the reaction

of the American delegation to the proposal:

they went so far as to raise the matter diplomatically through the United States Embassy inLondon. The extreme sensitiveness shown by the United States . . . only makes sense if infact they have already decided to proceed with a supersonic transport project of their own.40

He then made the suggestion that in public the government's stance should be one

of outright opposition to supersonic ight, whereas in private the government

should make up its mind on `how we want to face this most difcult and expensive

future'.41

The memoranda had their effect, and the chairman of the Ofcial Committee on

Civil Aviation Policy, Sir Thomas Padmore, was briefed accordingly. Padmore duly

informed the committee that `the Americans now seemed likely to develop a

transport aircraft ying at three times the speed of sound or more', and that

feasibility studies should be put out to British rms for airframes and engines as a

matter of urgency. However, `even the slower [Mach 2] aircraft would be extremely

expensive to develop . . . [and] its operation might be uneconomic, quite apart

from the effects of competition from American machines'. Padmore noted that the

Minister of Supply had approached the French government, which had agreed, in

principle, on co-operation. Co-operation with the United States would probably be

of more value to the United Kingdom in terms of economic resources, technolo-

gical know-how and access to markets, although `on the other hand, the Americans

had less incentive to co-operate than the French, and might try to dictate

unacceptable terms'.42 The Cabinet, though, remained sceptical that collaboration

with the French would be possible, given the technological backwardness of the

French aeronautical industry.43 Nonetheless a meeting between the British and

38 Aubrey Jones, Britain's Economy. The Roots of Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1985), 80.39 CAB 134/1447 CA (0)(59)3, Ofcial Committee on Civil Aviation Policy, `Supersonic

Transport', Memorandum by the Minister of Supply, 2 July 1959.40 Ibid., `Supersonic Civil Aircraft', Memorandum by the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation,

22 July 1959.41 Ibid.42 Ibid., Ofcial Committee on Civil Aviation Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held on 10 Sept. 1959.


French did take place on 27 October 1959, and as the head of the British delegation,

Dr Cawood, put it, although there had been co-operation on military projects, this

was `the rst meeting of its kind to explore the possibilities in relation to a civil

project'.44

The French road to Concorde

Having taken the decision in 1949/50 not to compete with the British and the

Americans in the construction of long-range aircraft, the French were nonetheless

faced with the threat of losing the medium- and short-range aircraft to the

Americans. The appearance of the Boeing 707 and the DC8 presented as severe a

challenge to the Caravelle and any successors as it did to the British aeronautical

industry. In the wake of the French National Assembly's rejection in 1954 of the

plan to create a European Defence Community which, inter alia, was to result in

the removal of Allied controls over the West German aeronautical industry, the

French Air Ministry sought to foster links between the French and West German

aeronautical industries in order to secure French leadership over the industry in

Europe.45

From June 1958 de Gaulle pursued a strategy based on seeking to maximise

collaboration with the United States and United Kingdom on nuclear matters while

co-operating with West Germany and then the other Common Market countries

on non-nuclear military and civil aviation. However, under its 1958 Mutual

Defence Agreement with the United States Britain was compelled to agree not to

share any nuclear research with France or any other country, while the West

Germans, stung by the French refusal to co-operate in the nuclear sphere, opposed

French requests to collaborate on non-nuclear aviation.46 While the French sought

German participation in the construction of the Mirage III, of which the prototype

had rst own in November 1956, the West Germans preferred instead to build the

American F-104 under licence. The Belgians and the Dutch followed suit, judging

the F-104 to be of superior quality, but they also wanted to prevent the French from

dominating the European armaments and aeronautical industry. All that was to

emerge after extensive discussions with the West Germans was the agreement signed

in December 1959 to build the transport aeroplane, the Transall, together.47

It was for all these reasons that the French gave a positive response to the British

suggestion to hold exploratory talks on developing a supersonic aircraft. In

preparation for these talks Paul Moroni, the general secretary for civil aviation in the

43 See Jones, Britain's Economy, 80; and Owen, Concorde, 18.44 PRO, AVIA, 63/20, `Anglo-French Discussion on Collaboration on a Supersonic Civil

Transport Aircraft', Notes of Meetings on 27 and 28 Oct. 1959.45 MAE 356 Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser. Memorandum from Ministere de l'Air, 15 Oct.

1954.46 William Park, Defending the West. A History of NATO (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), 5080.47 Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-strategiques franco-allemandes

19541996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 1402; and David Weldon Thornton, Airbus Industrie. The Politics of

International Industrial Collaboration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 545.


French Ministry of Public Works and Transport, set out the case for and against

supersonic transport. The interest of the airlines, he felt, would be to postpone any

new investment in buying supersonic aircraft, since they had invested so much

already in modernising their eets. Similarly passengers, whose main concern would

be to get the cheapest fares possible, would show no interest in supersonic transport,

which it was assumed, would be considerably more expensive than subsonic ight.

But on the other hand there were and would continue to be a number of

compelling reasons for developing supersonic aircraft. The rst was pressure from

the industry itself, particularly the large American rms such as Lockheed, which

had lost out in subsonic ight. Secondly, there was the competition between the

airline companies, with the more powerful ones, such as Pan Am, anxious to

encourage their weaker competitors to incur expenditure beyond their means.

Finally there was the pressure created by the rivalry between the United States and

the Soviet Union.

As a result, Moroni argued, supersonic aeroplanes would be coming on stream

sometime between 1965 and 1970. If France hoped to retain a place in aeronautical

construction it had little time to lose, he stressed, before undertaking preliminary

studies. But it was clear that, since the cost of developing supersonic aircraft far

exceeded the capacity of a single European country, the only way that France could

do it would be by collaborating with one or several other countries. The question

was, which ones? Britain had the greatest experience to offer, as well as access to the

markets of the Commonwealth. On the other hand the existence of the Common

Market and the proposals to form a European air union suggested an association with

the countries of Little Europe. But in view of the enormous effort required, Moroni

felt that it would be advantageous to have as large a number of countries associated as

possible. Why not include France, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,

Italy and Sweden, he suggested. The advantage to France of being the instigator of

such an association was recognised, but France was hardly in such a position at that

time. He therefore suggested that France should tell its Common Market partners, in

condence, of its conversation with the British, to nd out their views.48

The French ofcials appointed to the talks, held in October 1959, were mainly

from the Ministry of Defence: the engineer General Gerardin from the Direction

Technique et Industrielle of the Ministry of Defence; chief engineer Foch, head of the

aeroplane division within the Ministry; chief engineer Vialatte, head of the engine

division; and principal engineer Seguin, responsible for civil aeroplanes. Pierre

Moussa, an inspecteur des nances, appointed as director of air transport in the Ministry

of Public Works and Transport in de Gaulle's rst government,49 instructed the

delegates to restrict the discussions to technical issues.50

The French delegation was brought fully up to date with British progress thus far

and the French, in turn, informed the British as to their progress, but

48 MTPT 760 069 / 616. Note au Ministre. 14 Oct. 1959. P. Moroni.49 Pierre Moussa, La Roue de la fortune. Souvenirs d'un nancier (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 121.50 MTPT 760 041 / 118. Report of Meeting in London, 27 and 28 Oct. 1959.


no decision had been taken as to whether the nance could be found for the project. In

French public opinion it was most important to have reliable information on the operationcosts per seat mile of a supersonic airliner before taking a decision to proceed with theventure.51

Following a break for private discussions between the delegation heads, the broad

outlines of possible arrangements for collaboration were sketched out. If such

agreement could be reached then the rst step should be an integrated design team

formed from a French rm or group of rms, and a British industrial group. Design

and production responsibilities would be broken down and allocated, and there

would be an assembly line in each country. Such arrangements could not, however,

apply to the engine, which the British saw as solely a UK affair. Both industries

would be nanced by government, but, given that the `ultimate objective should be

to provide an aircraft which paid its way . . . any investment by the UK

Government would be in the hope that it would receive at least a part of the

investment back from customers'.52

Given that the British proposal went far beyond the technical brief which the

French ofcials had been given, they could do little but state their strong

reservations. French policy since 1951, as they explained, had been deliberately to

stay out of long-range aircraft production, where competition was erce and the

risks too high to justify the cost in France. The French delegation, however, agreed

to the proposals on co-operation, and General Gerardin, the head of the delegation,

said that he would report the outcome to Paris and await developments.

Reecting on the talks, it was clear to the French that if they were determined to

pursue their research into a medium-range supersonic aeroplane, no collaboration

with Britain would be possible. If, on the other hand, the French rallied to the

British proposal to construct a long-range aircraft, this would displace their other

plans for aircraft development. For such collaboration to be worthwhile the French

contribution would have to be at least 25 to 30 per cent of the total, which for a

Mach 2 aeroplane would cost between 350 and 450 million francs over ten years.

Unless the French government were prepared to take money from another budget

this would mean that the supersonic aeroplane would use up the money allocated to

the Caravelle, the Breguet 941 and the Super Broussard. And even then it was not

clear that it would make enough difference to an operation which even the British

admitted would be very difcult. The view was that the British had lost the battle

for subsonic long-range aircraft and were entering the battle for the supersonic with

even fewer advantages. Were the British gure to be correct, and were 2,500 aircraft

to be in operation by 1970 of which only 150 were supersonic, the French felt that

it would make much better sense to target the other 2,350 for the Caravelle or some

version of it, and to spend the money improving it. If, on the other hand, the

British gures underestimated the number of supersonic aeroplanes by discounting

51 AVIA 63/20, Anglo-French Discussions of Collaboration on a Supersonic Civil Transport

Aircraft, Notes of Meetings on 27 and 28 Oct. 1959.52 Ibid.


them on distances of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, then the French interest in this

medium haul would be fully justied.53 In his report on the visit to London, a Chief

Engineer at the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, J. de Lagarde, recom-

mended that the French should not collaborate with the British on the supersonic

aircraft. However, the Ministry of Defence did not act on de Lagarde's advice, and

informed the British that `they were anxious to continue discussions on supersonic

transport'.54

Indeed what the talks in London did was impress on the French how far behind

both Britain and the United States they were in their research on supersonic

transport. As an immediate result, the Institute of Air Transport was given a contract

on 17 November 1959 to carry out a general study of supersonic transport. This was

expected to take about six months to complete. The following February, the

Ministry of Defence commissioned the three main aircraft companies Nord

Aviation, Sud Aviation and Dassault to develop a prototype of a medium-range

supersonic aeroplane. The companies were asked to design an aeroplane carrying

between sixty and eighty people over a distance of 3,500 km with fuel reserves

representing 5 per cent of total weight carried. The speed was not specied.

Later that month and in the following months, representatives of Hawker

Siddeley aviation met with their French counterparts from Nord Aviation, Sud

Aviation and Dassault to explore collaboration. The talks were hardly encouraging,

with all three French companies insisting that the French government was interested

in a medium-range supersonic jet. As to a longer-range aircraft, the Nord Aviation

chairman, General Daum, expressed the view that `in the present political situation

it seemed unlikely that the French Government would accept a minor role, and

would probably insist on equal partnership'.55 As matters stood, however, the only

role for Nord Aviation in a British project would be as a sub-contractor. Nor was

the chairman of Sud Aviation, M. Hereil, much more forthcoming: `his idea of

collaboration was restricted . . . to the French undertaking sub-contract work on

cockpits, engine nascelles or similar components both for design, development,

testing and manufacture'.56 So underwhelmed was the British delegation that they

left the meeting convinced that Sud `were merely seeking to acquire sub-contract

orders, and had no real intention of facing up to the responsibilities and difculties

of collaboration in its full sense'.57 Dassault showed a marked improvement in

attitude, but this only served to highlight the gulf between the two industries and,

by implication, the two governments. M. Dassault expressed the view that his

government was interested in a medium-range eighty-seater supersonic aircraft and

53 MTPT 760 069 / 617. Rapport de la Mission faite a Londres les 27 et 28 octobre 1959 par

l'Ingenieur en chef de Lagarde.54 AVIA 63/20. `Anglo-French Collaboration on Air Matters.' Note of meeting held in London, 26

Jan. 1960.55 AVIA 63/20, `Notes of Three Discussions with Representatives of Nord Aviation SNCA, Sud

Aviation and General Aeronautiques in Kingston and Paris', 22 Feb., 16 and 19 Mar. 1960.56 Ibid.57 Ibid.


that `he could not see any likelihood of French nancial assistance for collaboration

with England on a long-range supersonic transport'.58 The best that could be hoped

for, in his view, was that Britain should take the lead in designing and manufacturing

the long-range supersonic transport, sub-letting 20 per cent of the work to France,

while France led on the medium-range aircraft and sub-let 20 per cent of the work

to England. Although this appeared to satisfy the Hawker Siddeley representatives, it

all left full collaboration in the air.59

This was given added spice a few weeks later when high-level delegations met in

Paris, ostensibly for talks on military aircraft, notably a vertical take-off and landing

(VTOL) or short take-off and landing (STOL) tactical support aircraft, and on

intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IBM). Also on the agenda was the supersonic

aircraft, although retrospectively the French probably wished it had not been, as it

set the tone for a performance by Duncan Sandys, head of the new Ministry of

Aviation, at his bellicose and hectoring best, or worst.

M. Blancard, representing the French Air Minister, introduced the topic by

asking what stage the United Kingdom had reached in its research and project

work. Sandys then launched into a strong and blatantly contradictory assessment of

the British position. No decision had been taken to build such an aircraft; the costs

would be huge; but ultimately the decision would be taken to build such an aircraft

as à country which does not undertake research in this eld is condemning itself to

disappearing sooner or later from aeronautical activity'.60 It was important, there-

fore, to share costs and eliminate competition. Breathtakingly, Sandys asserted that

òur contacts with the Americans have already gone a long way', and then asked the

French `whether you wish to work with us on this project, since it will be necessary

to make a considerable nancial contribution'. Time, he stressed, was of the essence,

requiring a decision within months ìf we do not want to be passed by the

Americans'. Stating that the initial British research was completed, Sandys asked if

the French government was prepared to instruct one or two of its aircraft companies

to collaborate with British rms, as `we should be happy to work with you, but if

you do not want this, we should then turn to the Americans'.61 Somewhat taken

aback by this, the French sought some refuge in technical details, complained that

their own research was not yet complete, raised the prospect of tripartite co-

operation and again agged up two aircraft with different ranges. All of this was

swept brusquely aside by Sandys, who told the French that

No purpose would appear to be served by our continuing to discuss this matter today. Iunderstand your position and I think it is better for you to consider the matter and let us

know later if you wish to collaborate with us or not. In the meanwhile I shall assume that thisis not your intention.62

58 Ibid.59 Ibid.60 Ibid., `Report of Anglo-French discussions', 12 Apr. 1960 and `Conclusions of a Meeting

between Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P. Messmer and M. Buron', 15 Apr. 1960.61 Ibid.62 Ibid.


Despite French protests that this misrepresented their position, it must have taken

a masterpiece of drafting a few days later for the British to note that Sandys and

M. Buron, the French Minister of Public Works and Transport, had discussed

`problems of mutual interest in the eld of civil aviation' and were `examining the

possibility of collaboration in the development of a supersonic aircraft'.63 On his

return to London, however, Sandys reported to the Cabinet that while collaboration

with the French on military aircraft and guided weapons had been positive, `there

was at present no European interest in the joint development of a long-distance

supersonic transport aircraft: this was probably a eld for co-operation with the

United States'.64

This was largely true. Both Moroni, as secretary of civil aviation in the Ministry

of Transport, and General Gerardin, his opposite number in the Ministry of

Defence, advised against any French participation in a long-range supersonic aircraft.

With none of the studies commissioned in France expected to report before the end

of 1960, Moroni summed up the French objections to a long-range supersonic

aeroplane. These were: the cost of the project (between 2,000 and 5,000 million

francs); the narrowness of the market (between 100 and 250 aeroplanes for the entire

free world in 1970); intense competition between the British, the Americans and the

Russians; and the relative inferiority of France, since it had not made any long-

range aeroplanes for many years. But he did not rule out all supersonic transport.

Indeed, as Moroni advised his minister, Robert Buron, were France not to

participate in the development of supersonic aircraft, employment in the aero-

nautical industry would fall steeply before the end of the 1960s and France would be

eliminated from the small club of great nations with an aeronautical industry. Even

then, in preparing the budget for the aeronautical industry for 1961 Pierre Moussa

tried to put the cost of the supersonic aeroplane into some sort of perspective. The

sums asked for in 1961 were, he claimed, less in real terms than those spent in 1951,

1952 or 1953 on the Caravelle.65 A few days later General Gerardin set out a

preliminary estimate of the amount needed to develop a medium-range supersonic

aeroplane, based on the research on prototypes beginning in 1960 and the aeroplane

entering into service in 1969.66 His total was 274 million francs (or 20 million).

The search for a partner

As events unfolded over the summer of 1960 it appeared as if the Americans and not

the French were the British government's favoured collaborators on the supersonic

aircraft. Reporting on the results of the feasibility studies to the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, Derek Heathcoat-Amory, Sandys made a number of points: the

favoured model was a 120-seat Mach 2.2 aircraft, the development of which would

cost in the region of 100 million over ten years. No collaboration with either an

63 Ibid.64 CAB 128/34 CC(60) 27, `Aircraft Industry', 26 April 1960.65 MTPT 760 069 / 616, Note from Moussa, 21 Mar. 1960.66 MTPT 760 041 / 118, Memo from Gerardin, 24 Mar. 1960.


American or a French rm would be possible until the British decided the type of

aircraft chosen and a rm to carry out the project. BAC was the favoured option for

the airframe, but no decision had been made with respect to the engine. The next

step was to progress with detailed design and wind tunnel studies, and Sandys sought

Treasury sanction for the expenditure of 500,000 over twelve months.67 Roughly

the same material went to Cabinet a few days later with the added llips that

approval would not mean `going it alone', and that `we should not rule out the

possibility of our being persuaded to join with the Americans in developing a steel

aircraft of higher speed'.68 Following a Cabinet meeting and a series of meetings

between Sandys, Heathcoat-Amory and Harold Watkinson, the Minister of

Defence, the chancellor summed up the position to the Cabinet. The proposal was

that a design contract costing 500,000 should be placed and that a public

announcement to such effect should be made. Not to accept this expenditure would

probably result in the break-up of the design teams, making it `manifest to everyone,

including the Americans, that we have effectively abandoned any intention of going

ahead with the project'. The full Cabinet duly approved the further expenditure,

but noted that `we could not afford to proceed with the development and

production as a solely British venture'.69 The necessity of nding a collaborator,

therefore, remained paramount with, in Heathcoat Amory's view, the United States

being the front runner and France a possible third partner.70

The French, meanwhile, alarmed by the news published in Aviation Week of 2

May 1960 that the US government was on the point of committing funds for

supersonic research, were actively canvassing support in West Germany for their

supersonic project. Relations between the two countries were improving, helped to

an extent by Macmillan's rejection of de Gaulle's proposal for co-operation between

Britain and France in the nuclear eld. In March 1960 the French and West German

Ministers of Defence had held talks during which the Germans had proved very

receptive to the French offer to collaborate on defence issues.71 This growing

rapprochement between West Germany and France was to result in a series of

agreements being signed on 25 October 1960, giving the West German army and air

force the right to train in France and use the facilities of French aerodromes.72 This

was followed by a meeting between General Aubiniere from the French Ministry of

Defence and representatives from the German Ministry of Economy in early

November, in which the Germans expressed considerable interest in collaborating

with the French in constructing a medium-range supersonic aeroplane.73 Finally, on

29 November 1960, Messmer and Strauss held talks in which it was decided that

67 AVIA 63/38, `Supersonic Transport Aircraft', Letter from the Minister of Aviation to the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, 29 June 1960.68 CAB 129/102 C(60) 111, `Supersonic Airliner', Memorandum by the Minister of Aviation, 12

July 1960.69 CAB 128/34 CC(60) 44, `Aircraft Industry', 21 July 1960.70 Owen, Concorde, 19.71 Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, 137, 157.72 Ibid., 166.73 MTPT 760 069 / 616. Note from Moroni, 28 Dec. 1960.


West Germany and France would each build a prototype of the same combat

aeroplane and hold talks at regular intervals to discuss strategic concerns, outside the

framework of NATO.74

The growing rapprochement with West Germany was matched by increasing

disengagement from Britain. As Moroni explained, whereas the Caravelle had

initially used engines and other parts produced in Britain, the engines for the new

Caravelle were to be made by the American company General Electric because of a

fall in the demand for the Rolls Royce RB141. Similarly the automotive parts were

being produced in France under licence from Lockheed.75 Thus, by the end of

1960, it seemed that Franco-British collaboration in supersonic transport would

become one more example of a missed opportunity, with Britain being replaced by

West Germany. That it was not can largely be explained by changes in British

policy in 1961. Anxious to secure the goodwill of the new US Kennedy administra-

tion and retain American support for the British nuclear deterrent, Macmillan was

now prepared to alter British policy to make it t into Kennedy's Grand Design for

the future transatlantic relationship. This was to mean joining the European

Communities in order to assume political leadership of them.76 At the same time

hopes that the new Democratic administration in Washington would want to

collaborate with Britain in building a supersonic aircraft, were fading fast. Co-

operation with France held a new appeal in previously sceptical quarters.

A renewed approach to the French had been prompted by a parliamentary

question to the new Minister of Aviation, Peter Thorneycroft, in June 1961, which

in turn had prompted Thorneycroft to write to Buron asking for a progress report.

In advance of this reply, however, the British air attache in Paris, P. A. Robinson,

reported to the Ministry of Aviation a discussion he had had with M. Poirier, from

Buron's ministry. Much of this rehearsed what was already known, although

Robinson had made the point that co-operation on the supersonic aircraft had been

a longstanding issue in Anglo-French talks and `that one could not afford to lose

valuable time indenitely'. What was new and was being relayed in `strict

condence', was Poirier's view that collaboration with the United Kingdom was

logical, given its powerful industry especially in engine production, and that

European collaboration was a desirable end in itself. Indeed,

If one assumed European economic co-operation was going to involve the United Kingdommuch more closely which, Poirier said, seems a reasonable assumption, and that the problem

of the UK's position vis-a-vis the Common Market is going to be solved soon, co-operationon the supersonic project would be much more easily attained.77

Poirier also revealed an approach from West Germany on supersonic co-

operation, but it was noted that `while the Germans can build, they have not the

74 Ibid.; and Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, 168.75 MTPT 760 069 / 616. Note from Moroni, 28 Dec. 1960.76 Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 19451963.

(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) 126130.77 AVIA 63/20, Letter from P. A. Robinson, Ofce of the Civil Air Attache, British Embassy,

Paris, to P. W. G. L. Haviland, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Aviation, 28 June 1961.


same research and development capabilities as the UK in the aircraft eld'. It was

obvious, however, that Buron could not ignore Germany, as a member of the

Common Market, while the United Kingdom `is not yet a member'. Thus an

entirely new element had entered the equation, which may well have swung British

thinking back behind collaboration with the French: British entry to the Common

Market. As Robinson put it, although no explicit statement had been made, he

`sensed . . . that M. Buron and the French Government may want to see how the

UK/Common Market countries position changes in the next two or three months

before getting too wrapped up with us in the supersonic eld'.78 The French had to

wait just one month for Macmillan to announce the British government's decision

to apply for membership of the European Communities.

On receiving the letter from Thorneycroft, Buron held a meeting with Moroni

and Moussa, during which he was to be quite taken aback by the advice he was

given. Instead of advocating that France should collaborate with West Germany or

with American rms to build a medium-range supersonic aeroplane, Moroni was

now advising that France should collaborate with Britain. What, Buron quizzed,

accounted for the dramatic change? According to Moroni, the advice given by the

French administration in preparation for a meeting between Buron and Thorney-

croft had shifted from opposition to any collaboration with Britain to positive

endorsement, for a number of reasons. First, the policy of a number of countries on

supersonic transport was now clear as a result of a conference held by the ICAO in

Montreal in April 1961. It seemed certain that the United States was going to build

a Mach 3 aeroplane. This would not suit France, where both industrialists and civil

servants had agreed that a Mach 2 would be the most appropriate. On the other

hand Britain was also moving in the direction of a Mach 2 speed. This meant that

there was a good chance that if the French were to build a Mach 2 supersonic

aeroplane it would have a British engine, and that the British might be prepared to

associate the French engine constructors with the research and manufacture of the

engines. A further reason for wishing to collaborate with the British lay in the

recently expressed opposition of Air France to both the cost of the supersonic

aeroplane and the medium-range distance proposed for it. If the medium range of

between 1,750 km and 3,750 km was both too short and too long to cover the needs

of Air France, the French felt that it would meet the needs of BEA and BOAC in

ying from London to continental Europe and the Mediterranean world.79

Buron accepted the advice and replied to Thorneycroft in an unusually positive

tone. Conrming that the French government had received and was studying the

reports from the aeronautical rms, he explained that he was not in a position to say

what the French government would decide as a result, but felt that it was more

likely than it had been in October 1960 that it would opt for a medium-range

aeroplane capable of ying at a speed of Mach 2.2. But whatever the aeroplane's

78 Ibid.79 MTPT 760 041 / 118. Moroni to Buron 18 July 1961.


precise characteristics, France would want to collaborate with other European

countries, and particularly with Britain, he assured.80

At that time the main issue under discussion in the civil sector was how to face

up to the competition which the arrival of the Boeing 727 was going to pose to the

Caravelle. The working group set up by the Commissariat au Plan met to consider

the options in September 1961. Opinion was divided between those who thought

that an investment of about 400 million francs to develop an entirely new Caravelle,

known as Caravelle XX, was justied, and those who argued that the French

Government should invest instead in a medium-range supersonic aircraft.

Supporters of the Caravelle XX argued that studies of the trafc of Air France

showed that almost 40 per cent travelled distances of less than 1,500 km, which was

too short a distance for supersonic aeroplanes to be viable. They argued that unless

the French aeronautical industry produced aeroplanes to cater for this demand,

France would have to import them. The counter-argument, advanced by Georges

Hereil, president of Sud Aviation, was that since France did not have the industrial

capacity to build both the Caravelle XX and the supersonic aeroplane it should

improve the existing versions of the Caravelle and invest in the supersonic airliner,

on the grounds that the future of aeronautical construction depended on supersonic

developments. This view was supported by General Bonte, an engineer and

member of the national committee for the expansion of the aeronautical industry.

Bonte's argument was that the Caravelle XX would not be able to compete with

the Boeing 727, since it would come on stream after the Boeing.

M. Rousseau, representing the Ministry of Finance, insisted that before any

money could be made available for the medium-range supersonic, the characteristics

of the aeroplane, including the partners for collaboration, would have to be agreed.

Since the budget for civil aviation for 1962 had already been drawn up it would be

quite difcult to add a sum for the supersonic aircraft. Hereil disagreed, arguing that

France should start the work before seeking a partner to collaborate with, especially

since the British thought that French research was more advanced than it in fact

was.81

For those responsible for drawing up the Fourth Plan for the aeronautical

industry one of the most compelling arguments for not investing in the Caravelle

XX was that it would enter the market after the Boeing 727 and would in the

meantime deter potential customers from buying the existing models of the

Caravelle the Caravelle VI and X. Instead, the planners decided that a wiser

strategy would be to improve the existing models of the Caravelle and begin work

on the prototype of the supersonic aircraft in January 1962. On the assumption that

it would take nine years to complete, the supersonic aircraft would then be able to

replace the rst versions of the Caravelle. What was important and what was

considered to have accounted for the Caravelle's early success was that it had been

the rst aeroplane of its type entering the market.

80 MTPT 760 041 / 118. Buron to Thorneycroft. July 1961.81 MTPT 760 069 / 311. Minutes of Meeting on 19 Sept. 1961.


In 1960 and 1961, 4 million and 10 million francs respectively had been allocated

to supersonic research. If France was going to meet the desired timetable the

planners argued that 135 million francs would have to be allocated in 1962. The

expenditure on Sud Aviation's building the airframe was estimated as follows: 1962

105 million francs, 1963 98 million francs, 1964 74 million francs, 1965 74

million francs, 1966 62 million francs: a total of 413 million francs. On top of that,

there would be the cost of participating in the engine construction and then the cost

of building a series of aircraft, making a grand total of 1,400 million francs. If France

could nd one or several partners, the cost of construction could be reduced

signicantly. The total, including the spending on other civil aviation programmes,

amounted to twice the current spending on civil aviation, but only one and a half

times that of the early 1950s. Were the cost of the supersonic programme not

written into the budget for 1962, as was the case at that time, then the planners

warned that France would not have a medium-range supersonic aeroplane and Sud

Aviation would have to cut its workforce by two-thirds. However, the planners also

warned that the supersonic programme alone would not ensure that at the end of

the Fourth Plan there would be an easy transition from the Caravelle to the

supersonic airliner.82

The French decision

Events then moved quickly in France. At the beginning of October 1961 the second

version of the pilot study by Sud Aviation, that of a supersonic aeroplane with a

speed of Mach 2.2 over a distance of 4,600 km, was chosen. Both of the ministers

involved, Buron and Messmer, were now convinced of the case for investing in the

supersonic aircraft and for work to begin in January 1962.

Armed with this resolution Buron and his ofcials travelled to London for the

long-awaited meeting with Thorneycroft. Held on 2 October 1961, it was preceded

by a full-scale meeting between British and French ofcials. The British reported

that two design studies were almost complete: the original long-range transatlantic

aircraft, coded BAC 198, and a concept which they claimed would meet both

British and French requirements for a long-range and medium-range aircraft, the

BAC 223. Both Rolls Royce and Bristol Siddeley had produced engine concepts

and collaboration with SNECMA had been explored. Startlingly for the British, the

French announced that Messmer and Buron would be asking the French govern-

ment for a decision on the project in the autumn and that `it was expected that

considerations of employment would weigh signicantly in the decision'.83

Approval would be followed by expenditure of 125 million francs in 1962 with the

aim of reaching a nal choice between the three designs. Making progress then was

82 MTPT 760 071 / 59. Commissariat general du Plan d'Equipement et de la Productivite.

Commission des Transports. Section des Transports Aeriens, Rapport en vue de l'etablissement du IVe Plan

de Modernisation et d'Equipement 19621965, Oct. 1961.83 AVIA 63/115, `Supersonic Transport Aircraft: Anglo-French Collaboration', Note of a Meeting

between French and British ofcials, 2 Oct. 1961.


a matter of securing agreement on airframes and engines, and convincing the

respective governments to nance the project. British ofcials argued that failure to

agree on a common airframe would be likely to result in the cancellation of the

project, while French ofcials also believed that their Government would abandon

the project ìf some technical snag, like the sonic boom, proved insuperable'. Both

sides laid great stress on the importance of getting the costings correct, as although

`the request for actual cash would cover only one year . . . it would be granted on

the understanding that the total cost had been accurately forecast'.84 These

discussions formed the basis of the meeting between Thorneycroft and Buron. In

Buron's view, the most pressing question was to decide on one aircraft or two, as

this would dene the possible parameters of collaboration. Thorneycroft then

advocated a detailed study by ofcials from both countries to mount a technical

appreciation, but also on project management, costs and likely markets: a proposal

with which Buron agreed.85

Two weeks later, Buron and Messmer wrote a joint letter to French Prime

Minister Michel Debre making the case for the supersonic aircraft. A negative

decision, they warned, would mean the dispersion of research groups, and the

permanent relegation of the French civil aeronautical industry to a position of

technological backwardness in the world. In addition to the social costs, which in

terms of unemployment would be high, there was the question of prestige, they

argued. Whatever the cost of the supersonic aircraft, the indirect benets to French

economic and cultural inuence in the world would be much greater. The most

important thing, as they saw it, would be to make a commitment immediately, in

order to get a head start on the Americans and to incite potential European

collaborators to follow the French lead. Finally and most disingenuously they argued

that ìt is perfectly clear that it will be possible to stop at any time, and particularly

between each technical stage of the operation'.86

Debre was quickly convinced of the case for the supersonic aeroplane, as was

Wilfrid Baumgartner, the Minister for Finance. However, before it could become

ofcial government policy it had to be approved by the Council of Ministers. In

order to secure this, Buron was advised by the government's secretariat that it

should be presented as part of the Fourth Plan. Ministers should be told that the

total cost of the project was estimated at 1,400 million francs, of which half would

be spent during the Fourth Plan, while the cost would be brought down if France

reached an agreement with other countries to build the aeroplane. What he was told

to avoid were phrases such as `the government had taken the decision in principle'

or that ìt agreed to nance research' or that àn agreement to cooperate

internationally was a pre-condition'. The suggested wording of the communique

was: `The Council of Ministers, having examined the proposal to build a medium-

84 Ibid.85 Ibid., Minister's Meeting with M. Buron, 2 Oct. 1961.86 MTPT 760 069 / 8. Messmer and Buron to Debre, 19 Oct. 1961. Ìl est parfaitement clair qu'il

sera possible de s'arreter en chemin a differentes occasions, notamment lors du passage de l'une a l'autre

des grandes etapes techniques de l'operation.'


range supersonic aeroplane and found in its favour, has decided that the investment

required to start it in 1962 should be released.'87 It was to prove a winning strategy.

The French government's decision to commit public money to the supersonic

aeroplane from January 1962 placed France in an invincible position. Were Britain

not to co-operate, West Germany could be counted on to help build the airframe,

since in the elections in September 1961 the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)

had retained its lead over the Social Democratic Party (SPD) although with a

reduced majority, and the engine could be bought from the United States.88

However, it was hard to imagine that Britain would allow France and West

Germany to take the lead in aeronautical research and construction in Europe,

particularly with Britain in the throes of negotiating the terms of its entry into the

European Communities. Were Britain to co-operate (and the French believed that

it would89), France was in a strong position to dictate the terms of that co-operation

and to emerge as the leader of the aeronautical industry in Europe.

Technological imperatives, therefore, while important in the history of the

development of Concorde, do not tell the full story. Certainly the rmly held belief

in both Britain and France that only those countries which could apply the

technology of supersonic ight to civilian transport could have viable aeronautical

industries in the future, was a critical factor. The considerable toing and froing

between 1956 and 1961, however, reected shifting priorities and concerns, with

politics increasingly in the ascendancy. The new Kennedy administration's pre-

ference for an aeroplane capable of ying at three times the speed of sound

punctured the hopes of many in the British government and the aeronautical rms

of partnering the United States in the supersonic adventure. This was to make

collaboration with France, which a minority had sought for political and strategic

reasons, now the only alternative to the nancially crippling one of going it alone.

For France fundamental objections to the long range proposed by the British for

their supersonic aeroplane had long been a reason for rejecting any collaboration

with them. But major changes in the British position in 1961 inspired condence in

the French that a satisfactory deal with Britain could be reached. Not only had the

possibility of collaboration between Britain and the United States receded, but

Britain had made the positive decision to apply for membership of the European

Communities. The French decision to commit funds to the supersonic project made

shortly after Britain's decision to apply for membership had the effect of bouncing

the British into commitment to the project. As Macmillan told the then Lord Home

in April 1962, `There is only one issue now which dominates everything for the

next few months. Shall we or shall we not be able to bring off our entry into the

Common Market? On that the fortunes and probably the life of the Government

depend.'90 From the meeting of October 1961 it would take a full year before

Britain and France would reach agreement and sign a binding treaty to build

87 MTPT 760 041 / 118. Note au Ministre. 21 Nov. 1961.88 MTPT 760 069 / 616. Note au Ministre. 27 Sept. 1961.89 Based on an interview with Pierre Moussa, 8 June 2000.90 John Turner, Macmillan (London and New York: Longman, 1994), 221.


Concorde. It would be a year in which the key decisions taken would increasingly

strengthen the French position, given that Britain could hardly withdraw from the

project while negotiating Common Market entry. Just how far the politics had

overridden the economics and the technological concerns would not become

apparent until later, but the road to Concorde had begun.


Documents

Johnman & Lynch - The Road to Concorde, Franco-Brit Relations (2002)