Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations01).pdf · principles and doctrine concerning the command and control, planning, execution, and support of joint forcible entry operations

16 July 2001

Joint Doctrinefor Forcible

Entry Operations

Joint Publication 3-18

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides the fundamentalprinciples and doctrine concerning thecommand and control, planning, execution,and support of joint forcible entry operations.It presents guidance for joint forcecommanders (JFCs) to employ in planningand executing these operations, and providesselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) for use by supported andsupporting commanders.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected JTTP to govern the joint activitiesand performance of the Armed Forces of theUnited States in joint operations and providesthe doctrinal basis for US militaryinvolvement in multinational and interagencyoperations. It provides military guidance forthe exercise of authority by combatantcommanders and other JFCs and prescribesdoctrine and selected tactics, techniques, andprocedures for joint operations and training.It provides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the JFC fromorganizing the force and executing the missionin a manner the JFC deems most appropriateto ensure unity of effort in the accomplishmentof the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics,techniques, and procedures and guidanceestablished in this publication apply to thecommanders of combatant commands,subunified commands, joint task forces, andsubordinate components of these commands.These principles and guidance also may applywhen significant forces of one Service areattached to forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable andconsistent with US law, regulations, anddoctrine.

S. A. FRYVice Admiral, U.S. NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• Purpose ..................................................................................................................... I-1• US National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations ........................... I-1• Forcible Entry Defined .............................................................................................. I-1• Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations ............................................. I-1• Forcible Entry Capabilities ........................................................................................ I-4

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL

• Purpose .................................................................................................................... II-1• Force Employment ................................................................................................... II-1• Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area ................................................ II-2• Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations ............................................ II-5• Airspace Management .............................................................................................. II-7• Air Defense Command and Control ......................................................................... II-9• Communications .................................................................................................... II-10• Fratricide Prevention .............................................................................................. II-14• Rules of Engagement ............................................................................................. II-15

CHAPTER IIIOPERATIONS

• Purpose .................................................................................................................. III-1

SECTION A. THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT..................................................... III-1• Setting Conditions for Forcible Entry Operational Success ..................................... III-1• Forcible Entry Operations Phases ........................................................................... III-2

SECTION B. PLANNING ....................................................................................... III-5• Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process ........................................................ III-5• Forcible Entry Planning Considerations ................................................................. III-6

SECTION C. INTELLIGENCE ............................................................................... III-9• General .................................................................................................................. III-9• Intelligence Considerations .................................................................................... III-9

SECTION D. CONTROL AND COORDINATION MEASURES .......................... III-13• Control and Coordination Measures ...................................................................... III-13

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SECTION E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS ....................................................... III-14• Information Operations ......................................................................................... III-14• Information Assurance .......................................................................................... III-15• Operations Security ............................................................................................... III-15• Military Deception ................................................................................................ III-15• Psychological Operations ...................................................................................... III-15• Public Affairs ........................................................................................................ III-16• Electronic Warfare ................................................................................................ III-17• Physical Attack and Destruction .......................................................................... III-17

SECTION F. SPECIAL OPERATIONS .................................................................. III-17• General ................................................................................................................. III-17• SOF Missions ....................................................................................................... III-17• SOF Employment ................................................................................................. III-17• Civil-Military Operations ...................................................................................... III-18

CHAPTER IVLOGISTICS

• Purpose .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Authority for Logistic Operations ........................................................................... IV-1• Logistics for Forcible Entry Operations .................................................................. IV-2• Concept of Logistic Support ................................................................................... IV-2• Logistic Planning Considerations ........................................................................... IV-3• Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems

Support ............................................................................................................... IV-8• Logistic Status Reporting ....................................................................................... IV-8

CHAPTER VINTEGRATION AND/OR SYNCHRONIZATION

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ V-1• Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations ................................................. V-1• Termination and Transition of Forcible Entry Operations ...................................... V-3• Summary ................................................................................................................ V-3

APPENDIX

A Amphibious Operations .................................................................................... A-1B Airborne and Air Assault Operations ................................................................. B-1C References ......................................................................................................... C-1D Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4

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FIGURE

I-1 Forcible Entry Operations .............................................................................. I-2II-1 Concurrent Forcible Entry .............................................................................. II-2II-2 Integrated Forcible Entry ................................................................................ II-3II-3 Notional Forcible Entry Joint Operations Area .............................................. II-4III-1 Forcible Entry Operations Phases ................................................................ III-2III-2 Intelligence Support ................................................................................... III-10III-3 Information Operations .............................................................................. III-14IV-1 Joint Logistic Centers or Boards .................................................................. IV-1IV-2 Logistic Functional Areas ............................................................................ IV-2IV-3 Planning Considerations ............................................................................. IV-4V-1 Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits ............................................................... V-1

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Introduces Basic Concepts of Forcible Entry Operations

Discusses Command and Control Responsibilities

Describes Operation Phases and Support Elements

Covers Logistic Requirements and Planning

Discusses Integration and/or Synchronization andTransition

Introduction

The primary task of the Armed Forces of the United States isto deter war and defend the United States and its territoriesagainst attack or aggression. To be credible both as a deterrentand as a viable warfighting option for policy enforcement, USarmed forces must be capable of deploying and, if necessary,fighting to gain access to geographical areas controlled byhostile forces. Operational applications of forcible entryoperations range in scope from an operation designed as theinitial phase of a campaign or major operation, to a forcibleentry that is a single major operation to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives. Armed Forces of the United Statestrain and rehearse three primary forcible entry capabilities oroptions: amphibious assault, airborne assault, and airassault. Joint force commanders (JFCs) may select one entrycapability or a combination of entry capabilities to completethe mission. Special operations forces (SOF) may also beused as part of or in support of a forcible entry operation.

Combatant commanders exercise combatant command(command authority) over all assigned forces, normallyexercised through subordinate JFCs and the subordinateService and/or functional component commanders. Theyestablish command relationships between subordinates thatprovide the authority to perform those functions of command

Forcible entry is seizingand holding a lodgment inhostile or potentiallyhostile territory that, whenseized and held, willenable continuous landingof troops and materiel andprovide maneuver spacefor subsequent operations.

The joint forcecommander shouldorganize and apply forcein a manner that fits thesituation.

Command and Control

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Executive Summary

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necessary to accomplish the mission. Forcible entry operationsemploying a combination of airborne, air assault, andamphibious forces will normally be under the command of aJFC. Concurrent forcible entry operations occur when acombination of amphibious, airborne, and/or air assault forcibleentry options are conducted simultaneously, but as distinctoperations with separate operational areas and objectives.Integrated forcible entry operations result when amphibious,airborne, and/or air assault forcible entries are conductedsimultaneously within the same operational area and haveobjectives that are mutually supporting. Special relationshipsare observed during the planning phase. These planningrelationships are designed to ensure that land, air, specialoperations, space, and naval force considerations are factoredinto decisions made concerning the conduct of the forcibleentry operation. To assist in the coordination and deconflictionof joint action, the JFC charged with overall responsibility forthe forcible entry operation may define operational areas orjoint areas, such as a joint operations area, area of operations,amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, orairspace control area.

Effective and efficient airspace management increasescombat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, andflexible use of airspace, with a minimum of restraint placedon airspace users while achieving the JFC’s operationalobjectives. The JFC will assign an airspace control authoritywho coordinates and integrates joint operations area airspaceand directs changes in accordance with the JFC’s intent.

Communications systems supporting forcible entryoperations must be reliable, flexible, interoperable, timely, andsecure and use standard terminology. Communications plansshould be developed and coordinated by the jointcommunications staff to integrate the communicationsequipment and facilities of joint force components.

The complexity and increased potential for fratricide inherentin a forcible entry operation demand efforts by all elements ofthe joint force to deliberately reduce the risk of fratricide.

The majority of the jointand supporting forcesrequire use of airspace inconducting and supportingforcible entry operations.

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Executive Summary

Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed infive phases: Preparation and Deployment (Phase I), Assault(Phase II), Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III),Introduction of Follow-On Forces (Phase IV - situationaldependent) and Termination or Transition Operations (PhaseV). Each phase must include contingency planning in the eventthat objectives become unattainable. Joint planning isconducted through a disciplined process by policies andprocedures established in the Joint Operation Planning andExecution System. Forcible entry operations may becomeextremely time-sensitive due to political or militarycircumstances.

Intelligence (to include counterintelligence) is fundamentalto effective planning, command and control, security, andexecution of a forcible entry operation. The JFC usesintelligence to decide when, where, and how to attack;determine forcible entry capabilities needed and taskorganization required to seize initial objective(s); supporttargeting and combat assessment; and anticipate futureoperations.

Information operations (IO) involve actions taken toaffect adversary information and information systemswhile defending one’s own information and informationsystems. IO applies across all phases of an operation,throughout the range of military operations and at every levelof war. IO is an essential component in setting conditionsfor forcible entry operational success. A successful IOstrategy will contribute to the security of friendly forces,seizing and maintaining the initiative, ensuring agility,contributing to surprise, isolating enemy forces from theirleadership, and creating opportunities for exploitation of enemyvulnerabilities. This is achieved through the synergisticapplication of information operations elements whichinclude but are not limited to: operations security,information assurance, intelligence support, psychologicaloperations, information attack, military deception,electronic warfare, public affairs, and physical attack and/or destruction during the planning and operational executionof the forcible entry.

The joint force should setconditions that cripple theenemy’s ability todecisively react to, orinterfere with, the forcibleentry operation.

Operations

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Integration and coordination of SOF with conventional forcesare always a critical concern. SOF systems must beinteroperable with each other, with conventional forces,and with US national resources as well as with allies andhost nations.

Within the context of forcible entry operations, logisticsenables movement and maintenance of forces frompreparation and initial deployment to the envisioned end stateof the operation or campaign. This requires commanders toplan and establish the logistic systems for follow-onoperations, if required. Campaign design must includeand integrate the six logistic functional areas oftransportation, health services, maintenance, supply, civilengineering, and other services. Successful integration ofthese functions within the broader concept of operation willultimately contribute to the unity of effort that is critical toachieving synergy by the joint force.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible forcoordination of maintenance within the theater. Wherepractical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service useshould be established. However, Service-peculiar itemmaintenance support should remain the responsibility ofService component commanders. Maintenance prioritiesshould focus on mission-essential systems that can be rapidlyreturned to combat readiness. Procuring, distributing, andsustaining the flow of the supplies and equipment requiredto support the joint force from the deployment to projectedtransition operations or termination pose significant challengesto logisticians. Planning considerations must include thosesupplies needed to sustain assault forces and support theinitiation of follow-on operations. General engineeringprovides the construction, repair, operation, and maintenanceof facilities as well as logistic enhancements required by thecombatant commander. The JFC and subordinate commandersmust provide services dedicated to support the quality oflife, morale, and welfare of the joint force. Combatantcommanders are also responsible for the recovery,identification, and disposition of remains within theirgeographic area.

Special operationscomprise a form ofwarfare characterized byunique objectives,weapons, and forces.

Commanders ofcombatant commands mayexercise directive authorityfor logistics (or delegatedirective authority for acommon supportcapability).

Logistics

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Executive Summary

The JFC’s concept for logistics plays a key role inintegrating and synchronizing joint operations. Throughthe concept of logistics, the joint force deploys, assaults, buildscombat power, builds supporting infrastructure and logisticsystems, sustains operations, reconstitutes, and redeploys orprepares for subsequent missions as appropriate. Logisticconsiderations significantly influence the commandestimate process and the course of action selected forexecution. The planning effort translates the commander’sintent and concept into guidance for execution by subordinatecommanders and logisticians. Joint force command, control,communications, computer, and intelligence supportplanning must include logistic requirements to fully integrate,synchronize, and support operations.

In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm the timing ofan operation, the JFC may choose to rehearse the operationplan. Rehearsals at the operational level range in scope fromjoint force exercises (driven by resource, time, space, and forceavailability constraints), to distributed command post exercisessupported by computer-aided simulations, to commanders and/or key personnel conferences.

The successful forcible entry should terminate in one oftwo ways: one, attainment of the objectives; or two, completionof the operational objectives wherein a lodgment is establishedfor follow-on combat operations. Upon achieving thecampaign or operation objectives, a period of postconflictactivities will exist. Termination activities are generallycharacterized by the transfer of control to civil or otherauthorities and the subsequent redeployment of forces. If theforcible entry is the first phase of the campaign, then the JFCmust define the conditions necessary for transition to the nextphase. A smooth transition will require detailed planning,coordination, and strong liaison staffs and/or transition teams.

The concept of logisticsspecifies how forcibleentry and follow-onoperations will besupported.

The goal of integrationand/or synchronization isto achieve the joint forcesynergy that will result inoperational success.

The transition from aforcible entry operation tosubsequent operationsmust be an integral part ofpredeployment planning.

Integration and/or Synchronization

Transition

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CONCLUSION

This publication provides the fundamental principlesconcerning the command and control, planning, and executionof joint forcible entry operations. It presents doctrine and jointtactics, techniques, and procedures for use by supported andsupporting commanders for joint forcible entry operations.

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

I-1

1. Purpose

This publication presents joint doctrine thatassists commanders to execute effectiveforcible entry operations. Forcible entryoperations are normally joint in nature, dueto requirements for Service-uniquecapabilities as well as the military’sincreasingly interdependent support,transportation, communications, andintelligence architectures.

2. US National MilitaryStrategy and Joint ForcibleEntry Operations

The national military objectives of theArmed Forces of the United States are topromote peace and stability and, whennecessary, to defeat adversaries. To achievethese objectives, US armed forces must beprepared to protect the Nation’s interestswhen, where, and as directed by the NationalCommand Authorities (NCA). The post-ColdWar geopolitical environment resulted in acomprehensive reshaping of US nationalmilitary strategy. This strategy now relies oncontinental United States (CONUS) basedforce projection and employment of animmediately available overseas presence.To be credible both as a deterrent and as aviable military option for policy enforcement,US armed forces must be capable of deployingand fighting to gain access to geographicalareas controlled by forces hostile to USinterests.

“Joint warfare is team warfare.The engagement of forces is not a series ofindividual performanes linked by a common theme; rather, it is the integratedand synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergythat results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrinemaximizes combat capability in unified action. Joint warfare does not requirethat all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they areavailable.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

3. Forcible Entry Defined

“Forcible entry” is seizing and holding amilitary lodgment in the face of armedopposition. A lodgment is a designated areain a hostile or potentially hostile territory that,when seized and held, makes the continuouslanding of troops and materiel possible andprovides maneuver space for subsequentoperations (a lodgment may be an airhead, abeachhead, or a combination thereof). Alodgment may have established facilities andinfrastructure (such as those found atinternational air and sea ports) or may simplyhave an undeveloped landing strip, an austeredrop zone, or an obscure assault beach.Planning must consider the geographic,environmental, and infrastructurerealities. Lodgment requirements dependupon the objective(s) of the overall operationor larger campaign plan (see Figure I-1).

4. Operational Applications ofForcible Entry Operations

Operational applications of forcible entryoperations range in scope from an operationdesigned as the initial phase of a campaign ormajor operation to a coup de main, whereforcible entry is conceived as a single majoroperation to achieve strategic and/oroperational objectives.

a. Initial Phase of a Campaign or MajorOperation. A forcible entry operation maybe the initial phase of a campaign or major

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Chapter I

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operation. To establish a military lodgment,friendly forces must seize and hold anairhead and/or a beachhead to ensure thecontinuous landing of troops and materiel andprovide the space to conduct follow-onoperations. The establishment of thelodgment, followed by the arrival andpreparation of follow-on forces, usually marksthe end of the forcible entry phase of thecampaign or major operation.

b. Major Operation Within aCampaign. A forcible entry operation maybe planned as a supporting plan to acampaign plan and executed as a majoroperation within the campaign. MacArthur’samphibious operation at Inchon during theKorean War dramatically illustrated the effects

of such an application. The operationalmaneuver by Joint Task Force Seven’s naval230-plus armada and subsequent amphibiousassaults to seize the strategic port of Inchonand then move inland effectively severed thelines of communications (LOCs) of the NorthKorean People’s Army. This operation setthe conditions for Eighth Army’s successfulcounteroffensive.

c. Coup De Main. A forcible entry maybe designed as a coup de main that willachieve decisive results. A coup de mainaccomplishes campaign objectives in oneswift stroke by capitalizing on surprise andsimultaneous execution of supportingoperations to strike directly at an enemy’scenter of gravity.

Figure I-1. Forcible Entry Operations

FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

FORCIBLE ENTRY

Seizing and holding a lodgment in hostile orpotentially hostile territory that, when seizedand held, will enable continuous landing oftroops and materiel and provide maneuver

space for subsequent operations

OPERATIONAL

APPLICATIONS

OPERATIONAL

APPLICATIONS

initial phase of acampaign or majoroperationmajor operation withina campaigncoup de main

CAPABILITIESCAPABILITIES

amphibious assaultoperationsairborne operationsair assault operations

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Introduction

OPERATION CHROMITE

On September 15, 1950, eighty-three days after North Korea invaded SouthKorea, a joint command of the United States, Joint Task Force 7, initiatedOperation CHROMITE by conducting an amphibious assault on the port ofInchon on Korea’s west coast.

Operation CHROMITE (simply known as INCHON) took place on the heels ofthe retreat of the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces down theKorean Peninsula in June and July to an enclave on the peninsula’s southerntip. The primary objectives were to land a large force behind the bulk of theNorth Korean People’s Army (NKPA), recapture South Korea’s capitol, Seoul,cut NKPA logistic lines, and provide an “anvil” against which the US EighthArmy, attacking from the south, would crush the NKPA.

Joint Task Force 7, comprised of 71,000 personnel and 230 ships of the SeventhFleet and X Corps (the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division),commenced invasion at 0630 on September 15th with an assault against thecritical island of Wolmi-Do following massive bombardment. By 1800 onSeptember 16th, main landings on Inchon had secured a beachhead andallowed the Commander of the 1st Marine Division to assume command of thelanding force from Commander, Seventh Fleet. On September 21st, commandof all forces ashore at Inchon was assumed by Commander, X Corps, uponwhich Joint Task Force 7, having achieved its successful amphibious assault,was dissolved with control of naval forces reverting to Seventh Fleet.

The impact of INCHON was dramatic. The NKPA at the Pusan Perimeter nowfaced a numerically superior and better supplied force. At their backs, theNorth Koreans now found a major UN force that was severing their logisticlines. The Eighth Army initiated its attack north to crush the NKPA against the“anvil” of the X Corps on September 16. By September 18 the North Koreansbegan to relinquish ground. The US IX Corps in the south moved quicklyforward to drive the North Korean 6th and 7th Divisions back to Chinju. Onthe northern and western front the North Korean 8th, 15th, and 5th Divisionswere pushed back nearly seventy miles in one week.

By September 26, 1950, units of the 7th Division, IX Corps, made contact withunits of the 1st Cavalry Division, I Corps, and Eighth Army. More than half ofthe North Korean Forces south of the 38th parallel faced certain death or captureas a result of the UN Forces encirclement operation. Compared to the dismalscenes of retreat in June and July, INCHON had produced a dramatic turningpoint in the war.

SOURCE: OPERATION CHROMITEUS Army Combat Studies Institute,

Ft. Leavenworth, KansasJoint Command in Korean War Amphibious Operations, 1950

Donald Chisholm, 2000

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5. Forcible Entry Capabilities

A geographic combatant commander withforcible entry capabilities compels the enemyto think and fight differently, even if thesecapabilities are never exercised. As long asthe potential for a forcible entry exists, theenemy must guard against that potential thatresults in fewer enemy assets available toother battles. (For example, during the 1991Persian Gulf War, a US Marine air-groundtask force (MAGTF) was embarked in thePersian Gulf. As a result, the Iraqis deployedunits to defend the Kuwait coastline inanticipation of an amphibious invasion thatnever came.) Armed Forces of the UnitedStates train and rehearse three primaryforcible entry capabilities or options. These

capabilities are amphibious assault,airborne assault, and air assault. Joint forcecommanders (JFCs) may select one entrycapability or a combination of entry capabilitiesto complete the mission. The capability selecteddepends on requirements dictated by the mission,enemy, terrain, weather, troops, and timeavailable (METT-T) analysis.

a. Amphibious Assault Operations. Anamphibious force (AF) with a forcible-entrycapability can be forward-deployed to quicklyinitiate or join other forces in a forcibleentry operation. An AF is defined as anamphibious task force (ATF) and a landingforce (LF) together with other forces that aretrained, organized, and equipped foramphibious operations.

OPERATION URGENT FURY

Operation URGENT FURY, the US battle plan for the invasion of Grenada, beganduring the early hours of October 25, 1983 when an elite squad of Navy SEALs[sea-air-land teams], trained in special seaborne operations, landed near St.George’s to secure the Governor’s residence. A short time later, US Marineslanded at Pearls Airport on the northeast side of the island aboard armedhelicopters from the amphibious assault ship Guam. The Guam was part of anine ship task force supporting the invasion off the coast of Grenada.Meanwhile, in the south of the island at the Point Salines Airport, Army Rangers(flown in from Savannah, Georgia) conducted an airborne assault to seize theairport. After fierce fighting in the Point Salines area, some six hundred Cubanswere captured. This assault allowed elements of the 82nd Airborne Divisionto air-land there. In the meantime, US Marines who had landed at Pearls hadreembarked on the Guam and were taken by sea to the west side of the island.These Marines landed at Grand Mal Bay just to the north of St. George’s. Theysecured the Texaco oil farm and the Beau Se’jour wireless relay station withlittle problem. They quickly overcame resistance from Grenadian troopsdefending the outskirts of St. George’s and relieved the US Navy SEALs at theGovernor General’s mansion.

The capitol was taken with little fighting. Its defenses had been softened byrepeated air attacks from US planes flying from the USS Independence offshore.The main Grenadian Army camp at Calivigny Point to the east of Point Salineswas taken by elements of the 2nd Ranger Battalion on October 27. By October28 all of the major military objectives had been achieved. By this time over sixthousand US troops were on the island.

SOURCE: The Battle for Grenada,Mark Adkin, 1989

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Introduction

• An ATF is defined as a Navy taskorganization formed to conductamphibious operations.

• A LF is defined as a Marine Corps orArmy task organization formed toconduct amphibious operations.

• As an assault force, AFs may projectpower directly against the enemy in acoup de main or may attack across abeach and/or by vertical envelopmentto establish a lodgment to enable theintroduction of follow-on forces. Inaddition to serving as a forcible entryassault force, such forces are capable ofconducting follow-on operations fromthe lodgment. AFs may also be insertedas a follow-on force by sea and/or by airto execute missions as directed.

Appendix A, “Amphibious Operations,”provides more specifics on amphibiousoperations.

b. Airborne Operations. Airborne forcesmay be used as the assault force for aforcible entry or may conduct follow-onoperations from a lodgment. As an assaultforce, airborne forces parachute into theobjective area to attack and eliminate armedresistance and secure designated objectives.Airborne forces may also be employed asfollow-on forces.

Appendix B, “Airborne and Air AssaultOperations,” provides more specifics onairborne operations.

c. Air Assault Operations. Air assaultforces can execute forcible entries using fixed-and rotary-wing assets. Air assault forcescan deploy from land-based facilities andnaval platforms. These forces can rapidlyproject combat power throughout the depthof an operational area.

Appendix B, “Airborne and Air AssaultOperations,” provides more specifics on airassault operations.

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CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL

II-1

1. Purpose

This chapter provides guidance on theemployment options, organization of forces,command relationships, and major commandand control (C2) functions that support theconduct of joint forcible entry operations.

2. Force Employment

a. Forcible entry can be accomplishedthrough amphibious operations, airborneoperations, air assault operations, or acombination of any or all of these forcibleentry techniques. The JFC should organizeand apply force in a manner that fits thesituation.

b. The JFC should determine thecombination of forcible entry techniquesneeded to accomplish the mission. Unity ofcommand is vital when amphibious, airborne,and air assault operations are combined.Forcible entry is usually a complex operationand should therefore be kept as simple aspossible in concept. Schemes of maneuverand coordination required among entry forcesneed to be clearly understood by allparticipants.

• Once the decision is made to use acombination of forcible entry techniquesto seize a lodgment, the JFC must decide— again, based on METT-T analysis —whether to conduct the forcible entriesas concurrent or integrated operations.Concurrent forcible entry operationsoccur when a combination of

“. . . a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier andcompensate for weaknesses . . . such as numerical inferiority or the politicallyinduced need to leave the initiative to the enemy.”

Martin van CreveldCommand in War, 1985

amphibious, airborne, and/or air assaultforcible entry options are conductedsimultaneously, but as distinctoperations with separate operationalareas and objectives (e.g., theamphibious operation around PearlsAirport and the airborne operation atPoint Salinas in Grenada duringOperation URGENT FURY) (see FigureII-1). Integrated forcible entryoperations result when amphibious,airborne, and/or air assault forcibleentries are conducted simultaneouslywithin the same operational area andwith objectives that are mutuallysupporting (e.g., the airborne operationin support of the amphibious landingsin Normandy during OperationOVERLORD). Integrated forcible entryoperations feature the complementaryemployment of forces and seek tomaximize the capabilities of therespective forces available to thecommander (see Figure II-2).

• The distinction between concurrentand integrated operations is importantbecause of the implications fororganizing forces, establishing commandrelationships, and applying force toaccomplish the joint force mission. Inaddition to METT-T factors, the JFCmust consider the unique aspects of thespecific operation and should organizethe force, establish commandrelationships, and apply force in a mannerthat fits the current situation. If theintegrated forcible entry operations occur

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Chapter II

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within an amphibious operational area,whether an amphibious objective area(AOA) or area of operations (AO), thecommand relationships are in accordancewith the establishing authority’s orderthat initiated the amphibious operation.Factors that may impact the establishingauthority’s decision include thefollowing.

•• The responsibility for thepreponderance of the mission.

•• Time, phase, and duration of theoperation.

•• Force capabilities.

•• Threat.

•• C2 capabilities.

•• Battlespace assigned.

•• Recommendations from subordinatecommanders.

•• Follow-on missions, anticipatedoperations, or transition considerationsbased upon the objective(s) of the overalloperation or larger campaign plan.

3. Organization of the ForcibleEntry Operational Area

a. Area of Operations. JFCs may defineAOs for land and naval forces. AOs do nottypically encompass the entire operationalarea of the JFC, but should be large enoughfor component commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces.Component commanders with AOs typicallydesignate subordinate AOs within which

Figure II-1. Concurrent Forcible Entry

CONCURRENT FORCIBLE ENTRY

LFO

BJ

LFOBJ

LFOBJ

LFO

BJ

Amphibious Objective Area

FORCE BEACH HEAD LINE

LandingBeachLandingBeach

LandingBeach

ATFOBJ

PORT

Airhead

LF Landing ForceOBJ ObjectiveATF Amphibious Task Force

II-3

Command and Control

their subordinate forces operate. For example,the commander, airborne/air assault force(CAF) may assign subordinate commandersseparate AOs within assigned airborne/airassault AO(s), or the commander, landingforce (CLF) may delineate separate AOswithin the AOA for Army and Marine Corpselements under CLF control. Thesecommanders employ the full range of jointand Service doctrinal control measures andgraphics to delineate responsibilities,deconflict operations, safeguard friendlyforces and noncombatants, and promote unityof effort. Normally when an AO is assignedto an AF, a high-density airspace control zone(HIDACZ) is also designated in accordancewith the airspace control plan or airspacecontrol order (ACO), due to the concentratedemployment of numerous and varied weaponsand airspace users.

b. Amphibious Objective Area. An AOAis defined as a geographical area, delineatedin the order initiating the amphibiousoperation, for purposes of C2, within which islocated the objective(s) to be secured by theAF. This area must be of sufficient size toensure accomplishment of the AF’s missionand must provide sufficient area forconducting necessary sea, air, and landoperations.

c. Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA).A restricted area of land, sea, and airspaceassigned by a JFC to the commander of a jointspecial operations force in order to conductspecial operations (SO) activities. Thecommander of joint special operations forcesmay further assign a specific area or sectorwithin the JSOA to a subordinate commanderfor mission execution. The scope and duration

Figure II-2. Integrated Forcible Entry

INTEGRATED FORCIBLE ENTRY

LFO

BJ

LFOBJ

LFOBJ

LFO

BJ

Amphibious Objective Area

FORCE BEACH HEAD LINE

LandingBeachLandingBeach

LandingBeach

ATFOBJ

PORT

Airhead

LF Landing ForceOBJ ObjectiveATF Amphibious Task Force

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of the special operations forces’ (SOFs’)mission, friendly and hostile situation, andpolitico-military considerations all influencethe number, composition, and sequencing ofSOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limitedin size to accommodate a discrete direct actionmission or may be extensive enough to allowa continuing broad range of unconventionalwarfare operations. Whenever a JSOA hasbeen established on terrain that will phaseinto an AOA, the JFC will establish a timelinefor relinquishing control in time for the conductof advance force and/or pre-landingoperations.

d. Airspace Control Area. The airspacecontrol area for the forcible entry operationalarea will normally be defined by theboundaries that delineate the operational

area. This airspace control area may includeairspace control sub-areas such as the airspacewithin an AOA. The airspace associated withthe AOA is included in the airspace controlarea. While the AOA is in existence, airspacecontrol within the AOA is in accordance withthe airspace control plan and ACO.

e. Figure II-3 depicts a notional forcibleentry joint operations area. This particularoperational area includes five majoroperational areas within it.

• A JSOA where supporting SOF willconduct operations to support overall JFCobjectives (e.g., seizure of a keycommunications complex). Dependingon mission requirements (e.g., density ofair traffic, size of the JSOA), the joint

Figure II-3. Notional Forcible Entry Joint Operations Area

NOTIONAL FORCIBLE ENTRY JOINTOPERATIONS AREA

Joint Operations Area (JOA)Airspace Control Area

High-DensityAirspace

Control Zone

AmphibiousObjective AreaAirborne and/or Air Assault

Area of OperationsNaval AO

JOA

Joint SpecialOperations

Area

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force special operations componentcommander (JFSOCC) may request theuse of additional airspace controlmeasures to coordinate and deconflict theairspace within the JSOA (such as aHIDACZ, coordinating altitude,restricted operations area, restrictedoperations zone, and other related areas).

• A naval AO encompassing the seawardportion of the operational area outside theboundary of the AOA.

• An AOA where an AF may execute acombination of amphibious assaults, SO,and airborne/air assault operations withforces assigned or in support to achievedesignated AF objectives.

• An airborne/air assault AO that maybe further divided into subordinate AOsto facilitate C2 and responsibility forspecific objectives within the overall AO.In this example, the ground forcecommander has requested, and theairspace control authority (ACA) hasapproved, the use of a HIDACZ tocoordinate and deconflict air trafficwithin the airhead.

4. Command Relationships forForcible Entry Operations

a. JFC Authority. JFCs have fullauthority to assign missions, redirect efforts,and direct coordination among subordinatecommanders. JFCs should allow Servicetactical and operational groupings to functiongenerally as they are organized and trained.

b. A Joint Task Force (JTF) as aSubordinate Force to a Larger Joint Force.The combatant commander may organize theforcible entry force as a JTF subordinate to alarger joint force. The establishingcommander will provide guidance to thecommander of the forcible entry operation.Applicable guidance on command and

support relationships among joint forcesubordinate commanders will be included inthe initiating directive.

c. Forcible Entry Employing aCombination of Forces. Forcible entryoperations employing a combination ofairborne, air assault, amphibious, and specialoperations forces may be under thecommand of the JFC or a Service orfunctional component commander. Thecommand relationship established betweenthe commander, amphibious task force(CATF) and CLF is an important decision.The type of relationship chosen by theestablishing authority of the amphibiousoperation should be based on the mission,nature and duration of the operation, forcecapabilities, C2 capabilities, andrecommendations from subordinatecommanders. Command authority options arein accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 3-02,Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

• The C2 of airborne operationsconducted in areas adjacent to theAOA are specified in the order initiatingthe forcible entry operation.

• Airborne forces employed inside theAOA will be under the operationalcontrol (OPCON) or tactical control(TACON) of the CATF or CLF, asappropriate. Generally airborne forcesare ready for a change of mission (e.g.,new mission orders from the CLF) uponseizure of their initial assault objectivesin the airhead. Once the forcible entryhas been accomplished, follow-on ortransition operations may require changesin command relationships to support theJFC’s campaign plan. Supportingoperations will be coordinated with thesupported commander.

d. C2 of Special Operations Forces. TheCommander in Chief, United States SpecialOperations Command (USCINCSOC)

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exercises combatant command (commandauthority) (COCOM) over all US-based SOF.In theater, the geographic combatantcommander normally exercises COCOM ofall assigned and OPCON of all attached SOFthrough the theater special operationscommand (SOC). The SOC, a subunifiedcommand, serves as the functional specialoperations component for the theater, andwhen a JFC is designated, the SOC may bedesignated as the JFSOCC. When serving asthe JFSOCC, the SOC may form andcommand a joint special operations task force(JSOTF) as a subordinate component of thejoint force. A JSOTF may also be formedaround an existing SOF unit withaugmentation from other Service SOF or,when directed, USCINCSOC may provide aJSOTF from US-based forces to a supportedgeographic combatant commander. TheJSOTF is a JTF composed of SO units frommore than one Service, formed to carry outa specific special operation or prosecuteSO in support of a theater campaign orother operations. The JSOTF may haveconventional nonspecial operations unitsassigned or attached to support the conductof specific missions. The JSOTF may beassigned directly to a JTF. When SOFparticipate in forcible entry operations, it is

essential that the JFC ensures that missionsidentified, nominated, and selected forSOF are appropriate. Accordingly, C2 ofSOF is normally exercised by the SOF chainof command. The JFSOCC or JSOTFcommander exercises C2 of assigned SOFthrough a number of organizations andcoordination and liaison elements to includeArmy special operations task force, jointspecial operations air component, and Navalspecial warfare task group and/or Navalspecial warfare task unit.

e. Relationships During Planning.Operation planning for forcible entryoperations can have unique commandrelationships during the planning phase asarticulated in Appendix A, “AmphibiousOperations.” These planning relationships aredesigned to ensure that land, air, specialoperations, space, and naval forceconsiderations are factored into decisionsmade concerning the conduct of the forcibleentry operation.

• The CATF and CLF, in consultation withthe supporting commanders, areresponsible for the preparation of theoverall plan for amphibious operations.The CAF, in coordination with the joint

USCINCSOC provides SOF to commanders of other combatantcommands for operational employment.

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force air component commander (JFACC)(if appointed) or other componentcommander (as appropriate), isresponsible for preparation of the overallplan for airborne/air assault operations.Finally, the JFSOCC, if designated, isresponsible for preparation of the overallplan for SO. The JFC coordinatesplanning and resolves differencesbetween subordinate commanders.

• At the time specified by appropriateauthority (usually the effective date andtime of the initiating directive),commanders of subordinate taskorganizations report to the designatedJFC for operations.

5. Airspace Management

Effective and efficient airspacemanagement increases combateffectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient,and flexible use of airspace with a minimumof restraint placed on airspace users — allwhile complementing and supporting theJFC’s operational objectives. The JFCnormally designates an ACA, who hasoverall responsibility for establishing andoperating the airspace control system. TheACA monitors, assesses, and controlsoperational area airspace and directschanges in accordance with the JFC’s intent.C2 of airspace requires two key elements: acontrol authority and a control system.

See JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone.

a. Airspace Control Authority. The JFCdesignates the ACA. The responsibilities ofthe ACA include coordinating and integratingthe use of the airspace control area.

• Airspace Control Authority DuringAmphibious Operations. In exercisingC2 of air forces during forcible entry

operations, the JFC will normallydesignate a JFACC and select thatindividual as the ACA. The ACA is thesingle point of contact for controllingthe airspace of the operational area. Ifoperations are to be conducted within anAOA, airspace control will be inaccordance with procedures outlined inJP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations. When an AOA has beenestablished by the JFC, responsibility forairspace control within the AOA istypically delegated to the CATF. TheCATF will coordinate air operationswithin the defined airspace with thecommander responsible for airspacecontrol in the surrounding area. As theforcible entry operation progresses, theCLF, or the commander ashore havingthe capability to control air operations,may establish C2 systems ashoresubordinate to the tactical air commandcenter (afloat) and incrementally acceptresponsibility for various C2 functionsfrom the CATF. When full capability isachieved, the CLF or commander ashoremay assume full responsibility from theCATF. It should be noted that in somecases it may be neither necessary nordesirable to transfer authority ashore.

• Airspace Control Authority DuringAirborne/Air Assault ForceOperations. When an airborne/airassault force is the supported entry forcein a forcible entry operation, theresponsibilities of the JFACC, area airdefense commander (AADC), andACA are interrelated and arenormally assigned to one individual,but they may be assigned to two or moreindividuals when the situation dictates.Based on the situation, if the JFC decidesnot to assign the JFACC, AADC, or ACAas one individual, then close coordinationbetween all three positions is essential.The JFACC may use airborne C2 assets

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to enhance coordination and control ofjoint air operations and airspacemanagement.

•• The distances involved and theduration of airborne and air assaultoperations may require establishingspecial air traffic control facilities orspecial tactics teams to extend detailedcontrol into the objective area.

•• The volume of air traffic throughoutthe airhead demands careful coordinationto limit potential conflict and to enablethe success of mission-essentialoperations within the airhead. AHIDACZ may be established around adrop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ),which includes sufficient terrain andairspace to permit safe and efficient airtraffic control. The HIDACZ can benominated by the ground forcecommander and should, at a minimum,include the airspace bounded by theairhead line. Within the HIDACZ, allaircraft flights should be coordinatedwith the DZ, LZ, and the agencyresponsible for controlling the jointairspace. The air mission commander

coordinates with the assault forcecommander to select the time on targetand the direction of approach into andthrough the airhead.

b. Airspace Control System. The forcesinvolved in the operation largely determinethe choices available to the ACA indesignating an airspace control system tocontrol joint air operations; systeminteroperability will also be a majordetermining factor. For the airspace controlsystem to function effectively, the ACA mustmaximize and enhance the capabilities ofthe collective force using existing controlsystems.

• Airspace Control System DuringAmphibious Operations. When anAOA has been established by the JFC,responsibility for airspace control withinthe AOA is typically delegated to theCATF. The CATF will coordinate airoperations within the defined airspacewith the commander responsible forairspace control in the surrounding area.In this situation the tactical air controlsystem will normally be the system usedto control joint air operations within the

A joint special operations area is defined by the JFC who hasgeographic responsibilities.

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AOA. The system provides thecapability for autonomous airspacecontrol operations, airspace management,and air defense operations and consistsof two elements: the Navy tactical aircontrol system (NTACS) and theMarine Corps Air Command andControl System (MACCS). NTACScontrols the initial phase of the operation.Air control is incrementally transferredfrom NTACS to MACCS as the force isestablished ashore. Once control hasbeen passed (phased) ashore, NTACStakes a back-up role to MACCS forlandward air operations but may continueto control seaward air operations in asubordinate role to MACCS.

• Airspace Control System DuringAirborne/Air Assault ForceOperations. The ACA will normallycontrol the airspace through the TheaterAir Control System (TACS) and theArmy air-ground system (AAGS) inforcible entries. Situations may limitestablishment of ground systems andrequire airborne or seabased systems toconduct airspace control.

6. Air Defense Command andControl

The operational area, including ingress andegress routes, must be fully protected by anintegrated air defense system consisting of air,space, land, and sea assets. The joint force isparticularly vulnerable to attacks by enemyaircraft or surface-to-surface missiles duringthe early stages of a forcible entry.Accordingly, the primary objectives for airdefense operations are to assist in gainingair superiority. The AADC is responsiblefor integrating the joint force air defenseeffort. All available surface-to-air assetsshould be incorporated into the overall airdefense plan and comply with procedures andweapons control measures established by the

AADC. The AADC will exercise a degree ofcontrol of all systems through establishedguidelines, determination of weapons controlstatus, and JFC-approved procedural controls.

a. Air Defense C2 During anAmphibious Assault

• As air defense forces are establishedashore in the AOA, the CLF will requestthe LF be given antiair warfare (AAW)responsibility for the landward sectorof the AOA. Upon concurrence from theCATF, the AADC will pass responsibilityof the landward sector to the LF controlagency (e.g., Marine tactical airoperations center (TAOC)), whileretaining overall AAW responsibility inthe AOA as well as coordination dutieswith the carrier battle group AAW andJFC’s overall ACA.

• The AADC bears overall responsibilityfor defensive counterair operations of thejoint force. The AADC may, however,divide the airspace into regions or sectorswith regional air defense commanders(RADCs) or sector air defensecommanders (SADCs) to enhance thedecentralized execution of the defensivecounterair operations. The CATF isusually designated RADC for theairspace allocated for amphibiousoperations. The CATF and CLF willcoordinate active defense plans andprocedures with the establishingauthority of the amphibious operationand the AADC. The CATF usuallyassigns an air defense commander (ADC),normally on the most capable air defenseplatform, to actually carry out air defenseoperations. The ADC coordinates withthe tactical air control center (TACC)afloat to maintain a current air picture. Ifthe ADC is not collocated with the TACCafloat, close coordination between theADC and TACC afloat is essential.

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• As LF air defenses are establishedashore, the CLF will coordinate with theCATF to create an airspace sector andassume responsibility as SADC for thelandward sector of the airspace allocatedto the AF.

• When an AOA is established, airspaceassigned to the AF usually includes amargin of airspace surrounding the AOAcalled the amphibious defense zone(ADZ). An ADZ is the areaencompassing the AOA and theadjoining airspace required byaccompanying naval forces for thepurpose of air defense. The actual sizeand shape of an ADZ is dependent uponcapabilities of air defense platformsassigned to the CATF; the size of theAOA; and agreement between the AF’sRADC, the AADC, and adjacent airdefense commanders. Within the ADZ,the AF air defense agency maintainspositive identification of all aircraft andconducts air within established rules ofengagement (ROE) and air defenseprocedures.

b. Air Defense C2 During Airborne/AirAssault

• During air movement to theoperational area, air defenseoperations will normally be controlledfrom an airborne platform (e.g.,Airborne Warning and Control System).In practice, extended distances fromstaging bases to designated AOs mayrequire the AADC to delegate controlresponsibilities to an air control elementon board the airborne platform. Initial airdefense assets may be limited to fighteraircraft only. Control of these aircraftwill normally be exercised throughestablished procedural controls.

• Forces initially entering the AO willbe accompanied by organic short-

range air defense systems that must beintegrated into the air defense C2architecture. Preplanned proceduralcontrol measures and guidelines may beestablished by the AADC to expediteintegration of assets.

• With force buildup and the introductionof follow-on forces into the lodgmentarea, more robust high to mediumaltitude air defense (HIMAD) systemswill likely become available. HIMADsystems must establish communicationswith the AADC’s C2 agency and beincorporated into the established airdefense system.

• Once established, designated AADCcontrol and reporting centers willnormally assume air defense controlresponsibilities for forces external to anestablished AOA or AO as defined bythe JFC or the initiating directive.

• Specific implications for forcessupporting CAF are addressed below.

•• Participating naval aircraft may beplaced under the control of theappropriate C2 agency.

•• In some circumstances, naval airdefense systems aboard participatingships may be limited. Accordingly, theAADC must take measures to ensure thata supporting AF is protected by othermeans.

7. Communications

Communications systems supportingforcible entry operations must be reliable,flexible, interoperable, timely, secure, anduse standard terminology. Typical forcibleentry operations communications will employsingle and multi-channel tactical satellites(TACSATs); commercial satellitecommunications (SATCOM); and single-

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channel ultra high frequency (UHF), very highfrequency, and high frequency radios.Communications plans should bedeveloped and coordinated by the command,control, communications, and computersystems directorate of a joint staff (J-6) andwith the geographic combatant command tointegrate the communications equipment andfacilities of joint force components.

a. Command, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) SystemsPlanning. C4I denotes the process thatcommanders use to C2 joint forces using thesupporting communication, computer, andintelligence systems. The J-6 should developthe JTF support plan or recommend whichcomponent should have responsibility forthe following functions.

• Communications-electronics duringmovement. Determining connectivityrequirements for each phase of theoperation: for example, to and fromstaging areas, controlling the assault, andextended requirements for follow-onoperations.

• The communications net for earlyoperations in the objective area and

transition from assault net operations tonormal communications nets.

• Communications from the objectivearea through the command, control,communications, and computer (C4)systems of geographic combatantcommands and other headquarters asrequired; communications from the jointforce headquarters to and betweencomponent commands; and from theDepartment of State or other agencies inthe objective area to the JTFheadquarters.

• Determining JTF communicationsand data interface requirements enroute to and in the operational area to besupported by the Joint CommunicationsSupport Element (JCSE) and requestingJCSE support.

• Relay-type communications fordisseminating intelligence or missionchanges to component force commanderswhile en route to the objective area.

• Electronic warfare (EW), includingjamming operations and coordinationto prevent interference with friendly C2.

Communications supporting forcible entry operations must be reliable,flexible, interoperable, timely, secure, and use standard terminology.

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• Defining the type of service required byusers (i.e., voice, electronic mail, data,teletype, facsimile, and single or multi-channel systems). Special features suchas net structure, secure communications,teleconferencing, and the ability tooperate while on the move should bespecified.

• Determining compatibility andinteroperability among communicationsand communications security equipment.

• Establishing reliability criteria anddetermining alternate and/or backup nets.

• Planning communications support ofdeception operations.

• Establishing liaison among all jointforce commands for communicationsplanning.

b. Joint Communications SupportElement. The JCSE is under the deploymentcontrol of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff in accordance with Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6110.01,CJCS-Controlled Tactical CommunicationsAssets. If the JCSE is deployed as a unit,then the inherent advantages of unit integrityare maintained. However, elements may beemployed separately to permit flexible useof JCSE assets. The JCSE can perform thefollowing functions.

• Provide communications support forJTF headquarters.

• Augment or provide contingency oremergency communications support tomeet the critical needs of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, Services, Defense agencies, andcommanders of unified and subunifiedcommands.

• Provide the latest informationconcerning US Air Force (USAF) and

Army communications capabilities thatcould be required to support joint forceoperations (e.g., USAF airborne C2packages, Army super high frequencysatellite equipment).

• Effect liaison with componentcommunications staff officers withinthe joint force (i.e., communications staffofficers with corps, divisions, andseparate battalions).

c. Communications Support forAmphibious Force Operations.Communications requirements vary with thesize and composition of the AF and mustsupport the specific needs of each phase ofthe operation. Plans must accommodate thepotential increase in requirements for long-range communications to supportdispersed forces over extended distances.Communications for amphibious assaultoperations must integrate C2 systems thatcontrol naval fire support, ship-to-shoremovement, joint air operations, assault vehiclecontrol, surface fire support, and logistics. TheCATF coordinates C4I requirements with theCLF and other forces within the AF andestablishes an integrated C4I plan. Theplan, designed to fully support the operationplan (OPLAN), reflects the requirements ofthe JFC, CATF, CLF, and other subordinatecommanders as appropriate.

• The CATF is responsible for thefollowing.

•• Preparation and promulgation of acoordinated plan for employment of AFcommunications during the operation.

•• Acquisition and assignment ofnecessary communications assets tosubordinate elements of the force.

•• Preparation of appropriate operationssecurity (OPSEC) and military deceptionguidance.

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•• Preparation and promulgation of acoordinated EW plan for the force.

•• Providing necessary shipboard C4facilities and services in support of theembarked LF.

•• Development of a coordinatedcommunications plan for the ATF forinclusion in the overall C4 systemssupport plan.

•• Development and promulgation ofa plan for communicationsconnectivity with other maritime forces.

• Specific C4 systems support planningresponsibilities of the CLF include:

•• Development of a coordinatedcommunications plan for the LFcomponent of the AF for inclusion inthe overall force C4 systems support plan.

•• Development and promulgation ofa plan for communicationsconnectivity with other ground forcesashore.

•• Establishment of computer andnetwork requirements while embarked.

•• Identification of connectivityrequirements prior to movement ashorefor follow-on operations, if required.

• Other commanders of the AF areresponsible for determination of their C4systems requirements and submission ofthose requirements.

d. Communications Support for Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations.Communications requirements vary with themission, size, composition, geography, andlocation of the joint force and the seniorheadquarters. Significant considerations forairborne and air assault operations include

the use of intermediate staging bases (ISBs)and airborne C2 platforms, which can add tothe complexity of managing thecommunications architecture. Airborne/airassault forces will initially deploy with alimited communications capability, largelybased on UHF SATCOM. Communicationssupport becomes more robust as signal unitsand equipment enter the operational area viaairdrop or are airlanded into the airhead.

• C4I relationships, nets, frequencymanagement, codes, navigational aids,and any other communication issuesmust be resolved before the assault phasebegins.

• Long-range radio communications maybe necessary with CONUS- based forcesor ISBs to facilitate control of personnel,supplies, and equipment into the airheador lodgment. Long-rangecommunications are initially establishedfrom higher to lower headquarters. Thehigher headquarters may be on land, sea,or air and may maintain contact throughretransmission and relay sites. Thecommunications plan must ensureinteroperability with the overall joint forcecommunications architecture and providethe redundancy for CAF and subordinatecommanders to adequately command andcontrol operations.

• Ground commanders in airlift aircraftmay communicate with the chain ofcommand over the Army secure enroute communications package(SECOMP). Normally, the airliftmission commander and the airborneforce commander are in the same aircraft.The senior ground commander canadvise embarked ground commanders ofchanges in the ground tactical situationor to the air movement plan.Communications installed on eitherthe airborne battlefield command andcontrol center (ABCCC) or the joint

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airborne communications center andcommand post may relay information fromthe objective area. If an aircraftemergency should occur, use of dedicatedArmy SECOMP will cease at thediscretion of the aircraft commander.

• Airborne/air assault forcible entryoperations require the use ofredundant airborne and groundcommand posts. Normally, a joint forceairborne command post will operate froma joint airborne communications centerand command post, while a commandpost from the airborne/air assault forcewill operate from an ABCCC or a speciallyconfigured C2 rotary-wing aircraft.

• TACSAT downlink and other en routecommunications systems can be usedto communicate with USAF specialtactics teams, theater airlift liaisonofficers, tanker airlift control elements,mission support teams, and elements inobjective areas. The use of specialnavigational aids and homing devicesto direct aircraft to specified areas (e.g.,a designated drop zone) may benecessary. Specialized airborne/airassault force personnel (e.g., specialtactics teams or long-range surveillanceunits) are equipped with navigationalaids, global positioning systems, andhoming devices. These teams will beemployed early to guide the airborne/air assault forces, and providereconnaissance, surveillance, visual flightrules service, and limited instrumentflight rules air traffic control service.Other joint force assets such as SOF orMarine force reconnaissance elementsare also capable of performing some ofthese functions.

8. Fratricide Prevention

The complexity and increased potential forfratricide inherent in a forcible entry operation

demand efforts by all elements of the jointforce to deliberately reduce the risk offratricide.

a. Primary Mechanisms for FratricidePrevention. Familiarization with andadherence to procedures laid down in JP 3-01,Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and MissileThreats, JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint FireSupport, JP 3-09.1, Joint Laser DesignationProcedures, JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Close AirSupport (CAS), and JP 3-52, Doctrine for JointAirspace Control in the Combat Zone, arenecessary during joint operations to avoidfratricide. The primary mechanisms forminimizing the risk of fratricide include:

• Disciplined execution of operation orders,standing operating procedures, ROE, theACO, area air defense procedures, and theair tasking order; and

• Acute individual and collectivesituational awareness enhanced byrealistic training and rehearsals.

b. Specific Force Protection Measures.Specific force protection measures that shouldbe addressed in plans, orders, and as mattersof coordination include the following.

• Weapons and munitions employmentrestrictions within the forcible entryoperational area.

• Guidance and restrictions regarding theemployment authority, reporting,marking, and clearing of mines and duds,to include submunitions (for example,those delivered by cluster bomb units).

• Special safety precautions to be observedduring ship-to-shore movement and withoperations ashore by helicopters.

• Policy regarding cessation of navalsurface fire support to ensure safety of

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joint forces operating within theoperational area, to include amphibiousshipping and aircraft delivering assaultforces.

• Development and disciplined use ofcommon operational graphics andassociated fire support and airspacecontrol coordinating measuresthroughout the joint force.

• Development and disciplined use of aneffective personnel and/or equipmentmarking system (combat identificationsystem).

• Restrictions on the use of incendiarymunitions in built-up areas or terrainwhere resulting fires might endangermaneuvering forces, indigenousnoncombatants, or uniquely sensitive orprotected environmental and culturalresources.

• Policy with regard to use of specialmunitions and fuzes (e.g., variable timefuse) in the operational area.

• Prohibited targets.

9. Rules of Engagement

CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules ofEngagement (ROE) for US Forces, reflect

political, legal, operational, and diplomaticfactors that delineate the circumstances andlimitations under which the joint force willuse force, including initiating and continuingcombat engagement with other forcesencountered in the operational area. Whenrequested by the JFC and approved by theappropriate authority, e.g. national commandauthorities or combatant commander,supplemental measures are issued, asnecessary, for mission accomplishment.

a. The challenge for a JFC is to ensure thatthe ROE for a forcible entry operation providesthe commander with the flexibility toaccomplish the mission, while assuring thesafety and security of that force. At the sametime, ROE must provide the specified level ofprotection to those persons and/or objectsentitled to protected status.

b. Forcible entry operations are normallycharacterized by a high operational tempo andviolent execution. Implementation of ROE isa command responsibility. Circumstances anddirectives, specifically ROE, can changehourly during forcible entry operations.Commanders must be attuned to changes inthe tactical and political situations, specificallyas they relate to ROE, and ensure that membersof their force receive timely notification ofROE changes in order to prevent unnecessaryloss of life.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIOPERATIONS

III-1

1. Purpose

This chapter provides information onplanning and executing forcible entryoperations. Section A describes settingconditions for forcible entry operationalsuccess and defines the five phases of aforcible entry operation. Section B providesa general framework for planning forcibleentry operations. Subsequent sections focuson planning and executing intelligence,information operations (IO), and SO insupport of forcible entry operations.

SECTION A. THEOPERATIONAL CONTEXT

2. Setting Conditions forForcible Entry OperationalSuccess

The joint force sets conditions that cripplethe enemy’s ability to decisively react to, orinterfere with, the forcible entry operation. Toset favorable conditions for operationalsuccess, the joint force should strive for thefollowing.

a. Achieve Surprise. The degree ofsurprise required depends on the nature of theoperation to be conducted. Achievingsurprise at strategic, operational, andtactical levels hinges on comprehensive IOplanning and disciplined execution by thejoint force, complemented by a well-designedand orchestrated public affairs operation.Planners should strive to achieve tactical

“The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does notknow where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places. . . And when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak everywhere.”

Sun Tzu, c. 500 BCThe Art of War

surprise regarding exact objectives, times,methods, and forces employed in theoperations.

b. Control of the Air. Air superiorityshould be achieved to protect the forceduring periods of critical vulnerability andto preserve LOCs. At a minimum, the jointforce must neutralize the enemy’s offensiveair capability and integrated air defenses toachieve local air superiority over the plannedlodgment. The joint forces control the airthrough integrated and synchronized airoperations.

c. Control of the Space Environment.Space assets are critical to operations.Limiting enemy access to services providedfrom space assets may also prove critical tothe success of forcible entry operations.

d. Control of the Sea. Control of the seaenables the joint force to project powerashore in support of the joint forcible entryoperation and to protect sea LOCs(SLOCs). Protection of SLOCs ensures theavailability of logistic support required tosustain operations and support the transitionto continuing operations by follow-on forces.

e. Isolate the Lodgment. The joint forceattacks or neutralizes any enemycapabilities with the potential to affect theestablishment of the lodgment. Thesecapabilities include enemy ground, sea, andair forces that can be committed to react tojoint force assaults, indirect fire systems and

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theater missile systems that can range thelodgment, and related C2 systems.

f. Neutralize Enemy Forces Within theLodgment. The joint force must neutralizeenemy forces within the lodgment to facilitatethe establishment of airheads andbeachheads within the operational area andto provide for the immediate protection ofthe force.

g. Manage the Impact of EnvironmentalFactors. Managing the impact ofenvironmental factors refers to overcomingthe use or effects of land and sea obstacles,planning for contingencies in the event thatthe enemy purposefully contaminates theenvironment (e.g., deploys nuclear, biological,and chemical hazards or prepares theenvironment with mines), and countering theeffects of climate, weather, and all othernaturally occurring threats with regard toboth operations and force protection.

h. Integrate Psychological Operations(PSYOP) and Civil-Military Operations(CMO). PSYOP and CMO planning mustbe integrated within the overall concept ofoperation to protect noncombatants,minimize collateral damage, and precludecivilian interference that will in any wayhinder joint force operational execution.

3. Forcible Entry OperationsPhases

Forcible entry operations may beplanned and executed in the five phaseslisted in Figure III-1. Each phase mustinclude contingency planning in the event thatobjectives become unattainable.

a. Preparation and Deployment (PhaseI). Forcible entry operations are conductedby organizations whose force structurespermit rapid deployment into the objectivearea. Joint forces may deploy directly to theoperational area or to staging areas to prepare

for subsequent operations (opposed entry intothe objective area without staging bases willrequire airborne forces from outside of thetheater or AFs from the sea to seize and securefacilities for follow-on operations). The JFCand staff must be intimately involved inplanning and executing the deployment offorces to the operational area. Amphibiousand airborne/air assault operations involvemovement planning from both strategic andoperational perspectives. Both operationsinvolve movement from marshalling areas aswell as loading and departure from ports andISBs for the sequenced movement of forcesto objective area(s) in accordance with theoperation order. During this phase, the JFCwill typically conduct rehearsals of the

Figure III-1. Forcible EntryOperations Phases

FORCIBLE ENTRYOPERATIONS PHASES

Preparation andDeployment

PHASE I

Assault

PHASE II

Stabilization of theLodgment

PHASE III

Introduction ofFollow-On Forces

PHASE IV

Termination or TransitionOperations

PHASE V

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operation as time and resources permit.Intensive intelligence collection effortsfocus on gathering information to satisfypriority intelligence requirements (PIR) thatthe JFC requires and determining if therequired conditions for the assault have beenestablished (e.g., local air superiority hasbeen achieved). Reconnaissance andsurveillance assets (e.g., SOF) may beinserted into the objective area during thisphase as part of this effort. During Phase I,the joint force sets the conditions that arerequired for a successful assault. Airinterdiction, naval surface fire support(NSFS), SOF missions, and/or other actionsto prepare assault objectives will normallyoccur prior to the commitment of assaultforces. In other situations, political oroperational considerations may preclude suchactions prior to the initiation of the assaultphase of the operation.

b. Assault (Phase II). Phase II begins withjoint force assaults to seize initial objectivesin the lodgment and concludes with theconsolidation of those objectives. Initialassaults are designed to surprise andoverwhelm the enemy with decisive forceand to protect assault forces as they

accomplish assigned missions. SOF may beemployed to precede assault forces to identify,clarify, and modify conditions in theoperational area; to conduct assaults to seizesmall, initial lodgments such as airfields orports; and/or to conduct reconnaissance,surveillance, and interdiction operations wellbeyond the initial assault objectives.Planning for this phase may includepreassault strikes by fixed-wing aircraft,attack helicopters, and/or NSFS to destroyenemy forces in the objective areas and/orenemy ground force reserves, aircraft, theatermissiles, and naval forces that could disruptthe operation. Naval mine countermeasure(MCM) forces may be required to conductMCM operations in order to clear transit andassault lanes of sea-based mines and/orobstacles in order to facilitate rapid movementof landing forces. Landing forces comprisedof Army and Marine Corps units will enterobjective areas via parachute assault, airlanding forces, helicopterborne air assault,and/or amphibious assault. Throughout theassault phase, landed forces must haveimmediately available joint fire support todestroy, interdict, or suppress enemy forces.The joint force must maintain the initiativeand rapidly prepare to receive follow-on

The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment.

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forces to develop the combat power necessaryto secure the lodgment. The JFC will be facedwith natural and manmade obstacles intendedto restrict or halt movement that allow theenemy to mass its forces and repel the assault.Naval MCM forces neutralize sea-basedmines and obstacles to provide land-basedforces the ability to transition from the sea toland. Combat engineers facilitate insertionof assault forces on land and prepare for theonward movement to the objective by clearingbreaches, roads, and airfields of mines andobstacles. Depending on resources availableto the JFC, the introduction of landingforces may be combined with simultaneousstrikes against other key enemy assetsthroughout the operational area in order toobviate the enemy’s ability to react effectively.The assault may be capped by offensive,defensive, or retrograde operations as definedby the JFC’s operational concept.

c. Stabilization of the Lodgment (PhaseIII). Stabilization involves organization ofthe lodgment to support the increasing flowof forces and logistic resource requirements,and the expansion of the lodgment asrequired to support the joint force in preparingfor and executing follow-on operations.Stabilization encompasses two majorfunctions: one, securing the lodgment toprotect the force and ensure the continuouslanding of personnel and materiel; and two,developing or expanding capabilities toaccommodate the introduction of follow-onforces.

• In order to stabilize and expand thelodgment, protect the force, and set theconditions for follow-on operations, thejoint force must rapidly build upcombat power in the lodgment. Forcebuildup begins with the securing ofobjectives by assault forces and must beconsistent with the overall campaign planwith regard to the proper balance ofcombat forces and logistics required toconduct subsequent operations. The

joint force takes immediate steps tooptimize lodgment throughputcapabilities.

• Details concerning the introduction offollow-on forces must be prepared duringthe planning phase of the operation.Commanders introduce reinforcingforces as required based on the tacticalsituation. All means of delivery areexploited to maximize combat power inthe lodgment. Though intended toconduct follow-on operations, in extremecircumstances, follow-on forces may berequired to assist assault forces in theseizure of initial objectives, or may beused to help secure and defend thelodgment. Provisions must be made toclear follow-on supplies and equipmentimmediately from offload points tomaximize airlift and sealift efficiency.The joint force must avoid anunnecessary operational pause. Thetempo of operations directed against theenemy must be maintained to prevent theenemy from reorganizing and effectivelycountering the establishment of thelodgment.

• Whether the forcible entry is envisionedas the establishment of a lodgment toenable future operations, or as a coup demain, the lodgment must be securedand protected in order for it to serveas an entry point for follow-on forcesand sustainment. Based on the JFC’sanalysis of the threat and available forces,the lodgment is expanded as required.Dimensional superiority must bemaintained in the vicinity of thelodgment, additional ground-based airdefense established and integrated withinthe overall air defense system, and aerialports of debarkation (APODs) andseaports of debarkation (SPODs) securedand repaired as necessary. Appropriatelogistic and communications infrastructuremust be established as quickly as possible

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to facilitate the reception of follow-onforces.

d. Introduction of Follow-on Forces(Phase IV). (Note: This phase is requiredwhen subsequent operations are planned forconduct in or from the lodgment.) Follow-onforces provide the JFC with increasedflexibility to conduct operations as requiredby operational conditions that are situationaldependent. Follow-on forces and equipmentmay flow via air LOCs and SLOCs into theAPODs and SPODs located within the now-established lodgment. During this phase, jointlogistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operationscommence in earnest. Follow-on forces mayalso deploy to the operational area to link upwith pre-positioned equipment that has alsoarrived there via SLOCs.

• Maritime Pre-Positioning Force(MPF). MPF provides the NCA with astrategic deployment option that may beemployed to support naval expeditionaryforces. The purpose of an MPFoperation is to rapidly establish aMAGTF ashore that is prepared toconduct the full range of militaryoperations.

• Army Pre-Positioning Afloat Program(Army pre-positioned force,equipment, or supplies (PREPO)afloat). Army PREPO afloat providesthe geographic combatant commander ordesignated subordinate JFC with asimilarly responsive brigade-sizearmored force to be employed rapidlyin response to a crisis situation. Likethe MPF, this capability consists of thecombat, combat support, and combatservice support equipment required by aforce to conduct a wide range ofoperations.

• MPF and Army PREPO AfloatEmployment. MPF and Army PREPOafloat options provide the JFC with

significant combat capabilities toinitiate or prosecute follow-onoperations. Fundamental requirementsfor MPF or Army PREPO afloatoperations include intertheater lift and asecure environment (e.g., arrival airfields,ports, and/or beaches) for arrival, off-load, and assembly of forces. These arethe conditions that will be achievedduring the stabilization phase of a forcibleentry operation.

• Follow-on Force Preparation forSubsequent Operations. Ideally, allfollow-on forces will be organized andtailored so they are ready for combatupon arrival in the lodgment; however,in most situations, follow-on forces willrequire a period of time to link up withequipment, organize, and prepare foroperations that follow the forcibleentry. METT-T will drive timerequirements.

e. Termination and TransitionOperations (Phase V). Follow-on forcesgenerally focus on executing sequels to theforcible entry operation that are designedto achieve campaign objectives. Thesesequels may include the full range of militaryoperations. Successful forcible entryoperations conclude in generally one of twoways: with the termination of combatoperations and subsequent reconstitution and/or redeployment of the joint force, or upontransition to other operations.

SECTION B. PLANNING

4. Forcible Entry and the JointPlanning Process

Joint planning is conducted through adisciplined process by policies and proceduresestablished in the Joint Operation Planningand Execution System. Time available is thecritical factor when planning and conductingany military operation; however, forcible

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entry operations may become extremelytime-sensitive due to political or militarycircumstances. Time, distance, physicalattributes of the operational area, or the natureof the crisis may dictate the deployment of ajoint force to staging areas outside CONUS.Commanders and operational planners willhave to compress planning timelines to meettime-sensitive mission requirements. Time-sensitive situations will likely demand:establishing joint staffs and exchanging liaisonpersonnel as soon as command relationshipsare defined; conducting parallel planning atall command levels; establishing thesupporting intelligence architecture fromnational to tactical levels; pre-positioningairlift and sealift with supported units; loadingunit sets of equipment on surge sealift shipsat US or allied seaports of embarkation(SPOEs); directing the movement of sea-based pre-positioned equipment to theoperational area; and conductingreconnaissance operations.

5. Forcible Entry PlanningConsiderations

The JFC and staff and subordinate and/orsupporting commanders and staffs considerthe following when planning forcible entryoperations.

a. Determine the forcible entrytechniques and/or capabilities to be usedto seize the lodgment. Considerationsinclude the following.

• Joint force mission.

• Threat to joint forces en route to, andoperating in, the operational area.

• Geography of the operational area.

• Forces available to the JFC.

• Time available.

b. Review and disseminate the JFCoperational objectives and intent.Considerations include the following.

• Strategic and operational aims, includingthe desired end state.

• Planning assumptions.

• Operational restrictions that may inhibitsubordinate commanders.

• End state in relation to friendly andenemy forces.

c. Plan forcible entry operations, toinclude the following.

• Establishing internal policies,procedures, and cycles for planningforcible entry.

• Initiating forcible entry planning duringcrisis action planning (CAP) Phase III,course of action (COA) development.

•• Coordinating planning activitiesamong the joint force staff, components,Department of Defense agencies,designated forces, and members of theJoint Planning and ExecutionCommunity after the NCA has selectedthe COA (CAP Phase IV).

•• Conducting detailed executionplanning (CAP Phase V).

• Requesting personnel and equipmentaugmentation for the joint force staff asrequired.

• Establishing connectivity through accessto Global Command and Control Systemwith US Transportation Command fordeployment planning, as required.

• Planning operational maneuver of SOFwith regard to infiltration, logistic

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support, exfiltration, and recoveryoperations.

• Deconflicting planned SOF operationswith other operations regarding thefollowing.

•• Target nominations and/or targetingefforts;

•• C4I interoperability and frequencyallocation;

•• Reconnaissance and intelligencecollection efforts;

•• Use of airspace;

•• Fire support coordination; and

•• SOF reporting requirements.

d. Plan Phase I (Preparation andDeployment). Considerations include thefollowing.

• Identifying command relationships andorganizational structure in the initiatingdirective.

• Determining the forcible entry option(s)to be executed, either:

•• Airborne assault;

•• Air assault;

•• Amphibious assault; or

•• A combination of airborne, air assault,and amphibious operations. Therelationship between SO andconventional force operations must bedetermined and/or specified.

• Establishing horizontal and verticalfunctional connectivity (e.g., C4I).

• Exchanging liaison officers and/or teamsas required.

• Determine requirements for joint airoperations C2.

•• Designating a JFACC, ACA, andAADC as appropriate.

•• Amphibious operation: NTACS(afloat) to MACCS (ashore).

•• Airborne/air assault operation: TACSand/or AAGS.

•• Combination of forcible entryoperations. Designate use of supportedforce system or alternative as directed.

• Identifying requirements to gain andmaintain air superiority.

• Establishing Joint TargetingCoordination Board (as appropriate).

• Determining logistic factors andestablishing airhead and beachheadresupply responsibilities.

•• Amphibious operation: 30-60 daysof supply afloat.

•• Airborne/air assault operation: 3 daysof supply and initial resupply options(airdrop and/or airland).

• Information Operations

•• Developing guidelines and controlmeasures.

•• Ensuring that PSYOP and CMOplanning is integrated with andcomplements joint force operations.

•• Ensuring that deception operationssupport forcible entry and theoverarching campaign plan.

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•• Ensuring complementary use of EW.

•• Implementing OPSEC procedures toprevent disclosure of future operations.

• Integrating and disseminating availableintelligence.

• Requesting communications augmentation,as required.

• Identifying and completing specialtraining requirements within given timelimitations.

• Conducting rehearsals.

e. Plan Phase II (Assault).Considerations include the following.

• Analyzing potential lodgment withregard to:

•• The ground tactical plan;

•• Potential capability for air and sealanding of personnel and equipment;

•• Space within the lodgment andmaneuver space for future operations;

•• Vulnerability to interdiction.

• Operating facilities and/or infrastructureto support operations.

• Identifying forces securing airheads and/or beachheads (e.g., advance, preassault,and landing forces).

• Preparing assault forces to receivereinforcing forces (if required) andfollow-on forces for subsequentoperations.

f. Plan Phase III (Stabilization of theLodgment). Considerations include thefollowing.

• Identifying the requirements forreinforcing forces and projecteddeployment flow, with attention to:

•• Cross-loading among lift assets; and

•• Task-organized by arrival sequence.

• Identifying potential restrictions and/orlimitations in force flow, and eliminatingand/or reducing accordingly.

• Establishing some redundancy of forcecapability in deployment flow for addedflexibility.

• Establishing call-forward procedures forreinforcing forces, if required.

• Determining means of delivery andcapacities to maximize combat power.

• Calculating throughput capability ofports of debarkation.

• Developing plans to clear supplies andequipment from off-load points.

• Preparing reinforcing forces for combaton arrival.

• Planning the expansion of the lodgment.

• Finalizing the arrival sequence ofcombat, combat support, and combatservice support units.

• Establishing force link-up procedures.

• Planning for casualty evacuation.

• Planning for enemy prisoners of war.

g. Plan Phase IV (Follow-on Forces).Considerations include the following.

• Identifying missions for follow-onforces.

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• Preparing for arrival of follow-on forces.

• Coordinating arrival and/or dispositionof any allocated MPF and Army PREPOafloat equipment.

h. Plan Phase V (Termination andTransition). Considerations include thefollowing.

• Continuing planning and coordinationactions initiated in early phases.

• Planning for reconstitution andredeployment of the assault force.

• Planning for transition to otheroperations.

• Planning for termination of the jointforce.

i. Develop and disseminate OPLANs forfollow-on phases (e.g., operations followingforcible entry) of a campaign or majoroperation.

SECTION C. INTELLIGENCE

6. General

Intelligence, to include counterintelligence(CI), is fundamental to effective planning,C2, security, and execution of a forcibleentry operation (see Figure III-2). The JFCuses intelligence to: decide when, where, andhow to attack; determine forcible entrycapabilities needed and task organizationrequired to seize initial objective(s); supporttargeting and combat assessment; andanticipate future operations. CI helps the JFCmaintain the element of surprise essential toforcible entry operations by supportingOPSEC and deception. Intelligence and CIcontribute to force protection byidentifying, locating, and countering theenemy’s ability to target joint forces,support facilities, and operations.

Intelligence should provide the JFC with anunderstanding of the enemy in terms ofenemy goals, objectives, strengths,weaknesses, values, centers of gravity andassociated decisive points, possible COAs,and critical vulnerabilities. Effectiveintelligence support depends on the JFC andsubordinate commanders clearly statingintelligence requirements andsynchronizing intelligence support with theconcept of operation.

See JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support toMilitary Operations, to identify the primaryproviders of intelligence assigned to orsupporting the JFC, and the diverse productsand services available to satisfy joint forceintelligence requirements.

7. Intelligence Considerations

Intelligence considerations for the fivephases of a forcible entry operation aredescribed below.

a. Preparation and Deployment (PhaseI). The preparation and deployment phaseprovides the foundation for subsequent phasesof the forcible entry operation. During thisphase, the JFC and staff conduct detailedplanning to execute planned operations fromdeployment through transition to follow-onoperations. Specific considerations duringthis phase include the following.

• Defining the JFC’s PIR. The joint forceintelligence directorate (J-2) isresponsible for assisting the JFC indefining the PIR for the operations. ThePIR will guide development ofcommander’s critical collectionrequirements by the J-2 staff.

• Forming the J-2 Staff and JointIntelligence Support Element (JISE).The JFC normally forms a J-2 staff and aJISE to direct the joint force intelligenceeffort. The J-2 assesses available

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intelligence resources and capabilities,and identifies the additional resources(including personnel and equipment asappropriate) needed from national, joint,interagency, and Service intelligenceorganizations to fully support each phaseof the operation.

JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support toMilitary Operations, provides guidanceregarding the organization andresponsibilities of the J-2, J-2 staff, andJISE.

• Establishing the IntelligenceArchitecture. The JFC determines thesize and composition of the intelligencearchitecture that will be required tosupport the joint force’s intelligence

needs (to include federated intelligenceanalysis and production requirements)from deployment through the transitionto follow-on operations.

•• Requirements. The intelligencearchitecture must be capable ofsupporting joint forces en route to andwithin the operational area. Ideally,equipment and procedures should alreadybe in place to ensure that time-sensitiveinformation and intelligence can bedelivered to the joint force. Connectivityshould be established between the jointforce, the supporting theater JointIntelligence Center, and otherintelligence support bases (to includefederated intelligence partners) outsidethe operational area using the Joint

Figure III-2. Intelligence Support

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

PROVIDES ENEMY INFORMATION

GoalsObjectivesValuesCenters of GravityComposition

DispositionStrengthsWeaknessesVulnerabilitiesCourses of Action

PROVIDES ENEMY INFORMATION

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER MAKES DECISIONSwhen, where, and how to attackdetermine capabilities needed and task organizationrequired to seize initial objective(s)

support targeting and combat assessmentanticipate future operations

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Worldwide Intelligence CommunicationsSystem and Joint DeployableIntelligence Support System.Particular attention should be given tothe communications and processingsystems required to transmit highvolume imagery intelligence (IMINT)products to the joint force andsubordinate commands. The J-2 workswith subordinate component intelligencestaffs to accommodate their intelligencerequirements to the maximum possibledegree.

•• Space Systems. Potential spacesystem applications with regard toforcible entry operations include: (1)Providing early detection of ballisticmissile attack to down-linked groundstations, facilitating joint force responseor preemptive action; (2) Providingdetails regarding the meteorologicalconditions relative to assault forceobjectives through the IntegratedMeteorological System; (3) Providingall-weather navigation data to missionplanners to ensure that weapons andforces arrive at the objective area; (4)Assisting in determining enemy orderof battle and dispositions within andadjacent to the operational area; (5)Assisting in determining the status of theoperational area environment withregards to the status of objective areasand infrastructures; (6) Assisting indetermining the extent of enemy use ofobstacles in the operational area; (7)Assessing the status of environmentalcontamination of potential assault forceobjectives, airheads, and beachheadswithin the lodgment; (8) Assisting in theprosecution of air, sea, LFs, and specialoperations and joint targeting effortsto support those operations; (9)Supporting and conductingreconnaissance and surveillanceoperations of designated objectivesbefore the assault phase of the forcible

entry; (10) Assisting in combatassessment efforts to determine ifsuccess criteria have been achieved withregard to the commitment of assaultforces or if reattack of selected targetswill be required; and (11) Providingcommunications links between forcesen route from CONUS to the operationalarea.

• Joint Intelligence Preparation of theBattlespace (JIPB). The JIPB processand the intelligence effort must focus on:evaluating the enemy and its potentialCOAs; identifying decisive points thatsupport the JFC operational objectives;environmental health hazards; andproviding information on theoperational environment, particularlygraphic (maps, terrain models, andobstacle overlays) and IMINT products.The intelligence effort must also focuson determining if the required conditionsfor conducting the forcible entryoperation have been met. Based on theJFC’s intelligence requirements,intelligence collection operations areundertaken to obtain essentialintelligence. Throughout this phase, theJIPB process continues to refine andupdate intelligence products to providecommanders and staffs the means tosuccessfully prosecute operations.

JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint IntelligencePreparation of the Battlespace, providesdetailed guidance on the JIPB process.

b. Assault (Phase II). The joint force ismost vulnerable to enemy action during theassault phase. Effective indications andwarning of enemy reaction to the assault andforce protection are paramount concernsduring this phase. Supporting intelligenceorganizations must integrate andsynchronize their efforts with the overalljoint force intelligence effort, maintain

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situational awareness, and designstreamlined procedures for reportingintelligence on enemy forces or activities thatmay pose a threat to the joint force. Thesesame criteria apply to intelligence support oftargeting, target development, and combatassessment during the assault. The ability todetect and track enemy targets for joint forceattack as well as to subsequently performcombat assessment to determine if successcriteria have been achieved is critical toachieving joint force objectives.

c. Stabilization of the Lodgment (PhaseIII) and Introduction of Follow-on Forces(Phase IV). In the remaining phases of theoperation, intelligence assets within thelodgment increase in numbers andcontribute to an enhanced collectiveintelligence capability. If the joint forceheadquarters deploys into the lodgment, theJ-2 must ensure the availability of sufficientassets to assure uninterrupted intelligencesupport to the joint force. The J-2 shouldanticipate an increase in the demand forhuman intelligence and CI assets to conductinterrogation, intelligence collection, andsupport liaison with the host nation countryteam and with any multinational forcesintroduced into the lodgment.

d. Termination and TransitionOperations (Phase V). Termination andtransition operations will assume one of twoforms: transition to follow-on combatoperations or termination of the operationupon achieving objectives.

• Termination of Operations. In thiscase, where the forcible entry operationis in essence terminated because militaryand political objectives have beenachieved, the joint force reconstitutesand prepares for redeployment.During the transition from combat

operations to peace, intelligencecontinues to support the JFC’sintelligence requirements andaddresses the potential for resurgenthostilities by either conventional orunconventional forces. Depending on thelength and scope of the transition period,intelligence support may be required tosupport such activities as minefieldclearing, infrastructure reconstruction,foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA),or restoring civil law and order, inaddition to the primary mission ofprotecting the joint force.

• Transition to Follow-on MilitaryOperations. Once a forcible entry hasbeen successfully executed as the firstphase of a larger campaign, the JFCshifts the focus of intelligence supportfrom establishing the lodgment tosustained combat operations.Intelligence support for sustainedoperations, planned during the initialphase of the operation and continuallyrefined as the forcible entry operationprogresses, now allows for a seamlesstransition that allows the JFC to beginexecution of the specific sequel that willachieve campaign objectives. In someinstances, follow-on operations will bein the form of military operations otherthan war (MOOTW). These operationsencompass a variety of activities thatvary in their respective intelligencesupport requirements. Someoperations such as a show of force,attacks and raids, and noncombatantevacuations may require the same levelof support demanded by combatoperations. Other operations such asFHA or counterdrug operations may notinvolve open combat, but will,nevertheless, still require intelligencesupport to plan and execute.

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SECTION D. CONTROL ANDCOORDINATION MEASURES

8. Control and CoordinationMeasures

Control and coordination of forcible entryoperations pose a particularly difficultchallenge to all elements of the joint force. Inaddressing this challenge, the JFCs andappropriate commanders may employvarious control and coordination measuresthat will facilitate the execution ofoperations and, at the same time, protect theforce to the greatest possible degree. Thesemeasures include, but are not limited to,boundaries that circumscribe AOs; controlmeasures to facilitate joint force maneuver;fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs);and airspace control measures.

a. Boundaries. Boundaries define surfaceareas to facilitate coordination anddeconfliction of operations. Boundaries mayalso define operational areas. The JFC maydefine lateral, rear, and forwardboundaries that are sized, shaped, andpositioned to enable forces to accomplish theirmission while also protecting the deployedforces. The JFC must decide onappropriate AOs for each of the landingforces conducting the forcible entry. AOsmust be sufficiently large to allow forces —airborne/air assault, amphibious, and SOF —to accomplish their missions and protect theirforces. The size and shape of AO(s)throughout the forcible entry and subsequentbuildup phases may require adjustment by theJFC. The JFC, therefore, must be prepared tochange the size of the AO(s) ashore toaccommodate the rapid force buildup andexpansion of initial entry points into a morecomprehensive lodgment area.

b. Control Measures. JFCs may use awide range of control measures to control and

coordinate the maneuver of joint forces inthe operational area. Two of the moresignificant measures with applicability atthe joint force level include objectives andphase lines.

c. Fire Support Coordinating Measures.FSCMs ensure coordination anddeconfliction of operations and the efficientapplication of force on the enemy. Theyshould not be so restrictive that safe havensare created for enemy forces. Restrictivemeasures such as restricted fire lines areparticularly important for converging units orlinkup operations. Similarly, no-fire areasand restricted fire areas are critical whenplanning to prepare a beachhead or airheadfor assault and to protect SOF operating inthe operational area. Permissive FSCMs suchas a free fire area may be used to clearlydelineate areas open to attack by any attacksystem and are intended to reduce the timeand coordination requirements for attackingenemy forces. Such measures also reduce thepossibility of fratricide due to an avoidanceby and absence of friendly forces in theseareas.

d. Airspace Control Measures. Airspacecontrol procedures enhance air operations,particularly with regard to a potentiallyconfined airspace over a specific lodgment ina forcible entry operational area. AppendixB, “Procedural Airspace Control Measures,”of JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone, provides acomplete listing of procedural airspace controlmeasures. Some examples include:

• Coordinating altitude;

• HIDACZ;

• Restricted operations areas and restrictedoperations zones;

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• Minimum risk routes; and

• Standard use Army aircraft flight routes.

SECTION E. INFORMATIONOPERATIONS

9. Information Operations

IO involve actions taken to affect adversaryinformation and information systems whiledefending one’s own information andinformation systems. IO applies across allphases of an operation, throughout the range

of military operations and at every level ofwar. IO is an essential component in settingconditions for forcible entry operationalsuccess. IO assists in setting conditions by:eliminating enemy early warning capability;causing the enemy to disperse forces so thejoint force can mass decisive force when andwhere necessary; severing and/or disruptingenemy C4I to preempt the ability to react toUS initiatives; lessening the enemy’s moraleand will to fight; and distorting the enemycommander’s understanding of the situation.A successful IO strategy will contribute tothe objectives listed in Figure III-3. This is

Figure III-3. Information Operations

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

SUCCESSFULINFORMATIONOPERATIONS

STRATEGY

security of friendly forcesseizing and maintaining the initiativeensuring agilitycontributing to surpriseisolating enemy forces from their leadershipcreating opportunities for exploitation of enemyvulnerabilities

OperationsSecurity

InformationAssurance

IntelligenceSupport

MilitaryDeception

PsychologicalOperations

InformationAttack

PhysicalAttack and/orDestruction

PublicAffairs

ElectronicWarfare

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achieved through the synergisticapplication of IO elements which includebut are not limited to: OPSEC,information assurance, intelligencesupport, PSYOP, military deception, EW,public affairs, and physical attack anddestruction during the planning andoperational execution of the forcible entry.

See JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for InformationOperations, for more information.

10. Information Assurance

“Information assurance” is defined as IOthat protect and defend information systemsby ensuring their availability, integrity,authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing forrestoration of information systems byincorporating protection, detection, andreaction capabilities.

See JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for InformationOperations, for more information.

11. Operations Security

OPSEC attempts to deny criticalinformation about friendly forces to theadversary. Airborne, air assault, and AFspreparing for deployment have large, distinctsignatures. Masking the movement of forcesto staging bases and to the operational area iscritical to ensure OPSEC. Thesemovements may not be totally hidden;however, such details as the composition ofthe forces or the time and location of theforcible entry may be concealed. The objectis to surprise, confuse, or paralyze the enemy.OPSEC procedures must be planned,practiced, and enforced during training,movement, and operations.

See JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for OperationsSecurity, for additional information onOPSEC.

12. Military Deception

Military deception should focus on causingadversary commanders to incorrectlyestimate the situation in the operational area.Military deception operations must be closelycoordinated with the overall operationalscheme of maneuver and other IO efforts. Thedeception operation will have little effect if itis compromised by poor OPSEC or conflictswith concurrent PSYOP. For forcible entryoperations, military deception operationsmay be planned and executed to completethe following.

a. Deceive the enemy as to the time,location(s), and strategic and/or operationalpurpose of the forcible entry.

b. Focus enemy attention and effort awayfrom actual assault objectives.

c. Cause the enemy to diffuse forces todefend all possible airheads and beachheadsin the operational area so the enemy cannotmass decisive force to deny joint forceassaults.

d. Induce the enemy to piecemealresources.

e. Desensitize the enemy to US actions byappearances of “routine” activities.

f. Force the enemy to maintain heightenedstates of alert and/or readiness for extendedperiods of time.

See JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for MilitaryDeception, for additional details on deceptionoperations.

13. Psychological Operations

PSYOP influence the emotions, motives,objective reasoning, and ultimately thebehavior of foreign governments,

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organizations, groups, and individuals insuch a way as to support achievement ofthe overall joint force objective. PSYOPcan be a significant force multiplier. PSYOPcan reduce the efficiency of adversaryforces and create disaffection withinadversary ranks. Further, PSYOP can bean extremely effective population controlmeasure.

a. PSYOP can accomplish the following.

• Amplify the effects of militaryoperations and project a favorable imageof US actions.

• Influence indigenous audiences tosupport (or at least not interfere with)military operations.

• Inform audiences in denied areas. Giveguidance or reassurance to isolated ordisorganized audiences by overcomingcensorship, illiteracy, or interruptedcommunications systems.

• Target adversary audiences to diminishmorale or to reduce the will to resist.Exploit ethnic, cultural, religious, oreconomic differences and give adversaryaudiences alternatives to continuedconflict.

• Sustain the morale of resistance fightersand influence local support forinsurgents.

• Support deception operations bydisseminating information that confirmsor supports the deception story presentedto the enemy through the intelligencechannels.

b. PSYOP efforts in support of a forcibleentry operation may include activitiesemphasiz ing noninterference bynoncombatants, providing critical informationto noncombatants or US citizens in the

operational area, assisting in deceptionoperations, assisting in combat search andrescue operations, and inducing desertion andsurrender within enemy units.

See JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations.

14. Public Affairs

a. Public affairs (PA) operations informAmericans, influence perceptions, and affectthe public’s understanding and support formilitary operations. PA operations can alsohave a profound influence on the adversaryleadership and population. Commanders mustrecognize this power and actively engage withthe domestic and international news media inall areas while maintaining absolutecredibility.

b. News media can be expected to be on-scene in the area of responsibility — before,during, and after forcible entry operationsbegin. Commanders must be fully preparedto actively engage the news media, advancingtheir messages at every opportunity. Mediawill find people to talk to them. If they donot get information from US forces, they willget it from a less knowledgeable source, orfrom the adversary.

c. Adversaries can be expected to usepropaganda in an attempt to sway publicopinion against what US commanders wantto achieve. Technology allows adversariesto instantly communicate and transferinformation to the international and Americanmedia. Furthermore, one must expect themedia will attempt to present both sides of aconflict and seek out the adversary’sperspective.

d. PA operations can be the first line ofdefense against adversary propaganda in thenews media. PA operations disseminate acontinuous flow of trusted, reliable, timely,and accurate information to military

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members, their families, the media, and thepublic. This capability allows PA operationsto help defeat adversary efforts to diminishnational will, degrade morale, and turn worldopinion against friendly operations.

e. Commanders must be prepared to fullyengage with the news media. The less UScommanders say the more time the adversaryhas to get their messages across to the public,thus putting the United States in a defensive,reactive mode. PA operations help thecommander prepare forces, develop andcoordinate messages to use with mediainterviews to help prepare publicexpectations, and fully explain goals andobjectives the moment operations begin.

See JP 3-61, Public Affairs in Joint MilitaryOperations, for additional detail on PA.

15. Electronic Warfare

EW includes any military action involvingthe use of electromagnetic and directed energyto control the electromagnetic spectrum or toattack the enemy. The JFC’s plan must bedeveloped to ensure complementary use ofassets and weapons systems to effectivelydisrupt and/or destroy enemy C4I andweapons systems while protecting joint forcecapabilities.

See JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for ElectronicWarfare, for additional detail on EW.

16. Physical Attack andDestruction

Physical attack and destruction refersto the use of “hard kill” weapons againstdesignated targets as an element of IO. Mostdestructive attacks to degrade the adversary’sC2 systems by attacks on C2 nodes qualify asinterdiction. To achieve its full potential insupporting a forcible entry operation,physical attack and destruction must belinked closely with the targeting process.

SECTION F. SPECIALOPERATIONS

17. General

SO comprise a form of warfarecharacterized by unique objectives, weapons,and forces. The successful conduct of SOrelies on individual and small unitproficiency in a multitude of specialized,often unconventional combat skills appliedwith adaptability, improvisation, innovation,and self-reliance. Although they may beconducted as a single-Service operation, theyroutinely require joint support andcoordination.

18. SOF Missions

SOF are organized, trained, and equippedspecifically to accomplish nine principalmissions: direct action, specialreconnaissance, foreign internal defense,unconventional warfare, combattingterrorism, PSYOP, civil affairs,counterproliferation of weapons of massdestruction, and IO. All of these missions canbe conducted in an operational environmentrequiring forcible entry, where SOFcapabilities make them especially useful inthis type of short term and/or limited scopeoperation.

19. SOF Employment

SOF may be employed prior to hostilities,as well as any time during hostilities. SOFmissions supporting forcible entries caninclude the following.

a. Direct action missions may include:raids, ambushes, and direct assaults; standoffattacks by SOF air, ground, or maritimeplatforms or units; terminal guidanceoperations to direct munitions at designatedtargets; personnel and material recoveryoperations; precision destruction operations;

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anti-surface warfare; amphibious warfare;and mine warfare.

b. Special reconnaissance missionsinclude reconnaissance and surveillanceactions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify,by visual observation or other collectionmethods, information concerning thecapabilities, intentions, and activities of anactual or potential enemy that may affectforcible entries or secure data concerning themeteorological, hydrographic, or geographiccharacteristics of a particular area. It includestarget acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

c. Unconventional warfare (UW)involves use of indigenous or surrogate forceswho are organized, trained, equipped,supported, and directed by SOF in support ofUS national objectives in the full range ofmilitary and paramilitary operations. Whenconducted in support of forcible entries, it canbe an important force multiplier. UW includesguerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage,intelligence activities, and evasion andescape.

d. SOF support to IO activitiesenhancing conditions favorable to forcibleentries includes direct action, special

reconnaissance, PSYOP, civil affairs (CA),and foreign internal defense.

See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations, for more information on SOF.

20. Civil-Military Operations

CMO encompass the activities taken by theJFC to establish and maintain effectiverelations between his or her forces and thecivil authorities and general population,resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral,or hostile areas where those forces areemployed. Properly executed CMO duringforcible entries can reduce potential frictionpoints between the civilian population and thejoint force, specifically by eliminatinginterference with military operations andlimiting the impact of military operations onthe populace. Use of CA forces and unitsspecifically organized, trained, and equippedto conduct CA activities in support of CMOcan assist the commander by accomplishingthe following tasks.

• Providing liaison to local agencies andcivilian authorities.

• Enhancing economy of force byreducing the need to divert combat-ready

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DECEPTION OPERATIONSDURING DESERT STORM

From 29 January until 16 February 1991, Naval Special Warfare Task Groupelements conducted nearshore and offshore reconnaissance missions insupport of Central Command’s deception strategy to fix Iraqi attention on apotential amphibious invasion by US Marines. The special reconnaissancemissions resulted in the collection of information, established a naval presencealong the Kuwaiti coast, and focused the attention of the Iraqi command on apossible maritime invasion. The deception effort culminated in a large-scaleoperation on the night of 23-24 February 1991, the eve of the ground offensive,which simulated a beach reconnaissance and clearing operation. Thedeception campaign prevented Iraqi units at the beaches from reinforcing thosebeing attacked in the west.

SOURCE: United States Special Operations Command History, 2d Edition

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troops from essential duties by planningfor and using local resources.

• Supporting maneuverability byminimizing civilian interference with USmilitary operations through the setup ofdisplaced civilian collection points andassembly areas, planning andcoordinating with local authorities toincrease maneuver flexibility, andrecommending routes that avoiddensely populated areas.

• Enhancing the effectiveness of sensitiveoperations by coordinating with localauthorities.

• Supporting security by planning for andusing local civil police to maintain order

in support of the security force, providinginformation about cultural, religious,ethnic, racial, political, or economicattitudes that would jeopardize themilitary mission.

• Performing governmental functionswhen local agencies are unwilling orunable to provide for their people’s needsand planning for and training hostnation personnel who subsequently willassume and/or expand upon ongoinginitiatives.

See JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, JointDoctrine for Civil Affairs, for additionalinformation on CMO and CA forces andactivities.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVLOGISTICS

IV-1

1. Purpose

This chapter provides guidance forconducting logistic operations in support ofjoint force planning and execution of forcibleentry operations. Specifically, the textdiscusses logistics during forcible entryoperations as it relates to authority for logisticoperations, the application of logisticfunctions, concept of logistic support, logisticplanning considerations, C4I for logistics,financial control during forcible entryoperations, and logistic status reporting.

2. Authority for LogisticOperations

Authority for logistic operations isprescribed in JP 4-0, Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Joint Operations. Commandersof combatant commands may exercisedirective authority for logistics over theirassigned forces (or delegate directiveauthority for a common support capabilityover their assigned forces to a JFC). Theexercise of directive authority for logistics bya combatant commander includes theauthority to issue directives to subordinatecommanders that may result in the reallocationof commodities and/or service supportcapabilities. Directive authority may beexercised to alter peacetime as well as wartimelogistic relationships as necessary to ensurethe following: effective execution of approvedOPLANs; effectiveness and economy ofoperation(s); and prevention or elimination ofunnecessary duplication of facilities andoverlapping of functions among the Servicecomponent commanders. The JFC maydesignate a joint theater logistics

“The great question of the campaign was one of supplies.”

General William T. ShermanMemoirs of General William T. Sherman, 1875

management structure. To assist incoordinating and controlling the logisticeffort, the combatant commander orsubordinate JFC may establish one or moreof the joint logistic centers or boards (listedin Figure IV-1) based on the scope of thecampaign or forcible entry operation. Boardsmay be staffed by functional experts fromService components, subordinate commands,or activities as directed.

Figure IV-1. Joint LogisticCenters or Boards

JOINT LOGISTICSCENTERS OR BOARDS

Joint Movement Center

Logistic Staff Officer forPetroleum and SubareaPetroleum Office

Joint Civil-MilitaryEngineering Board

Joint Facilities UtilizationBoard

Combatant CommanderLogistic ProcurementSupport Board

Theater Patient MovementRequirements Center

Joint Blood Program Office

Joint Mortuary Affairs Office

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Detailed discussions of joint logistic centersand boards may be found in JP 4-0, Doctrinefor Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

3. Logistics for Forcible EntryOperations

Within the context of forcible entryoperations, logistics enables movement andmaintenance of forces from preparationand initial deployment to the envisioned endstate of the operation or larger campaign. Thisrequires commanders to plan and establishthe logistic systems for follow-onoperations. Commanders and operational andlogistic planners must plan for follow-onoperations that will enable the force toaccomplish campaign object ives .Commanders and planners must avoid thenatural tendency to focus exclusively on thedeployment and assault phases of theoperation. Campaign design must includeand integrate the six logistic functionalareas of transportation, health services,maintenance, supply, civil engineering, andother services (see Figure IV-2). Successfulintegration of these functions within the

broader concept of operation will ultimatelycontribute to the unity of effort that is criticalto achieving synergy by the joint force. Thesix logistic functions are found in JP 4-0,Doctrine for Logistic Support of JointOperations.

Additional guidance for related doctrine isavailable in the JP 4-01 Series.

4. Concept of Logistic Support

The JFC’s concept for logistics plays akey role in integrating and/orsynchronizing joint operations. Through theconcept of logistics, the joint force deploys,assaults, builds combat power, buildssupporting infrastructure and logistic systems,sustains operations, reconstitutes, andredeploys or prepares for subsequent missionsas appropriate. Logistic considerationssignificantly influence the commandestimate process and the COA selected forexecution. The commander ensures that theconcept of logistics fully supports the forcethrough the anticipated span of the operationor campaign. The concept for logisticsincludes the following.

• Concept for movement of prioritizedforce packages into, within, and throughthe lodgment operational area (LOA).Includes analysis of need for en routeinfrastructure and ISBs to includelocations. Includes considerations forretrograde of prioritized personnel andcargo.

• Concept for theater distribution tominimize shortages or bottlenecks ofcritical resources.

• Identification of key logistic resourcesin the LOA and coordination for theiracquisition, control, operation, andimprovement to support the concept ofoperation.Figure IV-2. Logistic Functional Areas

LOGISTICFUNCTIONAL AREAS

Transportation

Health Services

Maintenance

Supply

Civil Engineering

Other Services

Transportation

Health Services

Maintenance

Supply

Civil Engineering

Other Services

IV-3

Logistics

• Identification of logistic resources to beintroduced into the LOA and theirpossible sourcing.

• Logistic conditions necessary to executefollow-on operations.

• Directive authority for logistics to assignService and agency responsibilities byfunction, by phase, and/or by geographicarea.

• Identifying ISB requirements andassociated transportation andinfrastructure support.

5. Logistic PlanningConsiderations

Logistic success hinges on the quality ofthe planning effort that translatescommander’s intent and concept into guidancefor execution by subordinate commanders andlogisticians. The discussion that followsaddresses planning considerations indeveloping the logistic system; identifiespotential decisions that must be made by thecommander to facilitate control of logisticoperations; cites general planningconsiderations for logistic concept andsupporting plans development; and identifiesspecial by-phase considerations to supportthe forcible entry. Environmental andenvironmental health management areimportant considerations, given the short- andlong-term dangers associated with manymateriel items and wastes and the domestic,international, and host nation standards fortheir controlled shipment, storage, use anddisposal.

Specific environmental considerations for allfacets of operations are discussed in JP 4-04,Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineer Support, notjust for specialized logistic functions.

a. Planning Considerations forDeveloping the Logistic System (see FigureIV-3).

• Geography. Planners must determinethe impact of topography, climate, andexternal factors affecting the logisticsystem. The various segments of thetransportation system, including allwaterways, rail, roads, pipelines, andairways demand close scrutiny.

• Transportation Considerations.Sealift is by far the most efficient modefor bulk tonnage; airlift is often the mostexpedient for people or for rapidmovement of equipment and supplieswhen time is critical. On land, rail (forbulk tonnage) and pipeline (for bulkliquids) are more efficient than trucks.These factors should influence the time-phased selection of transportation modesto meet operational requirements.

• Logistic Capabilities. The capabilitiesof the base infrastructure with regard toreceiving, storing, and issuing logisticresources influence the efficiency of theentire logistic system (for example,through the use of specialized containerhandling equipment). Infrastructure alsoimpacts the size of the force that can besupported. Logistic capabilitiesconsiderations include force structureassessments in regard to logistic unitsand personnel available and the need topossibly mobilize Reserve Componentassets to support the concept of logisticsupport.

• Logistic Enhancements. Plans shouldinclude means to reduce the impact oflogistic bottlenecks. Some examples areopening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking

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aprons, supplying additional materialshandling equipment (MHE), expeditingthe delivery of airfield and beachmatting, and acquiring additionalmanpower. Maximizing employment ofcommercial containers vice breakbulkcan aid in port clearance anddistribution, assuming ports areappropriately equipped. Planners shouldrealize that such a container policy maycreate problems elsewhere because itrequires a great amount of MHE andsurface transportation. Automatedlogistic information systems, such as theTransportation Coordinator’s-AutomatedInformation for Movement, providevisibility of unit equipment and thefollow on sustainment flow. Thesesystems have been enhanced withautomated identification technology toensure material visibility duringdeployment and sustainment.

• Multinational Support. The level ofassistance in terms of transportationresources, labor, facilities, and materielthat can be provided by multinationalsupport affects the amount of airlift andsealift that may be required for initialmovement of combat forces orsustainment.

• Contractor Support. Contractorsupport can be used to mitigate shortfallsin transportation, base and portinfrastructure, and host-nation supportwhile reducing requirements for scarcecombat support and combat servicesupport units. It is therefore critical thatcontractors and contracting officers beinvolved at the outset in operationalplanning. Transportation planners mustensure that, when employed, contractorpersonnel and equipment are included intime-phased force and deployment data(TPFDD).

Figure IV-3. Planning Considerations

PLANNINGCONSIDERATIONS

Geography

TransportationConsiderations

Logistic Capabilities

Logistic Enhancements

Protection of Logistics

Assignment ofResponsibility

Risk Analysis

Demands of anExpanding Force

Critical Items

System Constraints

Movement Control

Resupply Systems

Responsive EchelonedSupport

Multinational Support

Contractor Support

IntermediateStaging Base

IV-5

Logistics

• Protection of Logistics. Provisionsmust be made for force protection ofthe logistic system because it is anintegral part of combat power.

Expanded discussions of protection oflogistic infrastructure and LOCs, toinclude the designation of a joint reararea, may be found in JP 3-10, Doctrinefor Joint Rear Area Operations.

• Responsive, Echeloned Support. Thelogistic system must be responsive to theneeds of the joint force, extending fromCONUS to the forward operational area,providing supplies and services when andwhere they are needed.

• Assignment of Responsibility.Geographic combatant commandersshould assign responsibility for specificlogistic functions to supportingcommanders of a combatant command,Service components, or Department ofDefense agencies in accordance withtheir core competencies and the conceptof logistic support for the operation.

• Risk Analysis. Planning analysis mustdetermine the difference between the

requirements (defined in measurableterms) to support the entire campaignand the logistic system’s collectivecapabilities to satisfy those requirements.The resulting difference must beassessed in terms of risk to the forceand impact on the force’s ability toaccomplish the mission assigned.

• Demands of an Expanding Force.Planners should provide guidance forredistributing assets from organizationswith low priorities to those units with thegreatest need within the command;obtain assets from external sources withlower priority needs; control allocationof new assets in short supply; andprovide efficient means to retrograde,repair, and reissue damaged orunserviceable critical items. Intratheaterhealth services and medical evacuationcapabilities must be expanded to sustainthe increasing troop population within thetheater.

• Critical Items. Critical supplies andmateriel should be identified early in theplanning process, and prioritiesestablished and alternatives developed tooffset identified shortfalls.

Movement of forces into combat is a top priority.

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• System Constraints. Logistic plannersmust understand the constrainingfactors affecting all phases of thedeployment and sustainment plans.Intra-CONUS, intertheater, andintratheater movements can encounterbottlenecks that limit or degrade theability to support an OPLAN.Identifying bottlenecks en route to orwithin the theater is the first step incoordinating activities to avoidoverloading LOCs. Traditionally,limited unloading capacities at ports andairfields and limited inlandtransportation constrained theoperational capability of combat forces.Logistic planners must anticipatecongestion and seek solutions tobottlenecks. Planners assess and planjoint and possible multinational use ofreal estate, ship berthing andunloading facilities, labor,transportation, and constructionmateriel. Special consideration shouldbe given to ammunition and bulk fuelsport throughput and storagecapabilities.

• Movement Control. Movementcontrol must coordinate theemployment of all means oftransportation to support the conceptof operations. As the singletransportation manager, the Commanderin Chief, United States TransportationCommand will provide for proper liaisonwith the geographic combatantcommanders for movement of personneland materiel into theater. Geographiccombatant commanders exercisecontrol over intratheater movementand may delegate control to a subordinateJFC within a particular operational area;detailed coordination may be required tobalance competing demands of the jointforce, host nation, and/or alliedrequirements. Whatever uniquecircumstances prevail in a theater,

logistic plans should providecombatant commanders with thehighest practicable degree of influenceor control over movement. Operationalplanners anticipate the supportrequirements for exploiting operationalsuccess to facilitate acceleratedattainment of campaign objectives.

• Resupply Systems. Automatic resupplyworks best for certain commodities andwhen constant usage rates are available.Whether certain units can be resuppliedautomatically (“push” system) or inresponse to their requisitions (“pull”system), planners should determinesupply requirements in the context of aunit’s mission and its operating area. Theplan should provide flexibility to adjustplanning factors based on empirical dataand to switch between “push” and “pull”resupply for various units.

• Intermediate Staging Base.Establishment and employment ofISB(s) will be at the discretion of theJFC. ISBs support split based and reachoperations. Employment must beconsidered as integral to force projectionand force sustainment.

For detailed information on jointreception, staging, onward movement,and integration, see JP 4-01.8, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forJoint Reception, Staging, OnwardMovement, and Integration. JP 3-35,Doctrine for Deployment andRedeployment Operations, explains thedeployment and redeployment phases ofthe process. For detailed informationon movement control, see JP 4-01.3,Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Movement Control. Fordetailed information on JLOTS, see JP4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

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b. Special Logistic Consideration forSupporting Phases of Forcible EntryOperations. Logistic planning fordifferent phases of multiphased operationsoccurs concurrently, not sequentially. Thefollowing special planning considerationssupplement those detailed in JP 4-0,Doctrine for Logistic Support of JointOperations, and JP 5-0, Doctrine forPlanning Joint Operations.

• Phase I (Preparation andDeployment).

•• Identify and coordinate for ISBs asrequired.

•• Identify time-phased logisticrequirements.

•• Develop prioritized transportationrequirements.

•• Analyze capabilities, limitations, andvulnerabilities of APODs and aerialports of embarkation, SPODs andSPOEs, coastal areas for JLOTS, andoperational area infrastructure to supportprojected operations.

•• Determine air, sea, and land LOCrequirements to support forcible entryand subsequent operations.

•• Determine logistic factors andestablish airhead and beachheadresupply responsibility.

•• Analyze and/or assess multinationalsupport and contractor capabilities tosupport operations.

•• Analyze and recommend changes totime-phased force and deployment list(TPFDL) flow to ensure that adequatesupport will be available at the right timeand place.

•• Integrate and synchronize logisticsupport of initial and subsequent flowof forces into the operational area.

• Phase II (Assault).

•• Analyze potential lodgment area toensure continuous air and sea landing ofpersonnel, equipment, and logisticresources as well as availability of facilities.

•• Provide adequate medical supportand evacuation to support concurrent orintegrated assaults by amphibious,airborne, air assault, and SOF.

• Phase III (Stabilization of theLodgment).

•• Project and/or resolve restrictionsand/or limitations in the capability tosupport force flow.

•• Determine means of delivery andcapacities to maximize combat power.

•• Identify and plan advanced logistic basesin support of the joint force operationalconcept. Unless additional forcible entryoperations are anticipated, planning forfollow-on operations will be in accordancewith standard joint force logistic planningdoctrine in JP 4-0, Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Joint Operations.

•• Seek methods to maximize andexpand throughput capabilities ofAPODs and SPODs.

•• Develop provisions to clearreinforcing supplies and equipmentfrom off-load points.

•• Analyze requirements to expand thelodgment with regard to maximum onground capabilities, throughput, andinfrastructure.

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• Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-onForces).

•• Identify mission supportrequirements for follow-on operations.

•• Begin MPF and Army PREPOafloat operations.

•• Continue buildup of preplannedsupplies.

•• Initiate civil engineering andconstruction plans for support tofollow-on operations.

•• Plan for reconstitution andredeployment of the assault force forfollow-on combat or operations otherthan war.

• Phase V (Termination and Transition).

•• Redeploy and/or reconstitute assaultforces as appropriate.

•• Plan for preparing the force forfollow-on, out-of-area operations, suchas redeployment to another geographicalarea.

•• Once plans have formally addressedand integrated all six logistic functionalareas, the force should be well preparedto begin the application of thosefunctions that support operationalexecution.

6. Command, Control,Communications,Computers, and IntelligenceSystems Support

Joint force C4I support planning mustinclude logistic requirements to fullyintegrate, synchronize, and support

operations. Similarly, C4I contingency plansmust define back-up capabilities that willensure uninterrupted logistic support ofongoing operations. C4I infrastructure mustbe established quickly to enable fullutilization of logistic systems. C4I planningmust also include appropriate defensivesecurity measures to prevent penetration andexploitation of friendly systems by enemyforces.

7. Logistic Status Reporting

Logistic status reports provide the JFC withcritical input for making decisions in adynamic operational setting. Functionallogistic areas for which recurring or specialreporting requirements may be detailed mayinclude the following.

a. Status of deploying forces.

b. Personnel summary reports.

c. Logistic status reports for all classesof supply and for selected, criticalcommodities.

d. Projected resource requirements forprobable execution of selected contingencyoptions and associated costs.

e. Materiel readiness status of weaponssystems, vehicles, and equipment.

f. Status of joint force transportationassets.

g. Medical status of the force.

h. Status of operat ional areainfrastructure.

i. Status of support of CMO.

j. Special weapons status.

CHAPTER VINTEGRATION AND/OR SYNCHRONIZATION

V-1

1. Introduction

a. General. This chapter highlights somecommon issues and considerations thatintegrate and synchronize activities during aforcible entry operation. The discussion thatfollows is not a checklist, but may be used byJFCs and staffs as appropriate to meet theirspecific needs.

b. Rehearsals. In order to integrate,synchronize, and confirm the timing of anoperation, the JFC may choose to rehearsethe OPLAN (Other benefits of rehearsals arelisted in Figure V-1). Rehearsals at theoperational level range in scope from jointforce exercises (driven by resource, time,space, and force availability constraints), tocommand post exercises supported bycomputer aided-simulations, to commandersand/or key personnel conferences. Thedecision to conduct rehearsals will beinfluenced by the time available and byOPSEC considerations.

2. Integration and/orSynchronizationConsiderations

The following discussion illustrates thetype of activities that may occur at the JFClevel to integrate and synchronize a forcibleentry operation. This list is not all-inclusive,but presents major phases for JFCs andstaffs to consider when synchronizing a

“The joint campaign plan achieves sequenced and synchronized employmentof all available land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces —orchestrating the employment of these forces in ways that capitalize on thesynergistic effect of joint forces. The objective is the employment ofoverwhelming force designed to wrest the initiative from opponents and defeatthem in detail.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

Figure V-1. Operation PlanRehearsal Benefits

OPERATION PLANREHEARSAL

BENEFITS

CommonUnderstanding

Unity of Effort

Articulate SupportingIntents

Subordinate andSupporting

Commanders'Questions

Branches or Sequels

Integration andSynchronization

CommonUnderstanding

Unity of Effort

Articulate SupportingIntents

Subordinate andSupporting

Commanders'Questions

Branches or Sequels

Integration andSynchronization

V-2

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typical forcible entry operation. JP 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, reflects fivephases for a conventional operation:preparation and deployment; assault;stabilization of the lodgment; introduction offollow-on forces; and termination andtransition. The number and types of phasesfor forcible entry operations, as with alloperations, may vary; however, five will bediscussed in this publication. The exampleassumes that a combination of forcible entrytechniques will be used to obtain a lodgmentas the initial operation of a larger campaign.These phases are normally sequential but mayoverlap. During planning, commanders mustestablish conditions for transitioning fromone phase to another. The commanderadjusts the phases to exploit opportunitiespresented by the enemy or to react tounforeseen situations.

a. Phase I: Preparation and Deployment

• An accurate TPFDL is developed upthrough level 4 detail.

• The JFC assigns complementary and/ordeconflicted missions to components.

• Areas of operations are designated.

• Command, supported, and/or supportingrelationships are delineated.

• The intelligence effort for componentsis prioritized.

• Initial air apportionment decisions aremade.

• Targeting guidance is disseminated.

• Desired arrival sequence of forces in theoperational area is matched to availabletransportation and validated with theTPFDD.

• Integration and/or synchronization withother (if any) operations is completed.

• Deception operations are executed.

• Advance force operations (e.g.,countermine, air superiority, battlespacepreparation and isolation) are executed.

• Sustainment activities and/orrequirements are planned.

b. Phase II: Assault

• Air apportionment is reassessed andrevised.

• H-Hour synchronization is completedamong components.

• Modifications to existing plans andbranches and/or sequels are deconflicted.

• AOs and AOAs are activated.

• Fire support coordination and airspacecontrol measures are activated.

• Pre H-Hour activities and/or staging arecompleted.

• Supported and supporting relationshipsamong components are modified.

c. Phase III: Stabilization of theLodgment

• Terrain management issues areaddressed.

• Component boundaries are adjusted orAOs expanded.

• Airspace management is coordinated.

• TPFDL flow is managed.

V-3

Integration and/or Synchronization

d. Phase IV: Introduction of Follow-onForces

• Force sequencing is adjustedcontinuously.

• Battle handover is completed.

• Reconstitution and/or redeployment ofassault forces (e.g., embark the LF for asubsequent mission) is completed.

• Rear area operations issues are addressed.

• AOA is dissolved.

e. Phase V: Termination and Transition

• Joint force and/or component missionsand command relationships arereorganized.

• Priorities of support are shifted.

3. Termination and Transitionof Forcible Entry Operations

The transition from a forcible entryoperation to subsequent operations ortermination must be an integral part ofpredeployment planning. The successfulforcible entry operation should terminatein one of two ways: one, attainment of thecampaign objectives (termination); or two,completion of the operational objectiveswherein a lodgment is established for follow-on combat operations (transition).

a. Achievement of CampaignObjectives. If the forcible entry operationaccomplishes the strategic objectives, then theJFC may be directed to reconstitute andredeploy the joint force either to homestation or to some other theater of operations.

b. Achievement of OperationalObjectives. In many cases, a forcible entry

operation will probably be only one phase ofa campaign or major operation. As such,the forcible entry operation establishes theconditions for follow-on operations. Theseoperations occur across the range of militaryoperations and include war and MOOTW.

See JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War, for details onMOOTW.

c. Upon achieving the campaign oroperation objectives, a period of postconflictactivities will exist. The JFC must not onlyprepare the joint force for redeployment, butmust also ensure that the objectives achievedby the forcible entry operation are sustained.Termination activities are generallycharacterized by the transfer of control tocivil or other authorities and thesubsequent redeployment of forces.Activities may include the following.

• Establishing detailed conditions fortransfer of authority to other agenciesor authorities. Teams from current andfuture headquarters, along with liaisonstaffs, should be established.

• Reorganization of the joint force andestablishment of new commandrelationships and missions forcomponents and subordinate units.

• Conducting reconstitution andredeployment operations. Joint forcecombat power will likely be depleted tosome degree as a result of the forcibleentry. The JFC may conduct reconstitutionof forces prior to redeployment,considering the time, resources, andsubsequent mission of the joint force.

4. Summary

a. Planning accomplished during thepreparation and deployment phase of a

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forcible entry operation establishes theconditions for the transition to successfulfollow-on operations. Plans mustaccommodate accelerations or delays intransitioning from a forcible entry operationto those follow-on operations deemednecessary to reach the JFC’s operationalobjectives. Ultimately, that planning andsubsequent execution determines the degreeto which US policy objectives are achieved.

b. Synchronizing military actions inpurpose, space, and time to achieve decisive

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, USSouthern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple,simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. Byparachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen MilitaryAirfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and tolaunch immediate assaults against the PDF. The JTF commander synchronizedthe forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtuallyall capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategicallydeployed at staggered times from continental United States bases, some inC-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formationexperienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — itsoperations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted forassault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possiblecompromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct actionteams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets. At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and airelements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of themin the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint forcecommanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, theJTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealthaircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets. The forcible entryoperations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attacks against enemycommand and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzedenemy decisionmaking. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours, andcasualties were minimal. It was a classic coup de main.

VARIOUS SOURCES

results is the essence of operational art. Thebeginning forcible entry actions of OperationJUST CAUSE provide a case study of asynchronized operation that achievedsynergistic effects.

c. The JFC use of a similar strategy hassignificant potential with regard tosynchronizing the concept of operations.Regardless of the strategies or techniquesused, the goal of synchronization remains thesame: to achieve the joint force synergy thatwill result in operational success.

APPENDIX AAMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

A-1

1. Purpose

This appendix provides an overview ofamphibious operations. For detailedinformation, see JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine forAmphibious Operations.

2. Amphibious Operations

Many forcible entry operations involve theuse of an amphibious assault. JP 3-02, JointDoctrine for Amphibious Operations, definesan amphibious operation as “a militaryoperation launched from the sea by an AF,embarked in ships or craft with the primarypurpose of introducing an LF ashore toaccomplish the assigned mission.” Theessential usefulness of an amphibiousoperation stems from its mobility, flexibilityin task organization, ability to rapidly buildup combat power ashore, and sustainability.Amphibious operations can exploit theelement of surprise and capitalize on enemyweakness by projecting combat power at themost advantageous location and time. As withother types of forcible entry operations, thethreat of amphibious operations can induceenemies to divert forces, establish or reinforcedefensive positions, divert major resources,or disperse forces.

a. Types of Amphibious Operations.There are five major types of amphibiousoperations; each has the potential to contributeto joint operations, from MOOTW to large-scale amphibious assaults in a major theaterwar. The five types are amphibious assault,amphibious raid, amphibious demonstration,amphibious withdrawal, and other operations.Amphibious assault is the principal type ofamphibious operation employed in forcibleentry operations. Amphibious assaultestablishes a force on a hostile or potentiallyhostile shore. Amphibious raids and

amphibious demonstrations may be used tosupport an assault. Raids are swift incursionsinto enemy territory from the sea, followedby a planned withdrawal. Demonstrations areconducted to deceive the enemy by a show offorce that deludes the enemy into believingthat an amphibious assault is about to beconducted. Amphibious withdrawal involvesthe extraction of forces by sea from a hostileor potentially hostile area. Other operationsthat AFs are especially suited to perform arenoncombatant evacuation operations andhumanitarian assistance.

b. Characteristics. An amphibiouslanding normally requires extensive air andfire support and the integrated efforts of land,sea, air, space, and special operations forces.As a result, joint training and extensiverehearsals are required. An amphibiousoperation is executed within a clearly definedoperational area, either an AOA or an AO witha HIDACZ. This operational area includesland surfaces, water surfaces and subsurfaces,and the airspace above them.

c. Amphibious Force Composition. AnAF is composed of an ATF and an LF togetherwith other forces that are trained, organized,and equipped for amphibious operations.

• An ATF is defined as a Navy taskorganization formed to conductamphibious operations.

• An LF is defined as a Marine Corps orArmy task organization formed toconduct amphibious operations.

3. Organization and Command

a. Establishing Authority. Theestablishing authority is the JFC, Servicecomponent commander, or functional

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component commander delegated overallresponsibility for the operation. Theestablishing authority is responsible forestablishing communications channels withassigned forces to facilitate planning prior toissuance of the order initiating the amphibiousoperation, and for coordinating requirementswhich cannot be met from within the AF, suchas additional forces, shipping, or intelligence.The command relationship establishedbetween the CATF and CLF is an importantdecision. The type of relationship chosen bythe establishing authority of the amphibiousoperation should be based on the mission,nature and duration of the operation, forcecapabilities, C2 capabilities, andrecommendations from subordinatecommanders. Command authority options aredescribed in JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine forAmphibious Operations.

b. Principles of AmphibiousOrganization. Considerations that governtask organization of forces for any combatoperation apply to amphibious operations.However, the organization for execution ofthe amphibious operation reflects complexinterrelationships at every level among theelements of the LF, naval forces, SOF, andparticipating Air Force forces. Theseinterrelationships dictate that special emphasisbe given to task grouping and economy.

• Task Grouping. After the mission isanalyzed and necessary forces areallocated, they are assigned to task groupsaccording to their respective functions insupport of the amphibious operation.

• Economy. Amphibious operations makeextensive demands on shipping. Limitedavailability of these assets requires thatthe landing force be composed of onlythose units necessary to accomplish themission. There must, however, be abalance between resource constraints andthe decisive force necessary to

successfully conduct a forcible entryoperation.

• Chains of Command. The JFC, orestablishing authority, has the authorityto organize forces to best accomplish theassigned mission based on the conceptof operations. The JFC ensures unity ofeffort in achieving the amphibiousobjectives by establishing unity ofcommand over AFs. Accordingly, heor she will choose a commandrelationship between the CATF and CLFappropriate to the mission. Elements ofthe AF (ATF and LF) may be embarkedon the same platforms, but responsibleto different, or parallel, chains ofcommand. Such parallel chains createspecial requirements for coordination.The CATF is a Navy officer responsiblefor the Navy task organization formedto conduct amphibious operations. TheCLF is a Marine Corps or Army officerresponsible for the Marine and/or Armytask organization formed to conductamphibious operations.

c. Navy Forces. The Navy component ofthe AF, that may consist of US andmultinational forces, is organized accordingto the separate functional tasks required tomeet the operational requirements. The keyoperational characteristics upon which theNavy organization is based includemovement, force protection, power projection,functional control, NSFS, surveillance,deception, logistics, and SO. Each task groupmay be organized separately, or several maybe combined based upon operationalrequirements.

d. Landing Forces

• Landing Force. The LF component ofthe AF is composed of Marine Corps,Army, or both forces. It consists ofcommand, combat, combat support, and

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Amphibious Operations

combat service support forces. It is task-organized to conduct ship-to-shoremovement of personnel and materiel byair and surface. It also provides andcontrols supporting fires, air support, andlogistics to landing force units during theassault phase of an amphibious operation.Both the MPF and Army PREPO afloatprograms are ideally suited to supportPhase IV (Introduction of Follow-onForces) of a forcible entry operation.

• Marine Air-Ground Task Force. AMAGTF is comprised of a commandelement, a ground combat element, anaviation combat element, and a combatservice support element (CSSE). (Armyand multinational forces are composedof elements similar to the MAGTF whenconducting amphibious assaultoperations. However, the exactcomposition of their forces will dependon the situation and the needs of the JFC.)The MAGTF will vary in size dependingon the requirements of the AF mission.Notional task organizations include theMarine expeditionary force (MEF),Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB),and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).

See JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, forexpanded task organization andcapabilities.

•• MEF. The MEF may range in sizefrom less than one full division to severaldivisions and an aircraft wing or wings.A division-sized MEF consists of onedivision and one wing; the groundcombat element includes nine infantrybattalions in three regiments. Normally,a force of this size would include oneartillery regiment, a tank battalion, anassault amphibious battalion, a lightarmored reconnaissance battalion, acombat engineer battalion, and areconnaissance battalion. The CSSE can

provide supplies, maintenance,engineering, motor transport, andmedical and dental care for 60 days.

•• MEB. The MEB is a mid-sizedMAGTF that provides combatantcommanders with an extremely flexibleexpeditionary force. Commanded by ageneral officer, a MEB is normally builtaround a ground combat element of areinforced infantry regiment. Theaviation combat element consists of aMarine aircraft group with fixed- androtary-wing squadrons. The CSSE isorganized to provide the full spectrumof combat service support to the MEB.As an expeditionary force, the MEB iscapable of rapid deployment andemployment via amphibious shippingand strategic airlift and sealift, marryingwith maritime or geographical pre-positioning force assets or anycombination thereof. The MEB is acomplete fighting force with a self-sustainment capability of 30 days. It canfunction alone, as a logical follow-onforce to the MEU, a part of the JTF, oras the lead element of a MEF.

•• MEU. The MEU is comprised of areinforced infantry battalion and areinforced aircraft squadron. Usuallysea-based, the MEU is the mostresponsive MAGTF. It normally isprepared to operate with 15 days ofammunition, supplies, and medicalsupport. It can be reinforced orresupplied rapidly. Usually embarkedaboard three to five Navy amphibiousships, the MEU may also be airlifted.Two to three MEUs usually are deployedforward or standing ready for immediatemovement to forward combat areas orpeacetime crisis points.

• Maritime Pre-positioning Force andArmy Afloat Pre-positioning. See

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Chapter III, “Operations,” for adiscussion of the MPF and ArmyPREPO afloat programs.

e. Air Force Forces

• When Air Force forces are madeavailable to the AF by the JFC, they willnormally be task-organized under thecommand of an Air Force officer. In thatevent, the CATF normally exercisesTACON of these Air Force forces.

• When the Air Forces for the amphibiousoperation are provided by the USAFcomponent of the joint force and assignedto the AF, the Air Force componentcommander should provide a USAFliaison officer to advise the CATF andassist the ATF tactical air officerconcerning the total air effort in theAOA. At the CATF’s discretion (basedon criteria such as ability to perform thefunction and the preponderance ofaviation assets), that officer willnormally be assigned as the ATF tacticalair officer. In addition, the Air Forcecomponent commander should providestaff officers to integrate into CATF andtactical air officer staffs. When controlof air operations is passed ashore, thoseAir Force officers will normally assumethe same responsibilities for the CLF orthe appropriate commander ashore, asthey had for the CATF.

f. Advance Force. The advance forceprecedes the main AF to begin shaping andgathering information on the operational area.Forward-deployed amphibious forcesnormally have an embarked naval specialwarfare task unit, consisting of a sea-air-landplatoon, a special boat unit detachment, andUS Marine Corps reconnaissance units. Theseforces may conduct reconnaissance,hydrographic surveys, and direct actionmissions which will provide criticalinformation to the CATF and CLF.

g. Planning Relationships. Operationalplanning for an amphibious operation isdesigned to ensure that both ATF and LFconsiderations are adequately factored into theoperational decision. The CATF and CLFare responsible for preparation of the overallplan and are co-equal in planning matters.

4. Termination of theAmphibious Operations

When the amphibious mission has beencompleted, the CATF and CLF willrecommend termination of the amphibiousoperation and, if required, thedisestablishment of the AOA or AO, asappropriate. The JFC, or other designatedsuperior commander, provides positiveinstructions governing termination of theoperation and, if possible, commandarrangements, force dispositions, andoperations to be in effect followingtermination of the amphibious operation.

5. Transition

As conditions permit, the buildup of forcesand supplies for follow-on operations isconducted as specified in the initiatingdirective. The termination of the amphibiousoperation depends on the accomplishment ofthe AF mission. The establishment of the LFashore may be specified as one of theconditions. When the AF mission is toestablish a lodgment, the beachhead must besecure and sufficient forces must beestablished ashore to ensure continuouslandings to support subsequent operations.C4I and supporting arms coordinationfacilities must be established ashore, and theCLF must be ready to assume responsibilityfor subsequent operations. When follow-onoperations are to be conducted by forces otherthan the LF, these forces must be in positionand ready to initiate operations as directed.

APPENDIX BAIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

B-1

1. Introduction

Joint airborne and air assault operationsinvolve the air movement and delivery ofspecially trained combat forces and logisticsupport into an objective area to execute amission. Airborne and air assault forcesprovide the commander with the uniqueability to quickly respond on short notice andmass rapidly on critical targets. Airborneoperations are executed by specially trainedforces and can be launched at a considerabledistance away from the target area with suchspeed as to cause tactical or operationalsurprise and prevent effective action by theenemy. Airborne forces can secure and/ordestroy critical installations, facilities orterrain; reinforce US and multinational forces;and conduct a show of force or attack anadversary in isolated areas. Air assaultoperations increase mobility and freedom ofaction by providing operational and tacticalmobility for both the offense and defense. Airoperations enable forces to reduce time andspace limitations normally encountered inmovement of assault forces by land, crossterrain obstacles, bypass hostile areas, andattack, destroy, and/or seize objectives deepin enemy territory. Each component cansignificantly contribute to the successfulexecution of airborne and air assaultoperations.

2. Concept of Airborne and AirAssault Operations

a. Airborne and air assault forces arecapable of conducting operations in supportof strategic, operational and tacticalobjectives. They land intact with weapons,ammunition and other combat equipment andare prepared for combat immediately. Whenproperly employed, airborne forcesaggressively seize and maintain the initiative

until follow-on forces are committed to thefight. An airborne operation usuallyterminates upon seizure of the objective,linkup with other ground forces, or extraction.Air assault operations are deliberate, preciselyplanned, and vigorously executed to strikeover extended distances and attack the enemy.Alerting rapid deployment forces foremployment or moving naval expeditionaryforces toward the area of the crisis is a showof force that is politically significant in astrategic context.

b. Airborne and air assault forces sharemany of the same capabilities. They canextend the battlefield, move, and rapidlyconcentrate combat power quickly like noother available land forces. Airborne and airassault forces also share the same limitations.They are dependent on the availability ofairlift assets, fire support, and combat servicesupport resources; they are highly vulnerableto enemy attack by ground and air forces whileen route to the LZ and/or DZ; and are equallyassailable when operating in open terrainagainst an armored threat. Environmentalconditions and adverse weather can alsoimpact performance. There are four phasesof airborne operations: marshalling, airmovement, landing, and ground tacticalphases. Air assault operations have fivephases: staging, loading, air movement,landing, and ground tactical phases.

3. Planning Airborne and AirAssault Operations

a. From the time an operation isannounced until it is completed or terminated,echelons of participating componentscoordinate continuously. The commander,joint task force initiates airborne and/or airassault operations with a planning directiveto participating units. The directive is

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distributed through normal commandchannels and pertinent information is issuedto subordinate units. After receipt of adirective and preparation of initial estimatesand studies, the commanders, staffs, andrepresentatives of supporting forces meet ina joint conference to develop a concept ofoperations. The concept of operations formsthe basis for the preparation of thecommander’s planning directive anddevelopment of OPLANs and operationorders, including a list of forces in support, aschedule of events, and stated conditionsunder which the operation will begin, bedelayed, altered, or terminated.

b. Airborne and air assault commandersbegin planning operations with a visualizationof the ground tactical plan and work througha reverse-planning sequence. Planning forairborne and air assault operations is asdetailed as time permits. For airborneoperations, this sequence includes thedevelopment of a ground tactical plan, landingplan, air movement plan and marshalling plan.For air assault operations the sequence is thesame, but instead of a marshalling plan,loading and staging plans are developed.Direct liaison and coordination between thelogistic support agencies of the participatingcomponents and other supporting forces occurduring the preliminary planning stages. Forairborne and air assault operations,intelligence systems assist in accomplishingstrategic objectives, including all factorswhich will impact the arrival of forces intothe objective area, establishment of airheadsand lodgments, and linkup of forces inpreparation for follow-on operations. Alsoincluded in the planning process are thefollowing: counterair, informationoperations, logistics, joint fire support, forceprotection, special operations, engineersupport, public affairs, and military police.When developing the OPLAN, the JFCanticipates that assault forces may face

natural and manmade obstacles that areintended to restrict their movement so thatthe enemy can mass its forces and repel theassault. Combat engineers facilitate insertionof assault forces and prepare the onwardmovement to the objective by clearingbreaches, roads, and airfields of mines andobstacles.

4. Command and Control

a. The JFC may initiate joint airborne and/or air assault operations in support of strategicand/or operational objectives. The complexityof airborne and air assault operations and theirvulnerability require an exceptional degree ofunity of effort and operational coherence. Theinitiating directive is an order to the airborneand/or air assault commander to conduct theoperation. It is issued by the JFC delegatedoverall authority for the operation. JFCsestablish command relationships and assignauthority to subordinates based on theoperational situation, the complexity of themission, and the degree of control needed toensure that strategic intent is satisfied.

b. Airspace C2, established boundaries,ability to communicate, and the effectiveemployment of intelligence and EW are keyelements in facilitating effective C2 ofairborne and air assault operations. Theairborne force commander establishes astandard C2 system by defining the functionsand responsibilities of key personnel, ensuringthat all preliminary operational planning isaccomplished, and publishing OPLANs andorders. Air assault operations featureextended distances and speed of execution.To work swiftly under pressure, efforts mustbe integrated and synchronized. Effectiveliaison between operational elements of anairborne and/or air assault operation and withhigher authorities will facilitate mutualunderstanding, unity of purpose, and unity ofaction.

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Airborne and Air Assault Operations

5. Sustainment of Airborne andAir Assault Forces

Minimum CSSEs accompany airborneforces into the airhead or lodgment. Theyperform most essential services in themarshalling area or they defer them. Combatservice support is normally divided into threeechelons during deployment: assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of theseforces is helped by distribution of supplies,resupply by air including planned resupply,immediate airdrop resupply, and emergencyairdrop resupply requests; maintenance duringairborne operations; transportation; and healthservices support. The air assault force issupported by both organic and externalelements organized to push supplies, materiel,fuel, and ammunition forward by air. Theexact organization and disposition of CSSEsis a function of the air assault force’s missionand anticipated follow-on operations.

6. Airborne Combat Operations

a. Airborne forces are committed to combatby parachute assault, airland operations, or bya combination of these two methods.Normally, airborne operations are initiated byparachute assault. Parachute assault permitsdelivery of combined arms teams into theairhead in less time than airland operationsrequire. Once the assault phase is initiated, itis followed by one or more of the following:a defensive phase; an offensive phase; or anextraction phase.

b. The initial assault stresses thecoordinated action of small units to seizeinitial objectives before the advantage ofsurprise has worn off. After the initial assaultlandings accomplish the initial groundmissions, commanders must organize theairhead line. Airborne forces defend toprotect and retain areas or installations seized

during the assault phase of the operation.Because an airborne assault is most oftenconducted in the enemy rear, an all-arounddefense is required. Units can be airlandedon terrain under the control of friendly forcesnear the line of contact or on secured locationsin the enemy’s rear; however, it takes time toland a sizable force and a secured LZ isnecessary. Even when multiple LZs areemployed, it takes longer to mass forces inthe airhead during airland operations thanduring parachute operations. Subsequentoperations can include continued defense ofthe airhead, linkup, passage of lines, relief,withdrawal, or offensive operations, toinclude exploitation or further airborne and/or air assaults.

7. Air Assault CombatOperations

Whether performed from the sea or froman ISB on land, aviation and combined armsprovides the JFC with a remarkably agilefighting force capable of conducting bothoffensive and defensive operations. The airassault attack (hasty or deliberate) is the basictype of offensive operation conducted by airassault forces. It is the integration of combat,combat support, and CSSEs during themovement into or out of an objective area.Other types of offensive strategies includeexploitation, pursuit, secure and defend,reconnaissance in force, and raids. Defenseis a coordinated effort by a force to defeat anattacker and prevent the enemy fromachieving its objectives. An air assault forcescreening force provides early warning overan extended frontage. Guard force missions,covering force missions, reinforcement ofcommitted units, linkup operations, rivercrossing operations, rear operations, limitedvisibility operations, and ship-to-shoreoperations must all be considered during airassault operations.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CREFERENCES

C-1

The development of JP 3-18 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

2. CJCSI 6110.01, CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets.

3. CJCS Memorandum 3122.02, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment DataDevelopment and Deployment Execution.

4. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

5. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the Unites States.

6. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System.

7. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

8. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

9. JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

10. JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting.

11. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlespace.

12. JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

13. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

14. JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

15. JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

16. JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.

17. JP 3-02.2, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation.

18. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.

19. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

20. JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.

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21. JP 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.

22. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

23. JP 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant EvacuationOperations.

24. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

25. JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.

26. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

27. JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.

28. JP 3-17, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations.

29. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

30. JP 3-35, Doctrine for Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

31. JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.

32. JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

33. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

34. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

35. JP 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Supportfor Joint Operations.

36. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

37. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

38. JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs (under development).

39. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

40. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

41. JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.

42. JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore(JLOTS).

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References

43. JP 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, OnwardMovement, and Integration.

44. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

45. JP 4-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Supportin Joint Operations.

46. JP 4-02.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in JointOperations.

47. JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

48. JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

49. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

50. JP 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning.

51. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

52. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.

53. FM 100-27/AFM 2-50-USA/USAF, Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical AirliftOperations.

54. FM 100-103-1/MCRP 3-25D/NDC TACNOTE 3-52/ACCP 50-38/USAFEP 50-38/PACAFP 50-38, ICAC2: Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Commandand Control.

55. FM100-103-2/MCWP 3-25.2/NDC TACNOTE 3-56.2/ACCP 50-54/PACAF 50-54/USAFEP 50-54, The Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS).

56. FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger).

57. FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault).

58. FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Operations.

59. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations, Techniques, and Procedures.

60. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.

61. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

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62. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

63. FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception.

64. FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations.

65. FM 90-26, Airborne Operations.

66. FM 100-5, Operations.

67. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

68. NAP 22-2/FMFM 1-7, Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations.

69. MCDP 1, Warfighting.

70. MCDP 1-1, Campaigning.

71. MCDP 1-3, Tactics.

72. MCDP 3-42.1, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations.

73. MCDP 6, Command and Control.

74. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volume One and Volume Two.

75. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine.

76. AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.

77. AFSC Publication 2, Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces.

78. Coyne, James P., “Plan of Attack,” Air Force Magazine, April 1992, pp. 42-46.

79. DePuy, William E., “Concepts of Operation,” Army, August 1988, pp. 27-40.

80. Donnelly, Thomas, Roth, Margaret, and Baker, Caleb, Operation Just Cause: The Stormingof Panama, (New York: Lexington), 1991, page 100.

81. Luti, William J., “Voices From the Central Blue,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,December 1992, pp 33-37.

82. Maloney, David P., Planning for Victory: Joint Synchronization.

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor forthis publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: HQDA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and JointForce Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the jointpublication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outsidethe combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified jointpublication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through thelocal embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

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d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderAAGS Army air-ground systemAAW antiair warfareABCCC airborne battlefield command and control centerACA airspace control authorityACO airspace control orderADC air defense commanderADZ amphibious defense zoneAF amphibious forceAO area of operationsAOA amphibious objective areaAPOD aerial port of debarkationATF amphibious task force

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA civil affairsCAF commander, airborne/air assault forceCAP crisis action planningCATF commander, amphibious task forceCI counterintelligenceCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCLF commander, landing forceCMO civil-military operationsCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)CONUS continental United StatesCSSE combat service support element

DZ drop zone

EW electronic warfare

FHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFSCM fire support coordinating measure

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zoneHIMAD high to medium altitude air defense

IMINT imagery intelligenceIO information operationsISB intermediate staging base

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-18

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staffJ-6 command, control, communications, and computer

systems directorate of a joint staffJCSE Joint Communications Support ElementJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commanderJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJISE joint intelligence support elementJLOTS joint logistics over-the-shoreJP joint publicationJSOA joint special operations areaJSOTF joint special operations task forceJTF joint task forceJTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

LF landing forceLOA lodgment operational areaLOC line of communicationsLZ landing zone

MACCS Marine Corps Air Command and Control SystemMAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMCM mine countermeasureMEB Marine expeditionary brigadeMEF Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, troops and support

available, time availableMEU Marine expeditionary unitMHE materials handling equipmentMOOTW military operations other than warMPF maritime pre-positioning force

NCA National Command AuthoritiesNSFS naval surface fire supportNTACS Navy tactical air control system

OPCON operational controlOPLAN operation planOPSEC operations security

PA public affairsPIR priority intelligence requirementsPREPO pre-positioned force, equipment, or suppliesPSYOP psychological operations

RADC regional air defense commanderROE rules of engagement

GL-3

Glossary

SADC sector air defense commanderSATCOM satellite communicationsSECOMP secure en route communications packageSLOC sea line of communicationsSO special operationsSOC special operations commandSOF special operations forcesSPOD seaport of debarkationSPOE seaport of embarkation

TACC tactical air control centerTACON tactical controlTACS Theater Air Control SystemTACSAT tactical satelliteTAOC tactical air operations centerTPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTPFDL time-phased force and deployment list

UHF ultra high frequencyUSAF United States Air ForceUSCINCSOC Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations

CommandUW unconventional warfare

air control operations. The employment ofair forces, supported by ground and navalforces, as appropriate, to achieve militaryobjectives in vital air space areas. Suchoperations include destruction of enemy airand surface-to-air forces, interdiction ofenemy air operations, protection of vitalair lines of communication, and theestablishment of local military superiorityin areas of air operations. (This term andits definition modify the term “aerospacecontrol operations” and its definition andis approved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

air assault. The movement of friendly assaultforces (combat, combat support, andcombat service support) by rotary-wingaircraft to engage and destroy enemy forcesor to seize and hold key terrain. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

air assault force. A force composedprimarily of ground and rotary-wing airunits organized, equipped, and trained forair assault operations. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

air assault operation. An operation in whichassault forces (combat, combat support, andcombat service support), using the mobilityof rotary-wing assets and the totalintegration of available firepower,maneuver under the control of a ground orair maneuver commander to engage enemyforces or to seize and hold key terrain.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

airborne operation. An operation involvingthe air movement into an objective area ofcombat forces and their logistic support forexecution of a tactical, operational, or

strategic mission. The means employedmay be any combination of airborne units,air transportable units, and types oftransport aircraft, depending on the missionand the overall situation. ( JP 1-02)

airhead. 1. A designated area in a hostile orthreatened territory which, when seized andheld, ensures the continuous air landing oftroops and materiel and provides themaneuver space necessary for projectedoperations. Normally it is the area seizedin the assault phase of an airborne operation.2. A designated location in an area ofoperations used as a base for supply andevacuation by air. (JP 1-02)

airhead line. A line denoting the limits ofthe objective area for an airborne assault.The airhead line is bounded by assaultobjectives that are operationally located toensure that enemy fires cannot be broughtto bear on the main objective and forfriendly forces to conduct defensiveoperations in depth. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

airspace control area. Airspace that islaterally defined by the boundaries of theoperational area. The airspace control areamay be subdivided into airspace controlsectors. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commanderdesignated to assume overall responsibilityfor the operation of the airspace controlsystem in the airspace control area. Alsocalled ACA. (JP 1-02)

amphibious force. An amphibious task forceand a landing force together with otherforces that are trained, organized, andequipped for amphibious operations. Alsocalled AF. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definition

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4 JP 3-18

and are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

amphibious objective area. A geographicalarea, delineated in the order initiating theamphibious operation, for purposes ofcommand and control, within which islocated the objective(s) to be secured bythe amphibious force. This area must be ofsufficient size to ensure accomplishment ofthe amphibious force’s mission and mustprovide sufficient area for conductingnecessary sea, air, and land operations.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

amphibious operation. A military operationlaunched from the sea by an amphibiousforce, embarked in ships or craft with theprimary purpose of introducing a landingforce ashore to accomplish the assignedmission. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

amphibious task force. A Navy taskorganization formed to conductamphibious operations that, together withthe landing force and other forces,constitutes the amphibious force. Alsocalled ATF. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces. (JP1-02)

assault phase. 1. In an amphibiousoperation, the period of time between thearrival of the major assault forces of theamphibious task force in the objective areaand the accomplishment of their mission.2. In an airborne operation, a phasebeginning with delivery by air of the assaultechelon of the force into the objective areaand extending through attack of assaultobjectives and consolidation of the initialairhead. (JP 1-02)

beachhead. A designated area on a hostileor potentially hostile shore that, whenseized and held, ensures the continuouslanding of troops and materiel, and providesmaneuver space requisite for subsequentprojected operations ashore. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or localities from which amilitary force derives its freedom of action,physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities ofa commander that establish, maintain,influence, or exploit relations betweenmilitary forces, governmental andnongovernmental civilian organizations andauthorities, and the civilian populace in afriendly, neutral, or hostile operational areain order to facilitate military operations, toconsolidate and achieve operational USobjectives. Civil-military operations mayinclude performance by military forces ofactivities and functions normally theresponsibility of the local, regional, ornational government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. Civil-military operations maybe performed by designated civil affairs, byother military forces, or by a combinationof civil affairs and other forces. Also calledCMO. (JP 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-18

combat assessment. The determination ofthe overall effectiveness of forceemployment during military operations.Combat assessment is composed of threemajor components: (a) battle damageassessment; (b) munitions effectsassessment; and (c) reattackrecommendation. The objective of combatassessment is to identify recommendationsfor the course of military operations. TheJ-3 (operations directorate) is normally thesingle point of contact for combatassessment at the joint force level, assistedby the joint force J-2 (intelligencedirectorate). Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

combined arms team. The full integrationand application of two or more arms orelements of one Military Service into anoperation. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

commander, amphibious task force. Navyofficer designated in the order initiating anamphibious operation to command theamphibious task force. Also called CATF.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

commander, landing force. The officerdesignated in the order initiating anamphibious operation to command thelanding force. Also called CLF. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

connectivity. The ability to exchangeinformation by electronic means. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

coup de main. An offensive operation thatcapitalizes on surprise and simultaneousexecution of supporting operations to

achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP1-02)

decisive point. A geographic place, specifickey event, or enabling system that allowscommanders to gain a marked advantageover an enemy and greatly influence theoutcome of an attack. (This term anddefinition are provided for information andare proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

directive. 1. A military communication inwhich policy is established or a specificaction is ordered. 2. A plan issued with aview to putting it into effect when sodirected, or in the event that a statedcontingency arises. 3. Broadly speaking,any communication which initiates orgoverns action, conduct, or procedure. (JP1-02)

end state. The set of required conditions thatdefines achievement of the commander’sobjectives. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethalweapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support. Fires that directly support land,maritime, amphibious, and specialoperation forces to engage enemy forces,combat formations, and facilities in pursuitof tactical and operational objectives. Seealso fires. (JP 1-02)

force multiplier. A capability that, whenadded to and employed by a combat force,significantly increases the combat potentialof that force and thus enhances theprobability of successful missionaccomplishment. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Security program designedto protect Service members, civilian

GL-7

Glossary

employees, family members, facilities, andequipment, in all locations and situations,accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combatingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services, andsupported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (JP 1-02)

forcible entry. Seizing and holding of amilitary lodgment in the face of armedopposition. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

initiating directive. An order to asubordinate commander to conductmilitary operations as directed. It is issuedby the unified commander, subunifiedcommander, Service componentcommander, or joint force commanderdelegated overall responsibility for theoperation. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace.An analytical methodology employed toreduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,environment, and terrain for all types ofoperations. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace builds an extensive data basefor each potential area in which a unit maybe required to operate. The data base isthen analyzed in detail to determine theimpact of the enemy, environment, andterrain on operations and presents it ingraphic form. Intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace is a continuing process.Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

intermediate staging base. A temporarylocation used to stage forces prior toinserting the forces into the host nation.Also called ISB. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires produced during theemployment of forces from two or morecomponents in coordinated action towarda common objective. See also fires. (JP1-02)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist land,maritime, amphibious, and specialoperations forces to move, maneuver, andcontrol territory, populations, and keywaters. See also fire support; joint fires. (JP1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem. A continuously evolving systemthat is being developed through theintegration and enhancement of earlierplanning and execution systems: JointOperation Planning System and JointDeployment System. It provides thefoundation for conventional command andcontrol by national- and theater-levelcommanders and their staffs. It is designedto satisfy their information needs in theconduct of joint planning and operations.Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) includes joint operationplanning policies, procedures, and reportingstructures supported by communicationsand automated data processing systems.JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and executemobilization, deployment, employment,and sustainment activities associated withjoint operations. Also called JOPES. Seealso joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-18

joint operations area. An area of land, sea,and airspace, defined by a geographiccombatant commander or subordinateunified commander, in which a joint forcecommander (normally a joint task forcecommander) conducts military operationsto accomplish a specific mission. Jointoperations areas are particularly usefulwhen operations are limited in scope andgeographic area or when operations are tobe conducted on the boundaries betweentheaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restrictedarea of land, sea, and airspace assigned bya joint force commander to the commanderof a joint special operations force to conductspecial operations activities. Thecommander of joint special operationsforces may further assign a specific area orsector within the joint special operationsarea to a subordinate commander formission execution. The scope and durationof the special operations forces’ mission,friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence thenumber, composition, and sequencing ofspecial operations forces deployed into ajoint special operations area. It may belimited in size to accommodate a discretedirect action mission or may be extensiveenough to allow a continuing broad rangeof unconventional warfare operations. Alsocalled JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A groupformed by the joint force commander toaccomplish broad targeting oversightfunctions that may include but are notlimited to coordinating targetinginformation, providing targeting guidanceand priorities, and preparing and/or refiningjoint target lists. The board is normallycomprised of representatives from the jointforce staff, all components, and if required,component subordinate units. Also calledJTCB. (JP 1-02)

land control operations. The employmentof ground forces, supported by naval andair forces (as appropriate), to achievemilitary objectives in vital land areas. Suchoperations include destruction of opposingground forces, securing key terrain,protection of vital land lines ofcommunications, and establishment of localmilitary superiority in areas of landoperations. (JP 1-02)

landing force. A Marine Corps or Armytask organization formed to conductamphibious operations that, together withthe amphibious task force and other forces,constitute the amphibious force. Alsocalled LF. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

lodgment. A designated area in a hostile orpotentially hostile territory that, whenseized and held, makes the continuouslanding of troops and materiel possible andprovides maneuver space for subsequentoperations. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

Marine air-ground task force. The MarineCorps principal organization for allmissions across the range of militaryoperations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commandercapable of responding rapidly to acontingency anywhere in the world. Thetypes of forces in the Marine air-ground taskforce (MAGTF) are functionally groupedinto four core elements: a commandelement, an aviation combat element, aground combat element, and a combatservice support element. The four coreelements are categories of forces, notformal commands. The basic structure ofthe Marine air-ground task force nevervaries, though the number, size, and type

GL-9

Glossary

of Marine Corps units comprising each ofits four elements will always be missiondependent. The flexibility of theorganizational structure allows for one ormore subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned.Also called MAGTF. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary brigade. A Marineair-ground task force that is constructedaround a reinforced infantry regiment, acomposite Marine aircraft group, and abrigade service support group. The Marineexpeditionary brigade (MEB), commandedby a general officer, is task-organized tomeet the requirements of a specificsituation. It can function as part of a jointtask force, as the lead echelon of the Marineexpeditionary force (MEF), or alone. Itvaries in size and composition, and is largerthan a Marine expeditionary unit butsmaller than a MEF. The MEB is capableof conducting missions across the fullrange of military operations. Also calledMEB. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

Marine expeditionary force. The largestMarine air-ground task force and theMarine Corps principal warfightingorganization, particularly for larger crisesor contingencies. It is task-organizedaround a permanent command element andnormally contains one or more Marinedivisions, Marine aircraft wings, andMarine force service support groups. TheMarine expeditionary force is capable ofmissions across the range of militaryoperations, including amphibious assaultand sustained operations ashore in anyenvironment. It can operate from a sea base,a land base, or both. Also called MEF. (JP1-02)

Marine expeditionary unit. A Marine air-ground task force that is constructedaround an infantry battalion reinforced, a

helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support element.It normally fulfills Marine Corps forwardsea-based deployment requirements. TheMarine expeditionary unit provides animmediate reaction capability for crisisresponse and is capable of limited combatoperations. Also called MEU. (JP 1-02)

marshalling. 1. The process by which unitsparticipating in an amphibious or airborneoperation group together or assemble whenfeasible or move to temporary camps in thevicinity of embarkation points, completepreparations for combat, or prepare forloading. 2. The process of assembling,holding, and organizing supplies and/orequipment, especially vehicles oftransportation, for onward movement. (JP1-02)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational control normallyprovides full authority to organizecommands and forces and to employ thoseforces as the commander in operational

GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-18

control considers necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controldoes not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training. Alsocalled OPCON. (JP 1-02)

planning directive. In amphibiousoperations, the plan issued by thedesignated commander, following receiptof the order initiating the amphibiousoperation, to ensure that the planningprocess and interdependent plansdeveloped by the amphibious force will becoordinated, completed in the timeallowed, and important aspects notoverlooked. (This term and definition areprovided for information and are proposedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02by JP 3-02.)

seize. To employ combat forces to occupyphysically and to control a designated area.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne —A general locality between the mountingarea and the objective of an amphibious orairborne expedition, through which theexpedition or parts thereof pass aftermounting, for refueling, regrouping ofships, and/or exercise, inspection, andredistribution of troops. 2. Othermovements — A general localityestablished for the concentration of troopunits and transient personnel betweenmovements over the lines ofcommunications. (JP 1-02)

staging base. 1. An advanced naval base forthe anchoring, fueling, and refitting oftransports and cargo ships, and forreplenishing mobile service squadrons. 2.A landing and takeoff area with minimumservicing, supply, and shelter provided for

the temporary occupancy of militaryaircraft during the course of movementfrom one location to another. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids,protects, complements, or sustains anotherforce in accordance with a directiverequiring such action. 2. A unit that helpsanother unit in battle. Aviation, artillery,or naval gunfire may be used as a supportfor infantry. 3. An element of a commandthat assists, protects, or supplies otherforces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supporting arms. Weapons and weaponssystems of all types employed to supportforces by indirect or direct fire. (JP 1-02)

supporting forces. Forces stationed in, or tobe deployed to, an area of operations toprovide support for the execution of anoperation order. Combatant command(command authority) of supporting forcesis not passed to the supported commander.(JP 1-02)

supporting plan. An operation plan preparedby a supporting commander or asubordinate commander to satisfy therequests or requirements of the supportedcommander’s plan. (JP 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement ofmilitary actions in time, space, and purposeto produce maximum relative combatpower at a decisive place and time. 2. Inthe intelligence context, application ofintelligence sources and methods in concertwith the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent in

GL-11

Glossary

operational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance appliedto a guided missile between midcourseguidance and arrival in the vicinity of thetarget. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual,or other assistance given an aircraft pilotto facilitate arrival at, operation within orover, landing upon, or departure from anair landing or airdrop facility. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.The Joint Operation Planning andExecution System database portion of anoperation plan; it contains time-phasedforce data, non-unit-related cargo andpersonnel data, and movement data for theoperation plan, including: a. In-place units;

b. Units to be deployed to support theoperation plan with a priority indicatingthe desired sequence for their arrival at theport of debarkation; c. Routing of forces tobe deployed; d. Movement data associatedwith deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnelmovements to be conducted concurrentlywith the deployment of forces; and f.Estimate of transportation requirementsthat must be fulfilled by common-user liftresources as well as those requirements thatcan be fulfilled by assigned or attachedtransportation resources. Also calledTPFDD. (JP 1-02)

vertical envelopment. A tactical maneuverin which troops, either air-dropped or air-landed, attack the rear and flanks of a force,in effect cutting off or encircling the force.(JP 1-02)

GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-18

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-18 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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Documents

Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations01).pdf · principles and doctrine concerning the command and control, planning, execution, and support of joint forcible entry operations